In the first decades of the XXI century, the problem of vulnerability has become the subject of social sciences, including social and political theory in connection with the “affective turn” and the growth of social, political and economic instability. Representatives of feminist moral and political philosophy, revealing vulnerability as a universal and fundamental human trait, have played a significant role in its comprehension. The article explicates the concept of vulnerability as an ontological state of interdependence in the bodily ontology proposed by American philosopher Judith Butler and critically analyzes the relevance of deducing ethical and political obligations from this ontology. To solve this problem, the method of conceptual analysis is used, which allows to reveal the conceptual content of the key categories of Butler’s bodily ontology. The first part of the article is devoted to the consideration of Butler’s relational bodily ontology and its connection with the ethical and political reflections of the philosopher, for which two levels are distinguished: ontological and social. The second part analyzes three key categories of Butler’s proposed ontology: interdependence, vulnerability and precariousness. The application of these concepts in the philosopher’s criticism of liberal ideas about the subject as an autonomous, sovereign and independent individual is described. Finally, the third part analyzes Butler’s arguments on the justification of the ethics of nonviolence through an appeal to states of vulnerability and interdependence. Based on the analysis, the author comes to the conclusion that the ethics of nonviolence for Butler is a means of problematizing these ontological states in order to support political egalitarianism and refute liberal views about man as an individual; The bodily ontology developed by Butler can become a successful theoretical tool both for the criticism of established ideas about social subjectivity and for the study of the fundamental foundations of the existence of society, which remain invisible from the standpoint of individualistic views on man.