The State and the Class in Qajar Iran, 1794-1925

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The form of the relationship between the state and social class throughout the history of Iran has always been explained by theories of the 'Asiatic mode of production' and 'Oriental Despotism.' According to these theories, the power of the state is unlimited and it has all classes under its control. Meanwhile, many historical data of the Qajar era question this point of view and represent a situation in which various social forces limit the power of the state. The present article was written in response to the conflict between the theory of the 'Asian state' and the historical reality of the Qajar era. The main question of the article is: was the Qajar state limited by the social classes or did it have absolute and supra-class power? In answer to this question, the state classifications of Elman Service, Andrew Vincent, Max Weber, Karl Marx and Samuel Huntington are used. The research method is a historical case study that collects and analyzes data using two documentary methods and pattern matching. The results of the research show that the pattern of "balance, opposition and limitation" is established in the relationship between the state and the social classes of the Qajar era. This pattern can be described according to the classification of states based on the criterion of "accumulation and distribution of power". It is split into three periods. The first period is characterized as a "patriarchal" state, the second — as a "patrimonial" state, and the third — as a "constitutional" state. The state in the first and second Qajar periods was associated with a low accumulation of power and centralized power distribution, and in the third period, that of post-constitutionality, it took the form of a low accumulation of power and scattered power distribution.

Keywords: Oriental Despotism, Iran, Patrimonialism, Asiatic mode of production, Qajar.

Introduction and statement of the problem

The analysis of Iranian society’s historical development, particularly of the Qajar era, is commonly and predominantly conducted through the 'Asiatic mode of production' theory, which provides a special explanation of the relationship between the state and different social classes (Don, 1989). According to Marx and Engels, who are considered founders of the theory (Marx, Engels, 2010: 82), the economic and social structure of
Europe differs significantly from that of Asia. Asian societies have a specific mode of production that distinguishes them from European societies (Wittfogel, 2011).

This theory of power and class forms in this type of society and the way the two relate to each other delineates an unlimited and absolute autocratic state. In this state, different social classes, from serfs and tradesmen to courtiers, are nothing in comparison to the will of the monarch (Seif, 2008: 138). In this case, we are witnessing a powerful state that does not express the interests of any of its classes. Different social classes are in a kind of generalized slavery to the absolute power of this state, which is responsible for the ultimate ownership and control of everything. Maurice Godelier points out in his classic piece that the Asiatic mode of production is characterized by two dominant features: the lack of independent social classes and centralized governance (Godelier, 1978).

The theories of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ and ‘Oriental Despotism’ have some impassioned followers in Iran. Inspired by these two theories, Mohammad Ali Homayoun Katouzian states that throughout its history, Iran has been both an autocratic state and society, and these two have been independent and at enmity with each other (Katouzian, 2000: 32). According to him, absolute power, monopoly on property rights, autocracy, lack of law, illegitimacy and lack of continuity are among the characteristics of this type of state in Iran (Katouzian, 1998: 18). Yervand Abrahamian emphasizes the existence of such characteristics in Asian societies including Iran (Abrahamian, 1997: 5) and comes to the conclusion that the “Eastern despot” was able to rise to the top and dominate society due to his powerful nature (Ibid: 10). Some European travel writers also agree in drawing such a picture, as can be seen in Gaspar Drouville’s travelogue, for example, written during the reign of Fath Ali Shah, where the author highlights the Shah’s unbounded power over the people of Iran, describing the latter as the Shah’s possessions (Drouville, 1985: 182).

Despite this image of Iran’s political structure, some empirical facts of the Qajar era are such that the theory of the unlimited power of the state against the classes and the helplessness of the people against the iron will of the king, as is depicted by the theory of ‘Oriental Despotism’, is challenged. One example of this was the power of Prince Masoud Mirza, who in 1888 ruled almost half of the country (Dalmani, 1956: 907; Vanessa, 2010: 140). Polak stresses the might of Mirza Agha Khan Nouri in describing the role of Shah wives’ in his espionage system, used to gain awareness over the Shah’s actions and thus limit his power (Polak, 1989: 274). Also, the privilege of Shosse road, which was created by the Lynch Company to facilitate British commercial activities on the territory of the Bakhtiari tribe, was granted to the tribal leaders and thus became part of their private property, making them enormously wealthy (Pavlovichet al., 1978: 74). As a consequence, some scholars believe that the state literally did not exist during the Qajar era (Lambton: 1972: 180).

In addition, during the Qajar period, several uprisings of various scale could be witnessed, stirred up by different classes of society to assert their demands and challenge the central power, and at times the state was so weak that it inevitably gave in to the expectations and demands of the discontented. Examples include the tobacco uprising during the time of Nasseruddin Shah (Feuvrier, 1989: 222) or the great constitutional movement
that led to the signing of the constitutional decree by Muzaffaruddin Shah (Kasravi, 1984: 99). Even on a smaller scale, one of the Qajar kings was overwhelmed by the demands of the women who had rushed to the bakeries and finally to the royal citadel out of hunger (Etemad al-Saltaneh, 1363: 1027). In addition, many great religious figures, including great religious authorities, had great influence on the kings. It is even said that the Qajar kings were afraid of a general uprising when the weather was unfavorable and the crop was bad as a result (Abrahamian, 1997: 20).

The problem of the present article is the stark contrast between the assumed theory of the 'Asiatic mode of production' and the empirical data of the Qajar era. Can the relationship between the state and the class of the Qajar era be described as “Oriental despotism” or the Asian state (Wittfogel, 2011; Katouzian, 2013, 2014), or is it that in the era in question, we are witnessing a state where the power of the kings comes from the ruling classes? Was the state limited by the influential classes of society such as clergymen, rich merchants, local nobles, state rulers, princes, big landowners and masters of helots? Did the Qajar state enjoy the concentration of power or was there something more akin to power pluralism? Based on this issue, the current research revolves around the following question, "Was the Qajar state limited by the social classes or did it have absolute and supra-class power?"

Theoretical and methodological framework

The literature review of the relationship between the state and the class can be analyzed in two ways. The first one includes the theories of historical evolution of the Iranian society and comprises Marxist theories on the feudal and semi-feudal systems and the Asiatic mode of production (Ashraf, 1347: 19). The work of Soviet Iranologists such as E. P. Petrushevsky (1967), N. E. Loskaya (1977), A. M. Diakonoff (1968) and G. Lukonin (1971) is known to rely on this materialistic interpretation of history emphasized by Stalin (Pigulevskaia et al., 1977: 597-568). The theory of the feudal system in Iran has been proposed by such scholars as Herzfeld, Poliak, Kahn and Christensen. Herzfeld identifies the Achaemenid era with the feudal system, Poliak and Kahn consider the Islamic ēqtā to be the same as the Western fief (Ashraf, 1347: 21) and Christensen considers the age of Sassanid society to be comparable to the period of feudalism (2004: 35-36). The third approach includes scholars like E. K. Lambton, R. Cole Burn and Max Weber, who emphasize the difference between the Eastern landowner and the Western feudal and consider the Eastern systems as lacking the main features of feudalism. The theory of the Asian system in Iran was first proposed in the 1850s by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Don, 1989: 146; Marx, 1956: 124). After them, Carl Wittfogel in Oriental Despotism (1957) deals with a technological interpretation of the Eastern empires (Turner, 2001: 7). The defenders of this theory in Iran are Mohammad Ali Khangi, Mohammad Ali Katouzian, Ahmad Ashraf, Parviz Pouria, and Habibullah Peyman (Peyman, 1995: 89).

The second category of literature related to the subject examines the position of the state and the class during the Qajar era. Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi in the book
“Social Classes, State and Revolution in Iran” (2007) show how the foundation for the formation of modern social classes was provided in the Qajar era. Using the theory of autocratic government, Katouzian in the Conflict between the State and the Nation regards all the governments throughout Iran’s history as autocratic and Iranian society in all historical periods as short-term, static and lacking in dynamism. In Social Classes and the Shah’s regime (2001), Mohammad Rahim Eivazi uses the neo-patrimonial theoretical model to understand the structure of power in the Pahlavi state and its relationship with social classes. In his article “The nature of government in preconstitutional Iran” (2008), Mohammad Javad Etaat relied on Weber’s theory of legitimacy to show that the government’s political structure in pre-constitutional Iran was of a traditional type. Alireza Samiei Esfahani in his article “Strong Society, Weak Government: Sociological Explanation of State-Society Relations in Qajar Era Iran” (2007) outlines his belief in the reflective state-society relationship and seeks a realistic explanation of this relationship’s logic in Qajar Iran. In the article “Investigation of the Class Nature of Merchants in Qajar Period” (2008), Ali Mohammad Hazeri and Hadi Rahbari try to explain the question of whether the merchant class in the period under consideration acted independently of the government. In the article “Historical Sociology of the State: A Break into the Connection of the Elites and the Structure of the State in the Safavid Era” (2012), Naser Jamalzadeh and Ahmad Dorusti pay attention to the relationship between the political elites of the Safavid era and the ruling government. Jafar Aghazadeh’s 2013 doctoral dissertation, “Mutual Attitude of the Governmental Family and Iranian Society in the Qajar Period”, concludes that the government rulers considered the people as their servants and subjects throughout the first Qajar period. This mutual attitude did not change noticeably, despite foreign interventions and the introduction of new ideas.

The present study examines the relationship between the state and the class during the Qajar era from a different perspective. Some researches analyze the issue through historical explanations, independent of theoretical considerations. Others approach historical evidence from the perspective of a specific theory, enclosing historical evidence in narrow theoretical formats. The present research, aspiring to move away from the two flaws mentioned above, seeks to exchange theory and evidence in order to find out the historical model consistent with the theoretical model.

The issue of the model of the relationship between the state and the class is placed in the framework of the field of political sociology (Nash, 2011: 9). It is possible to examine this relationship from different perspectives.

Based on archaeological and ethnological scholarship, evolutionary researchers have reconstructed the trajectory of societies from the simplest to the most complex form. Elman Service, an American anthropologist, divides the political structure of human societies into four stages: group, tribe, chiefdom, and state (Service, 1962). The “group” consists of the extended family, where no one claims a greater share of wealth. The “tribe” refers to a larger social unit including a number of families who are related to each other (Demarrais, 2005). The “chiefdom” as a social and political unit is characterized by the control of resources in the hands of the Khan and integration of several settlements by
central power and hereditary authority. Social hierarchy is based on unequal access to goods and production resources, but personal wealth is not significant (Service, 1962). The fourth stage is the “state”. Early states have more population than the previous societies, their institutions are more formal, they possess means to enforce laws, collect and register taxes, and the distance between the privileged class and the common people is greater than that of the khanate (Flannery, 1998). Service’s classification was criticized by some researchers due to its limitation and uniformity, thus inspiring new classifications. For example, Fried’s three-stage classification (Fried, 1967) based on political relations (egalitarian, rank and class society) and Johnson and Earl’s classification (Johnson, Earl, 2000) based on environmental, cultural and social diversity.

In the field of historical classifications of the state, Andrew Vincent deals with the five classifications of absolutist, constitutional, ethical, class and pluralistic states based on their historical development. The “absolutist state” features five elements: (1) sovereignty: the ruling person is the source of law and responsible only before God; (2) ownership: the state is the personal property of the king; (3) divine right: the ruler reigns based on the decree and the protection of God; (4) expediency: only the ruling person could recognize the expediency of the state; (5) personality: the (legal) person of the king is considered to be identical with the whole country and the state (Vincent, 1997: 86-85). “ Constitutional state” seeks to limit power and maintain order based on the constitution. The characteristics of the constitutional state are as follows: (1) natural law, (2) natural and human rights, (3) social contract, (4) popular consent, (5) popular sovereignty; (6) civil society (ibid: 160-175). “Ethical state” is the term coined by German idealist philosophy and Friedrich Hegel. Hegel talks about the evolution of various state forms, synonymous with the stages of evolving individual consciousness: (1) external state which is a liberal and constitutional state; (2) political state; it implies the separation of powers and guarantees public freedom; (3) “ethical state” as a moral institution that includes the moral interests of individuals in the form of its laws and political structures (Ibid.: 206-211). “Class state” was proposed by Marx and Engels. This state is considered to be the manifestation of class relations and is not representative of any collective or contractual good or public goal (Ibid.: 206-223). A pluralistic state is a state where “there is no single authority or source of authority that is competent and inclusive in all respects”. The task of the ruling assembly is to regulate relations between groups and individuals in order to ensure justice, order and freedom (Ibid.: 309-310).

From the perspective of political sociology, the theories of the state are categorized into four groups: Marxist, elitist, pluralistic and postmodern (Bashiriyeh, 1995: 30). Postmodern theories focus on the relationship between power and knowledge, which is out of the agenda of this research. Pluralist states were described within the fifth clause of Vincent’s classification. Among elitist theories, Max Weber’s state theory can be mentioned. Weber speaks of three types of authority: traditional, rational-legal and charismatic, the interest of this research is the first type.

Traditional authority, or the authority of “eternal past”, is the authority whose legitimacy is based on the sanctity of traditions and systems that have existed since ancient
times. The organization of this authority is based on personal loyalty to the ruler. The subordinates of the ruler are his personal crew and relatives (Weber, 1995: 323). The ruling decrees are legitimized in two ways: (1) the tradition that determines the content, meaning and extent of the decrees; (2) the will and authority of the ruler, whose boundaries are determined by tradition. The master governs either with the help of organizational headquarters or without them, and the most common organizational principle is to give the highest positions to relatives of the ruling family (Weber, 1995: 325-325).

Weber considers traditional authority as including four types: gerontocracy, patriarchalism, patrimonialism, and sultanism. The common feature among them is that the ruling power is bound and dependent on the principles of tradition, and the difference between them is that gerontocracy and patriarchalism do not have a bureaucracy and an executive system, as opposed to patrimonialism and sultanism. Gerontocracy here refers to systems where power is exercised by elders, who hold authority due to better knowledge of sacred tradition and social custom (Ibid.: 328). Patriarchalism is taken to mean an economic organization or individual kinship based on the principles of inheritance, where authority relies on personal loyalty and obedience and does not adhere to abstract rules. It implies the dominance of the father or husband over family members alongside the authority of the hereditary ruler and prince over their subjects (Ibid.: 340; Weber, 1978: 1006). The important point in gerontocracy and patriarchalism is the mutual right of the ruler and subordinates to each other and the adherence of both to tradition. Sources stress the ruler’s lack of total possession over subjects, tracing the former’s strong dependence on their people’s desire to obey in the absence of a personal administrative apparatus and reliance on traditional dignity (Ibid.: 328).

Patrimonialism is the late form of traditional systems, the formation of which is a gradual process resulting from the change in the structure of patriarchal power. With the development of the judicial and administrative system, and especially the military system, the traditional patriarchal authority was transformed into a hereditary patrimonial system. Weber posits that the emergence of the ruler’s administrative and personal headquarters tended to shift traditional authority towards either patrimonialism, or, in the case of an extraordinarily powerful ruler, to sultanism (Ibid.: 329). Relatives would become subjects and the master’s right — his personal right. Accordingly, patrimonial authority refers to an authority that is basically bound by tradition, but is actually exercised through the personal will of the master. If the patrimonial authority is applied without observing the tradition, basically on the basis of personal will, it is called sultanic authority (Ibid.: 329). Of course, the boundary between these two is not clear. Sometimes it seems that the Sultan’s authority is not limited by tradition, but actually it is never like that. Despite this, the non-traditional element is not impersonally rationalized, but only includes the extreme expansion of the master’s personal will. This is the feature that distinguishes it from rational authority (Ibid.: 329).

In patrimonialism, the ruler’s absolute power over the individual is overshadowed by vulnerability in the face of all his subjects. Thus, tradition that limited the domain of the ruler’s tyranny created almost everywhere a legally unstable, but essentially effective
system (Ibid.: 347; Weber, 1978: 1012). The patrimonial ruler organizes his political power over his political subjects, without using physical force, like his household power. In the patrimonial state, the most important duty of the subjects to their political leader is to provide for his material needs (Ibid.: 350; Weber, 1978: 1013). Unlike feudal serfs, “political subjects” are free, similar to free peasants; their services and taxes are traditionally determined and fixed; they have control over their property; they can marry without the master’s approval and consent; they are allowed to sue in a court other than the ruling court (Ibid.: 350, 359; Weber, 1968: 1012-1013).

James Bill and Karl Leiden used this notion of patrimonial authority to analyze the political systems of the Middle East and considered their characteristics to be personal power, closeness, and informality of politics, balanced conflict, militarism and religious justification (Bill, Leiden, 1974: 160-177). John Foran uses the concept of “repressive state” with the two key elements of monopoly and personalism (Foran, 2015: 231). Juan Linz used the concept of the sultanic state in the classification of non-democratic states, and after him, Gunter Roth used it in his study of political systems in the Middle East. By separating the concept of patrimonialism from traditional legitimacy, Roth emphasized the personal aspect of patrimonialism and called it “personal sovereignty”. However, Roth refers to Weber’s obsolete term “sultanism” when describing the highly centralized type of personal government in which the ruler has maximum power over affairs of the state (Roth, 1968: 203). While confirming Roth’s theory that the basis of personal rule is personal loyalty in connection with material rewards, Juan Linz made a practical typology of four political systems based on modern personal dominance: modern sultanism, oligarchic democracy, military patriarchy and the authority of influential people (Linz, 2002: 11-62).

The concept of “neopatrimonial state” is proposed by Samuel Eisenstadt. According to Eisenstadt, neopatrimonial states are relatively modernized, with modern bureaucratic and party government, but in fact a powerful individual exerts their rule over society not through impersonal rules, but through an extensive system of personal patronage. Such states have the democratic appearance of parliament, parties, constitutions and elections, but the decisions of the head of state are absolutely certain because the system supports them and, if necessary, uses force to ensure the surrender of the legislature and parties, biased interpretations of constitutions and electoral victories. The basic characteristics of the neopatrimonial state are its reliance on the support of the elites, discord and disunity among the elites, the system of extensive personal support over the society, and the non-political nature of the people (Goldstone, 2015: 110-111). According to Juan Linz, the neopatrimonial state is in essence close to sultanism and shares similar tendencies, however, the freedom and authority of the ruler are narrower and the circle of supporters is wider (Linz, 2010: 27).

Along with Weber’s understanding of the state and its types of authority, it was Marx who for the first time addressed the relationship between the state and society from a sociological point of view (Bashiriyeh, 2000: 30). Marxist theories of the state are not found in the text or a specific book by Marx himself, and in his works he has put forward
various and sometimes conflicting opinions. Dunleavy & O’Leary divide Marx’s analysis of the state into three models: instrumental, arbitralional and functional (Nash, 2011: 23). David Marsh and Jerry Stoker also emphasize the existence of two Bonapartian and class views on the relationship between the state and the class in Marx’s writings (2001: 385). Due to the overlap of these two classifications and the lack of attention of both of them to Marx’s articles about India and Asian societies, in which he emphasizes the existence of the Asiatic mode of production and its specific state, Marx’ views on the state are classified in the framework of three models that are the class state, the Bonapartian state, and the Asian state, in which the state is characterized by the lack of power, relative power, and absolute power, respectively.

**Class state;** According to Marx’s political economy, political conflicts at the state level only reflect real class conflicts in society. In the German Ideology, Marx writes about the conflict between special and general interests, in which the latter finds independence in the form of the state, separated from the real individual and group interests. He states that the struggles within the state are imaginary forms, since the general interest is the imaginary form of public interest (Marx, 2000: 35). According to this instrumentalist theory by Marx, both the form and the nature of the state depend on the classes, and although the state may have different forms in terms of time, place, shape and nature, it is generally dependent on the classes. In all these cases, the state is a dependent and a tool of the ruling class (Dripper, 2003: 198). The state is a tool of class domination, and the work of the ruling class is to introduce its interests as the common interests of the society by using all the tools available, so the state becomes an instrument for this work (Hamilton, 2001: 5; Marx, 2000: 74). In the final analysis, according to this model, the state becomes subordinate to the dominant class in society and has no independent power.

**Bonapartian state;** Marx’s theory of the Bonaparte’s state is mentioned in the books The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852) and The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 (1850). In the first book, Marx focuses on the social preconditions of Bonaparte’s acquisition of power and bases the general narrative of events on the specific analysis of countless social forces that, according to Marx, were balanced by him (Kelly, 2004: 23). In his preface (1869) to the second German edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he expressed his hope that his book would lead to the rejection of the term Caesarism or the Caesarian system, which was difficult to use in those days, especially at that time, due to the stark difference between the conditions, both material and economic, of the class battles in the ancient and modern worlds (Marx, 2007: 6). Therefore, his goal was to show how the class struggle in France created a situation when all French political and cultural institutions “vanished like a phantasmagoria before the spell of a man whom even his enemies do not make out to be a sorcerer” (Marx, 2007: 5).

The issue is that in 1848, the coalition of the bourgeoisie under the name of the ‘Order Party’ managed to take over all the organs of the state and succeeded in defeating and eliminating the coalition of petty bourgeoisie and workers under the name of the Social Democratic Party (Ibid.: 53-92). The class struggle came to an end, but then the struggle between the state (Bonapartian) and the National Assembly began. The state, which was
created by the bourgeoisie but lacked independent power, managed to build its social base in those days of class struggle. It formed the “December 10 crowd” consisting of Lumpenproletariat and introduced himself as its real representative, that is of the people and its will expressed through the law (Ibid.: 104). The bourgeoisie, which had, as stated, destroyed the conditions of the parliament’s power with its own hands in its struggle against other classes (Ibid.: 120) by becoming a parliament without a cabinet and an army, unsupported by the people and public opinion, lacking in awareness and influence (Ibid.: 117), in reality left the executive power to the state of Bonaparte (Ibid.: 121), who had a cabinet independent of the parliament in November 1849, a cabinet outside the parliament by January 1851 and an anti-parliament cabinet in April 1851 (Ibid.: 123). In this way, the financial and industrial bourgeoisie outside the parliament against the bourgeoisie inside the parliament supported Bonaparte. So, the complete victory of Bonaparte and the demonstration of the revival of the empire took place with the December 10 coup (Ibid.: 138-157). Thus, the bourgeoisie's fear of the rise of the proletariat and the proletariat's fear of the rise of the bourgeoisie caused both of them to appeal to Bonaparte to take the state power (Ibid.: 158-162, 178). With the overthrow of the parliamentary republic, "France went from the tyranny of one class to the tyranny of one person" (Ibid.: 163).

Marx's interpretation of the formation and nature of Bonaparte's government is that he sees it as a continuation of the absolute monarchy of the 16th century, and while the first French revolution and Napoleon the First had helped to develop the concentration, scope, powers and administrative apparatus of government's power, in the next Napoleonic period the government reaches full independence (Ibid.: 165-164). However, the state's power is not fixed, and Bonaparte represents a specific class: the small-owner peasants (Ibid.: 166-167). Perhaps the phrase "class state independent of classes" is the most appropriate description for such a state. It is here that Marx outlines five characteristics (under the title of “Napoleonic thought”) for Bonaparte's state: (1) class state (small-ownership); (2) strong and absolute state; (3) large bureaucracy; (4) establishing the dominance of the priests as a tool of the state; (5) the superiority of the army (Ibid.: 173-177). According to Marx, all these "Napoleonic ideas" developed in line with the class interests of the small-ownership (Ibid.: 177). The state of Bonaparte is an independent executive branch of society that acts in its own name and feels that it is its mission to protect the bourgeois order. It wants to defend the interests of the lower class within the framework of bourgeois society, so much so that everyone calls him the benevolent father of social classes (Ibid.: 179-182).

The analysis presented in The Eighteenth Brumaire, like that in the treatise on Critique, suggests that the agents of the state are not merely coordinators of political life for the benefit of civil society's ruling classes. In certain circumstances (for example, when there is a relative balance between social forces), the executive branch has the possibility to initiate political reforms and coordinate transformations (Held, 1990: 186). In the article of 1858, Marx himself considered the secret of Bonaparte's victory in the "mutual exhaustion of the opposing parties". Friedrich Engels also wrote in the same year that its precondition was a timely indifference of the middle classes, coupled with the fruitless struggle of
the warring classes (Dripper, 2003: 402). In this interpretation, the state has a degree of independent power or relative independence from the upper class (Nash, 2011: 23). This state has a direct impact on civil society and prevents the exercise of the power of the bourgeoisie on the political scene. However, Marx stresses that the power of the state is not stable and indisputable (Ibid.: 166) and cannot be completely unconstrained by the owners and controllers of the means of production (Held, 1987: 119). The amount of state initiative towards civil society and its forces is limited, and the state in capitalist society cannot free itself from its dependence on the dominant class (Marx, 2007:163-162). In this model, the state has relative independence from the dominant class, which means that the state possesses relative power.

Asian state; Marx and Engels, after outlining the historical evolution of societies from the early civilization to socialism, examined in their historical researches the types of modes of production in different regions of the world. In his letter to Engels on June 2, 1853, Marx mentions the lack of private landowners as the real key to the “Eastern Paradise” (Anderson, 2011: 666). In response, Engels sees the cause in the climatic conditions, the type of soil, and in addition, in the existence of vast deserts. In such a situation artificial irrigation as a prerequisite for agriculture caused centralized water supply and resulted in the construction of irrigation facilities by the centralized authoritarian state (Wittfogel, 2011: 574). A week later, Marx announced his agreement with this idea.

In the same period, Marx sent their common thoughts in the form of a collection of articles to the New-York Daily Tribune newspaper. On its pages he introduced climate and regional conditions as the cause of artificial irrigation by water facilities, this primary necessity of economic and public use of water in the East caused the intervention of the centralized state power (Marx, Engels, 2010: 82). Although in works such as Grundrisse (1857) and later, Marx emphasizes the factor of “communal self-sufficient villages” as the essence of the Asiatic mode of production and its autocratic governments, in Capital (1867) he returns to his first classic position and emphasizes the monopoly of state landownership (Anderson, 2011: 682).

Thus, these two elements, the lack of private landownership and the presence of large-scale state water facilities (apart from being contradictory) are presented by Marx and Engels as the two main characteristics of the Asian state, in which the autocratic state machine had control over the production surplus. It was the central apparatus of suppression and the main tool of economic exploitation used by the ruling class. There was no intermediary force between the self-reproducing villages from below and the overly large state from above (Ibid.: 680). In such a situation, “the state is the supreme master” (Marx, 1956: 791). The absolute ruler is the representative of society, the supposed owner of all lands, and the management of their affairs is delegated to him.

As can be seen, Marx’ triple model of the state analyzes the relationship between the state and the class on three different levels. In the class model, the state lacks power and independence from the dominant class, the Bonapartist state has relative independence from the dominant class, and the Asian state has absolute power and autocratic authority over all classes of society.
In addition to the theoretical models mentioned above, we can refer to Samuel Huntington’s classification of political systems based on the two criteria of power distribution (centralized and decentralized) and power accumulation (low and high) (Huntington, 1991: 210-211). Based on this classification, the concentration of power does not necessarily cause an accumulation of power. One can imagine a state with a high concentration of power but with a low accumulation of it. It seems that Huntington’s classification is a suitable basis for drawing the types of government in the form of four distinct categories of low centralized power, high centralized power, low decentralized power, and highly dispersed power, as shown in Figure 1. Returning to the main question of this article, of whether the Qajar government had limited power or absolute and trans-class power, it is reasonable to examine it within the framework of the following classification.

*Figure 1. Formation of states based on the accumulation and distribution of power.*

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The current research method is a historical case study in which a phenomenon generates extensive information using various data collection methods over a long period of time (Creswell, 1994: 12), information that is combined with the aim of garnering results from it (Blakie, 2011: 281). The case study is a powerful method in the social sciences that is useful for generating and testing hypotheses (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229).

The information is collected through the document method in the form of written history (Baker, 1998: 326). Written documents are classified into two categories: first-hand sources and second-hand sources (Sa-e, 1391: 136). Third-hand documents, such as library catalogs, introduce first-hand sources and serve as a source for finding other documents (Flick, 2011: 278).

For data analysis, there are three general strategies: pattern matching, explanation, and time sequence (Yin, 1997: 151-167). As this case study is descriptive, the pattern matching method (type of rival explanations) is used (Griffin, 1993: 1097). This involves comparing the pattern based on historical experience with the predicted theoretical pattern. The successful match between the experimental model and one of the competing models indicates the correctness of the theoretical model (Yin, 1997: 154).
In the Qajar historical sample, a threefold theoretical model of the relationship between class and state was used to accurately determine the general pattern governing the sample.

**Research findings**

Understanding the relationship between the state and the class in the Qajar era depends on providing historical evidence that fits the proposed theoretical models. In this section, we will try to answer the research question by describing the relationship between the different classes of Iranian society and the Qajar state.

*The State and the Clerics*

General Gardan (1766-1818), who came to Iran on behalf of Napoleon to carry out a mission during the reign of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar (1769-1834), wrote in his memoirs that if in Europe religion could no longer stimulate people like it used to, and was transformed into a simple faith, this was not the case in Asia, where its strength was still huge, and the clerics possessed an ability to drive people in any direction they want by stimulating their sense of superstition (Gardan, 1983: 146).

Agha Muhammad Khan (1742-1797) was a religious person who, in line with his religious and traditional interests, adopted conservative policies. Despite the fact that he sometimes used the mediation of some clerics to spare the lives of some rebellious people, he did not have close and friendly relations with them, except for one cleric named Molla Muhammad Hossein Mazandarani known as “Molla Bashi” and another cleric named Mirza Muhammad Ali Behbahani, to whom he had special devotion (Hedayat, 1959: 85). Unlike Agha Muhammad Khan, Fath-Ali Shah Qajar had a very close relationship with the clerics and always asked them to choose Tehran as their place of residence instead of living in Iraq or Qom (Tonekaboni, 1925: 105). The Shah's enmity toward the Sufis, who angered Shiite religious leaders, can be seen as an example of the intellectual influence exerted on him by the clerics (Varharam, 1988: 156). In general, it should be said that the political power of clerics in the discussed period was strengthened by the declaration of Jihad against the Russian infidels during the series of wars between Iran and Russia (Adamiyat, Natiq, 1978: 44).

Muhammad Shah (1808-1848), the third king of Qajar, was strongly influenced by the teachings of the Sufi chancellor and his dervish, Haji Mirza Agassi (1783-1849), in governing the country, especially in relation to the clergy. However, the Shah lacked the capacity to engage in a risky confrontation with the Shi’i clerics, even with the assistance of his Sufi minister who held animosity towards them. To support this claim, we can cite Gobineau (1816-1882), who wrote about the confrontation between the clerics and the minister over the Bab issue when the latter asked for permission to come to Tehran, and Haji Mirza Agassi was ready to agree to his request at first... but the opposition of Sheikh Abdul Hossein Mujtahid forced him to change his opinion. The Sheikh stated that the
clerics had the power to defend themselves against both the state and the Bab (Gobineau, 1988: 250).

The model of the relationship between the state and the clergy in this period is that of “balance and cooperation”. The state prevents the clergy from coming to power, and the clergy also influences state policies and defends its interests. The traditional social position of the Shia clergy prevents the state from interfering.

But the long period of the reign of Nāṣer al-Din Shāh (1831-1896) shifted the relationship between the clerics and the royal authority into a new complex and challenging phase. While honoring the sanctity of the clerics, Nāṣer al-Din Shāh advised the governors of the states not to involve the clerics in politics and to limit their role to prayer and religious matters (Adamiyat, Natiq, 1978: 182). In a letter to the king after his dismissal, the Lieutenant General of the Chancellor (1827-1881) wrote:

“The mullahs were never as dear and respected as during my chancellorship, but Chancellor immediately added that I did not prescribe them to interfere in the affairs of the state” (Algar, 1976: 240).

The establishment of Diwankhaneh and Teaching House (Dar al-Funun) as two examples of secular reforms implemented by Amir Kabir (1807-1851) also reduced the exclusive rights of clerics and their independence from the state, as they sought to monopolize the court and education (Tabari, 2002: 45). However, the opposition from clerics to the establishment of modern scientific centers caused the lack of Iranian primary or secondary schools, except for home schools and religious schools, almost until the end of Nāṣer al-Din Shāh's reign, apart from Dar al-Funun (Keddie, 2002: 75).

The Tobacco movement (1891-1892) was a protest against foreign powers, the Shah, and his government. It highlighted the role of the clergy in sparking the popular unrest and the victory of the movement. In this regard, Edward Brown, English Iranologist of the Qajar period, provides first-hand information about the events and states that this skillful and wise blow rendered the monopoly of the sanctioned goods worthless without practically any rebellion, and the loyalty and self-restraint of the people who obeyed the command of this spiritual leader were beyond the power of description and praise (Brown, 1997: 64).

The participation of clerics in the Tobacco uprising depended on their economic and political connections and interests. For instance, those clerics, who had close financial or family ties with businessmen or were interested in tobacco production in waqf lands under their control, felt threatened, and directly confronted the agreement. In Isfahan, the clerics who had direct interests in private and waqf lands for tobacco cultivation, mostly voted together with the merchants (Afari, 2006: 49). At this stage, the “opposition” between the clergy and the state becomes apparent. The clergy opposed the king’s personal will due to their direct relationship with all the subjects.

During the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1831-1896), due to the power that the Islamic scholars had gained after the tobacco incident, the confrontation between religion and the
government intensified. An advisor to the Iranian consul in Baghdad visited the great mujtahids of Najaf to dispel rumors of Russian influence in Iran. Govind Sharabiani responded that if the scholars’ demands were not met, they would “remove the present dog (Moza’ Affar al-Din Shah) and put another one in its place” (Kasravi, 1984: 23). In this regard, Samuel Benjamin, the first permanent American envoy, wrote in 1887 that the most part of famous mujtahids did not accept any kind of pretense and presence in political scenes, but they believed that if the king, the crown prince, and the rulers were not to follow the Sharia law they have the right to remove them (Eliash, 1979: 9; Benjamin, 1887: 441).

These events mark the official entry of clerics into the political arena. The first parliament (1906) included clerics, comprising 20% of its social composition (Abrahamian, 1997: 80). Even the second principle of the amendment to the constitution regarding the election of five first-rate Foghīḥ to the National Council was not implemented during the first term of the parliament. However, it was implemented during the third telegram to the parliament, together with the influence of Najaf clerics in the second parliament and the introduction of twenty first-rate clerics (Hayeri, 1995: 13, 19). During this period, the clergy’s assistance in “limiting” the power of the state is evident, as they were officially involved in the construction of power.

During the Qajar era, the clergy had social support enough to influence political events, despite the unwillingness of the Qajar kings. This influence was sometimes overt, such as during the Iran-Russian wars (1804-1813) under Fath-Ali Shah and the Tobacco movement during the Nasser era or the Constitutional Assembly, at other times, it was exerted in a more subtle manner.

The State and Businessmen

Many texts related to the Qajar period mention that Qajar rulers and local leaders relied on marketers to meet their financial needs. According to Lambton, traders played a crucial role in preparing and transferring funds when banks were not yet established. They provided cash that was essential for the survival of ruling classes. These groups worked closely together. A provincial ruler may have had to engage in commerce to ensure payment of his state income to the central government (Lambton, 1984: 186). During the mid-19th century, the growth of retail and capitalist modes of production including crafts, artisans, guilds and merchants led to intertwined financial relationships between big traders and government officials (Foran, 2012: 207-212). Common interests gradually emerged between these groups (Ashraf, 1980: 26). The merchant Muhammad Hassan Amin al-Zarb, who was famous during the era of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh, is a good example that confirms this point (Mahdavi, 1994). Whenever the state needed weapons and luxury goods from Europe, Amin al-Zarb would trade with him. Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh appointed him as a special businessman to establish factories and procure goods from the West (Adamiyat, Natīq, 1978: 369).

Another example of close cooperation between Qajar statesmen and merchants can be found in the financial support provided by local rulers to merchants in buying govern-
ment positions. For example, when Mohammad Ali Shah (1872-1925) was in Tabriz as the crown prince and ruler of Azerbaijan, he received financial assistance from a merchant named Haj Mohammad Taqi Sarraf, who had run several offices in Tabriz and Tehran (Kasravi, 1984: 148). In certain critical cases, the state granted businessmen full authority to negotiate on their behalf some specific issues. Nazim-ul-Islam Kermani mentions this topic in his book “History of the Awakening of Iranians” in reference to the issue of merchant settlement on the eve of the constitutional revolution (Kermani, 1997: 533). The relationship model between the central state and the merchant class up to this point is one of “balance and cooperation”. The state prioritizes the interests of the businessmen, and in turn, the businessmen provide the necessary financial support for the state.

Unsettled economic situations and severe budget deficit in the state of Nāṣer al-Din Shāh necessitated significant economic and financial concessions to foreign countries and nationals to compensate for the backlogs and generate revenue. These concessions targeted the commercial and class interests of merchants, tradesmen, artisans and craftsmen, both directly and indirectly (Abrahamian, 1997: 77). As a result of such problems, Iranian marketers came out hard against the state and foreigners. For example, the movement to establish domestic industrial companies, which started in Isfahan with the assistance of some businessmen and intellectuals of this city, soon affected the whole of Iran (Ashraf, 1980: 101). Another example of class resistance of marketers and businessmen against the state was repeated and highlighted in the tobacco case. The big traders and sellers of this product were suffering from the exclusive concession of the tobacco to Englishman Talbot. Just one week after signing the contract, they wrote a letter to the Shah. When faced with cold and negative responses from the court, the protests expanded to the streets and direct conflict with the government. The most reliable merchant, Muhammad Malek-o-Toijar of Isfahan, resisted selling his products to Reghi Company and instead chose to burn them all (Adamiyat, 1984: 53). During the long reign of Naser al-Din Shah, the pattern of the relationship between the state and the merchants can be characterized as one of “opposition and resistance” towards each other. The modernization policies of central authorities conflicted with the interests of businessmen, leading to their opposition and, in some cases, pushing the state back.

The state budget deficit severely affected Muzaffar al-Din Shah government, so it was forced to increase revenues through internal sources such as customs. The Belgian delegation led by Monsieur Nous (1849-1920), which arrived to manage the country’s customs affairs and implement plans to increase taxes, brought classes such as clerics, officials, some courtiers and businessmen in opposition to the state of Amin al-Dawla. Additionally, Iranian businessmen, influenced by Iran’s intellectual climate, became part of the constitutionalist social forces. Mehdi Malekzadeh (1881-1955) was the son of Malik al-Mutakallimin and the author of the History of the Constitutional Revolution, who personally witnessed the events related to the constitution, mentions various series of assemblies that were organized with the help of some clerics, intellectuals and businessmen in all parts of the country (Malekzadeh, 2004: 394). In this period, we see businessmen supporting the opponents of the state and trying to limit its power.
The State and the Tribes

Military might and taxation were two important issues that heavily influenced the relationship between the people and the state in Iran (Lambton, 1984: 182). There have been many cases when some powerful groups of Iranian people refused to pay taxes. In such situations, it sometimes happened that the state used its military forces to suppress the tribal rebels. The Qajar army, which was not particularly powerful, relied mainly on the forces of nomads and tribes. In his travelogue, Lord Curzon (1859-1925), who lived in Iran during the Qajar era for three years, describes the first element of the Qajar army as the cavalry of tribes and border warrior clans. He notes that they obeyed their tribal leaders and were considered very dangerous due to their lack of discipline, insufficient military training, and pure obedience to their rulers (Curzon, 1968: 747). This situation indicates the strength of traditional and hereditary restrictions against state decisions.

The Qajar state attempted to control this social class in various ways. State positions, such as provincial rulership or military positions such as Amirtumani, were granted to members of the elite class, allowing them to join the political ruling body. Some particularly rebellious tribes such as the Turkmen of Koklan, Yamut, Charwar and Chamour, who were not willing to compromise with the Qajars and whose wickedness and plundering were known to everyone in Estarabad, were tamed to some extent through this process (Tajbakhsh, 2001: 462). Furthermore, the enmity, conflicts and competition between different branches of a clan or neighboring clans and tribes can allow for the central state to intervene in the management of their internal affairs. Mohammad Jafar Khormoji (1856-1922), the historian of Nāṣer al-Din Shah's court and the author of the book Al-Akhbar-Nasrī facts, highlights how the state exploited the powerful Shahson clan to suppress them during the conflict between two Turkic-speaking clans in Zanjan (Khormoji, 1966: 82). The first period's balance concludes with the oppositions of the second period, where the state's will prevails over the social classes in certain cases.

Despite the application of Qajar’s policies limiting the power of the tribes, they still enjoyed the necessary independence within the boundaries of their territories. For example, the Kurdish tribes located in the northeastern and eastern provinces of the country, such as Khorasan, were always a source of disturbance and concern for the central state of Iran. Jahangir Mirza (1810-1853), the son of Abbas Mirza, writes in his memoirs about the rebellion of the Zaffronlu tribe in Khorasan during the reign of Fath ali Shah (Jahangir Mirza, 1948: 160). The commercial activities of foreign countries in the territory under their influence could sometimes lead to the economic exploitation of some tribes. This can be another indication of the provinces’ freedom of action in their living environment. For example, the privilege of exploiting the Shosse Road, created by the Lynch Company to facilitate British commercial activities on the Bakhtiari territory, was granted to the leaders of the Bakhtiari tribe and became part of their private property. As a result, they gained enormous wealth (Pavlovich and others, 1978: 74). None of the Qajar statesmen were present during the consultations between British politicians and the heads of the
Bakhtiari clan. The benefits given to the Bakhtiaris did not reach the central state of Iran, indicating a reduction in the power of the central state even compared to the second period.

The State, Peasants, and Landowners

In the early 19th century, agriculture accounted for 56% of Iran’s gross national product (Katouzian, 1997: 88). Between 1887 and 1907, peasantry reached about 50% of Iran’s population (Adamiyat, Natiq, 1978: 356; Gilbar, 1976: 78). In Foran’s book, this figure is close to 66% (Foran, 2012: 207). Additionally, during the negotiations of the National Council, seven million out of ten million of Iran’s population were included, which refers to 70% of the country’s population. Therefore, it is very important to know the extent of landowners’ power, because the possession of the land in turn earned social prestige and political power for the owner (Lambton, 1984: 268).

Taxation of landowners and peasants was the most important factor that determined the type of relationship between these classes and the state. In many cases, tax rates were increased due to some economic needs and shortage or sudden events such as the outbreak of war (Lambton, 1984: 113). In this situation, the landowners put extra pressure on the peasants under their control. Abdullah Mostofi (1876-1950), who himself belonged to the long-standing old Iranian family during the Qajar period, says about the abuses of state bureaucrats: “Although during the time of Amir Nizam audits were carried out and taxes were determined... the greed of the governors made them ask the Naye al-Hokuma to increase the taxes, and they were forced to impose more taxes on the Bashi-block and the rural chieftains” (Mostofi, 1992: 101).

Opposed to the peasant and serf class, there was the class of dominant landlords or landowners, who were mainly from the most influential classes of the Qajar society, and the power of some of them in the areas under their ownership was comparable to that of the king and provincial rulers. For instance, Mohammad Wali Khan Tonekaboni (1846-1926), also known as Sepahdar, was a great landowner in Mazandaran. The independence of their actions in these areas was such that they were actually considered a separate independent area from Mazandaran’s government (Taghizadeh, 2000: 176).

According to Petrushevsky, Iran’s agricultural lands were divided into two general categories: government or Khalsa lands, including (1) civil properties, (2) forfeited properties, (3) transferable properties; (4) registered properties, (5) seed properties; the second category was private lands owned by individuals or waqf properties belonging to shrines and mosques (Wali, 2010: 108). During the time of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh, there was a constant pressure to increase the number of Khalsa properties by seizing endowments and confiscating the properties of disinherited persons (Stack, 1982: 248). However, at the end of the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh, many of the Khalsa properties were sold for government expenses, and when Muzaffar al-Dīn Shah ascended the throne, the only Khalsa properties remaining around Isfahan were the ruined villages of Braan (Ansari, 1943: 62). On the other hand, a large number of villages were removed from the super-
vision of the central government as before. In some cases, toyul were given from estates of the Khalsa as well as from personal property that might have belonged to the toyul-holder (Lambton, 1984: 292). The weak Qajars bureaucracy and the lack of a proper and efficient tax system, along with issues such as war with the powerful Western countries, had caused the central state of Iran to be unable to rule over the feudal regions as it should (Issawi, 1990: 85).

With the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution, although the peasants did not play a major role in its victory, they expected a change in the relationship between lords and serfs. A British representative writes in his report: “They have been indoctrinated that after this the rule will be by the will of the people and not by the will of the king.” Since, in the opinion of these classes, the collection of taxes was an act of oppression in favor of the king and the governors of the provinces, they ask, now that constitutionalism had been established and the king was not omnipotent, why should taxes be paid? (Adamiyat, Natiq, 1978: 448). Despite these great expectations, in some ways the landlords remained the same as in the past, and most of the power still rested in the hands of the nomadic chieftains and thanes (Ibid.). The first action of the National Council regarding land ownership was to cancel the pensions and privileges of many people, including distinguished persons and members of the royal family. The Council, however, added the sums collected by local rulers to the continuous tax, and paid the annual salaries of the tax payers from this tax (Lambton, 1984: 323). This allowed the landlords to maintain their sources of power against the state until the end of the Qajar era. Throughout the Qajar period, the preservation of big-proprietary relations in Iran resulted in the maintenance of the balance and opposition pattern between the state and landowners.

The State and Bureaucrats

There are a significant number of domestic and foreign comments and remarks regarding the Shah’s absolute power in Iran’s internal affairs. We have already mentioned the Drouville’s opinion about the times of Fath Ali Shah that “all the people of Iran belong to the Shah and the Shah treats them in whatever way he wants” (Drouville, 1985: 182). Katouzian notes that Fath Ali Shah expressed his surprise to European visitors about how it was “possible to manage the country while others are also involved in the ruler’s decision-making” (2002: 151). Additionally, Etemad al-Sultaneh expressed his trust in Nāsher al-Din Shāh: “We are all your servants. Your attention makes one an amir and the other a minister. When this attention is not here, we are all less than dog’s dung” (Etemad al-Sultaneh, 1969: 834). Nāsher al-Din Shāh once responded to the petition of the Kashan guilds: “Stop being wasteful, the government is not determined by the will of the subjects” (Zibakalam, ibid: 381). Some researchers believe that the state in its modern sense never existed in Iran during the entire period of Qajar rule. The lack of separation between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of power, inefficient state institutions and organizations, unclear distribution of duties and responsibilities among state officials, weak military and law enforcement forces, and the use of traditional and primitive administra-
tive patterns influenced by tribal laws have made some argue that the state literally did not exist during the Qajar era (Lambton, 1972: 180).

Said duality can be explained in this way: at the beginning of the Qajar dynasty the pillars of the government were limited to a few Mustofis, the governor Lashkar-e-Navis and the court Hajeb. But a century later, it had increased to nineteen ministries and several thousand government jobs and positions (Bharier, 1971: 5-8). Most of the important government positions during the Qajar era, including the province guardianship, were assigned to powerful Qajar princes. For example, during the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh, out of 325 government positions, 182 positions were occupied by Qajar princes and thanes (Mirza Saleh, 1990: 20). This issue shows the lack of an administrative system at the beginning of the Qajar period and its gradual formation during the following period, which indicates the existence of a patriarchal state in the first period and a patrimonial state in the second period.

The power and effectiveness of great government bureaucrats depended on various factors that also created a plurality of power centers within the government. The relations between each bureaucrat and the king were influenced by these factors. The clash of opposing opinions among the bureaucrats could also reduce the king’s power. In the conditions of competition between rulers, the king can become a tool in their hands to achieve their goals. For example, one can refer to the statements of the doctor Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh in his travelogue about Mirza Agha Khan Noori (Pollak, 1989: 274). This power of bureaucrats is indicative of the existence of an administrative system and a patrimonial state. At times this power cooperates with the king’s personal will, while at other times opposing it.

Regarding the ruling princes of the provinces, it should be noted that the power of some of them was so great that it occasionally intimidated the Qajar kings. An example of this type was Prince Masoud Mirza (1849-1918), also known as Zill al-Sultan. He attained the government of Isfahan at a young age and ruled almost half of the country in 1888 AD (Dalmani, 1956: 907; Vanessa, 2010: 140). The ruling princes also benefited from various strategies such as seeking assistance from nobles, great tribal thanes, high-ranking merchants, and clerics, as well as powerful Western countries to maintain their political or economic position. For example, without the support of the British crown and Allahyar Khan, the head of the Qajar Yokhari tribe, after the death of Fath Ali Shah, Muhammad Mirza (1808-1848) would never have been able to overcome other powerful princes who claimed and relied on the throne (Markham, 1988: 119). On the other hand, presenting exquisite gifts in cash or commodities was another way through which provincial rulers were able to attract the favorable opinion of the king and the central government (Sarjan Malkam, 2000: 762).

Selling government positions to wealthy people who wanted to hold office in exchange for a certain amount of money and paying provincial taxes to the state were two issues that played a role in how the state bureaucratic class dealt with the government and vice versa. When the reformist statesmen from Abbas Mirza (1789-1833) to Mushir al-Doleh (1840-1907) or Amir Kabir were in power, taxes had to be collected regularly
from different provinces. Abbas Mirza’s son wrote about this in his book (Jahangir Mirza, 1948: 132). Abbas Mirza, with the help of Deputy Chancellor Farahani (1779-1835), tried to put the country’s fiscal affairs in order, but for various reasons, the rulers of the provinces were extremely willing to take excessive taxes from the peasants of their governmental territory (Watan Dost, 1992: 176). Amir Kabir’s reforms remained incomplete after his dismissal and death, and the power of local centers increased. Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh’s doctor Polak wrote in his memoirs: “Not a year passes without many governors asking for a “tax discount”, and although the Shah announced in recent years that he will cut off the hand of any ruler who utters the word ‘discount’, he has no choice but to agree” (Polak, 1989: 254). The fiscal reform programs of Amin al-Dawlah, Nous, Mornard or Shuster were also halted by the constant disruptions of classes such as the upper strata of the country’s bureaucracy, whose interests could be directly threatened by these reforms (Ashraf, Banuazazi, 2014: 46).

Conclusion

The results of the research show that the nature of the relationship between the state and social classes in the Qajar era obeys the pattern of “balance, opposition and limitation”. This relationship in the Qajar period is divided into three sub-periods: (1) the beginning of Muhammad Shah’s reign; (2) the reign of Naser al-Din Shah; and (3) the reign of Muhammad al-Din Shah until the end. In the first period, the pattern of the “balance” of power is established; “opposition” to power and resulting resistance are consolidated during the second period; and “limitation” of state power against social classes is constituted in the third period.

The Qajar era saw a change in the model of the relationship between the state and social classes. Based on the classification criteria of “accumulation and distribution of power”, the state can be described as “patriarchal” in the first period, “patrimonial” in the second and “constitutional” during the third. During the initial period, the power was consolidated and maintained within the Qajar clan kinship groups in a hereditary form. The government lacked a specific administrative system, and was limited to a few positions, primarily entrusted to royal relatives. Tribes sometimes did not pay taxes and obeyed their tribal chieftains in times of war. The king lacked decisive power in dealing with clergymen, merchants, nobles and large landowners, and had a balanced relationship with them due to his adherence to traditional rules.

During the second period, this patriarchal dominance that turned into a patrimonial state with its central administrative and executive organization significantly strengthened since the time of Amir Kabir. It reached several thousand public jobs and offices, but not to the extent that it could eliminate the state's dependence on tradition. The administrative organization is personal in nature and positions are given mainly to the relatives and princes (182 out of 325 positions). The modernization policies of the central state, which were detrimental to the interests of the main classes of society, such as clergy, landowners, and merchants, faced their opposition (such as the tobac-
co uprising, Monsieur Nouz, or constitutionalism), so they were at times canceled, at times delayed. This resistance is a sign of the ruler’s powerlessness, highlighting that the people during the Qajar era had the characteristics of subjects, i.e. they were free, had property rights, and were able to marry, sue and levy certain taxes. Therefore, in the second period, there is a kind of balance between the limitations of tradition and the ruler’s personal will, so the king is not almighty. Despite the pressure of tradition and administrative organization, the personal will of the ruler is still effective and vice versa.

During the third period, the constitutional revolution took place and the constitution was issued. This led to the establishment of the parliament, granting the right to vote, and the formation of political parties. As a result, the king’s personal power was reduced, traditional restrictions were loosened. Modern impersonal rules such as those governing the parliament, schools, and the press were established alongside traditional policies regulating the state and society. Modern institutions together with traditional rules and institutions, such as the previous social classes, reduced the amount of personal will of the ruler and thus the patrimonial state was transformed into a constitutional state.

As for the Bonapartist and neo-patrimonial states, we must say that the existing limitations of traditional and post-constitutional modern institutions reduce the power of the Qajar rulers, and in both pre- and post-constitutional periods we do not witness a centralized army, a large bureaucracy, and an absolute state where the king is the sole source of law, the possessor of the divine right and the “personality and expediency” of the whole country. Of course, the Qajar state enjoyed relative independence from the social classes, which means that it had some Bonapartian elements, but it lacked the totality of this state model. Based on this, the concept of Sultanian state and personal sovereignty is ruled out.

It is hard to imagine a state with absolute power, in which there is no private ownership of land, as Marx proposes to be the main feature of the Asian state. Although the Qajar kings occasionally referred to their ownership of the people of Iran with its lands, this concept was not put into practice. The autocratic government machine, which controlled the surplus of production and the state, was not too large to have intermediary forces. The influential classes of society such as the clergy, rich merchants, local nobles, provincial rulers, princes, landlords and tribal chiefs, were the intermediate layers of society that limited the power of the state and did not allow the realization of the idea of “supreme lord” and the absolute ruler. On the other hand, the Qajar state, which originated from the Qajar clan itself, was practically not dependent on it or on other social classes, and tried to control and even suppressed them in various ways, through granting state offices or creating disagreement between the clans.

Therefore, the Qajar state was neither a tool of the ruling class nor did it have absolute power. It was neither a class state nor supra-class state. A state with a degree of independent power and relative autonomy from the upper class of society, based on its ability to create a relative balance between social forces. This relative independence during the
Qajar period can be explained according to three historical models of the patriarchal, patrimonial and constitutional state. During the first and second Qajar periods, the state was associated with low accumulation of power and its centralized distribution. In the third period, after the constitution, it held the form of low power accumulation and scattered power distribution.

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Государство и класс в Иране эпохи Каджаров, 1794-1925 гг.

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Форма взаимоотношений между государством и классами общества на протяжении всей истории Ирана всегда объяснялась теориями «азиатского способа производства» и «восточного деспотизма». Согласно данным теориям, власть государства ничем не ограничена и ей, безусловно, подчинены все классы. Между тем многочисленные исторические данные эпохи Каджаров ставят под сомнение эту точку зрения, и перед нами возникает ситуация, когда различные социальные силы ограничивают власть государства. Настоящая статья была написана в качестве реакции на несоответствие между теорией «азиатского государства» и исторической реальностью Ирана в эпоху Каджаров. Основной вопрос: было ли государство Каджаров ограничено социальными классами или же обладало абсолютной, надклассовой властью? Для ответа на него используются классификации государств, предложенные Элманом Сервисом, Эндрю Винсентом, Максим Вебером, Карлом Марксом и Сэмюэлом Хантингтоном. Метод работы — исследование отдельного исторического случая, когда сбор и анализ данных осуществляется путем изучения и сопоставления документов. Результаты исследования показывают, что образец отношений между государством и социальными классами в эпоху Каджаров было «равновесие, противостояние и ограничение». Этот образец может быть описан в соответствии с классификацией государств согласно критерию «накопления и распределения власти». Фиксируются три периода. Первый можно охарактеризовать как «патриархальное» государство, второй — как «патримониальное», а третий — как «конституционное». Государство в первый и второй периоды правления Каджаров ассоциировалось с низким уровнем аккумуляции и централизованным распределением власти, а в третий период, конституционный, приняло форму, характеризующуюся низким уровнем накопления и рассредоточенным распределением власти.

Ключевые слова: восточный деспотизм, Иран, патримониализм, азиатский способ производства, Каджары.