2015. vol. 14. No. 3

Recently, textual analysis has become quite popular in social sciences in general, and in sociological studies in particular, partly due to the “narrative turn” that emphasizes the textual nature of all social practices and legitimizes their explanations through discourses that constitute social reality and identification models in contemporary society. Though content analysis has long ago proved its methodological and technical relevance to solve sociological questions in providing both qualitative and quantitative data about discursively structured social reality, the modern popularization of textual analysis within sociology is associated with two vague and multifaceted approaches, those of narrative and discourse analysis. The article first outlines the three types of sociological data the researchers have to deal with: formalized data that can be arranged in different matrices and analyzed mathematically; weakly formalized, but still structured and organized data; and non-formalized data that supposes the application of textual analysis. The author then presents her explanation of the current state of affairs in the use of textual analysis in empirical sociological studies, in which narrative and discourse analysis are often positioned as the only possible research methods to be employed despite several decades of the successful application of content analysis. This explanation consists of two parts: the first section includes a number of strict requirements a researcher must follow while conducting content analysis, while the second consists of the attractive advantages of narrative and discourse analysis as determined by their interdisciplinary status, nature, and origin.

The article analyzes the properties of sensitive questions and, more broadly, of sensitive situations in unstructured interviews. Although direct sensitive questions are not typical for unstructured interviews because they can break the flow of communication, there is a quite large class of questions with contextual communicative perspectives that can be correctly considered as conditional/semi-sensitive. In particular, the questions regarding respect for elderly persons are not sensitive enough for informants to avoid answering them, but at the same time, are sufficiently delicate to make informants employ complex excusatory tactics in their answers. This practice supports the well-known thesis that to overcome the questions’ sensitivity, the most effective tactic is “justifying preambles,” which allows the removal of the moral burden either from the informant (in our case, by asking the question, “Are elderly persons sometimes themselves to be blamed for a bad attitude toward them?"), or from the circumstances in general (by creating a game situation/brainstorm on “How not to cede a seat to an elderly person on public transport?”). It should be remembered that, via this kind of research, we do not learn the real causes of rule-breaking as much, but rather a practical representation of the norm from the informant’s point of view, as well as a set of legitimate reasons for not following it. Particular attention should be paid to the informative value of sensitivity. For example, we can measure the level of the repression of social norms in specific areas of social life on the basis of the differences in the answers obtained in different ways.

In the second of ten Lectures on Political Right, delivered in Madrid’s Ateneo in November 29, 1836, Juan Donoso Cortés considers the notion of “popular sovereignty.” Distinguishing mind and will as two parts of human essence, Donoso deduces from the former the “law of the association” that unites all human beings, and from the latter, the “law of the individual,” that separates them. Hence, the main problem for Donoso as a liberal conservative is how to combine these two laws. Donoso states that while traditionalists propose to focus on the “law of the association” and ends with tyranny that destroys free will, revolutionaries, by contrast, focus on the “law of the individual,” which leads to anarchy as a variant of the same tyranny. In making a historical digression to the periods of the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages, Donoso shows how the revolutionary idea of “popular sovereignty”, linked directly to the “law of the individual”, gradually overcomes the idea of “divine right of kings”, based on the “law of the association.” Donoso criticizes the English and French philosophers of the 17–18th centuries (Hobbes and Rousseau, above all) the most, as these philosophers laid the foundation for historical drama of the Great French Revolution. Offering his own liberal-conservative alternative for the two named extremes (traditionalism and revolution), Donoso calls to abandon the “atheist”, “immoral”, “absurd”, and “impossible” “popular sovereignty”, and combine the “law of the individual” and the “law of the association” on entirely different basis of the “sovereignty of reason, sovereignty of justice”.

G. W. Leibniz is usually not regarded as a political philosopher. However, despite this prevailing opinion, Leibniz’ impact on political theory is valuable. The paper discusses Leibniz in the context of the history of the concepts of “sovereignty” and “federation”, and demonstrates that Leibniz presents an original interpretation of these concepts. Even though Leibniz’ attention to the problem of sovereignty is conditioned by the practical interests of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and Leibniz’ own intentions to participate in international negotiations, Leibniz’ theoretical solution is no less original. Leibniz, in his attempt to defend the independence of imperial princes, creates an alternative to Jean Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty, and argues that sovereignty is compatible with divisibility. In demonstrating the possible coexistence of several centers of power, Leibniz makes the notion of sovereignty relative, which, however, does not force him into rejecting the notion entirely. The article discusses the historical context framing the appearance of the Leibniz’ doctrine, the reasons why Leibniz is critical of Bodin’s theory, and the innovations introduced by his approach. Based on Leibniz’ texts Codex Juris Gentium (1693) and Caesarinus Fürstenerius (De Suprematu Principium Germaniae) (1677), the paper analyzes the development of his theory, and shows how power is divided between the Emperor (majestas) and the princes (suprematus). The paper raises the questions of how Leibniz’ interests are similar to those of contemporary political theorists in trying to reevaluate the notion of sovereignty, of which model of federation Leibniz prefers, and of how his political ideas are connected with his metaphysical system.

The article is a companion text to the first Russian translation of the fragment of Max Weber’s fundamental study The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. The article presents a brief history of this work first published 100 years ago. Weber’s book is analyzed as an integral part of his study of the genesis of Western rationalism. The author puts the thesis forward that the publication of a theoretical work on Confucianism marks a shift in Weber’s research interest, from the study of Protestant sectarian ethics in Europe to the universal, historical research of world civilizations. Furthermore, author demonstrates the close connection between the problems of the sociology of religion and the sociology of domination within Weber’s conceptual framework. The article also shows that the latter, in its turn, forms the sociology of rationalism because its main cognitive interest constantly revolves around the question of the extent to which religious and ethical worldviews are influence, through the practical orientation of their agents, the socio-structural evolution of societies, whose rationality is so different from Western capitalist and legal rationality. In the main section of the paper Weber’s reconstructed understanding of Confucianism is outlined as a type of practically-oriented secular rationalism which is not properly a “religious ethic” because of the absence in it of such ideas as sin, radical evil, and the related problem of theodicy. The article concludes with the thesis of persisting heuristic importance of Weber’s study of ancient Chinese doctrines which formed a unique rational and practical attitude to the world as a form of adaptation to it.

The chapter of Max Weber’s The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism analyzes the basic life orientations within Confucian ethics, and their economic implications. The author suggests that since the Chinese civilization had no powerful independent social class of priesthood, its functions were performed by the state bureaucracy. Furthermore, the author points out the absence of natural law and formal juridical logic in Chinese life, which had a significant impact on Chinese legal consciousness. In the main part of the chapter, the author reveals the essence of Confucianism as a type of rational secular ethics. He emphasizes the freedom of metaphysics, and the secular nature of Confucianism. Weber makes the notion of “decency” central to his analysis of the Confucian ethical worldview. He also demonstrates, through the concept of “deference” (xiao), the structural identity of personal relationships within the family and the bureaucratic hierarchy. The economic views of Confucian-educated bureaucrats, or the so-called mandarins, is analyzed as based on the strict rejection of any professionalization and specialization. The author emphasizes the positive attitude of Confucianism towards personal wealth and well-being, which was not perceived as an ethical problem. Weber underlines the importance of a classical literary education of potential candidates for responsible positions in the civil service, and the resulting personal benefits. Weber also posits the fundamentally pacifist nature of Confucianism. Weber concludes with the thesis of the absence in Confucianism of any methodical life orientations that characterize the religions of salvation.

Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) is considered one of the founders of international anarchism and theoreticians of federalism. This paper explores the transformations of the concept of “federalism” in Bakunin’s works from the end of the 1840s until the last years of his life. According to the conventional understanding of the evolution of Bakunin’s ideas, a crucial shift of theoretical views took place in the second half of the 1860s. During the first years of his participation in the revolutionary European movement, Bakunin expressed radical views and was predisposed to direct actions. By the middle of 1860s, he stayed within a broad conceptual framework of European radicalism, and understood federalism as a principle of self-administration and as a form of state system like in the USA or in the Swiss Confederacy. However, by the end of the 1860s, Bakunin shifted to a drastically new understanding of the state. He implicitly narrowed it down to the framework of modernity and identified it with the bureaucratic apparatus. Bakunin also claimed that every form of the state is a form of domination, production, and reproduction of inequality. Bakunin decided that there is principal inconsistency between the concepts of “freedom” and “state,” and argued for the destruction of the latter for the achievement of the former. At that moment, “federalism” was opposite to the state. It called for the destruction of the state apparatus as a system of dominance, and was a political form of socialism and the anarchic community. On the next step of his evolution, Bakunin introduced (but didn’t elaborate) the distinction of two types of power: formalized (i.e. official) and unformalized.

The review analyses the international conference “Christian Monasticism from East to West: Monastic Traditions and Modernity in Europe”, organized in June 2015 by sociologists and theologians from the Universities of Graz (Austria), Turin (Italy), and Bucharest (Romania). The conference initiated a sociological reflection of different monastic traditions, and the role of monasteries in terms of the decline of trust in religious institutions. It raised the question of the dynamics of monasticism as a traditional institution in modern societies, not only in Europe, but also in Asia, Africa, and America. The scholarly discussion paid particular attention to the adaptation and resistance of religious traditions to social changes. Researchers from different countries have demonstrated the innovative potential of monasticism in the economic sphere (monasteries from different countries are pioneers in the development of the sector of organic products), the cultural sphere (the development of tourism and excursion services), and the religious sphere (the emergence of so-called “new religious communities”). Alongside traditional roles, monasteries have acquired new social roles. The secularization of the concept of “monasticism”, and its use in relation to the phenomenon of “consuming the tradition” apart from a religious context is stressed. The conference continued to develop the theme of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of religion. The position of a researcher and his or her professional identity, the issues of objectivity, and the idealization of the research subject are analyzed.

Review: Izbrannye raboty po philosophii kul’tury: Kul’turnyj capital. Russkaya kul’tura I sotsial’nye praktiki sovremennoj Rossii [Selected Works on Philosophy of Culture: Cultural Capital. Russian Culture and Social Practices of Modern Russia] by Olga Zhukova (Moscow: Soglasie, 2014) (in Russian).

Review: Als das Dorf noch Zukunft war: Agrarismus und Expertise zwischen Zarenreich und Sowjetunion by Katja Bruisch (Köln: Böhlau, 2014).

Review: Review: Okolo tjur'my: zhenskie seti podderzhki zakljuchennyh [Close to Prison: Women’s Networks of Prisoners Support] edited by Elena Omelchenko and Judith Pallot (Saint-Petersburg: Aleteija, 2015) (in Russian).

Review: Politicheskij romatizm [Political Romanticism] by Carl Schmitt (Saint-Petersburg: Praxis, 2015) (in Russian).