This article analyzes the “praxeological rule” as a core component of ethnomethodological research policy, exploring its connection to the problem of social order. The author examines the rule in two interconnected aspects: ontological and epistemological. Ontologically, the rule is found in the everyday constitution of social order, while epistemologically, it is proposed by Garfinkel as a principle of inquiry.The “praxeological rule” allowed Garfinkel to define the conceptual field of early ethnomethodology, focusing on a critique of normative social order and its theoretical understanding, while developing an alternative conception of social order. In the 1970s, ethnomethodology’s research policy underwent a transformation, resulting in a more radical understanding of constitutive order. This shift also radicalized the “praxeological rule.” The rule now emphasizes adherence not to actors’ interpretive orientations in co-constituting order, but to an autochthonous, constitutive order that requires no special theory.The article’s main contribution is its demonstration that appealing to the idea of the “praxeological rule” is key to understanding ethnomethodology’s research policy and its relationship to the problem of order throughout the evolution of Garfinkel’s ideas. This rule allows for the mapping of Garfinkel’s phenomenological and pragmatist strategies of thought, which resolve the difficulty of correlating the formal and informal in the production and study of practices that constitute social order.