2025. vol. 24. No. 1

The article examines the concept of Christian eschatology, the katechon, conceived as a set of factors that keep humanity from a planetary catastrophe within the framework of the temporality of the “remaining time”. Based on the promise of Christian theology about the inevitability of the coming of the end of time, the conditions for (not) prolonging the remaining time are discussed. The introduction demonstrates the relevance of this issue and sets a general theoretical framework for the study. In the first part, the description of the temporality of “political bodies” used by E. Kantorovicz distinguishes between the time of mortals (tempus) and the eternity of angels (aevum), whose combination of urgent eternity constitutes the time of political unions. An appeal to the ancient and New Testament tradition of distinguishing between lasting time (χρόνος) and fateful moments (καιρός) allows us to interpret the time of political bodies as a chain of (not)favorable events καιρός, each of which may be the last. The second part defines the place of political bodies as a constellation of (1) territorial position on earth, (2) spatial position in the universe, (3) points of application of forces in relation to Another, and (4) places of self-identification. In the main part, the possible outcomes of the intervention of the temporality of kairos in the existence of political bodies are modeled. The de Certeau model is proposed, in which the intrusion of time in the form of concentrated wisdom (metis) into the original place leads to its improvement, as well as the Auge model, in which the opposite trend of successive deterioration of the original place occurs. The fourth part describes the temporalities of “metanoia time” and “somnambulistic time”, corresponding to the invasion of (un)favorable kairos in the Certeau and Auge models. It is concluded that the reconstructed temporalities correlate with the katechonic modalities of deterrence and transgression in the horizon of ὥρα (“time set by God”). In the final section, both models are combined in the concept of a “katechonic axis”, which both holds back the onset of disaster and pushes towards it, depending on how much people recognize a favorable kairos. In conclusion, it is concluded that the katechon as the sum of the forces of deterrence corresponds to the time of successful action in the conditions of the temporality of kairos, which contributes to the restoration of the coherence of the spatial and political-cultural order of the coexistence of political unions and humanity in general. The “remaining time” lasts exactly as long as a katechonic successful action is possible.

This article deals with plebeian republicanism, a relatively new current within the classical (civic) republican tradition. This current is characterized by a special attention to the works of Machiavelli who insisted on the productive character of conflicts between patricians and plebs in the Roman republic and hoped to institutionalize in a similar way the conflicts between the nobility and the people in the Florence of his days. Based on such an interpretation of Machiavelli the authors of plebeian republicanism propose to reestablish the institution of the tribunes of plebs, integrating it into the political systems of contemporary liberal democratic regimes, in order to thwart an oligarchization of power that plebeian republicanism sees as inexorable. Organs of such a tribunate could be established at a local, regional or federal level, or at the level of a nation state. They should rely on a wide network of people’s assemblies at a primary level, necessary for agenda-setting and deliberation. The article considers different versions of such proposed reforms and evaluates their consequences for Western political systems, as well as for Russia.

Since the concept of charisma entered into the language of social sciences and political practice, there have been significant evolutions and variations in its functioning. Max Weber himself distinguished «true» and routinized charisma, not arguing, however, that the routinization of charisma could lead to its complete disappearance as a type of domination. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 20th century, the line of thought and practice had prevailed on the desirability of the fastest possible, most preventive restraint of charisma and its political projections. However, the subsequent emergence of a whole galaxy of powerful charismatics has produced a new vector of interpretation. Ronald Glassman considers charisma as entirely «manufactured», and this is what the authors of numerous manuals on «development» of charisma and «personal magnetism» believe. At the same time, Edward Shils overturns the Weberian distinction of the «true» charisma, preferring to call it «intense» or «concentrated», and the routinized, calling it «dispersed», «attenuated». According to Shils, the initial, moreover «normal» form of charisma is the second one. This turns out to be the case because charisma is not, in fact, produced by one or other charismatic on his own, but by the center of the society that serves as the arena for its activities. There are societies — so there are centers. There are centers — so there is charisma. There is charisma — so there are charismatics. The concept keeps working. Yet in the first quarter of the 21st century, there are no outstanding political charismatics. It can be assumed that this deficit is related to the progressive loss of faith in the very existence of any politically significant transcendences, which according to Shils provide conditions for the construction of macrosocial centers. Can we imagine the conditions in which charisma and charismatic domination could be revived? Logically, yes. A part in this revival could be played by a shock of unprecedented strength and a priori unforeseeable nature, one which would make mankind believe once more in the presence of vitally «serious things» in their lives, that is, in things having «transcendent importance», «thought to be fundamental, that is, which affect the fate of human beings on earth, in life and in death» (Shils). In the absence (or in expectation) of immanent or transcendent shocks, it would be worth undertaking the task of operationalization of the known but not well-researched antithesis of «dark», «negative», and «light», «positive» charisma, primarily by studying their relative survivability and ability to regenerate.

One of the most important trends noted by researchers in the revolutionary events of recent decades is the rapid increase in the share of unarmed revolutionary uprisings and, accordingly, a decrease in the share of armed revolutionary insurgencies. The study of this trend is of great importance. This work continues previous research on unarmed revolutionary destabilization. Unlike in past studies, the authors here have significantly expanded the time range taken into account, considered together the main factors in the onset of unarmed (~ “nonviolent”) revolutionary uprisings, and significantly improved the methodology by combining these factors within one model. As a result, the study found that most variables are related to the probability of an onset of unarmed revolutions in a curvilinear manner, which explains the weak statistical relationship for some variables in the works of predecessors. The following have a non-linear relationship: the duration of the regime’s existence, economic growth, the level of democracy, the degree of corruption within the regime, urbanization, GDP per capita, the “youth bulge”, oil production, levels of discrimination. In addition, the key determinants of the onset of unarmed revolutionary uprisings were identified and ranked in order of their importance. The analysis performed allows us to assume that the onset of unarmed revolutionary uprisings is most likely in upper middle income states with young political regimes, high populations, very low (as well as very high) rates of economic growth, intermediate political regimes (partial democracy or, especially, partial autocracy), a high level of corruption of the regime (despite the fact that an extremely high level of corruption still has a rather inhibiting effect on the likelihood of an unarmed revolution onset), significant financial assistance from the United States, a fairly high level of coverage of population with modern formal education, a very long incumbent duration, a fairly high proportion of urban residents in the total population, the presence of a certain culture of protest, as well as low or no oil income. At the same time, it is confirmed that the likelihood of the outbreak of unarmed revolutions has increased markedly after the end of the Cold War due to changes in the global geopolitical situation.

This article aims to identify factors associated with the distribution of Presidential grants for environmental initiatives in 2017-23. The main objective is to check if there is a presence of political logic in supporting regional eco-initiatives. While previous studies considered environmental conflicts, as a rule, on the part of eco-activists, in this paper we focus to a greater extent on studying the strategy of the authorities. For this purpose, we propose using the concept of regional environmental politics. Assuming that the key point for the authorities is an attempt to reduce eco-protest activity, we proceed from the fact that the authorities seek to use not only the “stick”, meaning forceful strategies for combating protests, but also the “carrot”, or strategies for co-opting eco-activists. In this model, the distribution of grants to support environmental initiatives is considered as a reaction to the nature of environmental problems and conflicts. We test three main hypotheses about the logic of project support: a reaction to the deterioration of the environmental situation in the region, a reaction to the frequency of eco-protests, and a reaction to inequality, which contributes to protest sentiments in general. We rely on several sources of empirical data. First, we use data on the distribution of Presidential grants to eco-NGOs. Second, we use a large-scale database on eco-protests. Third, we use data from the National Ecological Rating of Russian regions. Fixed-effects models show that the distribution of presidential grants follows both eco-protests and the deterioration of the environmental situation in the regions. In addition, the distribution of grants is affected by low inequality, which in Russia is typically characteristic of poor regions. We also illustrate our arguments through the example of the Sverdlovsk region, which indicates a “gross” rather than individually based nature of support for environmental initiatives.

The formation model of collegially shared power (CSP) through the emergence of internal political forces parity in the conditions of common external geopolitical threats is tested on the material of Southern African countries in the 2nd half of the 20th century. The approach itself is based on the ‘geopolitical theory of collegial power’ by the American sociologist R. Collins, which describes the processes of formation of new political systems with ‘checks and balances’ through the centralization of military coalitions. A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of decolonization cases in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland is conducted on 4 dependent variables: presence/absence of coalition governments, intra-elite repression, government accountability to parliament and the right of the head of state to appoint members of parliament. Decolonization is interpreted as a transition to ‘black majority rule’ in which the population of a country has the ability, at least nominally, to approve and remove governments through general elections. The results of the analysis show that the previously derived model does not fully describe the cases under study, but, with the exception of the Botswana case, the emergence of domestic political forces parity during decolonization does correlate with high levels of CSP. It also reveals that the theory of CSP should take into account the experience of political systems with a dominant party. It is concluded that the analysis of the new sampling allowed both to partially confirm the results obtained earlier and to reveal certain limitations of the ‘geopolitical theory of collegial power’.

Cognitive sociology is supposed to join the ranks of those behavioral sciences that have already become part of the cognitive turn (e.g.: psychology, philosophy, linguistics). The basic idea of this research area is to recognize the social nature of thinking, cognition, and memory processes. The present work aims to add a cognitive dimension to the classic sociological question of social action. The theory of social action, inspired by theses borrowed from the cognitive sciences, discerns between the two types of practical beliefs: non-reflexive and reflexive. The former denotes automatic bodily «knowing-how», or habitual patterns of action, while the latter is defined as deliberative «knowing-what», or discursive ideas and judgments. The purpose of this study is to explicate the transition from one level to the other, from automaticity to deliberation. The conventional explanation assumes that a necessary condition for reflexivity is a certain kind of difficulty. Conversely, the routine realization of an action does not require additional reflection. These kinds of judgments are common but not inclusive enough: they do not theorize every-day, habitual action as a possible trigger of deliberation. The conceptualization of the transition to reflexivity presented in this paper considers both «problematic» and «routine» as potential reflexivity locuses. For this purpose, a dialogical model of the cognitive and affective reflexivity bases is constructed in this paper. The paper consists of several parts. First, the cognitive basis of reflexivity is derived from the theory of practices and classical pragmatism through the concept of interest. Then, an affective ground for reflexivity is proposed, which is responsible for the object of reflection’s emotional significance. Functionally different dialogical combinations of cognition and affect are assembled into a four-part typology of reflexivity. The latter is intended to point to the epistemic potential of cognitive sociology in the study of social action.

The article analyzes the conditions under which legal discourse affects the development of concepts concerning social order in the context of conflict-prone modern legal policy. The particular nature of this impact is determined by the form of legal discourse, as well as the linguistic and logical dimensions of legal communication. In the first section of the article, the authors provide a series of descriptive definitions for the concepts of legal discourse, social representations and social order. These definitions are accompanied by the thorough exposition of relationships between these concepts. The result of this analysis is a systematization of approaches to understanding these social phenomena. The authors then proceed to identify the main directions of legal discourse’s influence on the formation of ideas about social order, distinguishing between its institutional (legal) and non-institutional forms. The second part of this study explores the linguistic aspect of this influence, focusing on the inherent linguistic functions of legal discourse. These functions include semantic formation, normative and constructive functions, formalization and the function of a legal concept’s “cancellability”. These functions play a crucial role in shaping collective perceptions of social order. The third part argues that the content of legal discourse is determined by the selection of a logical strategy that establishes particular conditions for the development of concepts concerning social order. Thus, classical legal discourse, which is governed by formal logic, aligns with the modernist perspective. Conversely, non-classical and poststructuralist discourses introduce alternative versions of semantic logic: the logic of relations and the logic of differences and equivalences. The theoretical and methodological potential of the logic of equivalences and differences is demonstrated through the analysis of examples from the liberal legal discourse of the 1990-s, also the consequences of this discourse’s influence on the formation of modern worldviews are examined.

The transformational processes in working life are closely studied by social researchers. The sociologists of professions describe some of these processes in terms of occupational professionalization and deprofessionalization. Generally, the conceptualization of such terms begins with the definition of what a profession is; however, the sociologists of professions have not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Meanwhile, despite the conceptual diversity in the sociology of professions, there are points of intersection between different approaches of this branch of sociological knowledge in defining its basic concept and its derivatives. Namely, the sociologists of professions single out exclusive knowledge, the service ideal, and work autonomy as the elements of a professional complex; and they use these three attributes-dimensions to examine different occupations for their professionalization and deprofessionalization. Moreover, they assume that the work autonomy of professionals derives from the two other elements of a professional complex. Applying this analytical scheme of professionalism to the empirical world of occupations turns out to be difficult in the situation of the spread of formal structures such as markets and bureaucracies. This article reveals the problematic areas of matching this scheme with the contemporary realities of a professional world, in particular in the sociological study of occupations from the point of their professionalization and deprofessionalization. Moreover, occupational professionalization and deprofessionalization as analytical categories are characterized by empirical insensitivity. These categories obscure the variability of transformations with the knowledge base, the logic of acting in an institutional office and the scope of work autonomy of particular specialists in the changing social environment.

In this article, based on the theories of L. Theveno and L. Boltansky, N. Fligstein and D. McAdam, we try to find theoretical, methodological and empirical grounds for identifying and analyzing the phenomenon known as a complex urban conflict. Theoretical analysis allows us to identify its hypothetical features: the multiplicity of elements, connectivity with other conflicts and their components, stability of flow and structural mobility (ability to transform), as well as to take steps to substantiate them, empirically based on the analysis of the Geoinformation database of conflicts of the Novosibirsk agglomeration and more than sixty semi-structured interviews with their participants. Conflicts approximately corresponding to the selected features were selected from the database, and analyzed according to a number of parameters. The analysis showed that urban conflicts are becoming a more stable and closely related to the urban context space of interactions of an increasing number of interconnected actors moving simultaneously in different strategic fields and in different logical justifications of justice. Complex conflicts correspond to at least three of the highlighted parameters: they are a reaction of a significant resource; they manifest themselves in the ability of actors to create an information resonance, to make connections and find new allies by constructing new meanings and additional agendas; they involve actors who already have experience of repeated participation in urban conflicts.

This paper explores the cultural differences between Russian regions operationalized in terms of Minkov’s recent revision of Hofstede’s famous individualism — collectivism dimension (I-C). Using a large survey (N = 18,768) conducted in 2019-2020 and spanning 60 regions, we construct a cultural map of the Russian Federation illustrating withincountry variation in I-C. Our measure of I-C is based on respondents’ attitudes toward reproductive freedoms and gender equality in different spheres of life, aggregated to the regional level and then merged into a composite index via principal components analysis. The highest prevalence of individualistic norms is found in the Yaroslavl region, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, while the highest prevalence of collectivist norms is found in the Muslim regions of the Northern Caucasus. Such characteristics as average wage, geographical latitude of the capital, percentage of ethnic Russians and — to a somewhat lesser extent — freshwater availability per capita, predict higher prevalence of individualistic norms in regional culture. In addition, we find that the relative prevalence of individualism is associated with higher innovation rates, while the relative prevalence of collectivism is associated with less excess deaths per 100,000 during the active phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022). At the same time, we do not observe the putative effects of I-C on the level of volunteer activity and the quality of regional governance. Finally, we report I-C scores for all 60 surveyed regions, in order to facilitate further research endeavors focusing on the interplay between regional cultures and socio-economic modernization in Russia.

Until now there have been a few works in Russian sociology devoted to the study of disadvantaged neighborhoods. The use of the concept of ghetto and cultural models that determine the socialization are particularly questionable. The authors suggest that the use of the concept of autonomous community instead of ghetto would be more relevant to show how socialization in different types of households occurs in the disadvantaged neighborhoods across Russia. Based on long-lasting field studies in Astrakhan oblast, the authors show how individuals in different generations are socialized in typical households of the area. We argue that the different types of households that emerged after 1991 can expose individuals to different cultural models. We find that solitary producers or partners in the settlements of the Volga-Akhtuba Floodplain who are involved in IWT of sturgeon meat and caviar employ local collective cultural models that promote the hedonistic lifestyle, in particular widespread «easy» money, adultery and serial marriages. This results in the exclusion of adolescents and young adults from the households’ production chain, furthering the intergenerational gap when adults do not keep young people from leaving home. Thus, mainstream cultural models circulating among the youth are combined with «alternative» ones that are widespread among people of the older generation. Unlike settlements in the floodplain areas, settlers in the Volga River delta areas share unified «alternative» cultural models within the family firm type of household that allow them to maintain stable social order.

The article explores the “digital traces” of the structural integration of cross-border migrants in Russia by combining qualitative text analysis methods with automatic classifiers. Our goal was to analyze posts related to job and housing searches in migrant communities on VKontakte in order to describe the challenges these individuals face and how they use social media to overcome them. From the wide range of practices falling under the definition of structural integration, we focused on job and housing searches, considering them the most significant. Our tasks were to identify and classify mentions of these practices in migrant groups on VK, determining the role of social media in these processes. Given the large volume of material, achieving these goals required an approach that combined the capabilities of automatic classifiers with the analytical sensitivity of qualitative methods. The use of a linear classifier did not yield the expected results, prompting the need to train a neural network classifier. To reduce the associated labor costs, we tested the possibility of training the model on a small manually selected dataset of short texts. Using a Python-based parser, we extracted 129,261 posts from migrant groups, categorizing them thematically via web interface. The texts were then used to train a BERT network (F1 score: 0.94). To ensure the accuracy of classification and to obtain preliminary sociological insights, a randomized sample was analyzed using qualitative content analysis. This analysis revealed that the digital platforms under study serve as spaces where migrants build “the strength of weak ties,” accumulating information and social capital, which in turn reduces the costs and risks associated with integration when searching for jobs and housing in resource-scarce conditions. Religious and regional solidarity serve as the foundation of these networks. Additionally, digital media platforms become contact points between migrants and the host society: they facilitate the informal involvement of migrants, especially refugees from Ukraine, Donetsk, and Luhansk, into family economies and caregiving roles. For example, migrants are offered low-paying agricultural work or caregiving jobs for elderly relatives in small towns or villages, with free accommodation provided by the employer. Another category of posts offers housing in Russian cities to refugee women in exchange for domestic labor and sex. This indicates that some migrant groups may be part of the broader problem of sexual exploitation of female refugees in Russia and the marginalization of migrants by the host community. The results are consistent with those obtained through more traditional methods, indicating that this approach can be applied to the study of large datasets generated by less-researched communities.

The «friends and neighbors effect» is one of the classic contextual effects in electoral geography. It manifests as an increase in a candidate’s support in the vicinity of their home, birthplace, or other places to which they are connected. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the «candidate effect» or the «hometown advantage». This article provides an overview of the studies of this effect, formulates its main features and peculiarities, as well as the key problems facing researchers in this field. Despite the fact that 75 years have passed since the «discovery» of this phenomenon, research on the «friends and neighbors effect» is still concentrated in the USA, Australia, New Zealand, and a few European countries, while studies on other regions are rare. In Russia, it has also received little attention, with the first article devoted to this effect having appeared only in 2022. However, in the last 15 years, there has been explosive growth in interest in the «friends and neighbors effect» in English-language literature. It is during this period that a large part of the research on Eastern European countries has emerged, as well as several studies on African and East Asian contexts. Another pressing issue is the transition from the stage of accumulating information and initial results for the countries to the synthetic stage of generalizing knowledge based on comparative researches. Perhaps such generalization will help answer a number of unresolved questions.

The article explores the ideology of wokism and analyzes the contribution of the American philosopher Peter Boghossian to countering it. The concept of Boghossian’s “street epistemology” is considered in detail — a tool for conducting a conflict-free dialogue, which is designed to encourage a person to think about the reliability of the methods they use to form beliefs, especially religious ones. Boghossian advocates the use of the Socratic method to dissuade believers, and recommends focusing on criticizing faith as a way of knowing (he calls it “unreliable epistemology”) instead of highlighting the external aspects of religion. He characterizes faith and wokism as “mind viruses” and suggests a common method to combat them. The article highlights the similarities between wokism and religious fundamentalism identified by Boghossian and other scientists, and also describes in detail the conflict of some new atheists, including Boghossian, with the woke movement. The article shows that wokism has features of religion, including irrefutable dogmas (widespread racism), an analogue of original sin (whiteness), moral arrogance of adherents (disagreement is considered a vice), magical thinking (gender identity), Puritanism, rituals, martyrs. The concept of the “substitution hypothesis” and the role of new atheism in the formation of wokist atheism, called Atheism Plus, are considered. It is concluded that secularism practices can be applied to counter non-religious irrational ideologies such as wokism.

The article explores the complex reconstruction of the views of Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner — one of the most influential conservative essaywriters and theorists in post-war West Germany — on the political significance of Christianity for his project of ‘reconstructing conservatism’. This project, initiated in the 1970s, continues to influence German right-wing and conservative circles today. The author highlights the ambivalence in Kaltenbrunner’s attitude toward Christianity as a foundation for conservative political theory after the Second World War. The social, political and intellectual shifts of the first half of the XX century, including new trends in philosophy and theology, compelled the Catholic conservative to seek more rational and empirically grounded justifications for a conservative political stance. At the same time, Kaltenbrunner opposed the politicization and instrumentalization of Christianity by the left, which had become widespread in various forms. His reliance on anthropological argumentation aligns his ideas with classical XIX century conservative thought. However, the impossibility of invoking otherworldly justifications of the conservative position in the modern world led him to turn to secular philosophical anthropology, whose arguments Kaltenbrunner actively employed for polemical purposes. This anthropological framework later became pivotal for many German right-wing and conservative intellectuals, while religious argumentation completely lost its relevance. The present research is part of a series of publications examining the history as well as philosophical and political foundations of German post-war conservatism and the German New Right

Review of the book: Kollmann N. S. (2023) The Russian Empire: 1450-1801 / Translated from English by V. Petrov., St. Petersburg: Academic Studies Press / Bibliorossica. — 783 pp. ISBN: 978-5-907532-45-8.

Book review: Ignatieva O. (2025) Reconstruction of Max Weber’s concept of power, Moscow: Aspect Press. — 158 Р. ISBN: 978-5-7567-1335-0 (In Russian)