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- Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

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Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильности, власть, нарративы, события и т. д.

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Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: <http://sociologica.hse.ru/>. Чтобы получать сообщения о свежих выпусках, подпишитесь на рассылку журнала по адресу: farkhatdinov@gmail.com.

Contents

Editorial.	9
<i>Alexander F. Filippov, Nail Farkhatdinov</i>	

RESEARCH PAPERS

A Rumor of Philosophy: On Thinking War in Clausewitz.	12
<i>Nicolas de Warren</i>	
“Oh God! What a Lovely War”: Giorgio Agamben’s Clausewitzian Theory of Total/Global (Civil) War	28
<i>Kristof K. P. Vanhoutte</i>	
Normalized Exceptions and Totalized Potentials: Violence, Sovereignty and War in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes and Giorgio Agamben	44
<i>Anna-Verena Nosthoff</i>	
Humanism as Casus Belli: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Just War Theory.	77
<i>Arseniy Kumankov</i>	
War and Capitalism: Some Important Theories and a Number of Relevant Facts. . .	92
<i>João Carlos Graça, Rita Gomes Correia</i>	
Social Practices of Using War Memorials in Russia: A Comparison between Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd and Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow.	115
<i>Elizaveta Polukhina, Alexandrina Vanke</i>	

DISCUSSION

Models of Conflicts and a New Paradigm for the 21 st Century Security Environment	129
<i>Hrachya V. Arzumanyan</i>	
10 Theses on War and Social Order: Preliminary Arguments on the Constitutive Functions of Armed Conflicts	140
<i>Oleg Kildyushov</i>	

REVIEW ESSAYS

The Philosophical Foundations of the Russian Sociology of War at the Turn of the 19 th and 20 th Centuries	150
<i>Alexander Lunkov</i>	

Instead of a Review; or, What, and Thanks to Whom, Do We Know

About a Man at War?	173
<i>Irina Trotsuk</i>	

BOOK REVIEWS

Isolated Modernity	191
<i>Alexander Finiarel</i>	
Boëne B. (2014) Les sciences sociales et l'armée: objets, approches, perspectives, Paris: Presses Universitaires Paris Sorbonne	195
<i>Evgeny Blinov</i>	
Mortal God—Dying God?	199
<i>Alexander V. Marey</i>	
Suppressing the Fear, Taming the Warre: Early Modern “Post-Machiavellian” Politics	204
<i>Alexander Markov</i>	

Содержание

От редакции	9
-----------------------	---

Александр Филиппов, Наиль Фархатдинов

СТАТЬИ

Философский слух: понимание войны в сочинениях Клаузевица.	12
--	----

Николя де Варрен

«Простите! на войне бывают свои досуги песни смех...»

Траговка Джорджо Агамбеном теории тотальной/глобальной (гражданской) войны Карла фон Клаузевица	28
--	----

Кристоф Ванхоуте

Нормализованные исключения и тотализованные потенциалности:

насилие, суверенитет и война в философии Томаса Гоббса

и Джорджо Агамбена	44
------------------------------	----

Анна-Верена Ностхофф

Гуманизм как *casus belli*: критика теории справедливой войны

в работах К. Шмитта	77
-------------------------------	----

Арсений Куманьков

Война и капитализм: о некоторых ключевых теориях и значимых фактах	92
--	----

Жоао Карлуш Граса, Рита Гомеш Коррейя

Социальные практики использования мемориалов в России:

сравнивая Мамаев Курган в Волгограде и Поклонную гору в Москве	115
--	-----

Елизавета Полухина, Александрина Ваньке

ДИСКУССИЯ

Модели конфликтов и новая парадигма среды безопасности XXI века	129
---	-----

Рачья Арзуманян

10 тезисов о войне и социальном порядке: предварительные рассуждения

о конститутивной функции вооруженных конфликтов	140
---	-----

Олег Кильдюшов

ОБЗОРЫ

Философские основания русской социологии войны на рубеже

XIX–XX веков	150
------------------------	-----

Александр Луньков

- Странности рецензирования, или К чему приводят попытки зафиксировать
частно-человеческое «измерение» войны 173
Ирина Троцук

РЕЦЕНЗИИ

- Изолированная современность 191
Александр Финиарель
- Boëne B. (2014) Les sciences sociales et l'armée: objets, approches, perspectives,
Paris: Presses Universitaires Paris Sorbonne 195
Евгений Блинов
- Смертный Бог — умирающий Бог? 199
Александр Марей
- Вытесняя *Fear*, приручая *Warre*: «постмакиавеллистская» политика раннего
Нового времени. 204
Александр Марков

Editorial

One and a half years ago we announced the first special issue of the Russian Sociological Review “Borders: Merging, Emerging, Emergent.” Three words echoing each other expressed exactly what we aimed to say: borders in the modern world have become less firm, they have undergone changes, and new borders have emerged, sometimes suddenly and unexpectedly. The new borderless world envisioned by the proponents of globalization is about to transform, at least partially, into a seemingly more familiar world of politically bordered territories, as if social evolution took another, backward step. We missed two important words in our tripartite slogan, and they *emerged* spontaneously in the papers we collected and published. The first word was “*contested*” and the second one was “*war*.” Borders, especially new political borders between territorial units would be *contested* and even destroyed during *wars*. The reasons are obvious: new borders might often not be recognized and legitimated by international treaties, and might not be well-embedded in any political geography as a common culture of spatial representations and the images of political landscapes.

However, the notions of borders and wars bring different questions and different themes, and the second special issue of the Russian Sociological Review goes beyond complementing the first. Announcing our second special issue we emphasized both the continuity and novelty of what we aimed to achieve:

Despite globalization, it is often assumed that the self-organization of society takes place within the secure borders of national states. We have to abandon this assumption since there are many instances of hybrid situations in the contemporary world. Examples of undeclared wars, terror, the strengthening of secret intelligence services, coups d'état, and revolutions challenge the traditional oppositions of the external and internal, or war and peace. Warfare and social order have always had an ambiguous relationship. Any warfare causes disorganization and disorder, but it also causes reorganization and the beginning of a new order. Warfare is directly related to the redistribution of resources, border shifts, and the hybridization of social forms. War metaphors permeate civil narratives. The chance of being killed may be higher in a peaceful city than on the front line. Wars now begin without a formal declaration. Peace is often made beyond legal systems, so there is always the possibility of breaching the peace without the fear of being accused of violating agreements, or of being unreasonable. Warfare transgresses the border between the real and virtual worlds, since we live in the age of information-, financial-, hybrid-wars. (Call for Papers)

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In a sense, it was an attempt to get more theoretically oriented papers, to avoid shallow actuality. What we did not know at the time was the growing and threatening actuality of any discussion of war. An old dictum says nothing is more practical than a good theory, but, in fact, we still hope that this striking actuality of the theme will not overshadow the theoretical importance of it.

Since its foundation the Russian Sociological Review has aimed to direct the attention of the academic and broader community to fundamental issues related to the foundations of social order. It has been considered a crucial focus and our editorial policy has been to publish research papers which shed light on how social order is maintained on different levels of social organization. It may seem that this special issue on war marks a shift towards a different kind of research focus — one that is opposed to social order. In the literature this focus has been generally described often in terms of social conflict and change. It can be even argued that war is a radical form of a social conflict that transforms social order. However, with this issue we would like to emphasize its fundamental relevance to the constitution of social order and the topic “State of War: Human Order and Social Orders” reflects our intentions. The central concept *state of war* was chosen very carefully. It appeared for the first time in the middle of the 17th century and in the history of ideas it was permanently associated with the great political thinkers who introduced the concept of war into the very construction of contractually established peace. War is not the absolute beginning of sociality. War is always there, not before, not after the peace, but rather as the dark side of any peace itself. Paradoxically, as it may seem, the wars between political units (i.e. modern states) as well as any other, e.g., partisan or hybrid wars of today, appear less important than this original war (“Warre,” as Thomas Hobbes called it). This is not true. “War writ large” has many faces, and it was our pleasure to get a number of papers where not only the ghosts of the old great thinker would be invoked, but these many different faces of war have been demonstrated with a theoretical subtlety and a practical sense for actuality.

We know that the sociology of war is still a marginal discipline despite the fact that it is becoming more and more popular and has a long and rich intellectual history with many influences from history, philosophy and political science. We wanted to provide a conceptual framework for the discussion of the issues of war in relation to the fundamental problems of sociology and political philosophy, namely the nature of social order within the conditions of warfare or the nature of a specific social order that has war in its core. This project is inevitably cross-disciplinary since it requires thorough historical and philosophical explorations into how war has been understood previously and what the current implications of these understandings are. The papers in this special issue focus on these two key areas. It is not surprising that a number of papers are dedicated to the discussion of the seminal book *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz, who is considered to be one of the forerunners of contemporary philosophers of war. Nicolas de Warren suggests a close re-reading of Chapter 1, Book 1 of the book and follows the philosophical method of Clausewitz in defining the essence of war. Kristof K.P. Vanhoute reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s implicit references to the work of Clausewitz by establishing a “spectral kin-

ship” between Agamben’s ideas of the state of exception and the law of the escalation of extremes. Anna-Verena Nosthoff’s paper continues the discussion of Agamben’s political philosophy through the issues of pre-contractual violence and the future in Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Another important thinker in the field—Carl Schmitt—is the focus of Arseniy Kumankov’s study. His paper is a reconstruction of Schmitt’s critique of Just War Theory and the implications of this critique for the political philosophy of Schmitt. João Carlos Graça and Rita Gomes Correia provide an overview of how history may be used to deepen our understanding of warfare and its relevance to economic activities. Close empirical studies of war are often difficult to carry out and social scientists often use representations in order to study these events. Elizaveta Polukhina and Alexandrina Vanke deal with such empirical phenomena, i.e., war memorials. They compared the social practices of using two war memorials, in Moscow and Volgograd. Their study contributes to the understanding of politics of memory regarding war.

The review section opens with a paper by Alexander Lunkov who traces the history of Russian “sociology of war” back to the philosophical debates of Russian military thought of the 19th century. The review by Irina Trotsuk considers contemporary fictional literature on war and asks a number of methodological and ethical questions, i.e., what a “story” or a “narrative” is and who is entitled to speak and describe war events in a contemporary society.

The discussion section has two essays. The first essay written by Hrachya Arzumanian suggests an outline for a new paradigm for the 21st century security environment of the post-soviet geographical area, while the second by Oleg Kildushov proposes a series of theses to construct a robust conceptual approach to study social orders via the analysis of war.

Finally, we publish reviews on books that address issues of war from different angles: Caldor’s book on new and old wars (by Alexander Finiarel), Boëne’s recent book on military sociology (by Evgeny Blinov), Pavón’s book on the political philosophy (by Alexander Marey) and Ivanova’s and Sokolov’s book on early modern “post-Machiavellian” politics (by Alexander Markov).

We hope that it will be enjoyable and thought provoking reading and that this issue will launch and revive further discussions in the field.

The publication of this special issue would not be possible without the help and academic commitment of our colleagues from the Centre for Fundamental Sociology and those who served as anonymous reviewers.

Alexander F. Filippov, Nail Farkhatdinov

A Rumor of Philosophy: On Thinking War in Clausewitz*

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The aim of this paper is to understand the nature of Clausewitz's philosophical thinking in *On War* and its two-fold relation to the catastrophic event of the Napoleonic Wars and to Clausewitz's own reformation of a theory of war. In distinguishing between a philosophical and a military register of thinking—between a reflection on the nature of war and a theory of war—this paper examines Clausewitz's critique of 18th century military thought, the dialectical progression of this thinking in *On War*, and the “grammar” of war in its linkage of different definitions of war into a systematic whole. Against Raymond Aron's proposal to sever the connection between the three substantial definitions of war in the evolution of Clausewitz's thinking, this paper examines the conceptual progression of these three definitions within *On War*'s opening reflection on the nature of war. A closer examination of Chapter 1, Book 1, demonstrates the originality of Clausewitz's philosophical manner of thinking through the essence, or nature, of war from its apparently “straightforward” definition of war as a duel to the Platonic resonance of its concluding image of war as a “paradoxical trinity.” In this manner, Chapter 1 establishes a philosophical space for Clausewitz's development of a theory of war in the subsequent books of *On War*.

Keywords: war, philosophy, Carl von Clausewitz, Raymond Aron, *On War*, Napoleonic Wars, Fichte

“Essence is expressed in grammar. . . . Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.”

—Ludwig Wittgenstein

“War has its own grammar, but not its own logic.”

—Carl von Clausewitz

1

Penser la guerre, Clausewitz is the title of Raymond Aron's erudite study of the genesis and argument of Clausewitz's unfinished treatise *On War*. Through the effective use of a comma, Aron's title acknowledges the indispensability of Clausewitz's *On War* for “thinking war” in its totality on the basis of propositions and principles that would render trans-

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parent its political rationality and conceptual intelligibility. Clausewitz's guiding ambition was "to bring about a revolution in the theory of war," as he notes in a celebrated note from 1827, even though, as he proposes in an earlier note written between 1816 and 1818, his work offers only "material" for a theory, not a "complete theory" itself. Clausewitz's premature death in 1831 would ensure that his seminal treatise remained, in his own words of premonition, "a shapeless mass of ideas." Yet, even in this imperfect form, its originality remains as significant today for "thinking war" as when first published posthumously. As Clausewitz declared (1976: 63; hereafter *On War*): "It was my ambition to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject."

A book that seeks "not to be forgotten" must necessarily think beyond its own historical context, and yet in the case of *On War*, it was the profound transformation of warfare brought about by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars that incited Clausewitz to fashion a space of thinking that could reach beyond the very circumstances that engulfed it.¹ The legacy of a book "not to be forgotten" is nonetheless double-edged. The reception of Clausewitz's *On War* is largely a history of constructing an image of Clausewitz's thinking; its lean prose and unfinished construction further facilitated this historical tendency to package his thinking into to a handful of formulae and set-piece ideas of how war should be understood.² Against such a dominant form of reception, as amplified through the catastrophic conflicts of the 20th century, Aron proposed viewing Clausewitz anew through the prism of "thinking war." As Aron remarks (1976; hereafter *Penser*): "J'ai lu *De la guerre* pour la première fois il y a une vingtaine d'années, puis je l'ai cité comme tout le monde. En 1971–1972, j'étudiais l'ensemble des écrits militaires, politiques, personnels de Clausewitz et crus constater que la pensée du plus célèbre des stratèges restait à découvrir et à comprendre."³ One of the principal merits of Aron's study is to approach *On War* as a thinking to be retrieved (and in the case of Aron's own interpretation, through a meticulous historical reconstruction of its genesis) and re-activated, that is, as a thinking still to be fully thought through. A book that still remains to be "discovered and understood" is a book that still cannot be forgotten, and less for what we might think it has said, but for what it has yet to say, or, in the case of Clausewitz's masterpiece, for how we might still learn what it means to "think war."

The challenges for understanding the thinking of Clausewitz's *On War* are nonetheless substantial. As routinely acknowledged in the extensive literature that has emerged since its publication, even in its most accomplished sections, *On War* lacks argumenta-

1. For the importance of Clausewitz's military experience for the development of his thinking, see Paret (2007), and, most recently, Stoker (2014). In this respect, it would be wrong to consider, as Berenhorst did, that "the most significant part of [Clausewitz's] wisdom, he abstracted from the wisdom, the actions, and the maxims of Napoleon" (quoted in Gat, 2001: 208).

2. For the reception of Clausewitz in the 19th century, see Gat (2001).

3. "I read *On War* for the first time about 20 years ago and quoted from it like everybody else. In 1971–1972, I studied all of Clausewitz's military, political, and personal writings and came to the judgment that the thinking of the most celebrated military strategist still remained to be discovered and to be understood" (my translation).

tive definitiveness and methodological transparency. As Martin van Creveld observes (1986: 35): “[*On War*] violates the rule of composition in that it offers no single, clear progression of thought, no well-defined ‘culminating point’ towards which everything strives, not even ‘conclusions’ succinctly summarizing the main points that it seeks to make.” Aside from the contingency of its unfinished condition, the challenge of navigating the conceptual topography of *On War* is further aggravated by its originality as both a philosophical attempt to “think war” (to understand the essence or nature of war as such) and a theoretical effort to educate military leadership for the successful waging of future wars. The pedagogical thrust of *On War* is thus hybrid: it seeks to teach how to think war philosophically so as to teach how to fight war militarily. With such a dual ambition comes a double risk of misunderstanding. As Alexis Philonenko astutely remarks (1999: 454): “. . . si l’auteur de *De la guerre* est sans doute trop philosophique pour les militaires, il ne l’est peut-être pas assez aux yeux du philosophe, qui jugera sa méthodologie sur bien des points insuffisantes.”⁴

The patent difficulty for a philosophical appreciation of Clausewitz’s thinking—my primary concern in this essay—begins with acknowledging that Clausewitz did not understand himself to be philosopher, even though he was philosophically minded as well as somewhat philosophically educated. In this liminal zone between philosophy and non-philosophy, one hears a *rumor* of philosophical thought in *On War*. Numerous have been the commentators who recognize certain patterns in Clausewitz’s thinking that are commonly identified as features of a “dialectical” method. Clausewitzian concepts are constructed around polarities that are set into motion, and these polarities function as dynamic elements within the development of a whole, or totality.⁵ The circulation of philosophical vocabulary within *On War* is likewise taken as a tantalizing indication of different possible philosophical influences. Hermann Cohen argued for the importance of Kant; Kiesewetter’s influence on Clausewitz’s thinking has been documented; and Hegel’s ever present shadow for Clausewitz’s generation has likewise been claimed as having left its mark on *On War*.⁶ In his critical survey of these proposals, Aron prudently concludes with a series of question marks regarding any substantial imprint of Hegel, Kant, or Montesquieu on the formation of Clausewitz’s thinking.⁷ This rejection of any specific influence does not fully dissipate the rumor of philosophy in *On War*, but, on the contrary, further heightens its intrigue. In Aron’s assessment (*Penser*, I: 371): “. . . on doit avouer que Clausewitz écrit dans un style philosophique sans rien comprendre à la philosophie.”⁸ Aron’s judgment seems to be of a lesser degree, but not of a different kind from Bernard

4. “. . . if the author of *On War* is without a doubt too philosophical for military minds, he is not philosophical enough in the eyes of philosophers, who would deem insufficient his methodology on a number of points” (my translation).

5. Aron identifies three basic polarities (moral–physical, means–end, attack–defense) (*Penser*, I: 152ff.); see also van Creveld (1986: 37) and Terray (1999: 75).

6. Creuziger, 1883. For Clausewitz’s knowledge of Kant’s writings, see Paret (2015: 18–76) and (2007: 161ff.), and Stoker (2014: 91ff.). For a detailed account of Clausewitz’s debt to Kiesewetter, see Echevarria II (2007).

7. *Penser*, I: 360–371. Kiesewetter’s importance was missed, however, by Aron.

8. “. . . one must admit that Clausewitz writes in a philosophical style without understanding anything of philosophy” (my translation).

Brodie's observation that "in these opening pages [Chapter 1, Book 1] Clausewitz is using word-images made fashionable by the great German philosophers of his day, especially Kant and Hegel." Whereas Aron considers Clausewitz as having understood nothing of philosophy, Brodie credits Clausewitz for having understood philosophy too well (*On War*: 643): "Fortunately, Clausewitz was of much too pragmatic fiber to lose himself either deeply or for long in this brand of idealism, but here as the curtain rises on his masterwork, this man who never graduated from a university enters wearing the gown of academe." The philosopher (Aron) and the military strategist (Brodie) exhibit in their own manner the difficulty of positioning Clausewitz vis-à-vis his own thinking; both reduce the rumor of philosophy in *On War* to an appearance without substance ("style" and "fashionable word-images").

2

On War is a thinking born of catastrophe. The Prussian defeats at the battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 represented a humiliation that reverberated deeply within German intellectual circles. From a military perspective, the Prussian collapse during the seven weeks of Napoleon's relentless campaign was historically unprecedented. In David Chandler's words (1973: 502): "Seldom in history has an army been reduced to impotence more swiftly or decisively." Clausewitz himself, who served under Prince August's command at Auerstedt, registered in a letter to his wife, Marie, the traumatic experience of the defeat in 1806 in unequivocal terms: ". . . the sense of being beaten is not a mere nightmare that may pass: it has become a palpable fact . . ." ⁹ This palpable fact received an influential philosophical interpretation in Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (1807–1808), which, much as with Clausewitz's more slowly germinating treatise *On War*, responded to the perceived world-historical significance of Prussia's defeat and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. ¹⁰ As Fichte remarks in his First Address: "Time is taking giant strides with us, more than with any other age since there has been world history." Fichte understands 1806 in no uncertain terms as marking the end of a world: "this era has entirely expired and ended." Yet, this time of ending is a time of new beginning and promise for a new world order. As Fichte announces (2013: 7–8): "Should such a new world exist it would be the means of creating a new self and a new age for a race that has lost its previous self . . . and the purpose of these addresses is to demonstrate to you its being and its true proprietors, to bring a living image of it before your eyes, and to declare the means of its creation."

Although not charged with the nearly Biblical aspiration of creating a new world, Clausewitz's *On War* is likewise a response to the original catastrophe of the 19th century in the form of forging a new manner of thinking. *On War* is Clausewitz's testimony to an event which haunts its genesis and argument internally (within its theoretical framework) and externally (within its historical context) through its most original and controversial

9. For a detailed account of Clausewitz's service in the 1806 campaign, see Stoker (2014: 38–65); for the letter, see p. 54.

10. Dismantled by Napoleon in 1806.

proposition: the concept of absolute war. As Clausewitz notes (*On War*: 580): “. . . one might wonder whether there is any truth at all in our concept of the absolute character of war were it not for the fact that with our own eyes we have seen warfare achieve this state of absolute perfection.”¹¹ This appeal to witnessing the birth of a concept anchors *On War* to its singular historical situation while simultaneously opening the horizon for its thinking—for its conceptual testimony—beyond the event of its own inception. To think through an event—the advent of a new form of warfare—is to think beyond it in pursuing the full range of implications and consequences for what it means to think, and hence ultimately to practice, war. As Clausewitz remarks (*On War*: 580): “Surely it is both natural and inescapable that this phenomenon should cause us to turn again to the pure concept of war with all its rigorous implications.” This perfection of warfare is an historical *punctum* created by a “world historical individual,” to evoke Hegel’s celebrated designation of Napoleon. Whereas the generals under Fredrick the Great’s command and their opponents were guided by political aims and instructions, the opponent of Austria in 1805 and Prussia in 1806, as Clausewitz writes, was nothing less than “the God of War himself.” Napoleon’s genius is to have realized the impossible: to have perfected war in the absolute.

Emphasizing this constitutive relation between event and thinking, between Napoleon’s singular achievement and Clausewitz’s singular masterpiece, allows us to position *On War* with regard to the Napoleonic Wars as well as position the concept of absolute war—or better its function—within the thinking of *On War*. With respect to the latter, *On War* creates a space of thought meant to contain, in thinking through, the historical event of warfare’s perfected realization. The significance of this historical catastrophe is, however, two-fold. From a military perspective, and already beginning with the battle of Valmy in 1792, in the presence of which Goethe had declared: “From this place, and from this day forth begins a new era in the history of the world,” the defeat of Prussia, Russia, and Austria demanded the adoption of novel theories and practices of warfare. The following years, 1805–1809, witnessed the reforms of the Prussian Army under the leadership of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and of the Austrian army under Archduke Charles.¹² Clausewitz, who was allied with the reform-minded establishment in the Prussian military, faults the military leadership in 1805, 1806, and 1809 (each campaign culminating in decisive French victories: Austerlitz, Jena/Auerstedt, Wagram) for their failure to adapt to the changing pace and means of Napoleon’s new way of warfare.¹³ As he remarks, “Such a transformation of war might have led to new ways of thinking about it,” and the fact that it

11. Clausewitz continues (*Ibid.*): “After the short prelude of the French Revolution, Bonaparte brought [warfare] swiftly and ruthlessly to that point. War, in his hands, was waged without respite until the enemy succumbed, and the counterblows were struck with almost equal energy.”

12. For Prussian military reforms in light of the “cognitive challenge” of 1806, see the insightful Paret (2009).

13. It is here interesting to remark that Clausewitz does not make mention here of Napoleon’s 1807 campaign against Russia, the Russian defeat at the battle of Friedland and the Treaties of Tilsit. This omission further stresses the Germanic (Prussia and Austria) orientation of Clausewitz’s concern and intended audience in this passage.

did not is clearly suggested as an Allied military *and* political failure, on account of which Napoleon continued unfettered with his impressive military successes (*On War*: 583).

This demand for “new ways of thinking” carries another distinct meaning. In addition to its military implication, Clausewitz suggests that the military revolution brought about by “the God of War” calls for a philosophical revolution with regard to understanding the nature of war as such. The new way of thinking in *On War* is, in other words, not limited to a new military thinking with regard to questions of strategy and tactics, nor even in terms of a novel cognitive epistemology of war—all of which are indeed central to the project of Clausewitz’s thinking.¹⁴ These theoretical reflections in *On War* must furthermore be understood in relation to Clausewitz’s studies of various campaigns during the Napoleonic Wars, since it is with the historical analysis of individual and actual conflicts that Clausewitz demonstrates how his general propositions and principles were to have been applied in instances when they were not. More fundamentally, however, one finds a philosophical register of thinking in *On War* which reflects the two-fold significance of the Napoleonic Wars and Clausewitz’s dual roles as participant and witness, as an engaged military staff officer and as an educator in his capacity as an instructor at the Prussian War College in Berlin. As with Fichte’s *Addresses to the German Nation* and its emphasis on the critical function of philosophical education for the renewal of Germany and its world-historical mission, Clausewitz understands his own pedagogical mission as inseparable from cultivating a philosophical register of thinking.

This dual character in Clausewitz’s thinking, operating in both a philosophical and military register, finds concise expression in his critique of Heinrich von Bülow’s scientific approach to warfare and like-minded military theories, which would reduce war to “algebra on paper.” In *Geist des Neueren Kriegssystems* (1799), von Bülow fashioned systematic principles for a “science of war” (*Kriegswissenschaft*), as opposed to merely an “art of war” (*Kriegskunst*), by means of a “geometrization” of the purported rules governing an army’s engagement along its lines of operation. Von Bülow’s proposal for a “science of war” stems from his conjecture that the discovery of such a scientific system of war would in fact render war pointless (*Zwecklos*): given that armies are equally trained on the tactical level, if confronting armies were equally informed about the scientific principles governing strategy, victory of one party over another would effectively be rendered impossible (von Bülow, 1835: xiv). One is here reminded of the zero-sum game of tic-tac-toe in the 1983 film *WarGames*; in a comparable vein, von Bülow argues that war would be an unwinnable game if both parties followed an optimal strategy. Clausewitz’s rejection of von Bülow’s “science of war” reveals his rejection of the kind of military theory espoused in *Geist des Neueren Kriegssystems*. In opposing von Bülow’s prescriptive system of war, Clausewitz does not just formulate alternative views regarding questions of strategy, tactics, and other military topics; he presents instead a different conception of what a theory of war requires as a philosophical foundation. We can rightly speak of Clausewitz’s *On War* as a philosophical critique of war in the loosely Kantian sense of establishing the

14. For example, as insightfully argued in Engberg-Pederson (2015).

limits and capacities of an activity (“thinking” for Kant, “war” for Clausewitz) which inherently, when left unguarded and unknown with regard to itself, tends towards the unconditioned, thus exceeding the bounds of reason itself. Reason, much as war in Clausewitz’s argument, is this paradox of self-restraint and excess, of moderation and extreme. And much as with Kant’s critique of reason, Clausewitz’s critique of war will turn on demonstrating both the inherent “dialectical” movement within war that leads it towards an extreme (“absolute war”) and what Clausewitz calls the “braking” or “delaying” principles (*retardierende Prinzipie*), or “counter-poises” (*innewohnende Gegengewichte*), that inhibit war from its perfected realization. A critique of war must, much as with a critique of reason, find clarity (and, in this sense, “self-knowledge”) with regard to war’s proper ends and means, and thus avoid the confusion or contamination of one with the other. Napoleon’s new form of warfare awakens Clausewitz from his dogmatic slumber and thus awakens a reflection on war to its genuine subject-matter and purpose.

In contrast to von Bülow and other military theorists of his age (e.g., Jomini), Clausewitz does not begin his treatise *On War* with a “theory of war,” but begins with a set of reflections on “the nature of war.” The distinction between “Nature of War” (Book 1) and “Theory of War (Book 2) distinguishes his philosophical reflection on war from his military consideration of strategy and tactics.¹⁵ As Clausewitz remarks at the beginning of Chapter 1, Book 1, he does not want to begin with a “pedantic” and “literary” definition; he begins instead by “going straight to the heart of the matter;” in other words, he begins with the nature of war. This reflection on the nature of war in Book 1 opens the space of thinking for the development *On War*. Clausewitz thus creates the conceptual space, or topography, in which he situates his own theory of war without thereby mechanically deriving his theory of war from his preliminary philosophical thinking. The sense in which Book 1 is the foundation for his own thinking is not to be conflated with it as a foundation for the derivation of or “justification” for his theory. Instead, as Clausewitz makes clear, these opening reflections provide a constant point of reference (*Blickrichtung*), or better: an orientation, for the theory of war developed in Books 2 to 7. As Éric Weil argues, it is in this sense that *On War* develops a “genuine philosophy of war,” not in terms of philosophical principles that would usurp genuine military theory nor in terms of a military theory constructed from rigid principles and prescriptions, but in the sense of providing a foundation for a military theory of strategy and tactics in a reflection on the nature of war as such (Weil, 1971: 223). As an immediate consequence, the concept of theory becomes in turn transformed. As Weil remarks (Ibid., 221): “Clausewitz veut comprendre la nature de la guerre, et s’il élabore une théorie, elle a pour but précisément de libérer la pensée stratégique des entraves des ‘théories.’”¹⁶

This liberation of theory from theory finds clear expression in yet another facet of Clausewitz’s rejection of von Bülow. In a tacit reference to *Geist des Neueren Kriegssys-*

15. Compare, for example, how von Bülow begins his treatise in Section One with a consideration the “basic principles of the basis of operations.”

16. “Clausewitz wants to understand the nature of war and if he elaborates a theory, it is precisely with the aim of liberating strategic thinking from the obstacles of ‘theories’” (my translation).

tems, Clausewitz writes in a note written about 1830 (*On War*: 71): “It is a very difficult task to construct a philosophical theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for.”¹⁷ Although Clausewitz stridently rejects any conception of theory based on “permanent laws” and “inflexible plans” which would make war as coming “from a machine,” he nonetheless argues for “a whole range of propositions” and seeks to extract a structure of intelligibility from the diverse manifestations of war as well as from the complexity of war’s total phenomenon. Such propositions richly populate Books 2 to 7 of Clausewitz’s *On War*, and must not be considered as “analytic” propositions, but rather as “synthetic” propositions in a loosely Kantian sense of reflective judgment. As Emmanuel Terray observes (1999: 55), reason in Clausewitz is a combinatorial activity of thinking about the heterogeneity of the real in order to act upon it.¹⁸ Whereas in what Kant termed “determinate judgment,” a particular is subsumed to a universal, in “reflective judgment,” the universal must be found for the particular, which, for Clausewitz, requires what he calls “the tact of judgment.” As he remarks: “Here the activity of the understanding leaves the field of rigorous science, i.e., logic and mathematics, and becomes, in the larger sense of the word, an art, i.e., the ability to find in a confused mass of elements and relations the ones that are most important and essential to using one’s tact of judgment.”¹⁹ This emphasis on “the tact of judgment” is reflected in the literary composition of *On War* and Clausewitz’s frequent, often brilliant use of pithy propositions and analogies which approach aphorism. In this regard, Clausewitz’s style in *On War* is less “philosophical” and more akin to the scientific prose found in Lichtenberg with its threads of vivid images and metaphors woven into a tapestry of propositions and principles. The pedagogical function of this aphoristic leanness of prose is meant to reflect the premium placed on the exercise of the tact of judgment in war’s context of uncertainty, chance, and human failings.

3

Clausewitz’s unfinished masterpiece presents the reader with a collection of puzzle pieces that seemingly do not construct an unified image. The reasons for this “shapeless mass of ideas” have been indicated above: the dynamic character of Clausewitz’s thinking; the unfinished condition of his manuscript; the challenge of reconciling the “universal thirst for clarity” and “orderly scheme of things” with the “chameleon-like character of war”; and the relation between the singularity of Napoleon’s perfection of war and Clausewitz’s singular effort to bring about a “revolution in the theory of war,” i.e., in thinking war. A principal difficulty, however, which runs through these various factors is the basic challenge Clausewitz identifies for the construction of a “philosophical theory,” namely, to find the

17. Howard and Paret’s translation erroneously translate *philosophische* with *scientific*.

18. Weil also emphasizes the collapse of the distinction between theory and practice (1971: [x]).

19. For a contrast between Clausewitz’s “tact of judgment” and Kant’s “reflective judgment,” see Engberg-Pedersen (2015: 76ff.).

intelligibility that pervades the heterogeneity of the real. This form of intelligibility must be both dynamic and systematic, i.e., it must integrate different elements into a whole.

In *Penser la guerre*, Clausewitz, Aron identifies three “constellations” (or “definitions”) in *On War* and raises the issue of how to understand their systematic relation and conceptual compatibility. Although this issue of how to understand the relation between these three substantial definitions of war do not exhaust how to understand Clausewitz’s conception, or “thinking,” of war, it is an issue that compels a clearer understanding of how Clausewitz understood the relation between “concept” and “experience,” and the grammar of his thinking, its systematic progression and unfolding. The first constellation defines war as a duel that inherently mounts towards an extreme pitch of reciprocal violence; it is with such a notion in mind that Clausewitz coins the expressions “absolute form,” “pure concept” or “abstract concept” of war. A second definition is found in Clausewitz’s 1827 note, where a distinction is drawn between two kinds of war depending on its objectives: to over-throw the enemy or to occupy frontier-districts. For Aron, this second definition recognizes a spectrum of wars, and hence, the conceptual distance between “absolute war” and actual wars, and the polarity between violence and dialogue, military action and diplomacy. A third definition is identified with what Aron labels *la Formule*, “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” and the idea of the “paradoxical trinity” found at the end of Book 1, Chapter 1. This definition establishes the “logic” of war in terms of its subservience to political aims and motivations. In this celebrated “formula,” politics can exercise either a moderating or accelerating role; as either curbing the intrinsic progression of war to an absolute pitch of violence, or as adopting the means of violence for the pursuit of political ends. In each instance, however, the violence of war is a means towards a political end, not an end in itself, and hence, defined by political rationality and judgment. Whereas the aim (*Ziel*) of war is the destruction of the enemy forces, the goal (*Zweck*), and hence, the point, of war is political. The importance of this “mature” definition of war is stressed repeatedly by Aron. War’s diversity reflects the diversity of political aims and the three tendencies which can come to dominate the direction of a war as seen through the prism of the “paradoxical trinity” of the military establishment, the government, and the people.

Aron’s solution to the conceptual puzzle of how to understand the relation between these three definitions, and hence fulfill Clausewitz’s ambition to “think war” systematically, turns on a historical claim concerning the genesis of Clausewitz’s thinking and an interpretative strategy of decoupling what he considers Clausewitz’s “mature” view from his earlier definition of war. To this end, Aron speaks of Chapter 1, Book 1, in which the third definition comes to expression, as “Clausewitz’s spiritual testament.” This definition of war as the continuation of politics by other means entails, on Aron’s reading, a rejection of the first definition of war as a duel that moves unchecked towards an absolute pitch of violence, and which represents (for Aron) an earlier and discarded view in the development of Clausewitz’s thinking. This notion of “pure” or “absolute war” is interpreted by Aron as an “abstraction” and “irreal notion” that functions as a Weberian ideal

type. Indeed, Aron even speaks of the concept of pure war as “philosophical” in a pejorative sense: as only “pertinent in the world of concepts and abstraction.”

Aron’s historical reconstruction and understanding of the relation between concept and experience, absolute war and actual wars, need not detain us further here, and has been critically examined elsewhere (Terray, 1999: 51–83). Nor is the complex question of how to understand the meaning of “politics” (*Politik*) and “continuation” (*Fortsetzung*) in Clausewitz’s thinking (or in Aron’s reading) to be developed here. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relation between the three substantial definitions of war in Clausewitz’s *On War* can be pursued internally within the progression of Book 1, Chapter 1—Clausewitz’s “spiritual testament.” Contrary to Aron’s dismissal of Clausewitz’s “philosophical style,” if we take seriously the rumor of philosophical thought in *On War* and examine the progression of thinking in Book 1, Chapter 1, we find a conceptual linkage among the three definitions of war that does not separate one from the other (against Aron’s strategy of decoupling); one recognizes instead a certain grammar of thinking through war in its dialectical complexity. Following a suggestion by Éric Weil, we can identify two basic philosophical concepts that anchor the development of Clausewitz’s thinking, totality and polarity, to which, contrary to Weil, one should add a third, means and ends.²⁰ The relation between these three concepts is itself structured by totality and polarity: the total phenomenon of war is generated through polarities. Weil, however, sets aside the question of how Clausewitz arrived at this dialectical conception of thinking. As he writes: “Comment Clausewitz est arrivé à cette dialectique de la réalité historique—car c’est bien de cela qu’il s’agit, et au sens la plus strict—c’est une question qui ne doit pas nous préoccuper ici: on peut toutefois dire qu’il n’a guère eu de formation philosophique et que, en particulier, il ne semble pas avoir connu la pensée hégélienne” (Weil, 1971: 224).²¹ Regardless of its possible sources and motivations, this dialectical movement operates immanently within the progression of thinking in Book 1, Chapter 1, and, more specifically, establishes a series of conceptual linkages among the three definitions of war.

4

It is, in fact, just such a description of what it would mean to “think war” that Clausewitz proposes in the introduction to the philosophical opening of *On War* in Chapter 1, Book 1, when he writes: “I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject, next its various parts or sections, and finally the whole in its internal structure” (*On War*: 75). In a note written about 1830, Clausewitz remarks that “the first chapter of Book 1 alone I regard as finished. It will serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere” (*On War*: 70). This first chapter presents a progression of thought that

20. According to Weil, the concept of means and ends “ne sont pas philosophiquement fondamentaux” (1971: 225).

21. “How Clausewitz arrived at this dialectic of historical reality (since it is in fact here a dialectical method in the strict sense) is a question that should not concern us here: one can note, however, that it did not receive a philosophical formulation and that, in particular, it does not appear that he knew Hegel’s thinking” (my translation).

moves from “the simple” to the “complex,” and, in so doing, exhibits a progress of thinking that moves towards war as “total phenomenon.” This progression of thought links together “grammatically” different “definitions” (different puzzle pieces) of war, thus delineating the contours of the nature of war as such. In this manner, the linkages of different “moments” or “definitions” of war provide a clue to the question of the compatibility of different definitions of war which has often been debated by commentators, including, most recognizably, by Aron.

The first definition of war introduced by Clausewitz at the beginning of Chapter 1, Book 1, “goes straight to the heart of matter” in stressing from the beginning and as the most basic, or “simple,” basis for a reflection on the nature of war, the essential form of war as fighting, or armed conflict.²² War, Clausewitz here understands, is “a duel on a large scale.” Within the progression of Clausewitz’s thinking in Chapter 1, this definition of war is the most simple, which, over the course of this thinking, becomes more complex. We find not only the movement from “the simple” to “the complex,” but also, from “parts” to “whole.” This definition of war is not only methodologically speaking “straight-forward,” it is also historically speaking the most classical, even though Clausewitz will inflect this definition in a manner that establishes the measure for this departure from this traditional definition by generating his notion of absolute war from the inherent dialectical movement within reciprocity of interaction in a duel.

In *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625), for example, Hugo Grotius likens war between two states with a duel between two individuals. As Grotius observes, the Latin word *bellum* is derived from *duellum*, which in turn stems from *duo* “and thereby implied a difference between two persons.” In keeping with this image and historical definition, Clausewitz underlines that war as a duel (*Zweikampf*) is the employment of physical, violent force to compel another’s will. We find here a clear echo of the conception of war as conflict between two sovereign states. Referring once again to Grotius, as he remarks in *The Rights of War and Peace* (III, iii, XI): “. . . war is not the PRIVATE undertaking of bold ADVENTURERS, but made and sanctioned by the PUBLIC and SOVEREIGN authority on both sides.” Within Clausewitz’s progressive unfolding of this dyadic encounter, if force is a means to compel an adversary’s volition, it implies that war serves a political demand, namely, that the point or end (*Zweck*) of war is not the destruction of the enemy, even if this might be its aim (*Ziel*), but the recognition of our will and political demand as a law or command. The enemy’s will is compelled to “fulfill” our will: “*Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen.*”²³ The aim of war is to impose our will on the enemy, yet this imposition requires that the enemy accept this imposition, or, in other words, that a political act brings war to an end (a treaty), much as a political speech-act is required to declare war. This insistence on the political meaning of victory is repeatedly stressed by Clausewitz in his reflections on war plans in Book 8.

22. On the importance of this point through-out Clausewitz’s development, see Gat (2001: 205).

23. “War is therefore an act of violence for the purpose of compelling the adversary to fulfill our will” (my translation). For an emphasis on this point, see Thivet (2010: 167).

What leads the further unfolding of this initial statement of the definition of war as a duel is, however, not its tacit political implication, but the sense in which the means of violence is governed by its own “grammar.” This grammar of war is organized around the insight that war is an activity structured dynamically in terms of reciprocity and interaction (*Wechselwirkung*). Whereas the political implication of the definition of war as a duel remains muted at this preliminary stage, the inherent dynamic of war is explored through three figures of interaction which collectively account for the inner excitation, as it were, of the concept of war to a self-perfected realization. The definition of war as a duel thus introduces the distinction between means and ends, and this distinction quietly structures the development of his thinking: once the inherent grammar of war as means has been examined, Clausewitz will return to a more precise definition of war in which war is more explicitly and emphatically subsumed to its proper end, not its own activity, but political ends. At this beginning stage of development, what is important here that the structure of political recognition is based on a structure of reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) which operates, when considered in abstraction from “counter-poises,” independently. The thesis is central: “War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.”

Clausewitz advances, in fact, a double and mutually reinforcing claim: the application of war is logically unrestricted and the activity of war tends towards extremes due to the reciprocity of interaction. As René Girard here emphasizes, violence breeds violence as adversaries increasingly resemble each other in pursuing their ends through violent means. According to the principle of conflictual mimesis, adversaries become doubles for each other in focusing on each other, not their own objectives; in this manner, violence breeds a violence which blinds the participants to the object pursued through a mimetic fixation with the other. The movement towards extremes, on this reading, is proportional to the resemblance of adversaries to each other (Girard, 2007: 39ff.). Clausewitz identifies three forms of interaction. War is a paradox where the pursuit of control (to compel the adversary to fulfill one’s will) exposes itself to a situation beyond one’s complete control, but in the case of these forms of interaction which drive war to the extreme, the loss of control is due to the inner excitation, as it were, of the very concept of war itself as an activity. Clausewitz here likens these three forms of interaction to laws that would govern forces in a vacuum: “. . . a clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own” (*On War*: 78). When considered purely as a concept, war is “stupid,” not because of its instrumental value (which only becomes so defined once forces no longer obey their own laws), but because war in this pure dialectical unfolding towards extremes is “senseless” precisely because it operates with no purpose other than its own self-realization.²⁴ At this pure register of consideration, war is pure self-expression: its activity expresses only itself in its reciprocal progression towards perfection. Clausewitz’s suggestive image of an exploding mine to figuratively express war’s instantaneous, or better, spontaneous self-propagation—as an ideal or pure concept—underscores the senselessness of war left

24. For a different sense of “the dupe of violence,” see Dodd (2007).

unto itself.²⁵ It has a grammar, but no logic. This inherent stupidity of war in its pure concept is at the same time a lure, or temptation. As Clausewitz remarks (*On War*: 78): “If we were to think purely in absolute terms, we could avoid every difficulty by a stroke of the pen and proclaim with inflexible logic that, since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must always be exerted.” The implication here is that we might be tempted to consider that “the extreme must always be the goal” of war if we succumb to the “logical fantasy” of conflating the pure concept with the real concept. But insofar as the human mind is, contrary to Clausewitz’s optimism, *likely* “to consent to being ruled by such a logical fantasy,” it stands to reason that the pure concept of war opens the possibility for the contamination of politics through its own chosen means of war when such a means becomes unmoored, as it were, from any political logic. Political ends are never immune to the ardor of combat which contaminates both the ends and means of war. Heinrich Heine shrewdly speaks of “an eagerness for battle which combats not for the sake of destroying, nor even for the sake of victory, but for the sake of combat itself” (2013: 159).²⁶ Politics is perpetually exposed to the risk of being eclipsed by the violence it itself unleashes and legitimates.

This elaboration of the pure concept from war from the initial starting point of a definition of war as a duel brings into view the polarity between the “abstract” and the “real,” the pure concept of war and relative concepts of war, namely, relative to the pure, abstract concept. This passage from the first definition and its conceptual development to the second definition does *not* signal, however, a rejection or suspension of the first. Clausewitz identifies what he terms “counter-poises” (*innewohnende Gegengewichte*) which moderate and punctuate the realization of war: human psychology, the asymmetry of attack and defense, and change. The material realization of war (space and time, human psychology, and contingency) accounts for the irreducible gap between absolute war and actual war, as well as the gap between intention and execution within an actual war (Terry, 1999: 64). The dialectic of war can thus be understood as the interplay and tension between two opposed tendencies: materialization and de-materialization. Whereas the first reflects the “retarding principles” or “counter-poises” that moderate or inhibit the self-expression of war as absolute, the latter can be considered as the primary objective of military technology, espionage, and other applications of intelligence in war: to overcome or counter-act the counter-poises that inhibit war’s movement towards extremes.

Clausewitz reiterates, however, that the extreme of war is not a “theoretical requirement,” and thus, once seen to be a pure notion, becomes “no longer feared nor aimed at, because it becomes a matter of judgment what degree of effort should be made; and this can only be based on the phenomena of the real world and the laws of probability” (*On War*: 80). It is significant that Clausewitz introduces here the centrality of judgment (the tact of judgment noted above) immediately after his proposition that “in war the result is never final.” Judgment here enters the scene of thinking simultaneously with a transition

25. Clausewitz resorts to this metaphor again when describing both the French Revolution and the catastrophe of 1806 in Book 8.

26. His observation is with regard to the Vikings and “that ancient German eagerness for battle.”

to an explicit consideration of the political dimension of war. Indeed, as he observes: “A subject which we last considered in Section 2 [in Chapter 1] now forces itself on us again, namely the political object of the war” (*On War*: 80). Casting a glance back to Clausewitz’s point of departure with his “straightforward” definition of war as a duel in Section 2, Sections 3–10 can be seen as developing the inherent grammar of the nature of war in abstraction—without considering its political dimension, or object, namely, to compel the adversary to fulfill our political will. As Clausewitz notes, this political objective has thus far been “over-shadowed” by a focus on the grammar, or laws, of war. With this re-appearance of the political object of war from its initial appearance in Section 2, i.e., the definition of war as a duel, Clausewitz tacitly introduces the basic schema for what he will soon explicitly articulate in *la formule*, when he already declares here: “The political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires” (*On War*: 81).

Clausewitz considers a question that at first sight might seem insignificant or obscure: whether military operations can ever be interrupted for a moment, yet notes that “the question reaches deep into the heart of the matter.” The “heart of the matter” here is once again the relation between the pure concept of war and real, or relative, war. Unlike a mine which explodes to the extreme, war does not unfold according to a strict causal chain (i.e. according to laws of physical necessity); although it does possess an intrinsic mechanism of self-expression governing by its own laws, war is distributed, or, in other words, schematized, in space and time; real wars are discrete events, not an unbroken and incessant series of actions. The three counter-poles lead Clausewitz to his crucial insight that “war is further removed from the realm of the absolute and [this makes] it even more a matter of assessing probabilities” and that “no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” War is an art, not a science.

After this progression through two different, yet conceptually linked, constellations or definitions of war (war as a duel; war as a polarity between absolute war and real war), Clausewitz’s thinking arrives at what he calls “a more precise definition of war” and culminating with *la formule*; war is the continuation of political policy by other means. The consequences of this point is two-fold: war is not autonomous, but an instrument; wars are diverse given the diversity of political ends, and hence, the diverse manifestations of exertion and effort in war. The final consequence, however, for a theory of war, hence establishing the transition to Book 2, is the recognition of war as a “total phenomenon.” Looking back to the first definition of war as a duel, we have arrived by way of the “parts” to “the whole,” and through this progression, both the grammar and political logic of war has been thought through, yet thought through in such a manner that we are given an orientation or *Blickrichtung* for the development of a theory of war. The task set forth through this philosophical critique of the nature of war for a theory of war—and hence: for the practice of war—are delineated by the contours of war as a total phenomenon, or what Clausewitz calls “the paradoxical trinity,” in both an objective and subjective sense: people/hatred and enmity/blind instinct; the play of chance/creative spirit/commander and army; reason/politics/sovereignty. We are reminded here of the tripartite division of

the soul and the *polis* in Plato's Republic. This philosophical concept of the soul of war, in both its "objective" and "subjective" meanings (as political and psychological in Platonic senses) opens the space and sets the challenge for a theory of war. As Clausewitz writes: "Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."

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Философский слух: понимание войны в сочинениях Клаузевица

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Задача статьи — прояснить природу философского мышления Карла фон Клаузевица, которое он продемонстрировал в книге «О войне» (1832), а также проанализировать отношение этого мышления, с одной стороны, к драматическим событиям Наполеоновских войн, а с другой — к той ревизии теории войны, которую Клаузевиц осуществил. В статье проводится различие философского модуса мышления и модуса понимания войны, свойственного военной теории (различие между философскими задачами понимания природы войны и задачами теории войны). Это позволяет мне исследовать критику Клаузевицом военной мысли XVIII века, диалектическое развитие философского мышления в «О войне», а также «грамматику» войны в связи с различными определениями войны как часть цельной системы. В отличие от Раймона Арона, который предлагал исключить наличие связей между тремя содержательными определениями войны в эволюции идей Клаузевица, в статье я исследую концептуальное развитие этих определений в рамках рассуждения о природе войны, которым начинается сочинение «О войне». Более подробный анализ первой главы первой части этой работы позволяет увидеть особенности метода философского мышления Клаузевица, который рассматривает сущность войны, или ее природу, начиная с «прямолинейного» определения войны как дуэли и завершая образом войны как «парадоксального триединства» (в соответствии с Платоном). Таким образом в первой главе обозначается философское пространство, которое позволяет ему продолжить развитие теории войны в последующих частях своего сочинения.

Ключевые слова: война, философия, Карл фон Клаузевиц, Раймон Арон, «О войне», Наполеоновские войны, Фихте

“Oh God! What a Lovely War”¹: Giorgio Agamben’s Clausewitzian Theory of Total/Global (Civil) War

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When Carl von Clausewitz’s statement that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means” was inverted by Michel Foucault into “power is war, the continuation of war by other means” during his course entitled *Il faut défendre la société*, the already-growing interest in von Clausewitz skyrocketed. However, the enormous interest in this particular dictum overshadowed many of the even more intriguing observations discovered and diagnoses made by the Prussian general. The present text aims to investigate one of the less-famous pronouncements made in von Clausewitz’s *On War*. This pronouncement regards the ‘law’ of the ‘escalation to extremes’ that is inherent to every war (*a war becomes the war, becomes all or total war*). This ‘law’ has received little interest, although it can be considered much more worrisome than von Clausewitz’s more famous dictum. However, it has been recently rediscovered and discussed by the late French philosopher René Girard, and, as will be argued in this text, can be considered as the spectral heritage of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy. Although Agamben seldomly mentions the Prussian general (his main influences, Debord, Arendt, and Schmitt, however, often do), the discovery of the spectral kinship between Agamben and von Clausewitz allows us to consider Agamben’s philosophy of the state of exception and total/global civil war from a new and more provocative angle.

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1. For those who have not recognized this phrase, it is the English translation of the first verse of Apollinaire’s poem entitled *L’Adieu du Cavalier* (*The Cavalryman’s Farewell*):

Ah Dieu ! que la guerre est jolie
Avec ses chants ses longs loisirs
Cette bague je l’ai polie
Le vent se mêle à vos soupirs

Adieu ! voici le boutte-selle
Il disparut dans un tournant
Et mourut là-bas tandis qu’elle
Riait au destin surprenant

Oh God ! what a lovely war
With its hymns its long leisure hours
I have polished and polished this ring
The wind with your sighs is mingling

Farewell ! the trumpet call is sounding
He disappeared down the winding road
And died far off while she
Laughed at fate’s surprises

(Apollinaire, 1980: 220–221)

It is quite intriguing to see how Apollinaire’s theme has been revived (unaware, I am sure) by sections of the contemporary anarchist movement. The anarchist group that goes under the name Tiqqun (the Conscient Organe of the Imaginary Party), for example, has chosen as the title of one of its more influential texts (published later as the first chapter of the publication entitled *Exercises in Critical Metaphysics*) “OH GOOD, THE WAR!” (Tiqqun, 1999). It is already worth adding at this moment that Simon Critchley has interestingly argued that these contemporary anarchic movements (not just Tiqqun) have been fundamentally influenced by the writings of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who will be the main actor of this text (cf. Critchley, 2012: 148).

Keywords: Giorgio Agamben, civil war, escalation extremes, Michel Foucault, René Girard, politics, state of exception, Carl von Clausewitz, war

Introduction

In what has been considered by some as an almost-infamous paragraph of the *Philosophy of Right* (§ 324), Hegel writes that “war should not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external contingency whose cause is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be” (Hegel, 1991: 361). Whether or not Hegel’s affirmation is a justification of the ethical necessity of war or even a glorification of war—war being “just as the movement of the winds [which] preserves the sea from the stagnation which a lasting calm could produce” (Hegel, 1991: 361)—is not an issue in this text. Although no ethical claims will be found and neither will there be made any vindication of the glorifications regarding the most violent occupation known to mankind, war will be at the core of our considerations.

The contention that war will be at the centre of the considerations that will follow is, however, more worrisome than Hegel’s affirmation. In fact, what if war is not to be considered as contingent? What if war is not contingent nor an exception, but stands at the source and functions as the foundation and means of the continuation of civil society? These considerations should, however, not arouse suspicion. They are, in fact, almost as old as philosophy itself. Did the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, not already make similar remarks? Additionally, we read in fragment LXXXIII that “war is father of all and king of all” (Heraclitus, 1981: 67). In the chapters that follow, we will take this contention at face-value. War will thus not be considered in what follows as an evil nor as some external contingency, but as the basic source of (contemporary) society’s organization. This study can be considered as divided into two main parts, and each part will consist of two sections. The first two sections are dedicated to the study of two important arguments made by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. The final two sections intend to demonstrate how the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy can be considered as being (unconsciously) constructed along the same line of reasoning as proposed by the Prussian general. Being more than a political philosophy, we contend Giorgio Agamben has thus “re-introduced” war as the basic concept for understanding the organization of civil society.

We begin this study with one of the classics of war theory, namely *On War* by the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (Clausewitz, 2007). Our focus on von Clausewitz’s work will begin with “his” expression that war is nothing more, nor less, than the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 2007: 7, 28, etc.). Almost as if by necessity, von Clausewitz’s famous expression will lead us to Michel Foucault’s even more famous inversion of it in power or politics being the continuation of war by other means (Foucault, 2003: 15, 47–48). Our interest in von Clausewitz’s *On War* does, however, not finish with his famous dictum. In fact, this expression, which has been hailed for its (c)rude

realism, has overshadowed a far more intriguing and worrisome reasoning to which the second section of this first part will be dedicated to. We are referring to von Clausewitz's "law" of war's escalating logic. War, as this law states, tends to escalate by its proper nature. Every war runs the risk of it (always possibly) leading to total war (*a war becomes the war, becomes all or total war*). René Girard's *Battling to the End* (2010) will help us in commenting on this "law" and its logic.

Although the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben was introduced to von Clausewitz's work in his early career (in the 1970s, through Guy Debord), he does not seem to have dedicated much attention to the Prussian general in the decades that followed. However, when one performs a careful genealogy of the more important influences and key-concepts of Agamben's philosophy, most specifically in the so-called political philosophy as written down in his *Homo Sacer* series, it is difficult not to discover the spectre of the general haunting it. In fact, as we will attempt to demonstrate in the two sections of this text dedicated to Agamben's von Clausewitzian "influence," not only do the Italian philosopher and the Prussian general attempt to render explicit the same thing, they also attempt to render it explicit in the same way. To be sure, our contention is not that Agamben in some way took from von Clausewitz without letting his readers know (although Agamben does this often). For all we know, he is more than probably not even aware of the affinity his own political theory has with some of the more intriguing reasoning of von Clausewitz. However, that makes it even more interesting still. In fact, centuries after war was firstly declared the source and foundation of civil organization, we have still not become fully conscious of this fact, leaving us without the necessary means of surpassing its devastating implications.

1

Raymond Aron, one of the great specialists of the work of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, has written that "Carl von Clausewitz passes, correctly, as the most famous of the military writers, the only one of which no cultivated man has the right to ignore his name and two or three expressions"² (Aron, 2005: 42; my translation). Similar high praise for von Clausewitz and his *On War*—his *magnum opus* that remained unfinished³—has recently been expressed by another French scholar, René Girard. Girard described von Clausewitz's principle text as "perhaps the greatest book ever written on war" (Girard, 2010: xi).

Although judgments of von Clausewitz and his writings has not always been along these positive lines—there was a time that the name of the Prussian general could not be mentioned without a seriously negative undertone (had he not written an apology for

2. Although Aron describes von Clausewitz as the most famous amongst the military writers, whose name can't be ignored, he almost immediately continues by asking the very poignant question: "[H]ow many have actually read *On War* amongst those who cite it"? (Aron, 2005: 42; my translation). Although he has been cited much more since Aron's question, the latter is of the highest importance, even today.

3. A "shapeless mass of ideas" (Clausewitz, 2007: 8) as he once described it, largely underestimating his own work as such.

war, as some considered?)—they form the starting point of our considerations. We will start our focus on von Clausewitz by taking recourse to probably the most famous of the “two or three expressions” that should not be ignored. This expression—which, according to a myriad of his readers, von Clausewitz is even supposed to have coined⁴—is the famous “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” (Clausewitz, 2007: 7). Or, as he said in a slightly different and somewhat longer way: “. . . war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz, 2007: 28).

As Beatrice Heuser has conclusively shown in the introduction that accompanies the edition of *Vom Kriege* we consulted, von Clausewitz is not the “discoverer” of the relationship between war and politics that stands at the birth of the just mentioned expression.⁵ In fact, this relationship seems to have been some sort of general conviction that reigned amongst the students in the Military Academy at the time von Clausewitz was attending as a student. It was von Clausewitz’s classmate and future colleague at the War School in Berlin, Johann Jakob Otto August Rühle, who first put this complex relationship into words (cf. Clausewitz, 2007: xv). It is also von Clausewitz’s admiration for Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, which he read in a German translation, that should not be forgotten as a possible “source” for making the connection between war and politics.⁶

Leaving aside the paternity of the war-politics relationship which can be regarded as being only of secondary importance, it is with von Clausewitz that we find the connection between politics and war in what has become the traditional way of phrasing the expression. In fact, his is the intuition, an intuition that has been described as the Copernican revolution of the thinking about war (cf. Clausewitz, 2007: x), to turn what had been said about the interrelation between politics and war upside down. As von Clausewitz asks: “[D]o political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic” (Clausewitz, 2007: 252). Confirmed by this, the acknowledgment that war has (is a tool for obtaining) political purposes became with von Clausewitz the famous “War is nothing but the continuation of policy (politics) with other means” (Clausewitz, 2007: 7).

It has become common knowledge that the French philosopher Michel Foucault intended to invert Clausewitz’s dictum. In fact, during the first lesson of his 1975–1976 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault states that “at this point, we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2003: 15). Foucault’s aim was, however, quite different than could be thought when reading this sentence out of its context. Firstly, it is not his aim to invert Clausewitz’s

4. As we will demonstrate shortly, this is not the case. That the general did not coin the dictum should, however, not take anything away from the importance attributed to him nor to the expression.

5. General von Clausewitz, by the way, never claimed to have been the one who coined this expression.

6. War being, for Machiavelli, only one of the many tools available to the prince to bring his political ends to fulfillment.

aphorism. What is at stake, as becomes clear when he refocuses on this topic during the third lesson, is not that Foucault wants to invert the dictum but “who, basically, had the idea of inverting Clausewitz’s principle” (Foucault, 2003: 47). Secondly, the question, as Foucault continues, is not even “who” inverted Clausewitz’s expression, but what interests Foucault is Clausewitz’s inversion itself (his, just mentioned, so-called Copernican revolution of war theory). In fact, as we already indicated, the expression of war being merely an act of politics carried out with other means was a common conviction in the time of von Clausewitz, whose main “achievement” is thus not to be found in the discovery of a particular relation between politics and war, but in his very specific phrasing of the precise nature of that relation. At the heart of Foucault’s investigation stands the attempt to demonstrate that “the principle that war is a continuation of politics by other means was a principle that existed long before Clausewitz, who simply inverted a sort of thesis that had been in circulation since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Foucault, 2003: 48). In fact, what is truly at stake for Foucault in reference to von Clausewitz can be found in the conclusion of the seventh lesson (18 February 1976), which is interesting to propose in its completeness:

[T]he reason Clausewitz could say one day, a hundred years after Boulainvilliers and, therefore, two hundred years after the English historians, that war was the continuation of politics by other means is that, in the seventeenth century, or at the beginning of the eighteenth, someone was able to analyze politics, talk about politics, and demonstrate that politics is the continuation of war by other means. (Foucault, 2003: 165)

A detailed analysis of Foucault’s extremely rich course which goes under the title of *Society Must Be Defended* and from where all this can be found, unfortunately, can not be part of this text as that would lead us too far away from our basic aim.⁷ There is, however, a red line that can be found and that passes through what we have just said on von Clausewitz and Foucault, and which should be spelled out since its importance will be demonstrated continuously throughout this text. In fact, Ariadne’s thread which we are just beginning to unfold, is that far from being the absolute evil, (an absolute evil Hegel was already refusing to accept as the main judgment on war), war can even be, and has been, understood as the basis of civil society. Furthermore, war can truly function as a means to investigate and even understand civil society. Said differently and notwithstanding the inversion of the inversion (of the inversion), what is shared by the Prussian general and the French philosopher, and what will remain at the centre of all that will

7. Unfortunately, no time nor space can be dedicated to the extremely interesting discussion of the genealogical function of historical narratives of war, the so intriguing tales that are supposed to analyze politics as war which are, as Foucault so cunningly underlines, means of war in themselves. This function should, especially in our days where not so different tales are constantly being sent into the ether, remain a constant presence in one’s thoughts. They, in fact, and similarly to the description given by Foucault of the historic-political discourse of war, “function as weapons.”

follow, is that it is truly possible (and possibly even meaningful) to analyze politics—political power—by means of, or simply as, war.

2

Although the Prussian general is mostly known for “the Formula,” as von Clausewitz used to call it, this dictum should not be considered as von Clausewitz’s greatest lesson, according to Aron (cf. Aron, 1972: 220). For as much as “the Formula” should not be considered as von Clausewitz’s greatest lesson, it did, however, overshadow (most of) the other possible aphorisms that can be found in *On War*. Additionally, besides “the Formula,” there is a second dictum, or “law” as von Clausewitz defined it, that should be brought to the forefront. The reason this second “law” needs to be considered regards the fact that it is not only more intriguing than “the Formula,” but it is also much more worrisome. This second expression is so much more worrisome than the first one, that even the general himself, as René Girard noted correctly, “hides them [the effects of what is at stake in this law] behind strategic considerations” (Girard, 2010: xii). Or, as Girard re-phrases it closely afterwards after having discovered this “law,” von Clausewitz simply “retreated and tried to shut his eyes” (Girard, 2010: xii).

The “law” we are talking about, von Clausewitz’s “most brilliant intuition” as described by Girard (Girard, 2010: 83), is the one of the “escalation to extremes” that is inherent to every war (Clausewitz, 2007: 13). War, by its proper nature, drives to extremes and “to introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war” would only lead to “absurdity” (Clausewitz, 2007: 14). There is a persisting, and insistent, permanence in war of the risk of it (always possibly) leading to total war (*a war becomes the war, becomes all or total war*). As René Girard thought this law of the Prussian general through, he added the word “inevitable”: “The law of the escalation to extremes is inevitable” (Girard, 2010: 48). It is, for Girard, not even a “Clausewitzian’ law, it is simply real,” that is, it is pure and harsh reality (Girard, 2010: 43).

Before we can continue, a short remark is necessary about von Clausewitz’s understanding of this “law.” It has to be said that for the general, the “law” of escalation to extremes is generally defined as “abstract.” By defining this “law” as abstract, he is able to separate it from the “real world” where some forms of moderation will always be available. Thus, von Clausewitz can write at the beginning of the eighth point of the first chapter that “the abstract world is ousted by the real one and the trend to the extreme is thereby moderated” (Clausewitz, 2007: 18). However, when we recollect that not even four pages before this “real life modification aspect” von Clausewitz wrote “to introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would *always* lead to logical absurdity” (Clausewitz, 2007: 14; emphasis added), it does seem that Girard has a strong case when he claimed that von Clausewitz tends to retreat and close his eyes after having confronted us with such a harsh “law.” That theory does not always translate immediately into reality, furthermore, is by no means a certainty of any sort of modification; nor does it form some sort of solid base for a possible principle of moderation. True, theory does

not always translate into reality, but that is not because theory needs to be modified before it can become reality. One should recall here what Henri Bergson wrote—remembering a reflection made by William James—when the First World War began: “Horror-struck as I was, and though I felt a war, even a victorious war, to be catastrophe, I experienced what William James expresses, a feeling of admiration for the smoothness of the transition from the abstract to the concrete: *who would have thought that so terrible an eventuality could make its entrance into reality with so little disturbance?* The impression of this facility was predominant above all else” (Bergson, 1935: 149; emphasis added).

Returning to the “law” of escalation to extremes, this “law” seems to have escaped Foucault (and others, as we will demonstrate shortly). However, although it was ignored by Foucault, it seems to have been recovered (indirectly and non-explicitly)⁸, not only by the already-mentioned René Girard, but also by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Although Agamben has described himself as profoundly influenced by Foucault⁹, his knowledge of the Prussian general von Clausewitz derives not from Foucault, but from one of Foucault’s antagonists¹⁰, the French intellectual and founder of the Situationist movement Guy Debord.¹¹ Debord was considered by a large part of the French intelligentsia who were his contemporaries—and is still remembered by many—as a playful, insurgent alcoholic who once requested that one of his books be published with sandpaper as the covers so that it would rub away the name of the author and the title of the books on either side of it (cf. de la Durantaye, 2009: 173). For Agamben, on the contrary, Debord (with whom he socialized with in the 1970s in Paris) has to be taken very seriously.¹² Debord considered himself a “Strategist,” and in doing so, followed the definition of a strategist as given by none other than von Clausewitz. He made this perfectly clear for the first time in the preface of the fourth Italian edition of *The Society of the Spectacle* by which time Agamben had certainly made his (first?) acquaintance with the author of *On War*.¹³

8. The meaning and understanding of the seemingly indirect and non-explicit “recovery” of von Clausewitz’s “law” by Agamben will be the main topic discussed in the following section.

9. In *The Signature of All Things*, Agamben writes, for example, that Foucault is “a scholar from whom I have learned a great deal in recent years” (2009: 7).

10. Foucault wrote in *Discipline and Punish* that “our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance” (Foucault, 1995: 217). This should obviously be considered for what it was, namely a direct attack at the earlier published work of Guy Debord’s *The Society of the Spectacle* (1995).

11. As we already referred in the beginning, while most of the contemporary anarchic movements have been fundamentally influenced by the writings of Agamben, they, however, have also been influenced—and this is probably because of their interest in Agamben—by Debord. *The Spectacle* is a constant (negative) point of reference in these groups’ writings.

12. In a chapter of *Means Without End*, entitled “Marginal Notes on Commentaries on *The Society of the Spectacle*,” Agamben’s first lines are as follows: “Guy Debord’s books constitute the clearest and most severe analysis of the miseries and slavery of a society that by now has extended its dominion over the whole planet . . .,” and he continues: “[I]t would be of no use to praise these books’ independence of judgment and prophetic clairvoyance, or the classic perspicuity of their style” (Agamben, 2000: 72).

13. Agamben refers to all this also in the just mentioned chapter of marginal notes on *The Society of the Spectacle* (cf. Agamben, 2000: 73). We have written “through which Agamben certainly made his (first?) acquaintance with” because this is written proof that Agamben knew of the existence of the Prussian general. That Debord and Agamben, in their frequent encounters in the 1970s, would not have discussed von Clause-

Besides the two or three direct references to von Clausewitz that we find in Agamben's work, references that are always in concomitance with the presence of Debord, Agamben does not seem to have given a lot of time to the ideas of the Prussian general.¹⁴ However, it is not because there were not many direct contacts that a strong affinity between these two thinkers can not be established. In fact, is it not possible to connect Agamben's political philosophy with von Clausewitz's "law" of war's "necessary escalation"? Wouldn't this connection be of "exceptional" fruitfulness in order to improve our understanding of Agamben's position? Basically, the point we want to bring home in the following sections is that there is an incredible similarity between von Clausewitz's "law" of "escalation to extremes" and Agamben's "logic of the exception," as Eva Geulen called Agamben's political reasoning so cunningly (cf. Geulen, 2005: 73). If we would want to step on the ledge for just a moment, a short genealogical investigation of Agamben's understanding and direct sources can demonstrate a clear heritage, albeit of the spectre-type, as Agamben was probably unaware of this affinity with the Prussian general's ideas, particularly of the "law" of necessary escalation being discussed.

In order to demonstrate this genealogical lineage, we will start with an intriguing series of similarities between some opening (half-)sentences of three texts of Agamben that are closely related. We will begin by simply writing these (half-)sentences down, and we will do this chronologically: "... but there is no such thing as a stasiology, a theory of stasis or civil war" (Agamben, 2005a: 284); "... there is still no theory of the state of exception in public law" (Agamben, 2005b: 1); and to conclude: "... that a doctrine of civil war is totally missing is generally agreed upon ..."¹⁵ (Agamben, 2015: 9; my translation). The first (half-)sentence is from a paper entitled "The State of Exception," the second is taken from the first section of the first chapter of the book entitled *State of Exception* (the chapter goes under the title "The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government"), and the last (half-)sentence can be found on the first chapter (entitled "Stasis") of Agamben's

witz does seem somewhat unbelievable. As Bill Brown correctly informs us, Debord was made aware of von Clausewitz's work in the early 1970s (when Agamben and Debord were meeting in person), and in a letter from February 1974, in which Debord wrote that "at this stage and to speak schematically, the basic theoreticians to retrieve and develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautreamont, but Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz" (Brown, 2011: 199). If von Clausewitz was of such importance for Debord's thinking in that period, and Agamben held Debord's work in such high esteem as we came to see, then it does seem highly probable that the Prussian general must have been a frequent topic of discussion between Debord and Agamben.

14. It should be noted that the name of von Clausewitz does not appear in either of the impressive first introductions written on the philosophical work of Agamben, namely the English work written by Leland de la Durantaye (de la Durantaye, 2009), or in the Italian work written by Carlo Salzani (Salzani, 2013).

15. It is important here to insist once more on what we have mentioned a moment ago, namely that what we are dealing with here are "similarities." A (global) civil war is not identical with a (continuous) state of exception, nor is it identical with stasis. In fact, as Agamben wrote quite correctly, distinguishing, and interrelating, as such the three concepts, in the article that goes under the title of "The State of Exception": "... a possible reason for the absence of a stasiology in political science is precisely the proximity between civil war and the state of exception" (Agamben, 2005a: 284).

most recent addition, or intrusion¹⁶, to his *Homo Sacer* series entitled *Stasis: la guerra civile come paradigma politico* (*Stasis: Civil War as Political Paradigm*).

So what can be said about these fragments apart from their obvious similarity? First of all, they were all written by Agamben in about the same time period (2001–2003). Also, the text in the booklet that goes under the title of *Stasis* that was only published in 2015 goes back to a seminar delivered in 2001. Secondly, all these fragments bring us in direct contact, in a double way, with Hannah Arendt (and Carl Schmitt¹⁷):

(1) Two of the three semi-fragments are almost immediately followed by a reference to Arendt, together with Schmitt, as the source for the concept of “global civil war.”¹⁸ Arendt wrote, in fact, in *On Revolution* that the second world war could be (had been) considered as “a kind of civil war raging all over the earth”¹⁹ (Arendt, 1990: 17).

(2) The remarks made by Agamben in all three fragments that there has not been a theory of stasis / civil war / state of exception up until now can be brought back to Arendt’s remark in *On Violence*; she writes that it is surprising that “violence has been singled out so seldom for special consideration” (Arendt, 1970: 8). In fact, the similarity is so clear that Arendt might even have written, using almost the same formula as the ones we transcribed from Agamben, that there is no such thing as a theory or doctrine of violence. What is of importance here, however, is that Arendt is making this affirmation on violence while discussing von Clausewitz. Furthermore, Arendt is lamenting the fact that the very few who did have something to say about violence, and von Clausewitz did belong to these few, did not give violence (or war) a central-enough position. In fact, for Arendt, von Clausewitz’s formula (war being a continuation of politics by other means) is but an old verity that has to make room for the understanding that “war itself is the basic social system, within which other secondary modes of social organization conflict or conspire” (Arendt, 1970: 9).

Although Arendt seems to have missed out—but, as we have seen with Foucault, she is not an exception on this missing out—on von Clausewitz’s “law of necessary escalation” in its explicitness, it is not difficult to see that, implicitly, the general’s “law” remained present as some sort of phantom. Arendt, in fact, made exactly the same conclusion as von Clausewitz’s law predicted. Arendt, after WWII, was no longer afraid to draw

16. That *Stasis* can be considered a type of intruder can be seen from the fact that this volume “dethroned” *The Kingdom and the Glory* as the second book of the second part of the *Homo Sacer* series. I have been told, however, that this “dethronement” was a mistake and that *Stasis* is the final and missing forth book of the second part of the *Homo Sacer* series.

17. Carl Schmitt will not be of any particular importance at this moment, except for the important fact that he too held von Clausewitz in high esteem, and the book that is of importance for Agamben—Schmitt’s *Theorie des Partisanen*—is, up to a certain point, a re-consideration of a manifold of von Clausewitz’s points made in *On War*.

18. Agamben’s article entitled “State of Exception” only makes reference to Schmitt (Agamben, 2005a: 284). One can presume here that Agamben only successively discovered that Arendt also makes reference to something similar. Arendt, in fact, never wrote the three words next to each other that make up this concept.

19. Considering WWII as a global civil war, and assuming that Hitler obliged all his officers to carry a copy of *On War* in their bags as reported by Girard in his *Battling to the End* (cf. Girard, 2010: 182), makes one inclined to make certain connections that might not necessarily be the case but that do make sense and seem almost logical to make.

the conclusion the general had attempted (and succeeded rather well) to hide. WWII had, in fact, shown that the “law of escalation” was not just an abstract theory that could only be translated in a modified way (no longer as “total”) into reality.

Without wanting to establish any hidden, let alone intentionally kept hidden, kinship between the Prussian general and the Italian philosopher, it should be clear by now that the soil on which Agamben’s political theory has grown can be considered as greatly fertilized by von Clausewitz. In fact, and insisting on nothing but a spectre-type kinship, it would not be wrong to say that what is at stake with Agamben and von Clausewitz is pretty much the same thing.²⁰ The law of the *escalation* to extremes (which ends in total war) of the Prussian general and the statement that “faced with the unstoppable progression” of global civil war which makes of the state of exception the increasingly dominant paradigm of contemporary politics (Agamben, 2005: 2) of the Italian philosopher attempt to render explicit the same thing. But, even more importantly, they not only attempt to render explicit the same thing, they also attempt to render it explicit in the same way, as a menace.

4

We have already had the chance to mention Raymond Aron’s quite accurate remark that von Clausewitz’s greatest lesson was not the idea of the relation between war and politics, but his law of war’s “natural” escalation towards total war. We have also already mentioned that René Girard considered von Clausewitz to have been fearful of his discovery. Not only did he lock it in the cage of pure theory (to which he wrongly, as we have shown, opposed reality) but, still according to Girard, he simply “retreated and tried to shut his eyes” in front of (t)his “law” (Girard, 2010: xii). For Girard (and with this, this brief summary of what we have already seen in precedence will end) von Clausewitz’s “law” is not only inevitable, but it is not even a “Clausewitzian’ law, it is simply real” (Girard, 2010: 43). Aron would not have agreed with Girard’s conclusion. In fact, for Aron, who in a somewhat confusing way re-introduces the law of absolute war in the formula of war-being-politics, “absolute war remains political insofar it expresses the absoluteness of hostility between the belligerent but it never coincides with an actual war” (Aron, 2005: 34; my translation). However, for as much as absolute war can thus not be considered as “real” for Aron either, it did have a real function, according to Aron, in von Clausewitz’s theory of war. The real function of this law of escalation towards absolute war, a function that, still according to Aron’s judgment, made it into von Clausewitz’s greatest lesson, was that it functioned “not [as] a model, but [as] a menace” (Aron, 1972: 220).

That Agamben’s “theory” of the (continuous) state of exception or of the (global) civil war can not be considered as functioning as a model can be understood when we take a closer look at one of Agamben’s most “pregnant” concepts. We have already mentioned this concept when we indicated the origins of the (half-)sentence discussed in the previ-

20. Is not the intricate connection made between peace and war in Agamben’s “Idea della pace” (“Idea of peace”) quite intriguingly colored by the spectre of von Clausewitz, too? (Agamben, 1995: 81–82).

ous chapter. As we then mentioned, the second (half-)sentence was taken from the first chapter of the *State of Exception*, the work that goes under the title “The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government,” and the third, and last, (half-)sentence can be found in the first chapter (entitled “Stasis”) of Agamben’s most recent publication entitled *Stasis: la guerra civile come paradigma politico* (*Stasis: Civil War as Political Paradigm*). Only the first (half-)sentence seems to be missing a direct reference to the concept at stake (and for those that have not understood it yet, the concept is “paradigm”). However, although Agamben does not immediately make the connection between a (continuous) state of exception and its function as a paradigm, this connection is made some pages into the text where he asks whether the (continuous) state of exception should be considered as the “very paradigm of political action” (Agamben, 2005a: 288). Thus, for Agamben the (continuous) state of exception or the (global) civil war are and function as paradigms.²¹

“Stop!,” a reader might shout. “Isn’t a paradigm exactly to be understood as a model?,” (s)he would continue. For as much as Agamben’s political theory could be saying the same thing as von Clausewitz’s war theory, he most certainly is not saying it in the same way if the concept that is at stake is “paradigm,” the interlocutor would finish. However, although this imaginary reader would have demonstrated a basic linguistic and even etymologic understanding of the concept at hand, (s)he would have demonstrated a lack in understanding of Agamben’s peculiar usage of the paradigm.²² Let us thus turn to Agamben’s particular usage of “examples”/“paradigms.”²³

Agamben has, on various occasions²⁴, underlined the singularity of the paradigm and “the paradoxical status of the example.” In *The Coming Community*, Agamben writes the following: “[N]either particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that pres-

21. That the 2015 publication of *Stasis* could still be considered as somewhat of an “intruder” is deductable from still another reason. In fact, it is, for as much as we are aware of it, the very first time that the status of the global civil war is no longer that of a paradigm. In his foreword, a foreword of only a couple of lines where he very briefly ponders upon the remaining value of these texts, Agamben concludes with the following rather revealing lines: “[T]he reader will decide in what measure the proposed texts . . . maintain their actuality or of the entry in the dimension of the global civil war has significantly altered their meaning” (Agamben, 2015: 7; my translation).

22. That Agamben’s usage of the concept of paradigm cannot be considered synonymous with a “model,” as could be thought when, for example, considering the usage of the concept of a “paradigm” as used by Thomas Kuhn in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, is explained by Agamben in the first chapters of “What is a Paradigm?” (Agamben, 2009: 9–16).

23. What follows is a slightly modified and shortened version of what I have written elsewhere on the particular nature of Agamben’s (usage of the) paradigm (cf. Vanhoutte, 2014). I will only enter into the nature of the example as a paradigm as explained by Agamben without engaging into discussion with his critics. Defining the concentration camp, the *homo sacer*, or the *Muselmann*, just to name a few of the more “extreme” examples, as paradigms has obviously caused some perplexity and critique. The nature of this text, however, does not allow for any comment on these topics.

24. Agamben will return over and over again to the paradoxical nature of the “example,” “paradigm.” Starting with *The Coming Community*, the particular nature of the “example” will feature in *Homo Sacer*, in a lecture given in 2002 at The European Graduate School entitled “What is a Paradigm?,” and in the homonymous chapter published in 2008 (2009 in English) in *The Signature of All Things: On Method*. The concept of the paradigm also returns, as we already noticed, as part of Agamben’s titles. The first chapter of his *State of Exception* goes under the title “The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government” and the final volume of the *Homo Sacer* series has the title *Stasis: la guerra civile come paradigma politico* (*Stasis: Civil War as Political Paradigm*).

ents itself as such, that *shows* its singularity. Hence the pregnancy of the Greek term, for example: *para-deigma*, that which is shown alongside” (Agamben, 1993: 10). This leads Agamben to the conclusion that “the proper place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space in which its indefinable and unforgettable life unfolds” (Agamben, 1993: 10). The singularity of the example/paradigm can, however, only be understood through its relation to what it is the example of, that is, to the group it exemplifies. In fact, as Agamben writes in a chapter entitled, interestingly, “What is a Paradigm?”: “If we now ask ourselves whether the rule can be applied to the example, the answer is not easy. In fact, the example is excluded from the rule not because it does not belong to the normal case but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its belonging to it. . . . [T]he example is excluded through the exhibition of its inclusion” (Agamben, 2009: 24). As such, as Agamben concludes returning once more to the etymological origin of the example, “in this way, according to the etymological meaning of the Greek term, it shows “beside itself” (*para-deiknymy*) both its own intelligibility, and that of the class it *constitutes*” (Agamben, 2009: 24; emphasis added).

The example/paradigm is thus for Agamben that which constitutes a “group” or a “class” of “normal cases” that is precisely exemplified by the example. However, the group or class the paradigm exemplifies is not to be considered in historical terms. As Agamben explains at the end of his “What is a Paradigm?,” using something as a paradigm does not mean “tracing it back to something like a [its] cause or historical origin” (Agamben, 2009: 31). What is at stake is the intelligible rendering of a kinship that “had eluded or could elude the historian’s gaze” (Agamben 2009, 31). In fact, far more than operating on a historical level, “the paradigm,” as Agamben writes, “is a singular case that is isolated from its context only insofar as, by exhibiting its own singularity, it makes intelligible a *new* ensemble, whose homogeneity it itself constitutes” (Agamben, 2009: 18; emphasis added).

The Agambian paradigm cannot be understood as the model-type paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s sense. In fact, the model-type paradigm is historical whereas, as we have just discovered, the paradigm as it is used by Agamben is not. A paradigm, for Agamben, is not that ensemble of common possession or assets that are shared by all the members of a certain group, nor is it a single element that serves as common example or model (cf. Agamben, 2009: 11). The paradigm is not what explains what we have become or what we already are; it is, on the contrary, a herald of what is to come. The paradigm, as Agamben explains over and over again, is that which we are tending to, or what we are (dangerously) close to becoming. As Agamben writes in *State of Exception*, the global civil war is that *towards which* the West is leading up to (cf. Agamben, 2005: 87). The Agambian paradigm is, to use a strongly religiously-coloured word that is not out of place in this context, prophetic. Being heraldic or even prophetic, the step to use another word to describe the paradigm that has already been used is very small, that word being “menace.” In fact, what is at stake in the paradigm for Agamben using the language of Aron is that the paradigm is not a model, but a menace.

Conclusion

We started this text with a short reflection on the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz's famous formula "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means" (Clausewitz, 2007: 7). This dictum that considers war to be a true political instrument has made von Clausewitz into one of the few theoreticians of war that can not be easily dismissed or ignored. Discussing this famous expression almost obliged us to discuss the equally, if not more, famous reversal of this dictum as operated by Michel Foucault. Confronting Foucault's reversal of von Clausewitz's formula allowed us to find a further confirmation of the fact, non-detrimental to the historical importance of the general's treatise, that von Clausewitz did not discover the close relation that existed between warfare and politics on which the expression that made him famous was based. More importantly, however, Foucault's analysis allowed us to understand that the concept of war can and has been used for centuries, something already begun a couple of centuries before von Clausewitz wrote down the dictum in his *On War*, as a means to investigate and even understand civil society.

Following Raymond Aron, we then turned to the second of von Clausewitz's aphorisms, which is perhaps more than an aphorism since it regards a "law," that has been considered as his greatest lesson. This "most brilliant intuition," as René Girard defined it, is the law of the "escalation to extremes" that is inherent to war. Every war (necessarily) tends, following this "law," to become (a) total war. However, for as much as von Clausewitz put this law down in writing, he also seemed to have feared its consequences, and reduced the field of operation of this law to the ethereal spheres of abstract theory. Although this "law" seems to have been ignored by a series of scholars, it did make its way, explicitly, to the French scholar René Girard, and also, implicitly (as we attempted to demonstrate in the remainder of this text), in the theory of the (continuous) state of exception or the (global) civil war as elaborated by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben.

There is little necessity to rephrase the manifold reasons we have written down in the third and fourth sections that were intended to demonstrate the affinity between von Clausewitz and Agamben in a condensed way. If we have failed to be convincing in the long run, or even failing in "giving to think" of this affinity, then any form of "résumé" will only be able to fall short exponentially. As such, we will attempt in these final lines to give a conclusion that goes beyond any form of mere recapitulation.

Before writing the concluding lines on the affinity between Agamben and von Clausewitz, a more general concern needs to be stated. Almost 200 years have passed since von Clausewitz's book *On War* was first published by his wife. Foucault said that someone was able to analyze politics and demonstrate that it is the continuation of war by other means 200 years before von Clausewitz's work. If Foucault is correct, this means that almost four centuries have passed since politics and war have become closely related. If we were to read the different "reactions" regarding this close relationship—from a mere analysis, over a fearsome realization of an intrinsic escalating principle in this relationship, to the

affirmation of the sheer reality of total war (if Girard and the latest changes in Agamben's considerations on global civil war are to be taken head-on)—then they can almost be considered as a worrisome meta-theatrical confirmation of the law of escalation to extremes. Putting any sort of judgment on these rather eschatological theories on hold until a final verdict can be given might be the more pragmatic solution. Considering, however, that we are dealing with the organization of our public life, the mere possibility of them simply being “not wrong” should already fill us with horror. For one reason or another, this, alas, does not seem to be the case.

If we now return to our conclusion of Agamben and his affinity with von Clausewitz's theory of war, it seems necessary to insist once more on the spectre-type nature of the kinship between the Prussian general and the Italian philosopher. More than anything, we have attempted to demonstrate that the soil on which Agamben's political theory has grown can be considered as fertilized by von Clausewitz. If we were to use a concept familiar to Agamben and his philosophy influenced by Guy Debord, Hannah Arendt, and Carl Schmitt, we would say that his political theory was firmly rooted in an “episteme,” as understood by Foucault (or “epistemological soil,” as we would describe it continuing with a more geographical language), and profoundly coloured by von Clausewitz's war-theory. This influence is so strong, in fact, that it would not be wrong to say that what Agamben is trying to render explicit is the same thing as the Prussian general, and in an extremely similar fashion.

Discovering this affinity and vicinity between Agamben and von Clausewitz is obviously much more revealing for Agamben's philosophy. In fact, it would not be wrong to say that the “denunciatory” or the de-constructive part of contemporary politics that Agamben has developed mainly in his *Homo Sacer* series should not be considered as one more theory in the field of political philosophy. After we have attempted to bring to light Agamben's affinity with von Clausewitz, it should, in fact, be considered for what it truly is, namely a theory of (total) war, or a philosophy of war.²⁵ If we were to stress-test the mental flexibility of our reader(s), we would indicate the confirmation in St. Paul of what we have just claimed.²⁶ In fact, shouldn't we understand Agamben's philosophical journey, retrospectively obviously (which could be considered non-intentionally as tending to be reductive), as a continuous shifting between St. Paul's sword and St. Peter's keys?

25. If we are to consider the small changes that Agamben has made in his latest texts—global civil war is no longer that *towards which* the West is leading up to but, as he wrote in the foreword of *Stasis*, the dimension in which we have already entered—then von Clausewitz's “Formula” should no longer be that “war is the continuation of policy by other means” but “total war has become the new politics.”

26. That we are not out of bounds here with this reference to St. Paul should be noted to Agamben scholars. For those that are not familiar with Agamben's work, only a very rash summary can, unfortunately, be made here that demonstrates the continuous interest by Agamben in the figure of St. Paul for the past two decades. Agamben's (public) interest in Saul of Tarsus started, in fact, in 1998 when he held a seminar at the Collège International de Philosophie on the first ten words of the first verse of Paul's *Letter to the Romans* (cf. Agamben, 2005c). Agamben's interest in Paul, contrary to other contemporary continental philosophers' interest in the “13th apostle,” remained and returned to the forefront in *The Kingdom and the Glory* (cf. Agamben, 2011), and the more recent *The Church and the Kingdom* (cf. Agamben, 2012). Paul's importance in understanding Agamben's philosophy cannot be underestimated.

Additionally, shouldn't the text that we focused on be considered as belonging to the Pauline sword-section?

If all this is the case (and this open rhetorical question often returns as a figure in Agamben's writings), then we might as well want to conclude in the same way as we began, that is, with Apollinaire's verse: "Ah Dieu! que la guerre est jolie."

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«Простите! на войне бывают свои досуги песни смех...» Трактовка Джорджо Агамбеном теории тотальной/ глобальной (гражданской) войны Карла фон Клаузевица

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Постоянно возрастающий интерес к Клаузевицу достиг своего пика уже тогда, когда Мишель Фуко на лекциях в Коллеж де Франс сказал, что «власть это война, война, продолженная другими средствами» (курс лекций «Нужно защищать общество»), переформулировав высказывание Клаузевица («Война есть продолжение политики, только иными средствами»). Однако огромный интерес к этой оригинальной формулировке затмил более любопытные наблюдения и оценки, сделанные прусским генералом. Задача этой статьи — проанализировать один из менее известных аргументов Клаузевица из книги «О войне». Аргумент касается «закона предельной эскалации», который свойственен всякой войне (война становится не просто «одной из войн», а «той самой», войной предельной или тотальной). В литературе ему уделяется мало внимания, несмотря на то, что он может оказаться более существенным источником размышлений, нежели известный афоризм. Однако не так давно о нем вновь заговорил французский философ Рене Жирар. Политическая философия Джорджо Агамбена, как будет показано в статье, находится по отношению к этому закону в отношении неявной преемственности. Агамбен ссылается на прусского генерала в редких случаях (в отличие от ссылок на Дебора, Арендт и Шмитта, серьезно повлиявших на Агамбена), однако обнаружение преемственности между Агамбеном и Клаузевицем позволяет рассмотреть философию чрезвычайного положения и тотальной/глобальной гражданской войны Агамбена с новой стороны, что представляется автору более многообещающим, чем привычные подходы.

Ключевые слова: Джорджо Агамбен, гражданская война, закон предельной эскалации, Мишель Фуко, Рене Жирар, политика, чрезвычайное положение, Карл фон Клаузевиц, война

Normalized Exceptions and Totalized Potentials: Violence, Sovereignty and War in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes and Giorgio Agamben

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This study seeks to critically explore the link between sovereignty, violence and war in Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer* series and Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*. From a brief rereading of *Leviathan*'s main arguments that explicitly revolves around the Aristotelian distinction between actuality/ potentiality, it will conclude that Hobbesian pre-contractual violence is primarily based on what Hobbes terms "anticipatory reason" and the problem of future contingency. Relying on Foucauldian insights, it will be emphasized that the assumption of certain potentialities suffices in leading to Hobbes's well-known conclusion that the state of nature is a "condition of Warre." In a second step, this study considers some of Agamben's arguments to account for how pre-contractual violence as envisioned by Hobbes cannot be rendered impotent through the integration of a sovereign. In specific, Agamben's claims shed light on an irreducible, inextricable entwining between the state of nature and the state of law as "Siamese twins" (Virno). On a meta-level, Agamben thus implicitly shows how the "Hobbesian problem" cannot be merely reduced to a "problem of order" (Parsons). With regard to the current functioning of the stratagems of financial markets and the mechanisms of future-colonization underpinning global politics, this study finally argues that Hobbes ought to be reevaluated in particular regarding the problem of the future in his account. Partly responding to Agamben's critical investigations, I suggest that a careful exploration of what will be coined "the prospects of an actualization of the potentiality not-to-be" might serve as a first theoretical step towards a productive form of criticism.

Keywords: Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, Thomas Hobbes, violence, state of war, state of exception, thanatopolitics, neoliberal governance

"We are at war with one another; a battle front runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently . . ."

—Michel Foucault

"Hobbes . . . was speaking not to men in a state of nature, but to men in an imperfect political society, that is to say, in a society which did not guarantee security of life and commodious living . . ."

—C. B. MacPherson

Actual(ized) Potential: Conditions of War

In his *Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation*, the Italian philosopher and semiologist Paolo Virno (2008: 26) recently raised the following significant and timely question: “What is . . . the effective relationship between the state of nature and the civil state? Is it that between the one and the other there is a true caesura? Or are we facing Siamese twins obliged to take turns to support one another?”

This study considers Virno’s question as its major focus, and attempts to provide an account of the relation between post- and pre-contractual states through a discussion of the works of Giorgio Agamben, and by briefly revisiting Thomas Hobbes’s argumentative account of the emergence of the state of nature, particularly on Foucauldian grounds. From a brief rereading of *Leviathan*’s main arguments that explicitly revolves around the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality,¹ the study concludes that Hobbes’s illustration of pre-contractual violence is significantly based on “anticipatory reason.”² Relying on Foucauldian insights, the cause for “fear of violent death” (Strauss) in Hobbes could be argued to not be actuality but potentiality.

In contrast to pre-contractual violence, post-contractual violence (in Hobbes’s sense) was to function as the sovereign’s tool to assure overall negative liberty, first occurring within calculable means-end relations. However, alongside Agamben’s claims, this study argues that Hobbes’s notion of post-contractual violence merely functions as a superficial enclosure of pre-contractual violence. Rather than transforming the character of pre-contractual violence, it occurs in a different form, that is, it materializes differently within the threshold of *potentia* and *actualitas* via centralizing in the Sovereign’s body. The upshot of the claim that pre- and post-contractual violence do not change per se but only by way of their respective materialization—or, “artificial” embodiment, as it were—is that pre- and post-contractual topoi as depicted by Hobbes are, in a sense, rather indistinguishable, or, to argue with Agamben, that the state of nature is still predominant as potentiality within the state.

Virno’s question as raised above brings us close to the core of Agamben’s central arguments as articulated in texts of his *Homo Sacer* series, in particular his widely discussed *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (*Homo Sacer* I, 1); *State of Exception* (*Homo Sacer* II, 1), as well as *Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm* (*Homo Sacer* II, 2, based on two Princeton lectures originally held in 2001). What Agamben indicates therein throughout is that pre-contractual violence as envisioned by Hobbes cannot be rendered entirely impotent through the integration of an absolute sovereign. In this sense, Agamben’s arguments shed light on the irreducible, inextricable entwining between the State

1. Surely, Hobbes’s entire *Leviathan* was intended to criticize Aristotle’s conflation of ethics and politics. However, I am convinced that rereading Hobbes on the grounds of Aristotle’s ontological categories will prove fruitful in understanding the dynamics that underpins *Leviathan* in spite of his critique of Aristotle.

2. In this instance, I seem to be departing from William Rasch (2007: 102) who speaks of a Hobbesian assumption of a natural or an anthropological evil. Here, I will assert, to the contrary, that the assumption of sole potentialities suffices to account for the occurrence of the Hobbesian “condition of Warre.”

of Nature (hereafter SoN) and the State of Law.³ His claims point to how pre-contractual violence survives the contractual agreement, thereby rendering the boundary between pre- and post-contractual states and the form of violence accompanying them undecidable. Noticeably, through his evaluation of contemporary realpolitik, Agamben accounts for various forms of actualized violence that unmask themselves within a topographical matrix underpinned by bio-thanatopolitical power (politics going beyond biopolitics in not only producing life but also in “making die” for the sake of “making live” within zones of indistinction). On a meta-level, Agamben thus implicitly shows how the “Hobbesian problem” cannot be merely reduced to a “problem of order” (Parsons)⁴, but that the SoN and the SoL can in fact be considered as “Siamese twins,” as was implicitly suggested by Virno.

With regard to the current functioning not just of global realpolitik but also of the stratagems of financial markets and the mechanisms of future-colonization underpinning global politics, this study conclusively argues for a careful reconsideration of Agamben’s recent theoretical interventions. In partial agreement with Agamben’s claims, I consider this re-examination necessary in view of the realpolitik predominance of an undecidable threshold between the SoN and SoL in times of seemingly infinitely postponed crises. I contend that Hobbes ought to be reevaluated in particular regarding the current, temporal extension of violence into the future(s), which is (are) successively colonized by financial capital, and with regard to the uncannily dominant specter of algorithmic modes of probability, currently installed to construct predictability for the sake of solving future contingencies.⁵ Respectively, this study argues that a contemporary rereading of Hobbes should distinctly focus on the problem of the future in his account.⁶

Partly responding to Agamben’s critical investigations, this study finally suggests that a careful exploration of what will be coined “the prospects of an actualization of the potentiality not-to-be” might serve as a first theoretical step towards a productive form of criticism.

Rereading Hobbes: Sufficient Potential, Anticipatory Reason, and Future-Colonization

While this is not the place to reexamine the whole of Hobbes’s line of reasoning provided in his *Leviathan*, I at least consider it essential to reframe the core assumption of its arguably most famous chapter (Chapter 13). Its grounding thesis can be narrowed down to the following assertion: “[D]uring the time men live without a common Power to keep them

3. Hereafter SoL. I intentionally refrain from using “Civil State” here to implicitly point to the critiques of Agamben, Derrida, and Benjamin of the irreducible violence inherent in the origin of the Law, and, with it, the state (what Agamben will term “Force-of-Law”). Agamben also uses the term “state of law.”

4. Cf. Parsons (1937). See also Filippov’s (2013) insightful critique of Parson’s and Tönnies’s readings of Hobbes, as well as van Krieken (2002).

5. Cf. Streeck’s (2014) analyses in this respect, alongside Vogl’s (2014; 2015), and Berardi’s (2012) most recent interventions.

6. A rare, insightful paper in this regard has been provided by Michaelis (2007).

all in awe, they are in a condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man" (Hobbes 1985: 185).

Following Hobbes's line of reasoning, two premises are particularly critical in order to derive this assertion, first, the equality of the potential to kill anyone⁷, and second, the equality of prudence⁸. It is vital to take both into account regarding the question of violence (alongside Hobbes's well-known basic assumptions of a scarcity of resources and the desire for self-preservation). Regarding the equality to kill, Hobbes (1985: 183) writes: "For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself." The second assumption (equality of prudence) centers on the notion of anticipation⁹, which is of central significance for Hobbes's arguments. Most fundamentally, Hobbes claims that there is an equal common sense amongst individuals; since we cultivate anticipatory capacities, we know that anyone can potentially kill us. To quote Hobbes (1985: 185) directly: "And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."

In fact, a great deal of Hobbes's argumentative framework depends entirely on the two aforementioned assumptions, the equality to kill, and the equality of prudence. The fact that both rest on the notion of potential is important in terms of understanding Hobbes's account of violence, particularly with regard to Agamben's timely interventions, which will be the main focus of the second part of this paper.

First, note that Hobbes's SoN is not referring to a state of actual continuous fighting¹⁰, but rather to a state characterized by a high likeliness for preemptive attacks to occur. This insight underpins a whole range of remarks to be found in various works of diverse political theorists (especially coming from the continental tradition). Amongst them are Michel Foucault (whose inversion of the Clausewitzian argument is well-known), Paolo Virno in his *Multitude*, and Gilles Deleuze (1961) in a hitherto-unpublished lecture note.¹¹

7. Foucault refers to this potential as a "minor difference" which causes the ongoing struggle characteristic of the Hobbesian state of nature. According to his reading of Hobbes, the integration of the sovereign establishes a major inequality. See Foucault (2004: 90–91).

8. I rely partly on Rawls' argumentative reconstruction here: see Rawls (2007: 48ff.).

9. Rawls (2007: 49) writes about Hobbesian anticipation being "the state of affairs in which the disposition to strike first when the circumstances seem propitious is generally and publicly known, and is, by definition, a state of war."

10. This also relates to questions of reciprocity, expanded upon, for instance, by Robert Axelrod (1987).

11. Deleuze offers a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau which centers around the *passage à l'acte* from the virtual to the actual: "Les conflits entre individus entraînent mécaniquement des conflits intérieurs à l'individu (entre l'ambition et la peur de la mort violente)." Cf. Deleuze's hitherto unpublished lecture notes (1961). Full details are given in the bibliography. Furthermore, connected with the focus on potentiality in Hobbes's SoN is often an implicit assertion that there is no distinct line between pre- and post-contractuality, including the claim that Hobbes's SoN is, to some extent, always-already inscribed into social settings. It might not be all too surprising, then, that some explicit mentions of Hobbes have recently compared the SoN to frameworks underpinning neoliberal societies, including their institutional modes of governance. To name but a few ex-

In the following, I will turn to some of these authors to explicate what I conceive of as the nature of “potential” violence in Hobbes’s SoN, which, as will be suggested, might not at all be absent from contemporary modes of governance.

First, as I have already indicated, it is curious that Hobbes never explicitly mentions any becoming-actual of violence in the SoN. It is not without importance to highlight how he subsequently speaks of a “condition of Warre” and not of “Warre” as such¹²; and how he points to scenarios where people point weapons at each other rather than to actual shootings obeying specified tactics or strategies. Foucault (2004: 92) is thus right when, in *Il faut défendre la société*, he claims that Hobbes’s picture of the SoN tells us nothing about the kind of warfare characterizing it (if there is any):

[T]he state Hobbes is describing is not at all a brutish state of nature in which forces clash directly with one another. In Hobbes’s state of primitive war, the encounter, the confrontation, the clash, is not one between weapons or fists, or between savage forces that have been unleashed. There are no battles in Hobbes’s primitive war; there is no blood and there are no corpses. There are presentations, manifestations, signs, emphatic expressions, wiles, and deceitful expressions, there are traps, intentions disguised as their opposite, and worries disguised as certainties. We are in a theater where presentations are exchanged, in a relationship of fear in which there are no time limits; we are not really involved in a war.

So all in all, for Foucault (2004: 92), Hobbes’s SoN is rather a “sort of unending diplomacy” as he terms it, wherein what is significant in the first place is “my presentation of the strength of the other’s presentation of my strength and so on.” Hobbes’s SoN, then, is first and foremost a “state of fear,” implicating a not-yet-actual violence in which “the will to contend by battle is publicly recognized” (Rawls, 2007: 53). Hobbes’s (1985: 186) own, most distinct remarks pointing in this direction are crystal clear: “The nature of War consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.”

Borrowing from Agamben’s (Aristotelian) definition of potentiality,¹³ the anticipated, potential violence described by Hobbes thus does not necessarily “disappear immediately into actuality” (Agamben, 1998: 45). It is rather a projected probability underlying some future contingent. What Hobbes seems to have in mind is a somewhat immaterial and

amples, Critchley (2014) draws the analogy, even if somewhat loosely, in the context of the university. More explicit are Jeremy Gilbert’s recent *Common Grounds* (2014), and still most relevant, C. B. MacPherson’s influential *The Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962).

12. Moreover, Hobbes (1985: 186) explicitly claims: “For WARRE consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather.”

13. As Aristotle asserts in *Metaphysics*: “A thing is said potential if, when the act of which is said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing im-potential (that is, there will be nothing able not to be)” (quoted in Agamben, 1998: 45). Agamben concludes (1998: 46): “What is potential can pass over into actuality only at the point at which it sets aside its own potential not to be (its *adynamia*). To set im-potentiality aside is not to destroy it, but on the contrary, to fulfill it, to turn potentiality back upon itself in order to give itself to itself.” A detailed explanation of this is provided in Agamben (1999b: 177–219).

invisible form of violence, which can be felt through its potential, resting on highly psychological mechanisms. As Hampton nicely summarizes, the Hobbesian SoN can, thus, best be characterized as a high-risk situation giving rise to mutual misperceptions which “disrupt many people’s reasoning . . . while the rest fear this disruption and . . . refuse to cooperate to avoid being exploited.”¹⁴ Very illuminating in this context is a Plautinian assertion that Derrida (2011: 61) invokes in *The Beast and the Sovereign I*, which illustrates this point nicely: “wolf,” he claims, “is man for man, and not man, *when . . . one does not know which he is*.”¹⁵

The form of pre-contractual violence depicted by Hobbes is thus both potential and structural in that its actualization depends on the outcome of interrelational dilemmas of perception: the SoN presents a topographical and topo-logical matrix grounded in various prisoner’s dilemma-like situations, resting on informational asymmetries and a lack of security in the first place. According to Hobbes, it is also on these grounds that the insight into the reasonability of anticipatory attack arises: the latter is first and foremost a consequence of the perception of a potential yet invisible threat. I cannot know the other, who is my opponent in this case. To put it in Schmittian terms, there is no concrete possibility to decide between [*konkrete Möglichkeit zur Unterscheidung*] friend and enemy.¹⁶ Hobbes (1985: 187) confirms this when he points to individuals’ permanent suspiciousness toward each other, a picture which he obviously adopts not from his supposed “hypothetical” construct termed “state of nature” but rather, as MacPherson (1962) has aptly pointed out, from an observation of civil society. To quote Hobbes directly (1985: 187):

[W]hen taking a journey, he [i.e., man in civil society] armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he lockes his doores. . . . Does he not thereby accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words?

14. See Hampton’s “Hobbes’s State of War” (1985). See also Haji (1991), who points to a range of difficulties in Hampton’s approach. He argues that she comes up with the paradoxical final conclusion that, depending on certain factors, cooperation within the state of nature can be both rational and irrational. In this context, see also Hampton’s (1991) response. As she points out, from the claim that cooperation in the state of nature is per se impossible, it follows that establishing an absolute sovereign is impossible as well. She argues that the establishment of an external force is by nature an agreement non-cooperative agents could not make. She thus argues that Hobbes is either wrong in assuming that cooperation is impossible in the state of nature or in claiming that individuals will actually manage to overcome the state of nature by establishing a sovereign. In this regard, see also Braybrookes (1985).

15. The quote refers to Plautus (2006: xi). Interestingly, the saying *homo homini lupus* goes back to Titus Maccius Plautus. In *De Cive*, Hobbes refers to this: “To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe. The first is true, if we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare Cities” (1983: 2). Plautus’ original phrase, however, entails an important second part: “Lupus est homo homini, non homo, quom qualis sit non novit.” (“One man to another is a wolf, not a man, when he doesn’t know what sort he is.”)

16. Schmitt expands on the friend-enemy distinction in the most detailed manner in *The Concept of the Political* (1927).

This quote should suffice to lend credence to MacPherson's argument. While Hobbes explicitly believes there never generally was such a thing as a "condition of warre as this" (187; with the significant exception of American Indian rural societies that Pierre Clastres (2010: 237ff.) has evaluated extensively, especially in relation to the nature of war and violence), his depiction of the state of nature is probably not as hypothetical as he depicts it to be; it is rather closer to actual societies than to any alleged "natural" condition¹⁷. In fact, upon closer reading, civil society becomes discernable as the actual, tacit mirror image of Hobbes's "condition of warre," which underpins *Leviathan's* 13th chapter. Hobbes writes: "But there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority . . . are in continuall jealousies . . . having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another . . . and continuall Spyes upon their neighbors; which is a posture of War" (1985: 188). In other words, what Hobbes describes as a "state of nature" is obviously more of a product of civil society than a pre-social state.

Hobbes's Novel Prometheus: The Problem of Future Contingency

This observation, which is prominent both in Foucault's and MacPherson's readings, brings us to another significant factor to be discussed, namely future contingency. As I would argue regarding the relation between pre- and post-contractual states, future-contingency concerns not merely an exclusively pre-societal problematique, but one that potentially reoccurs within the state of law, and which becomes complicated therein. One might even go so far as to assert that future-contingency, grounded in anticipation, is the fictive glue that constantly holds together the state of nature and the state of law, even if the state of law on Hobbesian grounds is installed precisely to grant a considerable level of coherence and predictability. We will return to this in more detail later.

For now, let it suffice to mention that the issue of the future in Hobbes's account is an often-underrated factor regarding the emergence of the state of war. Indeed, by and large, what drives the insecurity and the reactions of agents in the SoN is not least the openness of the future, conceived of as a problem to be solved, and which itself causes the desire to proactively construct it. The emergence of the state of war as described by Hobbes could thus, as I would argue here, also be read on the terrain of the problem of future-contingents, and the means adopted by individuals to counter it.¹⁸ Take for instance the following passage from Hobbes's *Leviathan* that explicitly addresses the unknowability of the future:

The Present onely has a being in Nature, things Past have a being in the Memory onely, *but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of a mind,*

17. Clastres indeed points to a close analogy between American Indians of that time and Hobbes's illustration of the state of nature. While Clastres' argument is highly interesting, I will follow MacPherson's reading here and conceive of Hobbes's SoN as closely aligned with and as just a radicalization of observations of civil societies.

18. I will follow such an argumentative line in due course.

applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; with which most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. (Hobbes, 1985: 97; my emphasis)

Moreover, it is significant that Hobbes draws an implicit analogy between the situation of individuals in the state of nature and Prometheus's eternal punishment (i.e., being chained to a rock in the Caucasus). According to Hobbes, this comparison holds especially true for what he calls an "over provident" individual, that is, a "man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all day long, gnawed by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep" (Hobbes, 1985: 169; cf. Michaelis, 2007). Hereby, it is Hobbes's extremely idiosyncratic account of Prometheus that is striking. Literally translated, "Prometheus" means "foresight," yet, Hobbes excludes any account of his former deed (having gifted mankind with fire). Contrary to traditional Greek narratives, his reading is only interested in the Greek Titan's condition as an allegedly miserable one in which Prometheus faces an ever-the-same malignant future. Respectively, Hobbes's narrative is telling precisely as it is seemingly so over-occupied with the problem of future contingency (cf. Michaelis, 2007). Seen from this stance, Hobbes's implicit account of future-colonization highlights how individuals in the State of Nature above all end up in a condition of war due to a praxis of constantly anticipating potential futures and by acting in response to these imagined future(s) in the present. Thereby, they adopt those means that allegedly shape their future which best suit their interest of self-preservation. To colonize the future in this sense is to attempt to own both time and power over the future(s).

On the grounds of the issue of future-colonization and the nature of violence as potentiality in Hobbes's SoN, it should be evident that its most challenging aspects are clearly not anthropological assumptions predetermining a somewhat egoist selfishness (Hobbes continues to be misread in this sense). Although Hobbes describes certain passions as being natural to men,¹⁹ it is not natural "radical evilness" that causes the condition in which "lupus est homo homini," but rather a lack of assurance and the will to power over the future.²⁰ One thing that seems clear to Hobbes in this respect is that individuals possess a natural capacity to anticipate the future, which, according to my reading, is a significant factor for the emergence of the state of war as discussed in *Leviathan's* first book. It is only through anticipation that I can know that someone might potentially attack me; it is in an equal sense only through the cultivation of anticipatory reason that I will be able to acknowledge the preferability of the Commonwealth over the state of nature.

"Anticipatory reason" in this sense is a sort of long-term, focused, calculating way of imagining a future-yet-to-come accompanied by the rational insight whereby individu-

19. For example, Hobbes refers to aversion, hate, joy, etc. See Hobbes (1985: 122).

20. Strauss makes a similar claim. Cf. Strauss, 2007, esp. Chapter 2.

als acknowledge that “there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment” (1985: 202). According to Hobbes, the reason why individuals erect a “Common-Wealth” “to make good that Propriety . . . in recompence of the universall Right they abandon” (Ibid.: 202) is that they recognize that they will be better off if they opt for security at the expense of liberty, and not least to solve the problem of future contingency driven by the desire for self-preservation, or more accurately, “the foresight of their own preservation” (Ibid.: 223).

Agamben’s Intervention: Introducing States of Actual War

What will be of most interest in relation to Agamben’s interventions—which will be our focus from now on—is the passage from the SoN on the collective right transferal whereby the absolute sovereign is instituted. Respectively, Foucault (2004: 88–99) rightly claims that violence here becomes centralized within the body of the sovereign *before* any actual, preemptive attacks occur, as has already been hinted at. In fact, there is a sense in which the evolving process of the becoming-actual of a universal, total state of war is interrupted by the establishment of the Leviathan, the condition wherein *homo homini lupus est* is supposedly being exchanged for the conditional principle *protego ergo oblige*.²¹ It is on these grounds that, as Agamben will implicitly show, the whole structure of *Leviathan*, specifically the distinction between pre- and post-contractual situations, needs to be questioned—precisely as it always-already rests on a fundamental paradox that necessarily renders the limit between SoN and SoL undecidable. In this sense, by deconstructing the logic underpinning Hobbesian contractual sovereignty, I take Agamben to consequently show that the state of actual war (in the sense of an actualization of a potential) is yet to come, precisely because, relying on Aristotelian categories, potentiality similarly requires im-potentiality to not be rendered actual, i.e., the potential’s potentiality-not-to-be.²² Following Agamben, sovereignty’s absolute superiority lies precisely in its potentiality-not-to-be while maintaining the potentiality-to-be, meaning that it does not limit the potential but rather maintains it, potentially rendering it actual²³.

More precisely, what Agamben will show is that the actualization of potential violence that ought to be rendered im-potential by means of establishing sovereignty can be shown to (i) prevail in the figure of the sovereign, and (ii) be implemented on the grounds of a structural conflation of norm and exception that Hobbes had clearly not foreseen. However, what arises from the fact that the potential violence of the SoN can-

21. This principle goes back to Schmitt. As he (2007: 52) claims, “The *protego ergo oblige* is the *cogito ergo sum* of the state.”

22. Following Heller-Roazen’s (1999: 16) reading of Agamben’s exploration of Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality, “it is precisely the relation to an incapacity, which constitutes the essence of all potentiality.”

23. I read Agamben to rely on Aristotle’s definition of potentiality here. It is helpful to quote Agamben at length in relation to what he terms the Aristotelian definition of “the key figure of potentiality, the mode of its *existence as potentiality*”: “It is a potentiality that is not simply the potential to do this or that thing *but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality*” (Agamben, 1999: 179f.; emphasis added).

not be rendered entirely impotential by means of establishing sovereignty (that is, as an actualized impotentiality) is an ontic-ontological (or, an-archic, as it were) threshold, which renders actuality and potentiality indistinguishable. According to Agamben, it is within this threshold that a contractually covered, actualized form of violence will occur.

Agamben: Deconstructing Contractually Established Sovereignty

As has already been indicated, for Hobbes, the “Common-Wealth” symbolizes the overcoming of a sphere of constant fear and insecurity through the integration of an external figure, the “Mortall God,” which is by necessity situated beyond the law. This one person unifying the “Multitude” is authorized by the many “to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit” (Hobbes, 1985: 227). What Hobbes implicitly draws on is a binary opposition between those structural systems underpinning the SoN (often modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma²⁴ in classical game-theoretical terms) and the established State of Law (often modeled as an Assurance Game in game-theoretical terms, which is often thought of as a “solution” of the PD). Agamben, in a topographical manner, visualizes such type of relation as follows:




Figure 1: Illustration of the Hobbesian assertion in an Agambenian manner. The SoN (left, [a]) and the state of law’s structures (right, [b]) are logically opposed. In the case of the dissolution of the state, sovereignty is dissolving entirely, giving rise to a recurrence of the SoN in its original, atomistic, individualist form. What we confront here is, thus, an either-or of (a) or (b): $\neg a = b \rightarrow a = \neg b$. In Schmittian terms, it could be asserted that Hobbes implements the exception (the embodied SoN as conserved in unified sovereignty = Leviathan) for the sole sake of enabling permanent law-enforcement, i.e., for the creation of a securing norm (SoL).²⁶ In the Hobbesian

24. Hereafter PD. It has, however, been subject to wide debate whether the Hobbesian State of Nature can accurately be modeled as a one-shot PD game. Although I am rather opposed to framing the Hobbesian SoN as a one-shot game and found arguments for iterated games (with brighter prospects for mutual cooperation) convincing, I will nevertheless frame the Hobbesian SoN as a one-shot PD here. It seems sufficient for a broader illustration of the Hobbesian line of reasoning. The arguments of Axelrod, Kavka, and Hampton, however, should be taken into further consideration. It is especially Kavka who challenges Hobbes’s claim that anticipation is the best policy (see Kavka, 1983). For an interpretation of Hobbes’s state of nature as a one-shot PD game, see, for example, Rawls (2003: 238), Barry (2010: 253–254), Gauthier (1969: 79–80).

25. Figure taken from Agamben (1998: 38).

26. On Schmitt’s distinction between norm and exception, see specifically Schmitt’s *Dictatorship*.

Common-Wealth, the sovereign dwells in (a) and reigns over the subjects in (b), with both spheres (a) and (b), that is, the norm and the exception (allegedly) being clearly separable.²⁷

Agamben's critique now enters the picture in shifting our perspective from the inter-subjective dilemma characteristic of the Hobbesian SoN towards a predicament arising between the subject and the sovereign. I suggest that one might best grasp his critique by focusing on the terminologico-conceptual threshold arising from two slightly different notions describing the act of authorization, i.e., the Hobbesian "laying down" one's right, and the act of "transferring it." The latter reveals the origin of the relation between the sovereign and *homo sacer* (the emblematic figure that is bound to the sovereign while yet remaining outside the law, who (under Roman Law) could be legally killed but not sacrificed) or, the king and the multitude, which forms the core of Agamben's critique.

Acts of Asymmetrical Authorization: Totalized Potentialities

While it should be remarked that there are of course various liberal readings of Hobbes²⁸—most notably Carl Schmitt's appallingly anti-semitic *Leviathan*, which draws on Hobbes as the inventor of the state as the instance of the machinic (and thus a forerunner of what Schmitt thought of as its perverted form, i.e., parliamentarism as the technical mode of governance lacking any idea of the political)²⁹—this study intentionally focuses on parts where a risk—a *potential*—to totalitarianism could be decoded in the very act of transferring a right. This is specifically important to account for how Agamben will later interpret violence as always-already latent (that is, potential) within the institution of the contract. Clearly, for Hobbes, the prior aim for the establishment of the Leviathan was to preserve a considerable level of security on the grounds of coherent legal norms. Similar to Schmitt, however, Hobbes nevertheless anticipated that, for this norm to be executed, a realm exempt from it was needed. What he did in consequence then was to reserve this space for the sovereign only; it is this sphere beyond the law that Agamben will later decode as necessarily violent in an an-archic sense, i.e., it is violent before any foundation, or arché, could be established.

To be more explicit, Hobbes's *Leviathan* first defines the act of "authorization"³⁰ as an act of appointing "one man . . . that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices,

27. The same logic underpins Schmitt's depiction of a line of demarcation between norm and exception as articulated most significantly in his *Political Theology*.

28. Prominent liberal readings are, for instance, Strauss (1961), Oakeshott (1975), and, in some idiosyncratic sense, of course, Schmitt (1996b).

29. Cf. Schmitt (1996b: 61); for a critical stance on Schmitt's reading of Hobbes, see specifically Agamben (2015b: 45–48).

30. Interestingly, the Hobbesian definition of "authorization" allows for extremely contradictory interpretations. Gauthier (1969: 120–177) contends that Hobbes does not intend to make individuals subject to the sovereign, while Hampton (1986) argues against such reading on the grounds of Chapter 17 of *Leviathan*. As she asserts, Hobbes explicitly describes the act of rights transferal as one of "giving up one's own right."

unto *one* will" (1985: 227). This consolidation of all wills can justifiably appear as a true act of unification precisely as it is being freely consented to (in an almost Rousseauian sense). In this sense, it is an expression of individual autonomy with the sovereign being an instance of concrete representation (to borrow from Schmitt).³¹ Here, Hobbes, again, in a remarkable resemblance to Rousseau, speaks of the "reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man" (Ibid.). However, he continues in a slightly different fashion (and in this respect, it is not without importance to note that already in the quote cited before, he spoke of a "reduction" of wills, not of a will that adequately represents the plurality of wills). Hobbes speaks of this "one will" as becoming "his will," i.e., the sovereign's will, demanding the subjects to "submit *their* wills, every one of *his* will, and *their* judgments, to *his* judgment" (Ibid.). Again, it is entirely clear that the final possessive pronoun is reserved for the sovereign and it seems (in contradistinction to Rousseau) that the final source of legitimacy is not the *demos* or the unified will of the people (in the sense of a *volonté générale*), but is the sovereign alone. This corresponds to the absence of any institutionalised right to resistance in Hobbes within the established state of law (which arguably makes him less of a liberal than Schmitt thought). Let me quote one more striking passage taken from Chapter 28, where Hobbes writes the following about the "right to punish" (and of which Agamben [1998: 106] explicitly says that it "takes the form of survival of the state of nature at the very heart of the state," an argument that we will subsequently examine): "For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right [the right to punish.—A.N.]; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (expecting the limits set to him by naturall Law) as entire . . ." (1985: 354).

The act of exchange as it is explained here and the sovereign's specific right to punish in no way resemble any symmetrical relation (in the sense that I abdicate my right to freedom to better preserve my own security, even though preservation is still mentioned as the *causa finalis* of the sovereign's monopoly over the right to punish).³² On a meta-level, it is more or less impossible to not read these very ambivalent statements as a commitment to oneness as opposed to heterogeneity. This becomes distinct as well when Hobbes (1985: 227) asserts in an earlier passage that the sovereign is being appointed "to beare their [i.e., the contracting individuals' (my remark.—A.N.)] *person*," where a peculiar sense of intimacy characterizing the relation between the sovereign and the subject be-

31. Schmitt expands on the notion of concrete representation most concisely in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (cf., for instance, Schmitt, 1996a: 20). See also his reading of Rousseau in his *Dictatorship*, which is essentially concerned with the problem of representation in relation to the *volonté générale* and its (Jacobinian) realpolitik aftermath (cf. Schmitt, 2014: 110ff.). Particularly in response to Weimar parliamentarism, Schmitt thought that politics was in desperate need of an authority capable of embodying and intensifying "*an ethos of belief* [Ethos der Überzeugung]" (Schmitt 1996a: 17; my emphasis). This latter is a core belief, which is best expressed in Schmitt's reading of Rousseau in his *Dictatorship*, where Schmitt famously argues for complete homogeneity as a necessary precondition for concrete, coherent, and politically representative decisions.

32. Hampton points out that the "transferral" of rights resembles a "surrender" here. See Hampton (1986: 119). Foucault (2004: 94) makes a similar point: "The sovereign . . . will not simply have part of their rights, he will actually take their place, and the whole of their power."

comes graspable alongside a radically violent potential lying at its very core which, also in some sense, underpins his account of the right to punish. There is thus a sense in which this passage could be read as tacitly anticipating a “ban” (a form of inclusionary exclusion) between the sovereign and *homo sacer* in Agamben’s sense.

Before I explain the broader implications of the act of rights transferal on Agambenian grounds, let me briefly say a few words on Agamben’s thinking on what is implied by the term “ban” (as in fact, almost all of those binaries Hobbes relies upon—i.e., *peace/war*, *inside/outside*, and even *friend/enemy*³³—could be read to implicitly rely on such a form of inclusionary exclusion). Agamben here refers to set theory to expand on the structural asymmetry defining the “ban” (between *homo sacer* and the sovereign, or between the multitude and the king), which defines membership as $b \in a$. Hereby, membership is defined in contradistinction to inclusion, that is, the relation $b \in a$ indicates that (b) might be included in (a) without being a member of it (cf. Agamben 1998: 24). In addition, $b \in a$, thus, marks an asymmetrical relation that culminates in a form of “being-outside and yet-belonging” (Agamben 2005: 35). To quote Agamben at length: “. . . we shall give the name *ban* (from the Old Germanic term indicating both exclusion from the community and the power of the sovereign) to this original legal structure, through which law preserves itself even in its own suspension, applying to what it has excluded and *abandoned*, that is, banned.”

Certainly, Agamben implicitly refers to Carl Schmitt’s thinking on norm and exception (as most distinctly articulated in Schmitt’s *Political Theology*), of the idiosyncratic, anarchic law of the exception that prevails if the archaic, juridical law is legally abandoned (which is the state of exception), in order for it to be preserved.³⁴ In this sense, the law is suspended, but the suspension of the law is implied in the legal order. Spoken set-theoretically, it is implied in the norm without belonging to the norm, as it installs the exception as a topos distinct from it. For Agamben, however not only the relation norm/ exception, but also the relation *homo sacer/sovereign*—and, as I will argue, between the people and the multitude—is determined by such set-theoretical logic implying this peculiar (non-) relation implied in the concept of a ban.³⁵ It is significant that Agamben (1998: 107) finds this logic inherent precisely in the Hobbesian contractual agreement: “Sovereign violence is in truth founded not on pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the state.” As a consequence, he argues, “the foundation of sovereign power is to be sought not in the

33. The friend/enemy distinction of course refers to Schmitt in the first place. To my mind, the Hobbesian suggestion to commonly re-locate conflicts beyond the borders of the state indeed reads like an anticipated Schmittianism here. As Hobbes (1985: 228) claims, “For by this Authoritie . . . he is unable to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.”

34. To quote Schmitt (2005: 6) directly from his *Political Theology*: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. . . . The decision on the exception is a decision in a general sense of the word. Because a general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from the norm. . . . The exception, which is not codified in the legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.”

35. Crucially, he departs from Schmitt (in particular, from his *Dictatorship*), for whom norm and exception depend on each other while still being clearly separable.

subjects' free renunciation of their natural right but in the sovereign's preservation of his natural right to do anything to anyone" (106).

Indeed, Agamben explains this paradoxical relation with regard to Hobbes in more detail in his most recent *Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm*, which distinctly focuses on the divergence between the concept of the people (*populus*) and the multitude (*multitudo*). According to Agamben, this distinction is not made explicit in Hobbes's *Leviathan* (while it, however, implicitly echoes the distinction in Chapter 18), but all the more in *De Cive*, in which Hobbes expands on how the people in a monarchy necessarily dissolve into a politically insignificant multitude as soon as the king is chosen.³⁶ According to Hobbes (quoted in Agamben 2015: 33), the people "is something single . . . which has one will and to whom one action can be attributed." That is, the people is equal to the king (*rex est populus*) (cf. *Ibid.*). Now, it is essential to grasp what the people *de facto* signify for Hobbes: "Common men, and others who do not notice these things, always speak of a *great number* of men, that is, of the city, as the people; they say that the city rebels against the king." Hobbes, however, counters this assertion of "common men," claiming that in a post-contractual situation, the citizens are precisely not the people but only the multitude. As Agamben (2015: 35) asserts: "The people—the body political—exists only instantaneously at the point in which it appoints 'one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person' . . . but this point coincides with its vanishing into a 'dissolved multitude'. The body political is thus an impossible concept . . ."

Now, what is impossible here, according to Agamben's reading of Hobbes, is the very concept of concrete representation in the sense of a strict coincidence between the multitude, the people, and the body of the king. In other words, there is no actual identity between the artificial God and the multitude except during the moment of rights-transferal. What happens thereafter, according to Agamben, is that the alleged demos, or *populus*, is necessarily reduced to an empty, apolitical signifier—namely, to the multitude—once the contract is established. To rely on Agamben's concepts, the establishment of the contract first follows the act of unification of a hitherto *disunited multitude*; secondly, within the very moment of rights-transferal, the multitude becomes the people and coincides with the king; and thirdly, in a post-contractual situation, the multitude splits again from the people and becomes *dissolved* (*dissolved multitude*). According to Agamben, it is precisely this dissolved multitude that forms the remaining trace of civil war haunting the state from the inside. To quote Agamben (2015: 40–41) directly: "If the dissolved multitude—and not the people—is the sole human presence in the city, and if the multitude is the subject of civil war, this means that civil war remains always possible within the state. . . . Civil War and Common-wealth, Behemoth and Leviathan coexist—just as the dissolved multitude coexists with the sovereign."

While both the state (i.e., the sovereign, or the "people") as well as the state of nature (civil war, or the multitude, or as Agamben in various instances terms it, *ademia*, that is, the absence of the people or a *demos*) coexist at the same time, this, however, need not

36. *Ibid.* Cf. Hobbes's seventh chapter in *De Cive*.

imply that they are simply identical nor strictly correlative. As I would read Agamben here, the difference between both is the level of actualization, as already indicated. The inclusively excluded multitude as the incorporation of civil war into society is—contrary to the sovereign and the people—potential. Finally, insofar as it is rendered actual, a civil war is waged within the state against the people, that is, the sovereign.

What Agamben argues thus implicitly is that the transformation of the Hobbesian contractual “transferal of rights” marks the relational origin of a ban that always-already suspends any potentiality to newly contractual arrangements on behalf of the people without a previously waged war directed against the sovereign, precisely as it is only correlative with the multitude in the very act of right-transferal. “The people,” Agamben (2015b: 40; emphasis added) claims, “is the *absolutely present* which, as such, can never be present and thus can only be represented.” Thus, Agamben witnesses the potential that in “transferring their rights,” the subjects enter a relation whose very essence incorporates the potentiality—and, following Agamben’s reading, the actualization—of the people’s own suspension. This however does not imply that the divergence between the multitude, the people, and the king would cancel the relation between the rex and the multitude, which remains a “relation with the nonrelational,” a relation between the ordering power and someone within this order who is yet not a member of it in the sense of an inclusionary exclusion (as expanded above) (Ibid.: 29). The paradoxical double bind here arises from the contractual affirmation of a potential negationary totality³⁷; the “people” are only present in the very moment when they choose their sovereign, but, as Agamben (2013: 26) rightly claims, “this moment coincides with its vanishing in a dispersed multitude.” Agamben’s focus on the very act of the establishment of the relation between the sovereign and the subject, the rex and the multitude, characterized by an act of laying down that founds the potentiality of a one-sided, radical asymmetry within a topologically symmetrical structure,³⁸ eventually confronts Hobbes’s distinct, and in some sense, exclusionary focus on the problem of intersubjective violence in the state of nature with its own deficiencies.


Responding to contemporary realpolitik realities, Agamben’s focus is precisely on the potential to totalitarianism that marks the relation between the sovereign and the subject (or, the king and the multitude). As outlined above, he particularly emphasizes that the Hobbesian “condition of Warre” is always-already potential even if accompanied by im-potentiality³⁹, and that it, borrowing from Foucault’s (2004: 93) sophisticated reading

37. Cf. Agamben (1998: 50–51). His concept of the ban here draws on Nancy, who expands on this in *The Birth to Presence* and in *A Finite Thinking*. As Nancy (1993: 39) claims, “to be abandoned is to be left with nothing to keep hold of and no calculation.”

38. That is, both homo sacer and the sovereign are within and without the Law. As such, they have “the same structure.” Moreover, as Agamben (1998: 84) claims, they are correlative: “The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially *homines sacri*, and *homo sacer* is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.”


39. Cf. Agamben 1998: 104–111. In this context, see also Foucault’s (2004: 90) remark that “the state of war in the state of nature goes on even when the State has been constituted and Hobbes sees it as a threat that wells up in the State’s interstices, at its limits and its frontiers.” Taking a genealogical stance, he asserts that “‘the war of every man against every man’ that characterizes the state of nature is not a real historical condition but a

of Hobbes, remains a “permanent backdrop,” and is the topographical *modus operandi* of the juridical, the political (and the social). Moreover, Agamben lends much credence to Schmitt’s assertion that any norm always-already presupposes an exception (in the sense that Schmitt still upheld in *Dictatorship*). Beyond Schmitt and Hobbes, however, he grasps that the contemporary situation is far from binary and that the paradigm constitutive of the present geopolitical field is best illustrated as a merging of both. It is thus only consequential that he reconstructs the Hobbesian (and early Schmittian) binary in the following format:



(a) & (b)⁴⁰

Figure 2: What happens in the state of exception is the merging of both (a) and (b), i.e., the Hobbesian logic of a binary opposition between (a, exception, state of nature) and (b, norm, state of law) is rendered obsolete. The potential violence inherent in (a) is still present. The structure underpinning Hobbes’s state (an Assurance Game) has not succeeded in abandoning the Prisoner’s Dilemma Structure (i.e., potential violence) inherent in the SoN, logically leading to the following:



(a) = (b)⁴¹

Figure 3: The potential inherent in (a) becomes actualized: violence becomes partly actual. The state of law is still existent insofar as sovereignty is not dissolved while the SoN enters the political within zones of indistinction. Moreover, any decisive criterion capable of distinguishing the SoN and the state of law, the norm and the exception, becomes subject to unconditional undecidability (Agamben will term this a perpetual crisis, a point we will return to). To quote Agamben at length:

self-consciously fictitious construct, deployed rhetorically to legitimise the existence of the state” (Foucault 2004: 270). According to Foucault, “sovereignty is found on a calculation that makes it possible to avoid war. It is founded on a nonwar” (ibid).

40. Figure taken from Agamben (1998: 38).

41. Figure taken from Agamben (1998: 38).

The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two sides of a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappears, as a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar, in the inside (as state of exception), and the sovereign power is this very impossibility of distinguishing between outside and inside, nature and exception, *physis* and *nomos*. The state of exception is thus not so much a spatiotemporal suspension as a complex topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside and inside, pass through one another (Agamben 1998: 37).

The concentration of powers and violence within the sovereign becomes problematic specifically with respect to the potential merging of norm and exception (see fig. 3) that Agamben so clearly points to with respect to the current realpolitik situation. To quote Agamben (1998: 38): “What . . . is still happening before our eyes is that the ‘juridically empty’ space of the state of exception . . . has transgressed its spatiotemporal boundaries and now, overflowing outside them, is starting to coincide with the normal order, in which everything again becomes possible.” Agamben thus hints at the fact that it is especially in a post-contractual condition of established sovereignty that we encounter the potential for an actualization of precisely that violence, which arguably remains potential in the SoN (which Foucault [2004: 92] nicely illustrates as a “theater where presentations are exchanged”). Hobbes points to this radical, post-contractual potential explicitly: as he claims, dwelling in a unified manner in a sphere beyond the law, the Leviathan’s “power . . . ought to be greater, than of any, or all the subjects” (1985: 237–238).

Thus, the persistence of a state of war within society has two essential connotations, which Agamben thinks of as intertwined: first, the sovereign can only provisionally end the state of nature (that is, only as long as the multitude remains unified), and second, he is also necessarily exerting legal force over the multitude. The exception then has a two-fold dimension for Agamben: on the one hand, the exception is the potential for war that is necessarily latent in the state (civil war waged by the multitude); on the other hand, it is the legal exception that legally grounds sovereignty, but only by way of integrating a space of anomie into the realm of the *nomos*.⁴²

Within the SoL, the multitude’s potential violence thus becomes combined with another form of violence that Agamben, on the grounds of a reading of Benjamin, Derrida, and Schmitt, terms force-of-law [the original text uses a Heideggerian *kreuzweise Durchstreichung* here, as should be noted], which implicitly points to the exception preceding the norm in legal terms. Here, Agamben relies on Schmitt’s definition of the exception as the locus where the law is legally suspended to enforce it in arguing that there can be no all-encompassing grounding norm or arché [ἀρχή] as a universally granting right that was universally consented to. Law in this sense is based on an absence of origin; it can-

42. Cf. Agamben’s (1998: 18f.) reading of Schmitt: “The situation created in the exception has the peculiar characteristic that it cannot be defined either as a situation of fact or as a situation of right, but instead institutes a paradoxical threshold of indistinction between the two. It is not a fact, since it is only created through the suspension of the rule. But for the same reason, it is not even a juridical case in point, even if it opens the possibility of the force of law. This is the ultimate meaning of the paradox that Schmitt formulates when he writes that the sovereign decision ‘proves itself not to need law to create law.’”

not found itself but needs a *Setzung* (as is implied in the German *Ge-Setz* [law]), which implies a *setzende* subject or, in this case, the sovereign. Law in this sense is inextricably bound to *dicere*, to *force*, in the sense of violence [*Gewalt*]. For Agamben, the Hobbesian SoN is thus always-already and not so different from a state of exception in—following Benjamin's early insight⁴³—being the rule and incorporated within the norm.⁴⁴ The state of nature as the alleged exception is thus far from being overcome in the SoL; rather, it is slightly transformed by being installed *within* a society, and created within and effectuated by a legal framework.

Related to this is an account of a form of actual violence that rests upon the convergence of law and violence in the figure of the sovereign,⁴⁵ which becomes manifest in the context of generalized and instrumentally implemented states of exceptions. This violence is an institutionalised consequence of bare “force-of-law,” and is, thus, conditioned upon the contract's inability to incorporate the essential ungraspability of the law's origin.⁴⁶ We will expand on this form of violence in the following passage.

For now, let me briefly summarize those far-reaching structural and strategic consequences arising with the merging of norm and exception as illustrated in Figure 3. Firstly, the sovereign is not merely beyond law, but also within it. Potentially, he is the law, for, as Norris (2005: 9) nicely reframes Agamben, “[by] identifying the threshold between legal and nonlegal, sovereignty defines them both.” Secondly, the sovereign is total as he can possibly render law and life indistinct. Strikingly, within this shadowy zone, the reactualization of “becoming-wolf” is absolutely unexceptional, as “it is at every moment possible” (Agamben, 1998: 106).

Reading the Contract as a Ban

Keeping Agamben's concerns in mind, the “act of laying down” one's right at the very core of the Hobbesian contract can appear in a different light. On the grounds of a conflation of norm and exception, the act of contractual rights transfer can justifiably be read in a much more radical sense. If the norm conflates with the exception, the (arguably autonomous) decision preceding the contractual arrangement—the moment of “absolute presence” where the multitude becomes the sovereign, according to Agamben—is entirely suspended, as the SoN (where sovereignty could be redefined) is unattainable in its original form (that is, in the form of a disunited, not dissolved, multitude) without wag-

43. As Benjamin (quoted in Agamben, 1999: 160) puts it: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule.”

44. See Benjamin (2010: 139). Cf. also Madung (2007: 37–41).

45. As Agamben (1998: 35) writes: “It is important to note that in Hobbes the state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign, who is the only one to preserve its natural *ius contra omnes*. Sovereignty thus presents itself as an incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and law, and this very indistinction constitutes specifically sovereign violence. The state of nature is thus not truly external to *nomos* but rather contains its virtuality.”

46. See Agamben's remarks in *The State of Exception*, especially chapters four and five, as well as Derrida's (1992a) influential reading of Benjamin's *Critique of Violence*.

ing war against the sovereign to reenter the SoN. Now, if the exception is implemented within a juridical framework that is bound to the sovereign's decision alone and, further, where both norm and exception merge and eventually enter a terrain of undecideability, the multitude's passage from the state (norm) back toward the state of nature (the exception, and the disunited multitude) arguably becomes far more complicated, precisely as the state of nature is blurrily implied in the norm and is not merely external to it.

It is thus specifically at the very locus of the merging of norm and exception that we encounter the intrinsically aporetic structure at the origin of law that Walter Benjamin so thoroughly decoded in his "Critique of Violence," as Derrida's influential reading ("Force de Loi") has so articulately reminded us.⁴⁷ "Applicability, 'enforceability,' is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to the law," Derrida thus claims in his famous lecture held at the Cardozo Law School in 1989, "it is the force essentially implied in the very concept of *justice as law* (*droit*), of justice as it becomes *droit*, of the law as 'droit' . . ." (Derrida, 1989: 5). With this a priori conflation between violence and law (which becomes complicated in relation to a second conflation, that between norm and exception), the sovereign potentially becomes the incorporation of uncanniness; he can violently ignore the true "ultimate insolubility of all legal problems" ["die letztliche Unentscheidbarkeit aller Rechtsprobleme"] (Benjamin, 1996: 247) by himself, potentially emerging from it on the grounds of actualized decisions [*Dezision*] that are based on *dicere* (the term "dictator" in fact stems from *dicere* and *dictare*⁴⁸) rather than *respondere*. To quote Derrida extensively from his second lecture in *The Beast and the Sovereign I* (2011: 57), "the most profound definition . . . of the absolute of sovereignty, of that absoluteness that absolves it" is precisely that

[t]he sovereign does not respond, *he is the one who does not have to, who always has the right not to*, respond [*répondre*], in particular not to be responsible for [*répondre de*] his acts. He is above the law [*le droit*] and has the right [*le droit*] to suspend the law, he does not have to respond before a representative chamber or before judges, he grants pardon or not after the law has passed. The sovereign has the right not to respond, he has the right to the silence of that dissymmetry. He has the right to a certain irresponsibility . . . [emphasis mine]

In this respect, reminiscent of Schmitt's famous opening remarks in *Political Theology*, the sovereign is, in the first place, sovereign qua deciding rather than qua respond-

47. Derrida's "Force de loi" is in essence a critical reading of Benjamin's "Zur Kritik der Gewalt." Benjamin's text famously distinguished between law-preserving [*rechtsetzende Gewalt*] and lawmaking [*rechtserhaltende Gewalt*] violence, as well as between mythical and divine violence. Derrida's reading primarily centers around the ambivalence implied by the German term *Gewalt*, which can mean both a legitimate authority (and in this sense, power) as well as violence in the sense of force (cf. Derrida, 1989: 6). According to Derrida, law necessarily carries with it a notion of "force" (as is implied by the English "to enforce the law"). "Applicability, 'enforceability,' is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to the law. It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of *justice as law* (*droit*), of justice as it becomes *droit*, of the law as 'droit' . . ." (Derrida, 1989: 5).

48. Cf. Carl Schmitt (2014: 232). See also his influential distinction between commissary and sovereign dictatorship (particular chapters 1 and 4 in his *Dictatorship*).

ing. To follow Agamben's argumentative course, sovereignty thus "presents itself as an incorporation of the SoN in society" (Agamben, 1998: 35) with *bia* [βία] (violence) and *dikē* [Δίκη] (justice) jointly entering a threshold; in this sense, the passage from the state of nature to the state of law is not least a movement "from one fear to another" (Derrida, 2009: 42). The Hobbesian "known disposition thereto," a potentiality of violence that can at any time be actualized on the grounds of a monopolized decision upon both exclusion and exception, is post-contractually still embodied in the "artificial," "Mortal God." This condition becomes all the more urgent with respect to the structural condition illustrated in Figure 3. Being the law, the sovereign inhabits the perpetual right to actually place individuals before it without having to restore a norm.

Nevertheless, to do justice to Hobbes, it is crucial to remark that while the sovereign's right is absolute, it faces a limitation if it intervenes with the right to self-preservation.⁴⁹ According to Hobbes (1985: 272), the sovereign's accountability lasts only "as long as . . . the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them," insisting on the individual's right to self-preservation, which prevails within the state.⁵⁰ While even *Leviathan* offers figures "that might without injustice be destroyed" (Ibid.: 232) (and who are thus reminiscent of Agamben's *homines sacri* in that they can be killed "without committing homicide" [1998: 83]), the Hobbesian outlaws have autonomously chosen to dwell outside of the city (in the sense that they were unwilling to sign the contract). To the contrary, bare life as defined by Agamben is actively produced and decided upon; it is inclusively excluded by the sovereign. Similar to Kafka's *Before the Law* (where the man from the country faces an infinite boundary banning him from entering the law), the law remains in force without significance, and is inaccessible to those before it.⁵¹ In Hobbes's scenario, individuals at the very least still obtain the possibility to "submit to . . . decrees" (1985: 232).

However, to some extent, Hobbes fails to account for the fact that the act of "leaving one's right to the sovereign" bears the potential to not just in a Schmittian sense "demand . . . from the members of its own nation the readiness to die,"⁵² but also to strip the individual of any right, even of the right to have a right, to put it in Arendt's terms. Hobbes fails to account for those instances where self-preservation loses its meaning, as when the self becomes obsolete, or when it is violently laid bare, or when it cannot preserve itself as it is entirely powerless. Thus, although individuals constitute a sovereign "in order to live" (Foucault, 2004: 241), the ultimately violent paradox at the very core of sov-

49. With respect to this, see also Patton's (2007: esp. 214–217) paper on the link between Foucault and Agamben's stances on biopolitics.

50. As Hobbes (cf. 1985: 272) asserts, in the case that the sovereign acts against the individuals' right to self-preservation, individuals obtain the legitimation to re-enter the SoN via a civil war waged against the Sovereign.

51. As the man from the country in Kafka's *Before the Law*, Agamben's out-laws are unable to overcome the threshold that leads towards the Law's inside. Agamben's unorthodox interpretation of Kafka's parable is interesting in this regard (cf. Agamben, 1998: 49–62). The latter can be contrasted to Derrida's reading of the same parable (1992b).

52. Cf. Schmitt (2007: 46). It could be interesting to explore both Hobbes's and Schmitt's stances on the sovereign's relation to the individual right to self-preservation. Strauss (2007: 104–110) provides a thoughtful comparison here.

ereignty cannot be fully resolved precisely since, to quote Foucault (2004: 240), “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights *only as a result of the will of the sovereign*.”

The Hobbesian Mortall God thus, from the very origin of its institutionalization, bears the potential to—and here I use a Benjaminian (1998: 264) expression—become a “lord of creatures,” applying an actualized undecidability onto the sphere of politics in refraining from defining distinctions necessary to protect bare life from the threat of indistinction arising from the contractually joint triangle of sovereignty–law–violence (cf. Agamben, 1998: 31). Crucially, in its becoming actual, post-contractual violence is exerted upon figures that are still somewhat within the sovereign’s body, but as creatures, not as subjects—i.e., they are inclusively excluded. Thus, they find themselves exposed to a violence, which—here in suspending the potential not-to-be—becomes absolutely actual and truly unconditional.

The Global Condition: (In)visible Potentials, Hidden Actualities

Agamben’s examination renders it obvious that in incorporating the SoN as the included exception, the actualization of the Hobbesian Common-Wealth rests on the nature of a form of violence, which, in modernity, goes far beyond that seemingly-envisioned by Hobbes (a means-end-rational-punishment for the sake of the preservation of the whole).⁵³ For Agamben, contemporary violence is embedded in what might be termed “bio-thanatopolitics,” i.e., an intermingling of Foucauldian bio-political power and sovereign totalitarian violence. In introducing value into politics, “bio-thanatopolitics” is accompanied by a form of violence that works on an entirely different level than in Hobbes (cf. Agamben 1998: 141). With the decision regarding the very definition of life itself having become juridical, violence here hides itself behind the veil of creationary positivity, which makes life defined by the sovereign.

For Agamben, the reality of contemporary sovereign politics is, thus, a politics of life and death itself, with the concepts of life and death having overcome their past mutual exclusion. Bare life reveals itself as the indeconstructible origin lying at the core of the social contract, being exposed to the sovereign sword of punishment. Even worse, following Agamben, the latter reveals itself as the Damocles sword hanging over anyone,⁵⁴ as the reducibility to bare life is a universal condition; it is a form of potentiality which prevails, since its other—im-potentiality—has not succeeded in actualizing itself. As Agamben asserts (cf. 1998: 137), contemporary sovereign politics, then, creates creatural life, which, in being judged to be “unworthy of being lived,” can be destroyed whatsoever.⁵⁵ According to him, what we face today is the uncanniness of a politics that produces death for the sake of producing life (in the sense of “to make live and to make die” as a radicalisation

53. As Hobbes asserts, “A punishment, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, . . . to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience” (1985: 353).

54. With respect to this, see also Agamben (1999c: 82–84).

55. Agamben refers to the first document that distinguished between valueless and valuable life in relation to euthanasia by Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche in 1920.

of Foucault's biopolitical "to make live and to let die"); the hypothetically anticipated violence whose actualization Hobbes's "rational decider" opts against for the sake of self-preservation has become the reality of a type of violence that does not dare to undermine the Hobbesian first law of nature alongside the right to self-preservation.

The type of violence Agamben has in mind finds its most violent illustration in the absolute evil of Nazi policies conducted on so-called VPs (*Versuchspersonen*)⁵⁶ and, certainly, the *Muselmann*, described by Primo Levi (1959: 101–103) as "an anonymous mass, continuously renewed and always identical, of non-men who march[ed] and labor[ed] in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty really to suffer . . . the weak, the inept, those doomed to selection [for the gas chambers]." For Agamben, the Nazi concentration camps serve as bio-thanatopolitics' most extreme example. Respectively, he illustrates the figure of the *Muselmann* much in line with Adorno's early claim, taken from his "Meditations on Metaphysics," that "the individual no longer died in the concentration camp, but rather the exemplar," where the "individual is expropriated of the final and most impoverished which remained to it."⁵⁷ Corpses here become a matter of serial production, with death becoming de-individualized and arbitrary. Eventually, the Nazis went as far as to integrate the encamped in the process of producing death (Didi-Huberman and Bauman have both elaborated on the so-called *Sonderkommando* in Auschwitz-Birkenau⁵⁸, a group of selected encamped who were forced to work in the crematoria, they were liquidated and replaced after approximately four months of work).

For Agamben, after Auschwitz, little has changed since "non-men" were actively produced by the Nazis; little has been done to render impotential the condition(s) of possibility for the emergence of the *Muselmann*. It is well known that Agamben found their contemporary expression in figures such as the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay who were held in captivity under indefinite detention. However, it should be mentioned that his analogy has always been at risk of somewhat being a generalization. Surely, his comparison to the Third Reich is problematic, and I would agree here with Laclau that it potentially leads to a sort of "social indeterminacy."⁵⁹ However, while Agamben's rhetoric might appear to be not very finely nuanced in this respect, he is surely right in insistently pointing to the alarming extension of precarious lives. As we might specify with Zygmunt

56. Agamben expands on Nazi *Versuchspersonen*, the overcomatose person and 'lebensunwertes Leben' in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the third part of *Homo Sacer*.

57. Cf. Adorno, 1970: 355; my translation. Agamben expands on the figure of the *Muselmann* as the most extreme instance of *homo sacer* in *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (cf. specifically Agamben, 2002: 41–86). I agree with LaCapra (2007) however, and find it important to question whether the figure of *homo sacer* suffices to account for the (arguably) far more complex nature of the *Muselmann*.

58. Cf. Bauman's (2001) analysis; as well as Didi-Huberman (2008).

59. Here, Agamben's claim seems to be a generalizing one. I suggest taking into more critical consideration whether certain phenomena, such as Guantanamo Bay, the Nazi camps, refugee camps, etc., can legitimately be subsumed under the same category. A. Vasilache recently provided an insightful critique (Vasilache, 2007: 65–66). In a similar fashion, Laclau accuses Agamben of "essentialist unification" and "political nihilism." Although I think that Laclau's critique is not entirely justified, he provides few interesting points that seem useful for a potential critique. He also detects several argumentative and structural weaknesses that underpin Agamben's arguments (Laclau, 2007: 11–22).

Bauman (Bauman, 2013: 65f.), it is the refugees, those “ban-optically”⁶⁰ surveilled, those who are encamped and forcefully determined by an “absence of a *where to*—the declared prohibition or practical impossibility of arriving anywhere else” who are doomed to be singled out. Even if biopolitical selection mechanisms have become subtler they are perhaps no less violent. Agamben is also right to insist that for precarious lives to come-into-(abandoned) existence, the establishment of zones of indistinction remains a necessary, if not a sufficient, precondition, and that this topology has turned into contemporary global politics’ “central paradigm” (Agamben, 2014). For him, the political logic that produced 12 years of *Ausnahmezustand* in the Third Reich prevails in a created threshold between life and law, and it does so in a radicalized sense: the implementation of institutionalized exceptions has become the political’s very own condition of possibility⁶¹ in the form of a “perpetual *coup d’état*” (Agamben, 2014).

In this sense, Agamben’s account illustrates how violence itself has become structural in a radically different sense than Hobbes had envisioned or could have envisioned: it operates *through* structures on the grounds of geopolitical situations requiring response mechanisms far more complex than simple PDs. Violence is not visibly exerted by A over B; rather, it works via mechanisms of exclusion/inclusion, or of producing life/letting (or even making) die. What is more, it reproduces itself on normative grounds and through biopolitical *dispositifs*, when to govern is to manage effectively, and to manage effectively is to carefully separate the productive from the unproductive, the People (capital P) from “people” (Agamben, 1993). Compare this focus on productivity to (a Straussian reading of) Hobbes: the entirety of the *Leviathan* is focused on the question of how to avoid a violent death.⁶² There is little, if no mention of the effectivity of life or of the perfecting of the body politic, even if this logic might find a first visual expression in the frontispiece of the *Leviathan* which seemingly unifies all individuals in one body. Biopolitics might thus be tacitly implied, yet if it is, then it is implied negatively (avoiding a violent death is arguably different than a focus on the productivity of life). In other words, from there, it is still a long road to travel to a utilitarian, Benthamite vision of the state as government occurring more than a century later. In Hobbes’s vision, life was not (yet) to be made productive at the expense of some other; the question at stake was to avoid a worst-case scenario, i.e., to grant a considerable level of security to anybody willing to consent to the contract. In other words, at the core of the Hobbesian contract still lay a Decision (capital D) grounded on consent (and Hobbes was at least partly still concerned with *respon-*

60. Didier Bigo’s (2008: 8) concept of the “ban-opticon” can best be described as a conflation of Agamben’s and Nancy’s concepts of the ban (as forms of being inclusively excluded) and Foucauldian panoptical surveillance structures. Bigo accounts for the rise of a “Ban-opticon *dispositif*” to examine a new form of “governmentality of unease” that, according to him, characterises the post-9/11-era: “This form of governmentality of unease, or Ban, is characterized by three criteria: practices of exceptionalism, acts of profiling and containing foreigners, and a normative imperative of mobility.”

61. Agamben provides a detailed account of the history of article 48 (he clearly draws on Schmitt’s discussion of it at the end of *Dictatorship*), which he thinks is vital to take into account to truly understand Hitler’s rise to power. See Agamben (2005: 12–16).

62. Strauss (1961) reads Hobbes in this sense, and I am convinced that he rightly focuses on the avoidance of death. Strauss here somewhat counters Esposito’s (2014) recent (biopolitical) reading of Hobbes.

dere and not solely with *dicere*, even though, as Agamben has shown, a radical authoritarian potential is, by necessity, always-already latent in his conception of sovereignty). However, as Agamben (2014) clearly asserts, it is precisely this situation that has changed entirely: “The crisis, the judgement, is split from its temporal index and coincides now with the chronological course of time, so that—not only in economics and politics—but in every aspect of social life, the crisis coincides with normality and becomes, in this way, just a tool of government. Consequently, the capability to decide once for all disappears and the continuous decision-making process decides nothing.”

In other words, the perpetual crisis undermines our own capacity to decide, as there is no clear situation wherein a decision could be made when faced with the merging between norm and exception. Alternatively, as Agamben (2015a) pointed out recently in an interview, there is a different, important connotation of “crisis” in ancient medicine, which meant a decisive moment when the doctor was confronted with the life or death of his patient. In this context, “crisis” meant judgement, and thus has an ancient connotation directly opposed to the current praxis of enduring indecision and postponement, a divergence that is not just of terminological importance.

I will expand on a few further and more general implications related to this discussion of “crisis” in the following, concluding remarks.

Conclusion: Potential Is to Be, or, Crucially, Not to Be

To conclude, I once again pick up on Virno’s question raised at the very beginning of this paper, namely: “What is . . . the effective relationship between the state of nature and the civil state?” What Agamben’s reading of Hobbes has shown in response to this question, is, first, that the sovereign “decision” is always-already before any universal law, that there can be no all-encompassing *arché* of the *nomos*. It exceeds it by necessity, giving rise to an infinitely deferred actualization of the contract’s hypothetical gift. In pointing to the ultimate aporia that underpins the law’s paradoxical structure to which no abstraction can fully respond, Agamben not least confronts empty formalisms with their limits.⁶³ As I would argue, this holds equally for veils of ignorance, basic norms, impartial observers, or, last but not least, “Mortall Gods” who fail at rendering the law’s inherent violence as inexistent—be it actual or potential—for violence is always-already implied in the *Setzung* of the law, of *Ge-Setz*.

Furthermore, Agamben has explicitly revealed how the state of war is potentially implied in social settings in at least two ways: firstly, via the law’s inability to fully incorporate the exception into the norm, and secondly, via the ultimate divergence between the multitude and the people in post-contractual settings. Following Agamben’s arguments, these forms of inclusionary exclusion become complicated specifically, in a time when any proper “decision” (in the sense of judgement as etymologically implied in “crisis”) is seemingly suspended by a peculiar conflation between norm and exception.

63. This, I would say, applies equally to Neo-Kantians as diverse as Kelsen and Rawls, both of whom partially rely on the law’s empty formula, i.e., its pure form.

Subsequently, the legitimate nature of Hobbes's argument needs to be questioned in a few further respects, specifically if read from a contemporary stance. First, it has to be critically remarked that the Hobbesian SoN, rather than being merely hypothetical, has always-already been more of a concrete abstraction of civil society (as MacPherson has rightly argued). It needs to be taken into account that Hobbes's SoN therefore still obtains a peculiar relation to allegedly "civilized states"; as Agamben asserts, there is a sense in which we have never managed to exit the state of nature. It is far from being a prejudicial condition; rather, it is the "exception and the threshold" dwelling within the state (Agamben, 1998: 106). Taking into account the contemporary condition, timely indications of tendencies towards states of war are manifold, and, as one might add, as it has always-already been inscribed into a "civilized" topography, it has always retained its elements of barbarism.⁶⁴ Undoubtedly, its most significant examples are still to be found in those zones of indistinctions so rigorously depicted by Agamben.⁶⁵ Thus, I suggest to rather view the SoN as always implied in the State, or as really just another side of a large coin (Virno). The question to be asked would then be, of course, what side of the coin, or which pole our social (dis)order(s) tend(s) to in the present, and in what ways states of war are implied and actualised within our societies.

Secondly, I suggest that Hobbes, and in specific, his account of the state of nature—if read, with Agamben, not merely as being opposed to the civil state, but rather, as always-already inscribed into it as its very own exception—is of striking importance in another respect that I could only hint at in this study. What I described as a very early, implicit account of future-colonization could in some sense be translated into the contemporary, neoliberal condition with respect to the insights of authors such as Vogl, Streeck, or Berardi, all of whom hint at the fact that the future(s) is(are) currently being increasingly determined and colonized by financial transactions, which themselves construct futures via performative, self-fulfilling prophecies. In this sense, it could be argued that the predominance of financial capitalism shares certain facets with Hobbes's account of the state of nature, specifically regarding its time structure. As I tried to suggest briefly, Hobbes's account of the SoN essentially circles around the problem of the future, and specifically, insecurity, alongside the means adopted to solve it. Moreover, we should remember that Hobbes's state of nature was essentially grounded on potential, that is, for Hobbes, for there to be a state of war, a sufficient factor was a high likeliness for warlike states to unfold. Moreover, as I suggested, the nature of preventive, anticipatory reason as depicted by Hobbes was a significant factor for the emergence of a state of war.

To lend credence to the claim that Hobbes's account of the development of "anticipatory reason" shares certain features with the contemporary (allegedly post-contractual) condition, it is helpful to briefly point out that the French editorial collective *Tiqqun* (2011; cf. also Lyotard, 2004) has recently re-elaborated on the contemporary alliance between neoliberalism and cybernetics as a "Universal Automaton," thought of nowadays

64. This insight is, of course, not at all far from Adorno's and Horkheimer's early diagnosis in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

65. Cf. also Prozorov in this regard (2009: 334).

as a Leviathan without a specified sovereign, thereby essentially functioning as a perfect machine on the grounds of algorithmic determination and neoliberal governance (this, surely, is neoliberalism's peculiar way of trying to solve the problem of future contingency). Moreover, Serge Moscovici (1976) has elaborated on the development from what he calls a "mechanical" state of nature to a "cybernetic" one, regarding the nature of technology shaping individual action.

Above all, Franco "Bifo" Berardi (2012) has argued that what is lost in neoliberalism is an open future yet to come, a form of the future which can neither be predicted nor possessed. In a sense, Berardi adds to Agamben's account of a perpetual crisis which implies a radical lack of judgement in clearly articulating that the current crises we face are not simply the effects of the 2008 financial crisis alongside the separation of labor and capital, and the rise of what he (2012) calls "financial dictatorship." They are also, and probably most importantly, essentially caused by "a crisis of imagination about the future" (Ibid.: 8), closely connected to what Berardi terms an "ethical disorder" (Ibid.: 125); thus, we might add with a certain hint to Hobbes's elaboration on the state of nature, they might also be intensified by a certain form of "anticipatory reason." Such a crisis is embedded in global technology and linguistic machines producing idioms that reproduce an ideology of instrumental exchange rather than forms of gift-giving that would enable an ethico-social imaginary and a politics of attachment going beyond mere everyday-economic transactions and instrumentalised feedback-mechanisms pervading the social. In a sense, Berardi's (Ibid.: 60–61) description of the current form of the public space is distinctly Hobbesian, depicting it as "a jungle wherein everyone is fighting against one another." Furthermore, we might add, recent sociological analyses of the level of inter-relational competitiveness in contemporary neoliberal societies (such as those provided by German sociologists Hartmut Rosa [2006] and, most recently, Dietmar Wetzels [2013]) can lend high empirical credence to Berardi's implicit parallelization.

Thirdly, on the ground of the observation that Hobbes describes an abstraction of civil society, the content of an accurate "state of nature" in the sense of a state that is truly before the contract on behalf of Hobbes's description necessarily remains entirely fictional and speculative (that is, if deduced from an observation of civil society). In a way, then, Hobbes's account of a state of nature before an already established civil state is surely a myth, or in a Rousseauian sense, a fiction in a similar manner as the *volonté générale* is, and as sovereignty itself is. In Hobbes's own terms, sovereignty is based on artificiality (Agamben indeed speaks of an "optical illusion" [2013: 28] in this context). To quote Agamben (2015: 41) once more: "In other words, the state of nature, is a mythological projection into the past of civil war; conversely, civil war is a projection of the state of nature into the city: it is what appears when one considers the city from the perspective of the state of nature."

While any coherent picture of an actual state of nature before the contract arguably remains beyond Hobbes's grasp, this study argued that it is nevertheless vital to rethink the logics underpinning the Hobbesian SoN (specifically, if it is understood as an abstraction of civil society). In fact, doing so might serve as a powerful tool for a contemporary cri-

tique of sovereignty, especially regarding Agamben's (Aristotelian) distinction between potentiality and actuality. As Agamben (1998: 44) notes, "Until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality . . . has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality, a political theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable." If, grounded on Agamben's (Aristotelian) assertion that a potential is both the potential to-be and the potential not-to-be, what has to be considered are precisely the prospects for an actualization of the potential not-to-be that entirely excludes *any* remaining potential-to-be. Alongside Foucault, we should take into account those prospects; they are to be found in the fact that the SoN is a "condition of Warre," and not yet a Warre.

Even on game-theoretical terrain, reconstructions of Hobbes's state of nature have pointed out that there might be greater prospects for cooperative behavior amongst agents in anarchy than Hobbes's imagination was willing to admit.⁶⁶ It is these actual prospects that need to be taken into further consideration. The sources of mistrust evolving in the Hobbesian "condition to Warre" need to be explored. If A believes B to be shortsighted, A will not cooperate, no matter what kind of person B actually is. Why would he *believe* that A would not cooperate? Additionally, how would an actualization of the *potential not-to-be* have to materialize? What would a concrete action actualizing a potential-not-to-be demand from us? A becoming-aware of the sources of mistrust might, as I deliberately suggest here, serve as a major contribution towards a truly post-sovereign politics in Agamben's sense. This would be a politics which, from an "interstitial distance,"⁶⁷ confronts the *fact* that bare life is *produced*, the *fact* that for bare life to come into being, a threshold between law and life needed to be *created*. Such a politics would respond that Hobbes's SoN is a "condition to Warre," and that Agamben's *zones of indistinction* are unconditional while realizing that *conditional* is not yet *un-conditional*. Finally, this would be a politics that explores the potentialities silently opened up by Hobbes himself in not yet speaking of "Warre." It would go "beyond the state in the state."⁶⁸

As Levinas (1999: 159–160) critically remarks, it is "not without importance to know if the egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled [...] proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the irreducible responsibility of the one for all." In other words, the question to be raised is not least an ethical one; what comes before sovereignty? What is there and could there be anything before a thinking that is future-driven, or before a

66. Specifically, Kavka (1983) rigorously attacks Hobbes's assumption that anticipatory attack is the most reasonable policy. In this respect, I consider Hampton's (1985; 1986; 1991) claims fruitful as well, alongside Axelrod's (1987) studies on cooperative behavior and iterated PDs.

67. I follow the idea behind Simon Critchley's notion of 'interstitial distance' here. As Critchley asserts, the political act of resistance happens "in a situation that articulates an interstitial distance from the state and allows for the emergence of new political subjects who exert a universal claim." Moreover, he asserts that "working at an interstitial distance from the state" might help to "construct political subjectivities that are not arbitrary or relativistic, but which are articulations of an ethical demand whose scope is universal and whose evidence is faced in a concrete situation" (Critchley, 2004: 92). I explicate such a politics alongside the relation between Hobbes and Levinas in more detail in "Fighting for the Other's Rights First: Levinasian Perspectives on Occupy Gezi's Standing Protest," which is forthcoming in *Culture, Theory and Critique*.

68. I draw on Levinas' (1996) essay "Beyond the State in the State" here.

thinking that restlessly aims at self-preservation? Can there be such a before, and would that “before” be a rendering im-potential of potentiality, a rendering im-potential of a “condition of Warre,” as it were? Speaking with Derrida and Bennington (1999: 188), we must “try to think the gift before exchange, and the law before the contract.” In this sense, it is about time to explore Hobbes’s uncanny contemporariness to think through its ethical consequences, and not in the least instance, to think with Hobbes against Hobbes.

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Нормализованные исключения и тотализованные потенциальности: насилие, суверенитет и война в философии Томаса Гоббса и Джорджо Агамбена

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В статье критически рассматривается связь между суверенитетом, насилием и войной в «Номо Сасер» Джорджо Агамбена и «Левиафане» Томаса Гоббса. Вкратце остановившись на новом прочтении основных положений «Левиафана», явным образом отсылающих к аристотелевскому различению актуального и потенциального, я прихожу к выводу, что насилие до общественного договора, по Гоббсу, прежде всего основано на том, что он называл «антиципирующим разумом», и проблеме контингентности будущего. В соответствии с интуициями М.Фуко, я также утверждаю, что допущение определенных потенциальностей ведет к известным выводам Гоббса о естественном состоянии как состоянии войны («condition of Warre»). На втором этапе я анализирую некоторые утверждения Агамбена с целью описать, как воображенное Гоббсом насилие до общественного договора не может быть преодолено в результате появления суверена. В частности, доводы Агамбена проливают свет на неразличимую и неразрывную взаимосвязь естественного состояния и состояния закона, которые, как пишет П. Вирно, являются «сиамскими близнецами». Таким образом на мета-уровне Агамбен предполагает, что Гоббсова проблема не сводима к «проблеме порядка» (по Парсонсу). Предпринятый анализ проблематизации будущего в работах Гоббса позволяет понять, как работают современные стратагемы на финансовых рынках и механизмы освоения будущего (future-colonization), лежащие в основе глобальной политики. В ответ на критику Агамбена я утверждаю, что тщательный анализ того, что можно

обозначить как «перспективы актуализации потенциального не-бытия», может быть первым теоретическим шагом на пути к эффективной форме критики.

Ключевые слова: Джорджо Агамбен, Мишель Фуко, Томас Гоббс, насилие, состояние войны, чрезвычайное положение, танатополитика, неолиберализм

Humanism as *Casus Belli*: Carl Schmitt's Critique of Just War Theory*

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This article deals with the critique of Just War Theory (JWT) which appeared in the works of Carl Schmitt. JWT was revived in the middle of 1900s and was treated as an absolutely secular direction for military ethics. However, being Christian in its origin JWT retained a certain religious reasoning. This call for political morality could be compared to an appeal to divine law, but outside of the Christian context it loses its validity and weight. These features of JWT were noticed by Schmitt who offered the concept of bracketed warfare instead. The bracketing of war was an essential component of *jus publicum Europaeum* and it presupposed the recognition of an enemy as equal. Bracketed war was defined in political and legal terms and did not presuppose moral or religious evaluation of armed conflicts. In the 20th century bracketing of war was replaced with discrimination of war as morally and legally unacceptable act. JWT served as a theoretical foundation for this change. Though it is the prerogative of JWT to prove itself as an attempt at humanism, the invasion of morality into politics, from Schmitt's perspective dehumanizes the enemy and increases the totality of a conflict. Schmitt insisted on purifying the political sphere from all moral constituents in order to make it more balanced. A mere political approach to war made Schmitt's theory of bracketed war more humane and reasonable than JWT.

Keywords: war, JWT, bracketing of war, human rights, humanitarian intervention, Carl Schmitt

Introduction

Just War Theory (JWT) was revived during the Vietnam War, and proved its value and urgency in the 1990s when humanitarian intervention was actively discussed and carried out, especially after the September 11 attacks when the war on terror began, and as interest in the political thoughts of Carl Schmitt was rekindled. In spite his connections to Nazism, Schmitt is an important source for different authors. Moreover, we suppose that the presence of Schmitt's ideas in the contemporary agenda of political theory can be explained by the restoration of JWT.

The current dominant perception of Schmitt is as an inhumane bellicist, and this point of view will be critically evaluated in this paper. The central thesis of the article is that

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Schmitt expressed in his critique of JWT an alternative approach to an understanding of humanism and humanity. In discussing the ambiguity of JWT, we cannot avoid considering Schmitt's point of view on the application of ethics to politics. From a Schmittian perspective, true humanism could not legitimize any war because the lethal force used in war is incompatible with the very idea of human dignity. As Schmitt noticed, "Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet" (2007b: 54). Applying the term humanism to war is a logical fallacy, unless a rhetorical or ideological trick.

This paper, first, considers briefly the status and essence of contemporary JWT. Why and how has this theory returned from oblivion and what has reinforced it? Second, turning to a critical treatment of this normative theory of war in Schmitt's political theory, we will consider which JWT, and who, he was criticizing, as JWT has a long history and different traditions and modifications. Some of its premises can be found in the writings of Aristotle and Cicero, later it was developed by Christian political philosophers and then was restored in the second half of the 20th century within the framework of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy. Third we reveal Schmitt's arguments against JWT. Fourth, we raise the question of Schmitt's specific criticism of the humanism of the political. The humanistic aspect of the political is often overlooked by those who read Schmitt and this leads to the accusation in militarism and radical conservatism, which is, in fact, unjust.

Conflicts of the Present and JWT

As we noted above, JWT in the West was elaborated by Christian scholars, primarily by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas who rejected early Christian pacifism and stated that divine sanction allows the use of force. The Christian doctrine of *bellum justum* was carefully worked out in the Middle Ages and reached its zenith in the School of Salamanca, in the works of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. In the 17th century, Hugo Grotius stimulated the secularization of JWT. Immanuel Kant is usually identified as the last classical philosopher to support JWT, although there are different views on Kant's position on the ethics of war and many authors do not treat Kant as a just war theorist. However, we will leave this question aside since localization of Kant's thoughts within the framework of normative war theory is beyond our scope. It is only important to note that in the 18th century, Kant discussed war and peace without reference to divine sanction. After Kant, JWT suffered a theoretical crisis and there were only a few prominent adherents of this doctrine in the 19th century. John Stewart Mill is an exception with his essays "On Liberty" and "A Few Words on Non-Intervention." The lack of theoretical development of JWT is apparent even for its contemporary disciples—"it really is remarkable that it was not until the mid-1900s that just war theorists equal to the stature of Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel appeared" (Orend, 2006: 20).

There are a number of reasons for this decline. Probably the most important is the systemization of international law which began in the 19th century. Theorists were involved in peace conferences, where they discussed treaties and conventions elaborating the laws

of armed conflict. As Orend described this process, “many of the diplomats, academics and lawyers who worked on such treaties and codes would have made first-rate just war theorists. But the opportunity was ripe for them to engage in legal construction instead of theory-building, and so pragmatically they chose the former” (Ibid.). Only in the middle of the 20th century, did the works of Josef McKenna, Paul Ramsey and finally Michael Walzer appear, heralding a significantly renewed tradition of justification of war which had nothing to do with Christian political philosophy. The process of secularization was complete.

At present, JWT is a very heterogeneous area of military ethics. It is impossible to treat JWT as a group of schools each concentrated around one scholar or a group of classical authors. However the theory has a “core” approved by most just war authors. This core is a set of principles which determines the conditions which make a declaration of war justified (*jus ad bellum*) and which methods of waging war are humane (*jus in bello*). The moral acceptability of war is justified if going to war meets the requirements of both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. A discussion on a third category of just war, defining how to finish an armed conflict properly (*jus post bellum*) has recently begun. This third category has prominent advocates (Orend, 2006; Allman, Winright, 2010), however it has not been embraced by all just war theorists.

Contemporary JWT postulates that there could be circumstances when resorting to war would be not only wishful but also a morally acceptable way to resolve a conflict. Just war theorists assume lethal force may be used legitimately only for the restoration of justice or the protection of human rights and freedoms. However, just war doctrine has a property that often remains unexpressed but which is important for our discussion on Schmitt’s criticism of this theory. Just war theorists usually divide the world into those who are right and just, and those who are not, in other words into those who are morally competent and incompetent. This division is implied if not stated explicitly. St. Augustine, considered the father of JWT, elucidated this ontological dichotomy of the world: “But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will lament that fact that he is faced with the necessity of waging just wars; for if they were not just, he would not have to engage in them, and consequently there would be no wars for a wise man. For it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars” (Augustine, 2003: XIX, 7, 861–862).

This appeal to reason and wisdom, defined by Augustine, in a very platonic manner as knowledge of justice, may be found in contemporary just war language. JWT proponents understand themselves to be defenders of humanity and disciples of the pacifist ideal of perpetual peace but who are not afraid to do the “dirty work”—to use military force when necessary. In their struggle for peace, just war theorists suggest strictly limiting cases where war could be declared without committing a crime. Although the doctrine of *jus ad bellum* presumes that the criterion of just cause (*causa justa*) should be supplemented by a number of related principles—among them are proportionality, discrimination, probability of success, right intentions and legitimated authority — this latter criterion is absolutely dominant.

The list of just causes expanded in the 20th century because of dramatic changes in international relations and the rise of new types of armed conflicts. Just war theorists of the past admitted only two just causes of war: self-defense and the assistance of an ally fighting a defensive war. Ever more often we talk about the so-called new wars or non-classical wars, which have become the dominant type of armed conflict in the past few decades. Several features are inherent to non-classical wars: asymmetry (the collision of unequal political subjects); the low intensity of conflicts; identity politics (ethnic, religious or tribal); and the financing by predatory economic activities, such as pillage, the “taxation” of humanitarian aid and, kidnapping (Kaldor, 2013). Contemporary just war theorists have tried to adapt the theory to this context as otherwise it would remain incomplete and out-of-date. Orend suggests there are four more cases when the arms could be used legitimately—the war on terror, intervention in civil wars, an anticipatory attack, and humanitarian intervention (Orend, 2006: 68).

Civil war itself is not a new type of a conflict, but just war theorists are concerned with the problem of justifying an intrusion into a country where a civil war has begun. Orend, amongst numerous other philosophers, states it would be morally acceptable to assist a group rebelling against the oppression of an unjust and criminal government. In the middle of the 19th century John Stuart Mill stated that if people trying to throw off the yoke of tyranny “have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent” (Mill, 1988: 6). In fact this notion is usually ignored. Intervention in a civil war is considered to be morally permissible if it is aimed at a tyrant who “has no moral reason to exist” (Orend, 2006: 84).

Further, terrorism has become a generally recognized global threat. World powers carry the most notable losses in collisions with terrorist or rebel groups.¹ Terrorism is regarded as a just cause for resorting to arms as it is “always an impermissible tactic, since it involves the deliberate killing of innocent civilians” (Orend, 2006: 70). Human rights are understood as basic values and a state should ensure the security of its citizens and prevent them from terrorist threats by any means.

An anticipatory attack or pre-emptive strike is the third new just cause. In certain circumstances, force may be used to repel potential aggression. The justice of an anticipatory attack is confirmed by a “credible, grave and imminent threat” (Orend, 2006: 76). JWT is concentrated on the notion of the defense of human rights, and missed opportunity to prevent aggression can be considered a lack of competence and diligence to protect citizens.

Lastly, the fourth new just cause is humanitarian intervention, which is probably the most important and contradictory pro war argument. Humanitarian intervention has become one of the crucial arguments of political philosophy and war ethics over the last 20–30 years. In contrast to other just causes of war, humanitarian intervention gains not only political but also sacred meaning because it appeals directly to the univer-

1. See The Uppsala Conflict Data Program datasets: <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>

sality of human values. It presupposes that the human rights protector obtains a specific *auctoritas spiritualis* which allows the use of arms.

Humanitarian intervention can be considered a pre-emptive strike which is treated now as a just cause of war, as we noted above. This type of war rests on the idea that human rights violations are an international crime and must be punished. If there is desperate trouble—government massacres, ethnic cleansing, or criminal groups oppressing innocent people—a foreign army should intervene. Civilians cannot always resist mass slaughter, therefore another country cannot wait until the situation is resolved of its own accord. As Walzer wrote, “We don’t require that they [civilians] pass the test of self-help before coming to their aid. It is their very incapacity that brings us in” (Walzer, 2006a: 106). Human dignity should be protected even by armed force.

This amendment of JWT and especially of the *jus ad bellum* categories reveals the typical logic of the theory. Justification of war implies the rectification of an injustice, and the punishment of the offenders: the tyrant loses the moral right of existence; terrorism is by definition impermissible; a political community accused of human rights violation is deprived of the protection granted by international law.

These supplementary just cause principles are controversial as contemporary JWT lacks an important feature possessed by the Christian JWT. That theory is based on the Christian dogma appealed not merely to ethics but also to divine law. Reference to divine law made a war of self-defense or even an offensive war just, as it was a measure to punish sinners.

Secularized JWT can be supported only by positive law, which lacks the degree of universality peculiar to divine law. However, contemporary JWT is based on the claim that its principles and values protected by them are universal. The justification of war which was based on traditional religious reasoning is replaced now by something quasi-religious—science or morality—which pretends to gain the same immense force and absolute status as religious faith. This peculiar property of group belief was mentioned by Durkheim: “When a somewhat strong conviction is shared by a single community of people it inevitably assumes a religious character” (1997: 119). Nietzsche also pointed out this tendency to exalt common beliefs. He wrote about the “Will to Truth” as a new divine truth, new faith that was offered at the altar, but at the very altar where mankind have already “slaughtered one faith after another” (Nietzsche, 2001: 201). JWT works in exactly the same way, when it offers morality as a universal political value. This looks ambitious in the political sphere. Lee, in an analysis of Tony Blair’s moral justification of the military operation in Iraq in 2003, noted this doubtfulness saying that morality joins politics only when a “solid legal case for war could not be demonstrated” (Lee, 2012: 316). This unconvincing use of morality as a basic foundation of politics makes the consideration of Schmitt’s critique of JWT all the more relevant.

Carl Schmitt as a Critic of JWT

The writings of Schmitt on the problems of war and peace were written in the middle of the 20th century, at a time when interest in just war doctrine had almost been lost. However, from Schmitt's point of view, integrating just war thinking into military ethics or international law was dangerous. If one side may appeal to justice, the idea of the equality of political actors disappears. It was evident to Schmitt that JWT complicated and embittered modern warfare. An inevitable question arises in this context: which JWT was criticized by Schmitt? Another related question—and maybe more important—is Schmitt's skepticism and critique still relevant to contemporary JWT restatements?

The works of Schmitt contain many references to authors of European political science, some of whom belonged to the *bellum justum* tradition, including Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria and Suarez. But it is almost impossible to find references to any contemporary just war author in his texts. Schmitt mentioned American international law theorist James Brown Scott who advocated a “return to the Christian-theological doctrine of just war” (Schmitt, 2006: 321) and a move to a discriminatory concept of war. Scott's book *The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nation* (2000) may be regarded as a contribution to JWT, although this work was concentrated primarily on Vitoria's influence on contemporary international law and should be considered as a qualitative historical review on this matter. And, after all, criticisms of Scott appear in Schmitt's works in a terse form. Schmitt did not mention or quote any other contemporary just war theorist. We have to assume, therefore, that Schmitt's criticism was concentrated on catholic authors of the late Middle Ages, first of all on Vitoria and Suarez.

Schmitt's criticism was retrospective as he disputed the scholastic just war doctrine. It should be noted that retrospective criticism of JWT is not uncommon. In the same period, Hannah Arendt criticized this doctrine in her book *On Revolution*. She argued against Aristotle's idea of the justice of war against barbarians, which was compared to hunting for slaves. Some Antique authors agreed on this matter, Titus Livius could be an example, though the argument for legitimizing war for enslavement was not repeated either in the Middle Ages, or in the Modern Era; no one supported Aristotle's Hellenic chauvinism. Perhaps Arendt's retrospective criticism of JWT missed the target, while for Schmitt the retrospection was appropriate and deliberate.

Schmitt concentrated on the past but he guessed the coming of a new trend in the ethics of war, realizing that the reasoning typical for Christian JWT had become relevant again. His retrospection was foresight at the same time. Nor was Schmitt confined to criticism of the School of Salamanca (with Vitoria and Suarez as its most prominent scholars). He was engaged in theoretical disputes and in the debates on the practicalities of public law. Schmitt argued not only with the classics of JWT, but also with those who developed the international legal system after the First World War and who adapted the concept of justice to the political sphere. Justice in international politics (the core of JWT) included the legal discrimination of the enemy and war. Schmitt used this concept—“discrimination”—in order to emphasize radical change in understanding of war.

According to Schmitt, discrimination of war as aggression or criminal act would lead to an outbreak of international civil war that eventually would be the last war of humanity. JWT was criticized by Schmitt for both theoretical and practical ambiguity.

However, the question of Schmitt's urgency remains open. Is it possible to use Schmitt's arguments against the modern, secularized forms of JWT, with Michael Walzer as their patriarch? Walzer being a left-wing theorist did not require archaic—in his understanding—religious arguments when he was working on “Just and Unjust Wars.” Walzer's concept was based on logic, reasoning and the ethics of common sense. But as Schmitt noted in *Political Theology*: “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development . . . but also because of their systematic structure” (Schmitt, 1985: 36). JWT updated its exterior but the internal content has not changed essentially as it kept a scholastic logic for the justification of war.

As Brown explained, faith was a significant element of medieval JWT. The authors who developed the *bellum justum* doctrine in the Middle Ages expected the Antichrist's advent. This anxious expectation manifested itself in the political thoughts of *respublica Christiana*, which “believed itself to be under potential assault from the Antichrist” (Brown, 2007: 64) and was ready to play the role of Antichrist restrainer. Augustine and many other authors expressed same ideas. Contemporary JWT is secular in the sense that it does not need direct references to religious reasoning in order to legitimize warfare. But, as we said above, its logic and form imply there should be a kind of strong faith that makes use of force morally permissible. Prioritizing human rights, freedom and Orend's concept of the “minimal justice of a state” constitutes this new faith. In this context, it would be wrong to call Schmitt's critique retrospective, as we said above, inappropriate or outdated. Schmitt stated that in our time, when religious rhetoric is removed from politics, a moral justification of war would lead to a dangerous mode of political thinking and the expansion of war.

Schmitt's relevance is supported by the specificity of his arguments. There are several major ethical doctrines of war besides JWT—realism, pacifism and militarism. And there are authors who cannot be attributed to one of these traditions as they have offered an original approach to the philosophy of war. Schmitt's position diverges from political realists and other JWT opponents. Realists suppose that a state pursuing its national interest may use any means regardless of morality. Schmitt concurred with the realists in this respect but he went further declaring war to be a key characteristic of the global political order. Brown, comparing Schmitt with the British political theorist Ken Booth, wrote: “Schmitt makes much the same criticisms of the idea of Just War as Booth and other radicals but goes further, providing a fully worked-out context within which these criticisms make a great deal of sense. Moreover, although Schmitt does have some affinities with at least classical realism, his critique of Just War is far more deeply grounded than their critique” (Brown, 2007: 58). Schmitt is deeper and keener than the classicists of political realism to which he is moderately close. This explains the interest in Schmitt

among those who need to reinforce a realistic or conservative approach in arguments with the modern liberal JWT.

Arguments against JWT

Despite the fact that Schmitt criticized medieval religious JWT, his criticism is still relevant for two reasons. First, Schmitt mentioned that system of international law which utilized some assumptions of JWT returns the world to an unbalanced condition comparable to medieval times when war might be waged not only for political reasons. In addition to his belief that the ethical doctrine of war was incorrect, Schmitt found it dangerous because of its inherent potential to legitimize unrestrained warfare. This cruelty, as we know from history (at least, from the form of history that was described by Schmitt) was typical for religious and feudal wars. Second, contemporary JWT tends to see its basic foundations as a universal dogma which makes them similar to religious norms. JWT, from this point of view, is a methodology of contradictory moral justification for violence used for the sake of universal human values or humanity itself.

Now we will look more closely at the reasons that made Schmitt reject JWT. Schmitt suggested that the transition from bracketed warfare (or the non-discriminatory concept of war) to discriminatory war was a key move of the last two centuries. The golden era of *jus publicum Europaeum* (international law of European states)—as Carl Schmitt characterized the period between 1648 and 1918—established the tradition of the bracketing of war. This bracketing was guaranteed by a specific political order that presumed the equality of political bodies involved in a conflict. As Vattel notably proclaimed “the law of nations is the law of sovereigns; free and independent states are moral persons” (Vattel, 1916: 12). An adversary was recognized at that time as a sovereign state; his legal status as a *justus hostis* (just enemy) undoubtedly meant that there were always legal ways to regulate an armed conflict: by concluding peace or capturing the enemy’s territory. In addition, civilian immunity was unquestionable since noncombatants were excluded from being legitimate targets of war.

Bracketed war exhausted itself with the beginning of the total war era. The treaty of Versailles was “not a treaty and not peace and certainly not a peace treaty in terms of international law, but condemnation of the victors over the vanquished” (Schmitt, 1979: 103). The indictment of this treaty launched the process of the discrimination of war. International law condemned the enemy in categories of criminal law, and offensive wars were banned as aggressive.

This legal and moral denunciation of the military sphere removed the unique status of classical European laws of war and peace. The treaty of Versailles and subsequent international legal norms “in essence [rejected] the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants” (Schmitt, 1999: 34) and therefore rejected the differentiation between war and peace, which made the identification of the enemy impossible. Schmitt is too strict and harsh in this accusation of Anglo-Saxon (as he calls it) international law; modern international humanitarian law and JWT are extremely concerned about the distinc-

tion between combatants and non-combatants and civilian immunity as inalienable part of their mission. The problem is whether the ethical evaluation of war would serve as a deterrent to conflict escalation since now “the *justice* of a war is, more than anything else, fundamental to its totality” (Schmitt, 2011: 31).

The discrimination of war as a criminal act causes confusing situations when a state describes its activity not as a war but as, for example, police action or peace-keeping operations. This has become more apparent after the death of Schmitt. Benoist in a recent essay calling into question Schmitt's impact on contemporary American policy noticed that *jus publicum Europaeum* “excludes the very idea of ‘international police’” (Benoist, 2013: 23). However, although the conflicts of our time could be designated as police operations, international police could operate only in a world civil society or *civitas gentium* (state of nations). This political and social structure is an unattainable ideal as “each state places its majesty (for it is absurd to speak of the majesty of the people) in being subject to no external juridical restraint” (Kant, 2007: 17). Another contradiction appears when we look at the forces that conduct such police operations—that is armies rather than police. The army is not empowered to assume police duties as the “institution of the police in the modern sense of the term [is] the instrument by which one prevents the occurrence of certain disorders” (Foucault, 2007: 353–354). The army as an international police would have to undertake negative functions to suppress disorder. That in turn presupposes the existence of a special global order, while this global order is as unattainable as *civitas gentium*. “[I]nternational law is, after all, a ‘right of war and of peace’, *jus belli ac pacis*” (Schmitt, 2011: 31). This global order could appear only after states stop fighting.

Another dangerous tendency changing the essence of war, according to Schmitt, is the recognition of irregular forces which would be impossible in other circumstances. Irregular forces have demanded acknowledgment as legitimate political parties. Among them are insurgents, partisans and, we may add, terrorists. These new actors know neither the bracketing of war, nor the laws of war. It is obvious for Schmitt that

[F]or rebels, recognition as belligerents meant an extraordinarily significant and fundamental upgrading of their status. For the legal government in question, it meant a downgrading and a serious intervention. . . . What appeared, both internally and externally, to one side to be rebels, treason, felony, and criminality, and to the other side to be prosecution of crimes, administration of justice, and police action, now became for the recognizing state a *bellumustum*. (Schmitt, 2006: 299)

Bracketed and restricted war has been replaced by just and humanitarian war, but armed conflicts have not become more humane or rational. This can be seen in the fact that the majority of victims in contemporary wars are not soldiers but civilians. A partisan or terrorist victory, or victory over partisans or terrorists does not imply concluding peace and signing a treaty; only the complete destruction of the opponent. Irregular war contains the permanent threat of the transformation into the last war of mankind, into a global civil war which affects everyone and which would be international *bellum*

omnium contra omnes. The integration of liberal JWT into international law provoked this intensification of unrestrained irregular hostility.

JWT vindicates war in the name of universal values, such as justice, freedom, democracy. The problem is whether there are any truly universal values, commonly shared and approved by every political community. Furthermore, what was important for Schmitt, was that war as a political means should be void of moral, religious or any other value. It cannot be justified or morally cleansed while the “physical destruction of human life is not motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of life” (Schmitt, 2007b: 49). In this sense, the roots of war are both political and ontological, and the question is not whether war is good or not good, just or unjust. The question is how to fight a war and how to end it.

JWT goes hand in hand with rhetorical attacks on the enemy as it makes opponents unjust or inhuman. Combat flows from the battlefield to mass media. Information warfare requires decisive steps since it is necessary to define the enemy as negatively as possible and do this rapidly. The enemy is dehumanized and demonized when one of the parties tries to assert itself as the protector of humanity and the defender of all of mankind. The opponent is identified as *hostis humani generis* (the enemy of mankind) so that any available means of destruction can and should be used against him. Today “the most terrible war is pursued in the name of peace, the most terrible oppression only in the name of freedom, the most terrible inhumanity only in the name of humanity” (Schmitt, 2007a: 95). The cynical and oxymoronic practice of “humanitarian bombing” could be an example.

Total war with a criminal aggressor, with world evil, or with the enemy of mankind is threatening because, as an alternative to bracketed war, it lacks an important property possessed by classical war—the ability to be ended. The road to peace in the era of discriminated war is difficult. Long-term peace processes replace the evidence of victory over an enemy (Münkler, 2005). The erosion of the distinction between war and peace makes peace to be nothing more than a continuation of war by other means.

The irrelevance of the moral justification of war applies to all kinds of war—not only to those of self-defense or the defense of an ally, but also to the intrusion into civil war, war on terror or humanitarian intervention. New threats, which make the use of force legal in the opinion of just war theorists, were generated by the dominance of liberalism in international law, and therefore these types of wars are liberalism wrestling with itself. As described by the Italian political philosopher, Giorgio Agamben: “Security and terrorism may form a single deadly system, in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others’ actions” (Agamben, 2001).

Self-righteousness, peculiar to JWT, is another weakness of this doctrine. Liberalism remains controversial in its attempt to portray itself as the most progressive and reasonable political and economical form. In fact, it turns out to be aggressive and intolerant. Conventions and declarations which are supposed to regulate armed conflicts have repeatedly been violated by the superpowers without consequence. This reduces the meaning of justice and morality. Moreover, the concept of justice used for the vindication

of war serves as a cloak hiding national interest and a state's private objectives. The difference between JWT and political realism is therefore blurred.

To sum up, JWT in Schmitt's opinion promotes the discrimination of war and the enemy. The use of force ceases to be restrained and bracketed when the causes of war are assessed as just or unjust, legitimated or criminal. It is cynical to propose that the just cause you have would serve all mankind as some part of mankind would suffer from war, regardless of whether it is just or unjust. None of the new just causes proposed by Orend—humanitarian intervention, anticipatory attack, war on terrorism, and intervention into an anti-tyranny uprising—are truly justified by ethical reasons since only political reasons may justify warfare. According to Schmitt, the consequences of this discrimination are fatal. The international political system, which replaced *jus publicum Europaeum*, has caused the abnormal situation when an intermediate position between war and peace holds. This has made peace almost unattainable now.

Schmitt's arguments against the idea of the moral justification of war are directly relevant to the analysis of contemporary JWT. However, there are some shortcomings in his views. Brown points out Schmitt's selective account of history (Brown, 2007: 63). Slomp described Schmitt's position as "deeply ideological" (Slomp, 2006: 445). But we may say, that even if Schmitt is not always accurate in his historical interpretations, his concept still holds as a theoretical model alternative to JWT.

The arguments expressed by Schmitt are well known for just war theorists. Orend names the three most commonly held misbeliefs about JWT: (1) the theory is tainted by Catholic doctrine, (2) it is irrelevant, and (3) it justifies great evils. On the contrary, he says, the main purpose of JWT "is to facilitate a more insightful and targeted reflection upon the justice of the resort to war, conduct within it and its process of termination" (Orend, 2000: 9–10). Just war theorists usually describe themselves as advocates of peace and accuse their critics of a lack of humanistic concerns. In fact, they privatize the concept of humanism. In the concluding section of the paper we discuss, briefly, the substance and meaning of the alternative approach to humanism proposed by Schmitt.

The Humanism of the Political

Schmitt criticized JWT, and one could conclude the "Crown Jurist of the Third Reich" was a ruthless militarist. In fact, Schmitt was concerned about the specific humanism of the political which does not require ethics but a respect for human dignity by the people involved in politics. Describing the era of *jus publicum Europaeum* as a time when the major achievements of Renaissance humanism proved themselves, Schmitt blames the School of Salamanca for its reactionary character and retrograde philosophizing. Schmitt supposed that the humanism of politics and international relations appeared in the bracketing of war. War was central to politics and therefore required certain behaviors and mutual respect. And yet, Schmitt did not define war as the purpose and substance of politics, as war "does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy re-

mains valid” (Schmitt, 2007b: 33). Politics consists of the possibility to define friends and enemies, but not war as such. We cannot depict Schmitt as a militarist or a war attorney.

We mentioned before that Schmitt was similar to the political realists, but since he was not a military ethicist or a philosopher of war, it would be best not to assign him to one or another tradition of military ethics. Schmitt was anxious about the inevitable threats caused by the application of just war rhetoric to the sphere of war and international law. In *The Tyranny of Values* he partly follows Plenge and Sombart in their antipathy to vendible Anglo-Saxon capitalism and liberalism. The concept of value, the key concept of JWT, was derived from a capitalistic approach to morality, while the only sphere where the idea of value has sense is economics (Schmitt, 1996). The injection of a value-based moral theory into politics causes extremism and selfishness because the question of value always presupposes an individual standpoint. In other words, the “direct and automatic enactment of values” leads to an escalation of conflict, rather than to reconciliation.

Criticizing JWT, Schmitt came to an original interpretation of the humanism of the political. From his point of view, only a sovereign state could fulfill humanistic ideals in a political context. However, Schmitt used a kind of theoretical trick locating humanism in Europe and limiting the triumph of humanism to the period between the 17th and early 20th century. Humanism in political relations was possible only as a characteristic of the *jus publicum Europaeum* when “war was waged between states, between regular state armies, and between sovereign bearers of a *jus belli* [right to war], who also in war respected each other as enemies, and did not discriminate against each other as criminals” (Schmitt, 2007c: 9). And therefore “a peace treaty was possible and even constituted the normal, self-evident end of war” (Ibid.).

Humanism was a property of sovereign states equal in status. Humanity and morality were understood as kinds of immutable constants. Based on this implicit founding in ethics and law, states did not require ongoing discussions on the moral evaluation of their acts, or disputes on the concepts of justice. After all, each part of the conflict possessed a minimal opportunity to gain a victory. This state of affairs determined the appearance of the political in the sense that Schmitt understood it—as a sphere where a clear distinction between friends and enemies was possible and where war was a political, rather than ideological, instrument.

Matthias Lievens in his article “Carl Schmitt’s Two Concepts of Humanity” agreed with Schmitt’s notion that classical interstate wars did not require moral constituents. Though, Lievens points out that “once struggles become deterritorialized, however, it becomes harder to avoid a moral content slipping into the political struggle” (Lievens, 2010: 921). But the question is about the change of the convention of war rather than in the “deterritorialization of the struggle.” A purely political interpretation of war has been augmented by legal and moral interpretations. This has caused the integration of moral arguments into the political sphere which was previously free from ethical components. Changes in the political itself open the door to the invasion of morality into politics.

Schmitt criticized JWT as a theological concept; being a Catholic he criticized the School of Salamanca for its reactionary ideology. We may find here an amazing echo of

the conflict between Renaissance culture and scholastic theology. Schmitt made visible the difference between the two approaches to humanism. The first is classical humanism, or the humanism of the political. The latter is contemporary, liberal, depleted. In the past sovereign states did not wage wars for or against the sake of mankind, and in this sense they protected humanity. Wars between states did not presuppose the extermination of one state by the other. On the contrary, liberal humanism drew a line between those who require protection and those from whom the former must be protected. An enemy, in accordance with liberal JWT, is a disturber of universal human values. He is antihuman in this sense, a *hostis humani generis* who must be totally defeated. The just warrior realizes his moral superiority as well as the wise man in Augustine quoted at the beginning of the article. This superiority causes an intensification of hostility. War is always something of principal for the just warrior, as it is a struggle between good and evil where evil must be annihilated. Humanism unexpectedly became a method of justification for the extermination of the enemy, although initially, JWT proclaimed concern for the good of all people to be a grounding principle.

Conclusion

Our aim has been to define Schmitt's arguments against the idea of the moral justification of war and assess his approach to political humanism. We have outlined the status and principal propositions of contemporary JWT. Secularized JWT tends to impart universal significance to the norms of morality. This universality should justify waging wars for moral reasons. Morality is offered by JWT adherents as a common belief-system; as a fundamental law uniting mankind. In fact, and this was Schmitt's main argument against JWT, the use of force in the name of humanity divides people, and places the enemy outside humanity. In that case, war is not an opportunity to restore peace and security but a means to crush the enemy totally. From the point of view of Schmitt, the appeal to ethics in war makes armed conflicts more violent and leads to the dehumanization of the enemy. That brings the world to a dangerous condition of war that never ends.

Instead of this notion of humanism, Schmitt offered his own concept of political humanism. As Schmitt states, this specific humanism of the political was carried by sovereign European states in the period between the mid-seventeenth century to the early twentieth century and related to the practice of the bracketing of war. It was a true humanism because the aim of war was peace and opponents did not intend to exterminate each other, while *tantum licet in bello justo* (Schmitt, 2006: 322).

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Гуманизм как *casus belli*: критика теории справедливой войны в работах К. Шмитта

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В статье рассматривается критика теории справедливой войны, представленная в работах Карла Шмитта. Интерес к теории справедливой войны возродился в середине XX века, когда благодаря усилиям ряда англо-американских авторов, в первую очередь М. Уолцера, была создана новая, секулярная, интерпретация этой концепции. Однако своё начало теория справедливой войны берёт в христианской политической мысли, и можно отметить, что и современные подходы к проблеме нравственного обоснования войны сохраняют определённые черты религиозной аргументации. Аргумент к морали в политике может быть сопоставлен с апелляцией к божественному закону, но вне христианского контекста политический морализм теряет свою значимость и обоснованность. К. Шмитт обратил внимание на это парадоксальное свойство теории справедливой войны, предложив взамен оригинальную концепцию оберегаемой войны. По его мнению, оберегание войны было одной из ключевых характеристик *jus publicum Europaeum*. Суть его сводилась к признанию врага равным по статусу политическим субъектом. Несмотря на то, что именно сторонники теории справедливой войны претендуют на роль защитников человечества, использование морали в политике, с точки зрения Шмитта, ведёт к дегуманизации врага и усилению тотальности конфликта. Область политического должна быть очищена от всех моральных привнесений, это позволит сделать её более сбалансированной. Концепция оберегаемой войны Шмитта, основанная на исключительно политическом подходе к понятию войны, оказывается в большей степени гуманной и обоснованной, нежели теория справедливой войны.

Ключевые слова: война, теория справедливой войны, оберегание войны, права человека, гуманитарная интервенция, Карл Шмитт

War and Capitalism: Some Important Theories and a Number of Relevant Facts

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The first thing worth noting about “war and capitalism” are the important intellectual traditions referring to the relations between these two terms, which operate in radically opposing ways. However, the main intellectual currents since the Enlightenment have posited an essential antipathy between these two concepts. Economic links were supposed to inhibit social conflicts and promote reciprocal dependencies, thus civilizing customs and promoting peace, both internally and among different sovereign entities. These ideas are coherent with world-visions with many ramifications, but often expressed under the form of an “ought-to-be”, not regarding real facts. An example is the work of Adam Smith, who argued that colonial trade was potentially a peaceful activity, good for all parties involved, whereas he simultaneously recognized that economic reality strayed considerably from such a rosy picture. The exact reasons for that remained somewhat vague, although Smith tended to blame monopolies and the mingling of trade with the exercise of sovereignty, as opposed to a peace-inducing model of open competition. This cluster of issues is treated here via the revision of the correspondent ideas by a number of important social theorists, including Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Thorstein Veblen, Joseph Schumpeter, Alexander Gerschenkron, Karl Polanyi, Fernand Braudel, Giovanni Arrighi and Michael Mann. The theories advanced by these authors are also contrasted with various important historical facts and trends, mentioned in the works of other relevant researchers, mostly historians, suggesting the convenience of keeping an open mind vis-à-vis the complexities, ambivalences and indeterminacies of social realities.

Keywords: war, capitalism, cycles of hegemony, pluralism in sociological approach, complexity of historical realities, novelty and continuities in international relations

There are a number of important aspects immediately worth noting about “war and capitalism.” The first is the deeply heterogeneous nature of this conjunction. Another is the presence of important intellectual traditions regarding the relations between these two ideas, operating in very different, radically opposing ways.

The Theories

Leading philosophical currents in Europe since the Enlightenment have mostly argued for a negative correlation, even an essential antipathy, between these two concepts and the realities so denoted. The tendency in this case is to proceed based on the *doux commerce* model, i.e. economic links would supposedly inhibit social conflict and promote reciprocal dependencies, the convergence of interests, and more broadly the affinity of sensibilities, inclinations and mentalities, contributing to the “civilization of customs” and peace: both peace among different sovereign entities, and civil peace and social harmony within each State (see Elias [2000] and Hirschman [1997]).

Such views are coherent with world-visions implying many ramifications. Moreover, judgments are often set out under the form of an “ought-to-be,” not regarding actual situations. For example, Adam Smith (1999) argued that colonial trade was a potentially peaceful activity and good for all parties involved—the various European powers and the populations of colonial territories—but he recognized that reality strayed considerably from this rosy picture. Actual commercial activities were often based on prey, enslavement, secrecy, deception and generally on violent and harmful practices. However, Smith added, this was only circumstantial, without any logical necessity uniting the various terms, in fact quite the opposite: if violence and deception were connected with trade, that was because it occurred as a monopoly, using chartered companies and mixed with the exercise of sovereignty. If open competition prevailed, the pernicious consequences of economic activity would rapidly decrease with its beneficial, pacifying effects quickly rising to prominence.

This distinction is very important to understand the fundamental Smithian beliefs concerning relations between war and not just capitalism, but all of economic life. Obviously, Smith was convinced as to a generalized model based on peaceful competition, erasing violence by suppressing monopoly and sovereignty. Still, even peaceable, orderly, law-abiding economic activities require the existence of rule-of-law; and law, *dura lex*, by definition implies sovereignty and politics, therefore also violence, although in this case self-restrained violence officially aiming at its own eradication. Indeed, State and sovereignty entail a monopoly on “legitimate violence” (violence recognized as legitimate and exercised within the limits established by written law) in a given territory. A simple but important distinction therefore emerges: “internal trade” versus “international trade”; the first is easier to separate from violence, given the legislating capacity of the state, the second prone to relapse into the condition of a Hobbesian “state of nature.”

“Capitalism” was not a term 18th and 19th century authors typically used for economic activities, although they often recognized the importance of “capital” in the sense of lending undertakings producing interest. The 19th century writer who most contributed to the widespread use of the term was probably Karl Marx. For Marx, “capital” (a word that later evolved with other authors into “capitalism”) designates not only one specific commercial practice, but a generic set of “production relations” involving the existence of a social group of formally free workers lacking the ownership of the means of production,

and the owners of those means who hire that workforce and sell the resulting products for profit, thus appropriating the correspondent “surplus value.” This relationship, so argued Marx (2012), is normally compatible with peaceful, law-abiding conduct, and really tends to promote this state of affairs, because the functioning of capitalist logic as a whole reproduces itself on a larger scale by ensuring the accumulation of resources on the proprietors’ side, which is then reinvested, usually more efficiently (with greater division of labor and more intensive use of machines, for example), providing a greater accumulation of economic surplus, and so on. However, Marx added, underneath the origin of this process lies the usually violent expropriation of workers, who previously were independent owners, being initially separated from the means of production by “non-economic” processes, i.e., direct physical violence. Once this initial phase, or “primitive accumulation,” is completed capital is able to follow its logic by resorting only to peaceful, strictly legal means: its beginnings are, however, usually marked by raw violence. The same is valid for international trade, especially colonial trade, a vital cradle of resources obtained via “extra-economic” expedients and then invested in the ordinary process of accumulation, normalizing it in a formally peaceful way.

The difference drawn by Marx between the “primitive” and the “normal” accumulation of capital is retaken, whether explicitly or implicitly, by several other authors. Max Weber (1965) argued that “rational capitalism,” supposedly having an “elective affinity” with the Calvinist work-ethic, constitutes a peaceable activity. It is based on work as a profession, diligence and thrift, calculation and a strictly egoistic pursuit of self-interest; but also, and crucially, on recognizing the importance of respect for contracts, the exaltation of predictability, and more broadly, lawfulness and the peaceful nature of business. Weber therefore sharply distinguishes “rational capitalism,” presented as a non-intentional (“psychological” rather than logical) result of the Protestant work ethic which later became generalized and is said to define modernity, from other occasional forms of capitalism, and particularly “pirate capitalism,” based on plunder and war and therefore more dependent on an acute sense of opportunity and a predatory instinct than on diligence or constant and peaceable activity.

This Weberian distinction reappears, albeit significantly altered, in the work of Sombart (1982), according to whom in the capitalist ethic there was a fundamental defining ambivalence, differentiating and opposing “bourgeois virtues” such as the saving-and-investing ethos, the exaltation of peaceful and orderly conduct and a quantifying obsession, and an “entrepreneurial” aspect correspondent to combining, unifying and organizing capacities, a sense of opportunity, a killer-instinct, a generic restlessness and appetite for novelty, the inclination to disobey any-and-all commandments and, in this sense, a vague “Faustian” leaning or “longing for infinity.” This duality is constant in capitalism’s history and, if the “entrepreneurial” trait weakens as a result of bureaucratization, disenchantment and the “iron cage” (the argument is very close to Weber’s concerning these features), ecological blockage, declining fertility-rates or any other reason, capitalism in general will be in a very precarious situation.

The entrepreneurial element is unapologetically predatory and war-inclined: the generic bellicose leaning of societies in which capitalist activities prevail is something that Sombart did not doubt, identifying profit as the main motivation for wars. However, more important, according to Sombart (1943), is the opposite causality, starting from warfare to underline consequently the propitiation of capitalism. More than thinking of war as a consequence of capitalism, it is therefore imperative to understand it as its cause, whether voluntary or involuntary, logically or only “psychologically.” Sombart highlights the existence in European armies since the 16th century of a strict unity of command and a rationalization and streamlining of procedures; the ever-increasing need for accurate calculation and rigorous quantification; the extended scale of processes and an élan for unlimited growth, which corresponds both to the long-run tendency of armies and the evolutionary line implicit in the logic of capital; the need for a “domesticated” and disciplined proletariat, to which effect warlike activities are a propaedeutic exercise to the rational industry characterizing modern times. As a matter of fact, in line with Sombart the typical warrior-like virtues (discipline, diligence, patience, persistence, stoicism, bravura in the face of adversity, but also the ability to calculate, a global vision and an acute sense of timing) are virtually the same as the economic virtues, expressing a mix of “bourgeois” and “entrepreneurial” components where the first element predominates at the lower levels of hierarchies and the second obviously at the top. On the other hand, he argues that the organization of armies was the first important sector of social existence where a strict division of labor was imposed *en masse* and without question. Armed forces were quickly followed by the civilian industries directly producing for them, which were the pioneer sectors of the generalization into “civilian” economic activity of those rationalized standards of conduct. The existence and growth of the armed forces played also a crucial role in the formation of a coherent “consumer-type,” standardized and predictable and in a sufficiently high numbers, crucial in generating a global “effectual demand” sufficient to trigger the use of productive resources which would otherwise remain unused.

Sombart’s attitude to war, highlighting the importance of demand in the fostering of economic processes, may aptly be called *ante litteram* “military Keynesianism.” It appeals to a consciously demand-side analysis, but focusing on aspects concerning a “warfare state” because it underlines and praises the agonistic, competitive component of consumption and the social inequality inseparable from it, while mainstream Keynesianism developed in the 20th century largely in association with the progresses of the “welfare state” and was predominantly concerned with the reduction of social inequalities. The influence of Sombartian thought in subsequent economic thought, although often denied or repressed, deserves mention also regarding the tradition of “input-output analysis.” Actually, he was the thesis-supervisor of Wassily Leontief, whose “input-output matrix,” quantifying the impact on the productive sectors of any changes occurring in each of them, constituted an analytical device essential to the development of that field of studies.

Sombart’s thesis on a positive correlation between capitalism and war can be opposed to that of Thorstein Veblen (1990; 1994), who contrasted the psychological-cultural element inducing the diligent exercise of professional work with the “sporting instinct,”

explicitly deemed predatory, akin to the desire for ostentation and the corresponding forms of consumption and belligerent initiatives, considered a variety of prowess-cult. For Veblen, however, this second component was supposed to be fundamentally adversary and parasitic on the first. It is therefore a trait recognized as important in actual economic activities, but something to set aside in any alternative economic organization corresponding to what “ought-to-be,” and according to Veblen what “can-be.” The Sombart–Veblen opposition highlights their different approaches referring to both the warrior element and the “conspicuous” or agonistic trait associated with consumer practices. While these two authors recognize the same fundamental dichotomy in the configuration of modern economic attitudes, according to Veblen the exaltation of luxury and war is fundamentally harmful, while in Sombart’s opinion the dynamics of capitalism imposes both elements but is an essentially creative process, although this creation is inseparable from destructive aspects, and may thus be called “creative destruction.”

“Creative destruction” is crucial to understand Joseph Schumpeter, whose economic work should be considered as an extended comment on the previous ones. Schumpeter recognizes in “creative destruction” a Janus-like element essential to the study of capitalist economic reality, but refers it as a process of permanent innovation towards greater efficiency characterizing that economy, without relating it to war. This innovation constitutes a form of organization and creation, but it also presupposes a simultaneous destruction and disorganization of the realities subjected to such process. He argues it has a primordial root and an inexhaustible source of vitality in the correlative “heterogony of goals” (Schumpeter, 1976), i.e. the drive for indefinite innovation in patterns of consumption, induced by constant competition with others, or the social compulsion for “keeping up with the Joneses.” Schumpeter, however, posited no necessary relationship between capitalism and war; and he also argued for the absence of any link between those two terms regarding the dynamics of imperial expansion and the associated military conflicts. Although imperialism unquestionably produces wars, this is supposedly not the outcome of capitalist logic and actually tends to have conflicting relations with it, given the peaceful penchant which, within a generically “Smithian” argument (see above), Schumpeter (1986; 2009) assumes to correspond to the normal exercise of capitalism. Predominantly capitalist societies could thus induce imperial and bellicose tendencies only as a consequence of cultural atavisms expressing the influence of non-capitalist elements.

According to Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), whose ideas were consciously influenced by Schumpeter, economic development processes adopt very diverse characteristics, but can be globally understood considering the timing of each country’s development and its relative position. For example, in late 18th century Britain there was a very limited role for banks and a reduced presence of public powers, corresponding to traditional liberalism, i.e., the so-called “night-watchman State” which only guarantees protection in international relations and the rule-of-law internally. The state that Gerschenkron has in mind is therefore predominantly peaceful, and he actually argues that the very concept of “primitive accumulation” is a fundamentally misconceived device, spurious and harmful to scientific research. “Latecomer” countries, however, witness first a systematic

growth in the intervention of banks, and then a consistent increase in state intervention, imposed *inter alia* by the progressively enlarged scale of processes. Although starting from very different theoretical assumptions, Gerschenkron thus ultimately accepts the basic correctness of at least a considerable part of Sombart's arguments for the propagation of capitalism by warlike activities. Equally important, he emphasized the importance of proletariat-envy which the Prussian elite maintained during the 19th century, *vis-à-vis* its British counterpart: the "domesticated" and diligent worker, allegedly typical of the British case, presupposed an educational intervention by armies in previous periods and occurring only later in the Prussian case.

Fernand Braudel (1977; 1984) characterized European history of recent centuries by successive cycles of capitalist hegemony, each of them, in its last phase, witnessing the accentuation of capitalist traits. In all cases there was an evolution of social configurations where the relative importance of finance capital and its links with political power increase. These maneuvers may in the short-run enhance prosperity, but the intrinsic tendency of the system towards imbalance is expressed in ever increased militarism. When one hegemony is replaced by another these trends attenuate, capital investment partially returns to productive activities and commercial practices again tend to be based on competition and the open-market, until the cycle returns to the hypertrophy of the financial sector (always an announcer of "autumn," according to Braudel) and bellicosity subsequently recurs. This intrinsic logic of capitalist hegemony-cycles mixes with various dynamics of territorial expansion based on which those cycles are supported and so in turn reinforced.

There is in Braudel's work a distinction between "market," whose meaning is broader and usually associated with open competition, and "capitalism," a stricter category, suggesting links with sovereign powers and the advantages of monopoly, and more prone to war. This distinction evokes the analytical model proposed by Karl Polanyi (2001), whereby all economies operate established on a functional triad composed of "market," "reciprocity" and "redistribution." The first term corresponds to monetary exchanges based on particular interests, the second refers to economic flows of a voluntary, non-egoistic character (such as philanthropy, associations, cooperatives . . .) and the third denotes the exercise of sovereignty (taxes, subsidies and state provision of public goods). The normal viability condition of the first component is, so Polanyi argues, that it remains socially "embedded" in such a way that the dynamics of other sectors operate as a counterweight to any possible excessive mercantile component, and compensate for it. According to Polanyi, these devices allowed the 1815–1914 "hundred years' peace," in which the expansion of free-trade on a European scale and the simultaneous prevalence of concord were sustained by the existence of a social network that kept all the European leading circles close, either economically, politically and/or militarily. Inasmuch a full unleashing of the "market" component occurs, though, it evolves into a state witnessing a predominance of strict capitalist relations, driving the social factory to a global situation of imbalance which makes it prone, as a reaction, to autarchic leanings in the economy and to the outbreak of wars.

The theorizing of Braudel, Marx and others were somehow condensed more recently in the works of Giovanni Arrighi (1994; 2009). According to Arrighi, between the 16th and the 19th centuries three successive capitalist cycles occurred—the Genoese-Iberian, Dutch and British hegemonies—each evolving into a terminal crisis including a clear-cut “financialization” of economic activities, the strengthening of the capitalist component and the accentuation of bellicose tendencies. The current period of global economic history is characterized by the hegemony of North-American capitalism, fully accomplished in the 20th century with the demise of USSR and having initiated at the turn of the century a process aiming to create a unified world-state, an intent which came to global failure. According to Arrighi, over the centuries the capitalist dynamics were mingled in various ways with territorial-patrimonial logic, each of these components strengthening the other and, under certain circumstances, the aggressive propensity of the resulting social conglomerate. At the beginning of the 21st century the decline of North-American capitalism’s hegemony has been accompanied by the momentous rise of China, corresponding to a form of social organization where capitalist elements are subordinate and interstitial. The predictable triumph of China would be slow, progressive and essentially peaceable, bringing the full emergence and increased global role of the “Third-World”—in broad terms those societies which imperialist European historiography circa 1900 labeled as “peoples without history.” In its dying rattle, however, North-American hegemony may either peacefully withdraw and decrease its global involvement, or exacerbate its belligerent inclinations. Given the imbalance of military force on a global scale, hugely favoring the unipolar power of the USA, a very real risk exists of the progression to a widespread and global condition of chaos, with considerable danger of the destruction of sovereign entities (“failed states”) which at times are targeted as enemies by the hegemonic power, and a possible increase of the unpredictability and uncertainty of the whole geopolitical system. This evolution towards political disintegration and indeed a worldwide decivilizing process has also been propitiated by recent tendencies for the privatization of war, with its systematic outsourcing to “contractors”; in other words, the submission to a crudely capitalist logic of what even 19th century liberalism considered the holy-of-holies of sovereignty’s exercise: police and military roles.

The work of Michael Mann (1986a; 1986b; 2012; 2013a), endowed with a gargantuan theoretical appetite, produced an overview of history conceptualized mostly as evolving forms of social power, referring back to “social caging” processes which fashioned the first important civilizations, and all the way up to the more crucial problems of the present, both theoretically and practically. Mann underlines the manifold character of social power, distinguishing its political, economic, symbolic and military forms, and also the “orthogonal” relations these different axial dimensions have, assuming analytically independent processes of domination/subordination, producing various interspersing combinations through which the diverse dimensions in practical terms intersect and combine, producing huge numbers of possible arrangements. According to Mann, ours are times of a decreasing American hegemony, yet still devoid of any alternative global project viably disputing the dominance of capitalism. As a matter of fact (and well be-

yond the recession immediately subsequent to the financial crisis of 2008) we may be heading for a long period of economic depression, with zero or very exiguous growth; a “steady state” mostly induced by ecological obstacles, with a lesser unequal distribution of wealth on a global scale thanks to the comparative slow ascent of the Big South countries, more prone to adopt developmental-statist models, and recurrent impasses in richer ones, two social models competing here for predominance: one market-oriented and liable to greater hostility regarding its disenfranchised citizenry, a Morlock-like underclass (within a generalized tendency for the lower groups to encompass roughly $\frac{1}{3}$ of the population, a block of higher-plus-middle classes making up the remaining $\frac{2}{3}$), whereas a social-democratic model is apparently also viable, rather more lenient vis-à-vis their own injured and insulted. These occasional social-democratic tendencies are conceptualized by Mann (2013b; see also Mann, Jerónimo, 2013) mostly within a Polanyi-inspired frame, various non-mercantile elements of the social fabric compensating for the possibly nefarious influences of unrestrained capitalist markets.

The driving motive for economic development is confined in Mann’s diagnosis to the central Schumpeterian theme of “creative destruction,” the best of intentions coming down to orient this impetus towards technological innovation, arguably inducing an large environmentally-friendly technological revolution capable of stimulating simultaneously economic growth and ecological beneficence. In parallel, projects to curb the power of global finance ought to be pursued as well. Mann argues that in international policy inter-state conflicts are likely to decline, within a global context where the very importance of the nation-state is supposed to decay, leaning towards global governance, supplemented by the emergence of a truly global civil society and a set of more-or-less-democratic institutions proficient in monitoring the political instances endowed with the capacities for this global governance. Mann recognizes the intrinsic need for choices concerning politics, democratic institutions potentially acquiring dimensions directly in conflict with ecological imperatives, the need emerging for centers of political power to face tradeoffs, and sometimes to make agonizing choices. Within this broad theoretical scheme, recent American bursts of “global bully” behavior are interpreted as basically uncoordinated, mostly hubris-induced courses of action, corresponding to an “incoherent” imperialist (Mann, 2005) proclivity that radically departs from any economically sound purpose, instead expressing mostly a “back-seat driver” attitude which hinders both the direct targets of the corresponding military endeavors and any possibly economic consistency regarding US national interest. Things do not seem so amicable in Mann’s global scenario, various equilibriums being recognizably unwarranted and the focuses for hostilities assuming multifarious shapes and sizes, with global uncertainty and precariousness about the balances in global systems in part stemming from its own cumulative dimensions of orthogonality, and the correspondent complexity. Mann’s verdict is therefore fragmentary at best, the socio-historical Haruspex acknowledged to be better in retrospective exercises, rather than prospectively.

Some Relevant Facts

The wars of the last two centuries match a considerable number of aspects of the previously described theoretical schemes, but significantly diverge from them in many others. First of all, Karl Polanyi's "hundred years' peace" was an important fact for Western Europe, but only that part of the world. An important exception to it was the French-Prussian conflict, inextricably associated with the emergence of Prussia-Germany, seeking continental hegemony and disputing even British global ascendancy. Moreover, Prussian-Austrian clashes, Italian unification conflicts, the Crimean and Balkan wars, Mexican-American hostilities and somewhat latter also the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars clearly indicate that there was not a consistent lessening of tensions, instead they mostly were transferred from a relatively restricted West-European scenario into a globalized one. Actually, the 19th century was a period of very important imperialist expansion, including the "scramble for Africa," central Asia's "Great Game" and numberless other military occurrences more or less directly related to European colonial enterprises and/or American westwards expansion (cf. Davis, 2002; Losurdo, 2011; Lybeck, 2010).

Arguably, Polanyi's basic frame of analysis remains too "Smithian" in the sense of assuming economic prosperity would improve with peace and free-trade, Polanyi essentially hedging this underlying narrative with the important proviso that trading relations ought to be compensated for by adding components of both "reciprocity" and internally robust "redistributive" political institutions. However, protection not free-trade prevailed during the 19th century, besides mostly contributing for increased economic growth regardless of what conventional economic wisdom suggests today (Bairoch, 1999). Protection was also partly the result of rising political participation which culminated in universal male suffrage by the early 20th century in most European societies, and so it may be assumed that the widespread free-trade advocated by Smith would be viable only with the preservation of a mostly aristocratic society, more or less in line with the network of economic-political interests and family ties that Polanyi notes to have *de facto* dominated Europe prior to 1914.

Is there, in a socially opposite sense, any viable globally peaceful political development accompanied by both political democratization and sustained economic growth? Conversely formulated: does the set of social configurations expressing a "persistence of the old regime" (Mayer, 1981) actually contribute to the preservation of peace, or does it instead foster global aggression inducing warfare? These are still unresolved issues, and particularly relevant ones regarding the debates associated with the commemoration of the centenary of World War I. That the aristocracies of 19th century politics propagated peace holds true for a small European horizon only, since tensions were in fact exported, or transferred outwards with global imperial-colonial expansion. At any rate, these war-like dispositions hence directed outwards were later fundamentally reoriented towards an internecine conflict which evolved into a huge "European civil war," sometimes also called the "second Thirty-Years War," lasting until 1945 (cf. Canfora, 2006a: 152). This was

due to the close and complex intermingling of multiple inter-state warfare with various social conflicts based on both class and national issues and the correspondent unsettled questions.

One group of participants intensely affected by these conflicts were the various Marxist currents which prior to 1914 had coalesced into an important group of both legal and illegal political parties in the most important countries participating in the conflict. Although Marx had left no single indisputable legacy of ideas concerning war, the political currents so inspired were largely peace-leaning, namely for the crucial reason that Marxists had increasingly become aware of how war efforts were contributing to the desire for internal social peace, thereby preserving and reinforcing the capitalist domination in each of the countries concerned. Moreover, the debates subsequent to the deaths of Marx and Engels, and particularly the ideas expressed by Vladimir Lenin (1999), recognizably under the influence of John Hobson and against the thesis upheld by Karl Kautsky, had underwritten the importance of imperialism as a form of consistently violent conquest of cheaper natural resources and labor, and obtaining markets as a destination for both profitable capital investments and the sale of final products.

As a matter of fact, whereas European powers in this period tended to takeover formally separate colonial regions, with guarantees of the preservation of a "vital space" for free pillage of resources and duly protected final markets for each of the colonial rulers, the USA repeatedly subscribed to "open door" policies which were supposed to avoid the saturation of products for American industries (Williams, 1984). It should be noticed that, given the diversity of geographical conditions, Americans were consistently less worried about the possible scarcity of resources and Malthusian overpopulation fears, recurrent in Western Europe during most of the 19th century. On the other hand, given the industrialist path pursued at least since the Civil War and the recurrence of an industrial overproduction crisis, US leading circles became increasingly concerned with guaranteeing markets for their products under the absence of formal monopolies for any country. This would arguably provide them with the conditions to fully enjoy their underlying advantages, and so they consistently avoided any formal closure of geographic spaces by any other imperial power. This was supposed to promote the smooth replacement of the previous British "imperialism of free-trade" by an American one, with less emphasis on free-trade specifically, but still generically aiming at less impeded international movement of goods and capital flows. William Appleman Williams directly related this broad attitude regarding international relations, one that has come to define the permanent unchangeable bipartisan consensus of the entire North-American political establishment, to an initial "imperial anti-colonialism" which produced an emphatic "turn to imperialism" during the crises of the 1890s (Ibid.: 20–57). It was characterized by a persuasion, stemming from the views of the "frontier-thesis" associated with Jackson Turner, according to whom the combination of prosperity-cum-democracy, defining the American social experiment, could only be maintained if such an indefinitely open "frontier" was artificially maintained, after physical settlement had been accomplished up to the Pacific shore, via

a fix of external policies warranting the endless opening of markets for both American products and capital.

American “open door” policies suggest another recurrent theme of discussions within Marxist circles in early 20th century: Karl Kautsky’s idea regarding the possible formation of an “ultra-imperialism” (cf. Anderson, 2002) resulting in a condominium of ruling powers exerting dominance over the rest of the world, without any formal colonial empires, and indeed guaranteeing a margin of peaceful economic competition within the “first league” powers; but even more importantly ensuring the permanent exclusion, albeit only factually, of the rest of the world from the ruling clique. Such a scenario had previously been suggested as early as the 1840s by Friedrich List (2005), who advocated active protection for “infant industries” in countries deemed culturally suitable for industrialization, but simultaneously proposing a global or “cosmopolitan” free-trade arrangement ascribing to what is today called the Big South the mere production of raw materials or the “primary sectors” (agriculture, livestock and mining), whereas only truly culturally fit societies, i.e., Central-Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon America plus likely some marginal areas of European settlement south of Capricorn, would engage advantageously in industrializing endeavors. These were importantly supposed to occur in an environment of fair-play within the “first league” of polities, formal colonial empires having to be discarded and so the possibilities left open for each of the ruling condominium, whose collective permanent global monopoly was buttressed on factual advantages only, not in any written clause formally excluding the rest.

Things do not, however, always occur by the book, a fact easily understood by only briefly considering the cusp of the 19th and 20th centuries: in other terms the last portion of the so-called “Age of Empire,” 1875–1914, plus the very beginning of “Age of Extremes” or the “short 20th century,” 1914–1991 (Hobsbawm, 1989; 1996). Significantly, a number of important declining empires had to be rather proactively helped into actually withering away, mostly swapped by the dominance of the emergent USA or the Western-European powers. This was clearly the case with North-Americans replacing the Spanish Empire in Cuba and the Philippines, yet stopping on the brink of establishing a new formal colonial domination over the natives; it was also the case with the division of remains of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and to a lesser degree France carefully partitioning extended areas of influence but at the same time discretely flirting with emergent Arab nationalisms. The prevalence in these cases of formal “open door” principles did not, however, prevent the Japanese from intensely engaging in a strict imperial-colonial enterprise regarding very large areas in Eastern Asia and the Pacific, nor did it impede both Germany and Italy from entering a furious latecomers race to create formal colonial empires in Africa, these endeavors no doubt contributing for the generic embitterment of conditions which immediately predated World War I.

In Europe, and although facing the seemingly unstoppable global ascent of the USA, the United Kingdom remained during this period the major power and having the biggest colonial empire, in diplomatic terms oscillating between an attitude of “splendid isolation,” i.e. the tendency to assume being apart-from-and-above everyone else, and

a growing inclination to directly intervene in continental Europe and more broadly in world-politics, establishing formal pacts with a number of partners—the Anglo-Japanese alliance enacted in 1902 and Entente Cordiale, with France, in 1904. Within a complex system of enmities and alliances in Europe, the rivalry stands out between France and Germany, unified under the egis of Prussia in the immediate aftermath of victory in the Franco-German war of 1870–1871, resulting in the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, a shift in sovereignty which France managed to revert only in 1918. In this context, the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, complemented by the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907, debouched into the advent of a Triple Entente between United Kingdom, France and Russia, this block neatly opposing the Dual Alliance of Prussia/Germany and Austria-Hungary, with the addition of Italy in the Triple Alliance lasting from 1882 to 1914 (when Italy first chose neutrality in World War I only to latter shift into the opposing block).

World-wide though, whether in spite of North-American “open door” policies or thanks to them, the European ascent peaked, with China suffering a full-fledged series of unequal treaties that characterized the “century of humiliation” (1839–1949) and largely transformed into a de facto colonial dependency, in spite of the republican revolution of 1911; the Turkish Ottoman Empire openly recognized as the *homme malade* or the “sick man” of European politics, dismemberment and a republican revolution occurring in 1918–1922; India reduced to the condition of a formal colony, a situation that would-be pro-independency politicians were by this time unsuccessfully trying to attenuate via an evolution to dominion-status; and the partition of Africa concluded in the final years of 19th century. The most remarkable exception to this trend for European rule was Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, a fact culturally processed within Europe by symbolically accepting the Japanese as “honorary Europeans” (or “honorary whites,” as they were also latter described), while growing doubts were emerging concerning the deep character of Russia: whether truly European or instead fundamentally Asiatic behind a fragile European façade, thus necessarily “despotic” in nature.

Regarding cultural aspects important for World War I, in the West imperialist endeavors had been mostly justified within the ideological ambit of the so-called *mission civilisatrice*, which European countries claimed to have vis-à-vis non-white peoples (with significant variations, and important doubts regarding the capacities of these peoples to ever really become “educated” or “civilized”). This theme was transferred during the war onto enemies, the Germans becoming its victims, usually assimilated to non-Europeans by the Western Propaganda effort. In a clear-cut contrast, in Germany emphasis was put on *Kultur*, as opposed to merely material civilization, with specificities and diversity enhanced, uniqueness or the “ineffable individuality” of each society exalted and a broader “ideal” emphasized as opposed to merely material aspects of existence. This rift of ideas was subsequently accentuated by adding “vitalistic” elements, mostly of a Nietzschean variety, producing an intense worship of *Schicksal* or “destiny,” predominantly conceived as a collective destiny within a “popular community” or *Volksgemeinschaft*: community here representing a traditional, spontaneous, affective, disinterested and all-embracing

association, as opposed to “society,” posited to be historically more recent, grounded on calculation and interest only, affectively cold and life-segmenting. Therefore, in generic terms the war was officially, from the Entente Cordiale perspective, a civilizing enterprise directed against the “Huns,” as the Germans were depreciatively called, demoting them from the “noble” part of humankind or that inhabiting the Euro-Atlantic sacred space. Conversely from the German viewpoint it was a war for “community” and an “organic” way-of-life, as opposed to merely “mechanistic” *Gesellschaft* or “society”; a war for the “ideal” and “collective destiny” against mere materialism and utilitarian individualism; a war of the “metaphysical people” against “positivist” calculating ones; a war of a unique ideal “culture” against grossly material and standardized “civilization” (Elias, 2000; Losurdo, 2001). At any rate, another important element to consider in the preconditions of World War I was the fact that Europe was in 1914, according to Fernand Braudel, politically on the edge of socialism, and so an outer conflagration had to be somehow produced by the elites in order to divert attention from the class conflicts internal to each of the main countries (cf. Canfora, 2006a; 2006b). In this sense this war was “the great class-war” (Pauwels, 2014), one that the various upper layers of society—an amalgam of capitalist cliques and aristocratic groups that had more or less fused with them—had to induce to preserve their privileged positions from the attacks promoted by the diverse political currents disputing it, and apparently with very real chances of success until the war’s unleashing.

In the context of the overwhelming war-eulogy that globally characterized this period, one declaration stands out for its pathos and notoriety, fully expressing the German war ideology that officially despised superficial “bourgeois civilization” and longed for a revival of the “tragic culture” supposedly having characterized classical Greece: the one by Max Weber, usually a scholar with moderate political opinions, however on this occasion enthusiastically praising the conflict as a “great and wonderful war,” highly promising for a rupture with routine and “mechanistic” ways. Subsequently, in the Weimar period, the German milieu came to produce a variety of thought that was designated as “reactionary modernism,” in broad terms intending to retain technical novelties stemming from instrumental rationality, but fusing them with a restored “soul,” thereby creating a global “re-spiritualization of technology” (Herf, 1984). Equally important, during the war Germany showed a tendency to turn some of the Entente’s motives against it, for example momentarily subscribing the “civilizing mission” theme to stress (in a mood clearly echoing Confederate outrage regarding the Union’s appeal to black battalions during American Civil War) that Western Allies were actually using non-white, colonial troops in the European theater, which was supposed to constitute a clear lack of military sportsmanship; analogously, there was an inclination to identify Russia as not a truly European society, rather an Asiatic one under only a feeble “civilized” European mask. This theme was fully developed mostly after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and it was destined to have an extremely important role a few decades later: German ruling circles were increasingly prone to consider Russia as nothing but a large space susceptible to colonization, doomed to political dismemberment and subsequent sidelining and absorption, whether

peaceful or violent, by Central or Western European polities, its native populace mostly destined for subaltern social positions, indeed explicitly assumed as slaves in the case of Nazi ideology (cf. Losurdo, 2001).

A number of other national trajectories and alignments are worth noting, regarding the period subsequent to World War I. The first is the increasingly voluntary submission of the French elites to the German ones, within the ambit of what was called by Annie Lacroix-Riz the “choice of defeat” (2008; 2010b). This was a conscious, premeditated abdication of any relevant initiative, voluntarily ceasing to be a global historical protagonist and deliberately entering a subaltern position vis-à-vis their German counterparts. It occurred within a world-vision according to which France was an essentially “sinful” and “damned” country, with a disastrous global historical path which endlessly had produced revolutionary events and showed no signs of repent, making unviable the secretion of any lasting social cement and therefore somehow deserving a national euthanasia: the cultural baton of *longue durée*, inextricably associated with the Roman, Frankish and “Western Christian” legacies would thus be transferred to a Greater Germany, actually and symbolically amplified and metaphorically referred to as “Europe.” A somewhat analogous process was identified by the same authoress regarding the deep continuities underpinning Vatican policies (2010a), which have repeatedly and consistently marginalized the vital interests of various predominantly catholic countries, such as Poland and France (not to mention an Italy mostly regarded with a mix of suspicion and spite), and reduced Austria to a clearly subaltern position, instead enthusiastically doing all in its power to advance whatever might be considered the interests of “the Reich” even well before 1914, German predominantly protestant leaning and *Kulturkampf* notwithstanding. The Vatican’s basic instinct for Germany *qua* the alleged representative par excellence of Europe-Christianity was afterwards transported to the other shore of the Atlantic, with the originally mostly protestant and always fiercely “we-firsters” USA becoming the consistent beneficiary of that transfer of devotion.

Such a shift of fundamental loyalties underwrites the possibilities of the occurrence, within large historical periods, of several in-depth realignments. It highlights the importance of economic, and more specifically capitalist motivations for warlike endeavors, but also the presence of various other social components, namely cultural and political traits often operating as mediators in such processes. That is how one specific war may, on occasions, assume the character of a procedure to direct economic advantages, truly becoming a pillaging operation according to the motto of “no-blood-for-oil” recently and famously used by opponents in order to expose and denounce it; but it may also constitute a specifically political maneuver designed mostly to obtain support from the masses via a fundamental redefinition of alliances and oppositions, actually systems of fabrication of both friends and foes. This basic *modus operandi* was unquestionably applied by European elites during their imperial-colonial expansion, having immediate economic advantages, but even more importantly serving to attenuate internal conflicts and foment a collective perception within which the deep sense of collective belonging to one

privileged, exceptional, “God-chosen” group transferred into the entire imperial nations a trait formerly characterizing the nobility only.

Analogously, this disposition can be, and was repeatedly, employed in diplomatic-military alliances, in the case of Europe quite notably by the USA. These have as early as the 1820s famously asserted against Europe, and especially targeting Britain, their indisputable right to decide as to everything concerning the so-called “Western Hemisphere,” i.e., the entire Americas: hence a “West” that did not only exclude Europe, moreover it was directly promoted as a category specifically oriented against Europe. During World War I the American attitude was one of letting the conflicting powers bloody each other first, only to intervene later with a minimum of costs for the USA: hence a position of “splendid isolation” more or less mimicking, but also radically amplifying the model previously used by Britain vis-à-vis continental Europe. After the inter-war period, during which American inclinations oscillated more or less freely between Great Britain and Germany, again intervention in World War II was judiciously timed in order to maximize gains and minimize efforts, after what a more proactive approach was implemented: the USA targeted economic gains via the enhancement of “open door” policies, emphatically complemented with strong Keynesian stimulus (“the Marshall Plan”) in order to help the allies and their economic recovery, thereby guaranteeing a sustained expansion of American exports. But these economic components, albeit important, are only one part of the story, the other consisting of the political-cum-diplomatic-cum-military alignments being stimulated via the deliberate advancement of a new common enemy, the Soviet Union, consistently antagonized and basically presented an offer it couldn’t refuse, namely being forced into an arms-race it could hardly ever win, considering the astronomically different starting conditions (economically, demographically, militarily) (cf. Pauwels, 2002; Roberts, 2006). Hostility regarding the USSR was however a crucial instrument implicitly aligning and forcing into submission all Europeans, as antagonizing Persia had once been fundamental in order to allow Macedonia from above (and also partly from the outside) to unite Ancients Greeks; and maintaining hostility towards France was instrumental in allowing Prussia the mobilization of a pan-Germanic movement for its own benefit: “keeping the Russians out” was, after 1945, a fundamental tool in the process of the US “keeping down” all the Europeans, west and east.

Besides the continued North-American pursuit of “open door” goals and the convenient diversion maneuver of manufacturing a common enemy in order to line-up and subdue allies, there is another important element in post-1945 western policies vis-à-vis USSR, namely the notion, already promoted in German ruling circles during the Wilhelmine age and subsequently much emphasized through the Nazi period, according to which Russia was somehow the northern *homme malade* of Europe, destined to political fragmentation as were its former rivals, Turkish and Austro-Hungarian empires, Russia proper having to undergo a process of radical downsizing until susceptible to calm Western absorption, its vast regions a potential reservoir of wealth to be transformed into spoils, its populace undergoing a process of semi-colonial submission and its social creams “westernized” more or less according to the model of most Latin-American

“comprador” elites. This mental frame replicated an even older meme according to which Russia had always been nothing but a non-European, Asiatic shack barely hiding behind a handful of Germanized, Varangian leaders and a number of institutions only formally coping, indeed feebly aping Western mores.

This brings to the center of the debate the important issues of the scale of political entities and of the alleged “cultural temperament” of populations, as well as the implied political ramifications. If it had not been for the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, French historian Paul Veyne argued *en passant* in a 1971 book, Russia would have experienced an evolution likely transforming it into an Eastern-European analogous of Brazil (Veyne, 1984). As noted by Alexander Gerschenkron (see above, cf. also Anderson, 2013), one of the more important triggers for development processes in latecomer countries is the persistent tendency for considerably increased state economic initiative, and also the presence of various “ideological fuels” which often play a crucial role in the mobilization of efforts by larger segments of populations: this had been the case already with economic nationalism in Germany and Saint-Simonian ideas in France, so Gerschenkron argued, and a large-scale historical analysis easily identifies Russian Bolshevism as perfectly suited for that role, given both the greater backwardness of the pre-1917 Russian Empire and the inclination already of late Tsarist economic policies to promote a high degree of direct state-intervention in the economic sphere, definitely anomalous to the usual western criteria. Both the persistent leaning to economic “statism” and the tendency for the invention of “ideological fuels,” simultaneously enhancing each country’s specificities and assigning it a decisive role in universal history, are traits basically normal and indeed expectable, taking into account the scale of the economic backwardness, the usual trend for its increase as a consequence of various processes of “cumulative circular causation” and the titanic efforts often necessary to revert and overcome such situations.

Within Bolshevik Russia, the revolutionary movement seems to have started from a clearly anti-Russian stand (cf. Smith, 1999), which appears understandable considering that collective movements of mass auto-phobia or self-hatred are an extremely important trait that needs to be taken into account in the cultural characterization of societies undergoing routes of comparative impoverishment and/or political peripherization (as occurred in the late periods of the Russian Empire), but this rapidly evolved into processes configuring the metamorphosis of the previous cultural Russian legacy into an adjourned political gospel presumably able to express the basic content of “Russianism” by translating it into a truly universal message, capable of arousing enthusiastic adhesion *Urbi et Orbi*. In a more immediate manner, this meant the evolution for an outfit of “affirmative action Empire,” as Terry Martin called it (2001), a model to be contrasted with, for example, the “Kemalist” path in Turkey, which would presumably have implied more radical geographical downsizing, but in return meaning a more complete internal cultural homogenization and an easier evolution into the usual strictly “unitarian” notion of nationality. Conversely, the predominance of the principles of “affirmative action” and the trajectory consequently pursued prompted the USSR to become, in the long run, an outstanding inducer of national self-assertion movements on a global scale, which is

valid both for societies until then submitted to formal colonial domination, such as in Africa, Indochina and India, and also cases corresponding to subaltern positions and merely colonial submission, such as by then occurring in China and to a lesser degree in Latin American countries.

Economic interests were thus inextricably mingled with various cultural and strictly political components in order to induce the conflicts which came to characterize the “Cold War.” Regarding this, one aspect worth remembering is the retrospectively defensive character of the Soviet attitude in the European theatre, vividly contrasting, irrespective of the various ideological-propagandistic smokescreens involved, with the endlessly expansionist American stance, or its “Faustian bid” (Gowan, 1999), in economic terms to be understood as pursuant of its consistent “open door,” globalist goals. Regardless of various possible questions concerning the predominance of material or symbolic factors, whether on a European or a global scale, the USSR had in the post-1945 period the fundamental purpose of building-up what may be defined as a reverted “*cordon sanitaire*,” in other words guaranteeing that its immediate western neighbors were “friendly” countries, consistently avoiding any possible close repetition of either the immediate post-1917 foreign interventions, the Axis invasion of 1941 or any other analogous scenario. These assertions are not meant to deny that the post-1945 Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe became a noxious fact for these countries, or at least a fact that was perceived as noxious by both the elites and the masses of these societies, although the clichéd notion that they were economically hindered either by pro-Soviet geopolitical alignments or by socialist arrangements within their own economic spheres can also be disputed. As a matter of fact, and as noticed among others by Szelényi, Beckett and King (1994; 2005), well into the 1970s these societies not only became more prosperous in absolute terms: they even caught up with their Western counterparts, a condition however reversed during the subsequent 1975–1990 period. Be as it may, and regardless of judgments passed on the USSR’s absorption of these countries into her own “sphere of influence,” the fundamental point to underline here is the defensive, and mostly reluctant Soviet attitude regarding conscious expansion, a fact to be contrasted with North-American “Faustian bid” for endless spreading.¹ Concomitantly though, the momentum induced by the Chinese civil war and revolution, the correspondent preemptive independence quickly granted by Britain to India and the subsequent global wave of anti-colonial upheavals induced a level of global Soviet initiative considerably higher than the one foreseen by USSR’s ruling circles, with many events world-wide forcing their hand (such as Cuba, Angola, Afghanistan) and,

1. As to this set of problems, see especially the sub-chapter “The Open Door Policy and the Onset of the Cold War” in Williams (1984: 229–243); cf. also Roberts (2006), particularly Chapter 10, “The Lost Peace: Stalin and the Origins of Cold War” (pp. 296–320), and Chapter 12, “Cold War Confrontations: Stalin Embattled” (pp. 347–371). As to the mostly cautious and defensive Soviet attitude during the inter-war period, and within the context of “triangular politics” involving themselves, the western allies and the Axis powers, see also Roberts (1989). It was only after having been repeatedly deceived, rejected and crossed by western democracies (the Spanish Civil War, Czechoslovakia, Munich, etc.) that the USSR suddenly shifted to an alliance with Nazi Germany in 1939.

independently of the various possible outcomes, exacerbating global conflicts far beyond the level wanted by Moscow.

This mostly defensive Soviet purpose clashed with, and was eventually subdued by a globalist North-American endeavor, but a “statist,” and mostly militarily leaning USSR would in any case have been expected, Gerschenkron’s considerations on backward countries duly taken into consideration. The same holds, at least partially, for the Soviet tendency to over-invest in the ideology of conflicts, “ideological fuels” permanently at risk of backfiring, and often producing more heat than light. Conversely though, the absence of this statist-cum-military propensity plus ideological over-investment leaning would à la longue induce the disappearance or disintegration of the political commonwealth, a fact eloquently illustrated as a vivid counter-factual the by two-and-a-half decades subsequent to the formal end of the Cold War, with Russia *qua* Russia or more exactly “incommensurate Russia” (Anderson, 2015) becoming the crux of an apparently unsolvable problem from a Western strategic viewpoint, if nothing else because of the sheer geographic fact of its ostensibly oversized dimension.

Even more important on a worldwide scale is the emergence of China, indirectly and partly a legacy of Russia’s process of universalization, via Bolshevism and the Soviet Revolution. Mostly peaceful and strictly economy-inclined until recently, and even allowing for some provisional forms of economic symbiosis with the incumbent power, particularly through China’s systematic financing of the USA’s colossal external debt, China’s emergence will sooner or later tend to conflict with American political and military dominance worldwide. That is besides well perceptible within the context of increased Chinese initiatives in what its leading circles consider an economic, geopolitical and cultural “sphere of influence” in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Regardless of China’s predominantly peaceable penchant and the low profile consciously undertaken by its leaders, Arrighi’s ideas relating to one cycle of economic hegemony being replaced by another one must be recalled here, the ruling state being the capitalist USA, whereas the emergent power is an officially mostly non-capitalistic society. This unquestionably adds complexity to the usual narrative of just another capitalist cycle of hegemony replacing an older one, but more importantly it allows for historical narratives now decentered from the customary Western mode, and also from its usually intensely egocentric perspectives, with the correspondent errors of parallax (cf. Blaut, 2000).

Concluding Remarks

The essential uncertainty of the outcomes of this clash remains, with recent events pointing to a bellicose American response to the Chinese challenge, whereas China has shown itself capable of managing alliances, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, within which various forms of self-styled “south-south” cooperation are possible and promising, but the Chinese themselves are not necessarily exempt from possible friction, stemming above all from the potential rivalry between China and India, one that will likely be promoted by North-American influence, particularly via its prevailing

global influence in matters of “soft power.” A number of Michael Mann’s suggestions may easily be invoked regarding these themes, above all the prevalence of many possible “orthogonal” conflicts, potentially generating an almost endless set of possibilities regarding factual combinations. However, and in partial contrast to Mann’s diagnosis, it should also be noted that:

(a) The range of possible positive contributions for economic growth extend well beyond the meager Schumpeterian “creative destruction.” Indeed, this often implies consistently greater state intervention in the economies of latecomer countries, which prevents the cavalier early dismissal of the issue of “socialism” from political debates in the foreseeable future, and will really induce a return to it inasmuch as any “bring-back-the-state” idea remains, an undeniable fact whenever “positive externalities” recurrently emerge in association with increased public economic intervention;

(b) The declining importance of the nation-state is definitely not a generalized fact, the recognized need to curb the power of global finance implying the emphatic return of its relevance. Furthermore, this is the only level where democratic institutions have ever operated in a consistent fashion;

(c) The decline of the nation-state may well be instead taken as a mostly symbolic and performative aspect of the social landscape, still an extremely disturbing one, given that it is associated with the systematic disenfranchisement of large masses in several democratic countries, nothing even remotely similar to a genuine “global civil society” having emerged in the meantime. As a matter of fact, even in the case of regional associations, such as the EU, the transfer of power from nation-states to Brussels/Frankfurt has mostly meant the transformation of regular democratic procedures into farces, “democracy” here nothing but an empty shell, the whole process instead understandable as a soft variety of a “choice of defeat” by the national elites (subjection to Brussels/Frankfurt considered better than having to be responsive vis-à-vis the masses on the national level). This is arguably the quintessential nature of the political choices underlying the recent economic tragedies of countries such as Greece and Portugal;

(d) All political arenas have been until the present time, and are likely to remain, instances of the exercise of choices, some of them agonistic, but there are plenty of reasons to believe that a world-wide configuration of political power being exercised mostly by distributing that resource among various formally equal nation-states, such as posited in the UN Charter, is largely more desirable in terms of democratic content (agenda-building, open discussions on the nature of options, informed choices, etc.), world development and the correspondent ecological implications (regarding which it must be remembered that the economic catching-up of poorer countries has been and still is much less environmentally burdening, in comparative terms and on a “per capita” basis, than the perpetuation of the privileges of the “happy few”), and finally with reference to the theme of warlike tendencies, a field where the preservation of various relative equilibriums remains a generically good recipe for peace, the excessive and imbalanced power of the USA during the last decades having undoubtedly produced further trends of bellicosity.

Although these correspond to bursts of aggressiveness where often no clear economic purpose is identifiable, Mann's suggestion of a complete analytical severing of military aspects from economic ones might be usefully counter-balanced by meditating Polonius' dictum that "Though this be madness, yet there is method in it." As a matter of fact, this leaning towards chaotic, unreliable behavior may instead be more acutely perceived by confronting it with Arrighi's suggestion of an *après-moi-le-déluge* pattern of conduct, corresponding to one possible option open to US leading circles when facing the decline of its own global economic hegemony.

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Война и капитализм: о некоторых ключевых теориях и значимых фактах

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Говоря о «капитализме и войне», следует в первую очередь обратить внимание на важные интеллектуальные традиции, обсуждающие связи между этими двумя терминами радикально противоположными способами. Начиная с эпохи Просвещения, в основных интеллектуальных течениях эти два понятия полагались принципиально антагонистическими. Считалось, что экономические связи должны сдерживать развитие социальных конфликтов и способствовать усилению взаимозависимости, а, следовательно, делать обычаи более цивилизованными и содействовать миру как внутри суверенных единств, так и между ними. Включение подобных представлений в мировоззрение ведет к многочисленным последствиям, однако зачастую эти идеи выражались в форме «долженствований» и не соотносились с фактами реальной жизни. Пример — работы Адама Смита, который полагал, что колониальная торговля является в принципе мирной деятельностью, взаимовыгодной для всех ее участников, но одновременно признавал, что экономическая действительность сильно отличается от такой благостной картины. Подлинные причины этого расхождение не до конца ясны, хотя Смит был склонен возлагать вину на монополии и сращение торговли с заботой о государственном суверенитете, что противоречит модели открытой конкуренции, распространяющей мир. В данной статье мы рассматриваем этот кластер вопросов, анализируя соответствующие идеи ряда значимых социальных теоретиков, включая Адама Смита, Карла Маркса, Макса Вебера, Вернера Зомбарта, Терстена Веблена, Йозефа Шумпетера, Александра Гершенкрона, Карла Поланьи, Фернана Броделя, Джованни Арриги и Майкла Манна. Предлагаемые этими авторами теории так же сопоставляются с историческими фактами и тенденциями, отмеченными в работах других релевантных исследователей, в основном историков. Мы полагаем, что необходимо оставаться открытым к сложной, амбивалентной и неопределенной природе социальной реальности.

Ключевые слова: война, капитализм, циклы гегемонии, плюрализм в социологическом подходе, сложность исторической реальности, оригинальность и преемственность в международных отношениях

Social Practices of Using War Memorials in Russia: A Comparison between Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd and Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow

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This paper presents the results of research into the social practices of using memorials dedicated to the Second World War in post-soviet Russia. The authors introduce a comparative analysis of two case studies. They examine Poklonnaya Gora,¹ located in Moscow, which is a site of memory (*lieux de memoir*), according to Pierre Nora, where there was no real fighting during the Battle of Moscow in 1941–1942. This is contrasted with Mamayev Kurgan, located in Volgograd, which is a site of remembrance (*lieux de souvenir*), according to Aleida Assman, where violent fighting took place during the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943. The authors describe in detail the spatial infrastructure of both memorials and make a classification of the practices in relation to their use, including commemorative, political, leisure, religious, and infrastructure-related social practices exercised by different groups of social agents. The authors conclude that Poklonnaya Gora is a universal memorial relaying a monological heroic discourse, whereas Mamayev Kurgan reproduces the same triumphant discourse, yet twisted through the local context of interaction between the local authorities and the city's communities.

Keywords: war memorials, space of war memorials, use of war memorials, social practices, Poklonnaya Gora, Mamayev Kurgan, Russia

Introduction

Interaction with war memorials dedicated to the Second World War (WWII) and built in the countries formerly constituting the Soviet Union is a subject for increasing discussion and research in modern Russia and beyond. Sociological studies on interactions with war memorials are based on the metaphor of “site,” which refers to the corresponding geographical and time coordinates, and events. Any war memorial has a certain spatial location, and on memorial days various activities are undertaken around it, varying from

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1. Note: literally, the Bow Down Hill, also referred to as the Hill of Respectful Salutation or the Worshipful Submission Hill.

annual Victory Day² celebrations to the laying of flowers and wreaths. A memorial is located within a site that serves as a point of transition and convergence of different dimensions—the past and the present, space and time, public festivities and everyday life.

Studying the practices of interactions with war memorials, we turn to two notions that converge in the metaphor of site. The first of them is “site of memory” (*lieux de mémoire*), first introduced by Nora. This term implies sites turned into covenants of collective memory for a society or social groups: “Numerous sites of memory . . . exist because there is no longer any social group memory” (Nora, 1999: 17); they appear when the live communicative memory of eyewitnesses gives place to cultural memory (Vanke, Polukhina, 2014: 37). Studies on sites of memory are linked to the research of both discursive and material traces and physical objects, including war memorials, the functions they perform, and the ways they are referred to in different contexts. The second concept is the “site of remembrance” (*lieux de souvenir*), which means “a site meaningful for someone’s individual biography” (Assmann, 2014: 236). In contrast to an abstract space for human planning, creation and exploration, a site of remembrance is “a specific space where people have already performed some activities” (Assmann, 2014: 237–238). Human activities on sites of remembrance are linked to human fates, emotional experiences and recollections which are projected through monuments (Ibid.: 236). An example is Mamayev Kurgan, commemorating the Battle of Stalingrad, where real combat operations took place, with the recollections of eyewitnesses differing from the views of those who have learned about those events from other sources.

According to Debrè, “praising the ‘sites of memory’ higher than the communities of people capable of memorizing things, and making these sites independent of these communities is tantamount to making a fetish out of a building and, if you will, to separating a habitat from the habitation therein, or a body from the soul” (Debrè, 2009: 25). This means that it is impossible to study monuments and memorials in isolation from the surrounding communities and publics which form and are formed by the changing configurations of interactions, meanings and emotions that surround them. Therefore, we use the case study method for investigating the practices of using WWII memorials as sites of memory and sites of remembrance, that is, a comparative study of social phenomena in the context of the real course of events and situations, whereby the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are blurred (Yin, 1994: 13). A case study includes the following methods of collecting empirical data: social ethnography, overt observation, interviews and analysis of documents (Polukhina, 2013: 7).

We have selected two memorial complexes, which are very significant for Russians and enjoy government support, because the social practices exercised in these spaces clearly demonstrate the general attitudes to major war memorials in contemporary Russia. The cases differ from each other by their geographical location, as the principle of capital city/regional context was used for their selection; however, the cases chosen are similar in terms of devotion, scope and the grandiosity of the architectural concept.

2. Victory Day is celebrated in Russia on the 9th of May and is the commemoration of the victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945).

Empirical data were collected at Poklonnaya Gora and Mamayev Kurgan simultaneously on May 9, 2014,³ and non-simultaneously on other days, which made it possible to compare the social use of the two memorials during Victory Day celebrations and in everyday life, in the capital city and in the region. The comparison parameters were the spatial (infra)structures of the memorial complexes and the social practices exercised on the sites.

The empirical database of the project consisted of 21 street interviews with visitors to both memorials, two expert interviews with employees of the museums located on the premises of the complexes in question, seven sessions of overt observation and more than 500 photographs. Chosen for observation were holidays, weekdays and weekends; mornings, afternoons and evenings; sunny, rainy and frosty weather. The results were recorded in a field diary in thick description. The collection of field data at Poklonnaya Gora took place on May 9, 2013,⁴ February 23, March 20 and May 9, 2014, and from May 1 through May 20, 2014 at Mamayev Kurgan.

Spatial (Infra)structure of the Memorials

The Memorial Complex at Mamayev Kurgan is a monument to the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad and a national symbol of Russia.⁵ It is located on a high hill in the city of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad, and earlier known as Tsaritsyn) with a population of around 1 million in 2014. Its central 85-meter-high statue named “Your Motherland Is Calling!” can be seen from almost anywhere in Volgograd, with the local people regarding this statue as a symbol of their city and the pride of the Volgograd Region. Its significance it can be compared to the Statue of Liberty in New York (46 m) and the Statue of Christ the Redeemer in Rio de Janeiro (36 m). This monument embodies the historical memory of WWII (Semenenko, 2008: 14).

Mamayev Kurgan is a site of remembrance, associated with the war—the grief and heroism of the victorious people. In terms of landscape, Mamayev Kurgan is a hill located in the central part of the city. During the 1942–1943 Battle of Stalingrad, a 200-day long battle took place on the hill. According to the official view (Krivosheyev, 2001), the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point in the war, after which the Soviet Army gained the initiative. The monument to the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad was conceived as a space demonstrating the greatness of the people’s heroism, the bitterness of the losses and the significance of the victory on a global scale. The memorial was designed as a great, powerful and perpetual complex. The work on the project began as early as in 1948 and

3. The poly-local ethnography method is used by Gabowitsch (2015) in his studies of Soviet war memorials in Central and Eastern Europe.

4. Field materials at Poklonnaya Gora were collected in 2013 by one of the authors under the project “The Monument and the Holiday: May 9 Celebrations and the Interaction of Soviet War Monuments with Local Communities in the Soviet Military Block Heir Countries,” supported by the Center for French and Russian Research and Memorial Society.

5. According to All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) as of September 2013, Mamayev Kurgan was regarded as a national symbol by 12 % of the Russians (WCIOM, 2013).

the foundation stone laying ceremony was held on February 2, 1958. Then mine sweeping operations were conducted at Mamayev Kurgan.

The opening took place on October 15, 1967, and was attended by high-ranking military and civilian officials. During the ceremony, an Eternal Flame was lit by Leonid Brezhnev. The statue "Your Motherland Is Calling!" was listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the world's largest sculpture; it weighs around 8 000 tons and has a height of 85 meters. The memorial complex was designed by a team headed by sculptor Yevgeniy Vuchetich and architect Yakov Byelopolsky, both of them also having taken part in creating Berlin's Treptow Park complex. The monument site area is 26 hectares.

Around 35 000 people were buried on the hill of Mamayev Kurgan, though many sources estimate the number of those who died during the Battle of Stalingrad as higher. "Do you know what kind of place this is?! There was a sea of blood here, grass and trees did not grow here for twenty years after the end of the war. Thousands were killed daily!" (a female attendant at the Stalin Museum,⁶ Mamayev Kurgan, 05.08.2014).

The scale of casualties is also depicted in a short story by Victor Nekrasov, a writer and participant of the Battle of Stalingrad:

"And the mound [kurgan] on which I was fighting and where my soldiers were laying antipersonnel land mines into the frozen ground was called 'Mamayev Kurgan'. For five months blood was being shed there, instantly being frozen. When several years later, seven, to be correct, I happened to be there, it was still entirely covered with skulls and bones as the ground had been washed away by rain. . . . Everything is the biggest in this country. The mountains, rivers, dams, rockets and the Party. And this is the world's biggest monument. One toe of this monstrous woman is twice or even three times as large as an ordinary man. And all around there are dozens of grandiose sculptures, symbols, allegories and a pool, and above it there is a half-naked warrior with a submachine gun and the resolute face of Marshal Chuykov." (Nekrasov, 2005)

Victory Park at Poklonnaya Gora, along with the Eternal Flame in Aleksandrovsky Garden, is considered by Russians as the most significant memorial complex to commemorate the victory in WWII in Moscow. Poklonnaya Gora holds a certain place in the mentality of Muscovites and has triumphal, heroic and religious connotations. As it is located in the western part of the city, there was no fighting on Poklonnaya Gora itself during the German offensive on Moscow in 1941–1942. In 1942, however, it was proposed that a memorial complex be built there in honor of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the war. At the same time, the Union of Architects of the USSR announced a contest for the best design of the memorial complex (The History of Creating the Museum, 2014), but its implementation was suspended. Only in 1958, under the Khrushchev administration, was a memorial headstone laid at Poklonnaya Gora with the inscription: "Here will stand a monument to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945."

6. More details on the Stalin Museum at Mamayev Kurgan are available at: <http://vetert.ru/rossiya/volgo-grad/sights/337-muzej-stalina.php> (accessed 9 January 2015).



Figure 1. Layout of the Mamayev Kurgan Memorial Complex in Volgograd⁷

7. This layout was taken from the book "Mamayev Kurgan: The Main Height of Russia" (Volgograd: Panorama, 2013: 107). The elements of the Memorial Complex are: (1) an entrance square with the introductory composition "The Memory of the Generations"; (2) a Lombardy poplar lined avenue; (3) Stoyat' Nasmier't' (Die in the Last Ditch) Square with a giant warrior hero statue; (4) symbolic ruined walls; (5), (6) the Square of Heroes with six sculpture groups; (7) a Hall of Glory with a monumental bas-relief; (8) the Square of Grief; (9) The main monument "Your Motherland Is Calling!"; (10) All Hallows Church.

Victory Park, completed in 1995 according to Zurab Tsereteli's design, is a site of memory, which accumulates cultural heritage in the form of monuments, artifacts, material objects and discursive traces (Nora, 1998), serving to relay the national memory of the war.

Victory Park is located on a natural elevation, a slightly sloping hill in the Western Administrative District of Moscow, which was named "Poklonnaya Gora" from the word "to bow," semantically referring to the ritual of worshiping the city, the churches, the guests or the gods, who, according to the myth, abide high on the top of Mount Olympus, or in heaven (Moldovan, 2011: 301). Perhaps, it brings about associations with the "holiness" of the hill which symbolically and geographically immortalizes the memory about the war. Victory Park is framed by Minskaya Street and Kutuzovsky Prospekt, the latter rolling into Mozhaiskoye Shosse. It has an area of 135 hectares. The area of Victory Park is filled with commemorative items of different kinds, with new ones being added from time to time.

The two war memorials are organized in a similar manner. Both are located on elevations, and are surrounded by designations and memorable spots related to military themes. Both offer similar semantic paths that can be followed and "read" by the visitor. The size of the memorials and their multi-kilometer length tells the visitor about the grandeur of the memorable events and their importance to the national history. The long walkway, the number of stairs and steps in the "paths of memory" symbolize the hard road travelled by our predecessors. The emphasis is reinforced by war sculptures and inscriptions, symbolizing both heroism, and grief.

The memorials include small bodies of water and waterways, next to the pathways leading to the main monuments. These waterways are a reminder of the "tears" shed by mourning mothers and other people for their loved ones. On the way to the main statues, there is an Eternal Flame burning as if to perpetuate the memory. The main peak of the memorials is a majestic female statue, personifying the Victory. Both memorial complexes hold WWII museums and Orthodox churches.

Mamayev Kurgan is a single-event memorial, dedicated exclusively to the Battle of Stalingrad, whereas Poklonnaya Gora, by contrast, commemorates many wars and tragic events, such as WWI, WWII, the Afghan War, and the Holocaust. The Mamayev Kurgan sculptures were designed in the traditional manner of the time, in the style of socialist realism. They demonstrate human abilities as the backbone of the victory. The sculpture ensemble retains socialist realism features expressed through the national spirit, heroism and the proximity to historic events. The multi-event war memorial at Poklonnaya Gora was designed in the abstractionist style with its eclecticism and disproportion and a combination of secular and religious features. In addition to an Orthodox church, Victory Park also houses a mosque and a synagogue. It would be hard imagine such buildings at Mamayev Kurgan. Thus, while Mamayev Kurgan is the site of a single great battle which laid the foundation for victory in WWII, Poklonnaya Gora is a place reminding of war-related grief and sorrows and appealing for solidarity between various social groups.

Memorial Interaction Practices

Using overt observation performed at Mamayev Kurgan and Poklonnaya Gora during the May 9 and February 23 celebrations, and based on the monitoring of these memorials on weekdays, we classify the activities undertaken by different social agents with regard to the monuments. In other words, we can single out the types of practices used in interaction with the memorials by applying the following binary oppositions: capital city/region, site of remembrance/site of memory, official/individual; and single out the following series of practices: commemorative, political, leisure, religious, and infrastructure maintenance.




Figure 2. Layout of Victory Park at Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow⁸

8. Components of Victory Park are: (1) Victory Obelisk, 141.8 meters high, representing the 1,418 days of the war, was erected in 1995 and is now among the tallest monuments of Russia; (2) the Museum of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, established in 1986; (3) St. George the Dragon Slayer Church, built by the Moscow Government in 1995; (4) a Memorial Mosque, built in 1997 in memory of the Muslims killed during the war; (5) a Memorial Synagogue and the Holocaust Memorial Museum, built with the support of the Russian Jewish Congress in 1998; (6) the Monument to the Defenders of the Russian Land, constructed in 1997; (7) a sculpture composition “The Tragedy of the Peoples” in memory of the Holocaust victims, built in 1997; (8) a monument “To the Spaniards Fallen in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” dated 2001; (9) a Naval Weapons Exhibition; (10) an Outdoor Weapons and Military Equipment Exhibition.

Commemorative Practices

These make up a set of secular memorial and ritual interactions. Kolyagina and Konradova (2015: 137) write that while in the Soviet period May 9 was celebrated *en famille*, today we can see a tendency towards extended public practices of Victory Day celebrations that more and more take place in streets and squares. On the one hand, these practices are similar at both memorials. They include laying flowers, greeting veterans and giving them presents, singing wartime songs, seeing war movies, staging outdoor theatrical performances and concerts (for more detailed information on the repertoire of Victory Day celebration social practices at Poklonnaya Gora see: Vanke, 2015: 216–217). Huge bouquets of flowers can be seen at practically every sculpture at Mamayev Kurgan and at some monuments of Poklonnaya Gora on Victory Day. In both cases, flowers and wreaths are normally laid at the Eternal Flame; many of them can be found around the central objects, some in the peripheral areas. When answering our question during a street interview at Poklonnaya Gora one of the interviewees enumerated the following actions: “We presented flowers [to veterans], postcards, bars of chocolate, sweets, and passed them a greeting from our Most Holy Patriarch” (a 20-year-old female, Poklonnaya Gora, 05.09.2014).

On the other hand, commemorative practices have a number of inner distinctions due to the fact that Mamayev Kurgan is a site of remembrance while Poklonnaya Gora is a site of memory; this imposes certain restrictions on the rules of behavior on these sites. Both the authorities and the public have well-established ideas about the norms and ethics of the attitude towards and the use of Mamayev Kurgan as a site of remembrance, whose historic background is a significant part of national history. Apart from the monuments and chapels, this attitude is extended to the common graves where the soldiers who died in 1942–1943 were buried, and many people come there to commemorate the fallen warriors.

Being a place of memory, Poklonnaya Gora unites cultural reminiscences of several wars. Its area is inundated with monuments but the public does not catch sight of many of them. Therefore, the site becomes a point of emanation for official victory discourses and a center of attraction for ordinary people, which in the mass media discourse is usually referred to as “popular.” Poklonnaya Gora is located on the periphery of Moscow, and for this reason wreath-laying ceremonies are usually conducted at the Kremlin Wall where the Eternal Flame is burning (for more details about this ritual see Vanke, Polukhina, 2014: 48). On the contrary, Mamayev Kurgan is located in the symbolic center of Volgograd, due to which laying flowers at the Eternal Flame by the officials has become a tradition for this site.

Political Practices

These have ideological nuances and suggest activities such as participation in official mass marches and rallies, patriotic events.

On May 9, an official march at Mamayev Kurgan with participants from political parties, and municipal and regional authorities takes place in the morning. It is telecast and flags representing different political parties and government organizations are visible. Ordinary visitors and the marching groups seldom mix with each other. It should be noted that sometimes these political attributes provoke indignation among people: "Found a good place to wave your [party] flags?!" (a 28-year-old male, Mamaev Kurgan, 05.09.2014). The limits to ethical norms may be determined by studying conflict situations. They occur due to the fact that such places as Mamayev Kurgan and the monument "Your Motherland Is Calling!" have different purposes for official authorities, represented by people from the city administration and the regional branches of political parties, on the one hand, and for the broader public and various social groups, on the other hand. In 2014, Mamayev Kurgan was mentioned by the press in connection with meetings in support of the integration of the Crimea (Interfax Russia, 2014).

Mass patriotic events also take place at Poklonnaya Gora. For example, in February 2012 an "anti-orange rally" was held there (Kalk, 2012); in September 2013, a rally in support of the newly elected Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyenin was organized; and on May 9, 2014, a symbolic event called "The Immortal Regiment" march took place. The participants of the latter mass event broke into columns according to the number of Moscow's administrative districts. Each district was represented by its residents who came to Poklonnaya Gora with photographs of their relatives who had taken part in the war. No conflict situations between the authorities and the public have ever happened at Poklonnaya Gora, for this site relays such a consistent and generally accepted narrative on WWII that it is not perceived by both pro-government and opposition activists as a venue for confrontation. Instead, this place seems to be totally appropriated and controlled by the authorities. That is why it relays a monological memory about the war and rules out any opportunities for public debate (Vanke, 2015: 212).

Leisure Practices

These are applicable in the context of recreational opportunities offered by the two memorials which are traditionally considered as popular areas for recreation and tourism and as public use areas at the same time.

Poklonnaya Gora attracts a large number of city people in spring and summer due to its landscape, the design of its parkland, and the availability of lawns, paths and fountains. For the people of Volgograd, Mamayev Kurgan is also an improved "green" park and a site for ceremonies and rituals, such as newlyweds' visits, for example: "Almost all newlyweds in this city celebrated here on the kurgan; even if the photo shoot is in another place, the newlyweds will surely come here to lay flowers at the tomb, at the Eternal Flame" (a male photographer, resident of Volgograd, 05.09.2014). The practices of photo shoots and laying flowers at the Eternal Flame by newlyweds are also typical for Poklonnaya Gora, where wedding motorcades go along the Avenue of Brides.

Mamayev Kurgan's area is significantly commercialized. It abounds in stalls selling merchandise such as postcards, and souvenirs. The symbol "Your Motherland Is Calling!" is well replicated and appears on magnets, T-shirts, mugs, beer glasses, plastic bags and ballpoint pens. As for Poklonnaya Gora, the number of food and beverages stalls increases greatly during the Victory Day celebration period (May 7–10). On weekdays, there are no street markets in the square because all the souvenirs are sold in the WWII Museum building.

Religious Practices

These include participation in public prayers, memorial services and mass religious processions. The Orthodox Way of the Cross processions are organized both at Poklonnaya Gora and Mamayev Kurgan, which point at the domination of one single religion within the spaces of the two memorials and its intertwining with the generally accepted WWII narrative.

At the same time, there is an Orthodox church, a mosque and a synagogue in Victory Park which creates both a configuration and a pre-condition for people from different religious and ethnic groups to mix together in the same place and at the same time (on May 9, for example). In spite of the fact that religious events at Mamayev Kurgan have been taken place since 1996⁹, the only functioning Orthodox church there now is the one opened in 2005, which minimizes any interaction between Volgograd permanent residents and migrant workers who do not consider this place to be theirs.

A different situation is observed at Poklonnaya Gora, where various rituals are carried out at the mosque. This mosque is becoming more and more important for Moscow Muslims, and especially for migrant workers visiting it during religious holidays. The synagogue at Poklonnaya Gora makes it possible to exercise not just religious practices, but also commemorative and cultural practices, because, in addition to being a temple, it serves as a museum and an exhibition center. The staff conduct tours and arrange thematic exhibitions.

Maintenance Practices

At these two memorials, infrastructure maintenance practices and mass events, varying from festivities to rallies, are usually organized by municipal authorities, less often by city people engaged in volunteer cleaning and landscape maintenance. For example, every year the celebration of the Victory Day on May 9 at Poklonnaya Gora is organized and supported by workers of various municipal agencies, the Russian Union of Rescuers, the Russian Emergencies Ministry, paramedics, retail outlets and police officers, as well as by volunteers, members of student unions and patriotic organizations.

At the same time, the authorities regard both Mamayev Kurgan and Poklonnaya Gora as sites to be properly guarded, secured and maintained, and as important political tools.

9. Way of the Cross Procession 2000. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jo8nUoKS984> (accessed 12.25.2014).

The public sees them as “sacred” and “popular” places, places that are common and public, places that deserve to be honored and carefully maintained, with open discussions to be held on all issues concerning their future. Since the mid-2010s, the government’s policy has been aimed at maintaining their infrastructure and their maximum possible use—not only on May 9, but on other days as well. Significant funds are allocated annually for their maintenance.

Conclusion

In spite of the different socio-historical contexts in which the Memorial Complex to the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad on Mamayev Kurgan in Volgograd (1967) and Victory Park on Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow (1995) were created, both memorials are similar in terms of their thematic scope and spatial scale: they relay a consistent and triumphant discourse on the war. Their central monuments, the Victory Obelisk and the statue “Your Motherland Is Calling!” embody feminine images—the first of the ancient Greek goddess of victory Nike and the second of the Mother-Motherland, the latter being a personified image of Russia. On both sites, Museums of the Great Patriotic War and Eternal Flames serve as sense-making elements. Both sites accommodate religious temples and both memorial complexes have artificial waterworks.

Due to the differences in the reasons for creating these memorials, and in their geographic location (one in the capital, the other regional), these sites perform different functions and possess different meanings, which brings about different configurations of social activities. Poklonnaya Gora is a multi-event site of memory, semantically embracing several wars, whereas Mamayev Kurgan is a mono-event site of remembrance. In this regard, the connotative meanings of the two memorials differ as they appear in the local contexts of Victory Day celebrations, that is, in here-and-now situations.

With the help of a comparative analysis we have created a classification of the types of social activities. These include commemorative, political, leisure, religious and infrastructure-related practices that differ from each other in different contexts, viewed through the prism of such binary oppositions as capital city/regional, universal/local and official/public. Poklonnaya Gora is a universal memorial relaying a monological heroic discourse, whereas Mamayev Kurgan reproduces the same triumphant discourse, yet twisted through the local context of interaction between the local authorities and the city’s communities.

All this makes it possible to conclude that two-way communication on war memorials between the authorities and society is difficult in contemporary Russia. It is irregular and sometimes vacuous, in contrast to the situation in Central and East European countries (Gabowitsch, 2015: 108) where the problems of rehashing the memory and reorganizing Soviet war memorials are the subject of public debate and, in some cases, these problems are settled by reaching a consensus between the authorities and society.

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Социальные практики использования мемориалов в России: сравнивая Мамаев Курган в Волгограде и Поклонную гору в Москве

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В статье излагаются результаты исследования социальных практик использования мемориалов, посвященных Великой Отечественной войне в постсоветской России. Авторы представляют сравнительный анализ двух кейсов. Они изучают Поклонную гору, расположенную в Москве, которая является местом памяти (*lieux de memoir*), согласно Пьеру Нора, где не происходили реальные военные сражения во время битвы за Москву в 1941–1942 гг. Этот кейс сравнивается с Мамаевым курганом, расположенным в Волгограде, который является памятным местом (*lieux de souvenir*), согласно Алейде Ассман, где имели место жесткие сражения во время Сталинградской битвы в 1942–1943 гг. Авторы детально описывают пространственную инфраструктуру обоих мемориалов и выстраивают классификацию практик в отношении их использования, включая коммеморативные, политические, досуговые, религиозные практики, а также практики, связанные с инфраструктурой, применяемые разными группами социальных агентов. Авторы приходят

к выводу о том, что Поклонная гора — универсальный мемориал, транслирующий монологический героический дискурс, в то время как Мамаев курган воспроизводит такой же триумфальный дискурс, преломленный через локальный контекст интеракций между местными властями и городскими сообществами.

Ключевые слова: военные мемориалы, пространство военных мемориалов, использование военных мемориалов, социальные практики, Поклонная гора, Мамаев курган, Россия

Models of Conflicts and a New Paradigm for the 21st Century Security Environment

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The last decades of world history have been described as an epoch of deep and rapid changes, compelling researchers to think of a new paradigm for the security environment, based on a refinement of principles, classification systems, and models of conflicts. The development of a new paradigm needs to be correctly formulated. It is necessary to understand clearly that new ideas and principles need to be connected with the collective experience of a society and its narratives, and to be related to practice. The modern meanings of notions and ideas are formed through immersion in history; analogies are developed as part of the process of interpretation and the creation of narrative. As a consequence, the politician and the researcher are on the edge of possible meanings, focusing the attention of society on the ideas society will be able to comprehend and include in its narrative. The development of a paradigm is a difficult theoretical problem requiring both objectivity and subjectivity. The objective aspects are constant for historical epochs and cultures, which allows the use of the world's treasury of experience and knowledge. Subjective aspects depend on the specifics of the society, leading to an intellectual phenomenon. The development of a new paradigm for the security environment of the post-soviet space, in virtue of its complexity, should be considered more art than science.

Keywords: globalization, security environment, paradigm shift, models of conflicts, continuum of conflict, complexity, nonlinearity

The last decades of world history have been described as an epoch of deep and rapid changes. Attempts to comprehend the changes lead to an understanding that they are based on deeper processes than just technological innovations (Rosenau, 1997). These changes have touched the patterns underlying social institutions such as the family, the state, and the global political system as a whole (Rosenau, 1998: 145–169). Here it is possible to speak about the uniqueness of the emerging epoch, when the development of philosophical and conceptual bases of the new world takes place concurrently with the changes themselves. In such conditions, the only sustainable basis for the comprehension of the new era is a flexible theoretical basis

However, such a conclusion appears to be non-functional and, as a consequence, unacceptable for national security (NS). Having stated that the security environment of the 21st century is undergoing qualitative changes, the organizations responsible for forming the responses to the security challenges have no right to postpone the theoretical compre-

hension of the threats and the formation of responses by appealing to the impossibility of grasping the dynamics and of creating an internally consistent and coherent vision of the future. NS cannot be bound exclusively to a theoretical discourse; it includes elements and systems which are part of society and public life. The development and operation of NS systems requires concepts and doctrines, which are based on the comprehension of the challenges and threats to the society, and the methods of responding to them, although that comprehension and the methods may be incomplete.

In this sense, one may speak about a serious challenge and a paradox when the imperatives of the emerging epoch force the development of a theoretical basis originally assuming the qualitative changes realized through the mechanisms of adaptation and co-evolution. The semantic network of the underlying «basis» concept, traditionally including analogies and meanings, associated with constancy and stability, now include new elements linked with continuous and qualitative changes.

Is such an approach to thinking in terms of the NS acceptable? Being inertial and rigid, NS systems demand a corresponding rigidity from their own doctrines. How in the given conditions can their objective static and rigid character be interfaced with the imperative of continuous innovation? Where is the balance between inertia and flexibility? On what philosophical positions, on the basis of what paradigms, and in terms and concepts of what sciences should it be formed?

A response to the challenge is the synthesis of complex thinking, philosophy, and the sciences of complexity, systematicity and networks (Arzumanian, 2012). The implementation of the language of complexity, networks and nonlinearity into military theory can be observed at all levels of conflict. For example, the modern tendency for operational analysis is preferred to discourse on complex operations and intergovernmental operations (Kelly, Brennan, 2010), which are rooted in the science of the system, and to a holistic approach covering all elements of national power and society.

It is possible to speak about two dominant visions for future operations. The first rests on centralized, integrated military-civil campaigns. This direction evolves within the limits of the theory of operational holism, terms from the 20th century evoking the idea of, for example, a blitzkrieg. This vision is accompanied by doctrines of netwars and network-centric wars. The second vision develops within the concept of irregular warfare (Arzumanian, 2015) and qualitatively differs not only from the centralized vision of the doctrine of operational holism, but also from the military operations of the 20th century.

A similar collision of inherently polar visions and approaches to the estimation of the nature and forms of military confrontation in the 21st century can be observed at the strategic and political-military levels of conflict. The issue here is not the full and final victory of one of the visions, but a dynamic balance reflecting the results of a political and theoretical struggle.

The metaphor of “the hedgehog and the fox,” used in the discussions related to strategy and war, is from the work of the Greek poet, Archilochus: “The fox knows many things. The hedgehog knows one big thing” (West, 1989). “Isaiah immediately began dividing the great minds of the past into hedgehogs and foxes: Goethe and Pushkin were foxes; Dos-

toyevesky and Tolstoy were hedgehogs,” writes the biographer of Berlin, Michael Ignatieff (Ignatieff, 1999: 173). Hedgehogs are people of a single idea which defines their thoughts and acts. Foxes are pluralists and are little concerned about the integrity of their outlook: “[T]here exists a great chasm between those . . . who relate everything to a single central vision . . .—a single, universal, organizing principle—and . . . those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected only in some *de facto* way.” In many respects a conditional dichotomy highlights the difference between the focused, centripetal hedgehogs and the fluid, centrifugal foxes.

Looking at the security environment of the 21st century through the lens of this metaphor allows us to speak about the necessity of both a focused and broad approach, intended to cover the phenomena and processes within the limits of a general basis, and the decentralized and irregular aspiring to reflect the processes without developing such a basis. The solutions related to the globalization processes are, first of all, political, social and economic, not military. Nevertheless, globalization compels nations to reform their NS systems as a whole and their military organization in particular by developing a new paradigm for the security environment.

The Traditional Linear Model of Conflict

The linear thinking of the Cold War, especially in the USA, tended to divide conflicts into two categories: “major war” and “operations other than war” (OOTW) (U.S. Joint Chiefs Staff, 1995). The dichotomy was built on the assumption, that small threats can be overcome by small military efforts and the tools that are used in the resolution of large conflicts (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. The traditional linear model of conflict

This division is a consequence of a linear paradigm and the European model of the war which emerged in the middle of the 17th century (Czerwinski, 2008). War is conducted by state actors. The beginning of a war is defined clearly by its formal declaration. As soon as one of the parties surrenders, military actions stop, and a truce is arranged. Then a peace treaty is signed, the population of the states starts to return to normal life, and the hostility, the essential attribute of war, gradually fades away.

Within the limits of the model a legal base has been developed, time frames for the transition from peace to the war are defined. The model was supported by corresponding international law which, to some extent, was complied by all the participants of the conflict. There was also a statement regulating the behavior of armed forces in peace time, a country's transition into war, including considerations of future or on-going war as legal and fair, both from a moral and theological point of view (a just war). The criteria and substantiations were already visible in the works of St. Augustine (Russell, 2013), and the same principles inherently underlie the work of the UN Security Council. Though while the traditional model of conflict per se was seldom applied, it forms the framework which prescribes permitted activity. The model also helps to evaluate the parties of conflicts, war, and the coming peace.

A Nonlinear Model of Conflict

Although the traditional model continues to dominate western military thinking, in the 20th century war frequently developed within the bounds of other ways of thinking. In the 21st century many conflicts do not end with a peace treaty, but continue to smolder in a condition of "no war no peace," forming a separate, "hybrid" category in conceptual and categorical apparatus by which the security threats are described (Gray, 2013; 2012; Arzumanyan, 2015). Wars and crises in the 21st century can conditionally be correlated with the legal framework of the traditional model. The separation of any stages and especially the transitions between them become problematic, and most wars of the 21st century can be conditionally interpreted as "just." Armed forces in the 21st century should be ready to conduct operations against both regular and irregular enemies. Moreover, a regular enemy can resort to irregular, asymmetric tactics and strategy for the preparation and waging of war (Gray, 2005: 29).

Though both in society as a whole and in the military sphere in particular, a linear culture, outdated thinking and education continue to dominate; an adequate response to the threats of the new epoch should be developed on the basis of the terminology and concepts of a nonlinear paradigm (Whitehead, 2003: 48–49). As a consequence, there is a necessity to develop a new nonlinear model of a conflict (Beyerchen, 1992: 59–90) where instead of a discrete set of states, a continuum of competition and conflict is supposed (see fig. 2).

The continuum includes all the efforts of the nation and all accessible tools for deterrence—from the demonstration of military power to the local use of force. The transition from peace to crisis or from crisis to war is not well-defined, and represents a separate

“transient phase” (gray zone) with its own logic. The party adhering to the new model and knowing about the existence of such a niche can take advantage of it. A possibility which is denied the party continuing to remain within the limits of the old model (Smith, 2006: 11–15).

Under the new conditions it is impossible to allocate a point in time at which the hostilities between the parties begin or come to an end. The hostility which leads to a state of war in the old model, covers the whole continuum in the new one. Along this continuum it is still possible to define with some reliability the beginning and the end of major military operations, however the end of large-scale operations no longer means the end of hostility. Moreover, the opponent adapting to defeat in a conventional military campaign will in all likelihood pass into other forms of war. The struggle proceeds until the nation's possibility, or will, to wage the war is exhausted. The nonlinear nature of complex adaptive systems on which the given model is based leads to those “post-conflict stabilization operations” turning into a series of cycles the end of which can only be defined conditionally and, more often, retrospectively.




Figure 2. Nonlinear model of conflict

The complexity of the new model is in the interactions between the elements when the system's reactions through feedback and environment influent subsequent actions.

As a consequence, conflict is not a straight line, but a cycle or a series of cycles and a continuum of confrontation (Fig. 3).




Figure 3. Cyclic continuum of conflict

The lowest internal cycle transitions from peace to some form of interaction in the niches of the transient phase. The second reflects the development of some form of crisis (humanitarian, political) with a return to peace. The third maps a military crisis with low intensity warfare, and the fourth cycle maps large-scale warfare and military operations.

Within the limits of a nonlinear model it is incorrect to speak about a return to the status quo, as once the cycle has begun the initial parameters inevitably change and one cannot return to the initial conditions. The spiral of cyclical interactions, according to the scale, speed and the nature of interactions, becomes a crisis and conflict metaphor (fig. 4).

A cyclical view of crisis development and society as a whole is not new. The influence of long or Kondratiev's cycles (Kondratiev, 1988) in the military sphere has been known for a some time. Some authors track 45–50-year cycles of the major wars in the history of Europe (Goldstein, 1988). This new continuum model and the military reality of the 21st century describe the nature and sources of the complexity of modern wars. This complexity is connected with interactions which are focused more on the human dimension of the conflict, is holistic, and involves whole nation.




Figure 4. Spiral continuum of conflict

Conclusion: The Necessity of a Paradigm Shift

Changes in the security environment compel researchers to develop a new paradigm based on more refined principles and conflict classification systems. In particular, within the limits of the new paradigm the condition of “no war, no peace,” and “transient phases” should be recognized as a variation of the norms of political-military reality.

There is a necessity to define and interpret new phenomena, such as “black zones” where control is lost and there are no *sui juris* authorities or actors capable of providing order, or the basic needs of the population (Arzumanyan, 2015: 38–45). In the security environment of the 21st century the purpose of the international community is to avoid chaos in territories where conflict has developed, and to prevent radical religious and extremist groups, which deny the basis of the existing international order, from coming to power. In other words, the international community is strongly interested in the existence of actors ready to provide basic functions of government in conflict zones regardless of their status in the system of the international relations.

The new paradigm should reflect the changes in meanings of some basic notions, such as “regulation,” which, within the limits of the traditional model of conflict, was understood as the achievement of a lasting peace between the conflicting parties fixed by an international agreement. Under the new conditions such an interpretation is inadequate as it appears to be unattainable for the majority of modern conflicts. The dynamics of the processes in the security environment are so fast, that the power centers fail to give exhaustive security guarantees to the parties of the conflict or to compel them to commit over the long term. In the 21st century world powers have often lost control over the processes they have initiated, being unable to realise the plans they have mapped out. In

the new conditions it is necessary to speak not in terms of a definitive end, but an acceptable resolution when the possibility remains to monitor and constrain the conflict within presumptive margins.

The development of a new paradigm is a complex problem which also requires a sound basis in terms of political philosophy. It is necessary, first of all, to understand clearly how any new ideas and principles developed for the new paradigm are formed. According to Schmitt (2000) the emergence and development of ideas and notions cannot be explained within the limits of causality of traditional sociological analysis. Ideas arise from other ideas, not as the result of deduction, but rather as a free response. Emerging ideas and notions bring with themselves relics of their former meanings through interactions within the system of thought and practice of the society in which they have developed. Notions and ideas are connected with the collective experience of a society by a network of diverse relations and are supported by judgments, filled with meaning, within the narratives which are connected with social practices (Kahn, 2011: 106).

As an example of the evolution of the complexity of the distinction between war and peace is the work of Blechman and Kaplan (1978), many principles of which remain relevant. Kahn's (1965) conflict escalation ladder with 44 steps is an impressive theoretical concept for comprehending the structural dynamics of conflict

In search of a better understanding theorists often fail to avoid the temptation to achieve better insight only through ever deeper exploration. However, sooner or later, they notice that they have lost important aspects of understanding and judgment which can only be grasped on the basis of a holistic approach. Metaphorically, theorists appear unable to avoid a fog of theory (Gray, 2012: 13). Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the influence of the theorists on those engaged in the practical realities of NS.

The modern meanings of notions and ideas are not derived from the past as the conclusion follows from the premise in a logical construct, but through immersion in history, and as the result of operating with notions and ideas in the process of creating analogies, metaphors and associations. To draw an analogy means to highlight the symbolic structure of the phenomenon, binding it with a semantic network which is perceived by society as "known and owned." The analogy unfolds as a process of interpretation, but not as a revelation of truth or fact. It is a process of manufacturing the truth, which is peculiar for each person and society. People and society are free in their understanding of the world, and the process of such understanding is an act of freedom (Kahn, 2011: 109). Which interpretations will appear as key is impossible to tell in advance, and each society will have its own interpretations. In this sense, the politician, the philosopher or the researcher are on the edge of possible meanings, drawing the attention of society to those elements which society is able to comprehend and include in their narrative. One must speak about society's own narrative which has its own value, and whose meaning is not in grasping the truth, but in providing the rhetorical process to convince society of its correctness and its understanding of the truth (Kahn, 1992). It is impossible to tell in advance whether the new meanings are created or revived from history.

Paradigm development is a complex theoretical problem including both objective and subjective aspects. The objective aspects are constant for historical epochs and cultures using the world's treasury of experience and knowledge. New theorists address a philosophical and military heritage thousands of years old, trying to find answers to the challenges standing before a society developing rapidly (Gray, 2005: 3). Research always underlines the major role of culture, including strategic culture (Gray, 1999), the most important function of which is to exclude the surprise effect, when the society, colliding with a new reality, lets down its guard (Gray, 2005: 28).

The subjective aspects assume the presence of various forms depending on culture, ideologies, traditions and other peculiar features of a specific society. For example, the Western military culture is extremely plastic. Keeping a number of fundamental parameters, it admits a wide spectrum of ideas and influences from other cultures (Gray, 2005: 22). Western military culture is technologically effective and can be called machine-orientated (Parker, 1996).

The presence of subjective aspects leads to the emergence of an intellectual fashion which, like any another, is quintessentially volatile; sooner or later today's big idea gives way to a new one (Gray, 2005: 3). The sustainable development and security of a society in many respects depends on the ability of its elite to effectively work with new ideas, to make out the old ideas and approaches behind the new forms and interpretations, thereby facilitating an adequate response to new challenges. It is important to understand that new ideas sometimes develop unexpectedly even for their authors. "The history of ideas obeys a law of irony. Ideas have consequences but rarely those their authors expect or desire, and never only those. Quite often they are the opposite" (Gray, 2003: 27).

Developing a paradigm for the security environment of the 21st century in the post-soviet space is very complex. Researchers are obliged to be ready to import relevant ideas, but also to interpret the processes of their own societies on the basis of the concepts which have been developed in their own intellectual schools. A process which is nearer art than science.

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Модели конфликтов и новая парадигма среды безопасности XXI века

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Последние десятилетия мировой истории характеризуются как эпоха глубоких и быстрых перемен, вынуждая исследователей задуматься о новой парадигме среды безопасности, опирающейся на уточненные принципы и понятия, систему классификации и модели конфликтов. Разработка новой парадигмы нуждается в корректной постановке. Необходимо ясно понимать, что новые идеи и принципы связаны с коллективным опытом общества и его нарративами, находящимися во взаимных отношениях с практикой. Современный смысл и значение понятий и идей формируется через погружение в историю и выстраивание аналогий, разворачивающиеся как процесс интерпретации и создания нарратива. Как следствие, политик или исследователь находятся на кромке возможных смыслов и значений, привлекая внимание общества к тем идеям, которые оно будет в состоянии воспринять и включить в свой нарратив. Разработка парадигмы оказывается сложной теоретической проблемой, включающей в себя как объективные, так и субъективные аспекты. Объективные постоянны для исторических эпох и культур, что позволяет использовать сокровищницу мирового опыта и знаний. Субъективные зависят от специфических черт конкретного общества, приводящих к появлению феномена интеллектуальной моды. Разработка новой парадигмы для среды безопасности постсоветского пространства в силу сложности должна быть отнесена скорее к искусству, нежели науке.

Ключевые слова: глобализация, среда безопасности, парадигмальный сдвиг, модели конфликтов, континуум конфликта, сложность, нелинейность, метафора

10 Theses on War and Social Order: Preliminary Arguments on the Constitutive Functions of Armed Conflicts*

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At the beginning of the article, the author explains its idea—to explicate the conceptual approach to war as the most important structural element and mechanism for maintaining social order. The author claims the existence of a stable tradition of theorizing based on the argument about the social functionality of the structural violence, which allows interpreting war as a special type of sociality. The representatives of this conventional line of argumentation mentioned in the article are such key figures in the history of ideas, as Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt and Michel Foucault. The author formulates ten theses, which problematize the heuristic aspects of war in relation to the theory of social order and are accompanied by short comments explaining the ambivalent status of war topics in the philosophical tradition and sociological classics, because neither of them developed a complete theory of war relevant from the social theory perspective. The key theses state that war experience is constitutive for human societies, and reconstruct the line of argumentation that emphasizes the constitutive function of war for social institutions and political order and the role of war as a major factor of social transformations in the modernity for this role is often underestimated in sociological theory. In conclusion, the author states the need for analytical explication of the organized violence functionality in relation to the structures of social action typical for the modern era. He also claims that within the proposed social-theoretical perspective the war can become a heuristic key to understanding the nature of the social, because this approach allows not only to consider war as a cultural-universal phenomenon, but to analyze more realistically the structural role of violence in the processes of production, reproduction and transformation of social orders.

Keywords: war, social order, modernity, structural violence, Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault

In this paper, I will question the heuristic aspects of war in relation to the theory of social order without focusing on the tradition of a textual analysis of the relevant works. There is a historical argument about the social functionality of structural violence that every war can be interpreted as a special kind of sociality. Although this line of argumentation has never been dominant in the Western tradition of studying war, it still deserves to be reconstructed in its pure form. This is my aim in this brief note. I believe that sometimes it is more important to develop a preliminary, (as we always hope) interesting,

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and coherent framework for interpretation than to prove that our understanding is fully consistent in every detail with the text or phenomenon under consideration. I hope that the explication of such a “research program” will be useful from a heuristic point of view as a demonstration of the potential of one conceptual approach to the study of war, this “genuine chameleon” (Clausewitz). In the future, some of my theses can be verified, and the writings of the representatives of this conventional line of theorizing from Hobbes to Foucault will hopefully confirm them. In the meantime, I would like to present and briefly comment on the preliminary ten theses uncovering the social-functional understanding of war. I will begin with the more-or-less obvious positions, and finish with the counterintuitive ones that define war as a key to understanding the social as such.

1. War is the basic social experience possessing constitutive significance for the development of political, social, and economic structures.

Obviously, war is a form of social action, and the collective action implying the use of organized violence. In any typology of social actions, war takes a special place due to the extreme conditions of its occurrence fraught with the deaths of military “interaction” participants. War is a universal feature of human society, an example of cultural universals. Since ancient times, the entire cultural history of humankind has proven that armed conflicts are a fundamental social experience reflected in the political, economic, and technical development of the societies involved.¹ At the same time, war as the highest form of organized violence is an ambivalent phenomenon due to its structural connections with social order. In his comparative studies of the spiritual constitution of different civilizations, Max Weber indicated the structuring importance of the organization and method of warfare for the further socio-economic and political development of Western and non-Western societies.² In this sense, one cannot but agree with the statement of Douglass North and his co-authors that the way the societies choose to face and overcome the eternal and ubiquitous threat of structural violence defines the structures and forms human interaction takes, including the types of political and economic systems (North, Wallis, Weingast, 2009).

2. Despite the recognition of its social-constitutive character, the interpretation of war in the philosophical tradition and history of social thought is still ambivalent.

On one hand, the logos of war is as old as the cultural history of humankind itself. In this sense, the thousand-year experience of armed violence is certainly reflected in the texts of philosophical, historical-scientific, and social-theoretical tradition. It is enough to look through the collections of texts of philosophers and theologians on war to ascertain that few major thinkers did not comment on it in some form.³ There are Aristotle's

1. See, e.g., a collection of works on the comparative military history of ancient societies: Meißner, Schmitt, Sommer, 2005.

2. Thus, in the study of the major spiritual traditions of ancient China, he showed how the Chinese cities' lack of autonomous military force affected the further development of the social-economic and political structures, so different from the evolution of the Western cities. See Weber (1988: 291–292).

3. In this sense, one of the representative examples is a collection of philosophical texts on war published

arguments on the most effective strategy to protect the polis, Cicero's formulations of the Roman understanding of *bellum justum* (later developed in the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), Machiavelli's analysis of the relations of war and politics, the Hobbesian model of *bellum omnium contra omnes*, Spinoza's consideration of the organization of armed forces, Rousseau's estimates of the quality of troops, Kant's (and Hegel's) understanding of the role of war in human history, and the analysis of socio-economic conditions of war by Marx and especially Engels, etc. Thus, the discursive expression of the cultural-universal experience of war, starting in Antiquity with the questioning of the rationality of war as a political means and continuing in the legal and moral debates of the Middle Ages and early Modernity on the legality and fairness of warfare in terms of religion or natural law, adopted the form of various philosophical, theological and sociological discourses in the modern era. In other words, reflections on armed violence are a part of the basic repertoire of European spiritual history, which often considered war actions in a broad social context (Kleemeier, 2002).

On the other hand, this old tradition of interpreting war consists of a number of traditional questions and problem fields that can be differentiated into such stable toposes such as *the concept of war, just war, war and politics, condemnation and prevention of war*, etc. These toposes consider war mainly as a negative element that is opposed to peace as the desired state. Such an approach identifies war not so much as an independent object of social theory, but as a pathology of social practice demanding moral condemnation and correction by means of political action. The interest in war here is in fact theoretically secondary, and derived from the normative idea of the proper (peace).

3. Sociology as a modern scientific discourse on social order has theoretically ignored war for a long time, considering it a violation of the stability of social action structures.

The emergence of sociology is a genetic part of the Western modernity project. At the time of its formation as an independent social discipline, many scientists believed that Western societies had already basically realized the utopia of eternal internal reconciliation, and that Leviathan was acting as a legitimate monopolist in the field of structural violence. Such a self-description of modernity formed the basis of the implicit consensus within the new science. As Michael Mann puts it, war and structural violence were not so much "undertheorized", but simply ignored by social scientists.⁴

Regardless, the sociological classics did not develop its own "theory of war", although there are many pages devoted to the relevant issues in the writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. War has never been considered a central issue of mainstream sociological studies. However, it has always been a mandatory part of all important contexts thematically linked to it. Even after the beginning of the scientific and theoretical reflection on

in the last decade in Germany for educational purposes; it consists of excerpts from the writings of Cicero and Augustine, Luther and Machiavelli, Spinoza and Rousseau, Nietzsche and Sartre, etc. See Czelinski, Stenzel (2004).

4. See Mann (1988: 147).

war, the research focused mainly on such topics as rationality and limits of war, internal logic, and processual dynamics of organized violence, etc. At the same time, and for a very long period of time, there were no social-theoretical works explicitly examining the impact of war on the structures of modern societies. It has been only relatively recently that the studies of war in the context of the establishment of social order have taken their rightful place in sociological and social-philosophical reflection. There is only a short history of this type of social-theoretical analysis of war, and therefore war can still be considered as a relatively new subject of sociological research.⁵

4. It is a sociological fact that war can both destroy and create social structures.

It should be mentioned immediately that we are not talking about an apology for or the legitimization of war, but simply stating the obvious: on one hand, every war is an unambiguous indicator of the collapse of social order that had already taken place, while on the other hand, every war is a necessary condition for constituting a new social order. The latter may be more sustainable than the former, but, in any case, it possesses the same ontology as all regularities of the social actions, which ultimately depend on the *de facto* recognition of social actors.

Within the tradition that began with the works of Hobbes, we can explicate genetic and structural functions of war on the establishment of social order in the modern society-state. Moreover, from such a perspective, every existing social order interspersed with relations of power and submission is always a result of the previous latent or open war. The problematization of the constitutive nature of war in modern societies helps to reveal the productive social effects produced by war through organized armed violence. In fact, we are talking about its functions related to the establishing, strengthening, and protection of the integrity, viability, and efficiency of modern societies (Dierk, 2008: 9).

5. In the history of ideas, there is a line of argumentation that emphasizes the constitutive function of war for social institutions and political order.

In the analysis of the structural impact of war on social order, many concepts and intuitions of the classics of philosophical and social-theoretical thought which recognized politically-motivated violence as an ever-present option that played an important role in the conceptualization of the historical experience of modernity retain their heuristic importance. Thus, the classic works of Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Carl Schmitt, and Michel Foucault are heuristically relevant for the social-theoretical explication of the role of war in the processes of (re)production and transformation of social order. These political writers emphasize the social functionality of war, and its fundamental role for

5. I mean primarily the "new historical sociology," focusing on the state and the associated phenomena of organized violence. The representatives of this approach not only managed to analytically reconstruct the role of the state and the apparatus of coercion in the genesis of modernity, but also to radically reconsider the previous ideas about modernization as a holistic, consistent, and non-violent process. It is enough to mention the works of A. Giddens, M. Mann, Ch. Tilly, etc., all of whom primarily studied such issues as the emergence of the modern state, and the impact of inter-state competition and violence on the course of social processes in modernity. See Spohn (2005).

the political. With the help of war-military optics, they discovered the essence of social-economic and power relations in historically-contingent military conflicts. Despite being adherents of different traditions, these authors all sought to conceptualize the ambivalence of violence that can produce productive social effects.

Certainly, there are significant differences between these authors' positions at the semantic level. For instance, Clausewitz considers war as the continuation of political communication by other means, or, in short, "war is the continuation of state policy." For Schmitt, on the contrary, war and politics are identical, i.e., the political finds its most adequate expression in war. Foucault, in his turn, elegantly reverses the idea of Clausewitz, and defines war as not the continuation of state policy, but the opposite, that is, state policy is the continuation of war. Hobbes directly states that war, particularly civil war, is the opposite of the order guaranteed by the sovereign identified with the modern state. Schmitt substantiates the political tension of allegedly reconciled modern societies, emphasizing the ever-present existential dimension of political action that can always turn into war in a "serious case."

At the same time, there is an obvious and close intertwining of the concepts of social order and war in the works of these authors. For Clausewitz, war is a form of the external projection of order in one's own interests, and a dangerous form, because war threatens that order. Clausewitz constantly warns that war is unpredictable; it does not lead to any sustainable results and, therefore, can have unpredictable consequences for the territory (and its existing social order). The same idea is found in the works of Schmitt, who goes even further and analyzes the political with the help of a dynamic model presupposing the constant possibility of destruction and the creation of order. Foucault concurs with his statement that social order is an image, a way of transforming the structure of power, the rationality of which corresponds to the rationality of war. In addition, in their interpretations of war, all of these authors emphasize the crucial importance of structural violence (war being the most intensive form) as a deliberate attempt to force the counter-parties to certain actions within every form of social order, i.e., they stress that the politically-motivated use of violence aims to impose/save/change social order.

Numerous substantive intersections in the writings of these authors and their correspondent polemics are of particular interest in the study of this line of argumentation. It is enough to mention the reception of ideas comparing Schmitt-Hobbes, Schmitt-Clausewitz, Schmitt-Foucault, Foucault-Hobbes, or Clausewitz-Foucault, in which we can see both a certain continuity and the evident gaps in the understanding of the social implications of armed violence. In any case, all of these authors proposed heuristically-interesting theoretical models explaining the birth of social order out of the spirit of war.

6. War is not archaic, or simply a part of bygone history; it is a typical feature and an essential element of modernity.

The discourse of modernity considered war as mainly an anomie and deviation and not as a constitutive part of the modernization processes in Western societies, and therefore attempted to eliminate war from public practice as a relic of the pre-modern era.

Anthony Giddens wrote about a certain paradox in this context. On one hand, the role of war, which, in combination with diplomacy, actually determined the establishment of the European system of states, is generally accepted; on the other hand, sociological discussions ignore the issues of the impact of military aspects on the development of civil rights and other important features of the societal organization of modernity (Giddens, 1985: 232).

M. Janowitz wrote that macro-sociology showed very little interest in the identification of the impact of war institutions on Western nation states, which is difficult to explain given the critical importance of armed conflicts in the formation of structures in modern societies (Janowitz, 1975: 70). This can only be explained by the naive humanistic assumption of modern social science that traditionally defined violence as a vestige of the past in the reconciled present, i.e., as a problem of social practice that requires correction, but not as a cultural universal deserving the status of an independent subject of social-theoretical reflection.

Despite the obvious role of wars and revolutions in the historical dynamics of existing societies and the continuation as driving forces of social transformation in modernity, sociological theory is only approaching adequate analytical explications of the functionality of organized violence in relation to the structures of social actions typical of the modern era.

7. War is not the opposite of social order, but rather its expression and continuation.

Returning to our initial question of the nature of the connections between war and social order, we must admit that, firstly, war is not a natural phenomenon, but a result and expression of the created order. However, war is the *ultima ratio* in a completely different sense than is commonly believed. War is not the most extreme among all possible solutions, but rather the last decision which leads to a radical transformation, or even to the end of the current structure of order. In this sense, a stable social order is a prerequisite for taming violence, and violence is a prerequisite for maintaining social order (Popitz, 1986: 69).

Therefore, war is the most important part of social order under such a construction of the political. Thus, military power and the readiness to use it are ambivalent by definition: they are both a major threat to social order (if military resources are used for the benefit of individuals or various political or religious groups), and a prerequisite for maintaining social order and its protection from external and internal enemies.

8. War does not end with the establishment of social order, but becomes a structural part of it as a constant possibility of a collective action.

War (primarily civil war) is an existential threat to every statehood. However, this threat does not come from somewhere outside; it is an ever-present immanent option, structurally connected with social order based on the *de facto* recognition of rational actors. This option means a constant possibility exists of a dramatic weakening and, under certain circumstances, the subsequent collapse of the entire political structure (for

Hobbes it is the death of Leviathan as a mortal God). This option cannot be excluded simply due to the specific features of the horizontally constituted political relations, which are characterized by a considerable uncertainty regarding the future behavior of partners acting as competitors in the permanent struggle for scarce material and symbolic resources.⁶

Moreover, within the institutional forms of the existing social order, the radical-military optics allows for the discovery of the consequences of the real battles of the past, since those victories and defeats not only left a deep structural mark on the present, but continue to affect it in different forms despite the semblance of order and peace (Foucault).

An adequate social-theoretical analysis of the problem of social order requires the recognition of the potentially ever-open option of collective violence. This requirement allows for the consideration of war not so much as a deviation from the normal course of social processes or as an extreme political measure (*ultima ratio*), but rather as a basic condition of human coexistence (*conditio humana*). In fact, even the establishment of the modern state's monopoly on armed violence, which led to the significant internal reconciliation of societies of the modern type, did not completely force violence out of social practices, but merely provided it with new organizational forms. The intensification of an internal feud up to the level of armed conflict between political opponents who suddenly turn into existential enemies is an ever-present potential option and a structural feature of social order. Its historically regular actualization proves that we are dealing with the specifics of the social ontology depending at any given moment on the actual, rather than normative, acceptance of the actors (Schmitt).

9. The goal of the heuristically-oriented sociological theory of war is an explication of its social and functional nature.

The sociological reflection on war and its functions should primarily focus on the explication of the role of structural violence in establishing and maintaining social order, i.e., on the attempts to explore the structuring potential of organized violence or "sociality of war," according to the precise wording of Alexander Filippov (1991: 262).

Thus, the social theory of war is to study the phenomena of armed coercion and violence as structural elements of social order. Needless to say, such research is possible only within a framework of a radically-revised theory of modernity, free of excessively-optimistic pathos and progressivism ideology that are inadequate for the reconstruction of real historical processes associated with such unpleasant phenomena as war and other forms of organized violence. Sociology as an institutionalized self-reflection of modern

6. In this context, Niklas Luhmann mentioned the paradox of "double contingency" that demonstrates the fragility of social order under the conditions when the actions of one actor are determined by the actions or expectations of relevant actions of other actors. Moreover, this bilateral dependence is simultaneous, i.e., every party can know the decision of the other party only after making its own choice. That is, such political-communicative optics makes social order fundamentally problematic, because actors, as rational egoists pursuing their own goals, need to know about the behavior of their partners which the latter do not yet know themselves, etc. See Luhmann (2001: 10).

societies must give up some of the illusions of its founding fathers who tried to neutralize the violent aspect of the political and eliminate war from the normative description of modernity as its secondary, or even archaic, phenomenon more significant for the historical past than for the social present of the West (Knöbl, 1995: 19–20).

10. The recognition of the constitutional nature of war does not mean its legitimization; this recognition is rather a prerequisite for understanding the essence of the social as such.

The approach we consider here has nothing to do with the moral justification or legitimization of war by means of social theory. It is rather about the theoretical interpretation of war as a form of social action constitutive for the social as such. We are not talking about giving up the concepts of the moral and normative state of peace, which are undoubtedly important for both the history of ideas and social practice. It is rather an attempt to discover the regularities of social action in the dramatic events of the past and the present with the help of analytical tools. In this sense, the humanistic pathos of the progress of civilization can become an obstacle for the heuristics of war. Since the Enlightenment, this pathos has constantly been trying to drive the social studies of war into the framework of the proper (or more precisely, improper), describing war as something excessive, abnormal, and irrational.

The social-theoretical perspective we are trying to reconstruct here not only defines war as a universal cultural phenomenon, but also allows for a more realistic analysis of the structural role of violence in the processes of the production, the reproduction, and the transformation of social orders. That is, a certain definition of war may become a key to understanding the nature of social order, or the “principle of the power relations analysis” (Foucault). The works of the above-mentioned giants of philosophical and social-theoretical thought who considered war as a constitutive experience of modernity and sought to understand the social-ontological implications of war are an important heuristic resource in the cognitive process we are interested in.

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10 тезисов о войне и социальном порядке: предварительные рассуждения о конститутивной функции вооруженных конфликтов

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В начале статьи формулируется ее замысел, заключающийся в экспликации концептуального подхода к войне как важнейшему структурному элементу и механизму поддержания социального порядка. Утверждается существование устойчивой традиции теоретизирования, в рамках которой традиционным является аргумент о социальной функциональности структурного насилия, позволяющий интерпретировать войну как особый тип социальности. В качестве представителей этой условной линии аргументации называются такие ключевые фигуры истории идей, как Томас Гоббс, Карл фон Клаузевиц,

Карл Шмитт и Мишель Фуко. Далее выдвигаются 10 тезисов, в которых проблематизируются эвристические аспекты войны применительно к теории социального порядка. Тезисы сопровождаются краткими комментариями. В них констатируется амбивалентный статус топик войны в философской традиции и социологической классике, так и не создавших полноценной теории войны, релевантной с точки зрения социальной теории. В основных содержательных тезисах говорится о том, что опыт войны имеет конститутивный характер для человеческих обществ. Здесь же реконструируется линия аргументации, подчеркивающая конститутивную функцию войны применительно к социальным институтам и политическим порядкам. Также подчеркивается роль войны как важнейшего фактора общественной трансформации в Новое время, который часто остается недооцененным в социологической теории. В заключение формулируется задача аналитической экспликации функциональности организованного насилия применительно к структурам социального действия, характерным для эпохи Модерна. Утверждается, что в реконструированной в статье социально-теоретической перспективе война может выступать эвристическим ключом к пониманию самой природы социального, позволяющим не только рассматривать войну как культурно-универсальный феномен, но и более реалистично анализировать структурную роль насилия в процессах производства, воспроизводства и трансформации социальных порядков.

Ключевые слова: война, социальный порядок, модерн, структурное насилие, Томас Гоббс, Карл фон Клаузевиц, Карл Шмитт, Мишель Фуко

The Philosophical Foundations of the Russian Sociology of War at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries

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In this article, we are interested in the philosophical foundations of the Russian sociology of war. The philosophical foundations of science and humanities belong to the meta-theoretical level of knowledge and leave their imprint on the theoretical and empirical levels of research. The philosophical foundations involve ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological underpinnings. The study of these aspects reveals the following features of the sociology of war: general ideas about the nature of the phenomenon of war; criteria of veracity of knowledge in the sociology of war; rules for forming the source and derived concepts and assertions; and methods of discovery and development of new and true knowledge. The sociology of war as a new direction of social and humanities studies appeared in Russia at the end of the 19th century. It was the result of two processes taking place in philosophy. On the one hand, the appearance of the sociology and psychology of war was a logical step in the development of Russian military thought. The evolution of this branch of knowledge in Russia of the 19th century made researchers treat war as a social phenomenon. Also, the rapid development of the doctrine of positivism and the birth of sociology in the middle of the 19th century attracted the attention of many military and civil professors and academics.

Keywords: philosophy of war, sociology of war, military sciences, Genrih Leer, Nikolay Korf, Pitirim Sorokin, Nikolay Golovin

Today the sociology of war is one of the branches of sociology which studies the armed forces as a social institution, and military action (war) as a social phenomenon. The responsibilities of this discipline are very broad. The sociology of war studies a wide range of issues such as the social composition of the armed forces, values, motivation and outlook of military and civilian personnel of the armed forces, the relations of the army and other social institutions, the structure and characteristics of the control of the military collective, the influence of military operations on the society and the individual social groups, and the social rehabilitation and adaptation of veterans of the armed forces and war veterans. The development of this discipline developed in two ways, as one of a specific military science, and as a branch of civil sociology.

The history of Russian sociology of war has repeatedly been the subject of humanitarian studies. There are a number of papers in which the authors studied various aspects of the formation and development of sociological ideas and theories in Russia in this historical period. However, most of the authors were interested in specific sociological theories rather than the philosophical foundations of social science. In this article, we mainly use works and original sources which enables us to analyze the philosophical foundations of the Russian sociology of war and allows our bibliographic basis to be supplemented. For a broader view of the history of the problem, papers by several authors can be used. For example, the methodological aspect of formation of the military sociology was researched by Alexander M. Belyaev (Belyaev, 2002). Another researcher, Sviatoslav S. Brazevich, studied the common history of the appearance of military sociology in Russia (Brazevich: 1997). Igor A. Golosenko studied and developed the history of Russian sociology from the perspective of the historical-sociological approach (Golosenko, 1988). Finally, a team of authors has created a bibliographic reference edition of the main representatives of Russian sociology (Toshchenko, 2014).

The development of the military sociology of military science was carried out in parallel with the development of other particular military disciplines. It promoted an understanding of military science as a positive discipline, that is, having a particular subject of study in which the laws are implemented unchanged. This approach in European military thinking goes back to the works of the famous English strategist Henri Lloyd (1729–1783), but in Russia, it was established through the efforts of one of the greatest strategists and military theorists of the first half of the 19th century, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869). However, the domination of Jomini's views was not predetermined. Immediately after the end of the Napoleonic wars in Russia, there was an alternative in choosing the path of the development of military science. In addition to the ideas of Jomini, the views of the Prussian general and military thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) became famous in Europe. Both of these thinkers were in the Russian military service, although at different times.

In the first quarter of the 19th century, a new military science and philosophy of war began to form in Russia. These research areas were significantly different from the analogous branches of knowledge of the 18th century. Military science began to consolidate from a collection of disparate views and individual disciplines into a holistic system. This system of military knowledge relied on well-developed theoretical principles. There was a clear understanding of the hierarchy of the military sciences and their interrelationships. At the same time, the most prominent representatives of the Russian military science at the time, such as Ivan G. Burtsov (1794–1829), formulated an idea about the role of the philosophy of war. In their view, the philosophy of war should take the place at the top of the hierarchy of military knowledge, play a role of the general theory of the military science, and engage in the generalization of the facts collected by specific military sciences. At the same time, they stressed the fact that military science is closely linked with the social disciplines. Burtsov wrote: "Political sciences . . . have a great similarity with the military [sciences]" (1819: 9). As a political scientist, he understood political economy, statis-

tics, and political history as part of the generalized political science (Burtsov, 1819: 4). All these sciences and the moral science," provide rules for the control of the human heart" (Ibid.: 17), should become the theoretical basis for the education of a military leader and his actions. Burtsov's philosophical views are based on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and John Locke (1632–1704). Burtsov took Locke's important idea about the human experience: "Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself" (Locke, 1999: 87). Additionally, Burtsov based his theories on some of Hobbes's thoughts about human nature. Burtsov believes that the main reason of all wars derives from human passions and almost quotes one of Hobbes's work verbatim when he writes about the causes of war. Hobbes wrote that, "If to the natural tendency of men to exasperate each other, the source of which is the passions and especially an empty self-esteem, you now add the right of all men to all things, by which one man *rightly* attacks and the other *rightly* resists . . . it cannot be denied that men's natural state, before they came together into society, was War . . ." (1998: 29). Burtsov used Hobbes's idea to verify the need to develop military science because war is an integral part of society.

An interesting question is why the development of military science in Russia did not incorporate the theories of the Prussian general, Karl von Clausewitz, who is recognized today as one of the greatest European military thinkers of the 19th century. There are several reasons for the neglecting of his views in Russia.

First, the logic of the development of the Russian military art at the end of the 18th century was very different from the Prussian system. After a period of admiration and respect for the Prussian military art and military systems during the reign of Emperor Paul I (1754–1801), a period of the «cooling» down of the enthusiasm for Prussia followed, while the position of the outstanding Russian commander Alexander V. Suvorov (1730–1800) was actively promoted. He believed that the Russians did not have anything to learn from the Prussian military; since the Russians consistently defeated the Prussians, why did the Russians want or need to imitate the Prussian military's methods? In addition, the intellectual legacy of Suvorov actively affected the formation of Russian military science because the most active efforts in this direction were undertaken by people who considered themselves disciples of Suvorov and his successful traditions.

Secondly, during the Napoleonic Wars, Prussian diplomacy and a large number of officers of Prussian origin actively aspired to influence Russia's military policy. They offered a large number of strategic plans for Russia's war with France, the main essence of which consisted of retreating deep into the country and thereby prolonging the war. The Russian general and military thinker, Andrew E. Snesev (1865–1937), noted that while these plans "may differ in details, the idea remains the same—all authors have little regret about the loss of Russian regions and the associated pain and suffering with it, and it was easy to do strategic experiments on a foreign 'people's hump'" (Snesev, 2007: 129). These facts formed a certain cautious attitude in Russia towards the military-based theoretical ideas of Prussian origin.

Thirdly, when Carl von Clausewitz was in the Russian military service, he became involved, albeit in an indirect way, in the intrigues of the Russian headquarters (Snesarev, 2007: 126). As well, staying with the Russian army caused the Prussian military thinker disappointment at the neglect of the Russian art of war and of the Russian military leaders. This attitude was reflected in his 1815 work *Der Feldzug 1812 in Russland*, written before his basic work *On War* (Snesarev, 2007: 127). All of these factors, more personal than conceptual in nature, influenced the Russian lack of attention to the thoughts of Karl von Clausewitz.

The institutional design of military science in Russia took place in the same period. The Imperial Military Academy was founded by the French general and military-thinker, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869), in 1832. At the same time, the main efforts of Russian military theorists focused on the developmental problems of military science and philosophy in keeping with Jomini's views. The further development of Russian military thought in the 19th century, including military sociology at the turn of the century, continued under the influence of Jomini and the followers of his scientific tradition. Among them, Genrih A. Leer, Nikolay A. Korf, and Nikolay N. Golovin must be noted as a few of the most important proponents of Jomini's views. These men made great contributions to the development of the philosophical foundations of the Russian military thought, and military sociology as a positive science.

The main features of the concept of military art of A.-H. Jomini are as follows: (1) "The war is always carried out in accordance with the great principles of the art" (Jomini, 2009: 10); (2) "Military science is based on principles that can never be freely broken in the presence of an active and experienced enemy" (Ibid.: 13), and (3), "I do not pretend to establish these principles, because they have always existed" (Ibid.: 131). This approach brings military art and science together because the eternal and immutable principles of military art, as a form of theoretical knowledge, are almost the same as the laws of nature in the natural sciences. It must be pointed out that they relate to a specific area of human activity, that is, war.

Jomini formulated a very important philosophical principle which concerned the ontological base of military disciplines. He spoke about the relationship between politics and war. Military policy is a special part of state management, and is separated from other policy areas (Ibid.: 11). This means that the political existence of the state is ambivalent. This allows us to talk about the lack of a clear and direct link between politics and military activities. Subsequently, this approach often manifests itself not only in the mindset of military theorists, but also in political practice.

According to a number of researchers of Russian military thought, the most consistent successor of A.-H. Jomini was Genrih A. Leer (1829–1904). He was an outstanding Russian military theorist and historian, General of the Infantry, and a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. He is the author of several major tactics, strategy, and military-history works. These works became the foundation of Russian military thought at the beginning of the 20th century, including military sociology.

The methodological basis of Leer's doctrine of war was the historical method, because he believed that only the study of historical facts would make it possible to deduce objective laws. His logic was as follows: "General signs, derived from a large number of studied phenomena, exactly will give the actual laws that serve a solid foundation of science. From that moment science enters into a positive period of its existence" (Leer, 1869: 1). The historical method can be used in all branches of military science. Studying the history of warfare provides the primary material for scientific analysis. Leer understood the difficulties of historical research well, which requires the consistent application of the principle of historicism, not only to the subject matter, but also to the personality of the historian: "The ideal is reduced to that as far as possible to think and feel all that person thought and felt" (Leer, 1894: 68). In fact, the researcher must achieve a complete mental «incorporation» in the historical event (the military operation or combat) as its protagonist—the commander. Another essential part of the methodology of military science is the method of classification. Leer states that "classification—decomposition of the complex to the simple—is a very important method in all sciences, and especially in the social (observational) disciplines, which include military disciplines" (Leer, 1894: 4). For a complete study of its properties, an object of research "must be studied in its full purity, while eliminating all external conditions of time and place . . . i.e., place it into a kind of vacuum, as do mathematics and natural scientists" (Ibid.: 7). However, Leer has been criticized for a lack of attention to the dialectic, and to the idea of evolution. Accordingly, his views on the development of society were often abstract. His writings concerning military history facts are often deprived of their specific content in favor of the possibility of using these facts to confirm eternal and immutable principles (Svechin, 1926: 273).

This point of view correlates with the position of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the founder of positivism. According to Comte, "Actual science is in laws of phenomena, for which the facts . . . are always only a necessary raw material" (Comte, 2003: 79). One of the main distinguishing features of the philosophy of positivism is its attention to the history of society. Due to the principle of historicism, which was recognized by Comte to be the most important principle of philosophy and the social sciences, positivism "can adequately represents all the great historical eras as the different phases of the same main evolution, where each step follows from the preceding stage and prepares them for the next step in accordance with the constant laws, precisely determining its special part in the overall chain of facts" (Ibid.: 160–161). In addition, the main goal of scientific knowledge, both in terms of Auguste Comte and from the point of view of G. Leer, is the human. Various aspects of the study of human personality is the basis for creating a hierarchy of social sciences. Comte pointed out this fact directly when he wrote that all the sciences are, in fact, a parts of a whole—the science of mankind (Ibid.: 71). Man is the main driving force of war, so man should become the major subject of military science (Leer, 1894: 27). Social phenomena, and the military in particular, are the most difficult to learn. In this, both thinkers agree. By combining the historical method with the theoretical (philosophical) study of the subject, it is possible to "study the main thing . . . in particular in the individual events, samples of art, and this way not only gives the specific

content for the abstract truths, but also allows us to get acquainted with the infinitely varied using the same immutable principles, which using is dependent on the continual changing the situation" (Leer, 1960: 323). Leer offers to adhere to this scientific approach as much as possible. The Russian thinker emphasizes the importance of foreseeing events, and the scientific forecasting of various processes in the war. In this regard, Leer follows Comte, although the extreme complexity of the phenomena of war only slightly allows for the realization of this possibility of military science (Leer, 1880: 12–13).

However, G. Leer was faced with a serious problem in formulating the laws of war as a social phenomenon. It turned out that all the laws which he formulated do not apply to the field of war as a social phenomenon, but to the field of military art, i.e., to a variety of human activities. The author writes that "the number of laws which are the basis of military art is not large. They are eternal and unchanging, but its application, depending on the situation, goes to infinity" (Leer, 1869: 14). The author was most heavily criticized for the use of the term of 'law' in military science. The major part of this criticism came from military leaders and journalists. Even anonymous publications in periodicals were critical of Leer. As a result, Leer published a special article to answer the criticisms of his views. He thought that military science is not "a systematic set of rules for action... but a systematic set of laws" (Leer, 1870: 8). He continued his self-defense by writing that these laws are eternal, immutable, independent of time, place, and weapons (Ibid.: 11).

In developing his ideas of the methodology of military science, Leer came to the conclusion that the theory of military art is not designed to give ready-made recipes of decision-making on the battlefield. The task "of the theory of the military art is reduced to an explanation of the essence of military objects (properties, the nature of military elements), their interaction and . . . the nature, the essence of the military phenomena" (Leer, 1894: 3). All of this suggests that Leer created the science of war throughout his scientific life, a science which dealt with the most general theoretical and even philosophical questions of the study of military phenomena. He formulated the most important thesis for the development of the general science of war: "War obeys not only to the requirements of the situation, the conditions of a different era, but it mainly . . . obeys higher laws (principles), deriving from its very nature (essence)" (Leer, 1960: 332). When the existence of a specific object of research is proven and recognized by scholars, it is a key moment for the development of a scientific discipline and its demarcation that is separate from other related sciences.

In Leer's opinion, war and military activities refers to the social sphere and, accordingly, should be the subject of the social sciences, the laws of which are the most complex. Finding and studying the eternal and immutable causal relationships in the military sphere necessarily requires their correlation with the understanding of the social laws. It was difficult because of the slow development of social sciences in the second half of the 19th century. However, it is necessary to investigate war as a social phenomenon, because war, according to Leer, is a powerful engine of social development and improves the material and moral aspects of society. From this point of view, Leer is the successor of a very long tradition of "war apologists" (Snesarev, 2013: 74).

Thus, we can conclude that the doctrine of war and military art of G. Leer was greatly influenced by the classical positivism of Auguste Comte and other representatives of this school of thought. Thus, Russian thinkers began the tradition of positivism in Russian military-philosophical thought.

A disciple and follower of Leer's ideas in the development of military science as a branch of social knowledge was Nikolay A. Korf (1866–1924). He was a Russian military theorist, a lieutenant-general, and an active member of the Society of Adherents of Military Knowledge. His contribution to the development of Russian military sociology deserves close attention. His theoretical views are the striking embodiment of the specific features of the line of the military thought in Russia in the middle of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century. The philosophical foundations of N. Korf's scientific views also belong to the tradition of positivism. Korf is quoted in the works of a number of philosophers-positivists. However, his views have no condemnation of the role of metaphysics in human cognition. On the contrary, he believes that "philosophy has the task of coordination of metaphysical conclusions with the facts, with phenomena, which are delivered by sciences" (Korf, 2012: 90). This is the ontological basis of his views, and is closely connected with his epistemological views about the nature of truth. The completeness of true knowledge is obtained by summing up the scientific facts into the categories of metaphysics. In this case, knowledge will be based on the facts on the one hand, and on the laws of cognition on the other. The metaphysical laws of cognition receive an acknowledgment of their evident truth, and the phenomenon will have a rational basis (Korf, 2012: 91). In this sense, metaphysics is moving closer to the positive sciences, but will never be equivalent to them. Despite this, Korf does not completely deny the role of metaphysics, as does Comte and his followers. In addition, Korf believes that positive sciences will never reach the ideal in aspect of the accuracy of their predictions (Korf, 2012: 93).

With regard to the military sciences, "metaphysics will study the essence of war and military phenomena, philosophy will consolidate conclusions of the metaphysics with the conclusions of military sciences, reaching the "completeness" of truth and verification of the metaphysical conclusions" (Korf, 2012: 96). The tasks of philosophy of military science as formulated by Korf are as follows: (1) internal domain distinction between particular military sciences, (2) formulation of the final objectives of particular military sciences, (3) revealing the relative value of specific findings of military sciences for the formation of an integrated system of military knowledge, (4) the logical design of the specific findings of military disciplines in general conclusions, (5) conceptual assistance to specific sciences if they are undeveloped (Korf, 2012: 96–97).

N. Korf pays great attention to the study of the interaction of various military sciences with each other and their mutual hierarchy. First of all, he wrote that "the totality of science, which we have designated as the general name "social," can be divided into two clearly different department—psychology science and social sciences ("social" in the narrow sense), and each of them are grouped around one basic science,—namely, psychology and sociology" (Korf, 2012: 40). The main theoretical bases of military psychology

necessary for its occurrence are military history and common psychology (Ibid.: 46). The same can be said about military sociology. For its appearance, a military history which will be the source of the specific facts in the initial stage of development of military sociology, and a common sociology as a theoretical basis of this science, are also required.

In N. Korf's opinion, the main areas of research can be transferred from the common sociology to the study of military issues. From the perspective of social statics, the range of questions included the studying of the influence on war by "the dismemberment of society into separate groups," "the attitude of social groups to personalities, who forming parts of them," "the general trend of social connection," and the influence of the "social connections on the goodwill of fellow members" (Korf, 2012: 64–65). From the perspective of social dynamics, it is also necessary to study the influence on the war by "the natural tendency of social groups," and "the interaction of groups arising from their aspirations" (Ibid.: 65). In addition, it is necessary to research "the value for the military affairs of origin, development, characteristics and the nature of social groups, their activities and mutual relations" and arising from this "social and spiritual factors—religion, law, morality, polity" (Ibid.: 66).

Among other sources, Korf used the views of the best-known Russian sociologist of the late 19th—early 20th centuries, Evgeniy V. De-Roberti (1843–1915), as a theoretical base of his works. He believed that the place of the psychology and the specific history of knowledge is a part of the particular sociology (De-Roberti, 1914: 6). Moreover, "Sociology entirely based on psychology and history, as the two branches of the empirical or purely descriptive knowledge (or, in other words, a Natural Science of Society has its base and point of departure on the Natural History of Society)" (De-Roberti, 1914: 18). This position has been very productive for military sociology. The historical method has long been actively used by military science, and the methods of psychology allowed the exploration of the spiritual side of military activity, insisted on by leading military thinkers.

To substantiate the necessity of military sociology, N. Korf formulates his philosophical thesis with ontological content—the existence of a specific object of research, which is not subject to other sciences. Firstly, despite the trend towards a broader understanding of the subject of military sciences, especially strategy, they do not deal with the above problems. Secondly, military sociology is a branch of common sociology, which has its own subject of study (Korf, 2012: 67–68).

In N. Korf's opinion, military sociology should methodologically focus on the historical method. The deductive method of cognition, in which the conclusions of common sociology would fully apply to specific military realities in the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, was still not effective due to the weak development of common sociology. Inductive, empirical methods for the young science was applicable only through observation which, however, could be complicated by combat operations. Therefore, military history should provide military sociology primarily with an array of facts to analyze and derive empirical laws and fundamental laws (Korf, 2012: 69–70).

The possibility to study war with military sociology came after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. It was the heyday of military psychology. This discipline could now

organically combine theoretical research and the possibility of applying them in practice. In the period from 1900 to 1917, more than 100 publications devoted to the psychology of combat activity appeared in the press (Seniavskaya, 1999: 4–6). The Society of Adherents of Military Knowledge quickly embarked on a study of the war to remove without delay all possible expertise and to prevent the recurrence of national shame of this magnitude in the future. The Department of Military Psychology of the Society sent combatants extensive questionnaires to gather information. Respondents were asked to provide information on more than 20 aspects of the mental state of officers and men in various combat situations. For this purpose, the questionnaire contained 36 standard questions, and an opportunity to express their views in free form (Obshhestvo, 1993: 64–67). The authors of the questionnaire based the fundamental theoretical position that the “Personality psychology obeys to certain laws, after studying them, will be able to some extent to reduce the art of genius to the public science” (Ibid.). This approach has characterized the development of many branches of military science of the era and reflected the general trends in science. In addition, in February–March 1906, at the initiative of the Chief of General Staff and the Head of the Academy of General Staff collected written questionnaires from officers and generals of the Russian army. The questioning concerned the identification of shortcomings in the training of officers, and accounts of experiences in the war for the development of academic education (Obraztsov, 1993: 15). Also, N. Korf published a book in 1906 titled *On the Education of the Will of Commanders*, in which he realized his project on psychological research, and based on his own experience of fighting in the Russo-Japanese War (Korf, 1906). These studies have shown that in Russia in the early 20th century, military sociology and psychology began to transform from speculative projects into real scientific disciplines.

The most consistent development of the sociology of war was found in the works of Nikolay N. Golovin (1875–1944), lieutenant-general, Professor of the Academy of General Staff, a military scientist, historian, and researcher of military affairs. His scientific activity, both in Russia and in exile, was aimed at the creation of the sociology of war in the conceptual and organizational sense. According to I. Obraztsov, one of the most consistent researchers of his creativity, “Golovin’s views on war, as a phenomenon of social life, over many years of his research activities have evolved from symbiosis between Psychology and Social Darwinism to positivism . . . and vulgar materialism. The effect of various sociological trends allowed to form their own original approach to the analysis of social phenomena and contribute to the methodological foundations and methods of the future concept of sociology of war” (Obraztsov: 1994, 92).

Golovin wrote one of his first scientific work *Research of Combat: Research of the Activity and Abilities of Man as a Fighter* in 1907. In his dissertation, he formulated a number of ideas that he developed over the next 30 years. He begins his reasoning with the definition of “science.” According to him, science is the “objectively true and systematic knowledge about the actual phenomena” (Golovin, 1995: 11). This short definition has a profound ontological and epistemological sense. Firstly, in an ontological meaning, the Russian scientist claims that the need to complete the science is not only through the

presence of a specific object of research, or the field of “real phenomena.” What is more, these phenomena must submit to a special kind of determinism in their cause-effect relationships. The idea of the necessity of conforming to the laws of the natural order of phenomena requires a constant referral to the science of the concept of “hard” determinism, proposed by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827), and used in the classical natural sciences, in particular, in mechanics. It follows that “the answer to the question about the possibility of the science of war is directly dependent on the answer to the question of the existence of regularities in the phenomena of war” (Golovin, 1995: 11). According to Golovin, all scientific development was carried out in ways to change the perceptions of randomness and regularity in the phenomena of nature and society. Moreover, even an accident is subject to eternal and immutable laws (Golovin, 1995: 17).

N. Golovin, as well as N. Korf, thinks that “the phenomena of social life are directly related to the phenomena of immaterial life” (Ibid.: 19). The main part of his scientific work of 1907 was devoted to the study of the man-fighter in terms of its psychological characteristics. This line of research of the Russian military thinker continues in the wording of the laws of war in a 1908 lecture for the students of the Imperial Military Academy, *The History of Military Art as a Science* (published in 1913). In it, he argues that “the fundamental law, which we believe, is the law of dominating of the immaterial element in the phenomena of war” (Golovin, 2008b: 132) because “every battle ends with one of the sides’ refusal to fight” (Ibid.: 134). In addition, the second law follows from the findings of individual and collective psychology, which is the the law of a particular victory: the result of the battle is determined during the crisis in one of the individual sections of the front line. (Ibid.: 135). The third law is the claim that “all aspects of social life are so closely interconnected that none of them can not be changed, so that has not changed all the other” (Ibid.: 135–136). This law must take the investigation of war into account. As well, the consequence of this law is not only a conclusion on the relationships of all social phenomena. It follows that the “epistemological arbitrariness” of many scientists dealing with the war and often investigating military history to confirm their hypotheses, although excluding changes in social institutions, is significantly limited. Reflecting on the laws of war, N. Golovin, in his 1938 work *The Science of War: On the Sociological Study of War* returns to the old debates of the second half of the 19th century about laws and principles as forms of military theoretical knowledge. In contrast to G. Leer, he believes that “the science of war (the sociology of war) will tend to the discovery of laws. Meanwhile, the science of waging war (the theory of the art of war), even if broad generalizations, can be reduced to only those principles” (Golovin, 2008c: 33).

In epistemological terms, the science of war must be “objective and reliable” and consist of “systematic” knowledge. The criterion for the reliability of scientific concepts of the sociology of war are objective phenomena, and the degree of consistency of the knowledge must be high. N. Golovin selecting the term “reliable” instead of “the truth” to describe scientific knowledge is not accidental. Against the background of the discussion in the science about the criteria of the verity of knowledge, held in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, many scientists have redefined the epistemological basis

of their disciplines. N. Golovin believed that “social sciences (and the military) will never reach the same degree of development and precision as a simpler science, such as mathematics” (Golovin, 1995: 34). This idea is far from the optimistic view of Comte and his followers on the possibilities of sociology and its predictive capability. As Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) noted, Golovin believes that sociology can only be based on real facts and “can not be built on the basis of general principles or ideas, which are derived a priori” (Golovin, 2008c: 42). Thus, this discipline can only use inductive methods to build a system of knowledge.

In addition, Golovin, in some sense, anticipated the coherent concept of the verity of knowledge. He claimed that “the science will greatly benefit, when basing on the study of natural phenomena of the war, if she tells everyone summarizing the framework in which it will be reliable” (Golovin, 1995: 27). That is, the most general principles of the “science of war” concerning the nature and characteristics of military phenomena will not only play a backbone role for particular disciplines about war, but will also be a criterion of the internal consistency of the totality of the scientific knowledge about war. He repeats the same idea in his 1935 work *On the Sociological Study of War*. In this paper, N. Golovin comes to the idea that the sociology of war should act as a “customer” of the facts of the military history. Thus, military history is freed from the framework of current maintenance practices and political interests and will be able to operate with true facts, rather than tendentious ones (Golovin, 1992: 144).

In the methodological sense, the science of war must be based on statistics, since it was this discipline that comes closest to being able to quantitatively investigate qualitative phenomena (Golovin, 1995: 12–13). This view is a logical development of the features of the study of war in Russia. A record of military statistics has existed in the Imperial Military Academy since its 1832 inception. However, while this discipline should form the basis of the methodology of the science of war, it remained a secondary discipline of the theory of the art of war and solves other tasks. To solve this problem, N. Golovin returned to it after the First World War and the Revolution of 1917, while he was in exile. The studying of the experiences and results of the war from the perspective of sociology has encountered serious difficulties in the analysis of statistical data. It required much work in all areas, including clarifying the meaning of the terms and concepts used in the preparation of statistical documents in different countries in order to develop methods for their analysis. (The military statistics on the extent of their development should be separated from the sociology of war [Golovin, 1992: 146].) The same idea is approved by them in his fundamental work *The Science of War: On the Sociological Study of War* (Golovin, 2008c: 119). As a result, he creates “a system of social indicators to analyze the effects of war (such as ‘military tension of the country’ and ‘moral resilience of troops’)” (Obraztsov, 1994: 93).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the scientific community widely discussed the issue of the role of biological factors in social life and human behavior. Golovin also paid attention to this issue. In his 1909 work *Natural Selection and Social Assortment in Social Life* (though published in 1913), he argues that “the sociality is the result of adaptation

in the form of habits, instilled through a number of generations of separate individuals" (Golovin, 2008a: 146). According to Golovin's views, social life is preceded by biological forms of life that start with the simplest forms of organic life, but relies on other mechanisms. First of all, it is the mechanism of social assortment. This assortment "is expressed primarily in the union of people thinking the same way, believing the same way, together stakeholders, and therefore working together and fighting against those who oppose them" (Ibid.: 148). Social assortment is manifested at all levels of society, and represents a number of 'threads' such as religious, national, and others. Similar national threads in a modern society began to become generalized and unite with the others. Here, the author apparently defines the worldwide distribution of the national state as a form of organization of the state in mind. The mechanism of natural selection starts again at the level of the struggles of the nation-states. Eventually, the "struggle of these threads gets the ultimate expression in war" (Ibid.: 158).

Among other things, Golovin has made great efforts to institutionalize the sociology of war. He gave presentations in European and American universities, participated in sociological congresses, and organized the teaching of the sociology of war in military educational institutions of Russian immigrants. However, his plans have met opposition from some leaders of emigration. The press has begun a debate on the methods of military education in its pages. Soon, the discussion turned to philosophical questions, a discussion which took place in a spirit of confrontation between "Slavophilism" and "Westerners" (Domnin, 2012: 13). According to some scholars, Golovin had a great influence on the formation of military sociology in the United States (Kultygin, 1993: 133), and polemology (the science of war) in France (Solovyov, 1996: 32). In 1908, he was sent to France to study the teaching methods and the organization of research of the Higher Military School (L'École Supérieure de Guerre) (Obraztsov, 1992: 135). Immediately after his return from France, he actively began teaching, and his research. He began the reorganization of the teaching of the art of war and its methods, which most older professors considered revolutionary. As a result of the confrontations in the teaching environment of the Military Academy, Golovin and his followers had to leave (Ibid.: 136).

In addition to Golovin's research, there were other scientists who made great contributions to the development of the sociology of war. One of these scientists was Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968), one of the representative of the 'civil' direction in the sociology of war. His sociological views on the war can be divided into three distinct periods, in which his philosophical bases and methodological approaches are quite different. The first period includes his work before the 1917 revolution in Russia. At this time, Sorokin formed his basic views and methodology of sociology, its goals, and objectives. P. Sorokin raises issues of war and the army in his fundamental work *Crime and Punishment, Service and Reward: A Sociological Study of the Basic Forms of Social Behavior and Morals*. This work was published in 1914, and so does not bear the stamp of the enormous shock of the First World War. Among the major philosophical foundations of this work, it is necessary to highlight its positivism, evolutionism, moderate behaviorism, and psychology in understanding social processes.

The positivist approach to science in general and sociology in particular has been a feature of many scholars of the historical period under review. The recognition of the science of social phenomena as a “positive,” that is, having a solid foundation for a real facts, specific laws, and methodologies tending to the ideal of the natural sciences has become a powerful impetus for its development. For Sorokin, the idea of war as a typical phenomenon is not normal, and goes beyond the natural course of social life. The normal situation in society is an agreement between the people and their understanding of that agreement. For Comte, for example, it was the understanding based on positive philosophy, especially ethics. This was particularly characteristic of the proletariat, because, according to Comte, their inclinations, interests, and status across Europe were similar. This community of interests was pronounced and strong so there are no delusions that could destroy this unity. War is one of these delusions which is trying to destroy the unity of these views (Comte, 2012: 53); therefore, all its immaterial benefits are false, not to mention the fact that the material consequences of the war are always associated with the destruction involved. This axiological base is found in all of the Sorokin’s subsequent works.

In speaking of crime, Sorokin states that “currently, a number of murders (murder during the war, in the case of self-defense, the death penalty, etc.) is not only considered to be criminal acts, but, on the contrary, has been awarded as valiant acts” (Sorokin, 2006a: 148). The negative influence of war on society, in this case, would be that the reward for the killing is, in Sorokin’s terminology, the ‘train’ effect. It starts with a conscious understanding of the rewards and punishments for a particular behavior, as “aspirational and utilitarian reasons of a person can somehow influence the behavior of the individual” (Sorokin, 2006a: 229). However, the notion of the possible public reaction to a particular behavior “accordingly puts pressure on the psyche of man and forces him to commit an act or refrain from doing or to endure something, that without this effect would hardly have happened” (Ibid.: 230). Sorokin expresses this idea most clearly in his later works, in which he consistently pursued a behaviorist understanding of human behavior.

In the above-mentioned work, Sorokin examines the nature of social phenomena. This question is fundamental to all types of sociology and forms the ontological foundation of this science. Sorokin formulates the following thesis: “a social phenomenon is a connection of mental origin and it is realized in the minds of individuals, leaving at the same time the content and duration beyond” (Ibid.: 90). He then writes that “any social phenomenon can be decomposed into two elements that must be separated from each other: (1) a certain psychic experience or pure psyche, and (2) non-mental signs by which the mind is objectified or symbolized” (Ibid.: 103). Thus, Sorokin goes beyond the approach that reduces social phenomena to the phenomena of the mental. However, reliance on psychology in his understanding of social phenomena plays an important role, which brings its position in line with that of military sociologists. The principle of evolution in Sorokin’s early works was manifested in his understanding of the driving forces of social development. He rescales the consideration of social processes and from the analysis of the behavior of the individual, and proceeds to analyze the interactions within the group and between groups. He consistently finds the same pattern, that is, “a

different understanding of the proper, recommended and prohibited behavior leads to fighting, the same—to peace and mutual consensus” (Ibid.: 276). He notes that a merger and consolidation of groups usually occurs through a war. War in this case is the method of collective punishment of one group by another. The reason for the war, then, is the “inappropriate behavior of another group, in other words, its criminal behavior” (Ibid.: 290). Social evolution is a result of conflict and poverty. P. Sorokin emphasizes that a society without war “would be possible only when the social life would stand in one place and hasn’t evolved, or when changes in intra patterns of behavior committed by and at the same time in the same direction among all members of the group” (Ibid.: 299).

Sorokin’s new period of creativity began with the end of the First World War and the revolutionary upheavals in 1917. He pays the greatest attention to the sociological analysis of the axiological value, and the causes of war and peace. He sees the main reason for the war of unprecedented cruelty and casualties among military and civilians as a tragic incompatibility between the value systems of different societies. In his 1917 article “The Causes of War and Peace Terms,” he writes: “The main reason, or foundation, of internal social peace is the presence of coherent core values and relevant norms of behavior in the society, which are permanently included in the life” (Sorokin, 1994a: 491). The same condition is necessary for intergovernmental relations, although these values do not necessarily have to be the same for all societies. Value systems must be compatible with each other. In this article, there is a new philosophical basis of his sociology of war—the principle of systems. It is expressed in emphasizing the importance of the integrity of the system of values in order to maintain internal and external peace. Moreover, “one or other an isolated value is not makes peace or war itself, and the whole system of higher values acts as a whole” (Ibid.: 492). In a study of the degree of integrity of the system of values, the important place belongs to sociology. In Sorokin’s scientific views, this stage of history already plays an important role in the principle of holism (the primacy of the whole over the part), and the principle of non-reducibility of the system to the simple sum of its elements.

Sorokin continued the thread of moderate behaviorism in his later works. For example, this can be seen in his 1922 article “War and the Militarization of Society,” which also contains a large number of emotional assessments of the impact of war on human behavior. This is more typical for journalism than for rigorous scientific text, but the topic is clearly perceived as very emotional after the First World War. The author’s rejection of the war is manifested in three ways. Firstly, a long standing in a state of war leads to the assertion in a society of military-socialist model of management, since according to Sorokin, “The longer and more difficult a war is, the closer social organization develops to a military-socialist model” (Sorokin, 1994b: 356). This type of organization is necessary for society’s survival in the time of war, but at the same time, it prevents the development of arts and sciences, suppresses freedom and creativity, and makes society a “disciplinary army” (Ibid.: 357). Secondly, war changes people’s behavior for the worse: “The war . . . has taught people to behavior that is opposite to actions of peaceful life” (Ibid.: 357–358). It should be noted that both war and peace “teach” the person to act one way or another.

The author clearly returns to his idea of the “training” effect of rewards and punishments, extending this approach to all social phenomena. Thirdly, the war “not only reduces the population, but also dramatically change its qualitative composition. It takes the best from the field of life and leaves to survive the worst human material” (Ibid.: 358). This affects future generations since surviving “second-rate people” will procreate. Of course, such views could not remain unnoticed by the Soviet authorities, since, in addition to the scientific content, there was strong criticism of the Bolsheviks’ policies in Sorokin’s articles. One of his works was strongly criticized by V. Lenin, who questioned a number of statistical facts Sorokin used, and the methodology for the analysis of these facts. As a result, Lenin, in his usual manner, called Sorokin “the feudal,” “reactionary,” and one of the “graduated flunkies of clericalism” (Lenin, 1950: 208–210).

In 1921–1922, shortly before his expulsion from Russia, P. Sorokin published a number of articles and monographs on the impact of mass starvation on society, and on the interconnection of starvation with global social upheavals of wars or revolutions. For example, in the article “The Impact of the War on the Part of the Population, Its Property and Social Organization,” he clarifies his understanding of the concept of the “quality of the population.” Sorokin wrote “As ‘the best’ I mean the elements of the population, which (a) bio—more healthful, (b) energy—more employable, (c) socio—a more moral, (d) mentally—a strong-willed, more talented, more gifted and developed intellectually” (Sorokin, 2003b: 557). Here, he continued the line of behaviorism and even biologism in the analysis of war. War distorts human behavior. This distortion is based on “a biological principle: the function creates the organ; the produced act is rebound reflected in the soul and the body of his actor” (Ibid.: 572). In his biologism, Sorokin’s comments on the arguments of the superiority of one race over another. Speaking about the influence of the First World War on society, he notes that “the war weakened the white, the most talented race in favor of the colored, the less talented” (Ibid.: 561). This thesis are not subscribed to in modern science, but they were quite common at the beginning of the 20th century, dating back to the ideas of social Darwinism. A number of modern Russian scholars researching Sorokin underscore the fact that he first called attention to the phenomenon of negative selection during the war. This is especially evident in his research of the civil war in Russia (Azarov, 2014: 59; Reviakin, 2008: 75). However, so-called positive selection also acts during wars and revolutions. Some statements of the proponents of negative selection caused doubt, and Sorokin wanted them to investigate further (Osipova, 2013: 97). Perhaps the theory of social solidarity and altruism as a positive deviance behavior resulted from this desire. Such behavior, in his view, is able to resist aggression, wars, and revolutions (Efremova, 2014: 72; Osipova, 2013: 104).

P. Sorokin continued the line of study of biological prerequisites of war in an important 1922 book, *Hunger as a Factor*. He reveals all aspects of the impact of starvation and all “eating behaviors” on the development of society, its organization, etc. In this paper, the author expressly declares “real reason for the war is hunger” (Sorokin, 2003a: 303). In addition, there is the positive feedback between these two phenomena: hunger creates war, and war creates hunger and other social evils. The longer a war lasts, the more dif-

difficult it is for a society to break out of this vicious circle. In his book, P. Sorokin explores the impact of war on the natural movement of the world's population with extensive statistical material. Ideas about the dangers of the war, which until then were perceived as intuitively true, received a serious scientific rationale. The author studied all three indicators, the number of marriages, birth rate, and mortality. As a result, even this incomplete investigation reaffirmed his belief in the extreme hazard of war on society.

In 1922, P. Sorokin was expelled from Russia, and with this expulsion, the next stage of his scientific work began. In the sociology of war, he was associated with the final formation of the sociocultural approach (Obraztsov, 1993: 8). In the years 1937–1941, Sorokin wrote and published the book that has brought him worldwide fame, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. First of all, the author formulates a number of key issues which should be engaged in the study of sociology. How often do sociocultural fluctuations accompanied by the destruction of the established system of social relations occur? How strong are the outbreaks of violence that occur? How long do these disorders last? Is there a trend when war breaks out, as well as a number of other issues (Sorokin, 2006b: 678–679).

The answer to these questions requires a large amount of statistical data and empirical evidence. However, P. Sorokin concludes that the study of war is faced with the difficulties in obtaining such evidence, or the inability to obtain this evidence (Ibid.: 680–681). Even in modern science, the problem of counting military losses is faced with great difficulties, and gives rise to conflicting schools of thought. P. Sorokin made a great contribution to the methodological foundations of sociology when he examined this issue. He noted that the main methodological difficulty in the study of war is the inability to “make an ‘accurate translation’ in a purely quantitative language of any phenomenon, which has a qualitative-quantitative essence. And the large part of social and cultural phenomena, including such as wars and revolutions, have precisely this property” (Ibid.: 681). This thesis should be an important epistemological foundation of sociology, namely, the representation of the truth and validity of the knowledge gained. According to Sorokin, “the study, and possibly inaccurate in many details, might still be valid in its most significant findings, if appropriate to apply to it the criterion of reliability” (Ibid.: 682). This criterion is the scale of the consideration of phenomena. Inaccurate data of the study of a particular war may enter the same set of data on other wars and used to identify a particular trend, and the dynamics of war of a century and era. It is necessary to choose the right indicators to measure these dynamics. Most researchers of the history of wars most commonly used indicators of the duration of the war to bring about its scale. In the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, a number of works were written which calculated the total “peaceful” and “military” time in the history of society, and made appropriate conclusions about the increasing or reducing the military burden on society. However, a simple comparison of the Hundred Years War with its sporadic military operations, and the First World War, during which the fighting took place for four years, shows all the inadequacies of such an approach. P. Sorokin proposed to assess the extent and dynamics of war by using these variables, showing the size of the army and the number of victims relative to the population (Ibid.: 687). Such an approach is productive, but, as noted above, is faced

with great difficulties in the selection of relevant statistical data. Application of this research methodology has led Sorokin to an unexpected conclusion about the dynamics of the wars in the history of Europe: "Our study did not reveal the presence of any kind has been a steady trend (based on relative terms) for all the considered centuries" (Ibid.: 703).

In his book, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Sorokin first uses the principle of 'integralism', which "is an epistemology, a theory of human nature, and a philosophy of history. While each element is analytically separate, in Sorokin's discussion, they combine into complex cultural supersystems, and give great insight into the dynamics of society, and the process of history (Johnston, 1999: 27). Therefore, we can use this principle for the study of various social phenomena, including war. Moreover, Sorokin was trying to give his work the function of bringing people together in the face of present and future conflicts and upheavals. His research methodology allows for the prediction of the nature and content of historical global events, but not the specific times of these events. This possibility was based on the understanding of the processes that occur during the change of the type of dominant culture in the society: "Along with the war studies, they were attempts to inform and mobilize people for action. They combined analysis with moral injunctions and wrapped Sorokin in the cloak of prophetic sociology" (Ibid.: 32).

P. Sorokin's conclusion has implications for the formulation of the ontological foundations of the sociology of war. The author concludes that the concept of «cyclical» and the concept of "linearity" in explaining the dynamics of the wars in the history of the society (Sorokin, 2006b: 712) are unacceptable. All attempts to justify the cyclical effects of war and peace, as if these cycles are tied to the periodicity of natural phenomena (such as the solar cycle), lead to the tendentious selection of facts and distort the real situation. The same thing happens in the case of linear representations. The idea about the growth or reduction of the burdens of war in the history of society is very often made in favor of a concept that has an ideological, religious, or populist basis. Furthermore, P. Sorokin's calculations showed that the fluctuations of military activity had no clear periodicity or cyclical patterns.

V. Jeffries, the American researcher of Sorokin's science legacy, noted that "the system of sociology contained in Sorokin's writings is based on a comprehensive program of professional sociology. His ideas make three particular contributions to this form: a basic orientation to the nature and organization of the discipline, a close correspondence of theoretical development and empirical research, and the ontology and epistemology of integralism" (Jeffries, 2005: 68). Sorokin dedicated his scientific life to the idea of the integrated study of social processes. He never admitted to the possibility of explaining the phenomenon of war from the perspective of a single factor. For this, he was seriously criticized by Marxism and other philosophical and sociological schools of the monistic type (Osipova, 2013: 100). As a result, Sorokin's integralism became one of the main philosophical foundations of the sociology of war in his papers. One of the main thesis of integralism is "that the reality that is the subject matter of the social sciences contains empirical-sensory, rational-mindful, and superrational-supersensory components" (Jeffries: 2005, 69). This approach allows us to examine the role of spiritual and psychological

factors during war. Also, if we want to study the nature of war, we can use integralism, because the phenomenon of hatred is based on the characteristics of cultural interaction between people and societies: "Sorokin explains solidarity and antagonism by cultural factors characteristic of the interacting parties: the nature of norms and values, whether they are concordant or discordant, and the degree to which they are expressed in behavior" (Ibid.: 74).

Other fundamental problems the author studied were the questions of the causes and the nature of wars. A condition for the possibility of any war is the breaking of organized relations between states. The character of a particular war depends on the type of society that begins any military actions. For ideational societies (i.e., based on the priority of immaterial needs), wars are typically religious, and war is fought for an idea. Societies of sensate cultures (the priority being physical needs) often start economic, utilitarian, or imperialist wars (Sorokin, 2006b: 719). Thus, the philosophical question about the nature and the character of the war, in essence, is dealt within the field of social sciences. However, the reasons that lead the society to sever relations remain quite uncertain. P. Sorokin admitted that all commonly enumerated reasons for war do not give a full explanation of such. It appeared impossible to identify a single cause or a single class of causes that can be used to explain the majority of military conflicts (Krotov, Dolgov: 2011, 38). However the approach is the so-called "multiple causation" also lacks in explanatory potential. This is the other extreme, a relatively monistic approach, which was previously mentioned. In this case, "say everything" means "do not say anything" (Ibid.: 42). The basis for the understanding of the causes of war is in Sorokin's study of the causes of militarization of society during and after war. Militarization does not start at the beginning of the war. In the study of the militarization, Sorokin puts forward three factors: the survival instinct of society, changes on a personal level, and the loss of the best part of the population (Ibid.: 21–22). The same factors can be used in the investigation of the causes of war. Sorokin does so when he studied the role of starvation in social development, changes in behavior that occur under the influence of military service, and the impact of the incompatibility of cultures on the interaction of societies.

All of the above leads to several conclusions about the development of the sociology of war in Russia in the late 19th to the early 20th centuries and its philosophical foundations. Firstly, the sociology of war has developed in two ways: on the part of military science, and by civil sociology and philosophy. The military branch of the sociology of war was based on a long tradition of studying the phenomenon of war, formed at the beginning of the 19th century through the influence of French military thought. In addition, Russian military theorists were strongly influenced by the philosophy of positivism. At the beginning of 20th century, the sociology of war was used to analyze the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War.

Secondly, the civil branch of the sociology of war actively explores the negative effects of this phenomenon on society. This trend was characterized by a clear moral and ethical condemnation of the war. Through his efforts, P. Sorokin significantly advanced the research into the nature of war, depending on its nature from different conditions and

parameters of its dynamics. He had a great influence on the philosophy of positivism, evolutionism, social Darwinism, and recognized the seriousness of the role of psychological phenomena during the war. The main result of his many years of research was the creation of a unique sociocultural approach to the study of the problem of war.

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Философские основания русской социологии войны на рубеже XIX–XX веков

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В данной статье исследуются философские основания русской социологии войны. Философские основания науки относятся к метатеоретическому уровню научного знания и оказывают влияние на теоретический и эмпирический уровни. Философские основания включают в себя онтологические, гносеологические, аксиологические и методологические основания. Их исследование позволяет сделать вывод о целом ряде особенностей данной науки: основных идеях о природе и сущности феномена войны, о критериях истинности знания в военной науке, о правилах формулировки и вывода общих понятий и терминов, о методах получения нового знания и т.д. Предпосылкой к появлению социологии войны в России была русская военная мысль и философия войны. Собственно же социология

войны в России начала формироваться в конце XIX века. С другой стороны, развитие общей психологии и социологии повлияло на становление их разделов — военной психологии и социологии, так как война все чаще становилась предметом исследований, особенно после серьезных вооруженных конфликтов. Этому способствовала и логика развития военных наук, согласно которой военные явления рассматривались как социальные. Также бурно развивающаяся в данный период философия позитивизма обратила на себя внимание многих русских военных мыслителей и гражданских философов. Это привело к использованию концептуальных и методологических наработок этой философской школы в исследованиях войны.

Ключевые слова: философия войны, социология войны, военная наука, Г. А. Леер, Н. А. Корф, П. А. Сорокин, Н. Н. Головин

Instead of a Review; or, What, and Thanks to Whom, Do We Know About a Man at War?

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This article was initially intended to be a review of *War*, a book by Arkady Babchenko published in 2015, but turned out to be more of an essay. On one hand, the purpose in publishing a book in 2015 about the two Chechen military campaigns may be questioned especially since Babchenko had previously published numerous texts about his recent experiences as a war journalist. On the other hand, *War* is full of sociological issues, which eliminates any doubt about the possibility of writing a review of this definitely non-sociological book for a sociological journal. In fact, such books revive a new round of debates on two topics important for the sociological discourse. The first considers the status of the “stories” of ordinary witnesses of the events, and their logic of narration has obtained the same legitimate status as scientific narratives; that is why sociologists are interested in the everyday “testimonies” within the “micro-” approach to the study of war. The question that underlines the second topic of the debates is central for contemporary society in general, that is, who has the right to write about war and to suggest linguistic, thematic, discursive, and implicit ideological formats to speak and to think about it? Certainly, there are adequate, institutionalized methodological models to study and to write about war. However, the macro-optical perspective inevitably misses the substantial meanings and emotions that turn wars into the most epiphanic moments of our lives expressed in biographical narratives. To overcome this limitation, we turn to the narratives of those who happened to witness wars from “within”, either to fictional narratives (represented by *The Kindly Ones*, authored by Jonathan Littell), or to non-fictional stories (represented by *Pathologies*, written by Zakhar Prilepin). The latter are more typical for contemporary Russian tradition and, thus, are considered on the example of *War*. However, both fiction and non-fiction narratives allow us see the “human dimension of war”; they differ, perhaps, only in the power of conviction, and the level of trust.

Keywords: war, Arkady Babchenko, narrative analysis, fiction and non-fiction, Jonathan Littell, Zakhar Prilepin, “micro-” and “macro-” approaches to the sociological study of war

Is There Any Sense in Reviewing Non-scientific Books on War?

Thanks to the media that constantly informs us very quickly, distantly, unemotionally, and in between commercials while sometimes providing expert opinions (often far less comprehensible for an average person than the news) of tragic war events all around the world, we all claim to be competent enough in the causes and consequences of all the

war conflicts we are aware of. For instance, if asked, anyone could mention that the scale and number of wars have recently increased, that their key features have radically transformed, and that we all live in an epoch of violent confrontations between tribal, ethnic, and religious factions battling with both primitive and the most sophisticated weapons without state-supported armies and resources, and that previous distinctions between civilians and soldiers are challenged. Some people completely deny the acceptability of warfare as a method of resolving contradictions. Others accept the use of war as an extreme form of armed violence to achieve certain goals because they either refuse to consider the moral aspects of war and exaggerate its ability to achieve the desired goal, or recognize the temporary permissibility of this evil for the sake of moral values (the so-called “just war”). Both would agree that no official or scientific definitions and explanations help us understand the very essence of war that has not changed for centuries, because man’s feelings in the thick of the battle are shown only in fiction and non-fiction books, at least in terms of the authors’ intentions. This is why these types of books are becoming more and more numerous and popular, regardless of the horrific events described (let us be honest and confess that there are enough sad moments in our everyday life and no obvious reason to multiply our sorrows by reading about wars), and the remarkably long history of scientific attempts to explain, model, and prevent wars.

The text below was initially intended to be a review of *War*, a book by Arkady Babchenko and published in Moscow in 2015, but to write a review on such a book today seems to be a task either too simple (leaving out all the accompanying contexts and focusing on the narrative as it is or its sociological meaning) or, on the contrary, too complicated (not leaving anything out). That is why I must warn our readers that this essay does not claim to be a classical review in the full sense of the word, although the idea of such a review seemed both appealing and questionable to me from the very beginning due to the personality of the author. Arkady Babchenko calls himself a “war child” since he fought in the first Chechen war at the age of 19, and also took part in the second Chechen campaign. His experiences became the basis of his highly-acclaimed autobiographical novel *One Soldier’s War in Chechnya* (precisely and convincingly capturing the fear, chaos, and brutality of contemporary combat, and published in English in 2007) that won Russia’s Debut Prize, which recognizes authors who write “despite, and not because of, their life circumstances.” This experience made Babchenko a journalist, a founder of a veterans’ association, and the Internet site “Art of War.” In Chechnya, he fought in major cities and tiny mountain villages, and describes both Chechen wars in a number of devastating first-person narratives. In these texts, we see the raw and mundane realities of war presented by an extraordinary storyteller for whom such narratives are a means of coping with harrowing memories¹: “Writing was the only thing that helped . . . If I had not started writing, I might have lost myself to drink. It was the only real cure. When a person comes back from war, from prison, from any extreme situation, he has to get it out from himself. The whole horrific experience—he needs to vent it . . .”

1. <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/nov/21/biography>

There is no need to provide additional links to the interviews Babchenko gave to both the Russian and Western media to summarize what he consistently says about the war in Chechnya. In his recently-published book *War*, he wrote that Russian authorities branded the war as a restoration of “the constitutional order,” while the Chechens (although it is a too-general label to use when talking about the entire population of the republic) believed it was a war for national liberation. However, his purpose in publishing his book in 2015 about the two Chechen campaigns may be questioned, especially since Babchenko published enough texts about his recent experience as a *Novaya Gazeta* war journalist in the Ukraine, and in Georgia in 2008, writing extensively about the absolute hatred that has appeared in these two regions². The answer becomes obvious by doing two things: (1) by reading some interviews and Facebook posts by Babchenko in which he partly explains the need to return once more to the most tragic pages of Russian contemporary history that are still difficult to explain and understand, and; (2) by reading *War*, since it does make one truly believe that this is one of the most timely books among war prose ever written.

According to his numerous publications in various (mainly Internet) editions, Babchenko is sure that what happened in Chechnya during two war campaigns explains how Russian soldiers are treated, and what war is, especially the urban warfare within the borders of a single country. Babchenko believes that the story of Chechnya is an open textbook written in blood which no one wants to read or learn from. It is important to note that while many of his critics consider Babchenko to have Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder which he writes about or even to be a schizophrenic whose mind was forever broken by the war, no one doubts that he is an honest journalist and one of the founders of contemporary Russian war prose. He is able to speak of war without pathos or embellishment, presenting an autobiographically-based story about everyday life in the Chechen war—endless days, full, though not with heroism, but with hatred, pain, and fear, and, at the same time, with hope, and a crazy, devouring thirst for life, to survive and to remain human after and outside the war which forever alters the fates of all people involved. Babchenko emphasizes the fictional character of his book as not being autobiographical, but rather as a reflection of the events that happened to him (he notes that 80% to 90% of the events described did happen), and claims that the book was not meant as a book or a literature, but rather as attempt at rehabilitation in not having one's past in a backpack, because “the best way to get rid of war is to tell about it” (Babchenko, 2015: 7).

However, even after I started a kind of a review you are reading, I continued to question the possibility of writing such a doubtfully-sociological text on a definitely non-sociological book for a sociological journal. As most social scientists would agree, the realities often dispel doubts. In my case, these were the debates that followed with the Belarusian author and journalist Svetlana Alexievich winning the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature. Actually, the discussions of this inspiring event (no matter how you personally perceive it) in the history of post-Soviet literature in Russian can be divided into two

2. See, e.g., <http://www.threekingsblog.com/tag/arkadiy-babchenko>

groups. The first type of debates focus on the political background of the Swedish Academy's decision in the current international situation, i.e., on recognizing and supporting Alexievich as a longtime critic of the Soviet regime, and more recently, of the Russian government, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. This is a consistent pattern in the perception of the Swedish Academy's decisions in seeking political motives, (especially in Russia), but the least interesting for this essay.

The second line of debates includes the criticisms of the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature decision for the "status" of Svetlana Alexievich's books. According to Sara Danius, the Permanent Secretary of the Swedish Academy, Alexievich won the award because she "has offered us new historical material and a new genre."³ Those who accepted the decision of the Swedish Academy and congratulated the post-Soviet literature in Russian for it consider the works of Alexievich non-fiction and, thus, worthy of the award⁴. People who disagree with the decision of the Swedish Academy consider the works of Alexievich as pure journalism and not worthy of the Nobel Prize in Literature, intended primarily and solely for fiction. The grounds for this line of argument are obvious. Alexievich's books weave the voices of hundreds of interview subjects⁵ together in exploring the most tragic pages of Russia's recent history, including the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan,⁶ and the experience of Soviet women who were on the front lines during World War II.⁷ These are the parts of the expansive project *Voices of Utopia*, which the Swedish Academy evaluated worthy of the Nobel Prize in Literature for "polyphonic writings, a monument to suffering and courage in our time"⁸. Alexievich has consistently chronicled what has been intentionally forgotten, from the Soviet war in Afghanistan to Chernobyl to the post-Soviet 1990s (the subject of her most recent book).

The 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature, in fact, unexpectedly launched (or, better to say, revived) a new round of debates on two topics important for the sociological discourse. The first thematic line is within-disciplinary (although interdisciplinary, in essence) and considers the status of narratives in contemporary science. No one would challenge the thesis that the "narrative turn" emphasized the textual nature of all social practices or negatively estimate the methodological and technical consequences of its legitimization in explaining all social events through discourses that constitute social reality and iden-

3. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature

4. Although in recent decades the world's most prestigious literature prize has been awarded to writers of non-fiction very seldom, for example, to Bertrand Russell and Winston Churchill in 1950 and 1953 respectively.

5. By the way, Haruki Murakami, named among the Nobel nominees, once wrote a kind of the same type of non-fiction book *Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche* (it was published in Russian in 2008, almost ten years after its first Japanese edition, and much later than the English version released in 2003) about the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. The book is made up of a series of interviews with those who were affected by the attacks of the members of the religious cult Aum. Using a similar format, Murakami wanted to capture the way the attack had affected average citizens, and those who suffered the more serious after-effects, either the members and ex-members of the doomsday cult or the victims of the attack.

6. These two books are available in English—*Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster* and *Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from the Afghanistan War*.

7. *War's Unwomanly Face* was published in 1985, and was hugely popular in the Soviet Union.

8. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature

tification models in contemporary society. However, there is one ambiguous result of the “narrative turn,” that being the shaken status and credibility of the sociological (and broader—scientific) discourse. This is because the notion “narrative” is generally accepted as a legitimate characteristic of both the respondent’s and the sociologist’s texts other than description or logical and statistical explanations, due to its temporal structure, historical design, and rhetorical mode of explanation. Therefore, no less than everyday actors, sociologists (and all scientists, for we are not the only “victims” here) are “narrators,” telling “stories” to explain how they transform narratives of everyday actors and empirical objects into some spatial, temporal, and logical configurations generally accepted as valid and reliable scientific explanations.

In other words, the narratives of ordinary witnesses of the events and their logic of narration (and even larger due to the “naturalness” and immediacy of the life experience) obtained the same legitimate status as scientific narratives; that is why sociologists study these everyday “testimonies” (Franzosi, 1998: 517). The so-called “narrative research/sociology” proceeds from the following assumptions: all individuals are socialized storytellers, and are constantly in the situation of potential narration; most of the speech acts contain elements of narrative; the content and structure of narrative depends on the situation, audience, individual perspectives, and the power hierarchy; narratives can confront each other or interact; all narratives are incomplete by nature due to different levels of the narrators’ linguistic competence, uncertainty of the narrators’ position, differences in the length and degree of institutionalization, and an endless interpretation process, all of which results in the same narrator presenting different versions/narratives of the same events to different audiences at different times (see, e.g., Maines, 1993).

What Kind of “Optics” Does the Scientific Approach Provide?

There are two conventional approaches to the sociological study of war; let us call them the “macro-” and the “micro-” approaches. The latter is represented by narrative analysis, but not in the traditional philosophical-historical interpretation developed, for instance, by F. Ankersmit, who defined narratives as assumptions about the past that cannot be true or false, only useful and fruitful, or vice versa (Ankersmit, 1994). Rather, sociologists consider the narratives of ordinary people as not singularly reflecting, singularly reproducing, or singularly constituting social reality, but as doing all the above at the same time. Thus, every narrative is a fictionalized story enriched with the narrator’s interests and priorities. However, a narrative does possess some “similarity” with the real world: we cannot apply the criterion of truth/falsity to narrative interpretations for they have subjective justification, and, by this very fact, are at least emotionally true. Besides, every narrator believes that his narrative is true simply because his self-descriptions seem authentic to him at the moment of narration (see, e.g., Suchan, 2004: 304). This is why narrative analysis considers language not as an instrument of reflection on the external world, but as a means and condition for constructing meanings. In other words, narratives tend to be the truths of the experience (“temporal constructs”), and narrative analy-

sis studies real people with their real life experiences in the real world by interpreting meanings that social actors prescribe to the experienced events.

The above mentioned second line of the debates about the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature, considering the “status” of Alexievich’s works as fiction or non-fiction is extra/outer-disciplinary for the question that underlines such debates is central for contemporary social life in general: who has the right (duty, or responsibility) to write about war, and to suggest linguistic, thematic, discursive and implicit ideological formats to speak and to think about the most tragic events of personal and social history? I like the notion of “wise literature” used by Alexander Markov to justify the decision of the Swedish Academy (Markov, 2015). He believes that the catastrophes Svetlana Alexievich writes about are supra-personal tragedies, which raises the question of who has the right or responsibility to discursively record them for the present and future generations. The representatives of narrative analysis would say that this right belongs to the witnesses and direct participants of war events being a part of their biographical experience. In addition, these narratives may be restorative, for instance, as they largely contributed in successfully getting rid of many stereotypes of the German public during World War II (Kyari, 1996: 250). Such a micro-optics allows us to see the whole historical and socio-cultural context in a single personal story narrated in given space-time coordinates. This explains why and how this type of narrative became socially symptomatic or typical, regardless of recognizing the fact that there is always a “gap” between the reality of life and the reality of the story about it (Bourdieu, 2004).

In its turn, the macro-optics focuses on issues other than personal experience during wars, such as the relationships between war and peace, warfare and armament, on war as a part of cultural rituals, and discourses of collective social actors. One can say that there are adequate and institutionalized sociological methodological principles and technical decisions to study war-connected phenomena in contemporary society and in different periods of the past at this level of analysis. Certainly, there is nothing to argue about; on the contrary, there are generally known conceptual models to think about, to study, and to write about war. However, the macro-optical perspective inevitably misses the substantial meanings and emotions that turn wars into the most epiphanic moments of our lives and, thus, into biographical narratives, which explains the popularity of (non-) fiction works as a means a society at war tries to understand itself with, even if it is with difficulty and horror. In brief, even within the qualitative approach, no interviewer is able (or strives) to become “an ear” (Saprykin, 2015) recording every personal story as it is, that is, not as an interesting and socially significant typical integration of personal and social experience, but into a narrative form reflecting the dominant social ideological scenario. Unlike fiction and non-fiction literature, all scientific studies fail to convincingly show, till the shuddering heart, that war is a perfect mechanism of bringing the price of human life and dignity to zero. Here, let us compare scientific and non-scientific ways of demonstrating this unique feature of every war.

Sociological books are never as popular and cited as recently-numerous fiction and non-fiction literature, regardless of the amazingly-old discursive attempts to describe and

explain war, seemingly to be the most integral part of human history. Perhaps scientific texts (by definition, by nature, or by the ambitions of the authors) seem too abstract for an average reader, because they provide information that is (a) not interesting⁹, or (b) too often repeated in the mass media and, thus, looks too obvious, too clear, and too simple. For example, we can not only name a wide range of negative consequences of every war, such as the abnormal conditions of social organisms, the destruction of social system values, norms, and institutions, millions of victims and destroyed economies (this is often the price for an unchanging situation), a negative impact on the socialization process, a sharp population decline, etc., but also war's positive consequences, such as the creation of external group boundaries, promotion of group identity, the strengthening of internal cohesion, the centralization of the group for cooperation, etc. Scientific books do not say much about how a person feels about war in all its manifold manifestations, how he manages to survive, how dehumanization takes place in each particular case (sociology is not interested in personal matters, only in socially typical and symptomatic ones). As N. N. Golovin aptly noted (1997: 467): "Sociologists directed all their efforts on the study of the role played by war in the life of humanity . . . primarily its causes and consequences . . . and do not study only one thing—the war itself."

Thereafter, to overcome such a limitation of the sociological study of war, we turn to the personal narratives of those who happened to witness war from "within." And once again, we must admit, that in collecting and presenting such biographical stories, sociology loses out to fiction and non-fiction literature simply because the latter is not bound by the requirement to explicate the results of the analysis of a single narrative on the broad socio-cultural context, not in the sense of statistical representativeness, but as a step in the construction of sociological definitions and interpretations. Non-sociological texts must only be interesting, exciting, and look realistic; they do not have to follow the many steps that guarantee, albeit partly, the correct sociological "translation" of war witnesses' narratives into scientific text, such as evaluating the level of a story's truthfulness, identifying the specific meaning of the text, structuring the content of the narrative in accordance with sociologist's criteria, the social "localization" of the narrator, etc. All these steps and related problems are irrelevant for fiction and non-fiction literature which exaggerates the meaning of some features of personal life stories that narrative analysis takes into account, such as every narrator considering his story as an authentic self-description at the time of narration (see, e.g., Suoninen, 2001: 304). In addition, we acquire knowledge of the past in the narrative form, i.e., when one reads a narrative, he reads a narrative, and there is nothing to add (see, e.g., Ankersmit, 1983). This is too shaky a foundation for the sociological study of war, but a perfect one to attract a reader's attention and to create an illusory impression of knowing the truth about a man at war by looking at it through his eyes.

9. For instance, my own content-analysis of the discourses on the Russian-Chechen military confrontation in the media aimed to identify whether or not the concept of "war" was used by different "evaluators," and which terminology prevailed in different periods, i.e., during the first and the second Chechen campaigns (Trotsuk, 2005).

Fiction or Non-fiction—What to Prefer?

In short, the reasons above are why people prefer to find out about wars either from the media/news (if interested in knowing what is going on in the world), or from fiction and non-fiction books. The former are probably preferable to those who want to capture the emotions or the feelings of “a man at war” without being touched to the very depths of their heart, because fiction books tell us about fictional characters. The latter are much more shocking, for we know that their heroes are as real as we are, and what we learn from such books could have happened to us if we had been unlucky enough to witness war as described through real-people’s real stories (slightly fictionalized, as are all biographies “for sale”). One of the most recent illustrative examples of fictional war-stories (it is important to refer to this book because it was translated into Russian just last year, a year before Arkady Babchenko’s book was published) is the 900-page book by Jonathan Littell, *The Kindly Ones* (*Les Bienveillantes*) (Littell, 2014). The story is narrated by the fictional Maximilien Aue, a former SS officer of French and German ancestry, who describes his personal experience of being part of several major events of World War II. In one of his interviews, it is noteworthy that Littell emphasized a highly significant aim of his work in saying that he “was seeking the novelistic truth, not the plausibility” and stressed that this type of truth was different from historic or sociological ones. As his literary agent said, Littell wrote “intimate memoirs of an ex-Nazi mass murderer” (Landler, 2006). This intimacy that involves, shocks, and excites is probably what attracts readers from all over the world. However, these are kinds of artificial feelings, because we know that this is a story of a fictional character, although in real historical circumstances¹⁰. While reading, we follow imaginary characters and events that merge into a historical representation of the Nazi regime, German culture, and war-torn Europe.

To write the book, Littell conducted 18 months of research traveling to Germany, the Ukraine, Russia, and Poland, and read dozens of books about World War II and the post-war trials of the Nazis to understand an executioner’s thinking and the origins of state murder, retrospectively imagining what he would have done and how he would have behaved if he had been born into Nazi Germany. Littell also had the experience of working for the international humanitarian organization Action Against Hunger in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Chechnya, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan, and saw the consequences of the actions of war and mass sufferings. Nevertheless, his book caused fierce debates in European countries. Most critics recognized the author’s talent as a novelist who created a masterpiece (and a bestseller, at least in France), but his attempts “to describe the Hell” made some critics call the book the first terrifying “work of fiction to come out of the Holocaust that places us in its very heart” (Korda, 2009), and named its author as “a pornographer of violence” (Mönninger, 2006). It must be noted, however, that German critics panned the book (see, e.g., Uni, 2008).

10. In some interviews, Littell mentioned that he wrote the book after he discovered a photo of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, a female Soviet partisan hanged by the Nazis in 1941 and watching the movie “Shoah” by Claude Lanzmann, invoking his interest in the bureaucratic aspects of genocide.

Regardless of the controversial subject matter of Littell's narrative, hardly anyone doubts that his book is an outstanding historically, intellectually, and emotionally powerful novel, "a monumental narrative" and "the first novel to engage the Nazi genocide in a nonallegorical mode" (Sanyal, 2015: 192). The debates mostly considered the key idea of this fictional wartime memoir easily identified by its (probably, scientifically-oriented) conscientious readers (see, e.g., Ascherson, 2009) as the enduring mystery of how a large number of human beings could have consented to carry out the appalling acts of cruelty and savagery or been aware of them without experiencing an overwhelming revulsion. Littell's narrator is a self-confessed killer, represented as a man who carried out numerous murders *ad hominem* as a part of the "machinery" of genocide, both observing and participating in mass murders and the management of the network of concentration and death camps (Hutton, 2010: 9). With the statement that nearly everyone in a given set of circumstances does what he is told to do (a bureaucrat simply follows orders), Littell reasserts, through the eyes of a former Nazi perpetrator, Arendt's notion of the banality of evil (the uncomfortable moral scenario that leads ordinary individuals to commit heinous atrocities for the most trivial and arbitrary reasons [Arendt, 1965]), thus providing a greater psychological insight into the banality of evil than the documentary historians (Catani, 2015: 662).

Considering Littell's book after Svetlana Alexievich won the Nobel Prize for non-fiction stories of historical events she did not participate in, it would be strange to think that authors who took part in war events describe it in the non-fiction format, while those who did not do so in fictionalized stories. Nevertheless, if one had actually witnessed some tragic events from the "inside," one have the possibility to decide what the degree of fiction would be in one's (in any case) biographical narrative. In most such cases, authors seek a compromise between fiction and non-fiction to achieve a credibility of the realities presented in the text with the means of artistic imagery. However, Russian literature tends to produce emotional rather than rational and non-emotional narratives (such as Littell's book) about wartime, while at the same time preferring to look at war through the eyes of good men (heroes and victims) and not the executioners' (as in Littell's book). One good example is the novel, *Pathologies* (Prilepin, 2005), about the Chechen war by the Russian writer Zakhar Prilepin, landing its author on the 2005 Russian National Best-seller Award¹¹ short list, and translated into French in 2007. In the first pages, Prilepin characterizes his book not only as an adventure thriller,¹² as an extremely frank story about real military work, the essence of which is not only the mutual destruction of fighting people, but also as a story of a violent, crazy love (probably, Prilepin's descriptions of the emotional experience of a loving man are among the strongest, most convincing, and touching in contemporary Russian prose). In one of his interviews, Prilepin mentioned

11. It should probably be noted that Svetlana Alexievich considers Zakhar Prilepin, also a well-known Russian writer abroad, her opponent as a representative of contemporary Russian intellectual elites supporting the political regime and militarized public consciousness (see, e.g., Gordeeva, 2015).

12. Although there are some features of such in the story about the fate of one fearless soldier at war that make us believe from the very beginning that even in the most serious moments of the Chechen war, the hero will survive, and nothing bad will happen.

that he planned to write a novel about love, but eventually, after three or four years of work, it turned into a novel about Chechnya, according to the famous Russian saying that whatever Russians do, it always turns out to be a Kalashnikov.

Zakhar Prilepin fought in Chechnya as an officer of the Russian paramilitary police, but this did not prevent him from criticizing his own brutal unit, the OMON. Prilepin is a very controversial figure for, on the one hand, every one of his books is a bestseller, especially among young urban readers, and he won a major literary award for being the best new writer of the last decade. On the other hand, he is a very active person with unstable political preferences which often makes him an object of severe criticism from both supporters and opponents of the current political regime. Nevertheless, Prilepin's political position does not interest us now, so let us turn to his most famous book of the Chechen war, *Pathologies*. For the most part, the text is dark because of the commonness of killings and deaths, but at the same time, in some sense, the author romanticizes war as an extreme state of human life that suddenly selects people who demonstrate amazing reserves of strength, love, and patience unprecedented in peaceful life.

Prilepin's two tours of duty in Chechnya became the basis of *Pathologies*, but he denies that his book is true, and insists on writing a fictional novel, not an autobiography. At the same time, he accepts that most things he describes really did happen to him (for example, his driver was shot in an ambush just yards from him), and intoxicated him with the rituals and bonds of maleness, and, by extension, by the perception of war as the ultimate test of manhood. Some critics praised the book for its neutrality (both patriots and opponents of the Russian army and politics can refer to it for support), but this is not neutrality—it is a very frank and ascertaining life-narrative without heroes, situations, and events hypertrophy (perhaps slightly). Military routine, poverty, disease, death, and sex are described with the same physiological accuracy, almost unemotionally, which softens the story about everyday life during the Chechen war. However, this seeming lack of emotion emphasizes how illusory the distinction between normality and pathology, or between life and death, is (that is why the most calming activity for the author at war is cleaning his machine), thus, convincingly showing that we live in a beautiful, and at the same time, fragile world. As Prilepin puts it in his book: “God holds the world as an exhausted thirsty child holds a cup of milk: with tenderness and trepidation . . . But he can easily drop it.”

Why We Are to Read about the Chechen Wars Again?

To be honest, I thought that the theme of the Chechen wars was exhausted by the end of 2000s, partly due to the state official rhetoric considering the current situation in the Chechen Republic, partly due to the more urgent war conflicts Russia has recently been taking part in, and partly due to the already published works such as Prilepin's *Pathologies*. That is why I thought that *War* by Arkady Babchenko was a collection of non-fiction stories about the author's journalistic trips to Ukraine, mainly to Donbas. Babchenko is famous for mastering the journalist profession after his military service in the Russian

army, in which he took part in both Chechen campaigns. Later, he visited many hot spots, including those in the Ukraine, and, unlike Zakhar Prilepin today, openly declares his disagreement with the official position of the Russian authorities on his Facebook page with thousands of followers. On this page and in interviews, Babchenko has repeatedly expressed his opinion about the situation in Donbas, often finding parallels between the Donbas conflict and the first Chechen war. Firstly, Russia entered the conflict in 1994 in exactly the same condition as Ukraine did in the Donbas war from economic, political, and military points of view. Secondly, whatever the official authorities or the media say, people on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian borders know what is really going on (as it was in Chechnya many years ago). Thirdly, in the recent war conflict, no one has ever counted casualties; we still do not know how many soldiers were killed in Chechnya, and no one is going to count the Russian citizens who died in Donbas. Another significant aspect common to all wars in modern human history which interests Babchenko the most is post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD.

The book *War* consists of 18 short stories. The first three are the heaviest, impressive, and memorable, for they form the thematic and evaluative framework for the rest of the book, which mostly provides a more-detailed description of the people, places, events, and situations mentioned in the first three short stories after the introduction. The latter provides a short biographical explanation of how Babchenko arrived to the first Chechen war, and what hardships he passed through as a soldier in the Russian army, hardships sometimes too horrific to write about in any other manner than humorous: “Our invincible army, presented by the hefty drunken sergeant-paratrooper, greeted me with promising words: ‘Well, faintings, here you are in the army . . . Who wants to get in the snout?’ I did not like the beginning of my military service” (Babchenko, 2015: 6).

The first short story, *Airstrip*, provides a brief description of the biographies of the boys with whom Babchenko was waiting with to be sent to the war zone in the heart of Chechnya. He writes about how they got there, who and what they were afraid of, why they became so important for Babchenko, and how he will remember each of them for the rest of his life (for example, Andryuha will always stay in the author’s memories as a small, thin guy, like a dried cockroach). In this short story, all the boys are still alive and happy, basking in the sun and living in the moment. Babchenko describes his first impressions about what was going on in Chechnya during the first war as a terrible mess, with constant movement, crowds of people consisting of journalists willing to pay any amount of money to board the next helicopter to Chechnya, and soldiers willing to be as far away from there as possible: the former were left at the airstrip, while the latter were taken to Chechnya—“that is how weird life is” (Babchenko, 2015: 18). Here the author saw the first wounded victims in his life, with mad eyes and blackened faces, who screamed, cried, and stunned themselves with tons of vodka. For the first time, the author captures the staggering incompatibility of wartime and the wonderfully peaceful life around it: “War must go on where everything is bad, and not where life is so good. The war must go on beyond the Arctic Circle, where life is grim and gloomy and people do not see sun for months. We do not believe that we were brought to this place, which looks like

a beginning of heaven with its smell of apricots, to be put into silver bags for corpses” (Babchenko, 2015: 25).

The second short story, *Mozdok-7*, describes routine robberies, the beatings and abuse of soldiers in the barracks full of arrant lawlessness and chaos in the first Chechen campaign, for the officers returning from the war zone “were giving orders only with punches. They did not care about anything—soldiers’ lives, the Chechens’ lives, their own lives . . . They wanted only one thing—an endless war with people to kill . . .” (Babchenko, 2015: 40). Such a routine stultified the soldiers, and they were terrified that they were only beaten and did not learn how to fight. They wondered very rarely who started that war and blamed “the bureaucratic gang that existed only to have them beaten and clobbered in the barracks, and then led to the airstrip, put in the copters and killed somewhere over the ridge” (Babchenko, 2015: 67). Most of the soldiers did not understand whom they were fighting against: “If the Chechens are enemies of Russia, then we have to kill them all unceremoniously . . . if they are Russian citizens, then how can we fight against them?” (Babchenko, 2015: 68). Babchenko completes this part of the book with the statement that “a man at war is changing very quickly, and if on the first day you are frightened by a dead, then a week later you eat your canned meat leaning on the torn off head so as to sit more comfortable. These bodies, which lie next to us, are just dead people, that’s all” (Ibid.: 85).

The third short story, *Summer of ninety-six*, is devoted to the roads of war, on which each barrier and checkpoint, like an invisible border, cuts soldiers off from their previous life with no turning back. Babchenko describes everyday life in the tents and barracks where people have to fight heat, thirst, hunger, diseases, and constant beatings, sometimes when leaving for the war zone to be struck by the fact that life goes on, and that life is wonderful in its strangeness against the background of the black, ugly war. Although the author’s narrative is rather unemotional and ascertaining for the most part, it is interspersed with brief descriptions of the horrors of war, like the terrible fates and sufferings of soldiers’ mothers looking for their children, executions of prisoners, deaths of the wounded, accidents, violent killings out of revenge, and more, all permeated by the single and all-consuming desire of the soldiers-boys to survive.

The rest of the book describes different aspects of life during war in more detail, addressing the topics of the first three stories already drawn in broad strokes. *Argun* is a cinematic depiction of the soldiers’ feelings of happiness in rare minutes of calmness between the fighting and mockery, and of the absolute loneliness, abandonment, deception, and fear of a man at war that makes him an insane aggressor. *Soldier’s Dream* shows that the night dreams in war are as terrifying as the reality itself. On the contrary, *New Year* shows that dreams reminding him of a happy peaceful life can save a man from going insane. *Storm* very convincingly describes the banality of war actions one at first expects to see in heroic colors, but they turn out to be as simple and trivial as everything a man does in his everyday life. *Peace* shows that hatred begets only hatred, resulting in soldiers hating not only the Chechens they fight against, but also their officers, and that this feeling is overwhelming, mutual, and largely deserved. *Special Cargo* mesmerizes with the realistic

description of the routine dealing of the dead and death, and draws a kind of borderline between two parts of the book. In this section, we are dealing with the fictional character of Artyom, or somebody not precisely identified, although the character possesses the same biographical features, and describes the same situations and feelings of a man in a war who happened to fight and almost freeze to death in *Alkhan-Yurt*, who understands *Wartime Fraud* and the strangeness of being alive while visiting peaceful places he used to fight in a few years ago.

The book *War* is titled in both Russian and Chechen, so the expectation is that the author will try to show the international dimension of the Chechen war by describing both sides of it. However, the book turns out to be too “Russian.” Of course, there are schematic and impersonal Chechens, or rather “the Czechs,” not as the main villain, but rather as some background scenery causes of death, firing at the positions of the Russian troops, cutting off the heads of prisoners, stabbing, strangling, and crucifying their captives. Although the Russian soldiers do the same during their sweeps, the difference is that the author describes his brother-soldiers in personal terms as they live and try to survive the awful life in these terrible places together, while the Chechens are like some ephemeral messengers of death that acquire a human face for a moment if they are civilians to trade with, or policemen supporting the Russian troops, or good people saving soldiers from humiliation and war. The transiency of this subjectivity of the Chechens is explained in the book. Civilians of any age and gender can kill Russian soldiers with a knife to the throat or a bullet in the head, while, the next moment, they are selling the Russians vegetables in the market. Although the situation in Chechnya changed radically after the first campaign, even in the second Chechen campaign there were no positive or negative Chechens for Babchenko—only some blurred, as if distant, figures, but still potentially dangerous and deadly ones.

The main and the only characters in the book are Russian soldiers (regardless of their ethnic origin which varies from Jewish to the Dagestani and the black boy Min’ka, whose father was from Guinea), who are neither heroes nor anti-heroes because war destroys the demarcation line between these two options. Just after the publication of the book, some critics wrote that the worst and the most frightening thing in it are not the killings, but the bullying, the cruel commanders, and the state and army authorities’ absolute indifference of the soldiers who regularly suffer hunger and dysentery, turn gray at the age 18, and most importantly, are constantly beaten and humiliated to break them down, for extortion, just for fun, or out of revenge if they try to fight back, whether behind enemy lines or on the frontlines. These critics sometime mention that there are so many descriptions of beatings and humiliations that a reader unwittingly waits and hopes for the main character to take up the machine gun and shoot all his abusers. It is clear that he does not because the novel is largely autobiographical, and we know that Babchenko is not in prison for murder. However, I strongly disagree with the critics who allegedly do not understand why the hero preferred horror without end to a terrible personal end: while being opposed to the system which sent him (as many other soldiers) to death and humiliation, he chose to buy into it and to become a part of the machine that repressed him.

Those who are beaten, start beating; those who suffer from hunger caused by the thefts of procurers, begin to steal, too; soldiers sell weapons to the enemy to get money, because everybody steals and sells weapons, the only difference being in the scale of the crime and bullying. All these monstrous traditions are accepted as the norm of army life, and are aggravated by the proximity of death in wartime. As the author humorously describes his feelings in the first two weeks of military service before being sent to the first Chechen war, he “thought he would die, but later understood that on the army’s standards it was paradise” (Babchenko, 2015: 6).

Babchenko repeatedly offers explanations for the extreme cruelty of a man at war. Any cruelty towards the enemy is justified by the belief that the soldier fights against evil and injustice, but this is probably the most terrible tragedy of every war: under the slogan of fighting against evil and injustice, armies multiply them in every possible way. In its turn, the cruelty to one’s own soldiers is a result of a strange, inexplicable, irrational (according to Zakhar Prilepin, pathological) mixture of the awareness of the inevitability of death and the will to live, is mainly responsible for PTSD, and explains the author’s surprising fatalism of his decision to voluntarily return to Chechnya during the second campaign. The cruelty and indifference to one’s brothers-soldiers’ sufferings are the result of getting used to death’s proximity, inevitability, and unpredictability, since, in war, all combatants “live this very minute” (Ibid.: 15); there are “peace and corpses at the same time” (Ibid.: 22)¹³; “everybody hates everyone, hatred and insanity hang in the air like a heavy stinky cloud to impregnate new-comers with fear, like a barbecue with lemon juice, before sending new cannon fodder in a war grinder—to help them to die” (Ibid.: 59); “everybody believes that they all will be killed in this war” (Ibid.: 73); with indifference and “cynicism soldiers treat themselves not to go mad completely” (Ibid.: 81); “when the whole cannon fodder will die—in silence and unfairly” (Ibid.: 84); and “nothing changes after somebody dies . . . for death at war is as natural as hunger, thirst and beatings a thousand or ten thousand years ago” (Ibid.: 109).

* * *

Thus, we can turn to the words with which Jonathan Littell starts *The Kindly Ones*: “My human brothers, let me tell you how it happened” (originally, in French, it read as “friends,” but the author agreed that this word did not work as well). Littell wanted to show that understanding the Germans of sixty years ago may make one feel that one is not that far from it, as one is used to think, and may make one enforce one’s social mechanisms to prevent one’s societies from getting into similar wars. Many years after the Chechen campaigns, Arkady Babchenko published a book devoted to probably the same reasons, in order to show that nothing has changed (therefore, the comparison of the dead town

13. These are really the most terrifying pieces of texts—describing how wonderful nature and the world are, absolutely ignorant to human sufferings and the circle of life and death shown throughout the book by the incessant arrivals and departures of military helicopters that load both dead and live people, like sacks of potatoes, surrounded not by white and black, but by wonderful, colorful life.

of Grozny in 1996 with Stalingrad is not accidental), and that all wars are bad, cruel and senseless, regardless of how one prefers to name them. As Babchenko mockingly writes about the first Chechen war, the Russian troops were officially fighting not against the Chechens, but against illegal armed gangs, not because they wanted independence, but because the Constitution says that no region can secede from Russia just like that: he writes “‘restoration of the constitutional order,’ ‘anti-terrorist operation’—just meaningless words, invented to justify killing of thousands of people” (Ibid.: 69).

Unlike Zakhar Prilepin who slightly romanticizes war as a realm of men’s brutality, Babchenko’s narrative is full of tough men’s humor and social satire to emphasize the ordinariness of evil in war.

Here a man is not a man, but some other creature . . . It is not possible to tell about the war to those who did not fight at it—not because they are stupid or blunt, but because they simply lack the sense to feel it . . . Nobody returns from war. Never. Mothers get back only a pitiful semblance of their sons—aggressive angry beasts, embittered on the whole world and not believing in anything except death . . . Yesterday soldiers still belong to war, from which only their bodies came back. Their souls stayed there . . . And here you are—a yesterday ensign, soldier, or captain, a hundred times contused, all riddled, darned and pieced together, half-mad and stupefied—writing and writing, and whining from weakness and despair, and tears running down your face . . . And the bloody lines go one by one, and you drink liters of vodka, and death and madness sit with you in the arms, push you in the side and help you to write. (Ibid.: 124, 346, 348)

I am sure the quotes above do not remind any reader, whether an average person buying fiction or non-fiction books, or a representative of the social sciences, of the traditional scientific representations of war. The latter hopelessly, albeit convincingly and nicely, seeks to explain the reasons and consequences of war rationally and “from a distance,” rather than to represent them through the biographical narratives of those who have actually experienced such causes and effects. For instance, most social scientists admire the famous theory of J. Huizinga who introduced an agonistic interpretation of war as a function of culture based on the notion of glory rather than “any rational and intellectualist theory of economic forces and political dynamisms” (Huizinga, 1949: 59, 90). Certainly, there are many famous names in the history of military science, but researchers of war never forget to refer to the works of C. von Clausewitz, who defined war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill will” (Clausewitz, 1874), and named three main objects of warfare: “to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; to take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and to gain public opinion” (Clausewitz, 1942). The books of these two prominent war theorists are constantly reprinted, but cannot compete in popularity with fiction and non-fiction books on war. The reason is not that these two conceptions are too old or outdated, although Huizinga himself recognized that war had lost its play-quality and connections with the cult and festival, i.e., its “status” of an element of culture, while the theory of Clausewitz was

criticized by M. van Creveld in his famous *Transformation of War*. I believe the reason is different: such books are too rational-explanatory, while people want to see the “human dimension of war,” to have a look at warfare through the eyes of a “simple combatant” (“a man with a gun”), that is, to understand *what* the war really was for the one who happened to be in the thick of it, instead of learning *why* and *who* “from above” unleashed it.

Besides, there is a faint hope that if we do not trust in the ordinariness of evil in war just like that, perhaps the words of a witness and a direct participant can convince us. Perhaps the power of conviction and the level of trust is the only significant difference between fiction and non-fiction in war prose. However, looking at the world around us, we must admit that both (not to mention all the scientific calls for peace) seem to fail to convince us otherwise.

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Странности рецензирования, или К чему приводят попытки зафиксировать частно-человеческое «измерение» войны

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Первоначально данная статья задумывалась как рецензия на вышедшую в 2015 году книгу Аркадия Бабченко «Война», но текст решил зажить собственной жизнью и превратился в обзор/эссе, породив у автора подозрения в сомнительности его исходного замысла. С одной стороны, не вполне понятны причины возвращения Бабченко к теме двух чеченских кампаний в 2015 году, учитывая его огромный опыт работы в качестве военного корреспондента в других горячих точках. С другой стороны, «Война» — один из ярчайших примеров современной военной прозы и поднимает ряд важнейших социологических вопросов, что снимает сомнения в необходимости рецензирования этой по определению несоциологической работы для однозначно социологического издания. Подобные книги неизбежно запускают очередной виток социологически «нагруженных» дискуссий: во-первых, о статусе нарративов — обыденные повествования и логика их конструирования обрели сегодня столь же легитимный статус, как и научные тексты, поэтому социологи обращаются к повседневным «показаниям» в рамках «микросоциологического» анализа войны. Во-вторых, о том, кто обладает правом писать о войне, задавая, тем самым, лингвистические, предметные, дискурсивные и скрытые идеологические форматы ее проговаривания и осмысления. Безусловно, в социологии давно сложились адекватные и институционализированные методологические модели описания и объяснения войн, однако макрооптика неизбежно упускает из виду те значения и эмоции, что превращают войны в эпифанные моменты, отраженные в биографических нарративах. Для преодоления этого ограничения макрооптики мы обращаемся к повествованиям тех, кто видел «изнанку» войны и смог описать ее в формате художественного произведения (например, Джонатан Литтелл в романе «Благоволительницы») или автобиографической публицистики (например, Захар Прилепин в романе «Патологии»). Второй формат более свойственен современной российской литературе и рассмотрен в статье на примере книги Аркадия Бабченко «Война». Впрочем, оба формата позволяют увидеть «человеческое измерение войны», и, видимо, единственное различие между ними — сила убеждения и уровень читательского доверия.

Ключевые слова: война, Аркадий Бабченко, нарративный анализ, художественная литература и публицистика, Джонатан Литтелл, Захар Прилепин, «микро-» и «макро-» подходы к социологическому изучению войны

Isolated Modernity

KALDOR M. (2015) NOVYE I STARYE VOJNY: ORGANIZOVANNOE NASILIE V GLOBAL'NUJU JEPOHU [NEW AND OLD WARS: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA] (TRANSL. A. APPOLONOV, M. DONDUKOVSKY), MOSCOW: DELO. 416 P. ISBN 978-5-93255-417-3 (IN RUSSIAN)

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This year The Gaidar Institute Publishing House has translated Mary Kaldor's book *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Being for the first time published in 1999, the book became a scientific sensation and was long and widely debated. Despite the fact that the book has already become quite old it is of a special contemporary interest since it can be addressed to the many large-scale conflicts which have begun in the last few years.

In her work Kaldor analyses how modern wars have changed in comparison to what used to be understood by war. In Chapter 1 "the old wars"¹ are analyzed based on the ideas of Clausewitz. Chapters 2–5 are devoted to the study of "the new wars." In Chapter 6 Kaldor proposes the means of the realization of cosmopolitan governance. Chapter 7 applies Kaldor's ideas to the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapter 8 investigates theories about the future.

Descriptions of the wars in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, which include personal experience and great amounts of data, support Kaldor's ideas and together with her suggested peacekeeping methods make the book stand out among other research on this theme. Kaldor vividly demonstrates how the difference between legitimate and non-legitimate violence, combatants and non-combatants, interstate and intrastate conflicts blurs, how the new war economy works, why battle results do not define the results of wars, and why attempts by western countries to stop these wars, being based on modern politics, are ineffective.

Her main thesis is that the new wars are based on exclusive particularistic policy. That is why she proposes inclusive cosmopolitan democracy as the main means to stop them; by restoring social consensus with the help of local social organizations which should be accepted as the only legitimate power, so that is they who are dealt with when establish-

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1. Since the novelty of *the new wars* is debatable it should be mentioned that terms *the old* and *the new wars* are used here in the sense in which Kaldor uses them herself.

ing peace. Otherwise the forces which are likely to prolong violence would be legitimized by international society and they would be unintentionally helped to reach their goals.

New and Old Wars is a practically oriented book promoting cosmopolitan democracy for governments and politicians. That is how Kaldor justifies her preference for the term *new wars* over *hybrid* or *multivariant wars* or *complex warfight*s (p. 410). That is also why the book provides mostly factual information and little theorization (Kaldor only uses Clausewitz's and some of her contemporaries' concepts).

However, this is also a weakness of Kaldor's work. She agrees that the new wars and the old wars are ideal concepts, they can share many characteristics and their transformation is connected with the transformation of modern states. If she considered medieval or ancient wars, and theories of war and state it would be clear that they resemble the new wars and together with them differ from the old wars.² Decentralized power, a war economy based on robbery, a high level of popular involvement and a greater number of victims, the absence of rules regulating violence and separating combatants from non-combatants, and weak governing and state institutions all of these can be applied to the new wars and to the ancient wars, while for the old ones these are not relevant.

Both Kaldor and some of her critics, arguing whether the new wars are actually wars and if there still any wars going (Muller, 2004: 172), miss the point that the old wars (or modern age wars) seem to be quite uncommon. Their characteristics mostly occur during a short period of history the modern epoch and refer to a limited number of conflicts and are connected with the formation, development and expansion of modern state. At the same time as Newman argue all the characteristics of the new wars have been present in many conflicts throughout the last century (Newman, 2004: 179–180). Kaldor herself agrees that the type of old war described refers mostly to European wars (p. 56–57). This could be the root of the problem: Kaldor begins with an examination of *wars* and extends it to modern *conflicts* not including the old ones. That is why the term the new wars provokes the strongest critique of Kaldor's book.

"*New and Old Wars* falls short when addressing today's conflicts," says Benjamin P. Nickels in his review (Nickels, 2009). It also falls short when trying to theorize about civil wars or about features of the new wars in the past. It is not clear enough from Kaldor's book how to distinguish among contemporary wars, the new wars and the old wars; where to put revolutions and civil wars; and why this division is needed (Kalyvas, 2001: 99–118). It is probably not war itself but the number and intensity of conflicts which differ from the old wars which have changed since the end of the WWII (UCPD, 2014).

Nevertheless, *New and Old Wars* is still a success. What makes this book topical is that it predicts partially the characteristics of some of today's wars (Malantowicz, 2013). Thus, war with ISIS in Syria and Libya is a perfect example of the new war which includes particularistic policy as an ideological basis, terror, vague frontlines, and the robbery of local population as the main source of war finance (Zelin, 2015). The rise of ISIS has pushed Kurdish consolidation and a rise in autonomy of their regions in Iraq and Syria (Kajjo,

2. Edward Newman argues that it is the lack of data on earlier conflicts which, together with new means of war, gives an impression that a new type of conflict has emerged (Newman, 2004).

2014). The Kurds have restored legitimacy and social order on their territory and fought ISIS with some success. Even though they established their People's Protection Units on the national basis of the Kurd's struggle for independence and for the protection of Kurd-populated regions, they carry out tolerant, multinational and multireligious policy, cooperating with the Free Syrian Army (Muslim, 2014) and recruiting Arabs (Meseguer, 2013), Turks, westerners and Syrians, which is a good illustration of how Kaldor's idea of cosmopolitanism work. In addition, one cannot say Kaldor is wrong claiming that the new wars begin in so called failed states. Ukraine, Iraq, Libya and Syria³ were not failed states. However, they were incapable of maintaining balance and providing security and stability on their territories, therefore they were affected by external influences and internal conflicts (Torri, 2015).

All in all, Kaldor's critics cannot but agree that *New and Old Wars* contributes important insights to the study of the transformation of war. The book provides a useful scheme of how war has changed since the end of the Cold War and helps to organize ideas on this subject. New waves of violence issue many challenges against Kaldor's theory which will probably make some of its weaknesses more obvious. Nevertheless, Kaldor's critique of the current international peacekeeping system and her suggestions for cosmopolitan policies help us awaken to the fact that war is not what we once thought it to be, and our attitude and our approach towards it have to be revised.⁴

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3. These conflicts also prove that Kaldor's theory is far more effective than the ones of her competitors such as Huntington. His ideas turn out to be invalid referring to them since there are problems with legitimacy but not with the clash of civilizations.

4. Maria Chernyaeva in her dissertation investigates the significance of the new war thesis saying that it is not only the thesis but the whole debate provoked by it makes Kaldor's theory valid (Chernyaeva, 2010).

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Изолированная современность

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One of the protagonists of Mikhail Bulgakov's novel *The White Guard*, an old school Stabskapitän, declared that he was able to read *War and Peace* to the end because it was written "not by some kind of a blockhead but by an artillery officer." Although Bernard Boëne, the author of *Social Sciences and the Army: Objects, Approaches, Perspectives* and a leading French military sociologist, made no career in the army, he has for many years been the director of teaching and research at Saint-Cyr, the nation's supreme military academy. The author's competence in the subject, thus, makes reading this book a rewarding experience and provides it with the credibility, so often lacking in the attempts of mere "social scientists" to write about war and its impact on society. Currently professor Emeritus at University of Rennes and the chancellor of Geneva Graduate School of Governance, Bernard Boëne is also the chief editor of the professional review *Res Militaris*, a holder of the prestigious Morris Janowitz Career Achievement Award named after one of the founders of military sociology, and the author of a hundred of articles on various aspects of military action. His study provides an ambitious theoretical synthesis of what has been achieved in the field of military sociology in the past century. It is not a mere historical outline, but rather an unusual reflection on the disciplinary boundaries of what the author designates as "the military object" (*objet militaire*) aiming at a definition of its particular traits and an explanation of its rather marginal status within the social sciences. According to Boëne, this state of affairs has been slowly changing in the last few decades, as military studies is becoming a specific field of research, mainly in the Anglo-American scientific community. The very term "social sciences" (*sciences sociales*), far more common in the English-speaking than in the francophone world, clearly indicates the author's predilection for Anglo-American material, all the more because he claims that military studies *stricto sensu* have become such an area of research in Great Britain and the United States, partly because of an abundant scientific "demography," and partly because of the less rigid borders between disciplines and institutions which encourage transversal analysis.¹

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1. Notwithstanding this fact the author remains within the French sociological tradition from Durkheim to Aron, though he believes that a few great names is not enough to maintain that there is a particular school of military studies in France. The German context from Clausewitz to Carl Schmitt and Ludendorff, extremely important from the historical point of view, is presented only to a limited extent. See Boëne (2014: 33–34).

Nevertheless, Boëne still displays a very typical French sensibility to the questions of method and his study could be considered a treatise on the methodology of war studies as much as an outline of the approaches to military sociology. And since the book contains graphical presentations and tables it could equally have obtained the status of being “recommended for military academies.” As Jean Baechler, another eminent specialist in the field, observes in his preface to Boëne’s book, there is no way to treat such complex subject other than by “doing philosophy” (p. 11), or, more precisely, by combining sociology, history and philosophy in order to comprehend the reason for violent conflicts between various human “polities.” However, the perspective on these matters which the book provides is full of nuances and is not limited to this triad: the famous question about the “reasons for wars” among different “polities” is far from being his primary concern. The author is rather trying to explain the bad luck, or, more exactly, the malediction that military questions have to deal with in the social sciences. He discusses the profound conviction nurtured by the Enlightenment of the belief that wars “are condemned to disappear.” Social sciences, as we know them, have a “natural born hostility” towards military questions and even Marxist philosophy of history focuses essentially on social conflicts instead of confrontations between the states.²

Therefore, Boëne argues that we should delimit within the social sciences what he calls “the military field of martial action” (*champ militaire de l’action martiale*), and the first part of the book deals with this question. The four essential concepts being proposed are violence, organization, legitimacy and sovereignty. Boëne’s definition of the military domain is as follows: “It covers the phenomena connected to the application, real or potential, of organized legitimate violence that deals with sovereignty (whether it is juristically recognized or not)” (p. 39). These factors are not seen as having the same influence and so the author proposes a sort of historical typology by measuring their impact on the strategic, operative (the intermediate) and tactical echelons connected to the stages of the development of society which constantly develops from an “archetypical martial action” to the “mass war of preindustrial era” which dates back to the middle of the 17th century and continues through to “mass industrial war” (of the middle of 19th century). The period of the Cold War with its “mutual dissuasion” of both camps by the means of nuclear annihilation, Boëne designates as the era of “paradoxical war” when the possibility of a WW-type conflict is almost totally excluded and yet the preparation for a global war accompanied by numerous peripheral conflicts becomes permanent. According to Boëne, this transformation of the military field confirms the thesis of Clausewitz that war is like a “chameleon” (even through in the book he insists that the classic Clausewitzian triad remains relevant to contemporary military studies). Probably, the most evident shift

2. Boëne attests a paradoxical absence of Marxist military theory in the true sense, although many important authors from Engels to Trotsky and Mao showed their interest to the question of war and the Red Army theorists certainly made their contribution to the matter. Boëne refers to Etienne Balibar, who gives three important reason for this phenomena: first, the strict Marxist emphasis on the war between the classes makes conflicts between states a rather secondary factor in the “economy of violence and cruelty”; secondly, an “anthropological optimism” that derives from the Enlightenment and its numerous projects of “eternal peace”; thirdly, a particular “metaphysics of history” seeking to convert violence into justice. See p. 104–105.

in the era of “paradoxical war” is that the border between “external conflicts” and “inner war” became more and more transparent, and for this reason the topics of war and the famous Weberian problem of the “control of violence” within the state should be an object of a complex comprehensive analysis.

Notwithstanding the evolution of military studies, the social sciences still have much trouble in understanding the specificity of the military object, though for very different reasons. The second part of the book is devoted to an analysis of this systematic failure. Boëne discerns two kinds of reductionist approaches to the military object: the first group neglects it “by default” and underestimates it, while the second, on the contrary, uses war as a universal metaphor of social conflict and equally misses the point. Among the “negationist” approaches Boëne picks out those which tend to disqualify war from the evolutionist point of view as an apparent anachronism in the era of Modernity, and those which condemn it methodologically, i.e. by considering military conflicts as something “irrational.” On the other side, theorists inspired by the Machiavelli-Hobbes tradition treat war as an essential model of political relations. Into this category fall not only the 19th century doctrines of social Darwinism or the Schmittian theory of the political, but also the neo-Nietzschean interpretations of social conflicts which have become widespread in France since the 1970s under the influence of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. (This part of the book, in our opinion, has an evident omission: Boëne only briefly mentions this trend without referring to the Levi-Strauss/Clastres discussion of “primitive war” in the structural anthropology which has had a profound influence on the contemporary French philosophy.³) However, for Boëne both of these approaches hardly seem to be relevant to the treatment of the military object because, as he claims, they are not able to explain its specificity and proper place within the social sciences.

Finally, in the third part of the book Boëne scrutinizes various tendencies in the development of the military field, and here again no consensus can be attested between the “anthropological optimism” professing the end of war, and the eschatological rhetoric about the world’s forthcoming collapse. On the one hand, military conflicts in the past thirty years have been less intense and bloody, and have led to significant cuts in defense budgets, along with the ongoing professionalization and demassification of armies causing an unprecedented corrosion in soldiers’ identity and the loss of military prestige which has reached a peak within the national states. On the other hand, one could argue that collateral damage remains important in ongoing conflicts and the funds which had earlier been spent on defense are now invested in internal security. Moreover, the gradual disappearance of military problems from the public discussions is claimed to be asymmetrical to the flourishing of military studies which have recently become an independent research subject. The general solution proposed by Boëne consists of the substitution of the notion of war by a more encompassing and flexible one “military action” (*action militaire*) which could embrace both fields of external conflicts and the internal “control of violence” (p. 222). As Boëne warns, one should never confuse tendency with

3. On the attempts of anthropology to treat the phenomenon of a modern war see Audoin-Rouzeau (2008).

destiny and so there is no apparent evidence whether our brave new world will be a safer place to live in.

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Mortal God—Dying God?

NEGRO PAVÓN D. (2014). IL DIO MORTALE: IL MITO DELLO STATO TRA CRISI EUROPEA E CRISI DELLA POLITICA. ROMA: IL FOGLIO. 109 P. ISBN 978-88-7606-532-3

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The events of the last two months of 2015 which took place in the Europe and, especially in France, renewed once again some questions about the political nature of the EU and that of its members. Should we speak about the EU as a state? Alternatively, an empire? Is it possible to affirm an autonomous statal nature of the members of the EU? Finally, is the current depression in Europe purely economic in character or it is also a political crisis? These problems are not only for political scientists but also for philosophers, and each of them has their own answer. This review outlines one of the possible answers given by the eminent Spanish scholar, member of the Royal Academy of the Political and Social Science, and philosopher Dalmacio Negro Pavón.

The political philosophy of Negro Pavón is based on the recognition of the crucial distinction between Government and State. According to him, Government is the primary institution which existed in each hierarchical human society and whose existence was conditioned by human nature itself. While State was created by Government as a tool helpful for the administration. Each human community from the beginnings of its existence required Government but not State. These are the two main starting points of the Negro Pavón's conception: political life is possible even without State; State is an artificial construction made by Government for the first time at the end of 15th or the beginning of the 16th centuries.

The first forms of western political organization of human life were the Greek *Polis*, the Roman *Urbs*, the Christian *Civitas* o *Res publica Christiana*, the Byzantine *Basileia* and, finally, the State-Nation (p. 17). Leaving out the Byzantine example, Negro Pavón constructs two major lines for the political evolution of Western civilization. The first begins in the *Polis* and leads towards the State-Nation, the second begins in the Roman city

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and leads towards the Christian Republic or, what is the same, the Church¹ and further to Empire. Thus, the modern state, which Negro Pavón, following Bertran de Jouvenel, defines as a “State-Minotaur”, is a monstrous hybrid of the State-Nation and the Church (p. 83–84). However, here I put the cart before the horse and I should backtrack a little.

All of these forms, from *Polis* up to Empire, were the forms of Government and not of State. One more preliminary note. It is quite evident that State became possible only in a Christian or more generally, in a Monotheistic culture. Pagans including the ancient Greeks with their Philosophy or the Romans with their Law could not even imagine State, an artificial identity which embraces everything and absorbs everything. The image that had the most similarity to State was the Aristotelian *Polis*, which was a whole while its citizens were only the parts. However, such form of the political organization was possible only in a small city and no more. The closed structure (one of the hardest questions was to receive the rights of the citizen of the polis) was not able to extend outside its limits. Alexander the Great proved that Aristotle’s theory was not applicable to big spaces.²

Only the appearance of the Christian Church made European States possible, although not in a day. The idea of the single God, who created the universe, visible and invisible, united all Christians under the rule of divine law. That is why the Middle Ages, according to Negro Pavón, cannot be called a time of political theology. Quite the reverse, it was a time of juridical theology, of the theology constructed through law. Within the borders of the Holy Roman Empire and, more widely, of Christian Europe, every political institution was subdued to the law, was the part of the whole regular order. The emperor on one side, and the Pope on the other, both claimed to be God’s vicars. Later European kings of the 13th and 14th centuries declared the same thing. However, the very recognition of Christ’s supremacy, of His existence as the Highest Sovereign unfastened the political space, opened it towards the sacral plane, and finally subdued all the temporal orders to divine law. Government was built into the political universe as a necessary element of the God’s justice.

The appearance of State was first described by Machiavelli and a little later by Vitoria and Bodin and slowly the situation changed beginning by assuming temporal *potestas* and unifying the political space under its control. The demolition of feudal castles, the overcoming of feudal legal customs and, further, the unification of the judicial system within its borders were, in fact, the first steps in the formation of a new political order, known as *absolute monarchies*. During the Reformation, when the Catholic Church had lost much of its power, State began to usurp ecclesiastical *auctoritas*. As a result, State power acquired the sacral character, State became a sacred place, the sources of its sanctity were found within itself. God, in this case, was thrown out of the political order, the State’s political space became closed. The apogee of this process can be seen in the works of Hobbes and Spinoza.

1. More comprehensively Negro Pavón analyzes these lines in his *Introduction to the History of the Forms of the State* (Historia de las formas del Estado: una introducción), published in Madrid at 2010.

2. Here seems convenient to remember that Julius Evola proposed to translate Carl Schmitt’s concept of *Grossraum* as “the space of the Empire” (*spazio imperiale*).

The artificial identity described by Hobbes, and the *Mortal God*, whose name Negro Pavón used as the title for his book, devoured not only Government but also the Church. Negro Pavón accentuates many times the mystical nature of the Hobbesian Leviathan and, at the same time, its closedness as a social system. In contrast to Empire, which was an open-space political structure, the Hobbesian State represents a closed, tight space (like the human body) where political life, in fact, does not exist. This State is, without any doubt, a political object. However, the politic remains only at its external borders not inside. The civil religion established by the sovereign reinforces the mystical nature of State and its genuine independence from the God as a political ruler.

Almost the same can be found in Spinoza's political theology. State emerges as an artificial identity as a result of the social contract. However, and here Spinoza moves further than Hobbes, his State has a potent neutralizing activity. Within its limits, State dissipates the citizens, anticipating any possible conflict, especially religious. In the Spinozian State, the private life of the citizens became private in the full sense of this word. The resident who leaves the public space, even for a short time, becomes closed in his house or the temple of his religion. Only inside, being completely isolated from other people, can he perform the rites of his religion. When he comes outside, he becomes only a citizen, one of many, a little part of the State. This whole space limited by the state borders was completely depoliticized in all senses, it was neutral and without conflict. Neither in the Spinozian nor Hobbesian State were there "people" in the classical meaning of the word. The *populus* disappeared after the creation of State and lost its political subjectivity, being transformed into a multitude of individual citizens.

The State epoch in European history signified a time of closed political subjects who conserved the Politic only in their interrelations but completely demolished it inside themselves. State assumed the functions not only of Government and Church but also, in some sense, of God himself. The autonomy of State law-giving reinforced political autonomy. That is, the only authority remaining within State was State itself. In some sense, a real alternative to State was the Holy Roman Empire, which was an open-space political entity composed of many autonomous principalities. The power of the emperor did not have any mystical components, and the inner space was full of the different political conflicts between not only the principalities but also individuals. That is to say that the inner space of the Holy Roman Empire was not neutral in any sense. I suppose that such inconvenience was one of the reasons for Samuel Pufendorf to call the Holy Empire a "political monster."

The question of the position of individuals in State remains the problem of "state anthropology" (in contrast with political anthropology which does not exist in such conditions). In the neutral space, where political action is not possible, it is substituted with some types of public or, better to say, administrative activity directed towards the "common good." It is crucial in this case to make a strict distinction between the *res publica* of Cicero and other Greek and Roman thinkers, and the "common good" of State. The citizens themselves as "political animals" formulated the first of them and, consequently, this concept reflected their interests and their will. The second defined State, and explained its

goodness and necessity to every citizen as individuals and collectively. In such a way the only unique possible political actor within State, the only entity who could define what was good or bad, right or wrong, was State itself. Its inhabitants, in this case, occupied the position of children who had only the illusion of activity, while State began to define everything in their life, up to the regulation of the sexual conduct or suicide.

The depoliticization (in his book Negro Pavón widely uses the concept elaborated by Carl Schmitt) which took place in Europe during the last two or three centuries converted Europeans into apolitical children incapable of living their lives without recourse to State. To emphasize the difference, I stress the point that the Russian political experience is entirely different according to Negro Pavón's conception, from that of the inhabitants of Empire. The mighty (and sometimes despotic) imperial power which could destroy the life of the individual was, however, very far from the people. There was an absence of the depoliticization and neutralization processes. The citizens were taught from childhood to avoid any contact with State power and resolve any emerging conflicts themselves. All this permitted the elaboration within Russian social culture many formal and, more often, informal ways of conflict resolution, and allowed the creation of a properly political culture. An attempt to change Russia's political form from Empire to State led to the growing political crisis that began just after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Returning Negro Pavón's first question about the political nature of the EU, it is possible to make some principal conclusions. First, the EU cannot be classified as a classical State, although it has a common government, as it lacks other crucial features, such as stable borders, a united legal system, a single political order and, finally, the absence of the other sovereigns within its limits. Secondly, the EU cannot be called an empire though there is an open political space and the many political subjects inside. The leaders of the EU do not recognize one higher sovereign, and do not have any formal subordination between them. Within their states, all of them have a depoliticized and neutralized space and a dissipated and atomized population. Third, the inhabitants of the EU have mostly lost their political culture having been transformed into apolitical children without any real autonomy. Finally, the only exit possible for them, according to Negro Pavón, is to abandon the idea of State and using their constitutive power create a new political order with Government but without State. The actual problem is that State will counteract them using all its power and all the available instruments including the police, the army or even a state of the emergency.

The "Mortal God" of Negro Pavón logically continues his great "Introduction to the History of the Forms of the State". However, this is not a mere continuation which serves only to adjust some details. This brief but deep analysis shows Negro Pavón's approach to the EU's crisis. It is highly significant that such a view was formulated by an intellectual from the Spain—the limitrophe of the EU and published in the Italy, another *enfant terrible* of today's EU. It is fascinating also that Negro Pavón's appraisal of the EU situation coincides in its major points with that formulated by some Russian intellectuals. From both extremes of the European world, it seems to be in a deep depression. Where is the exit? Maybe it is that proposed by Negro Pavón in the "Mortal God" and further devel-

oped in his next book dedicated to the “Iron Law of the Oligarchies” published in Madrid at the end of 2015.

Смертный Бог — умирающий Бог?

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Suppressing the *Fear*, Taming the *Warre*: Early Modern “Post-Machiavellian” Politics

IVANOVA Y., SOKOLOV P. (2014) KROME MAKIAVELLI: PROBLEMA METODA V POLITICHESKIH NAUKAH RANNEGO NOVOGO VREMENI [BESIDES MACHIAVELLI: THE PROBLEM OF METHOD IN THE POLITICAL SCIENCES OF EARLY MODERN PERIOD], MOSCOW: KVADRIGA. 320 P. ISBN 978-5-91791-171-7

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In a sense, this book deals with the ways of taming the underlying civil *Warre* between early modern authors: from the Giambattista Vico’s “most certain criticism of the voluntary action” to Pieter and Johan De la Court’s “therapeutic politics.” The terrifying perspective of the “catastrophe and disaster”, which pushed Machiavelli to the extremes of political amoralism, permeated the reflection of both his admirers and critics, causing them to seek refuge in the Sovereign’s will, in the double-edged rhetoric of the “beneficent violence,” or in the shady hypothesis of the physiological substrate of sociability (W. Harvey, R. Cumberland).

Do not be misled by the title: this book is not about how political theory as a strict discipline found its own method in resisting Machiavellian voluntarism. The authors are well aware that polemics contra Machiavelli are not enough to transform ethical or practical observations into political science. Ivanova and Sokolov have chosen much broader research perspective: if we want to answer the question, “How does method work in political science?”, we need to explore generally how methods have emerged in the humanities. The main question is: what happened in the humanities when they ceased to be a kind of art, but were yet to become a form of institutional knowledge?

This period in European culture does not have a clear interpretation, and it is tempting to reduce it to the problem of independent humanities against the institutional logic of universities and scientific communities. But it would be a bad idea to invert the historical perspective. Even if we could talk about the dispute between Renaissance humanists and institutional logic, it is unlikely that further discussion could be represented as the revenge of the institutions. It is also tempting to see in the development of political science from Machiavelli to Hobbes, the construction of extremely broad world-thinking projects, reducing the political problem to the problem of switching from theory to prac-

tice. Some authors, inspired by the concepts of Hannah Arendt, are likely to do so, but I doubt whether such approach will lead us from the history of philosophy into the realm of the humanities.

Ivanova and Sokolov seriously argue against Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, accusing them of establishing the opposition of ordinary and extraordinary politics, and considering these various concepts of power as attempts to return to the pragmatic sense of ethical actions for a sovereign ruler. The need to analyze sovereignty as an ethical phenomenon led these great minds to see the idea of sovereignty as a fiction of independence, with sophistic more than philosophical roots. For Ivanova and Sokolov, the European concept of sovereignty emerged not from the frustration of the irrational, but from a conscious rationalization of the irrational nature of public interest. State interest is not the courage to act in favor of public or private benefit, but an attempt to overcome the opposition of Public and Private through the introduction of the concept of state itself, in order to transform the rhetorical *topos* of stability and permanence into the *topos* of the state (of affairs).

The peculiar “pan-rhetoricism” of the Ivanova and Sokolov book, their willingness to display political concepts and even political practices from the literal understanding of the rhetorical figures, has an undeniable rationality, even though we cannot accept their arguments as the only possible interpretation of cultural development.

Ivanova and Sokolov’s argument moves from the fact that Renaissance historical, rhetorical and political practices were in the same discourse of non-compulsory decisions, and therefore the structuring of history in the text and the production of political structures were under the same logic. This book marks an effort in new Renaissance studies to focus on the history of practices, rather than the history of individual political figures or ideas.

Despite the absence of an index overcomplicating the use of this insightful book, it is clear that the ideas of such thinkers as Michel Foucault and Quentin Skinner underwent critical processing in the book. The authors discuss at length how ethical guidelines become a device of political theory and of the humanities. Although the link between the armature public occupations of early humanists and the normalization of the political doctrines of modernity is proved in the book with a number of interesting, unexpected and compelling examples, such examples are too scattered throughout the book, and this lack of index and cross-references is frustrating.

The research part of the book takes only 160 pages of the 310-page text. Almost half of the book is comprised of excerpts from the works of the authors discussed, in Russian translation. The reader is invited to look into this anthology, to listen to the original voice of the tradition: Ivanova and Sokolov, as translators, tried to convey the Baroque style, and to reproduce all literary figures and sometimes odd surprises of the style. The book contains the following sources: Book I of the treatise on *The Reason of State* by Giovanni Botero, an excerpt from the book *On the Reason of State* by Lodovico Zuccolo, chapters from the book *On the Mysteries of State* by Arnold Clapmarius, a chapter from the book *Coup d’état* by Gabriel Naudet, and two chapters from the book *On the Consistency of*

Philology by Giambattista Vico. Further there are excerpts from sources which do not treat political problems in the strict sense, but civic life from the point of view of the general laws of the universe. These sources reflect the pursuit to naturalize politics in early modernity. There are chapters from the works: German Konring's *Propolitica*, Paolo Mattia Doria's *Civil Life*, Johan and Pieter de la Court's *Political Discourses and Considerations of State, or Political Balance*, Richard Cumberland's *Treatise on the Laws of Nature*, Giambattista Vico's *On the Study Method of Our Time*, and Johann David Müller's *A Schematic Sketch of the Method of Civil Prudence*. Translations are provided with bibliographical notes and a glossary of key terms, although, unfortunately, a bibliography of these sources and the available translations in Russian or other languages is absent. The commentaries have their legacy in the Soviet tradition, where commentaries on translated texts were the least censored and therefore combined into an encyclopedic reference. Soviet authors achieved real skill in the retelling of a whole scholarly argument in several lines of fine print. The authors of this book have probably not managed to create the impression of the all the world's culture in a few pages but they form an illustration of the friendly circle where Dilthey can be on a par with the Russian professor Makhlin.

The first part of the book, called "Anti-Machiavelli," is devoted to the theological and political controversies in the era of the Counter-Reformation. It is a detailed look at how a complicated exegesis of the Bible helped to explain the notion of community in the secular space, and the work of Caesar Baronius already in this seed have an idea of the church community as a constant source from which volatile civilian communities were deployed. The desire of Church historians to discredit civil life has become its legalization. It can be questioned, whether this legalization was achieved by textual means, or through the establishment of new institutions by papal Rome; this, however, is beyond the scope of the book.

Considering the legacy of Giovanni Botero, a famous critic of Machiavelli, Ivanova and Sokolov demonstrate his work as an eccentric variation of the political ideas of the aesthetics of classicism, such as credibility and hypocrisy. The origins of Diderot's "paradox of the actor" can be seen in the discussion of Botero's criticism of the pretenses of Numa Pompilius. In this case the literary-critical interests of the authors of the book take precedence over ethics and politics, but careful study of the history of exegesis allows them to prove how ways of reading the Bible were transformed for reading profane history.

The authors subtly note that this transformation was not a conscious program, but the result of the inertia of language and familiar formulas, derived from preaching and religious education. Botero "creates a special political-theological logic, which allows him to combine Christianity understood as the immanentist control technology, and Christianity as a form of transcendental justification and propagation of political domination of the Catholic Church throughout the ecumene" (p. 43). If the reader is ready to wade through such a cumbersome phrase, his diligence will be rewarded, just as the zeal of the lover of historical pieces is rewarded with scenic paradoxical characters.

Explicating the intellectual history of the concept of Reason of State, Ivanova and Sokolov see not only a political concept but also a fictive general goal of civilization. Here we could talk about the profanation of divinity, and even about the profanation of Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics. This concept eventually anticipated the neutral concepts of science, such as space.

The end of the first part of the book is an unusual presentation of Giambattista Vico's conception of the origin of social and political life from the experience of shame, not (as ancient authors claimed) from a sense of self-protection, love or friendship. Vico's case is studied as an example of the exhaustion of the old rhetorical arguments invented in favor of political community and the need to invent another reason for its establishment.

The origins of such a concept of shame are rooted in the Renaissance understanding of shame as a means to overthrow tyranny and to restore a republic. It is enough to point to a picture by Lorenzo Lotto (c. 1533), depicting the image of a woman dressed as Lucretia with the figure of Lucretia. Shame was conceived very early as radical political action. Ivanova and Sokolov speak in detail about the tragic form of politics that inspired Vico, presenting radicalism as a kind of tragic aesthetic.

Generally, the book will be not easy for a specialist in political theory to read because of the large number of unexplained terms from literary criticism. It corresponds to the Russian tradition, where literary criticism became, after the discredit of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, the basic norm of humanities. The second part of the book is entitled "Mathesis Politica" (political science), which reconstructs the appearance of the object and method of the science. This part is the most innovative, since for Ivanova and Sokolov the development of the concept of method and the development of natural philosophy are both tools for the inauguration of science. Politics is an area where you have to act like nature—a formula which immediately recalls Aristotle's mimesis. Hence the emergence of political science marks the collapse of the aesthetics of Aristotle.

For Ivanova and Sokolov the legacy of Hobbes is associated not only with a rational philosophy, but with the rhetoric: "once the *a priori* principles for political practice have only a limited import (or else Hobbes would have to return to the humanistic normative model), they must be implemented by the principles that can only be found (in the sense of the rhetorical *inventio*) in, or drawn from social life" (p. 131). Unfortunately, the authors do not give an explanation on how the word "invention" has gained the modern meaning: not a rhetorical search for a suitable material for the speech, as in classics, but the creation of new gadgets for speech and research. It is shown how the political theory of Hobbes, which becomes a kind of general working model of all modern political thinking, contaminated anthropological intuitions, semiotics, natural philosophical arguments, and rhetoric. This reconstruction of work patterns is reminiscent of Soviet semiotics, its "secondary modeling systems."

The semiotics of abstract ideas, as a magic tool of analysis, forcing into existence not only the thoughts and feelings of the people of the past but past concepts and abstract theories, is more than commendable. Interdisciplinary cooperation, necessary for this new approach to Hobbes, relies on the huge cultural erudition of the authors of the book.

If it were not for the need at each page to keep in mind what was said ten pages before, one would immediately take up the translation of this book (in any case, the research part). Such translation would be desirable, after additional linking, indexing and the addition of a full bibliography.

Вытесняя *Fear*, приручая *Warre*: «постмакиавеллистская» политика раннего Нового времени

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