The history of the establishment of the presidency in Russia has rarely been the focus of scholarly attention. In the works of constitutionalists, the establishment of the presidency appears to be a natural and non-controversial aspect of constitutional reform in the RSFSR. At the same time, there are many inconsistencies and contradictions. Why was the presidency, which was conceived as an integral part of the new constitution, eventually incorporated into the unsuitable soviet constitution of the RSFSR? Why was the issue of introducing a popularly elected president brought to a referendum, rather than the issue of deciding on a model of presidential power, which was then the main subject of constitutional debates? Why did the implementation of the referendum results turn out to be so protracted and confusing? Finally, why were the presidential elections called earlier than the laws on the presidency were passed, and why did the latter precede the introduction of the presidency into the Constitution? Was this not a kind of unconstitutional coup legalized retroactively? This article attempts to systematically answer these questions using Andreas Kalyvas’ theory of extraordinary constitutional politics, which is based on his interpretation of Carl Schmitt’s theory of constituent power. The main thesis of the article is that the establishment of the presidency in the RSFSR was not simply a revision of constitutional laws, but an extra-constitutional transformation in an extraordinary dimension of politics which therefore cannot be fully understood within the framework of ordinary constitutionalism.