@ARTICLE{27043461_937193772_2024, 
	author = {Elena Tykanova and Irina Shevtsova and Anna Zhelnina}, 
	keywords = {, urban local conflict, activists, public authoritiescoalitions},
	title = {Alliances between Authorities and Activists in Urban Local Conflicts},
	journal = {The Russian Sociological Review},
	year = {2024},
	volume = {23},
	number = {2},
	pages = {90-119},
	url = {https://sociologica.hse.ru/en/2024-23-2/937193772.html},
	publisher = {},
	abstract = {Cooperation between public authorities and activists is a well-studied issue in social movement research. However, the authorities are often considered monolithic and analyzed as targets of activists’ actions affecting urban conflict outcomes. Meanwhile, various representatives of public authorities demonstrate their own interests in urban disputes and different levels of engagement in resolving conflicts. An evaluation of the database concerning dynamics of urban conflicts in Russian million cities shows rare attempts to resolve conflicts by core executives, such as mayors, governors, and deputy governors, compared to city and regional council members. Based on the sociological tradition of studying social movement coalitions (Van Dyke; Diani; Sterns and Almeida; Jasper and Duyvendak) this article examines the reasons why core executives make the decision to support activists in urban conflicts in the context of a noncompetitive regime. The research is based on 97 semi-structured interviews with participants in urban and ecological conflicts as well as experts in five Russian million cities (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan). Cases of core executives’ engagement are explored as examples of state actor-social movement coalitions where officials provide their organizational resources and leverage to contribute to social movement goals. We identify six reasons why core executives make the decision to support activists in urban conflicts: 1) public resonance created by urban activists around a symbolically significant object; 2) changes in economic and political structural conditions; 3) the potential risk of sanctions from or direct interference by federal officials; 4) the proximity of elections and the need to maintain public reputation; 5) the exploitation of urban conflicts in order to win in intra-elite competition; 6) the emotions of core executives allowing them to align themselves with urban activists.},
	annote = {Cooperation between public authorities and activists is a well-studied issue in social movement research. However, the authorities are often considered monolithic and analyzed as targets of activists’ actions affecting urban conflict outcomes. Meanwhile, various representatives of public authorities demonstrate their own interests in urban disputes and different levels of engagement in resolving conflicts. An evaluation of the database concerning dynamics of urban conflicts in Russian million cities shows rare attempts to resolve conflicts by core executives, such as mayors, governors, and deputy governors, compared to city and regional council members. Based on the sociological tradition of studying social movement coalitions (Van Dyke; Diani; Sterns and Almeida; Jasper and Duyvendak) this article examines the reasons why core executives make the decision to support activists in urban conflicts in the context of a noncompetitive regime. The research is based on 97 semi-structured interviews with participants in urban and ecological conflicts as well as experts in five Russian million cities (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan). Cases of core executives’ engagement are explored as examples of state actor-social movement coalitions where officials provide their organizational resources and leverage to contribute to social movement goals. We identify six reasons why core executives make the decision to support activists in urban conflicts: 1) public resonance created by urban activists around a symbolically significant object; 2) changes in economic and political structural conditions; 3) the potential risk of sanctions from or direct interference by federal officials; 4) the proximity of elections and the need to maintain public reputation; 5) the exploitation of urban conflicts in order to win in intra-elite competition; 6) the emotions of core executives allowing them to align themselves with urban activists.}
}