

ISSN 1728-1938

RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

2017 * Volume 16 * Issue 4 (Special Issue)

СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ

2017 * Том 16 * № 4 (Тематический номер)

RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW



2017. Volume 16. Issue 4

Special Issue

“Spontaneous Orders and New Forms of the Social:
Between the Mundane and Institutions”

ISSN 1728-1938

E-mail: puma7@yandex.ru

Web-site: sociologica.hse.ru/en

Address: Staraya Basmannaya str., 21/4, Room A205, Moscow, Russian Federation 105066

Phone: +7-(495)-772-95-90*12454

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief

Alexander F. Filippov

Deputy Editor

Marina Pugacheva

Editorial Board Members

Svetlana Bankovskaya

Nail Farkhatdinov

Andrei Korbut

Internet-Editor

Nail Farkhatdinov

Copy Editors

Karine Schadilova

Perry Franz

Russian Proofreader

Inna Krol

Layout Designer

Andrei Korbut

International Advisory Board

Jeffrey C. Alexander (Yale University, USA)

Gary David (Bentley University, USA)

Nicolas Hayoz (University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

Nikita Kharlamov (Aalborg University, Denmark)

Dmitry Kurakin (HSE, Russian Federation)

Peter Manning (Northeastern University, USA)

Albert Ogien (EHESS, France)

Anne W. Rawls (Bentley University, USA)

Irina Savelyeva (HSE, Russian Federation)

Victor Vakhshayn (RANEP, Russian Federation)

Jaan Valsiner (Aalborg University, Denmark)

Special Issue Editorial Team

Special Issue Editor

Nail Farkhatdinov

Academic Editor

Svetlana Bankovskaya

Literary Editors

Perry Franz

David Connolly

About the Journal

The *Russian Sociological Review* is an academic peer-reviewed journal of theoretical, empirical and historical research in social sciences.

The *Russian Sociological Review* publishes four issues per year. Each issue includes original research papers, review articles and translations of contemporary and classical works in sociology, political theory and social philosophy.

Aims

- To provide a forum for fundamental issues of social sciences.
- To foster developments in social sciences by enriching theoretical language and vocabulary of social science and encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue.
- To provide educational materials for the university-based scholars in order to advance teaching in social sciences.

Scope and Topics

The *Russian Sociological Review* invites scholars from all the social scientific disciplines to submit papers which address the fundamental issues of social sciences from various conceptual and methodological perspectives. Understood broadly the fundamental issues include but not limited to: social action and agency, social order, narrative, space and time, mobilities, power, etc.

The *Russian Sociological Review* covers the following domains of scholarship:

- Contemporary and classical social theory
- Theories of social order and social action
- Social methodology
- History of sociology
- Russian social theory
- Sociology of space
- Sociology of mobilities
- Social interaction
- Frame analysis
- Ethnomethodology and conversation analysis
- Cultural sociology
- Political sociology, philosophy and theory
- Narrative theory and analysis
- Human geography and urban studies

Our Audience

The *Russian Sociological Review* aims at both academic and non-academic audiences interested in the fundamental issues of social sciences. Its readership includes both junior and established scholars.

Subscription

The *Russian Sociological Review* is an open access electronic journal and is available online for free via <http://sociologica.hse.ru/en>.

СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ



2017. Том 16. № 4

Тематический номер

«Spontaneous Orders and New Forms of the Social:
Between the Mundane and Institutions»

ISSN 1728-1938

Эл. почта: puma7@yandex.ru

Веб-сайт: sociologica.hse.ru

Адрес редакции: ул. Старая Басманная, д. 21/4, к. А205, Москва 105066

Тел.: +7-(495)-772-95-90*12454

Редакционная коллегия

Главный редактор

Александр Фридрихович Филиппов

Зам. главного редактора

Марина Геннадиевна Пугачева

Члены редколлегии

Светлана Петровна Баньковская

Андрей Михайлович Корбут

Наиль Галимханович Фархатдинов

Редактор веб-сайта

Наиль Галимханович Фархатдинов

Литературные редакторы

Каринэ Акоповна Щадилова

Перри Франц

Корректор

Инна Евгеньевна Кроль

Верстальщик

Андрей Михайлович Корбут

Международный редакционный совет

Николя Айо (Университета Фрибура, Швейцария)

Джеффри Александер (Йельский университет, США)

Яан Вальсинер (Университет Ольборга, Дания)

Виктор Семенович Вахштайн (РАНХиГС, Россия)

Гэри Дэвид (Университет Бенгли, США)

Дмитрий Юрьевич Куракин (НИУ ВШЭ, Россия)

Питер Мэннинг (Северо-восточный университет, США)

Альбер Ожбен (Высшая школа социальных наук, Франция)

Энн Уорфилд Роулз (Университет Бенгли, США)

Ирина Максимовна Савельева (НИУ ВШЭ, Россия)

Никита Алексеевич Харламов (Университет Ольборга, Дания)

Редакционная коллегия тематического номера

Редактор номера

Наиль Фархатдинов

Научный редактор

Светлана Баньковская

Литературные редакторы

Перри Франц

Дэвид Конноли

О журнале

«Социологическое обозрение» — академический рецензируемый журнал теоретических, эмпирических и исторических исследований в социальных науках. Журнал выходит четыре раза в год. В каждом выпуске публикуются оригинальные исследовательские статьи, обзоры и рефераты, переводы современных и классических работ в социологии, политической теории и социальной философии.

Цели

- Поддерживать дискуссии по фундаментальным проблемам социальных наук.
- Способствовать развитию и обогащению теоретического словаря и языка социальных наук через междисциплинарный диалог.
- Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

Область исследований

Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильности, власть, нарративы, события и т. д.

В частности, журнал «Социологическое обозрение» публикует статьи по следующим темам:

- Современные и классические социальные теории
- Теории социального порядка и социального действия
- Методология социального исследования
- История социологии
- Русская социальная мысль
- Социология пространства
- Социология мобильности
- Социальное взаимодействие
- Фрейм-анализ
- Этнометодология и разговорный анализ
- Культурсоциология
- Политическая социология, философия и теория
- Нарративная теория и анализ
- Гуманитарная география и урбанистика

Наша аудитория

Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудитории, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

Подписка

Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: <http://sociologica.hse.ru/>. Чтобы получать сообщения о свежих выпусках, подпишитесь на рассылку журнала по адресу: farkhatdinov@gmail.com.

Contents

EDITORIAL

- Sociology and the Problem of Order. 7
Alexander F. Filippov, Nail Farkhatdinov

ARTICLES

- Spontaneous Order and Relational Sociology: From the Scottish Enlightenment
to Human Figurations. 14
Alex Law
- Getting Order Out of Chaos: A Mathematical Model of Political Conflict 37
Georg P. Mueller
- Social Imagination and Solidarity in Precarious Times: The Case of Lower Class
People in Post-Soviet Russia 53
Karine Clément
- Precarity: Local Disorders or New Global Order? 72
Vyacheslav Bobkov, Vadim Kvachev
- Interactional Lenses for Contemporary Migration Studies: The Case of the
“Cosmopolitan Sociability” Concept. 87
Maxim L. Ni, Pavel P. Lisitsyn

BOOK REVIEWS

- Some Features of an Inspiring Book; or: Why Sociologists Should Study Love
Despite Its Intangibility 105
Irina Trotsuk
- Book Review: Matthew Ratcliffe, *Experiences of Depression: A Study in
Phenomenology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 119
Anna Yampolskaya
- Political Augustinism Revival. 125
Alexander Marey

Содержание

ОТ РЕДАКЦИИ

- Социология и проблема порядка 7
Александр Филиппов, Наиль Фархатдинов

СТАТЬИ

- Спонтанный порядок и реляционная социология: от Шотландского Просвещения к человеческим фигурациям 14
Алекс Ло

- Возникновение порядка из хаоса: математическая модель политического конфликта 37
Георг П. Мюллер

- Социальное воображение и солидарность в прекарное время: случай трудящихся классов в постсоветской России 53
Карин Клеман

- Неустойчивость: локальные беспорядки или новый глобальный порядок? . . . 72
Вячеслав Бобков, Вадим Квачев

- Перспективы интеракционистского анализа в современных миграционных исследованиях: случай «космополитического общения» 87
Максим Ни, Павел Лисицын

РЕЦЕНЗИИ

- Какой должна быть вдохновляющая социологическая книга, или Почему нужно изучать столь неуловимую любовь 105
Ирина Троцук

- Рецензия: *Matthew Ratcliffe. Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 119
Анна Ямпольская

- Возрождение политического августинизма 125
Александр Марей

Sociology and the Problem of Order*

In April 2017 the editorial board of Russian Sociological Review announced a call for papers for its regular annual special issue. We invited scholars from a broad range of social science disciplines to reflect on one of the core problems of sociology — social order. The papers collected here are valuable contributions to their respective fields covering this more general one. We selected them from many proposals and draft manuscripts under a meticulous procedure of peer-review but, while being satisfied with the result of this selection, we cannot but confess a slight disappointment reconsidering our own starting point. It seems less sophisticated now; we could have got more diverse papers if we formulated better what we aimed to achieve. While still recognizing the role of globalization and the omnipresence of global flows, financial institutions, and cultural patterns of everyday action worldwide, we aimed to produce a volume composed of papers dedicated to various instances of what seems to be disorderly practices but eventually turns out to be a specific form of order. Spontaneous orders, we argued in our call for papers, “may reveal themselves in various configurations of order and disorder, in unprecedented or partially transformed situations, or in episodes of social life in time and space. The novelty may be traced by unexpected events or by issues of communication, by the distribution of sources and by the shifting of centers of activities, or by the composition of new types of inert communication. Spontaneous orders relate to the shop floor of the Social where new forms of interaction emerge and get tested. The times and situations, when the dominant tendencies are not yet defined, and the future is still open, are the most favorable to these orders.” Now it is time to revisit our initial concerns to add a few lines of further clarification for our starting position.

This issue is a part of a larger project of the Centre for Fundamental Sociology. In recent years we have been trying to re-arrange the basic concepts of social science and make them more appropriate for catching new changes in social reality. For us, they are not ahistorical, sterilized tools of analysis but — in a sense — something that belongs to the social reality itself. We cannot think of any theoretical work without the relevant historical studies of the concepts. In our studies of the history of social and political thought we go centuries back to follow the complicated dynamics of seemingly universal concepts, such as state, society, power, authority, conflict. The same can be said about more recent concepts. Every historian of political thought knows that concepts are slow

© Alexander F. Filippov, 2017

© Nail Farkhatdinov, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-7-13

* The publication of this paper is supported by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

to change, they are not simply reflections of social reality but rather outdated descriptive tools. That is the penalty: researchers regularly apply concepts which bear traces of previous decades (if not centuries) to situations which are changing dramatically. It was our idea to take a step forward before the inadequacy of the commonly accepted conceptions strike back.

In the announcement we wrote:

Undoubtedly, we agree that today's global phenomena such as flows and networks cover the world and horizontal connections continue to be omnipresent like any other new global social institution. Yet nowadays, radical changes are taking place that will become more sophisticated on the global scale, and will question and reduce the importance of what used to be a symptom of globalization. This is exemplified through the new reinforcement of the State, the reducing power of international legal institutions and the authority of the international organizations, the emergence of new forms of spontaneous order everywhere, and the growing avalanche of information on various episodes of social interaction. Globalization is questioned with respect to the process of the blurring of political borders of states and other territories. Where social events take place, states gain their role as a main social unity anew. Still, they are permeated by global flows. The interaction of the global and the local takes a new shape. Furthermore, new forms of social interaction emerge, and it is not possible to definitely classify them as global or local. Neither traditional institutional nor newer network- and flow-inspired languages of description can be used to make sense of them. These interactions — often spontaneous, slightly formed, and embedded in the routine practices — may emerge and then quickly dissolve. However, they may become the origin of the yet-unknown future.

So, we tried to discard outdated views and conceptions, however, the idea of globalization being still in fashion, preoccupied our arguments even in the form of critical evaluation. It overshadowed two more significant concepts, central for any practically oriented sociological theory: *event* and *order*.

The concept of *event* appears here as a *terminus technicus* taken for granted by everybody; although a category of great importance, it is rarely clarified in sociological texts. For us, social events occurring in space and time are something that can be directly observed in social life. Nobody has ever seen a system, an institute or even a (the) society or social action. What we (both as lay agents and sociologically trained observers) can get immediate access to are always events as occurrences correlative to observations. They would be remembered, narrated or expected. Through expectations and narrations, we get the order of events. Every social order would be considered then as an order of events, absent in the past, emerging now and passing away in the future. If we are interested in what is occurring, we need an optic to observe events so that we can narrate a story remembering the sequences or circulations of events or describe future events as being expected according to the experience of their occurrences. Therefore, for a *thick description* of social reality we need not any theory but several narrations about events or, better, descriptions of ordered events in narrated episodes.

We also need a more elaborated conception of spontaneous order. For the classics of social sciences, *order* was one of the central concepts. “Order and progress”, “the Hobbesian problem of order”, “How is social order possible?”, “There is no Order in the Plenum” — these are the most famous formulations. According to Robert A. Nisbet, “[t]he fundamental ideas of European sociology are best understood as responses to the problem of order created at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the collapse of the old regime under the blows of industrialism and revolutionary democracy”¹. Those responses contained, in turn, other, more modern ideas of order. The concept of order was to be found at the core of the theories now generally acknowledged as classical. Sociology as a great project claimed the place traditionally occupied by the philosophy of law and politics. The *social* was its mode of thinking about order. Social order would be established amidst the social by the social itself. Niklas Luhmann, the last sociologist of the last century to be aware of the consequences of the radical break with the traditions sociology undertook, described it once as follows: “Classical social theories have answered the question of what makes social order possible by reference to normative conditions: to natural law, the social contract, or consensual morality. This has also been true for sociology, for Durkheim, and for Talcott Parsons. However, Parsons pointed the way to an alternative, which is not, however, unchecked but assigned to the still normative meaning of codes and shared symbolic values. It lies in the theory of symbolically generalized media”². Sociology inherited from earlier legal and political thought not only the idea of order as such but also the idea of a *normative* order, produced in a society which solves its problems after the revolutionary downfall of the traditional hierarchy of orders. However, in Parsons’ theory of action and system integration Luhmann saw another way of thinking about order, without direct appeal to consensual agreement and generally accepted norms. Luhmann elaborated and radically transformed this theory to free it from superfluous normative content. For him, interconnected communications became momentarily operations of self-creating (autopoietic) systems. In fact, he no longer needed the concept of order. We shall come back to this.

The idea of *order* appears more often not in sociology but in other social sciences; it looks today — at least in respect to Google search — as mainly *the* libertarian and even anarchistic concept. Thousands of publications referring to F. A. von Hayek, L. von Mises, M. Rothbard etc. as the founding fathers of spontaneous order theories belong to this discursive field and demonstrate a rather slow development in its main arguments³. As Stephan Kinsella puts it, “modern libertarian theory is only about five decades old”, and after five decades of development “there remains a need for treatments of the ideas of liberty that are explicitly anchored in antistate, Austrian-Misesian, and systematic Rothbardian ideas”⁴. Just a couple of arguments taken from the works of von Hayek will il-

1. Nisbet R. A. (2009). *The Sociological Tradition*. New Brunswick: Transaction. P. 21.

2. Luhmann N. (2012). *Theory of Society*, Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press. P. 190.

3. See e.g. an earlier attempt at reconstructing this tradition of thought in: Barry N. (1982). *The Tradition of Spontaneous Order // Literature of Liberty*. Vol. 5. № 2. P. 7–58.

4. Kinsella S. N. (2015). Foreword // Rachels C. *A Spontaneous Order: The Capitalist Case for a Stateless Society*. CreateSpace. P. 7, 9.

lustrate this idea⁵. In *Law, Legislation and Liberty* he describes the distinction drawn between *made order* and *spontaneous order* as follows: “The made order which we have already referred to as an exogenous order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed social order, as an organization. The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order”⁶. Whereas *made order*, or *taxis*, would be of moderate complexity, concrete (perceived) and arranged purposely, *grown* (spontaneous) order, or *cosmos*, can (but would not necessarily) be of great complexity; “they will often consist of a system of abstract relations between elements which are also defined only by abstract properties, and for this reason will not be intuitively perceivable and not recognizable except on the basis of a theory accounting for their character”⁷. An individual action can be purposive but an order of actions or an order as an aggregated result of actions will be not. Hayek did not belong to sociology in the narrow sense. More striking are the resemblances between his explications of order and those of, say, Talcott Parsons⁸. Here is another quotation from Hayek: “The order of society is therefore a factual state of affairs which must be distinguished from the regularity of the conduct of individuals. It must be defined as a condition in which individuals are able, on the basis of their own respective peculiar knowledge, to form expectations concerning the conduct of others, which are proved correct by making possible a successful mutual adjustment of the actions of these individuals”⁹. These theoretical elaborations could be of first-rank importance to sociology but were largely ignored by the discipline which took its own direction. The theory of spontaneous order influenced other areas of knowledge; it was not sociology but *another* project of a general theory of action. The same can be said about the praxeology of von Mises. The ideological, libertarian bias of the theories of this kind was one of the reasons why they remained without much influence on sociology.

The proponents of spontaneous order trace it back to through a centuries-long tradition reaching to John Locke and even to Hugo Grotius. Sociologists could say the same about the history of their science — when the history of their science was important for them. The tradition of sociology is broken now, as far as sociologists refuse the concept

5. See: Kley R. (2011). *Hayek's Social and Political Thought*, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 26ff., 111ff. for a thorough reconstruction of von Hayek's conception of spontaneous order.

6. Hayek F. A. (1983). *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P. 37.

7. Ibid. P. 39.

8. Cf.: “Factual order . . . connotes essentially accessibility to understanding in terms of logical theory, especially of science. . . . Normative order, on the other hand, is always relative to a given system of norms or normative elements whether ends, rules or other norms. Order in this sense means that process takes place in conformity with the paths laid down in the normative system” (*Parsons T.* [1966]. *The Structure of Social Action*. New York: The Free Press. P. 91). The following, with reference to Max Weber's distinction drawn between an order based on agreement and an imposed order, is also worth mentioning: “[F]or one who holds an order to be legitimate, living up to its rules becomes, to this extent, a matter of moral obligation” (Ibid. P. 661).

9. Hayek F. A. (1982). *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas*. London: Routledge. P. 9.

of order¹⁰. Fields, systems, networks and the like supersede order in sociology. Other disciplines re-establish themselves as the sciences of social order. We are trying to demonstrate, that in sociology, nevertheless, the concept still remains fruitful; this is a source not to be neglected.

Let us confront Hayek with Luhmann again¹¹. They both studied the organization of events. The differences are nonetheless great. For Hayek, significantly organized events were (if not the cosmic occurrences of nature) “events of actions”¹². Actions are done by individuals with or without any idea of order in mind. “While the deliberate use of spontaneous ordering forces (that is, of the rules of individual conduct which lead to the formation of a spontaneous general order) thus considerably extends the range and complexity of actions which can be integrated into a single order, it also reduces the power anyone can exercise over it without destroying the order. The regularities in the conduct of the elements in a cosmos determine merely its most general and abstract features”¹³. Hayek, therefore, is not interested in the sustained production of different restricted orders through spontaneous activity. Rules are akin to law; law and legislation are the visible purpose of his basic statements¹⁴. For Luhmann, as we mentioned, events are communications. Communications are elements, i.e., they have their component parts but cannot be divided into those parts again, each communication is related to another communication, it has meaning through its relations to other communications, not to any events in the world. “All operations in coupled systems are only events that are over as soon as they occur. They must therefore produce the difference from the environment through a sequence of matching operations. This requires memories specific to systems. Although the memory participates only in the system’s own operations, remembering or forgetting only its own operations, it presents the outcomes (products) of operations on the basis of the distinction between self-reference and other-reference”¹⁵. This is the most problematic point. What is the *sequence*? For Luhmann, it is a circular relation. Events are over as soon as they occur, however, through the memory of the system, the events emerging now are related to the previous events of the same sequence. “The theory of

10. “[T]he eternal problems of social order”, Richard Grathoff wrote in his Introduction to the Schutz-Parsons correspondence (*Grathoff R.* [1978]. Introduction // *Grathoff R.* (ed.). *The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. P. XXI), however, in sociology, it does not seem so eternal now as it used to be. Erving Goffman’s “the interaction order” and Harold Garfinkel’s explications of the order of ordinary practices are rather exclusive options, not the mainstream of contemporary sociology. Cf.: *Kim K.-ki.* (2003). *Order and Agency in Modernity: Talcott Parsons, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

11. Cf. the excellent contribution by Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça (*Vasconcelos Vilaça G.* [2010]. From Hayek’s Spontaneous Orders to Luhmann’s Autopoietic Systems // *Studies in Emergent Order*. Vol. 3. P. 50–81). However, we cannot accept his main idea. The theory of an autopoietic system is not another and better version of the concept of order. It rather precluded Luhmann from making his theory more flexible.

12. The notion itself comes from Parsons.

13. *Hayek*. *New Studies*. P. 75.

14. In Vasconcelos Vilaça’s concise wording, “law is the stepping stone of the entire analysis of social order by Hayek. In fact, he admits that the spontaneous order of market (and action in general) crucially depends on the existence of specific legal arrangements” (*Vasconcelos Vilaça*. Op. cit. P. 54).

15. *Luhmann*. Op. cit.. P. 66.

complexity then requires recursive operations, in other words recursion to and anticipation of other, non-actual operations *in the same system*. It then no longer suffices to represent system development as a decision tree or cascade; recursion itself becomes a form in which the system enables boundaries to be drawn and structures to be formed¹⁶. There is however no reason to identify these non-actual operations as always the operations *in the same system*. If Hayek too readily presupposes law as a condition for spontaneous orders, Luhmann too readily presupposes systems as the most appropriate place for communicative events. He was the only one who correctly elaborated the key notion of the event of communication, however, he could have — but he did not — take a step in another direction, towards a theory of multifold orders of communication, instead of to a theory of autopoiesis and autopoietic systems. Memory, recursion and “sameness” do not mean systems only. He could learn something more from Hayek, Goffman and Garfinkel. This is what remains to be done. Through a unified theory of communication, through a re-thematization of the history of political philosophy, the unity of social sciences can be re-established with a new interest in the concept of order. We can find and make more use of these resources if we take them without theoretical prejudice or dogma.

At the end of this brief reconsideration of our call for papers, we would like to introduce the papers that compose the special issue this year.

A historical account of the origins of the notion of spontaneous order opens the issue. The paper by Alex Law provides a theoretical ground for the understanding of spontaneous order and compares the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment and the sociology of Norbert Elias. The paper argues that the contemporary globalized world often labeled as neoliberal and globalized can be more adequately described once the vocabulary of relational sociology — a dominant one nowadays — is revised. Alex Law suggests that going back to the Scottish Enlightenment and Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology provides conceptual insights for the empirical work related to the understanding of the contemporary controversies of the interrelations of state, society and market. The next paper by Georg P. Mueller addresses the processes of how social order emerges in a more classical and methodologically rigorous way. Using mathematical modeling the paper approaches political processes and particularly protests, and studies the strategies of how a new social order may emerge as a result of protests, i.e. via the government’s response towards protests. Karine Clément presents the results of empirical studies of how people from lower classes in Russia cope with instability and atomization and still engage in the processes of building social ties and networks. In doing this she introduces one of the mainstream sociological agendas to our issue — precarity. Despite the fact that spontaneity and the emergent nature of contemporary spontaneous order is often difficult to grasp within conventional notions, precarity provides an example of an influential domain of research that puts this task in the forefront. The second paper dedicated to precarity discusses the nature of labor in contemporary society. It does not seem surprising at all that this field of research has become the most sensitive to the issue of spontaneous order. In their paper

16. Ibid. P. 80. Italics added.

Vyacheslav Bobkov and Vadim Kvachev focus on the significant transformations that the contemporary labor market undergo and argue — quite conventionally — that old sociological notions are not relevant anymore. In general precarity has become more than just an academic notion and this fact shows that despite the mainstream preoccupation with transformations there is still demand for the discussion of what social order looks like at least in the field of labor. The final paper of the issue by Maxim Ni and Pavel Lisitsyn explores another widespread topic of contemporary studies of globalization and identity — cosmopolitanism. Their paper uses a micro-sociological approach (ethnomethodology and interaction rituals theory) in order to reveal how cosmopolitan sociability takes form and stabilizes on the basis of spontaneous forms of interaction and communication. It is an example of how micro-sociological studies can be integrated into the studies of order which are often considered to be macro-phenomena in the mainstream sociological tradition.

The issue also contains three book reviews. Alexander Marey's review considers the book by José-Luis Villacañas in political theology and philosophy and in this respect may be of interest to those who are more concerned with the genealogy of concepts and the studies of political order. The reviews by Irina Trotsuk and Anna Yampolskaya are dedicated to the books that approach what are commonly considered to be non-sociological issues — love and depression. According to Trotsuk, the book by Eva Illouz *Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation* enables us to see in love more than just a romantic feeling but a foundational opportunity for contemporary people to build up their identities and self-respect. *Experiences of Depression* by Matthew Ratcliffe reviewed by Anna Yampolskaya looks at depression from a phenomenological perspective, yet the reviewer recommends the book to sociologists since it challenges many of the notions that social scientist takes for granted (such as “situatedness” and agency).

With this issue we hope to continue the discussion of key fundamental issues of contemporary sociology and to draft a possible direction of future research.

Alexander F. Filippov
Nail Farkhatdinov

Spontaneous Order and Relational Sociology: From the Scottish Enlightenment to Human Figurations

Alex Law

PhD, Division of Sociology, Abertay University
Address: Bell St., Dundee, DD1 1HG, UK
E-mail: a.law@abertay.ac.uk

If viewed from a long-term and large-scale perspective, human interdependencies today can be seen as approaching species integration on a worldwide level. However, emergent worldwide processes of integration and differentiation tend to be reduced to static concepts such as “governmentality”, “globalization”, “cosmopolitanization”, “mobilities”, and “networks”, helping to obscure the mundane processes of institution formation, in particular the tenacious endurance of the nation-state. This paper argues that the pathological realism of neoliberal globalization today can be more adequately approached by engaging with the historical precursors of the so-called “relational turn” in contemporary sociology. The earlier relational sociology of the Scottish enlightenment, particularly Adam Ferguson (1767), Adam Smith (1776) and David Hume (1739) developed ideas of spontaneous order and such related concepts as “the invisible hand” and “unintended consequences” in an attempt to understand and control the rapid transformation of Scotland, a relatively under-developed economy on the edge of Europe. The Scottish spontaneous order tradition is compared to Elias’s idea of “figuration” as an unplanned but patterned process of increasingly complex and opaque social interdependencies and functional democratization. This process appears to have reached definite limits. Humanity is ensnared in a compelling global double-bind process of armed states that continue to threaten, endanger and fear each other, and a pervasive elite belief in the spontaneous efficiency and self-correcting mechanisms of the global “magic market”.

Keywords: spontaneous order, Scottish enlightenment, Norbert Elias, human figurations, national habitus, relational sociology

When one considers what a great number of sounds, forms reach us at every moment of our existence . . . nothing is easier than to configure! Configure! For a split second this word took me by surprise like a wild beast in a dark forest, but it soon sank into the hurly-burly of the seven people sitting here, talking, eating, supper going on.

Witold Gombrowicz, *Cosmos*

From plans arising, yet unplanned
By purpose moved, yet purposeless

Norbert Elias, *The Society of Individuals*

Introduction

If viewed from a long-term and large-scale perspective, human interdependencies today can be seen as approaching species integration on a worldwide level. However, emergent worldwide processes of integration and differentiation tend to be reduced to static concept-things such as “governmentality”, “globalization”, “cosmopolitanization”, “mobilities”, and “networks”, helping to obscure the mundane processes of institution formation, in particular the tenacious endurance of the nation-state. In response to unplanned processes, static concepts either bewail or celebrate new global threats and opportunities. Fantasy “they-images” of the dangerous outsider and inter-state rivalries are today bolstered by what the American sociologist Charles Wright Mills (1958) sixty years ago called “crackpot realism”. Mills (1958: 90) was referring to the dogmatic calculus of the “power elite”, political, media, economic and military managers who imposed gross simplifications on contested realities, reacting to foreshortened time horizons and shifting events which threaten to overwhelm: “The crackpot realist does not know what he will do next; he is waiting for another to make a move”. Moral and political dilemmas, Mills feared, were being sacrificed to a mythical belief in “the autonomous forces of the magic market” where “the unintended consequences of many wills form a pattern and that this pattern ought to be allowed to work itself out” (Mills, 2008: 101). With Hayek’s reformulation of unintended consequences, the concept was transformed from an enlightened means of orientation to foster human improvement and self-knowledge into the counter-enlightenment denial that planned improvement and foreknowledge were at all possible or even desirable (Ullmann-Margalit, 1997).

This paper argues that the pathological realism of neoliberal globalization can be more adequately approached by engaging with the historical precursors of the so-called “relational turn” in contemporary sociology. It traces the genealogy of the relational sociology of spontaneous order to the Scottish enlightenment, particularly Adam Ferguson (1767), Adam Smith (1776) and David Hume (1739) (Smith, 2009), in order to situate the present concerns of relational theory with mundane social change to the rapid social and economic transformation of a peripheral society on the margins of eighteenth-century Europe, a transformation unparalleled until the Meiji restoration in Japan after 1868 and

the gargantuan scale and breakneck pace of Stalin's forced industrialization of the USSR in the 1930s. While Adam Smith's ideas of the "invisible hand", the role of sympathy in emotional solidarity and the "impartial spectator" as a self-reflexive observer of others are well known, this paper also considers the early contribution of Smith's compatriot David Hume to nascent sociology, which, compared to his political histories and moral philosophy, is less well understood. Hume's approach to relational interdependencies fostered by "sympathy" represented what Duncan Forbes (1975: 106) called "the high-watermark of his sociological imagination". Although he did not use the term — the first use of "spontaneous order" is attributed to Michael Polanyi (1951) two hundred years later (Jacobs, 1999) — much of the spontaneous order tradition traces its roots to Adam Ferguson's proto-sociology of civil society. This contained the essential features of later relational theories *in statu nascendi*, albeit with significant differences, and exerted a profound influence on thinkers as different as Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Hayek, Foucault and Elias (Hill, 2006; Petsoulas, 2001).

The founding of the spontaneous order tradition by the Scottish enlightenment groped towards what has more recently been described as "relational sociology" (Emirbayer, 1997). While relational sociology takes various forms, at its core it shares with the Scottish enlightenment a conception of interdependent social relations as a reality *sui generis*. As Hume (2007 [1772]: 80) expressed the common assumption underlying the earlier form of relational sociology: "The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent."

In this paper the Scottish spontaneous order tradition is compared to the more recent "relational turn" in sociology, focusing particularly on Norbert Elias's notion of "figuration" as an unplanned but patterned social process of social interdependencies and functional democratization. This allows some conclusions to be drawn about the sociology of the unintended yet anticipated consequences of pathological realism today.

Nominalization and Human Figurations

"How does it happen at all", the sociologist Norbert Elias (2012a: 404) asked, "that formations arise in the human world that no single individual has intended, and which are anything but cloud-like formations without stability or structure?" Elias found a simple enough answer in the "compelling dynamics" of human figurations as a spontaneous order. Here the "whole secret" of the figuration as a blind process consists in how "from the interweaving of countless individual interests and intentions — whether tending in the same direction or in divergent and hostile directions — something comes into being that was not planned and intended by any of these individuals yet emerged nevertheless from their intentions and actions" (Ibid.: 346–347). Elias (Ibid.: 526) compared figurations to a social dance, a structure relatively independent of specific dancers, in the sense that these dancers could be replaced by others, but never of individual dancers themselves.

Spontaneous order forms the central paradox of figurational processes. As individuals cooperate or conflict with each other their interdependent relations create “an order *sui generis*, an order more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of individual people composing it” (Ibid.: 404). Asymmetrical power ratios are often conceived as formed either by the *independent* relations of hermetically isolated agents exercising free-will or by the *dependent* relations of the unilateral domination of powerless subordinates. In such cases, the individual and society appear as distinct and even antithetical to each other. By contrast, for relational sociology *interdependencies* always shape the possibilities for action, to varying degrees, for all sides of the relationship (Elias, 2012b: 125). Sociologists in the spontaneous order tradition therefore attempt to explain both sides of a single process: purposeful inter-personal action and unintended impersonal consequences. What Elias (2012a: 403) termed the “civilizing process” occurs over many centuries without purposive planning by individuals yet at the same time it “is not merely a sequence of unstructured and chaotic changes”. It evinces a discernible pattern and direction across time.

As the chains of interdependency become longer, more dense and opaque the overall shape of the figuration becomes more difficult to discern for the people ensnared in it. A more open or latent ambivalence among people tends to characterise more opaque relations of interdependency. As Elias (Ibid.: 352) put it: “All people, all groups, estates or classes, are in some way dependent on one another; they are potential friends, allies or partners; and they are at the same time potential opponents, competitors or enemies”. Feelings of affection and enmity are muted to varying degrees by the contradictory demands of complex figurations, particularly where groups attain more or less equal power chances that cancel out each other. This results in a tension-balance where no side is capable of unilaterally imposing its will on the other. More or less evenly balanced contending sides come to be regulated by a centralised authority, above all the machinery of state. Again, neither side of the inter-dependent relationship planned this outcome. It is set in train by the mutual compulsions of the entire figuration.

Earlier attempts to grasp this process remained trapped in functionalist ideals about the rational designs of the mind. One such attempt was Hegel’s “cunning of reason” which proceeds by allowing “the passions” to act on behalf of “the general Idea”, “the ultimate purpose of the world”, which mysteriously uses the concrete particulars of actual historical agents so that historical necessity may somehow triumph whatever the intentions of the people involved (Hegel, 1975: 89). Nevertheless, Hegel was wrestling with a genuine paradox of his time. As social processes are experienced increasingly as exerting a compelling force beyond the control of people, impersonal metaphors, nouns and static categories come to be adopted as a standard mode of communication about human integration (Elias, 2012b: 86–87). The reduction of processes to static concepts makes it more difficult to understand the socio-historical momentum of spontaneous orders (Mennell, 1992).

Sociological thinking has come to be dominated by what Billig (2013: 144–161) calls “the big nouns”, concept-things such as “governmentality”, “globalization”, “cosmopoli-

tanization”, “mobilities”, and “networks”. Noun phrases, terms for *things*, are made to do the heavy lifting for sociological explanation by subordinating or displacing verbs, terms for *action*. Critical discourse analysts identify “nominalization”, the process of converting a clause into a nominal or a noun, as a way of deleting people and action from language (Billig, 2008). Yet the use of “nominalization”, a verb turned noun, commits even critical discourse analysts to similar processes of “agent-deletion”. Paradoxically, concepts of globalization, governmentality and networks and so on rely on the very forms of de-personalization that its proponents seek to unmask. As Billig (2013: 152) argues, the more that sociologists produce concepts as things, the more that the research agenda uncovers ever more examples of the concept-thing, the more that the concept-thing is taken for reality by researchers.

Nominalization is not a new problem for sociology. In the 1960s Norbert Elias (2009) sharply criticised both the “nominalist metaphysics” of Karl Popper’s hypothetico-deductive logic of science and Talcott Parsons’s “analytical realism”. Both Mills and Elias had reason to challenge the dominant post-war sociological meta-theory of Parsons. In elaborating history-structure-biography as a single sociological process, Mills (1959: 23) famously excoriated the “Grand Theory” of Parsons for its “elaborate and arid formalism” as an unintelligible, “rather abstract and static” conceptual system. Impervious to specific empirical problems, Mills argued that Grand Theory functioned less as an explanatory model and more as an exercise in ideological legitimization for elite we-ideals of an American Cold War normative consensus. Elias (2012a: 497–501) levelled similar charges, if less polemically, that Parsons reduced diachronic processes to short-term, static and stand-alone categories of “the individual” separated from a homeostatic “social system”, where social change defied empirical explication and occurred only as a “malfunction” of an otherwise normatively consensual social system. Like Mills, for Elias (Ibid.: 510) Parsons conflated empirical analyses and normative ideals in a meta-theoretical system which resembled the idealised self-image of America as a well-integrated, harmonious and democratic nation of equals.

In the case of Parsons’s contemporary, Robert Merton (1936) “the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action” referred to “the sum-total or concrete consequences” for the actor and other persons mediated by the social structure, culture and civilization. Merton (1968) later designated such outcomes in terms of the functional needs required by “the social system”, for instance the need for group cohesion or institutional reproduction secured through an unintended “latent function” as well as its foreseen or “manifest function” in the reproduction of a social system. In so doing, Merton conflated the “unintended” aggregate effects of a myriad of informal individual actions and the “unanticipated” effects of formal institutional action as more self-conscious forms of decision-making.

From such premises, *unintended* consequences increasingly came to be identified with or used as a synonym for *unanticipated* consequences. Yet, unintended perverse effects can be either foreseen or unforeseen (Boudon, 1982). As de Zwart (2015: 286) notes, “unanticipated consequences can only be unintended, but unintended consequences can

be either anticipated or unanticipated, a distinction lost in the single opposition of ‘intended’ versus ‘unintended.’” This conflation serves politicians, managers, policy-makers, and analysts who take considerable measures to ascertain the likely outcomes of their purposive actions, and so are not “unanticipated”, to evade responsibility for their actions. Undesirable outcomes — say military violence, economic crisis or widening inequalities — are excused on the basis that they were unforeseen. Yet, while the deleterious consequences may have been an unintended side-effect of some other priority they were nonetheless eminently foreseeable.

Anthony Giddens (1984) developed a trenchant critique of Merton’s “functionalist” turn and with the theory of structuration provided a more sophisticated account of unintended consequences which dispensed with Merton’s mystificatory “functional needs”. Instead, Giddens outlined how unintended consequences form the “unacknowledged” ground of further action as both the enabling medium and the constraining condition of the social system. While Giddens reintroduced agency and processes into the idea of unintended consequences it is less clear that structuration as a meta-theoretical system successfully circumvented the problem of nominalization at the core of the agency-structure and individual-society dualisms.

More recently, the so-called “relational turn” in sociology has attempted to overcome the structure–agency and individual–society dualisms (Dépelteau, Powell, 2013; Emirbayer, 1997). Bourdieu’s version of relational sociology, for instance, occupies something approaching near-hegemonic status for much contemporary sociology. Relational sociologists reject the idea that sociological analysis begins with substantial, pre-given entities such as the individual, class, minority, state, nation or society (Emirbayer, 1997: 287). Yet, there are a wide range of approaches to, and varying emphases within, the relational turn, ranging from neo-structuralism, interactionism, constructivism, phenomenological, pragmatism and critical realism (Crossley, 2011; Dépelteau, Powell, 2013; Donati, Archer, 2015). Often, however, one side of the dualism is still assumed to predominate over the other; sociological relations emerge either from situated exchanges between individuals or as a property of the wider structuring force of the social system (Law, 2015). In attempting to overcome the “substantialist” fallacy in sociology which treats cultural practices as thing-like essences, even Bourdieu’s (1998) claim that “the real is relational” remains limited to analysing relations between vacant, thing-like “positions” or “properties” of the social field that come to be occupied according to “position-taking” choices made possible by the sociogenetic dispositions of habitus.

Of the classical sociologists, Georg Simmel (2009 [1908]) placed the greatest stress on social relations, and even minted an active term, “sociation”, to distinguish his relational sociology from passive and substantialist approaches to “society”. Individuals for Simmel (1997 [1911]: 120) are “bearers of the processes of association” who pursue specific interests through innumerable relationships, “with-one-another, for-one-another, in-one-another, against-one-another, and through-one-another, in state and commune, in church and economic associations, in family and clubs”. In part deriving his methodological relationism from Simmel, what Elias (2012b) called “figurations” similarly af-

forded primacy to interdependent social relations as a single process as the proper object of relational sociology.

Democratization Processes and Human Survival Units

Much of the relational turn shares a penchant for meta-theoretical nominalization of pre-given categories. For Elias, on the other hand, it is sociologically more useful to examine specific, socially compelling processes such as changes through time in the personality structure and the state formation process. As societies become more complex, differentiated and integrated, social change can be explained less and less in terms of the intentions, will or rationality of individuals and groups. As the differentiation of social functions proceeds so does the differentiation of the human personality, which becomes more sensitised, self-conscious and habitual under the compulsion of multiple dependencies on countless others. Sociogenesis and psychogenesis emerge together in unplanned ways that only later may become subject to more self-conscious controls and more adequate means of human orientation. Popular culture, music, art and fashion, for instance, operate in a tension balance between spontaneity and self-consciousness in a typically cyclical pattern of relatively unselfconscious spontaneity followed by the increasingly self-conscious controls and calculations of commodification and standardisation processes (Elias, 2017).

When viewed through the lens of long-term curves of development, short-run, contingent events are not simply random occurrences but exhibit a shape, a pattern and a sequence of flow. History evinces two main directions for Elias, tending over many generations, either towards greater or lesser social integration and differentiation, thus rejecting the false choice between the Scylla of static structures and the Charybdis of unpatterned contingencies (Elias, 2012a: 6). More complex, differentiated and integrated figurations emerge out of less complex, differentiated and integrated ones. However, while an earlier figurational flow is a necessary precondition for a later one to emerge, the later figuration is not the inevitable or necessary outcome of the earlier one, which may or may not develop in a range of different possible ways (Elias, 2012b: 157). Worldwide violent conflagrations such as the First and Second World Wars may appear as short-lived bursts of destruction, bending away from the longer-term development curve of self-restrained regimes of emotional regulation, but they nevertheless depend upon the necessary, though not inevitable, preconditions of protracted but unplanned state formation processes (Wouters, 2016).

Figurations find their limit and inner coherence only in dialectical relation to other, external figurations. At the core of this process is the need for humans to create institutions for struggles of self-defence and attack, what Elias (2012a) called “survival units”. Historically survival units have taken different forms, families, tribes, villages, city-states and so on. Today the preeminent survival unit is the state form constituted and defined by its relationship with other states. Compelled by mutual contact and fear of rival states an unplanned “double-bind” process of reciprocal surveillance, adjustment and armed

preparation is set in train. In the light of Elias's defensive figurations, Kaspersen and Gabriel (2013: 77) rule out the possibility for the emergence of a single, global survival unit encompassing the whole of humanity on the basis that it will have no other unit outside of itself against which it is compelled to struggle and survive. A global state cannot function as a survival unit. Instead, Kaspersen and Gabriel (2013) appeal to von Clausewitz's principle that defensive survival units are more tensile and resistant to the concentrated military force of offensive units and impose a precarious "pause" on asymmetrical warring states who are compelled to mutually recognise the sovereignty of each other. In contrast, during the Cold War Elias (2010) entertained the, admittedly remote, possibility of global governance exerting a monopolization of the means of violence capable of inducing a worldwide pacification process through difficult struggles of human learning to collectively avoid catastrophic wars, including nuclear war (Landini, Dépelteau, 2017).

Shifting asymmetrical power ratios are a function of lengthening chains of human interdependencies. The transition from dynastic elites monopolising power chances to the progressive narrowing of the power differentials between the governed and governments demonstrates the deepening processes of what Elias called "functional democratization" involving more and more interdependent people. By deploying the term "functional democratization" Elias (2012a: 63) refused to limit the process of more equal power chances arising from functional specialization to "institutional democratization", arguing that the process of social equalization was as evident in one-party states as it was in multi-party states. Power differentials have reduced between many groups, classes, races, men and women, heterosexuals and LGBTI, and so on. For example, the unequal power imbalances of parent-child relations have narrowed considerably. They are strikingly less marked by punitive authority relations and are increasingly characterised by more egalitarian relations of parental self-restraint and greater child autonomy alongside advancing adult thresholds of shame and embarrassment (Elias, 2008). Hume (1969 [1739–1740]: 538) made a similar observation about a more even power balance between parents and children with the quickening of the civilising process in mid-eighteenth century Scotland: "Parents govern by the advantage of their superior strength and wisdom, and at the same time are restrained in the exercise of their authority by that natural affection, which they bear their children."

This process cannot be understood either voluntaristically as the result of conscious planning or, as Hume assumes, naturalistically as an innately universal feeling. Instead, Elias (2008: 32) argues that it results from a compelling dialectical process of intentional and unintentional changes in the mutual constraints that interdependent people and non-human nature exercise on each other, with "the interweaving of the planned acts of many people results in a development of the social units they form with each other, unplanned by any of the people who brought them about".

Nor is functional democratization simply conceived as a unilinear process of increasing social harmony, integration and consensus. It is always beset by many tensions and reversals. Development towards a less uneven distribution of power chances, Elias (2012a: 64) argued, "permeates the whole gamut of social bonds, although there are impulses

simultaneously running counter to this trend". Stephen Menell (2014: 12) termed such counter-trends "functional de-democratization" and recently argued that the balance of socio-economic inequality and power resources for both America and at a global level has tipped "back in favour of the more privileged, and global interdependences are increasingly interwoven with countries' internal power ratios". None of this bodes well for the possibility of the global monopoly of violence that Elias hoped would mitigate the dangers of armed inter-state power rivalries.

Spontaneous Order in the Scottish Enlightenment

Elias' approach to figurations as unplanned but purposeful demonstrates a clear indebtedness to the human science of unintended consequences developed by the leading figures of the Scottish enlightenment (Hill, 2006). Elias appears to have assimilated the spontaneous order tradition of the Scottish enlightenment as mediated by Hegel, Marx and Williams Sumner (van Krieken, 1998: 23). Just as Elias reacted against the prevailing philosophical and sociological perspectives of his time, so also Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, William Robertson, Lord Kames, John Millar and Gilbert Stuart reacted strongly to the mythical thinking of social contract theory which attributed a wholly imaginary origin for society and the state in pre-social individuals combining to secure their own survival and offering their tacit consent to be ruled by a governing institution. As Hume (1969 [1739–1740]: 600) argued, no one can give their consent without first of all having some knowledge of the promise made in their name. Similarly, and despite some shared moderate Calvinist convictions, they also rejected the "Great Legislator" theory, which posited an imaginary origin for social institutions created by the free will and intentions of a mythical force or individual such as God or a king. The unintended effect of incremental changes may escape the purview of the people exposed to it. For instance, the emergence of civil society was not the result of the purposive rationality of great legislators. "But though this progress of human affairs may appear certain and inevitable, and though the support which allegiance brings to justice be founded on obvious principles of human nature, it cannot be expected that men should beforehand be able to discover them, or foresee their operation" (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 30). Hume therefore considered it necessary to understand the historical momentum of social and political processes rather than isolate sudden disruptive lurches that he associated with violent episodes contingent on the passions of a few people.

By developing a distinctive sociological perspective Hume attempted to argue on the realist basis of what he considered demonstrable or at least indisputable facts about the nature of humans in society. He founded his social science on the principle that what depends on a small number of people is largely a matter of "chance" while what arises from larger numbers may be assigned "determinate and known causes" (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 57). As John Millar (2006 [1803]: 730) described the relational process underpinning all human survival units:

The first aim of every people is to procure subsistence; their next is to defend and secure their acquisitions. Men who live in the same society, or who have any intercourse with one another, are often linked together by the ties of sympathy and affection; as, on the other hand, they are apt, from opposite interests and passions, to dispute and quarrel, and to commit mutual injuries. From these different situations, they become sensible of the duties they owe to each other, and of the rights which belong to them in their various relations and capacities.

Similarly, Ferguson began from the “universal characteristics” of shared human dispositions. These include the ability to reason through foresight and reflection, judgement, knowledge, disciplined habits, and interests. A natural but unplanned propensity for language, for instance, makes the beneficial diffusion of knowledge possible, indeed makes society itself possible.

Like Elias, the Scottish enlightenment groped towards a long-term process theory and rejected as futile the endless search for the origins of collective institutions. Adam Smith (1963 [1762–1763]: 88) urged that an infinite regress of causal origins should be avoided by pursuing historical inquiry only to the point that “we know all that is necessary of the matter”. Here Smith’s emphasis on sufficient historical knowledge appears to contrast with the impossibility of acquiring the knowledge necessary for establishing the multiple preconditions of the spontaneous order coordinated by the famous “invisible hand”. An individual, Smith (1976 [1776]: 456) argued, “neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it”. Individual intentions are limited by concerns for personal security and personal gain. In this, Smith (1976 [1776]: 456) famously claimed that an individual is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention”. By sacrificing knowledge of public benefits to the immediate gratifications of self-interest Smith’s invisible hand often serves as a model for the mythical neoliberal idea of the “magic market” as a self-regulating mechanism. Yet Smith (1963 [1762–1763]: 85) also argued that immediate events are always the result of remote causes, themselves subject to even remoter ones. Smith’s historical approach was primarily concerned with how social action contributed towards revolutionary change in states and governments. “Design and contrivance” not “accident and chance” therefore must form the proper object of historical study as a means of human orientation.

Ferguson (1980 [1767]: 144) tended to share Smith’s invisible hand principle that “private interest is a better patron of commerce and plenty, than the refinements of state” (Ferguson, 1980 [1767]: 144). As Lisa Hill (2006: 105) argues, for Ferguson, like Millar, the accumulation of wealth derives from an instinctive need for subsistence, generating a causal chain of unintended effects that “inadvertently leads to technical improvements in production; the development of private property leads to the emergence of legal and political establishments; the herding instinct develops, over time, into nationalistic sentiments and thereafter leads to the emergence of sovereign states.” It is not only individuals that progress over the course of their lifetime but the species itself builds on the accumulated history of socially-acquired knowledge. Each generation, Ferguson (1980 [1767]: 5) claimed, “builds in every subsequent age on foundations formerly laid; and, in a succes-

sion of years, tend to a perfection in the application of their faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to which many generations must have combined their endeavours.”

Hill (2006: 121) compares Ferguson’s process theory to the operation of deep structures, hidden mechanisms or innate essences that lie behind surface phenomena in structuralist theory. However, where structuralism tends to posit stasis, function and system Ferguson posited change, conflict and progress. Humans were believed to be possessed of an innate drive for improvement, “the desire of something better than is possessed at present” as Ferguson (1792: 207) put it. Among human desires, Ferguson listed the need for more wealth and property, more effective government to promote “the peace and good order of society”, more scientific knowledge, more refined arts, and more adequate philosophical theories.

However, self-interest in wealth-maximization cannot provide the limit of human dispositions. Other “disinterested” passions — hate, indignation, and rage — may be opposed to and undermine self-interested profit. Neither does economic self-interest necessarily result in public benefit. As Ferguson (1980 [1767]: 12), two centuries before Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) and Mills (1958), noted, narrow self-interest comes to dominate and erode other more fundamental human dispositions, “the principles of self-preservation”, which provide the ground from which self-interest initially arose and which will produce ruin and violence unless restrained by the rule of civil society. Ferguson adopted a teleological view of the evolution of institutions. Short-term “efficient causes” at the level of individual instincts, drives, habits, frailties, pleasure and pain contribute blindly to long-term “final causes” at the level of entire human survival systems. Ferguson’s providentialist view of spontaneous order conceived of humans as too feeble to grasp God’s cosmic design let alone attempt to realise it. Restless human activity is guided by the unknown movements of a hidden God: “The scenes of human affairs change in his management: his emblem is a passing stream, not a stagnating pool” (1980 [1767]: 7).

In effect, Ferguson, Smith, Hume and their compatriots attempted to empirically establish general patterns of social life, not isolated, individual deviations, through historical and comparative analysis. Like Elias, Ferguson wanted to subordinate any appeal to benevolent normative outcomes of unplanned social processes to a more adequate description of reality, desirable or otherwise (Bogner, 1986). Where empirical evidence was obscure or missing altogether from the historical record, a universal theory of human nature or “theoretical history” would supply the basis for making reasoned “conjectures”, sociological judgements and comparative knowledge of human relations. Given universal human propensities and broadly similar historical condition then similar institutions — governments, religion, arts, science — were also assumed likely to emerge.

Public Benefits and Private Vices

Bernard Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees* was an important precursor for the Scottish spontaneous order tradition (Goldsmith, 1988). Mandeville (1970 [1714–1723]) famously made

the “public benefits” of wealth and power counter-intuitively dependent on “private vices”, such as greed, theft, envy, vanity, pride, domination and ambition. Vice, not virtue, creates social complexity through the demand for recognition, goods and services. For instance, the need of anonymous strangers for social approval in large modern cities creates a culture of vanity in the wearing of fashionable clothing for “the pleasure of being esteemed by a vast majority, not as what they are, but what they appear to be” (Mandeville, 1970 [1714–1723]: 152). From Mandeville’s perspective, no wealthy and powerful nation could at the same time be a nation of moderation and virtue.

By such means Mandeville opened the way for Scottish intellectuals to consider the tensions and conflicts of ordinary human sociability without resorting to the moralist valuations of elites. Hume reserved particular invective for Shaftesbury’s (1999 [1711]) detached refinement of polite manners. He rejected the inflated but fashionable pretensions of polite moralists like Shaftesbury who “exalt our species to the skies, and represent man as some kind of demigod” (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 43). For Hume, while the private interests of individuals are multiple and varied, the public interest is always the same. In response to the dispute over Mandeville’s intended vice/unintended benefits duality, Hume (Ibid.: 47) argued that if self-love and vanity really did predominate in human affairs over sociable and virtuous principles then human nature would indeed be “contemptible”. Hume (Ibid.: 177) also rejected Mandeville’s idea that the vice of self-interest was generally beneficial to society as “little less than a contradiction in terms”. Hume’s trans-valuation of values (1969 [1739–1740]: 349) proactively reversed the usual relationship between virtue and vice: “by *pride* I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves: and by *humility* I mean the opposite impression”. Virtue, not vice, excites pride, while vice, not virtue, produces humility. Emotional affects are derived from the “double relation” of self and perception. Both virtue and vice are related to the same object, the self, but relate differently to what Hume called “the impressions”, that is, whether the perception of the cause of the passion is pleasurable (pride) or painful (humility or shame).

Pride and humility are not fixed as eternal sources of vice and virtue as Mandeville and orthodox moral philosophy assumed. In fact, Hume claimed, private vice cannot be so precisely demarcated from the ascribed virtues of public benefit. Self-interest is not the acme of social relations. Instead private egos are always embedded in and moderated by a dynamic process of sociability rendered by a human capacity for sympathy and pleasure in emulation, imagined or real. Individuals take self-satisfaction from mind, body and external objects (Ibid.: 330–331). Pleasure is taken by the self-regarding individual, first, by “imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity”; second, in the exercise of bodily powers, “beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture”; and, finally, in the relationship of the self to external objects, especially the personal possessions elevated by “commercial society”: “Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, clothes”. A “secondary cause” of pride arises from the reputation that the self acquires through the sentiments of others,

particularly individuals and groups that we ourselves approve of: “Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinion and sentiments of others” (Ibid.: 366–367). This, in turn, is sustained by the security and protection provided by detached and rational public institutions of government, law and economy.

Wealth and power provided Hume (Ibid.: 362) with what he considered “one of the strongest arguments” needed “to prove the influence of the double relations of pride and humility”. Under conditions of increased self-restraint power and money are augmented by an imagined anticipated pleasure in their use and a vicarious comparison with less powerful and subordinate others. Hume acknowledged that luxury may become a vice where it consumes the personal wealth of individuals and prevents at least part of it from being put to other, more virtuous uses such as education or poor relief. It is therefore necessary, Hume argued, to trade off opposing vices, say to prefer vicious luxury over public idleness, on the basis of which would be the least damaging to the public interest.

Hume (Ibid.: 647) conceded that visible signs of self-satisfaction and vanity mutually excite “the greatest indignation in each other”. It is difficult for individuals to be confident that feelings of self-regard are merited and well-founded in the eyes of others. Pride therefore varies, from a vicious and unmerited “overweening conceit” to a justified good opinion of ourselves, while pride in others is often judged harshly by our own offended pride. To assert otherwise, as Mandeville did, rested on two fallacies. First, the supposed vice of taking “secret pleasure” from virtuous acts of altruism or friendship gets the relationship the wrong way around: self-love derives from virtue not virtue from self-love. Second, any vanity that comes from public recognition is almost inseparable from virtue itself: “To love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue” (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 49).

Pride must be concealed by “some disguise”, maintaining a “fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour” (Hume, 1969 [1739–1740]: 648). Ostentatious displays of pride are placed under restraint by the social conventions of good manners embedded in the personal and social habitus. Generally accepted social conventions dictate the precise balance to be struck between pride and humility across the different classes of society. “’Tis necessary therefore to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be fix’d by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. ’Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly” (Ibid.: 649).

Hume was dealing with an earlier phase of the democratization process when it seemed “natural” in “common life and conversation” to afford different classes of people unequal modes of recognition. Subordinates were presumed by Hume (Ibid.: 410–411) to spontaneously sympathise with their social superiors, even when no personal advantage could be expected, due to the “the secondary satisfaction” of reflected glory in the wealth and power of others:

A man, who is himself of a competent fortune, upon coming into a company of strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect and deference, as he is inform'd of their different fortunes and conditions; tho' 'tis impossible he can ever propose, and perhaps wou'd not accept of any advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In short, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated by riches, and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintances.

Just as laws are established to secure property in commercial society against competing interests so rules of "good-breeding" and decency are established "to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive". "Mutual deference or civility" emerges from "the arts of conversation" of well-mannered interlocutors "regulated by riches" and "good breeding".

Habitus and State Formation Processes

Once an improvement in the economy of manners is collectively adopted its continued practice transforms it into part of the habitual dispositions of self, what Elias and Bourdieu called "habitus". As a disposition acquired by repeated actions, habitus refers not only to what individuals chose to do but also to what they feel inclined or compelled to do. In line with Ferguson's Protestant ethic, a habitus acquired by persevering in the overcoming of difficulties is to be commended while a habitus borne of idleness is to be condemned. Any learned habit must engender "some serious passion" if it is to surmount difficulties and not become "insipid or frivolous" (Ferguson, 1792: 229). Exposure to repeated dangers and difficulties temper the passions. As habit takes hold, emotional passions lose their force without lapsing into indifference. "The veteran becomes cool and deliberate in the midst of occasions that try his temper; he becomes at the same time far from indifferent, but resolute and able in the conduct of affairs to which he has been long accustomed: He has an easy recourse to the expedients in practice, or to the considerations in persuasion and argument, on which he has decided the part which he acts" (Ibid.: 229–230).

An innate capacity for judgement enables humans to adapt habits through the "power of discerning" and to overcome embodied limitations as "the artificer of [their] own nature" (Ibid.: 227). Habits imposed under external constraint by an external body may at first be resisted as painful but with repeated exposure over time come to be experienced as a personal power that provides satisfaction and pleasure. What was initially repugnant in manners, fashion, housing, or diet may become pleasing and desirable. What was once awkward and forced for the personal habitus becomes familiar and automatic.

Social institutions like government come to be embedded over time in piecemeal fashion through the accretion of habit, convention and custom as public authority and private individuals become increasingly interdependent: "as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, so

the public becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men” (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 156). Improved, more realistic knowledge and more restrained inter-personal relations result: “When the tempers of men are softened as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears still more conspicuous, as is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance” (Ibid.: 171). Power is circumscribed by ever more complex interdependencies where “very considerable motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forebear what he wishes to perform” (Hume, 1969 [1739–1740]: 363). Thus, when a hypothetical enemy of an unarmed Hume passed by on the street armed with a sword, he nevertheless felt secure: “I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain’d or imprison’d”. Without such external constraint, however, Hume’s enemy may feel no such restraint and acquire “a full power” over him “as his subject or vassal”. Only social learning from past experience of the conventions of the world provides people with the security and confidence that violence is unlikely, or, where violence is possible and perhaps even probable, that the uncertainty and contingency of the situation is routinely experienced as painful and reactive.

Mutual restraint from arbitrary violence emerged under what Hume (1993 [1776]: 59) described as “a free government”. The earliest form of rule Hume called “barbarous monarchy” where authority was centred in the person of a despotic prince and the exercise of power was discretionary and unrestrained at all levels. Such lawless tutelage debases people and makes life precarious. Under such insecure conditions neither art nor science are able to develop. Hume next considered republican government as placing definite checks on unlimited authority to protect free citizens and secure property relations. Republics depend on a chain of interdependencies where the “candidates for office must look downwards to gain the suffrages of the people” (Ibid.: 68). Inter-personal security acts as a stimulus for knowledge and civility: “From law arises security; from security curiosity; and from curiosity knowledge” (Ibid.: 62).

In the case of republics “where power rises upwards”, the relative independence of citizens enables greater scope for emulation in useful knowledge and industry but offers less possibility for polite refinement and deference. In Hume’s final case, “civilised monarchy”, the chains of interdependency are arranged more minutely and political candidates “must turn their attention upwards, to court the good graces and favour of the great”. While the people depend on the sovereign for security, the prince feels so detached from their private intrigues and interests that the loose chain of inter-dependencies barely registers in his remote calculations. In the case of civilised monarchies, “there is a long train of dependence from the prince to the peasant” that neither threatens property relations nor hinders the ingenuity of the people, who seek to emulate the dominant models of polite manners “most acceptable to people of condition and education” (Ibid.: 69).

Political authority based on collective allegiance emerges over time as an imperfect, pragmatic process to curtail and regulate civil disorder and violence. It is conditional on

the public interest in security and protection. Human exigencies create institutions to meet an immediate need to restrain violence and facilitate security (Ferguson, 1792: 206).

Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such a uniformity in human life. (Hume, 1969 [1739–1740]: 450)

Government authority depends on routine habits of thought among the governed, habits which can be rapidly dislodged by irregular state force or draconian policies. Any use of violent force to impose opinions on the public, Ferguson (1792: 219) argued, is counter-productive, “preposterous and ineffectual”. It excites militant resistance and rebellion compared to a more emollient and gradual reform of public opinion.

Only in exceptional conditions where the public interest is violently subjugated by oppressive and tyrannical government does passive obedience become what Hume called “an absurdity” and resistance justified. Otherwise both “prudence and morals” demand submission to government authority:

Submit quietly to the government, which we find establish'd in the country where we happen to live, without enquiring too curiously into its origin and first establishment. Few governments will bear being examin'd so rigorously. How many kingdoms are there at present in the world, and how many more do we find in history, whose governors have no better foundation for their authority than that of present possession? (Hume, 1969 [1739–1740]: 609)

Ferguson disputed such arguments from “refined” politicians and philosophers that demanded passive obedience from “the vulgar” and represented “every dispute of a free people” as a form of mutinous disorder. In response, Ferguson (1980 [1767]: 221) advanced a democratic critique of elite superiority: “Men of superior genius sometimes seem to imagine, that the vulgar have no title to act, or to think”. Like Ferguson, John Millar also drew different conclusions from Hume concerning the “long train of dependence”. Millar (2006 [1803]: 724) detected a general process of functional democratization arising from commercial “improvements” that enabled people to “more easily to gain a livelihood by the exercise of their talents, without being subject to the caprice, or caring for the displeasure of others; that is, to render the lower classes of the people less dependent upon their superiors”. As relations between “the ranks” of society became more interdependent so the gradations of social distance between them also narrow, which “leaving no chasm from the top to the bottom of the scale, will occasion a continual approximation of the different ranks, and will frequently enable the inferior orders to press upon the superior. ‘The toe of the peasant comes so near the heel of the courtier, that it galls his kibe’ [Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 5.1]” (Millar, 2006 [1803]: 725). In other words, the we-ideal of outsider

groups was beginning to demand and expect more democratic modes of social recognition from elite groups. Established groups began to keenly feel the social proximity and intimacy of former outsider groups pressing into their backs, a precondition for the social integration and horizontal solidarity that makes modern nations possible.

National Habitus

Despite often being accused of a fixed belief in the uniformity of human nature, Hume resisted the enlightenment prejudice that universal reason would result in a cosmopolitan or Eurocentric culture. While the fine-grained interdependencies of small-scale states helped stimulate mutual communication and learning, and checked arbitrary power and authority, they also proved resistant to the hegemonic cultural and scientific pretensions of similar-sized neighbouring states (Hume, 1993 [1776]: 64). Rival nations, Hume claimed, always examine works of art from other states “with the greatest care and accuracy” and scrupulously judge them against the standards established by their own prevailing prejudices. Hume put this down to “mutual jealousy” and national competition for cultural esteem and eminence.

Trivial, everyday customs in such ways disclose differences and similarities of the national habitus. The longer that the national habitus endures then the more difficult it is to challenge or revise prevailing opinion and mores. Ferguson (1792: 217–218) drew three lessons from this unplanned process. First, individuals simply accept long-held notions unless fundamentally challenged by counter-evidence. Second, other nations are just as likely to be sincerely committed to their own unexamined habits and prejudices. Third, received opinion is often based on a stable and regular commitment to a perceived truth confirmed by habit and so not easily dislodged by novel ideas. In such ways, habit binds nations together and helps compensate for the anomic pain of isolation from the rest of humanity.

National differences are apparent in the respective tension balances at different stages in the democratization processes (Elias, 2006). A youthful Hume distinguished between the “real politeness” of the French and the “expressions of politeness” of the English. By “real politeness”, Hume (1932 [1734]: 20) meant a moderate temperament, sincere kindness and a readiness to serve. By “expressions of politeness” he meant “outward deferences & ceremonies, which custom has invented, to supply the defect of real politeness or kindness, that is unavoidable towards strangers & indifferent persons even in men of the dispositions of the world”. English manners, Hume claimed, depended on the pleasures and satisfactions of outward appearances and an imperceptibly refined charismatic performance rather than any deeper sense of inner authenticity. French manners, by contrast, depended on more deeply embedded dispositions of politeness, “tho’ troublesome & impertinent, yet serve to polish the ordinary kind of people & prevent rudeness & brutality”, among whom Hume (Ibid.: 21) mentions washerwomen, porters and coachmen, presumably occupations of a coarser nature in England.

Hume (Ibid.: 21) gave as an example of national differences the varying use of formal modes of address. In England, the phrase “humble servant” was dropped as soon as less formal relations were established, while in France the phrase was further adorned as “the Honour of serving”, to the extent that Hume’s laundress expressed her “honour” of serving him, while even social superiors spoke of their “honour” of serving their subordinates. While Hume’s observations can be reduced to fixed categories of “natural” (real inner politeness) versus “artificial” practices (external expression of politeness), a more useful sociological approach is to treat them as general tendencies of the democratization process, leaning in pre-revolutionary France more heavily towards the more formal codes of court society and in Hanoverian Britain to the more informal exchanges of commercial society.

Conclusion

In the period immediately before the self-regulating global market became an established social fact an increasingly acquisitive “commercial society” in Scotland provided the relational foundations for bourgeois public authority, sociability and personal security (Finlay, 2007; Berry, 2013). Commercial society propelled the civilising process by increasing social interdependencies as part of an unplanned process. A shared sociological realism was common across the Scottish enlightenment, including by lesser luminaries such as the historian Gilbert Stuart (1778: 51): “It is from no pre-conceived plan, but from circumstances which exist in real life and affairs, that legislators and politicians acquire an ascendancy among men. It was the actual condition of their times, not projects suggested by philosophy and speculation.”

In commercial society industry, knowledge, and humanity reciprocally expanded together, linked by what Hume (1993 [1776]: 170–171) called “an indissoluble chain”, while public authority — “laws, order, police, discipline” — became less severe and more humane compared to previous historical regimes. Millar (2006 [1803]: 773) similarly described increased external constraints and self-restraint in terms of an inter-related process of humanist normative codes and the interdependent functions of commercial society: “Mankind are induced to abstain from injustice by the feelings of humanity, which dispose them to avoid hurting their neighbours, as well as by the consideration that such a conduct will be highly conducive to their own interest; and both of these principles operate with peculiar force from the circumstances in which a commercial people is placed.” Particular emphasis was placed on processes of human differentiation and integration, not least by delineating the unintended consequences of the division of labour, most notably by Smith and Ferguson. Driven by human creativity to ease arduous labour, the technical division of labour specializes tasks by a gradual, largely unplanned process of trial and error that culminated in a wholly unforeseen social division of labour. The corrosive side of commercial society identified by Ferguson in particular was later reformulated by Karl Marx in his analysis of the restless, crisis-prone nature of capitalism.

Both the Scottish enlightenment and Elias attempted to understand “the indissoluble chain” of human integration and differentiation, without lapsing into the illusory static thinking of nominalization or the fatalism of pathological realism in their attempts to provide a more secure means of human orientation to resist the “main drift” of unplanned, self-destructive processes. Higher levels of global integration are ensnared in an unplanned tension balance of unequal power chances between states as units of national integration and survival. This does not refer simply to the demiurge of sub-rational micro-processes but more pointedly refers to the tension-balances within global interdependencies presupposed by the global “magic market” and a world system of rival states unregulated by any single, central authority (Linklater, 2016). Increased knowledge of largely unplanned, relatively autonomous processes allows for the possibility of greater human control over, and coordination of, individuals and social structures. Yet, the state formation process is part of a long run, inter-generational unintended consequence of social division, competition and conflict. Formal governance was seen by the Scottish enlightenment as necessary to meliorate the informal excesses and tensions of civil society, putting it on a more secure and peaceable footing. This process appears to have reached definite limits. World humanity is ensnared in a compelling global double-bind process of armed states that continue to threaten, endanger and fear each other.

What remains is the pathological realism that Mills (1958: 90–91) identified sixty years ago when “men equally expert in practical next steps” substituted the “unknown fear, the anxiety without end” for the reductive calculations of “known catastrophe”, above all an unwinnable nuclear war. While Mills’ designation of crackpot realism is subject to a rather vague idea of “the main drift” of events and a highly cohesive ruling elite dominating a fragmented mass of people, it is nonetheless suggestive of current anxieties about the catastrophic drift of global events and the “magic market” apparently beyond the control of self-contradictory political and economic elites (Davies, 2017). It also expresses Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) idea of the spontaneous order as a “double movement” where the market becomes magically disembedded from its social moorings as a self-regulating machine followed by attempts to protect society from its destructive effects. Pathological outcomes are not necessarily the result of error, ignorance or stupidity in the more restrictive sense of unintended consequences but, given that such harms are often anticipated by elite planners, managers and politicians, why, de Zwart (2015: 295) asks, “do they chose to go ahead anyway”. It is precisely this problem of specific figurations that requires substantive sociological analysis today.

References

- Berry C. J. (2013) *The Idea of Commercial Society in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Billig M. (2008) The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominalisation. *Discourse & Society*, vol. 19, no 6, pp. 783-800.

- Billig M. (2013) *Learn to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bogner A. (1986) The Structure of Social Processes: A Commentary on the Sociology of Norbert Elias. *Sociology*, vol. 20, no 3, pp. 387-411.
- Boudon R. (1982) *The Unintended Consequences of Social Action*, London: Macmillan
- Bourdieu P. (1998) *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Crossley N. (2011) *Towards Relational Sociology*, London: Routledge.
- Davies W. (2017) *The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition*, London: SAGE.
- de Zwart F. (2015) Unintended but not unanticipated. *Theory and Society*, vol. 44, no 3, pp. 283-297.
- Dépelteau F, Powell C. (eds.) (2013) *Applying Relational Sociology: Relations, Networks, and Society*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Donati P, Archer M. S. (2015) *The Relational Subject*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elias N. (2008) The Civilising of Parents. *Essays II: On Civilising Processes, State Formation and National Identity* (eds. R. Kilminster, S. Mennell), Dublin: UCD Press, pp. 230-55.
- Elias N. (2009) On the Creed of a Nominalist: Observations on Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery. *Essays I: On the Sociology of Knowledge and the Sciences* (eds. R. Kilminster, S. Mennell), Dublin: UCD Press, pp. 161-90.
- Elias N. (2010) *The Society of Individual*, Dublin: UCD Press.
- Elias N. (2012a) *On the Process of Civilisation: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, Dublin: UCD Press.
- Elias N. (2012b) *What is Sociology?*, Dublin: UCD Press.
- Elias N. (2017) Spontaneity and Self-consciousness. *Excitement Processes: Norbert Elias's Unpublished Works on Sports, Leisure, Body, Culture* (eds. J. Haut, P. Dolan, D. Reicher, R. S. Garcia), Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Emirbayer M. (1997) Manifesto for a Relational Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 103, no 2, pp. 281-317.
- Ferguson A. (1792) *Principles of Moral and Political Science: Being Chiefly a Retrospect of Lectures Delivered in the College of Edinburgh, Vol. 1*, London: A. Strachan and T. Cadell.
- Ferguson A. (1980 [1767]) *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Finlay C. J. (2007) *Hume's Social Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in A Treatise of Human Nature*, London: Continuum.
- Forbes D. (1975) *Hume's Philosophical Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giddens A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Goldsmith M. M. (1988) Regulating Anew the Moral and Political Sentiments of Mankind: Bernard Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 49, no 4, pp. 587-606.
- Hegel G. W. F. (1975) *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill L. (2006) *The Passionate Society: The Social, Political and Moral Thought of Adam Ferguson*, Dordrecht: Springer.
- Hume D. (1932 [1734]) *The Letters of David Hume, Vol. 1: 1727–1765*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hume D. (1969 [1739–1740]) *A Treatise of Human Nature*, London: Penguin.
- Hume D. (1993 [1776]) *Selected Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hume D. (2007 [1772]) *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Other Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jacobs S. (1999) Michael Polanyi's Theory of Spontaneous Order. *Review of Austrian Economics*, vol. 11, no 1-2, pp. 111–127.
- Kaspersen B., Gabriel N. (2013) Survival Units as the Point of Departure for a Relational Sociology. *Applying Relational Sociology: Relations, Networks, and Society* (eds. F. Dépelteau, C. Powell), London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Landini T. S., Dépelteau F. (eds.) (2017) *Norbert Elias and Violence*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Law A. (2015) *Social Theory for Today: Making Sense of Social Worlds*, London: SAGE.
- Linklater A. (2016) *Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mandeville B. (1970 [1714–1723]) *The Fable of the Bees*, London: Penguin.
- Mennell S. (1992) Momentum and History. *Culture in History: Production, Consumption and Values in Historical Perspective* (eds. J. Melling, J. Barry), Exeter: Exeter University Press, pp. 28–46.
- Mennell S. (2014) What Economists Forgot (and What Wall Street and the City Never Learned): A Sociological Perspective on the Crisis in Economics. *History of the Human Sciences*, vol. 27, no 3, pp. 20–37.
- Merton R. K. (1936) The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 1, no 6, pp. 894–904.
- Merton R. K. (1968) *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York: Free Press.
- Millar J. (2006 [1803]) *An Historical View of the English Government: From the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Mills C. W. (1958) *The Causes of World War Three*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Mills C. W. (1959) *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mills C. W. (2008) *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Petsoulas C. (2001) *Hayek's Liberalism and its Origins: His Idea of Spontaneous Order and the Scottish Enlightenment*, London: Routledge.
- Polanyi K. (2001 [1944]) *The Great Transformation*, Boston: Beacon.

- Polanyi M. (1951) *The Logic of Liberty*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Shaftesbury, Third Earl of (1999 [1711]) *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Simmel G. (1997 [1911]) *Sociology of the Senses. Simmel on Culture* (eds. D. Frisby, M. Featherstone), London: SAGE.
- Simmel G. (2009 [1908]) *Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms*, Leiden: Brill.
- Smith (1976 [1776]) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Smith A. (1963 [1762–1763]) *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson.
- Smith C. (2009) The Scottish Enlightenment, Unintended Consequences and the Science of Man. *Journal of Scottish Philosophy*, vol. 7, no 1, pp. 9–28.
- Stuart G. (1778) *A View of Society in Europe in its Progress from Rudeness to Refinement*, Edinburgh: John Bell.
- Ullmann-Margalit E. (1997) The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason. *Social Research*, vol. 64, no 2, pp. 181–198.
- van Krieken R. (1998) *Norbert Elias*, London: Routledge.
- Wouters C. (2016) Functional Democratisation and Disintegration as Side-Effects of Differentiation and Integration Processes. *Human Figurations*, vol. 5, no 2. Available at: <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0005.208> (accessed 5 December 2017).

Спонтанный порядок и реляционная социология: от Шотландского Просвещения к человеческим фигурациям

Алекс Ло

PhD, департамент социологии, Абертейский университет

Адрес: Bell St., Dundee, DD1 1HG, UK

E-mail: a.law@abertay.ac.uk

В долгосрочной перспективе и на макроуровне взаимозависимость людей распространяется сегодня на весь мир. Однако всемирные эмерджентные процессы интеграции и дифференциации принято сводить к таким статичным понятиям как «правительственность», «глобализация», «космополитизм», «мобильности» и «сети», что не позволяет увидеть обыденные процессы, поддерживающие институты, в частности, национальное государство. В этой статье утверждается, что патологический реализм неолиберальной идеологии сегодня можно лучше понять, если обратиться к историческим предшественникам так называемого «реляционного поворота» в современной социологии. Более ранняя реляционная социология Шотландского Просвещения, представленная Адамом Фергюсоном (1767), Адамом Смитом (1776) и Дэвидом Юмом (1739), развивает идеи спонтанного порядка, оперируя такими понятиями, как «невидимая рука» и «непреднамеренные последствия».

Это происходит в Шотландии, экономически малоразвитой периферии Европы, вступившей в эпоху резких изменений. Шотландские традиции осмысления спонтанного порядка сравниваются с концепцией фигураций Норберта Элиаса. Последний понимал фигурации как незапланированные, но упорядоченные процессы все более сложных и менее ясных социальных взаимозависимостей и функциональной демократизации. Эти процессы, как кажется, достигли определенных пределов. Человечество попало в ловушку непреодолимого противоречия между глобальным развитием наращивающих военную мощь и угрожающих друг другу государств и широко распространенной верой элит в спонтанную эффективность и самонастраивающиеся механизмы глобального «волшебного рынка».

Ключевые слова: спонтанный порядок, Шотландское Просвещение, Норберт Элиас, человеческие фигурации, национальный габитус, реляционная социология

Getting Order Out of Chaos: A Mathematical Model of Political Conflict

Georg P. Mueller

PhD, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg
Address: Blvd de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
E-mail: georg.mueller_unifr@bluewin.ch

Time series data about violent internal conflicts such as protests or riots often display irregular fluctuations. This article argues that these fluctuations are manifestations of a *deterministic chaos* that can be described by a relatively simple *difference* equation. It presents a mathematical contagion model of the interaction between three groups: (a) already mobilized rebellious citizens, who are protesting against the government and its policies, (b) initially non-rebellious but frustrated groups, which become mobilized by imitating the rebels, and (c) repressive governmental forces, which attempt to curb the rebellion and reduce the number of mobilized persons. The integration of these three processes results in a *logistic growth model*, which converges for many parameter configurations to stable shares of mobilized protesters, including in certain situations also *zero-protest*. However, for other specific parameters this logistic process may result in *chaotic fluctuations* in protest actions, which are dangerous to the regime as they are *unpredictable* and often *very massive*. By computer-simulations, the article explores the consequences of the different parameter configurations for protest dynamics. In order to ensure their political survival, most governments have a vital interest in getting from chaotic conflict dynamics to a *stable equilibrium* of protest, preferably at the level of zero. They may actively do so (i) by reforms which reduce the share of frustrated citizens who can be mobilized for protest (ii) by the intimidation and/or repression of protesters, (iii) by censoring media reports about protests such that the conflicts become less contagious. A formal analysis of the model shows that the most successful of the three strategies are *reforms*, which reduce the share of frustrated citizens and thus lead to a *new political order*.

Keywords: social contagion, political conflict, reforms, chaos theory, mathematical models, computer simulation.

1. Introduction and Overview

Time-series of political protest events often look chaotic with many irregular up- and downswings. Fig. 1 presents data from the US as an illustration of this kind of conflict-dynamics, which are similar to graphs in textbooks about logistic chaos (see e.g. Brown, 1995: 15). Given the fruitfulness of chaos-models for social sciences (see e.g. Kiel, Elliott, 1996; Creedy, Martin, 1994a; Eve, Horsfall, Lee, 1997; Bühl, 1990: chap. 5) the author looked for a formal model of protests, which is sociologically plausible and displays chaotic dynamics. Unable to find an appropriate model in the existing literature, he developed a contagion model of the interaction between three groups: (a) already mobilized rebellious citizens, who are protesting against the government and its policies,

(b) initially non-rebellious but frustrated groups, which become mobilized by imitating the rebels, and (c) repressive governmental forces, which attempt to curb the rebellion and reduce the number of mobilized persons. The integration of these three processes resulted in a *logistic growth model*, which has three central parameters: the share of the frustrated citizens in the total population, the contagion rate of protest, and the repressiveness of the government.




Fig. 1. The number of protest events in the USA 1957–1977¹

A formal analysis of the model shows that these parameters determine the dynamics of the model, which are not always chaotic but may also result in stable equilibria, under certain conditions even in *zero-protest*. Hence the article explores the relation between the parameter configurations of the model and the resulting conflict dynamics. This analysis is useful for answering the central questions of the article: how to get from a chaotic situation to a stable equilibrium — and from a stable equilibrium to chaos. The first question is of interest for governments, which are generally threatened by chaos, the second for protest movements, which often profit from chaos.

The main model of this article is primarily theoretical with no empirical tests. Consequently the article ends with a discussion why possible checks of the model are difficult. The central problem of testing is not the chaotic nature of the model but rather the lack of specific observational data required for such tests.

2. A Contagion Model of Social Protest²

This article is based on the trivial wisdom that governments always have opponents who are frustrated by their politics. This *share of the frustrated* in the total population is as-

1. Data sources: Taylor and Hudson (1976: tab. 3.1), Taylor and Jodice (1983: tab. 2.1).

2. For readers' convenience there is a glossary of mathematical symbols at the end of the article.

sumed to be equal to F and varies between 0 and 1. Some of the opponents are so frustrated by their governments that they engage in public protest-demonstrations as postulated by Feierabend and Feierabend (1972) and Gurr (2010: chap. 2). This *share of the mobilized* in the total population is assumed to be equal to M and generally has as the theoretical lower and upper limits 0 and 1. The upper limit of M points to the possibility that more than the share of the frustrated may be mobilized, e.g. by bandwagon-effects finally entailing $M > F$. However, as long as $M \leq F$, only frustrated citizens are assumed to be the bearers of protest. Consequently, the growth of a protest movement is at the beginning only fueled by frustrated citizens. The related growth-process is assumed to be contagious: non-mobilized frustrated citizens join the protest movement after direct or indirect contact with frustrated protesters. As usual in the theory of innovation diffusion (Hamblin, Jacobsen, Miller, 1973: chap. 4) this is an *imitation process*, in most cases based on media reporting about protest events (= indirect contact), sometimes, however, also on face-to-face relations (= direct contact). Consequently we hypothesize that the growth of the mobilized citizens

$$\Delta M = M * (F - M) \quad (1a)$$

during a *finite* time interval $\delta \gg 0$ is proportionate to the product of the shares M of the mobilized frustrated and $(F - M)$ of the non-mobilized frustrated. Thus on the one hand, the higher the share of M , the higher the rate of “infection” with protest. On the other hand, the higher the share of the “non-infected” $(F - M)$, the higher the growth of M by new “infections”. Both processes together lead to a growth-dynamic, which is logistic and not linear, as described by Hamblin et al. (1973: chap. 4).

Equation (1a) is based on two simplifications, neither of which are realistic: the first assumes that the *contagion rate* c is always equal 1 and thus need not be mentioned in this equation. This is obviously wrong, since governments try to lower the contagion rate by censorship, and protest movements try to increase it by getting media attention for their political goals and the related protests. Thus equation (1a) has to be generalized as follows:

$$\Delta M = c * M * (F - M) \quad (1b)$$

This formula obviously includes the special case of equation (1a), as shown by the substitution of c by 1. However, in general $c \neq 1$.

The second simplification of equations (1a) and (1b) implies that there is no governmental repression of protest, which is for authoritarian governments obviously wrong (Gurr, 1972: 200ff.). In order to correct this simplification, one has to add to equation (1b) a term $-(r * M)$, where r is the *repression rate*. It varies between 0 and 1 and describes the share of M , which is from one time point to the next demobilized by governmental actions against protesters. Thus by taking repression into account, equation (1b) becomes:

$$\Delta M = c * M * (F - M) - r * M \quad (1c)$$

In order to assure that $M \geq 0$ for all possible parameters c , F , and r , we finally have to introduce into equation (1c) the following safeguard:

$$\Delta M = \max (c * M * (F - M) - r * M, -M) \tag{1d}$$

This way $\Delta M \geq -M$, and consequently the next value of $M \geq 0$.

Equation (1d) is the final one, describing the model we analyze in the next section. It is related to the *change of protest* ΔP by the following hypothetical proportionality:

$$\Delta P \approx \Delta M \tag{2}$$

However, although ΔP is much easier to observe than ΔM , we are analyzing in this rather theoretical article mainly equation (1d) or its elementary transformation

$$\Delta M = \max (-c * M^2 + (c * F - r) * M, -M) \tag{3}$$

which establishes an inverse parabolic relation between M and ΔM .

3. The Dynamics of the Model

3.1. An Overview of the Different Model-Dynamics

As Dixon (1994: 51) shows, equations (1d) and (3) correspond to a Roos-type logistic growth-model. Their dynamics depend on the weight $(c * F - r)$ of the linear term of the parabola (3). Five different types of values of $(c * F - r)$ have to be distinguished (Creedy, Martin, 1994b: 8ff.):




Fig. 2a. Convergence to the stable equilibrium $M = 0^3$

3. Start value of $M = 0.15$, $F = 0.0$, $c = 3.0$, $r = 0.20$, $c * F - r = -0.200$

Type 1: $c * F - r \leq 0$: In this situation the weights of the linear and the quadratic term of equation (3) are negative or zero and consequently yield a negative growth rate ΔM such that M finally reaches the level $M = 0$, where it *stabilizes* due to the max-clause of equation (3). Fig. 2a illustrates this dynamic, which implies the total demobilization of the protest movement.

Type 2: $0 < c * F - r \leq 2$: The share M of mobilized protesters in the total population converges either to the *stable equilibrium* $(c * F - r) / c > 0$ or alternatively to 0, depending on the initial value of M .⁴ The first case is illustrated by Fig. 2b. The second case, i.e. the convergence of the share M of the mobilized to 0 is in so far a *critical event* as the protest movement is completely demobilized.




Fig. 2b. Convergence to a stable equilibrium $M \geq 0$ ⁵

Type 3: $2 < c * F - r \leq 2.57$: Under the already mentioned assumption that the time interval δ between two subsequent time points is substantially greater than 0 (see section 2), the share of the mobilized begins to *oscillate* in a regular manner. Protesters and government need a finite time interval in order to respond to the political situation. Consequently they “overreact” and tend to miss the stable equilibrium. However, as the illustrative Fig. 2c shows, government and protesters can easily anticipate the next situation and adapt their strategies accordingly. Obviously, stable oscillations can rarely be observed for a long period of time.

4. If the equilibrium $\Delta M = 0$ is reached and $(c * F - r) > 0$, formula (3) implies for $M > 0$ that $c * M = (c * F - r)$. Thus $M = (c * F - r) / c$ is an equilibrium of M , however only if on the way to this target ΔM always satisfies the condition $\Delta M < -M$. If this condition is violated, M is “trapped” at the level 0 by the max-clause of formula (3) and the equilibrium is $M = 0$. Similarly, if $(c * F - r) > 0$ and $M = 0$, formula (3) implies that $\Delta M = 0$ and consequently the equilibrium is $M = 0$.

5. Start value of $M = 0.00001$, $F = 0.25$, $c = 6.0$, $r = 0.67$, $c * F - r = 0.830$.




Fig. 2c. Regular oscillations⁶

Type 4: $2.57 < c * F - r \leq 3.00$: For these parameter values deterministic chaos prevails and predictability is lost, as Fig. 2d illustrates. Typically for this chaotic situation, even small changes of the initial values of M may lead to totally different outcomes, which cannot be anticipated. For government, this lack of predictability is critical as it bears the risk of being overwhelmed by a sudden increase in protests, to which there is not enough response by coercive counterforces (see e.g. in Fig. 2d the tripling of mobilization between Time = 17 and Time = 18). For the protest movement this chaos is an opportunity to realize its goals by intimidating or overwhelming the government with violent action. It profits from the opportunity that also non-frustrated citizens may temporarily support the protest movement: for short periods bandwagon-effects tend to increase the size of the protest movement beyond the value F.




Fig. 2d. Chaos⁷

6. Start value of M = 0.00001, F = 0.30, c = 10.0, r = 0.67, $c * F - r = 2.330$.

7. Start value of M = 0.00001, F = 0.30, c = 12.0, r = 0.67, $c * F - r = 2.930$.

Type 5: $3.00 < c * F - r$: This case implies the transformation of chaos into “hyper-chaos”, which entails after a *very short time* the breakdown of one or both conflict parties by driving the share of the mobilized M either to 0 or beyond 1. In the first case, the protest movement breaks down due to its total demobilization, which is initiated by *non-frustrated* and badly motivated citizens and spreads thereafter to the hard core of the *frustrated* actors. In the second scenario the government is likely to be overwhelmed by a rebellion involving the whole citizenry plus external foreign supporters, such that $M > 1$. Since this situation is chaotic, the outcome of hyper-chaos cannot be anticipated. In the exemplary Fig. 2e the loser is the protest movement that vanishes at Time = 27 after a series of chaotic fluctuations. However, by a small change of the initial value of M, the loser in this conflict situation could easily be the government, due to peak values $M > 1$. Consequently, the government as well as the protest movement probably avoid the situation $3.00 < c * F - r$.




Fig. 2e. Hyper-chaos⁸

Figs. 2a–e represent ideal types of conflict dynamics with *constant* parameters c , r , and F . This is not realistic as governments and protest movements try to change these parameters in order to pursue their goals (see section 3.3). Apart from such strategic actions there may be societal developments like e.g. the spread of the internet, which can lead to the destabilization of formerly constant parameter values like the contagion rate c . In order to model such changes the author proposes the segmentation of the simulated social history of a country into sequences of distinct periods with internally stable parameter values, which may also result in changes from one type of conflict dynamics to another. Fig. 3 illustrates such a change caused by an increase of the level of frustration from $F = 0.15$ to $F = 0.30$ at Time = 21. This increase of F , e.g. produced by a rise of food-

8. Start value of $M = 0.00001$, $F = 0.625$, $c = 6.0$, $r = 0.67$, $c * F - r = 3.077$.

prices, triggers in Fig. 3 the transition from a *stable equilibrium* with a relatively low level of mobilization *M* to *chaos* with a higher average level of conflict.




Fig. 3. The transition from equilibrium to chaos due to an increase of frustration from $F = 0.15$ to $F = 0.30$ at Time = 21⁹

3.2. The Relation Between Parameter Values and Model Dynamics

This section aims at localizing the different model dynamics of section 3.1 in a parameter space defined by r , F , and c . For this purpose we have to analyze the frontiers between the following types of dynamics:

- a) Convergence to the stable equilibrium $M = 0$, representing the perfect demobilization of the protest movement.
- b) Convergence to a stable equilibrium $M \geq 0$, which may be at $M = (c * F - r) / c$ or alternatively at $M = 0$.
- c) Stable oscillations.
- d) Chaos.
- e) Hyper-chaos.

According to section 3.1, the *frontiers* between these types of dynamics are located as follows:

between (a) and (b), which separates the zones called *Equi = 0* and *Equi ≥ 0* at¹⁰

$$F = (r + 0) / c \tag{4a}$$

9. Start value of $M = 0.00001$. Values for $t \leq 20$: $F = 0.15$, $c = 12.0$, $r = 0.67$. Values for $t \geq 21$: $F = 0.30$, $c = 12.0$, $r = 0.67$.

10. From $c * F - r \leq 0$ required for a stable equilibrium at level $M = 0$ (see section 3.1) follows $F = (r + 0) / c$.

between (b) and (c), which separates the zones called *Equi* ≥ 0 and *Osci* at¹¹

$$F = (r + 2.0) / c \quad (4b)$$

between (c) and (d), which separates the zones called *Osci.* and *Chaos* at¹²

$$F = (r + 2.57) / c \quad (4c)$$

between (d) and (e), which separates the zones called *Chaos* and *Hyper Ch.* at¹³

$$F = (r + 3.0) / c \quad (4d)$$

Figs. 4a–d visualize the resulting parameter space, which suggests the following conclusions:

- Chaos is an early warning sign of an imminent breakdown into hyper-chaos, which may concern the government as well as the protest movement: a small increase in contagion c or frustration F or a small decrease in repression r leads from chaos to hyper-chaos and triggers such a breakdown. Similarly, regular oscillations are an early warning indicator of chaos.
- As Figs 4a–d demonstrate, protest mobilization leading to $M > 0$ always requires a minimum level of frustration $F > 0$. This threshold of frustration increases with repression r and decreases with contagion c . For contagion $c = 0$ even the highest level of F is not sufficient for triggering a mobilization $M > 0$, if the repression $r > 0$.
- Figs 4a–d show for chaos and hyper-chaos regularities similar to protest mobilization: on the one hand, the higher the repression r , the more frustration F is needed in order to trigger chaos or hyper-chaos. On the other hand, the lower the contagion c , the more frustration F is needed to trigger these dynamics.

3.3. Implications for Getting in and out of Chaos

Chaos is dangerous to governments for two reasons. On the one hand, it implies sudden and unpredictable outbreaks of protest, which may be strong enough to overthrow the government. On the other hand, its dynamics are sometimes hard to distinguish from the initial fluctuations of the extremely detrimental *hyper-chaos*. Consequently a *rational* government with a minimum level of risk-aversion should try to get out of chaos, either to a stable equilibrium *Equi* ≥ 0 at any level of mobilization or to the total demobilization of protest represented by the zone *Equi* = 0. Since the former equilibrium often means a stable level of *residual* conflict, it may be used for legitimizing the maintenance of authoritarian rule that prevents society from slipping back into chaos. For reaching these

11. From $0 < c * F - r \leq 2$ required for a stable equilibrium at level $M \geq 0$ (see section 3.1) follows $F = (r + 2) / c$.

12. From $2 < c * F - r \leq 2.57$ required for stable oscillations (see section 3.1) follows $F = (r + 2.57) / c$.

13. From $2.57 < c * F - r \leq 3$ required for chaos (see section 3.1) follows $F = (r + 3) / c$.

equilibria, government may increase the repression rate r , reduce the frustration F by political or economic reforms, or decrease the contagion rate c by censoring the media (see Figs 4a–d). The required effort for leaving the zone of chaos depends on whether the goal is *total demobilization* ($Equi = 0$) or *stabilization* ($Equi \geq 0$) of protest: in terms of the changes of the parameters r , c , and F , the first goal is obviously more demanding than the second.




Fig. 4a. The frontiers between different conflict dynamics for repression $r = 0.00$ ¹⁴




Fig. 4b. The frontiers between different conflict dynamics for repression $r = 0.33$

14. Legend to Figs 4a–d: $Equi = 0$: Convergence to equilibrium $M = 0$; $Equi \geq 0$: Convergence to equilibrium $M \geq 0$ (see Fig. 2a); Osci: Stable oscillations (see Fig. 2c); Chaos: Chaos (see Fig. 2d); Hyper Ch.: Hyper-chaos (see Fig. 2e).




Fig. 4c. The frontiers between different conflict dynamics for repression $r = 0.67$




Fig. 4d. The frontiers between different conflict dynamics for repression $r = 1.00$

According to Figs 4a–d it is always possible to reach from chaos either $Equi \geq 0$ or $Equi = 0$ by *reducing the share F of the frustrated*. A comparison of the different values of c and r in Figs 4a–d makes clear that the lower the contagion c and the higher the repression r , the higher the frustration F , for which these goals are still attainable. In the case of $r = 0$ (see Fig. 4a) the necessary lowering of F for reaching $Equi = 0$ is always total, which obviously implies very substantial reforms. This is in sharp contrast to Fig. 4d, where for the highest level of repression $r = 1$ and a contagion $c = 4$ the frustration has e.g. only to be lowered to $F = 0.25$ in order to get from chaos to $Equi = 0$.

The *increase of the repression* r is a less successful strategy than the previously discussed decrease of the frustration F . A comparison of Figs 4a–d shows that the frontiers between oscillations and chaos on the one hand and chaos and hyper-chaos on the other are not much influenced by the value of r . Consequently there are chaotic situations like the one for $r = 0$, $c = 5$, and $F = 0.600$, where an increase of the repression r even by the considerable amount of 0.33 units is not sufficient for getting out of chaos (cf. Fig. 4a vs. Fig. 4b).

In contrast, the *reduction of the contagion rate* c is a successful way for getting out of chaos. Reaching $\text{Equi} \geq 0$ of protest-stabilization is always relatively easy. The equilibrium zone $\text{Equi} = 0$ of total demobilization is, however, only reachable if the contagion rate c is substantially reduced by ca. 75% and if the repression $r > 0$. In internet societies, where people can easily access foreign uncensored media, this change may be unrealistic. Moreover, the contagion rate is also influenced by protest movements, which are generally interested in *increasing* the value of c by additional media reports about protest events, such that others are induced to support their concerns. The parameter c is the only instrument, to which they have access in order to provoke a chaotic situation, which is generally in their interest. However, the use of c by protest movements is for this purpose only possible if the frustration has reached a minimal threshold. For $r = 0$ an increase of the contagion rate to $c = 12$ requires a frustration $F > 0.2$ to trigger chaos (see Fig. 4a), whereas for $r = 1$ the corresponding threshold of frustration is even higher, i.e. $F > 0.3$ (see Fig. 4d). Thus governments wanting to make the contagion parameter c unusable for protest movements should engage in reforms, which drive the frustration F below the mentioned critical thresholds.

4. Summary and Outlook

This article presents a logistic model of protest-contagion, which describes the following types of conflict dynamics: hyper-chaos, chaos, regular oscillations, and convergence to a stable equilibrium, which can include *zero-protest*. By purposive changes of the model parameters it is possible to get from a conflict dynamic to another, e.g. from chaos to a *zero-protest* equilibrium. Especially efficient according to the analyses of the previous section is the reduction of the frustration F by reforms, which often leads to a change from an old chaotic to new conflict-free order. Likewise, but beyond the control of the political actors, the dynamics of hyper-chaos may trigger the sudden replacement of the old regime by a new one or the breakdown of the protest movement.




Fig. 5. Phase diagram of the chaos dynamics of Fig. 2d¹⁵

Insights into these changes were gained by a formal analysis of a model, which is theoretically plausible but empirically untested. This deficiency calls for systematic empirical checks in follow-up studies, which are, however, not easy to realize. One of the obstacles seems to be the chaotic nature of the model, which is nonetheless easy to solve. Since the observed ΔM are generally sufficiently large such that $\Delta M > -M$, the relation between the *past mobilization* M_- and the current mobilization M is a perfectly deterministic inverse parabola¹⁶

$$M = -c * M_-^2 + (c * F + 1 - r) * M_- \tag{5}$$

exemplified by Fig. 5, which is just another view of the chaos-dynamics of Fig. 2d. This parabola of *deterministic* chaos is different from the phase diagram of *stochastic* chaos, where the whole (M_-, M) -space would be filled with data-points (Liebovitch, 1998: 127). Thus by using the level of protest P as a substitute for M (see proportionality (2)) it is possible to estimate the parameters $-c$ and $(c * F + 1 - r)$ of equation (5) by means of multiple linear regressions (Cramer, Howitt, 2004: 139).¹⁷ However, as a first real problem, it is evident that these two estimates are not sufficient for determining the elementary parameters F and r ; $-c$ and $(c * F + 1 - r)$ can at best be used for a general test of the model, which checks the correspondence between the expected and observed values of M . Moreover, the parameters of the model are assumed to change over time. Consequently one has to identify periods in the political history of a country with *relatively stable* pa-

15. Model parameters: Start value of $M = 0.00001$, $F = 0.30$, $c = 12.0$, $r = 0.67$, $c * F - r = 2.930$.

16. If $\Delta M > -M$, equation (3) implies: $M = M_- + \Delta M = M_- - c * M_-^2 + (c * F - r) * M_- = -c * M_-^2 + (c * F + 1 - r) * M_-$.

17. $-c$ and $(c * F + 1 - r)$ are just the coefficients of a regression equation with two explanatory variables M_-^2 and M_- . This facilitates their estimation by multiple linear regressions.

parameter values, which requires good country-specific knowledge. Plausible events that mark the beginning or end of such periods are democratic electoral swings, major public policy changes such as the introduction of censorship, or economic crises, which increase the level of frustration. The “proof” that a historical period has correctly been identified is the correspondence between the simulated and observed conflicts in this period. If needed, the period may be shortened or extended by statistical experimentation. Finally, testing and parameter estimation require time series with an appropriate time interval δ (Liebovitch, 1998: 212). This parameter is probably much shorter than the 1 year-grid data available in many conflict statistics as Taylor and Hudson (1976: tab. 3.1) and Taylor and Jodice (1983: tab. 2.1). So the main challenge of model testing and parameter estimation is access to appropriate data.

Glossary of Mathematical Symbols

- c: Contagion rate, where $0 \leq c$.
- δ : Time interval between two subsequent values M , where $\delta \gg 0$.
- F: Share of the politically frustrated population, where $0 \leq F \leq 1$.
- M: Share of the population mobilized for protest.
- M_- : M lagged by the time interval δ .
- ΔM : Growth of M during a finite time interval $\delta \gg 0$.
- r: Repression rate, where $0 \leq r \leq 1$.
- P: Number of protest events in the analyzed country.
- ΔP : Growth of P during a finite time interval $\delta \gg 0$.
- \approx : Proportionality between two variables.

References

- Brown C. (1995) *Chaos and Catastrophe Theories*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Bühl W. (1990) *Sozialer Wandel im Ungleichgewicht: Zyklen, Fluktuationen, Katastrophen*, Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke.
- Cramer D., Howitt D. (2004) *The SAGE Dictionary of Statistics*, London: SAGE.
- Creedy J., Martin V. (eds.) (1994a) *Chaos and Non-Linear Models in Economics: Theory and Applications*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Creedy J., Martin V. (1994b) The Strange Attraction of Chaos in Economics. *Chaos and Non-Linear Models in Economics: Theory and Applications* (eds. J. Creedy, V. Martin), Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 7–29.
- Dixon R. (1994) The Logistic Family of Discrete Dynamic Models. *Chaos and Non-Linear Models in Economics: Theory and Applications* (eds. J. Creedy, V. Martin), Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 44–69.
- Eve R., Horsfall S., Lee M. E. (eds.) (1997) *Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology: Myths, Models, and Theories*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

- Feierabend I. K., Feierabend R. L. (1972) Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory. *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research* (eds. I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, T. R. Gurr), Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp. 136–183.
- Gurr T. R. (1972) A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research* (eds. I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, T. R. Gurr), Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp. 184–222.
- Gurr T. R. (2010 [1970]) *Why Men Rebel*, Bolder: Paradigm.
- Hamblin R. L., Jacobsen R. B., Miller J. L. L. (1973) *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change*, New York: John Wiley.
- Kiel D., Elliott E. (eds.) (1996) *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Applications*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Liebovitch L. (1998) *Fractals and Chaos Simplified for the Life Sciences*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor Ch., Hudson, M. (1976) *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (2nd edition), New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taylor Ch., Jodice, D. (1983) *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Vol. 2 (3rd edition), New Haven: Yale University Press.

Возникновение порядка из хаоса: математическая модель политического конфликта

Георг П. Мюллер

Факультет экономики и социальных наук, Фрибургский университет

Адрес: Blvd de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland

E-mail: georg.mueller_unifr@bluewin.ch

Данные динамики насильственных конфликтов внутри стран, протестов или беспорядков, зачастую демонстрируют нерегулярные флуктуации. В статье доказывается, что эти флуктуации являются проявлением *детерминированного хаоса*, который можно описать через относительно простое дифференциальное уравнение. В основе уравнения лежит модель последствия, которая описывает взаимодействие трех групп: а) уже мобилизованные восставшие граждане, протестующие против правительства и его политики, б) группы фрустрированных граждан, которые не присоединились к протестам в самом начале, в) репрессивные правительственные силы, которые стремятся обуздать протесты и сократить число участвующих в беспорядках граждан. Интеграция этих процессов приводит к *модели логистического роста*, которая сходится при множестве конфигураций параметров и ведет к стабилизации доли протестующих, в том числе на *нулевом уровне* в некоторых ситуациях. Однако при других параметрах эта модель может привести к *хаотическим флуктуациям* в протестных действиях, которые опасны для правящего режима, поскольку являются *непредсказуемыми* и носят *массовый характер*. При помощи компьютерного моделирования в статье анализируются последствия различных параметрических конфигураций для протестной динамики. Ради политического выживания

многие правительства заинтересованы в том, чтобы выйти из динамики хаотичного конфликта и перейти к состоянию *стабильного равновесия* протеста, а затем свести его на нулевой уровень. Они могут добиться этого при помощи 1) реформ, которые сократят долю фрустрированных граждан, потенциально способных на протест, 2) устрашения протестующих и/или репрессий, 3) введения цензуры в сообщениях СМИ о протесте для ограничения распространения информации о протесте. Формальный анализ модели показывает, что наиболее успешными оказываются реформы, которые сокращают долю фрустрированных граждан и, как следствие, ведут к *новому политическому порядку*.

Ключевые слова: модель последствия, политический конфликт, реформы, теория хаоса, математические модели, компьютерная симуляция

Social Imagination and Solidarity in Precarious Times: The Case of Lower Class People in Post-Soviet Russia

Karine Clément

Associate Professor of Sociology, Director of the Andrew Gagarin Center for Civil Society and Human Rights,
Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Saint Petersburg State University
Address: Universitetskaya nab., 13B, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation 199034
E-mail: carine_clement@hotmail.com

The paper seeks to enrich existing literature on group making by studying the process of group formation among lower class people in post-soviet Russia, which provides important findings on the way precarization and atomization in global neoliberal capitalism can be overcome. Drawing on a large database consisting of in-depth interviews in different regions and a few observations, the study sheds light on the way social ties and social imagination can develop among lower class people, who have been subjected to harsh social and economic destabilization. First, a process of inhabiting one's social and material environment has to unfold, along with the recovering of habitus or a sense of occupying a "normal" place in society, and regular interactions with people recognized as occupying a similar place. Second, rootedness in one's everyday experience gives lower class people the capacity to grasp the broader social space and to draw some lines of differentiation and division, while populist and anti-populist discourses can provide the background for acknowledging and naming new social divisions. To grasp these processes, the author argues, a comeback to such classics of critical (or structural-constructivist) sociology, as Marx and Bourdieu, would be useful.

Keywords: social imagination, habitus, everyday experience, lower classes, social cleavages, post-Soviet Russia, precariousness

Theories of globalization and post-modernism (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; Melucci, 1989; Bauman, 2000), as well as theories of neoliberalism and precarization (Boltanski, Chiapello, 1999; Sennet, 1998; Standing, 2011) describe the end of the society, national society first of all, and the nomadification or atomization of individuals, their increasing mobility, destabilization and insecurization. Rootlessness gives rise to mourning the loss of social attachments and to new demands for social belonging, which are depicted in the literature as identity politics (for a critical view on the concept, Bauman, 2001; Brubaker, Cooper, 2000). However, identity politics or the search for identity seems to be an unsatisfactory concept for embracing the multiple forms of constructing social links and a sense of belonging. First, it appears to be too normative, assuming that they are "good" identity claims for the recognition of ethnic or sexual minorities or gender differences, ignoring the "bad" identity claims of the majority or the old-fashioned claim for the rec-

ognition of the poor and exploited. Second, identity politics is too narrow a concept to embrace all the multiple social groups or social bonds being made. Still, the quest for social belonging and the suffering linked to individual isolation and insecurity are strong in our times, leading to the rise of populist or nationalistic politics or movements.

No doubt, this trend is developing all around the world. However, it seems that Russia is a valuable vantage point from which to look at it, since it is hard to think of another society that has so deeply been shaken and broken up. Indeed, Russia has experienced many twists and turns in a relatively short period, particularly since the collapse of the communist regime and the breakdown of the Soviet Union. At different times in the course of their lives, Russian people have experienced multiple crises and upheavals: the collapse of one great country (the Soviet Union) and the emergence of another (Russia), the substitution of communist ideology with free-market democratic ideology, brutal ups and downs of material and social status, the reversal of the bad and the good, several economic collapses, wars and the beginnings of civil wars. The radical and profound transformations that Russian society has endured since the end of the 1980s made it difficult for most people to maintain their ordinary and familiar (routine) relations to the world. In this sense, we can speak of a “cultural trauma” which shattered identity, atomized society, disoriented people and debased a wider sense of public meaning (Alexander et al., 2004; Sztompka, 2000). The result, at least in the most destabilizing period (the 1990s), was an atomized, scattered, and exploded society where people shared hardly any patterns of socialization. Almost every person had to make their own synthesis of the contradictory layers of life experiences; this rendered it difficult to figure out the society one lived in, and hindered the building of solidarities and common visions.

One of the consequences of the turmoil for the theoretical knowledge of our contemporary societies is that which is considered as commonplace in western sociology, the intuitive and non-reflexive sense of one’s place or social location (Goffman [1974] refers to it as “frame” or “footing” in interactional contexts; Bourdieu [1990] talks about “habitus”) appears to be problematic. Moreover, the shattering of “habitus” or the intuitive sense of the world and one’s place in the world weakens people instead of emancipating them from oppressive social structures and the unequal distribution of capital.

Russia is obviously not unique in this situation. Many other countries have been subjected to upheavals, wars and other human tragedies. Moreover, at least one process breaking social ties is now global: social, labor and material precarization. This is a massive worldwide trend in neoliberal capitalism, abundantly analysed in the literature (Boltanski, Chiapello, 1999; Breman, van der Linden, 2014; Sennet, 1998; Standing, 2011). Precarization was all-pervading in the 1990s in Russia, but continues to destabilize people and break solidarities, although it is not acknowledged as a political or social problem.

From this perspective, Russia provides a perfect example of an atomized society where most people are entrenched in their close and intimate environment of one’s home and family, disengaging from the hostile and incomprehensible outer world. However, despite the weight of the atomizing dynamics, there are also countertendencies, particularly since the 2000s, towards the building of social links and the recovery of a sense of

social belonging, which is not limited to identity claims. The object of this paper is to look at such countertendencies through the analysis of selected cases of communalization or connectedness in the everyday life experience of lower class people.

Lower class people are the subject of the paper for two main reasons. One is that they represent the majority of the Russian population: those people who live with incomes below the official (undervalued) poverty line or not much higher, or who live under the threat of falling into poverty if they lose their job, fall ill or have growing children. To give only one estimation, according to a recent poll (May 2017), around 40% of the population try to save money on food and clothes¹. A key feature of Russian poverty is that it is not limited to specific groups (although the disabled, families with many children, single-parent families and retirees are among the most vulnerable categories), but make up a large part of low-paid workers, non-qualified and qualified. From this perspective, lower class people in Russia fit into the growing category of “working poor”, which is one of the features of precariousness all around the world. The second reason to concentrate on lower class people is that this category of people is emblematic of the new precarious and uncertain times of post-soviet capitalism, if speaking of Russia and other post-soviet states, or neoliberal global capitalism, if speaking of world trends. They do not form a class in the sense of homogeneous and self-conscious group (a reason for which the more conceptual term of “working class” has not been chosen as the primary term, although they empirically almost merge), but they represent a wide category of people facing similar material and social insecurity.

Except for a few exceptions mentioned in the text, data on lower class life experience come from a large database collected in 2016–2017 within a research project devoted to everyday nationalism², which consists of twelve observations of everyday interactions and 220 in-depth interviews on their everyday life experience with people from six regions with different social and professional profiles. Most of the people interviewed are former or actual blue-collar workers or low-wage workers (many retirees are also still working in order to survive). The cases explored in this paper illustrate the ways some people from the bottom, who were harshly destabilized and disoriented by the neo-liberal reforms and turmoil of the nineties, or whose parents were, arrange new spaces for living a more or less good life, which implies developing attachments to certain things and people.

1. <https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=116154>.

2. Ongoing research on “Patriotism in Contemporary Russia” under the project “Living Together: Issues of Diversity and Unity in Modern Russia: The Historical Legacy, the Modern State, and Society” (2016–2017). Research supported by the grant for the Foundation for Support of Liberal Education at the Center for Historical Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics Saint Petersburg and Gagarin Center for Civil Society and Human Rights.

The Main Thesis: From Desubjectivation to the Recovery of Social Consciousness

Precariousness was maybe nowhere so widespread and all-pervading as it was in the 1990s in Russia. Blue-collar workers or industrial bottom-workers, who were the absolute majority of the soviet population, were among the first victims of precarization, because of deindustrialization, the loss of their symbolic significance as the mythicized Soviet proletariat and the weak mobilizing potential of their organizations. The field studies I conducted in the 1990s among industrial workers led me to describe their life's precarization as a process of desubjectivation (the tendency towards the loss of some sense of the self and agency, see Clément, 1999). In the 1990s, they lost two thirds of their average real wage, most of their social wage and protections, including guaranteed employment, as well as their social image of the leading class of Soviet society. However, workers have stood by relatively passively in the face of such hardship, since they had lost themselves in the turmoil of the market reforms. Most of them lost points of reference and orientations, experiencing trouble identifying themselves and identifying the society in which they live. Many talked about themselves in derogatory terms: "a small screw in the soulless machine", "nothing", "unneeded people", "cattle" or "slaves". The high degree of worker alienation and atomization was noticed by other scholars having done research at that time (Ashwin, 1998).

Industrial workers were not the only ones to be shaken by processes of desubjectivation and precarization, although the experience of declassification was certainly more painful for them. Which is why it is all the more striking to discover now, after more than 25 years of reforms, that many people, including blue-collar workers, display a social consciousness that was lacking in the 1990s. In this paper, I give some empirical evidence of the new sense of the social that I noticed during the most recent research (2016–2017) and point out the processes leading to the renewal of social consciousness.

First, what do I call social consciousness? This is the sense of one's own and others' positions in the social space and a certain representation of society. This is not only the mess, the collection of lost atoms or a black box, like it was for a long time for many of the people I interviewed in the 1990s and 2000s. In the eyes of many lower class people interviewed over the past few years, society presents some obvious lines of cleavages: between the poor and the rich, between the "productive" or "manual" workers, on the one side, and the "paper" workers, employers, civil servants, bureaucrats or corrupt politicians, on the other side. A cleavage also appears separating people in the regions from people in the big central cities.

This paper addresses group-making in a time-space of high turbulence (post-soviet Russia). The process of group-making is a traditional sociological issue and the literature devoted to its study is too large to be fully discussed. What this paper proposes is to discuss some specificities of group-making in a society destabilized in the 1990s by the loss of a big part of its territory, by the dissolution of its national identity, by harsh economic

reforms and the symbolic destruction of the traditional soviet class-structuration of the society.

By analysing and comparing interviews between people who witness a sense of social belonging and those who do not, it is possible to identify two interconnected processes contributing to the recovery of social consciousness: the process of habiting one's life or surroundings; and the process of opening to the imagined communities of ours and theirs.

Inhabiting

At [the factory], there is a room where people can relax at lunch time. And we really like to spend time there and talk together. Doesn't matter, about what, it can be about wives, prices, or politics. The important thing is that we feel comfortable and free to speak there. It's really pleasant, I learn a lot in this way. It's far more interesting and more convincing, than what we have on TV.

(Operator, 40 years, Saint Petersburg)

This quote is representative of workers' search for opportunities to talk together among themselves, workers who share the same life experience, especially the same labor experience. In such settings, the workers feel free to talk about everything that matters for them without being shy or feeling constrained by rules of correct behavior or speech. The enthusiasm and strong need for free and equal communication inside the workplace can be illustrated by a collective discussion triggered by the sociologist's presence in a water treatment plant in the industrial monotown of Rubtsovsk in June 2011³. I wanted to learn more about the state of affairs in the monotown, and the blue-collar workers — male, 30–40 years' old — began to discuss the issue of a town in decay, abandoned by the political authorities, where only the blue-collar workers tried to do something to save the infrastructure and make life liveable for the town's citizens. They used the presence of the sociologist to talk to each other rather than to answer the questions, which were forgotten in the course of their talking together. In the same town a few years later, in July 2017, while I was conducting fieldwork on everyday patriotism, working people made multiple allusions to the fact that they had already (or "just today") discussed the point with their colleagues at work. In many other places around Russia where I have interviewed people over the last few years, working people report on typical conversations with their colleagues on very different issues, beginning with private and personal things (the children's education and leisure, their wives/husbands, etc.), but including also — which is new compared to interviews and echoes from the 1990s and 2000s — political issues. Moreover, workers speak of these conversations on political issues as something "normal" and "obvious". "Of course, we talk about it at work". Maybe women are less prompt to talk politics (some say that these are male issues), but it is not the case of all women.

3. Fieldwork on urban movements in 3 towns (2011–2012), see Clément, 2013.

Such spaces for informal conversation have always existed in soviet and post-soviet enterprises, but, contrary to the 1990s, the quest for one's own space of comradeship is now going beyond the enterprise's walls. The flat itself, which was closed to strangers not belonging to a narrow circle of relatives during the harsh time of the 1990s, is now being opened to welcome workmates and friends or acquaintances from other workplaces. This has partly to do with the fact that more workers have been able to renovate their flats, which are now more "presentable" and, thus, hospitable. More generally, workers who I have met frequently depict their time outside the workplace as being full of social and informal activities in the course of which they can develop friendly or cooperative relationships with their co-workers or workers from other places. These are, for instance, fishing, walking in the countryside, playing sport, doing some manual work together (fixing cars, building dachas, etc.), looking after children. Compared to the 1990s, where most of the time outside the workplace was devoted to working (informally, domestically, etc.) for money or to survival practices involving workers individually, often putting them in competition with each other, time off is now more dedicated to relaxation, leisure and informal communication.

For instance, some workmates from Ford in Vsevolozhsk (Leningrad region) regularly meet for volleyball. Others in Astrakhan regularly meet for fishing on the Volga River. Many find their space of relaxation in garages where they work on or fix equipment, often in small groups of peers. Of course, they often drink together in these occasions. If these activities are rather male-dominated, activities at home and traditional tea-parties are the domain of women. Once again, these activities are rather pursued for their own sake (not for survival) and for sociality.

Women especially, but men also, often use outdoor spaces for chatting, looking after the neighborhood, or having good time singing or playing. This is especially the case when the courtyard (*dvor*) between several apartment buildings is looked after by the inhabitants themselves. I have seen many such places since the implementation of the new housing legislation (2005), which gives the inhabitants the right to self-organize to manage their own buildings. Such soviet practices as *subbotnik* (volunteer workday) have reappeared with new meanings, especially for cleaning the courtyard, gardening or painting. These occasions for socializing are appreciated by most of the residents. As an old woman in Astrakhan exclaimed after such a *subbotnik* (May 2008⁴), "It was the first time in a long time that I saw so many people in the courtyard. It was as if I had woken up after a 20-year-long hibernation!" I have seen dozens of beautiful and welcoming courtyards, arranged with flowers, paintings, wooden sculptures by handymen in all the towns I have visited since the end of the 2000s. In Perm, neighbors of a completely restored block of flats in an old industrial district arranged the basement for a common recreation and celebration space. In Pushkin (St. Petersburg), neighbors put a long table, arranged flowers and installed a fountain in their courtyard. They regularly organize common celebrations, sharing food and drinks, inviting all the neighbors, and their relatives and friends.

4. Fieldwork on housing self-management (2007–2011), see Clément, 2015.

They even celebrate the most popular holiday in Russia, New Year, meeting together in the courtyard at midnight, and dancing and drinking until late in the night.

The lower classes also invest in public places, sometimes using official celebrations for their own use and at their own convenience, without any piety towards the official dramaturgy. For instance, in Perm at the 2016 Victory Day celebration on May 9, many blue-collar workers living in one neighborhood came to the “The Immortal Workshop” public event, which commemorates Perm industrial workers, who produced armaments during WWII. The event was celebrated in the industrial district Motovilikha and accompanied “The Immortal Regiment” march, which took place in the city center. People gathered to commemorate and honor the veterans of WWII and to socialize. They formed small groups and circulated, hugging each other, joking, recalling stories from the great times of the industrial district, mocking the official authorities and toasting. Many were secretly drinking (the public consumption of alcohol was banned that day), which added to the relaxed and joyful atmosphere of the gathering.

This is not to say that nothing like this existed before, during soviet times or just after the fall of the USSR. I instead argue that these places and activities of sociality are becoming more widespread; more people, especially from the lower classes, are engaging in them. More importantly, they engage in these activities with their own meanings, which differ in each situation or interaction, but have in common a sense of being able to speak freely and among “themselves”, people sharing the same positions, on an equal footing, without ceremony and in sometimes crude and irreverent language. On these occasions, people rarely complain (or they do it ironically, distancing themselves from the role of victims), rather they mock the adversity and hypocrisy of the better off. They talk about everyday life with many concrete and colorful details, using irony and allusions to the tacit knowledge of commonplaces shared by all the interlocutors. They praise themselves for “making a go of it” or “doing it by ourselves”.

What happened in the meantime? How can we explain this new trend? I would argue that since the end of the 1990s, the growing economic and political stability, especially the sense of stabilization, give people, particularly from the lower classes, some ground under their feet on which they could build some other ways to understand the world and their place in it. Stability sometimes means an improvement in wages and labor conditions, or at least the end of wage arrears, and a production revival. It means the stable payment of pensions. It means stable government since 2000 and the restoration of the state. All this, at least in the 2000s and until the global economic downturn of 2008, allowed most people to recover from shock, positional suffering (Bourdieu, 1999) and self-depreciation, and provided them with a sense of normality and ordinariness.

Many lower class people describe their everyday life as having always been marked by poverty or need. However, they interpret it as “normal” or “ordinary”. “It has always been like this, nothing new. We just keep going. No problems, no crisis, just the usual things” (female, June 2016), said an ex-worker pensioner who works now as a concierge in St. Petersburg and lives in very poor housing conditions. Contrary to the “litanies and laments” heard by Nancy Ries (1997) in the 1990s, lower class people in the 2010s rarely complain

about their lot. They can blame somebody, ironically criticize some aspects of their life experience, talk to others about it with enjoyment, but they rarely cry about it. The same concierge explained in detail how she loves her little decaying one-room apartment, how she feels comfortable there and “at home”; she describes the little gifts she regularly makes to her relatives, the help others give her; and values her part-time job as a concierge (which she was “very lucky” to find) highly. Although it may look like resilience or the process of never-ending individual adaptation to hardships, it is rather a striving to get some satisfaction or enjoyment from life. Striving to make one’s life habitable and even comfortable instead of binding oneself to the neo-liberal demands of individual “adaptation” or devaluing one’s life in regard to its failed character from the point of view of the new market ideology. For example, this same concierge gets pleasure in talking with people who share the same life experience, talks about her friends and relatives as living in even worse conditions than she lives in, finds a way to buy some good coffee and sweets and take some to her friends for a moment of chatting. In a word, she feels “good” in life, at work as well as at home.

A great change seems to have unfolded in the way people, and particularly people from the lower classes, relate to their life and environment. From the desubjectivation and the disorientation of the 1990s, many today fully inhabit their world and have repositioned themselves in their surroundings. To use Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, the process has been from a “broken habitus” (Wacquant, 2002: 1499) or “split habitus” (Bourdieu, 2004: 94–114) (the old positions and dispositions incorporated through the experience of soviet social structures having come into contradiction with the new post-soviet social disorder, which led to the failure of people’s practices and common sense) towards a recovered habitus that again fits the social structures and allows the social agent to act in the best way intuitively. This intuitive and comfortable (which implies being “at ease” with the surroundings and one’s position) sense of one’s position provides the ground for people to seek for connectedness and sociality. As Crossley reminds us, “the habitus forms the practical-social basis for innovative and improvised action. It consists of forms of competence, skill, and multi-track dispositions” (Crossley, 2001: 8). This is why habitus allows people, especially those who have been weakened and symbolically put down after the fall of the communist regime, particularly the working class, to take steps in their environment, which had long been experienced as hostile, unfamiliar (everything had changed), insecure and incomprehensible. This stepping towards the social world, through encounters, interactions and actions, fuels the mechanisms of rebuilding a coherent habitus. Connectedness and interactions (especially with people sharing the same social position) are indispensable for the rebuilding of habitus, schemata of visions and divisions. Habitus is first forged through joint activities and interactions with significant others, “people like us” (Wacquant, 2014: 126).

For the working class, especially, a rebuilt habitus (which is practically coherent with social structures) requires the reconciliation of the person with materiality and bodyness, while an abstract or reflexive striving for meaning, which could be essential for educated upper or middle classes, is not enough. This is why inhabiting as well as embeddedness

in one's environment, rootedness in one's material and corporal life is so important (on the importance of the body, see Wacquant, 2014). The significance of bodyness or the reconciliation with one's body, the perception and sense of the world through the body, is illustrated by the value many current or ex-blue-collar workers give to the practice of doing something with their own hands, to getting enough to eat and drink, to arranging one's own place to live and to welcoming guests. It can also be illustrated by the importance of sport for men especially, of beauty care for women and of gender roles for both.

More than bodyness, I would stress the importance of the down-to-earth or very pragmatic anchorage in (or the sensitive experience of) one's daily life as a necessary starting point for lower class people to rebuild the sense of their place in the social world. It supposes the re-foundation of the mundane and the inhabitation of the surrounding and material environment, that is feeling the deep physical, emotional, sensitive, mindful, and moral relationship to places, people, and things that are a regular part of one's daily life. It is the essential condition for engaging with and making sense of the world and one's life experience. The concept of inhabitation or habitability is important here, what Morris (2016: 8), studying working class people in a Russian monotown, calls "the striving for mundane comfort and ordinariness". Inhabiting means living one's life despite insecurity and uncertainty, finding it normal, ordinary, even "good". Inhabiting is "making habitable the inhospitable and insecure space of lived experience" (Morris, 2016: 236). By these efforts and practices, people turn from the "suffering of positions" (Bourdieu, 1999) to "enjoying one's place". The recovery of habitus and a sense of one's place does not mean that lower class people would gain an awareness of any domination or social inequality, but they gain the ability to look at the social world without feeling lost in chaos.

As a whole, the process of inhabiting leads to re-connectedness, to the building of social ties and to group making. People arrange their own comfortable place to live in, which means regular interactions with significant others, that is, with people sharing a similar life experience. Despite globalization and the progress of virtual communication, physical co-presence and face-to-face interactions or interaction rituals (Durkheim, 1912; Collins, 2004) are still key, especially concerning working class people, who value embodied activities and communication, for the formation of solidary groups. It is apparent in my current fieldwork that most of the (ex-)blue-collar workers interviewed for the research project on nationalism prioritize the company of their peers for leisure or shared activities (once again, in complete opposition to what was the workers' motto of the 1990s: "Each one for oneself"). For most of them, the blue-collar milieu, or the "simple", "ordinary" workers, are the referent group, the group of belonging and of valuation.

Imagine the Community of Enlarged "Ours"

A second striking feature, which shows up in my recent fieldwork concerning lower class people, is the development of their social imaginary, that is their opening to imagined communities of enlarged ours and theirs. This finding is in complete opposition with the expressed inability to figure out Russian society in any way except for aesthetic emotional

pictures (a tunnel, a ravine, a mess) — the dominant pictures I collected in interviews until recently. More and more frequently, cleavages, which are based on social criteria, are expressed, in interviews or informal conversations. Social cleavages are mentioned spontaneously, seeming congruent or salient in everyday life. The most frequently named cleavages are between the rich and the working (wage) people, between blue-collar workers and the employers or office workers, between the provincial towns and the big cities. A very clear cleavage separates those who work in earnest for the good of the country, who do something useful or productive (or have done, if speaking of pensioners) and those who only talk or live at the expense of the genuine workers. It is something quite new, since the workers (especially industrial ones) were long denied any social recognition, their work being depicted as outdated and unneeded in the new liberal economic order; their competences and know-how were dispraised. It is also worth stressing that new cleavages are arising which are not the traditional dividing line between “the people” and “the power”, which has been dominant for a long time, supported by the discourse of the ruling elite and the liberal opposition. The new cleavages reveal a growing sense of social inequality and unfairness, which is strongly expressed by blue-collar workers, people working in the production sector, pensioners and the lower and middle classes from the regions. They indicate the formation of a sense of social belonging that dissolved after the breakdown of the soviet system. Workers use frequently the pronoun “we” to refer to collective social entities, which are something wider than the mere small family circle or other restricted circles of “ours” (traditional Russian term *svoi* refers to people whom I personally know and with whom I interact on the basis of mutual aid and interdependence). In many interviews and conversations, the “we” refer to general categories, such as “the hard-working people”, “the ordinary folk”, “ordinary citizens” and even “the working class”, which had long disappeared from public discourse and from everyday conversations after the fall of the USSR. What is awakening here is the social imagination, the ability to imagine other people having some common experience and understanding of life.

I first provide some empirical evidence to underlie the point, and then turn to some theoretical elaborations on the on-going group-making processes.

Astrakhan, June 2016. From an interview with a blue-collar worker repairing the roof of an apartment building: “Nothing will never change in Russia in our lives. What can change? Everything has been seized, it’s business, it is profitable for them, do you understand, it’s profitable to take everything from the workers, to pay them so little. . . . They talk a lot, but talking is easy, they promise a lot, but nothing changes.”

Astrakhan, June 2016, collective interview in a courtyard with some members of the housing committees and some less active residents (all women, 30–60, lower class).
“(Putin) lifts the country up? Not our country, maybe Syria or Crimea.”
“You know, I don’t think he lifts our country up, nor Crimea and Syria.”
“Yes, he lifts up the well-offs.”
“All the money is offshore. . . . Nothing remains in Russia.”

“Yes, he works for the rich.”

“Banks also do well, our welfare funds go to the banks.”

“What did Putin do for the pensioners? What? Nothing! No-thing! Only empty words.”

“They live very well, and we struggle to survive.”

Perm, May 2016, an informal conversation with two blue-collar workers. The same two workers mentioned above that were standing in the central place of the industrial district Motovilikha, celebrating the Victory Day, expressed a keen sense of social inequality and social belonging. They referred to “we” as “simple working people”. The “simple working people” with whom they identified included those who work for a low salary and cope with very concrete difficulties in life (e.g., food prices, cost of utilities, low wages, the condition of roads and buildings). The alternative category of “them” included the “oligarchs,” property owners or power-holders, as well as people from Moscow and Saint Petersburg (who “get salaries in dollars, shop in dollars, and think in dollars,” as one of the workers put it). “They” are rich, greedy, line their pockets, and live in a world completely disconnected from the world of simple people; “they” symbolically dominate (they are “up there,” “on top”). The two workers’ narratives constantly moved back and forth between these two categories of “top” and “bottom.”

For instance, they pointed out the contradiction between the richness of Russia’s natural resources and the poverty of its inhabitants, particularly among those working in the gas sector:

Oleg: “Why do we sell gas to everybody but don’t have gas for our houses?”

Anton: “We sit on oil.”

Oleg: “I work for Gazprom and have no gas in my own house.”

They attacked the hypocrisy of official statistics (here on average salary) and stood up for more equal salaries.

Oleg: “For example, if the governor receives half a million, and the nurse in a kindergarten has 7,000, the average could be 29,000 (rubles a month). I think that the average salary should be counted with reference to the workers. Or to equalize all the wages. The governors’ wage, mayors’, . . . heads of administrations, Putin’s . . . To equalize with that of a nurse. Let them work as a nurse for a while! To wipe kids’ asses for 7,000!”

Oleg and Anton were talking loudly, often looking at other people standing nearby, addressing their words to them also, and being confident of their approval and comprehension, as if they were certain the others shared the same tacit knowledge and life experience. Moreover, it seemed to me that the audience of the message was not limited to the public physically standing nearby, but was wider, an imagined public of people knowing from their everyday life what does it mean to have no gas at home and to earn 7,000 rubles for wiping kid’s asses.

Moscow, metro driver, February 2017: “When you [referring not so much to himself as to other poor-working people] see that so many people earn so little money from their own work, it arouses a feeling of hatred”.

A high-skilled young blue-collar worker, St. Petersburg, Jan. 2017: “I love my job, I really enjoy it. And I want to earn money from it. However, it turns to be without any value. Human labor is not valued anymore. . . . Those fat arseholes, sorry, who

sit in their chairs in the Duma, don't do anything and earn half a million are considered far more useful . . . And what about the pensioners? They have worked all their lives for the good of the country, since soviet times! And they still have to work in order to survive, instead of travelling and enjoying life, like foreign pensioners It's a shame! . . . And the regions, all these little towns where people live without jobs and money. Why did all factories close?"

These quotations illustrate the liberation of people's social imagination, or the opening of spatial and social horizons. People imagine a group larger than one's family or one's personal space as a point of reference, "we" who is seen as sharing the same life experience. For all these people, social inequality is the country's main problem, the main division, far more important in all accounts than national, ethnic, gender or generational ones. They advocate for the workers, those who produce, for the ex-workers (pensioners), for the working-poor in the regions who face social breakdown. In that sense, the group they relate to in their imagination while talking is not restricted to those people close to them. The group is imagined within the entire national borders. The group is an imagined community (Anderson, 2006) based on a sense of common life experience or common positions.

What made possible the awakening of such a vision of society? One condition is the process of inhabiting, analyzed in the first section, which implies a pragmatic anchorage in one's daily life, connectedness and the rebuilding of habitus or sense of one's place. Another favorable condition, I would argue, is the dominant populist and patriotic discourse, which has been developing since the second half of the 2000s and the background it provides for acknowledging and naming new social divisions.

Such activity requires discursive resources that are not easily appropriated by those submerged in the hegemonic discourse. In the logic of Ernesto Laclau (2005), one condition for a new discourse to appear is the emergence of empty signifiers and names that are open to contradictory understandings. One such signifier gaining strength in Russia today is the category of "the people." Empty of specific signification, "the people" also opens the way for different understandings of who "the people" are. It could generate a sense of collective belonging and solidarity among the subordinates ("the simple people" in our cases). Therefore, it could serve as a ground and channel for the constitution of another, popular, populism.

A new populist and patriotic discourse has been developed by the Kremlin as a reaction to the massive 2005 protests against the social welfare reform called *monetizatsia lgoty* (monetization of social in-kind benefits), accentuated by the reaction to the 2011–2012 "For Fair Elections" movement and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Putin administration promotes a discourse of government concern for the people and a rejection of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Putin uses populist rhetoric and turns back to the "hard-working" and "conscientious" "ordinary folk," acknowledging the demand for a socially progressive state. He primarily speaks to 'ordinary citizens' and 'people who work'

and “love Russia.”⁵ His popularity is largely rooted in the fact that he has permitted many people from the bottom of the social hierarchy to recover a degree of recognition and self-esteem. The rhetoric of the liberal opposition only reproduces the populist discourse by inverting it (see also on this Yudin, 2017). The Moscow liberal intelligentsia holds a strongly anti-populist rhetoric, supporting the myth of the enlightened minority and the unenlightened majority, depicting “the mass post-Soviet people,” especially lower class people from the regions, as ‘paternalistically minded,’ authoritarian, cynical, and materialistic (Gudkov, 2013; Gudkov, Dubin, Zorkaya, 2008). Derogatory terms which are used to refer to the unenlightened majority are very crude, such as *sovki* [people still “stuck” in the Soviet past] or *vatniki* [literally, “quilted jackets”] and are picked up by the power elite with inverse connotations. As a result, it is not rare in interviews to hear people emotionally asserting that they are not *vatniki*, but worthy citizens.

The Kremlin discourse and the anti-Kremlin discourse both provide new social markers and a renewed vision of society, which breaks with the “shock therapy” vision of the chaos, or the neoliberal vision of an individualistic society of consumers, competitors and risk-takers. The discourse conveys a new terminology and (old) new macro-sociological categories, such as “the working-class people,” “ordinary Russian people,” “simple people” that are appropriated by many people in their ordinary conversations. My fieldworks show, however, that there is a gap between the meanings given to these categories by the ruling and oppositional elites, and the meaning attributed by the people who identify themselves with these categories. One of the most striking mismatches is the presence or absence of social-economic inequality. The problem is silenced by the media from both ideological sides; it is hardly mentioned by intellectuals. On the contrary, in-depth interviews reveal a high proportion of people, particularly from lower classes, addressing the choking rise of social inequality.

Another aspect of the dominant discourse allows for different and ambivalent interpretations: the nationalistic rhetoric which has strengthened particularly after the annexation of the Crimea. Whatever people may think about any particular concrete feature of living in Russia (and critical views largely dominate), most of the interviewees support the project of rebuilding the “great Russia” and giving people reasons for being proud of their homeland. Instead of the national shame of the 1990s, which is painfully remembered in many interviews, people now demonstrate a striking capacity to grasp the whole country, at least in their imagination. The restoration of the national frame (whatever its specific content, which I will not discuss here) and the strengthening of the nationalist discourse widens the geographical, territorial and social boundaries of the imagination. Interviews are full of mentions of “poor regions,” “outrageously rich Moscow” or the “decaying countryside”. Many interviewees embrace the whole of Russia when trying to assess the current situation in the country, comparing different regions or cities or places. Many refer to people “like us” living in other parts of Russia. This does not mean that the dominant identification is with the nation as the community of Russians.

5. From Putin’s speech at the rally held on February 23, 2012, at Luzhniki in Moscow against the “For Fair Elections” movement.

More often than the “we-Russians”, the broader social-territorial category mentioned in interviews as “ours” is the social-economic “we” of the poor, despised and dominated but worthy people. As a whole, the interviews testify to an opening of the horizons of thinking, which obviously provide grounds for the development of macro-sociological groups of belonging.

It can be argued that we are witnessing a process of group making that has perhaps not led to stable collective identities, boundaries and institutions. However, something is unfolding which is worth trying to grasp for a better understanding of Russian society, as well as for theoretical elaboration. The study of collective identities (Brubaker, Cooper, 2000; Tilly, 2003, Melucci, 1996) and boundaries (Lamont, Molnar, 2002) is well developed, scholars in various fields try to grasp the process of group making in our post-modern pluralistic and fluid societies. The dominant feature of these studies is their constructivist stance. Most scholars avoid giving any essentialist features or objective existence to groups and stress the role of representations, imaginary, emotions and cognitive efforts involved in the construction of groups, especially on the part of the elites (although not reduced to it). These are useful insights to cover the wide range of practices and meaning making involved in the process. Post-soviet Russia, certainly along with other countries or cases, points to the importance of the materialistic and structural components in the process. As already highlighted, the process of imagining a reference group with which a person feels commonality requires first the foundation of “habitus”, a corporal and physical inhabiting of and rootedness in one’s quotidian and mundane world. The recovery of habitus is not achieved by the operation of the will or through cognitive work, but through the stabilization of life experience, regular interactions and practices of “inhabiting”. Thanks to this physical and emotional reconciliation with one’s immediate world, it becomes possible to take a stance on the larger world, to see it in a more or less meaningful way.

In an extremely unequal society, such as contemporary Russia, most lower class people see society through the lenses of socio-economic inequality. This view of the world has also emerged thanks to the (anti-)populist and (anti-)nationalist discourse of the ruling and intellectual elites which puts under the spotlight a new vocabulary to grasp reality, where the categories of “the people” and “the homeland” are at the fore. However, it would be oversimplifying to subsume the complex process of group making to this aspect. The extent to which the meanings of “the people” and “the homeland” used by the elites and lower class people coincide is under question. The elites have far more resources, symbolical power, first of all, to impose their view on the world. However, paradoxically enough, the principles of classification and the names that are imposed from above correspond to lower class people’s social markers. Objectively then, both the elites and the lower class people benefited from the provisory outcome of the classification struggle.

The question remains of the mismatch in interpretations, which empirical qualitative studies concerning slight differences and nuances may clarify. A general theory is also needed, which would reconcile structural social inequality and spaces to maneuver for the struggle of classification and interpretation. An appropriate theory may be Bourdieu’s

theory of the social space and symbolic power, in which, along with objective social positions, classification and symbolical struggles play an important role in the structuration of the social order and the production of any class (Bourdieu, 1989). Symbolic boundaries are lines of social differentiation that appear to be obvious, taken-for-granted, and, thus, legitimate. I assume that, for now in Russia, social boundaries (“objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources”, in Lamont, Molnar, 2002: 168) and symbolic boundaries do not completely coincide, which prevents the solidification (common sense understanding) of social boundaries. The struggle over meanings and interpretations is still unfolding alongside the issue of social inequality (to raise or not the question in public debates). More likely to address the question of social inequality are those who experience its real oppressive manifestations in everyday life, while inhabiting their mundane close world and getting their vision of the wider world from their rootedness in their quotidian life experience. Therefore, there is a chance for those socially and symbolically dominated to influence the understanding of these “empty signifiers” (in today Russia, “the people” and “the nation”) conceptualized by Ernesto Laclau (2005). These signifiers are open to debate over their contradictory meanings, and to the imposition of a class-based vision and division of society, where class means socio-economic class and not mere sociological layer (lower, middle, upper classes).

Certainly, lower class people have far less resources to influence the group making process than the economic, intellectual or political dominants. Their symbolical power is dependent on their strong anchorage in their daily life experience and the sense of commonality and solidarity which may develop along with their awareness of the growing socio-economic inequality. Against this tendency towards the forming of the lower class group are two strong constraints and obstacles. First, there is a strong discourse against any vision of a divided society, along whatever socio-economic divisions. The divisions which resonate in the political or intellectual debates are national divisions (the Russians as an undifferentiated whole and the rest of the world, particularly the West) and the people versus the power division. Sometimes some moral divisions arise, “good” people against “bad” people being the dominant line. These are not social divisions at all. The question of social inequality is almost never raised publically, at least not as a structuring principle of society. Part of the problem is also that lower class people do not have any spokesperson or organization, which Bourdieu presents as conditions for successful group making, especially concerning the symbolically dominated classes (Bourdieu, 1985). Thus, the commonality and connectedness which are developing now among lower class people, and their growing sense of social inequality, remain in the domain of the mundane. In a country where there is traditionally a strong symbolical distinction between the low-level and low prestige *byt* (mundane and everyday life) and the high-level and high prestige *bytie* (intellectual and spiritual life) (Boym, 1994), the former has little chance to win the battle over principles of vision and division of society. On the other hand, since lower class people in Russia are not a marginal few, but the absolute majority,

the instruments they produce to understand the world may have some practical importance and consequences on the social order.

In the end, more as a strong hypothesis than as a conclusion, I would qualify the social world corresponding to the practical sense of the lower class people as a class-based perception of social inequality relying on an unexpressed, and maybe unconscious, Marxist frame for grasping the surrounding social reality. I am encouraged to make such an assertion by recent ethnographic studies which also stress “vernacular Marxism” as a strong framework for the understanding of Russian everyday worlds (Kruglova, 2017). As incredible as it may seem, I did not plan to finish the paper with Marxism, nor to come back to Pierre Bourdieu, one of my earliest favorite social theorists. The dynamics of a comprehensive analysis of the empirical data led me to Marx and Bourdieu. It is, as such, an interesting unplanned development of my thinking to reflect on.

Conclusion

What general conclusions can we draw from the above analysis to shed light on the way social ties and social imagination can develop among lower class people, who have been subjected to harsh social and economic destabilization?

First, a process of inhabiting one’s social and material environment has to unfold, along with the recovering of habitus or a sense of occupying a “normal” place in society, and regular interactions with people recognized as occupying a similar place. This implies a certain degree of stabilization of social and economic structures, and more importantly, a sense of growing stability (the emergence of a social “order”).

Second, rootedness in an inhabiting environment and in one’s everyday experience gives lower class people the capacity to grasp the broader social space, to order what seemed to be messy and disordered, to draw some lines of differentiation and division. This occurs despite the dominant vision of the society as undivided, being one nation or one people, bad or good according to the elites’ ideological preferences. This means that society is being restructured, represented as divided and unequal by those dominated, when they succeed in plenty trusting their everyday life experiences, against the erosion and invisibilization of social cleavages and the inequality driven by neo-liberal globalization and the dominant discourse.

In this classification struggle, nationalist and populist components of the dominant discourse can help those dominated to describe their intuitive knowledge of social reality and to recognize themselves to a certain extent using some words, such as “the people” or “the nation”. However, what is at stake in this struggle is which meaning of these terms will become common sense. For now, the outcome of that struggle remains unclear.

To grasp the process, there is certainly a need to come back to the kind of traditional sociology which reconciles the constraining power of social structures (even, and maybe especially, when they seem confusing and ungraspable) and the structuring power of people sharing some common positions or places in the social world. That is why classics of social thoughts such as Marx or Bourdieu still have good days ahead. It may even

be that a certain popular, vernacular or common sense version of Marxism still has an impact on the everyday experience for many lower class people.

References

- Alexander J. C., Eyerman R., Gieson B., Smelser N. J., Sztompka P. (2004) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Anderson B. (2006) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.
- Ashwin S. (1998) Endless Patience: Explaining Soviet and Post-Soviet Social Stability. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 31, pp. 187–198.
- Bauman Z. (2000) *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Bauman Z. (2001) Identity in the Globalising World. *Social Anthropology*, vol. 9, no 2, pp. 121–129.
- Beck U. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, London: SAGE.
- Boltanski L., Chiapello E. (1999) *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme*, Paris: Gallimard.
- Bourdieu P. (1985) The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups. *Theory and Society*, vol. 14, no 6, pp. 723–744.
- Bourdieu P. (1989) Social Space and Symbolic Power. *Sociological Theory*, vol. 7, no 1, pp. 14–25.
- Bourdieu P. (1990) *The Logic of Practice*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu P. (1999) *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu P. (2004) *Science of Science and Reflexivity*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Boym S. (1994) *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Breman J., van der Linden M. (2014) Informalizing the Economy: The Return of the Social Question at a Global Level. *Development and Change*, vol. 45, pp. 920–940.
- Brubaker R., Cooper F. (2000) Beyond “Identity”. *Theory and Society*, vol. 29, no 1, pp. 1–47.
- Clément K. (1999) *Les ouvriers russes dans la tourmente du marché*, Paris: Syllepse.
- Clément K. (ed.) (2013) *Gorodskie dvizhenija Rossii v 2009–2012 godah: na puti k politicheskomu* [Urban Movements in Russia, 2009–2012: On the Road Towards Politics], Moscow: New Literary Observer.
- Clément K. (2015) Unlikely Mobilisations: How Ordinary Russian People Become Involved in Collective Action. *European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology*, vol. 2, no 3–4, pp. 211–240.
- Collins R. (2014) *Interaction Ritual Chains*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Crossley N. (2001) The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction. *Theory and Society*, vol. 30, no 1, pp. 81–120.
- Durkheim E. (2008 [1912]) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Mineola: Dover.

- Giddens A. (1991) *Modernity and Post-Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Goffman E. (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Gudkov L. (2013) Russian Cynicism: Symptom of a Stagnant Society. *Open Democracy*, 22 October 2013. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/lev-gudkov/russian-cynicism-symptom-of-stagnant-society> (accessed 20 November 2017).
- Gudkov L., Dubin B., Zorkaya N. (2008) *Postsovetskij chelovek i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo* [Post-Soviet Man and Civil Society], Moscow: MSPS.
- Kruglova A. (2017) Social Theory and Everyday Marxists: Russian Perspectives on Epistemology and Ethics. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 59, no 4, pp. 759–785.
- Laclau E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso.
- Lamont M., Molnár V. (2002) The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 28, pp. 167–195.
- Melucci A. (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Melucci A. (1996) *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morris J. (2016) *Everyday Post-Socialism: Working-Class Communities in the Russian Margins*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ries N. (1997) *Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perestroika*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sennet R. (1998) *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*, New York: W. W. Norton.
- Standing G. (2011) *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*, London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Stompka P. (2000) Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change. *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 3, no 4, pp. 449–466.
- Tilly Ch. (2003) Political Identities in Changing Polities. *Social Research*, vol. 70, no 2, pp. 605–619.
- Yudin G. (2017) “Scratch a Russian Liberal and You’ll Find an Educated Conservative”: An Interview with Russian Sociologist Greg Yudin. *LeftEast*, 23 March 2017. Available at: <http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/scratch-a-russian-liberal-and-youll-find-an-educated-conservative-an-interview-with-sociologist-greg-yudin/> (accessed 20 November 2017).
- Wacquant L. (2002) Scrutinizing the Street: Poverty, Morality, and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography. *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 107, no 6, pp. 1468–1532.
- Wacquant L. (2014) Putting Habitus in Its Place: Rejoinder to the Symposium. *Body & Society*, vol. 20, no 2, pp. 118–139.

Социальное воображение и солидарность в precarious время: случай трудящихся классов в постсоветской России

Карин Клеман

PhD социологии, доцент Факультета свободных искусств и наук Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета, директор Центра им. Эндру Гагарина по изучению гражданского общества и прав человека

Адрес: Университетская набережная, д. 7–9, Санкт-Петербург, Российская Федерация 199034

E-mail: carine_clement@hotmail.com

Статья стремится обогатить библиографию работ о процессе формирования социальных групп, взяв в качестве объекта исследования людей из трудящихся классов в постсоветской России. Автор предлагает некоторые выводы относительно того, как в глобальном неолиберальном капитализме могут быть преодолены прекаризация и атомизация. На основании обширной базы данных, состоявшей из глубинных интервью, взятых в разных регионах, и нескольких наблюдений, сделанных автором, исследуется, как устанавливаются социальные связи и какова роль социального воображения у представителей трудящихся классов, подвергшихся серьезной социальной и экономической дестабилизации. Во-первых, должен иметь место процесс «оживания» собственного социального и материального окружения, одновременный с восстановлением «габитуса» или чувством, что человек занимает «нормальное» место в обществе. Также должны восстановиться регулярные взаимодействия с людьми, признаваемыми в качестве «обитателей схожих мест». Во-вторых, опора на собственный повседневный опыт дает людям из трудящихся классов способность действовать в широком социальном пространстве и выстраивать собственные линии дифференциации и отделения, в то время как популистский и антипопулистский дискурсы предоставляют рамку для признания и обозначения новых социальных разграничений. Для того чтобы понять эти процессы, считает автор, было бы полезно вернуться к идеям классиков критической (или структурально-конструктивистской) социологии — Марксу или Бурдьё.

Ключевые слова: социальное воображение, обитание, повседневный опыт, трудящиеся классы, социальные разделения, постсоветская Россия, прекарность

Precarity: Local Disorders or New Global Order?*

Vyacheslav Bobkov

Doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation
Chief Research Fellow, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics
Head of the Laboratory of the Problems of the Level of Life and the Quality of Life,
Institute of Socio-Economic Studies of Population, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Stryemiannyi per., 36, Moscow, Russian Federation 117997
E-mail: bobkovvn@mail.ru

Vadim Kvachev

PhD in Sociology, Senior Lecturer, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics
Address: Stryemiannyi per., 36, Moscow, Russian Federation 117997
E-mail: kvachevg@mail.ru

The paper is devoted to the research of the nature of precarity. The authors explore the dual substance of precarity as both global and local phenomena. There are four major premises in the formation of precarity at the global and local levels: the divisions of labor markets deepening inequalities and asymmetries; the Fourth Industrial Revolution providing a demand for labor with machines replacing the living workforce; the changing nature of labor which dissolves the boundaries between alienated labor and independent private life; and the intervention of neoliberal ideology in practice, manifesting itself as invasion of the state and capital into the social production of individuals. The sum of these premises lead to the expansion of precarity in different forms, although mainly in the form of precarious employment. As a result, precarity is considered in the paper as a form of a new global order produced by the multitude of local disorders.

Keywords: precarity, precarious employment, labor market, Industry 4.0, alienation, exploitation, biopolitics, neoliberalism

Introduction

The current “normal” mode of relations between employers and employees which also qualifies as standard employment is a result of multiple consensuses between business, workers, and governments in the second half of the 20th century. The very core of these labor relations was created immediately after World War I in the form of the International Labor Organization. This was a response to international changes and, at the same time, a brick in the new world order that politicians tried to build.

The new world order, temporarily established in the second half of the 20th century, required new approaches to labor. The rise of communism in Russia and China showed

© Vyacheslav Bobkov, 2017

© Vadim Kvachev, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-72-86

* The research has been implemented with the financial support of the Russian Science Foundation (Project № 16-18-10140 “Precarious Employment in the Russian Federation: The Present Situation and Reducing Methods”).

that exploited workers could become a substantial political force. The task was to loosen the contradictions. The original idea in capitalist countries was to constrain a free market relationship with the labor market, not only because the lack of regulation led to excessive exploitation, but also because poor working conditions resulted in the inability of the worker to provide an elementary reproduction of one's human resources, translating into the degradation of national human capital.

The ILO's core conventions were aimed at turning the savage capitalism of the early 20th century into a more civilized version, with multiple compromises between worker and employee. The very essence of the ILO's principles, "labor is not a commodity" (ILO, 1974), is recorded in its core document, the ILO Constitution. The purpose of the ILO was to show that the labor market, unlike any other free-market, is outside the purview of the laissez-faire principle. The labor market should be regulated rather strictly in order to provide a balance in asymmetric labor relations.

For that purpose, the Organization designed and created social-labor relations which included multiple characteristics including standardized working hours, a social security system, and legal wages not lower than the minimum specified by the state. After the Allies won WWII, the working class was unified by the European Left parties and movements and, as a result of a long struggle, achieved remarkable economic and social progress, including social guarantees. This progress resulted in developing values which later, in the 1990s, was called the "European social model". It is based on stable labor and the social guarantees of permanent labor contracts and a high level of social protection of the employee. At the same time, in the USSR and Soviet Russia, the level of protection of employees was even higher. Consequently, the influence of the USSR on the European social model development during the 1950s to the 1980s was significant. The basic socially-oriented transformation of this period in Western Europe resulted in the formation of the "standard employment" notion.

At the same time, this was a broad social contract aimed at the stabilization of the social situation and gave an example of satisfactory relations between labor and the capital in non-socialist systems. From that time forward, the standard employment concept is associated with the "full-time nature of the job, its stability and the social standards linked with permanent full-time work" (ILO, 2006: 43-44). These characteristics are rooted in the previously-mentioned attempt to stabilize the labor market system.

At some point, these conditions seemed to be an expected result of the market capitalist system order. A three-way social partnership system is considered to be the representation of the famous Fukuyama's end of history concept of labor markets. At a certain point, this constructed balance between labor and capital seemed to be the long-awaited social harmony under market conditions. Standard employment relations became mainstream not only in the Western countries where they originated, but also worldwide.

However, the economic and social development of global capitalism in recent decades showed that this system was not as stable as it appeared. The system of standardized labor relations seems to fall apart because it is unable to tackle global challenges. The ILO's report from 2012 concludes that there is a "larger majority of people who work, but who do

not have a decent job, with a decent wage, a secure future, social protection, and access to rights” (ILO, 2012: 3). Established work conditions seem to be increasingly destroyed by different flexible and nonstandard labor practices, resulting in the expansion of precarity and precarious employment. These changes manifest themselves in the change of the nature of labor relations and the economic conditions of employment.

There are several basic premises that led to the worldwide expansion of precarity:

- The dynamics of international and national divisions of labor;
- The change in the nature of labor;
- Industry 4.0;
- The spreading of the neoliberalism ideology.

The total of these premises identifies a new form of reality in the labor market, known as precarity (Bobkov, 2017). It is inevitable that precarious employment is defined *ex contrario* as the labor relations that are in any sense opposite to standard ones. Thus, precarity comes out as a three-dimensioned phenomenon made up of the lack of income and/or wealth or poverty, the lack of control over one’s space and time (especially at work), and the control over situations and practices including an inability to plan a future career (Herrmann, van der Maesen, 2008: 15).

In modern societies, precarity is strongly connected to precarious work. In modern society, the living standards and a multitude of positions and statuses in society are mostly defined in terms of employment. Thus, labor markets are the key to the system of economic distribution: the social position is connected with the position of an individual in the space of the labor market.

In the broadest sense, precarious employment could be understood as a constrained form of work with limited social benefits and social insecurity. The main characteristics of precarious employment are the limited duration of the contract (fixed-term, short-term, temporary, seasonal, day-labor, and casual labor) and the nature of the employment relationship (triangular and disguised employment relationships, bogus self-employment, subcontracting, and agency contracts) (ILO, 2012: 29). According to Vosko, it is also shaped by the social contexts of exclusion, discrimination, social relations, etc. (Vosko, 2006: 3–4).

For the purpose of understanding the nature of precarity, it is necessary to consider the four above-mentioned premises. The analysis should give us an understanding of the nature of precarity and an answer to the most intriguing question: is the expansion of precarity a result of multiple disorderly originated processes, or is it a certain new global order spread by means of capitalism?

The Dynamics of International and National Divisions of Labor

The standard employment relation system has never provided a fully global social stability. On closer inspection, the insubstantial balance is dissolving. Harmonized labor relations based on the appropriation of surplus value exists in the same way as did previously. Immanuel Wallerstein formulated that the key difference was an unequal exchange be-

tween the West and Third-World countries in the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 2004). In this exchange, the relatively high status of modern employees in Western countries is a result of transferring the exploitation of workers in less-developed countries. In other words, the high quality of life in advanced economies was created because of the low level of life in poorer countries. This appearance of imperialism in the labor market showed that the general principle of resource shortage has an effect on the labor market, just as in any economic institution.

The massive effect of this form of imperialism affected the world after the fall of the Soviet Union and the appearance of Chinese economic reform. The emergence of capitalism in post-Socialist countries was accompanied with a shocking neoliberal therapy which led to a near-annihilation of standard employment relations (Bobkov, Veredyuk, Aliev: 2017). New labor markets with low-cost labor opened to corporations as a new prospective for cost-saving. It turned out that labor markets are less regulated in less-developed countries, so corporations could set their own working standards. In turn, the governments in these countries were interested in lowering these standards to provide easy terms in raising investments. Ulrich Beck called this ability of corporations to influence governments “meta-power”, which is the ability to intimidate governments with the withdrawal of capital and thus be able to determine provided economic conditions (Beck, 2006: 52–53). These interactions between corporations and national governments resulted in different regimes of labor relations regulation with different standards, requirements of labor conditions, and payments. Local disorders erode the principal unity of approaches proclaimed by the ILO, and create “grey areas” of precarity and exploitation.

Despite all the intentions towards a global government, the world economy remains a patchwork of economic areas defined by the combination of state regulations, informal rules, and corporative policies. Corporations can easily move through these areas in the pursuit of profit maximization, while workforce flows are restricted by migration legislation and governments tied by an inability to negotiate uniform international rules.

Z. Bauman hence proclaims a “disengagement between capital and labor”. Capital is unbound in a global way; it “has cut itself loose from its dependency on labor through a new freedom of movement undreamt of in the past” (Bauman, 2001: 25). Bauman describes it in a rather poetic way: “Having shed the ballast of bulky machinery and massive factory crews, capital travels light with no more than cabin luggage” (Bauman, 2013: 2). Through this liquidity, capital had acquired the possibility to look worldwide for the most advantageous conditions.

No national government will formally renounce standard employment regulations. In some developing countries, very rigid labor relations regulations can be found (Freeman, 2009: 29). In fact, though, many governments of these countries turn a blind eye to the state of labor market enforcement where corporations are allowed to ignore some rules. Moreover, “deregulation in labor markets provided opportunities for employers to cut excess costs...The resultant higher profit has permitted them to grow fast and provide more employment, albeit at low wages and at uncertain terms” (Acharya, 2006: 74–75). In other words, even if unemployment is decreased, new jobs usually are of low quality.

Labor market deregulation also appears in advanced economies (Peters, 2008). However, in this case, global labor functions distribution leads to deindustrialization and the increase of service-type jobs in the Western and North American economies. In this case, old-fashioned Keynesian tools of regulation cannot embrace the multitudes of precarious work cases concealed in many gaps of even the most rigid regulation framework. The general principle is that cost-effective capital is much faster in decision-making than the state bureaucracy.

On the level of the national economy, the labor market is segmented into categories dependent on the nature of labor (Harrison, Sum, 1979). “Good jobs” are those that include high earnings and the possibility to increase earnings, provide benefits and social security, and control over work activities and terms of employment, as well as over job termination. “Bad jobs” are opposite in every way (Kalleberg, 2011: 9–10). Precarity influences the worker, depending on the nature of his or her labor. The most protected positions are high-qualified intellectual-by-nature workplaces, while the least protected are low-qualified manual jobs.

Precarity reveals itself in the context of global inequality, and each national case is built in this global tendency. The ILO showed cross-national differences in the labor market in its 2013 World of Work report. The number of those who are involved in vulnerable employment in advanced economies in 2013 was 10%, while the figure was 55.4% in developing countries (ILO, 2014: 40). Data provided by the ILO shows that the number of those involved in vulnerable employment in developing countries has risen to 78.9% in 2016 (ILO, 2017). Another report of the ILO shows that the number of working poor in emerging countries in 2016 was 30.2%, while the number was 72.2% in developing countries (ILO, 2016: 4).

However, for the share of workers involved in vulnerable employment, the unemployment rate and working poverty numbers are only several of the many factors identifying the conditions of worldwide precarity. We see only the surface of the statistics. The international division of labor also divides the lives of millions of workers into categories dependent on the role of the nation in the global production process. This is the global distribution of risk of being subject to different forms of precarity.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution

In the 1974 book titled *The Fragment on Machines*, Marx states that as capitalism is developing, the living labor force will be more and more appropriated by the objectified labor of machinery (Marx, 1974). This process can be considered as a replacement of circulating capital by fixed capital. Ultimately, living labor will become an infinitely small quantity in the production process, a minimally-required appendix for the powerful system of machines. The machinery is a result of a social knowledge aimed at production intensification. Thus, objectified labor in the form of embodied intellect, that is, machinery, expels living labor outside the production process, as in the famous proverb “le mort saisit le vif”.

The differentiated and yet globalized world of labor exists in the context of emerging technologies known as Industry 4.0. As before, these changes came to the labor markets not in the least because of technological development. The evolution of material production in the previous decades was aimed at increasing the role of fixed capital and decreasing the role of variable capital in the production process. Finally, it resulted in Industry 4.0, which caused changes in the nature of work and production.

Within the framework of Industry 4.0, a multitude of self-regulated intelligent electronic systems are created to replace lower-qualified industrial labor, and accomplishes the Marxian transfiguration of labor into a minimally-required appendix. Where there were many factory workers in the previous era, there will be few highly-qualified engineers and programmers in the future.

Of course, the projects within Industry 4.0 mostly exist in high-developed economies. In the Western world, technologies are aimed at the creation of the “communism of capital” (Virno, 2004: 110–111) or technological socialism (Mason, 2016), in which radically decreased costs of production will lead to the elimination of scarcity, and the ability of the economy to satisfy all basic needs equally. Moreover, in the long term, Industry 4.0 could extinguish the phenomenon of work in material production as such. If the work is most effectively done by machines, why do we need human participation in the production process at all? The work could become the excessive inhuman activity performing outside the social context. The moderate socialist era could come in the form of a universal basic income replacing traditional wages and other forms of social security.

However, there is a cloud behind every silver lining. The pursuit for the elimination of primitive work is also a response to the dynamics of the international division of labor, labor migration, and the dependence of advanced economies on developing ones. Industry 4.0 should eliminate and disguise the unpleasant marks of imperialist exploitation in developing countries, such as child and forced labor, poor conditions of work, and a low level of life. Nevertheless, it is questionable that Industry 4.0 will positively influence poor countries. On the contrary, the sharp increase of the level of life in Western countries will at the same time provide much more independency on their economies from the global Third-World factories with their cheap labor. Concurrently, the collapse of work of the developing countries' material production means the elimination of an enormous number of workplaces.

In the case of Industry 4.0, precarity comes as a change in the conditions of production which influences the organization of labor relations, employment, and the labor market. It deepens the existing asymmetry of the labor markets and social inequality by improving the well-being of rich countries and eliminating jobs in the poor ones.

The Nature of Labor

Manuel Castells noted that new technologies will imminently lead society to new forms of labor-relations organization (Castells, 2010). Castells emphasizes that it is traditional working patterns that have to be changed pursuant to new social and digital trends. G.

Esping-Andersen underlines that “the advanced Western nations’ welfare states were built to cater to an economy dominated by industrial mass production . . . This consensus has disappeared because the underlined assumptions no longer obtain” (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 3).

As the scope of the so-called “non-manufacturing sector” widens, labor becomes more and more immaterial, and gradually transforms into “info-labor” (Berardi, 2009). It involves the manipulation of intangible objects such as information, although it does not require complex and expensive means of production, as most info-work can be done by means of a personal computer.

The exploitation of the industrial proletariat as proclaimed by Marx in the 19th century seemed to be an anachronism in a world where intellect as a factor of production means more than proletarian manual labor. In the Fordist industrial production process, the mass of low-qualified workers (the reserve army of labor) unified in terms of skills and the nature of their labor were exploited by capital by the appropriation of surplus value. In the post-Fordist era where the nature of labor changed, it seems obvious that there is no alienation since there is fewer material results of labor.

However, the famous philosopher Paolo Virno objects to such an interpretation of this exploitation (Virno, 2004). The strict rules of Weberian bureaucratic organization were aimed at the delimitation of spaces. A classic bureaucratic attribute is the creation of boundaries between the professional and personal spheres. A person as an individual in this case is also a person as a professional, but these two social roles are different in terms of time (there is working time and leisure time), capabilities (there are professional skills and personal psychological qualities), space (there are working places and home space), etc.

The erosion of this rationale of the division of labor leads to the dissolution of conventional organizational and administrative hierarchies. Virno shows that the problem of the transition in the nature of labor connected with the replacement of the bureaucratic division of working functions by “division of linguistic and cognitive capabilities” (Virno, 2004: 18) determining innovativeness and adaptability in an immaterial working process. This leads to the fusion of the professional and personal spheres.

There is no more restriction between professional skills and personal qualities, between working and time off work, or between the workplace and personal space. Virno referred to the Marxian difference between physical and virtuosic labor. In the Fordist era, the only object of capital exploitation was the mechanical function of the human being. In the post-Fordist era, capital fully exploits all the professional, psychological, individual and other qualities of one’s personality. In the Fordist era, labor was alienated in the form of material production; in the post-Fordist era, it is alienated in the form of the appropriation of the worker’s personality for the purpose of immaterial production. Through this vision, we could develop an understanding of precarity as a new form of exploitation and alienation where the internal sources of the individual are put on the free-market as the products. This leads us directly to the next premise of the political and ideological parameters of precarity.

Neoliberalism

Karl Polanyi, a social predictor rather than an economist, wrote about the current economics system, stating that “a civilization was being disrupted by the blind action of soulless institutions the only purpose of which was the automatic increase of material welfare” (Polanyi, 2001: 228). The Great Transition, documented by Polanyi, was a transition from a multi-sphere, complex civilization to a society dominated by inevitable free-market laws. This is why precarity is not only an abstract but also a political and ideological issue. Precarity itself could be described as “a tendency of economic and legal deregulation of labor relations and an increase in the forced labor in the time of parallel overthrow of social guarantees” (Bobkov, Chernykh, Aliev, 2011: 161), i.e., the practice of turning social-labor relations into free-market relations. The transformation itself is based on the ideology of neoliberalism, a fundamentalist version of conventional wisdom among economists persuaded that a society could be reduced to a market.

L. F. Vosko considered standard employment relations that are constructed from three prominent pillars: (a) bilateral employment relations which implies that the labor market, unlike other markets, is highly regulated, and imposes responsibility for social stability as well as for economic efficiency; (b) standardized working time, which is uniform and synchronized paid working hours, working weeks, and the working year; (c) and the continuity of employment, that is, open-ended employment relationships (Vosko, 2010: 52–61). Neoliberalism attacked all three of these pillars as a way to destroy uneconomical conditions in labor relations.

One of the very first and farthest-reaching attacks on standard employment relations was executed by the assertive concept of human capital introduced by the distinctive representative of fundamentalist free-market ideology proponents, G. Becker (Becker, 1993). The aim of the human capital concept was to conceal the very nature of labor relations, and to present it as if the employee is equal to the employer. This means that both are equal economic agents in the free market, and both are entrepreneurs. The only difference between them, according to the theory, is that the employee owns immaterial human capital and an aggregate of innate abilities, and acquired knowledge, skills and motivations. In other words, an individual in the labor market operates with his or her personal skills and qualities as if they were parts of some sort of capital analogous to the material capital of the business.

This concept is insightfully described by L. Boltanski and E. Chiapello as a “new spirit of capitalism”. This new capitalist order implies that each worker is an investor and entrepreneur of his or her own human and intellectual capital. A person can invest in one or another “project”, and then return a profit (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2011). Just as a businessman manages his capital, a worker manages his time and resources, investing them in one or another project as a form of self-investment. He takes risks, and in the case of success, he earns a profit. On the one hand, as a result, the responsibility for social security and quality of life transfers from the government or the employers to the employees in this model. At the same time, an unsuccessful career and poverty are interpreted as

an ineffective project or, in other words, a bankruptcy. On the other hand, work and leisure interfuse with each other because, in the conditions of this new modern capitalism, a ceaseless flood of projects demands the full immersion into a working process that does not correspond to traditional work schedules and regimes. Boltanski and Chiapello mark that the new capitalist order demands to reject “stability, rootage, devotion to one particular place, assurance in relations and liabilities for the long term” (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2011: 229).

The philosopher and sociologist A. Gorz proclaims that the new economy of labor requires a total dedication from workers. He writes that “workers should become businessmen by themselves and even at the big factories . . . they have to care for profitability of their work” (Gorz, 2007: 6). The neoliberal paradigm not only constructs a new global order, but also the system of production of a human being. The new subject is constructed under this system: a worker-entrepreneur is independently managing his own work, time, and human capital, while at the same time, is exposed to the alienation of his own personality to severe market relations where everything can be sold and bought (Tsianos, Papadopoulos, 2006).

The neoliberal concept was the manual of practice for the governments in the last quarter of the 20th century. It is praised by representatives of this ideology in Russia as well. Its absurdity in Russian conditions is obvious, as the investment in the skills of the workers never recovered with an increase in income. More than 16% of employees are poor, 50% more suffer from a low level of life and do not provide an expanded reproduction of material conditions in their lives. The most precarious groups are intellectual workers such as medics, teachers, researchers, etc. Their wages and incomes are generally already much lower than the low-to-middle average performance at both the national and regional levels. As the famous opponent of neoliberalism, D. Harvey, claims, “neoliberal state is necessarily hostile to all forms of social solidarity that put restraints on capital accumulation. Independent trade unions or other social movements . . . have therefore to be disciplined, if not destroyed, and this in the name of the supposedly sacrosanct individual liberty of the isolated laborer” (Harvey, 2005: 75).

Precarity is a practical issue in which the ideology of neoliberalism results and, at the same time, is its ultimate representation. P. Herrmann describe it as “implementing the claims” of the current system: extreme individualism of classical economics and its translation into a libertarian political culture is consequentially implemented and defined as new principal norm of the entire social fabric” (Herrmann, 2011: 33–34). This principal neoliberal norm states the new global order in which deregulated, entrepreneurial human resources replaces the socially-provided labor in the former welfare state.

What actually happens is that social labor implies the usage of common social skills and intellect; thus, the result of the production process is not only a commodity but also a “production of social relations” (Hardt, Negri, 2009). That idea referred to is one expressed by Marx when he wrote “The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the con-

trol of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it" (Marx, 1974). Immaterial informational labor thus results in the construction of social organization.

The strategic aim of competitive fighting of capital in the labor market in society is the control over personality, as long as the individual characteristics could be appropriated as a factor of production and, in this sense, as human capital. Capital invades the process of human production and reproduction. This is what M. Hardt and A. Negri called the "biopolitical production" (Hardt, Negri, 2009). "Biopolitics" is a term invented by M. Foucault to describe a neoliberal technique of deregulatory regulation: it establishes a set of rules that is alleged to be objective and depersonalized while it is integrated into the system of values and beliefs of a person. Then biopolitics is controlling his or her behavior, leaving the person with the feeling that a free choice had been made (Foucault, 1997).

A human being produced in the context of biopolitical production is "atomic individual whose natural self-interest and tendency to compete must be fostered and enhanced. He or she is a fundamentally self-interested and rational individual who will navigate the social realm by constantly making rational choices based on economic knowledge and the strict calculation of the necessary costs and desired benefits. The popularity of self-help guides and self-management manuals are seen as a symptom of this current, neoliberal understanding of the subject: individuals are solely responsible for a number of problems that were previously considered social or political issues" (Oksala, 2013: 66–67). The variety of techniques is countless, from teaching children social studies and economics at school, to self-education, mindset trainings, communications in social nets, etc.

In the neoliberal paradigm, precarity appears as the deregulation of the social system, a shift of risks from the state and business towards the employee. The precarious conditions of an individual destroy the assurance of the social security system, and leaves the individual face-to-face with a free market. The commoditization of labor reveals itself in the objectification of the human personality.

Conclusions

The great deconstruction of standard employment relations and traditional labor market regulation have roots in the following four above-mentioned premises: the dynamics of divisions of labor markets deepening inequalities and asymmetries; the Fourth Industrial Revolution providing a demand for labor with machines replacing living workforce; the changing of the nature of labor that dissolves boundaries between alienated labor and an independent private life; and the intervention of neoliberal ideology manifesting itself as an invasion of the state and capital into the social production of individuals. The totality of these premises leads to the expansion of precarity in different forms, but mainly in the form of precarious employment as projected on the precarity of modern societies.

The main question of whether these premises represent disorder or order was raised by Marco Ricceri (Ricceri, 2016). Proponents of the first point of view (let us call it "legitimizing" as it claims that positive outcomes will be achieved) insisted that the current state of society in general and labor in particular is a result of uncontrolled global process, an

inevitable new step in the development of civilization. This is why workers should make peace with these new unstable and precarious conditions and prepare to change the way they work. The second point of view (let us call it “critical” as it not only sees imbalances and controversies in the modern state of thing but also points out its benefits) tried to show the avoidable character of these capitalistic transformations.

In fact, each point of view is partially true. Local disorders form a new global order manifested in precarity, which starts from the precarious employment in the labor markets, and results in the existential precarity of an individual and society (Sennett, 2006). However, this global order is not governed by some evil force from the outside, but constituted by many social and economic practices existing in the context of the capitalist system. The problem of precarity is not in struggling against something outside human society, but in changing society itself.

Paradoxically, precarity is destroying and bolstering the global order at the same time. Local disorders produce inconsistent regimes of regulation and conflicting economic zones, but also create global order which is rather chaotic, but still is sufficiently organized. This is the true nature of this great destruction of the world of labor: local disorders form up a worldwide hierarchy mirroring the level and scope of global precarity. This system is a completely new capitalist order which no longer suffers from crises only because it is itself a crisis of capitalism shaking society to its foundations (Gorz, 2007: 48). Thus, precarity is not a coincidence, but is an institutionalized order which is pragmatically and consciously constructed as an element of global and national policies (Sager, 2015: 120–126).

However, as Foucault stated, where there is power, there is resistance. Precarious conditions not only make exploitation more sophisticated, but also provides the worker with the resources to consolidate and fight for their rights. Uber drivers use the soft spot in the software to increase the constantly-decreasing prices of the company, and thus get more money from their work; remote workers get control over their time and effort; restrictive administrative power over office workers dissolves if there is no office at all. Moreover, precarization, especially if it is voluntary, does not always means the worsening of labor conditions. Social quarantines may exist in the form of informal network liabilities between the employer and the employee existing outside state regulatory measures (De-
genne, 2002: 210–211).

Precarity invariably is not a choice, but a new global socio-economic order. Consisting of local disorders, it allows for multitude adaptations and resistance strategies. These strategies for both the employer and the employee provide measures for balancing imbalances, and the equalization of inequalities. Consequently, the future is open for improving employment relations and the labor struggle. What is needed from researchers is intellectual vigilance and a conscientious attitude to the world of work.

Finally, the problem of precarious employment is not in the struggle with some outside force but with the changes of the society as a whole. This change could be based on a transformation to the co-evolution of society and nature (Bobkov, Bobkov, Herrmann, 2016). The resulting society could be founded on the scientific principles of the develop-

mental acceleration of human intellect in regard to the complexity to the world around it (Bobkov et al., 2017: 673).

References

- Acharya S. (2006) Economic Development, Deregulation and Employment Conditions: The Indian Experience. *Labor Market Regulation and Deregulation in Asia: Experiences in Recent Decades* (eds. C. Brassard, S. Acharya), New Delhi: Academic Foundation, pp. 57–80.
- Bauman Z. (2001) *The Individualized Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck U. (2006) *Power in the Global Age: A New Global Political Economy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Becker G. S. (1993) *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Berardi F. (2009) *The Soul at Work*, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Bobkov V. (ed.) (2017) *Neustojchivost' zanjatosti: mezhdunarodnyj i rossijskij konteksty budushhego sfery truda* [Precarity of Employment: Global and Russian Contexts of the Future of Work], Moscow: RealPrint.
- Bobkov V., Chernykh E., Aliev U. (2011) Precarity in Russia and Labor and Employment Markets Transformation. *Precarity: More than a Challenge of Social Security; Or: Cynicism of EU's Concept of Economic Freedom* (eds. P. Herrmann, S. Kalaycioglu), Bremen: Europäischer Hochschulverlag, pp. 160–180.
- Bobkov V., Bobkov N., Herrmann P. Searching for a New Way of Thinking Society for Today — Noospheric Social Quality. *Ekonomika regiona* [Economy of Region], 2016, vol. 12, no 2, pp. 451–462.
- Bobkov V., Kvachev V., Loktyukhina N., Ricceri M. (2017) Kriterii, veroyatnost' i stepen' neustojchivosti zanyatosti s uchetom osobennostey rossiyskogo rynka truda [Criteria, Likelihood, and Degree of the Precarity of Employment with Account of the Peculiarities of Russian Labor Market]. *Ekonomika regiona* [Economy of Region], vol. 13, no 3, pp. 672–683.
- Bobkov V., Veredyuk O., Aliev U. (2017) Risks of Society Stability and Precarity of Employment: A Look at Russia. *International Journal of Social Quality*, vol. 7, no 1, pp. 21–43.
- Boltanski L., Chiapello E. (2011) *Novyj duh kapitalizma* [The New Spirit of Capitalism], Moscow: New Literary Observer.
- Castells M. (2010) *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Degenne A. (2002) Employer/Employee Relationship among Regulation and the Lessons of School/Work Transition in France. *Conventions and Structures in Economic Organization* (eds. O. Favereau, E. Lazega), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 200–212.
- Esping-Andersen G. (1996) *Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies*, London: SAGE.

- Foucault M. (1997) The Birth of Biopolitics. *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth* (ed. P. Rabinow), New York: New Press, pp. 73–79.
- Freeman R. B. (2009) Regulations, Unions, and Social Protection in Developing Countries: Market Distortions or Efficient Institutions? Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14789> (accessed 10 September 2017).
- Gorz A. (2007) Znanie, stoimost' i kapital: k kritike ekonomiki znaniy [Knowledge, Value and Capital: Toward a Critique of the Knowledge Economy]. *Logos*, no 4, pp. 5–63.
- Hardt M., Negri A. (2009) *Commonwealth*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Harrison B., Sum A. (1979) The Theory of “Dual” or Segmented Labor Markets. *Journal of Economic Issues*, vol. 13, no 3, pp. 687–706.
- Harvey D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Herrmann P. (2011) Precarity and Precarisation in the Light of EU-Integration. *Precarity: More than a Challenge of Social Security; Or: Cynicism of EU's Concept of Economic Freedom* (eds. P. Herrmann, S. Kalaycioglu), Bremen: Europäischer Hochschulverlag, pp. 16–48.
- Herrmann P., van der Maesen J. G. (2008) Social Quality and Precarity: Approaching New Patterns of Societal (Dis)Integration. Available at: <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10245/> (accessed 10 September 2017).
- ILO (1974) ILO Constitution. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (accessed 10 September 2017).
- ILO (2006) *Decent Working Time: New Trends, New Issues*, Geneva: International Labor Office.
- ILO (2012) From Precarious Work to Decent Work: Outcome Document to the Workers' Symposium on Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious Employment. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_179787.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).
- ILO (2014) World of Work. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_243961.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).
- ILO (2016) World Employment and Social Outlook 2016: Trends for youth. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_513739.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).
- ILO (2017) Global unemployment expected to rise by 3.4 million in 2017. Available at: http://embargo.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_541128/lang-en/index.htm (accessed 10 September 2017).
- Kalleberg A. L. (2011) *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s to 2000s*, New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
- Marx K. (1974) Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft). Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/> (accessed 10 September 2017).

- Mason P. (2016) *PostCapitalism: A Guide to our Future*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Oksala J. (2013) Neoliberalism and Biopolitical Governmentality. *Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality* (eds. J. Nilsson, S.-O. Wallenstein), Stockholm: Södertörn Philosophical Studies, pp. 53–72.
- Peters J. (2008) Labor Market Deregulation and the Decline of Labor Power in North America and Western Europe. *Policy and Society*, vol. 27, no 1, pp. 83–98.
- Polanyi K. (2001) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Ricceri M. (2016) Social Precarity and Labor Markets Reforms in Europe: The Need to Go Beyond. *Verunsicherte Gesellschaft: Prekarisierung auf dem Weg in das Zentrum* (eds. R. Hepp, R. Riesinger, D. Kergel), Wiesbaden: Springer, pp. 35–54.
- Sager M. (2015) Precarity at Work: Asylum Rights and Paradoxes of Labor in Sweden. *Vulnerability, Exploitation and Migrants: Insecure Work in a Globalised Economy* (eds. L. Waite, G. Craig, H. Lewis, K. Skrivankova), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 115–128.
- Sennett R. (2006) *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tsianos V., Papadopoulos D. (2006) Precarity: A Savage Journey to the Heart of Embodied Capitalism. Available at: <http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/tsianospapadopoulos/en> (accessed 10 September 2017).
- Virno P. (2004) *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life*, New York: Columbia University.
- Vosko L. F. (2006) Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labor Market Insecurity. *Precarious Employment: Understanding of Labor Market Insecurity in Canada* (ed. L. F. Vosko), Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 3–39.
- Vosko L. F. (2010) *Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Wallerstein I. (2004) *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Неустойчивость: локальные беспорядки или новый глобальный порядок?

Вячеслав Бобков

Доктор экономических наук, профессор, заслуженный деятель науки Российской Федерации, научный руководитель ОАО «Всероссийский центр уровня жизни», руководитель научных проектов РЭУ им. Г. В. Плеханова, заведующий Лабораторией проблем уровня и качества жизни Института социально-экономических проблем народонаселения РАН

Адрес: Стремянный пер. д. 36, г. Москва, Российская Федерация 117997

E-mail: bobkovvn@mail.ru

Вадим Квачев

Кандидат социологических наук, старший преподаватель, Российского экономического университета им. Г. В. Плеханова

Адрес: Стремянный пер. д. 36, г. Москва, Российская Федерация 117997

E-mail: kvachevvg@mail.ru

Статья посвящена исследованию природы неустойчивости. Авторы показывают ее двойственный характер как локального и глобального явления. Существуют четыре основных предпосылки, которые влияют на распространение неустойчивости на глобальном и локальных уровнях: разделение труда, углубляющее асимметрию и неравенство на рынке труда; четвертая промышленная революция, замещающая труд машинами; изменяющаяся природа самого труда, размывание границы между отчужденным трудом и частной жизнью; и распространение неолиберальной идеологии и практики, которая проявляется как вторжение государства и капитала в процесс социального производства индивидов. Сумма этих предпосылок ведет к расширению неустойчивости в различных формах, главным образом в форме неустойчивой занятости. Неустойчивость становится формой нового глобального порядка, возникающего как результат множества локальных беспорядков

Ключевые слова: неустойчивость, неустойчивая занятость, рынок труда, Индустрия 4.0, отчуждение, эксплуатация, биополитика, неолиберализм

Interactional Lenses for Contemporary Migration Studies: The Case of the “Cosmopolitan Sociability” Concept*

Maxim L. Ni

Junior Research Fellow, International Research Laboratory “Transnationalism and Migration Studies”,
Saint Petersburg State University
Address: Universitetskaya Nab., 13B, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation 199034
E-mail: jintae@mail.ru

Pavel P. Lisitsyn

PhD, Associate Professor, Saint Petersburg State University of Economics
Research Fellow, International Research Laboratory “Transnationalism and Migration Studies”,
Saint Petersburg State University
Address: Universitetskaya Nab., 13B, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation 199034
E-mail: fox_sociology@mail.ru

The article attempts to revise the concept of ‘cosmopolitan sociability’, proposed by Nina Glick-Schiller for the field of migration research, from the interactional perspective. Cosmopolitan sociability characterizes such forms of integration of mobile people that do not refer to ethnicity or the country of origin; instead they are based on openness, free emotional sharing, and general human competencies available to everyone. However, the use of the concept by anthropologists and sociologists seems to neglect specific situational mechanisms of how cosmopolitan sociability is produced and reproduced in everyday interactions. We seek to fill this gap addressing theoretical resources of ethnomethodological membership categorization analysis, as well as interaction ritual theory. We propose to combine these approaches as complementary conceptual frameworks to analyze cosmopolitan sociability practices at the situational level. Ethnomethodological tradition helps to identify mutual definition and accounting of what is happening in specific here-and-now situations. This allows analyzing the stability created within the framework of cosmopolitan interactions, as well as the specific moral order that is reproduced within them. Moreover, ethnomethodological analysis helps to identify contexts where cosmopolitan sociability can or cannot arise. Interaction ritual theory, as developed by Randall Collins, characterizes situational solidarities and group symbols emerging and sustaining in everyday interactions. It is also able to trace the influence of the individuals’ past experiences (previous chains of interactions) on their participation in situations of cosmopolitan sociability. The proposed approach is illustrated by the analysis of several examples of labor migrants’ interactions in the Federal Migration Service.

Keywords: cosmopolitan sociability, actual cosmopolitanism, migration studies, transnationalism, social interaction, interaction ritual chains, ethnomethodology, membership categorization analysis

© Maxim L. Ni, 2017

© Pavel P. Lisitsyn, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-87-104

* Work on this paper was supported by grant № 17-78-20107 from the Russian Science Foundation.

At the dawn of sociology in the second half of the 19th century people's lives were generally limited by the rigid borders of national states, and solidarity was perceived as a cohesion within bounded political formations. Hence, the early metaphor of society as a social organism, where the organs are in a functional relationship with each other and support the existence of the whole thing. In turn, it is obvious that the contemporary world is radically different from those realities. Intensification of the capitalist mode of production contributed to the development of transport, communication tools, and most importantly, to a sharp increase of movement of people on a global scale. The massive migration of the population, primarily due to the search for earnings, initiated an extensive research program aimed at critique of traditional sociological thinking.

Ulrich Beck claims that classical sociological thinking is not more than "methodological nationalism" (Beck, 2006). He argues that its optic limits the field of analysis, entailing serious biases. The main shortcoming of thinking within the framework of "sustainable" borders is the inability to explain events that occur across the borders of nation states. As illustration he provides the case of September 11, 2001, global transplantation networks, and mass labor migration that would not be possible in a world of closed social systems. In a similar vein, the classic interpretation of the concept of "society" was criticized by John Urry. In his works the emphasis is on re-writing the social context in terms of the networks and the flows passing through state boundaries (Urry, 2010).

In the field of migration research, this line of criticism is developed in the works of Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc (Basch et al., 1995), as well as a number of followers (Faist, 2013). They propose to use the concept of "transnationalism" to indicate the forms of social interaction that occurs beyond borders¹. Field research demonstrates that many migrant workers do not break ties with their homeland. Moreover, they are also active actors in the political and economic development of their countries and come back regularly, living "between" the two states. Such arguments obviously question traditional discourses on integrating migrants into society.

The most remarkable example of a study based on "transnational approach" is *Transnational Villagers* by Peggy Levitt (2001) that considers in detail the case of the migration from the Dominican village of Miraflores to Boston, Massachusetts. The main argument of the book is that sustainable migration changes social relationships not as much in the host community of migrants as in their homeland. These transformations occur as the result of the "social exchange" between sending and the receiving communities. Ideas, patterns of behavior, and social capital circulating here affect the social context within the sending community. Levitt, in particular, shows how the government of the Dominican Republic changed its legislation, encouraging dual citizenship that provided emigrants the opportunity of political participation of their native country. Moreover, the existence of relatively cheap airfare tariffs allows migrants to exist in two worlds and to compensate their socioeconomic status in their homeland through their earnings from the United States.

1. See Ni, 2017. Several arguments of this article are also presented there briefly.

Today the transnational approach to migration is quite conventional in the social sciences. Global movements of people are considered as an important problem. There is a need for more detailed framework analyzing the ways people exist and produce solidarity within transnational spaces. Contemporary researchers are increasingly asking questions about migration without reference to the traditional discourses of integration in terms of cultural assimilation. One of the productive options for answering such demands was the optic of sociological or actual cosmopolitanism. In contrast to the philosophical debate about the construction of a cosmopolitan society developed in normative terms (Nussbaum, 1994), sociologists and anthropologists seek to understand how the logic of everyday cosmopolitanism works (Delanty, 2012). Researchers focus on how everyday discourses and people's practices promote openness to cultural diversity. Studies in line with everyday cosmopolitanism are designed to oppose the conventional optics of migration research focused on the determining role of ethnic and/or national identity in building networks of interaction and closed groups.

In this article we continue the tradition of actual cosmopolitanism. We analyze one of the key concepts in the cosmopolitan turn, the concept of "cosmopolitan sociability" that was coined by Nina Glick-Schiller, Tsypylma Darieva, and Sandra Gruner-Domic (Glick-Schiller, Darieva, Gruner-Domic, 2011). It was developed to grasp the processes of interactions in transnational environment that can be characterized as cross-cultural or as cross-ethnic, that significantly expands the field of analysis of migration research. In addition, we propose several advances to this conceptual framework using the developments of ethnomethodologists, as well as the "radical micro-sociology" of Randall Collins. These "external" theoretical resources, in our opinion, will significantly expand the opportunities for detailed, empirically verified description of the phenomenon, and will allow constructing causal hypotheses about the stability of spontaneously emerging patterns of cosmopolitan sociability.

Cosmopolitan Sociability as Emerging Sociality

Glick-Schiller and her colleagues seek to re-focus the attention of migrant scholars to the form of interactions and experiences of mobile people that generate solidarity beyond ethnic, national, and other forms of difference characterized by the dichotomy "we/they". The concept of "cosmopolitan sociability" is grounded on George Simmel's interpretation of sociability as a purely social phenomenon (Simmel, 1971). The main property of Simmel's "sociability" is freedom from the pressure of a person's authorities and internal intentions. Sociability is like a game without external interests. Thus, it is free from the external causality, as well as the inner aspirations of the person at the intersection of which fate is formed. Moreover, for Simmel sociability is the opposition to the teleology of real life; however, Glick-Schiller interprets it as one of the common areas of everyday interactions of mobile people. These free interactions unite people in physical space or cyberspace around those interests that are not always purely utilitarian. Cosmopolitan sociability is defined as "forms of competence and communication skills that are based

on the human capacity to create social relations of inclusiveness and openness to the world” (Glick-Schiller, Darieva, Gruner-Domic, 2011: 402).

These forms of interaction do not necessarily exclude ethnic or national dimension, but exist in parallel by inserting an additional variable in the equation of the formation of group solidarity. Thus, the study of Tsypylma Darieva is devoted to the ways in which young ethnic Armenians in America build ties with the “homeland of their ancestors” through participation in projects to preserve the mountain landscape of Armenia. What is interesting to us is that the general interpretation of participation in this project is articulated in a global scale. The activists emphasize that the preservation of the Armenian ecosystem is important for the whole planet. Such motives attract even the attention of people who are not ethnically related to Armenia (Darieva, 2011).

It should also be noted that most cases where cosmopolitan sociability is built demonstrate the formation of closed communities with a rigid border. For instance, in the article “Socialist Cosmopolitanism Meets Global Pentecostalism” Gertrude Hüwelmeier examines the situation of Vietnamese migrants in Germany (Hüwelmeier, 2011). Her study demonstrates historical transformation of the social context of migrants’ inclusion. Her informants report that their initial settlement experience in a new location was inclusion into socialist brotherhood, but after the fall of The Berlin Wall the situation changed dramatically. The post-socialist realities of German cities redefined the status of Vietnamese people; they faced stiff racial stigmatization that sharply limited opportunities for building relationships outside their ethnic communities. Finally, in the mid-nineties, the Pentecostal Church, that adopted Vietnamese converts without regard to their class, ethnic, or political affiliation, began its work around the globe. Parishes with overwhelming numbers of ethnic Vietnamese appeared with the central Pentecostal mission in Hanoi. Hüwelmeier emphasizes that religious identity has become a driver for cosmopolitan sociability not in terms of tolerance, but rather through the appeal to a higher order, namely the order of salvation. This kind of “cosmopolitanism with a moral mission” (Van Der Veer, 2002: 167) arises from religious ideology and forms of solidarity, excluding those who are not involved in religious practices. Thus, the identification of cosmopolitan sociability takes us aside from the unequivocal opposition of rootedness and openness. The principle of openness to the world can be incorporated within the quite rigid boundaries of the religious community.

However, cosmopolitan sociability can emerge beyond closed organizational contexts. The construction of the common space of interaction is a creative process that can take place quite spontaneously, starting from some situation in which people find themselves. Nina Glick-Schiller emphasizes the role of human creativity when she defines cosmopolitan sociability as “a set of practices in which people are not passive consumers but are active participants in creating common spaces” (Glick-Schiller, Darieva, Gruner-Domic, 2011: 403; Massey 2005; Leitner, Peck, Sheppard, 2007). In this respect, examples of the influence of the context of a multi-ethnic environment on the creation of special forms of communication in workplaces are quite interesting. For instance, the study of Uma Kothari describes how street peddlers in Barcelona form a special type of differentiated

communication (Kothari, 2008). Occupation and migrant status help to create a very unusual type of interaction between them. The emphasis is on ethnic differences, but they are interpreted not in opposition terms, but as exchanging specific professional skills. So, the true experts in sales are the Senegalese, who “really know how to sell” (Kothari, 2008: 508). The neophytes of the “camaraderie on the street” strive to establish contacts with them in every possible way. Kothari points out that cosmopolitan sociability can be interpreted as a phenomenon arising from the context of a particular situation. In this regard, for a full analysis, we need tools that identify relations between the conditions of the situation in which sociability produced, and radically empirical data (naturally occurring conversation, narratives, video recordings, etc.). Understanding the possibility of actual everyday cosmopolitanism, in our opinion, requires the development of theoretical and methodological toolkit of researchers.

It is necessary to take a step towards the unbundling of the conventional dictionary of migration researchers. Here we adhere to the approach of Rogers Brubaker who criticizes the notion of “group”, “ethnicity”, and “nation” (Brubaker, 2002: 166). According to his idea, a group, whether ethnic, religious, or professional, exists only in specific contexts. Therefore, an analytical tool is necessary for a situational analysis that is radically empirical and does not refer to pre-defined concepts. If we initially aimed at researching ethnic groups, our analysis will show us ethnicity as something integral which relates individuals to a particular group once and for all. The analytics of cosmopolitan sociability assumes completely different perspective in which group identifications can be shifted, giving the room for openness of actors. In his criticism of “methodological groupism”, Brubaker points out the need to address the resources of situational approaches, in particular, the use of the ethnomethodologists’ developments (Brubaker, Loveman, Stamatov, 2004: 35), as well as the core aspects of Goffman’s frame analysis (Brubaker, 2000: 3). These theoretical resources help to understand the mechanisms of the “embodiment” of ethnicity as an objectively perceived phenomenon. We agree with this approach, but apart from researching the procedures for implementation of cosmopolitan sociability, we are interested in the question of why actual cosmopolitanism takes place in organized communities in some cases, but not in others. In this regard, we complement ethnomethodology with Randall Collins’ theory of interaction ritual chains.

Everyday Cosmopolitanism as Accountable Order

Let us begin with ethnomethodological developments for the study of cosmopolitan sociability. Ethnomethodology is not a theory in a strict sense, but rather a research direction that study practices through which ordinary people create an adequate or recognizable order of interaction in the ordinary situations of their lives. The basic theoretical intuition here is that any interaction take place in an ordered form, and, most importantly, this orderliness can be explained without external theoretical constructions such as ethnicity, social structure, or class. A detailed description of the ways of how this order is produced is the main goal of ethnomethodology. Thus, the task of an ethnomethodolo-

gist is radically different from traditional approaches of sociologists. Instead of looking at empirical data for the indicators of some theoretical concept, the focus is redirected to the ways by which people produce the phenomenon of interaction under natural conditions.² In turn, interaction always occurs in a certain context, that has a definite effect on the acting. This statement seems like a sociological truism,³ however ethnomethodology defines context not through abstract structures “above us”, but in purely phenomenal terms of the observed resources.⁴ Hence, the concept of “indexicality” is required to explain the phenomena of order. Any actions of the person are connected with those details that are given to him/her in direct observation. It means that production of social reality can be traced without appealing to the transcendental sphere of meaning. The account of empirically understood “indexicality” determines the understanding of human interactions as artful productions of an accountable reality (Hilbert, 1992: 30). In other words, the model of the actor in ethnomethodology includes the property of human creativity, thereby releasing it from the model of “cultural dope” determined by the external social structures.

These characteristics of ethnomethodological approach surprisingly resonate with the definition of cosmopolitan sociability provided by Glick-Schiller. Both approaches emphasize that the emergence of sociality occurs in situational context, and behavior of actors is not completely predetermined by social structures. Let us recall that the definition of cosmopolitan sociability point to the competencies of people based on the human ability to create social relationships of inclusion and openness to the world. It is also a set of practices through which people create a common space. Researcher can be asked the question of how and on what basis it is possible to produce accountability between people who are differentiated and put into rigid opposition by conventional sociological optics. This, in fact, is an ethnomethodological question that requires a new description of everyday cosmopolitan situations, taking into account the thematization of traditional categories of migration studies. Following the ethnomethodological intuition, we can ask ourselves about the situations in which self-identification as a member of ethnic group shifts to a more general or multi-layered category, such as “Pentecostal Christian” or “Senegalese expert in trade”. Moreover, we are able to inquire in which cases such everyday work of categories produces common spaces, and in which cases it creates an excuse for antagonism.

Within the ethnomethodological tradition, there is a sub-discipline that specializes in researching of how people categorize the participants. This is the Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA), an approach developed by Harvey Sacks (Sacks, 1972; Lepper,

2. Here we mean the setting for switching from sociological use of concepts as the resources for the description to making these concepts a topic for empirical investigation (Zimmerman, Pollner, 1970).

3. For conventional sociology, it is obvious that the interaction is embedded in a macrostructural or institutional order (Rawls, 1989).

4. It should be noted that ethnomethodology does not deny the existence of macrostructures, but their role is reduced to selection, accounting, explanation and justification of the recurring ways of ordering interactions occurring in local contexts. Similarly, despite the title of the article, attribution of ethnomethodology to the directions of micro-analysis is debatable (Hilbert, 1990; Korbut, 2014).

2000: 6). MCA focuses on identification of patterns by which participants in natural interactions classify themselves and others. The sets of categories that are associated with one class are designated as the Membership Categorization Device (MCD). For example, the categories “mother”, “father”, “daughter”, and “son” in modern societies are connected in the MCD “family”. MCDs compete with each other in conversation. Brubaker emphasizes the productivity of using the MCA to identify ways in which ethnicity is realized as the form of a cognitive scheme (Brubaker, 2004: 16). The same way of thinking, in our opinion, can be applied to the methods of achieving cosmopolitan sociability, considering it as a mutual categorization of participants in interaction within the MCD that does not directly refer to ethnicity.

The analysis of Membership Categorization Devices is achieved through applying a number of principles and rules for the application of categories in a naturally occurring talk. First, categories are linked through the registration of category bounded activities, actions that common sense considers functional within the MCD. Sacks illustrate this rule by analyzing a simple statement: “X cried. Y picked it up” (Leaper, 2000: 14). Common sense tells us that instead of the unknowns, we must substitute the categories “mother” and “child”, but how do we come to this conclusion? Sacks draws our attention to the fact that, for an adequate interpretation, we use those resources that are already embedded in the texture of the observed situation on the one hand, and are part of a common culture, on the other. The sequence “cried” and “picked it up” is associated with categories, allowing us to make judgments about the identification of participants. These marks are called “category bounded activities”, they denote a set of specific actions that are attributed to category carriers. The term “standardized relational pair” consists of reciprocal categories that axiomatically assume mutual obligations with respect to each other. So, in the described example, the mother–baby pair is fixed and correlates with the obligations of care, and is expressed in empirically fixed actions. Further, consistency rule states that if at least one individual was categorized and a category from a specific MCD was used, then other members of the same group will be categorized from the same MCD. Economy rule is closely linked with consistency rule, since one category suffices for one participant in the interaction. The case of categorization is offset when a new category from a new MCD is applied to an individual, and is thus associated with the observed change in the context of the conversation. In the duplicative organization feature, when persons are categorized within the framework of a single MCD, its actual or potential members are considered as a unit rather than as separate individuals. If a rule of duplicative organization is applied to a certain number of people, they are considered not separately, but together. For example, instead of individual husbands and wives, the pairs are considered as families. Finally, rule of pragmatic relevance claims that if participants in interaction are allocated as the actual relational pairs, the non-observance of pair positions is observable. If the actual pair is not available, its counterpart can be selected by a sequential selection from the MCD.

It is worth to make an important point here. Sacks’ original approach implies that categories and their meaning are re-usable objects distributed in the cultural space. Thus,

culture is taken for granted. In contrast, an interpretation of the recent work in line with the MCA offers more situational approach. Thus, Stephen Hester and Peter Eglin propose a distinction between the decontextualized culture model and the ethnomethodological model of culture-in-action (Hester, Elgin, 1997: 12). The first corresponds to the embeddedness of categories, predicates, and MCDs in a rigid cultural context. In the second case, both the use and recognizability of categories rely on contextual resources of interactional situation. Identifying the situation is based not on categorically bounded activity in pointing to the relevant categories, but rather on sequential identification of a specific local context where will be appropriate to place certain objects in a certain category unit. Accountability of categories depends on contextual resources available within the situation (Hester, Elgin, 1997: 29). Thus, the production of categorization becomes situational and local.

The application of MCA to the studies characterized in the first part of the article can significantly expand understanding of everyday cosmopolitanism for several reasons. First, MCA focuses on analysis of naturally produced conversations that avoids distortions arising in the interview. Secondly, MCA, as one of the subfields of ethnomethodology, initially problematizes the role of theoretically developed concepts for describing the nature of groups. Thirdly, this approach allows us to correlate the work of group categories and the contexts where they are used by participants themselves that will help to outline the position of cosmopolitan sociability in the structure of the everyday life of mobile people. We can not only understand the contexts in which ethnic, national, or class identities are treated in conversation, but also to study how it is intertwined with more general membership devices by its orientation on local details. Thus, retrospectively applying MCA procedures to the empirical material collected by Uma Kothari (Kothari, 2008), we could conclude that the Senegalese ethnic labeling is closely related to the categorically bounded activity of more general categorization device of “peddler”. The categorically bounded activity of the seller is “selling”, someone does it better, and someone does not. Based on the distributed scheme within the local culture, the Senegalese are categorized as “the inborn sellers”, and finding this category within the “peddlers” categorization mechanism unites them and helps to establish close contacts. Thus, ethnic identification within this machinery of categories becomes not a barrier, but a bridge for the formation of cosmopolitan sociability.

However, in spite of its merits, the ethnomethodological approach has one serious drawback. The description of the accountability order does not imply an explanation of its preservation. It is produced here and now, and it is fundamentally impossible to build bridges between discrete situations. Thus, the important question of how cosmopolitan sociability becomes the foundation for the formation of solidarity beyond a particular moment remains behind the brackets of ethnomethodology.

Interaction Rituals Chains and Maintenance of Cosmopolitan Community

In order to fill the gaps in the explanation of everyday cosmopolitanism, we need theoretical resource that works with more familiar, classical questions of sociology regarding the nature of groups. A detailed analysis of the interaction *per se* does not help to comprehend production of stable cohesion. As A. Filippov points out, “the ability to induce a solidary action in an undetermined but limited set of individuals as a subset of a larger set does not say anything about their solidarity inside the smaller, or about solidarity within a larger set. The production of a coherent “we” of a solidary group needs other means and involves restrictions” (Filippov, 2011: 30). In our opinion, a productive supplement here is the interaction ritual theory of Randall Collins that which emphasizes the role of rituals in uniting the group (Collins, 1983, 2004).

Collins treats solidarity as a sense of belonging to a group, and the size of group is not limited (Collins, 2004: 49). A group can be defined as a conversation between two people, a class in school, or even a global intellectual community. The sense of belonging to a group is formed through interaction rituals that consist of several components. First, participants in the ritual must be in common physical space. Secondly, there must be a common object on which attention is focused. It can be something external to people or actually people themselves. For example, Irving Goffman, whose work Collins is largely based on, demonstrates that the exchange of courtesies in greeting focuses the actors’ attention on themselves (Turner, Stets, Jan, 2006: 136). From here, we come to the next point of the ritual — generating awareness of group boundaries. Finally, the fourth component is shared emotional mood of those who are involved in the ritual.

In a successful interaction ritual, common emotional focus and mutual concentration on the object are mutually reinforcing. There is rhythmic coordination of bodily movements and synchronization of voices in conversation⁵ (Collins, 2004: 48). The synchronization of rhythms enhances the sense of reciprocity and the commonality of experience. The actors intensify their participation in the interaction. This leads to the intensification of general emotional background, leading to the effect that Emile Durkheim called “collective effervescence” (Durkheim, 1965), and thus solidarity is achieved between the participants. A successful ritual promotes the emergence of group symbols that have the properties of sacral objects. This sacralization can carry both positive and negative tone. There are standards of group morality in relation to the emerging symbols, their violation causes a collective disapproval.

Moreover, interaction rituals generate emotional energy (EE) that is distributed among participants. In terms of outsider observer, EE can be described as willingness to join interaction. In case of EE increase, the individual shows enthusiasm and confidence. If the individual is passive, we can notice the lowering of EE. An important aspect here is

5. Rhythmic synchronization is an object of study for neuroscience-oriented sociologists and psychologists. Its presence in a naturally flowing conversation at the level of synchronization of the participants’ voice modulations was recorded and statistically validated in studies of Stanford Gregory (Gregory, 1983; Gregory, Webster, 1996).

the distinction between short-term and long-term emotions (Collins, 2004). Short-term emotions are directly related to the situation and change the emotional energy locally. At the same time, situationally generated emotions can be translated into long-term emotions. Participants can use their accumulated cultural capital (a collection of previously accumulated symbols) in current situation and thereby contribute to creation of group solidarity. Thus, separate ritual interactions are linked and go beyond their borders.

Participants can combine their stock of symbols and emotional energy and enter into cooperation that results in creating solidarity. Thus, interaction rituals are connected (chain) with each other. Individuals tend to build their chains of interaction rituals in a way to maximize the level of EE and carry as-little-as-possible costs (Collins, 1993: 206). The category of “emotional energy” allows Collins to go beyond the field of closed situational analysis. The amount of EE is not constant; it needs to be replenished in the process of new rituals, which prompts the individual to search for and select “markets for ritual interaction” (Collins, 1993: 208). The available pool of EE is invested in rituals that can be replicated in future. The more the investment is, the greater the profit will be, and thus, any person is treated as an EE-seeker.

We can see that Collins’ theory have not so many similarities with ethnomethodology and Membership Categorization Analysis. As the main argument for compatibility of these approaches, we turn to Richard Hilbert’s article “Ethnomethodology and Micro-Macro Order” (Hilbert, 1990). The main idea or the “radical thesis” of the article is that ethnomethodology and interaction ritual theory have one common feature, that is, an indifference to the distinction of micro-macro levels. Hilbert suggests to look at phenomena of the constitutive ordering of everyday life through the prism of interaction rituals. As an example, he considers natural conversation ordering. Hilbert proposes to add the content of conversation to the analytics of conversation structure. In this case, the content of the conversation (including the categories) becomes a Durkheimian sacred object (Hilbert, 1990: 803). The task of the ethnomethodological description, then, is to describe methods of assembling a sacred object by using situational resources. At the same time, mutual understanding that is reached within the situation is reified. These reified entities are linked by means of engagement and redefining in the new interactions. Hilbert argues that “linkage from event to event is biographical, temporal and sequential and ought not to be confused with a “micro-macro link” (Hilbert, 1992: 805). The interaction level produces both what is called “microstructures” and what is conceptualized as “macrostructures”.

With theoretical framework of interaction ritual chains we are able to provide a causal explanation for the emergence of stable forms of solidarity based on cosmopolitan sociability and associated with emotional dimension. Moreover, we can explain how cases of cosmopolitan sociability are formed within institutional frameworks of sustainable organizations, as well as in spontaneous forms. For example, interpretation of daily cosmopolitanism of the Pentecostal sect studied by Gerturda Hüwelmeier is associated not only with the historical context of political change in the country, but also with the local practices of interactions characterized by getting emotional feedback from collective re-

ligious rituals and community activities. When we apply MCA, we can describe schemes that produce openness and inattention to ethnicity or any other form of differentiation of migrant / non-migrant type. However, the interaction ritual theory toolkit allows revealing to what extent the group assigned to a single membership categorization device is united. Researcher's attention will focus not only on narratives of informants, but also on empirically observable manifestations of emotions. In addition, we are able to make some predictions about transforming spontaneous, everyday cosmopolitanism into additional long-term forms of relationships.

Spontaneous Cosmopolitan Sociability at the Federal Migration Service

Let us now illustrate the applicability of the proposed conceptual framework with an example. We base our analysis on data collected during the observations of interactions at one of the branches of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Saint Petersburg. The main purpose of visiting this location was to collect information by a questionnaire survey about language competency of labor migrants arriving in the Russian Federation, as well as on problems that migrants encounter during their stay in the country. Unfortunately, the use of a voice or video recording devices met a sharp disapproval from both the administration and the respondents. Because of this, the observations of migrant interactions were conducted in form of spontaneous autoethnography. The main way of recording data was field notes and diary. This, of course, does not allow conducting a comprehensive study. The analysis we attempt to make is rather a pilot sketch that requires further work in the field. Nevertheless, we hope to present an interesting case for analysis.

Visiting FMS is a prerequisite for obtaining the documents for a work permit (patent) in the Russian Federation for foreign citizens. The period of validity of the patent is limited to one year, and in addition, if migrant fails to submit documents for patent registration within 30 days from the time of arrival, sanctions are imposed in the form of fine or restriction to leave the country and re-enter. The period of 30 days is perceived by most of migrants as a very short period of time since during this time, it is necessary to find an apartment, to get a job, and only then to be allowed to apply for patent. As a result, the territory of FMS is always crowded, despite the efforts of the administration to manage the problem.

It is necessary to describe the physical space of FMS as the site where the interactions unfold. It can be divided into two parts, inner and outer ones. The inner part is the first floor of the building where a number of offices and consultation windows are situated, as well as three halls. In the first hall, there are several benches, a large information monitor, and a toilet, as well as several offices, the purpose of which remained unknown to us. From this room, there is a pass to the next one where there is an office for the employees with two windows, and six rows of welded iron chairs to accommodate about thirty-six people. The employees behind the windows accept documents for the registration of patents, verify their authenticity, and check the presence of the applicant's information in the

database. The number of people in this room varies depending on the time; since the hall is open until 4 p.m., it is already quite empty by 5. From here, people move to the next room where they need to get a patent from one of the windows. This space looks just like the waiting room of a suburban station. There are seven windows for issuing papers, as well as several rows of seats that are always occupied.

The outer part of the FMS building consists of the courtyard with an area about 150 square meters. There is a way to get there from the big hall that issues papers, and this space is also very crowded. The yard is covered with a canopy to protect people from rain and snow, and under the roof, several rows of backless low benches stand perpendicular to the exit/entrance of the building. The distance between the benches is no more than one and a half meters. After every two benches, there is a wall made of iron mesh, and iron wickets are attached to the ends of the walls. There are usually so many people here that the queue goes outside the courtyard to the territories adjacent to the FMS building.

We spent most of the time in the yard where people gathered, and we discovered that their turn to obtain patents or other documents would not come very soon.⁶ Our attention was attracted by the repeated complaints connected with the conditions of the long wait for the documents. These complaints manifested in two forms: first, when the researcher came to the point of the questionnaire asking “What situations would you like to avoid in the future that take away much of your time and energy?”, and secondly, the topic of complaints spontaneously arose as an excuse to talk to unfamiliar people in the same situation as themselves. Next, we will focus on analysis of these situations.

Since most of the visitors to the FMS were migrants from Central Asia, we invented a special methodology for attracting respondents / informants to collect data for the survey. Most of migrants from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan do not know Russian well. We, in turn, had a limited knowledge of Central Asian languages. Thus, during the field work, we adhered to the tactics of the “spontaneous recruitment of translator”. If the first respondent spoke Russian, then after the survey, we tried to get in touch with him and ask him to help with translating the questionnaire for his compatriots. Partly because of this, and partly because of the interest in our research, there were several people constantly around the researcher. Even in those moments when no one was interested in taking the survey, we were surrounded by two or three curious people. In this, the questions on those situations that are time-and energy-consuming itself often became an occasion for collective discussions. The respondents complained that the procedure for obtaining documents from the FMS is the most exhausting. Often, instead of a clear answer to the questionnaire question, some of the respondents began long monologues-explanations, and then the rest become involved in the process. For instance, responding to the question, one man from Azerbaijan sharply criticized the authorities of St. Petersburg, and his criticism was supported by “translator” from Uzbekistan, as well as an occasional witness. Here is a reconstruction of the statements based on the diary entries:

6. Many people often did not get their turn at all during the day and had to return the next day.

R1: “Did you ask me about most of all time and effort? And what, you do not know? Nobody needs all of your research! You go here, ask questions, and then what? Simple people are suffering! Hard workers!”

Int.: “Yes, but still we are trying to change something. Our research is not just done to be done. They then come to the government’s eyes.”

R1: “Stop it! You’d better go and ask your *administration* why people on the street are sitting like *cattle*. They have to patch up the roof, do something to reduce the queues. And we’re sitting here — there’s nowhere to fall crumbs!”

R2: “They all have everything ‘bar-bir,’ my friend (turns to R1). I have already come here from five in the morning and all wasted, but at work the days are idle. They do not care about us.”

R1: “Yes, they don’t care! They just fill out the paperwork, and we’re here . . . Are you (referring to Int.) saw what was happening this autumn? This roof is all flowing, it’s cold . . . You need to throw your papers — it’s all useless!”

In the situation it is clear how the discussion of complaints about the work of the FMS is unfolding. A common understanding of the situation is built on the basis of the locally distributed resources of the situation. Waiting in the FMS creates institutional context. The Institution is responsible for issuing documents for registration in the territory of the receiving state and for employment. Consequently, the categories of people here are limited to “hard workers” and “administration”. Boredom and the lack of places to sit causes inconvenience. In addition, the behavior of those who are classified as the “administration” demonstrates a clear disregard for the “hard workers”. This is indicated not only by the documented reconstruction of the conversation, but also by repeated complaints about the rude attitude of those whom we (the researchers) categorize as “guards”, while the informants, following the rule of the duplicative organization, are referred to as the unit of “administration”. Focusing on the local context details, the informants refer to themselves as the category of “suffering people”. The situation in which we (the researchers) turned to them with the question on “problem situations” also becomes a resource to categorize themselves primarily as “suffering people”, and only then as “hard workers”. Thus, general understanding of the situation is made with respect to the opposition of the two apparatuses of membership categorization; the “suffering people” and the “administration”. Following the rules of economy and duplicative organization, such categories as Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Azeri, or builder, roofer, or painter in this context are combined by referring to the category of “sufferers”, correlated with the situation of being in the FMS. In addition, through a combination of contextual details and categories, the categorically related activity of “suffering people” arises when one has to wait an extraordinarily long period of time for one’s turn and endure an inhuman attitude from the employees of the FMS. The work of MCD⁷ “administration” in this regard is ambivalent. In the described fragment, participants demonstrate the application of the rule of pragmatic relevance to

7. As previously mentioned, the Membership Categorization Device (MCD) is the set of categories that are associated with one class and categorically-bounded activity.

the category-related activities of administration. It is understood that the duties of the administration are to “. . . to patch up the roof, do something to ensure that there are no queues”, but instead it causes people to suffer. Using this thematic vocabulary allows building of communication mode that is open to those who fall under the general category of “suffering people at FMS”, regardless of their ethnic or national affiliation. The only criterion for entry is language skills.

The same conclusions are relevant for spontaneously arising communication that we overheard and recorded. Even if ethnicity was somehow referred to in the conversation (most often it was the question “where are you from?”) discussing conditions for obtaining patents, ethnic categorization was absorbed by MCD “hard workers”. The only difference in the case of spontaneous communication was the greater variability of topics associated with categorically-bounded activities. Typical development of the conversation, which began with the discussion of endless queues and clarification of ethnicity, involved discussion of work. It is interesting that some of the informants with whom we had contacts outside the survey noted that during these spontaneous discussions they had made new colleagues, although not always with their fellow countrymen.

Moreover, we can assume that within the framework of discussions of discontent with the work of the FMS administration solidarity is created based on involuntary participation in interaction rituals. All indicators of the success of the ritual are noticeable: physical co-presence; general focus on the need to obtain patent; group boundary separating those who are categorized in the conversations as “hard workers” from those who are referred to as “administration” or “superiors”; and, finally, shared emotional mood. Despite the fact that the sacred object or symbol generated in this case has a negative tone, it is also capable of creating emotional energy and solidarity. As Collins himself notes, “solidarity presupposes not only positive emotions, it is created by a conflict situation, since solidarity is not opposed to conflict, but to indifference” (Collins, 2006: 128). From this perspective, the ritual unfolds around the pronouncing of the situation, which is a form of passive resistance from below. The participants in the interaction experience emotional upsurge through the articulation of “just anger”. The position of weak becomes a source of solidarity beyond ethnic differences.

Why did we not notice the transformation of this kind of everyday cosmopolitanism into a structurally organized community? Collins’ theory draws our attention to the temporal structure of migrants’ stay on the FMS territory. A person comes here, spending a few days collecting necessary documents. During this s/he accumulates certain dissatisfaction (– EE), and probably enters into interaction rituals where s/he replenishes emotions (+ EE)⁸. However, after collecting documents, s/he hurries to work or home. For a long times/he is free from visiting this place. Those emotions that were produced in successful interaction ritual are not recharged for a long time, so the degree of solidarity remains low. As a result, we can assume with a high degree of certainty that the original cosmopolitan sociability that generates solidarity on the basis of complaint will not take

8. The term (– EE) means the loss of emotional energy, while the term (+ EE) means the growth of emotional energy.

the form of sustainable community. However, the contacts established within the situations of criticism of the FMS administration have the potential to grow into something larger by using those types of categorically-bounded activity that are relevant for the categorization device of “hard workers”. It is possible that the emergence of such forms of everyday cosmopolitanism will generate stable group solidarity.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of cosmopolitanism, as considered through sociological lenses, is of special interest for analytics of the contemporary deterritorialized world where the borders of national states are gradually eroding. Analysis of everyday interactions, where identities lose their primary importance and yield their place to communities of a more general order, opens the possibility to grasp new forms of sociality that arise spontaneously from large-scale global migrations. That is why the research of cosmopolitan sociability as proposed by Nina Glick-Schiller and her colleagues is so important today.

We believe that supplementing studies of everyday cosmopolitanism with the resources of ethnomethodology and interaction ritual theory will significantly expand the understanding of mechanisms of how cosmopolitan sociability emerges and maintains. Application of ethnomethodological membership categorization analysis helps to understand how situational resources allow mobile people to perceive themselves and others in categories more general than ethnic ones. Looking at the situation from the point of interaction rituals theory makes it possible to explain transformation of spontaneous forms of communication into stable groups and to reveal the reasons for non-emergence of institutionalized solidarity.

Our frames do not have an integral character. Our main goal was to draw the attention of migration scholars to research optics of the sociology of everyday life that helps to escape the reduction of methodological nationalism. Our approach allows re-definition the classical notions of group boundaries through the thematization of essential ideas about the forms of identification and the boundaries that they assume. Attention to local contexts of cosmopolitan solidarity, description of the ways in which they are produced in terms of cognitive schemes, and actualization of the role of emotions make it possible to create truly “thick descriptions” grasping the specifics of people’s lives in the era of globalization. We hope that the developments presented will find their application in concrete empirical studies, and will be further advanced.

References

- Basch L., Glick-Schiller N., Szanton Blanc C. (1994) *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Beck U. (2006) Living in the World Risk Society. *Economy and Society*, vol. 35, no 3, pp. 329–345.

- Brubaker R., Cooper F. (2000) Beyond Identity. *Theory and Society*, vol. 29, no 1, pp. 1–47.
- Brubaker R. (2002) Ethnicity without Groups. *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 43, no 2, pp. 163–189.
- Brubaker R., Loveman. M., Stamatov P. (2004) Ethnicity as Cognition. *Theory and Society*, vol. 33, no 1, pp. 31–45.
- Collins R. (1993) Emotional Energy as the Common Denominator of Rational Action. *Rationality and Society*, vol. 5, no 2, pp. 203–220.
- Collins R. (2004) *Interaction Ritual Chains*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collins R. (2006) Moj put' v sociologii [My Path in Sociology]. *Sociological Studies*, no 11, pp. 125–132
- Darieva T. (2011) Rethinking Homecoming: Diasporic Cosmopolitanism in Post-Soviet Armenia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 34, no 3, pp. 490–508.
- Delanty G. (ed.) (2012) *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Durkheim E. (1965) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, New York: Free Press.
- Faist T. (2013) Transnationalism. *Routledge International Handbook on Migration Studies* (eds. S. J. Gold, S. J. Nawyn), Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 449–460.
- Filippov A. (2012) Mobil'nost i solidarnost. Stat'ja vtoraja [Mobility and Solidarity. Second Article]. *Russian Sociological Review*, vol. 11, no 1, pp. 19–39.
- Glick-Schiller, N., Darieva T., Gruner-Domic S. (2011) Defining Cosmopolitan Sociability in a Transnational Age: An Introduction. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 34, no 3, pp. 399–417.
- Gregory S. (1983) A Quantitative Analysis of Temporal Symmetry in Microsocial Relations. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 48, no 1, pp. 129–135.
- Gregory S., Webster S. (1996) A Nonverbal Signal in Voices of Interview Partners Effectively Predicts Communication Accommodation and Social Status Perceptions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 70, no 6, pp. 1231–1240.
- Hester S., Eglin P. (eds.) (1997) *Culture in Action: Studies in Membership Categorization Analysis*, Washington: University Press of America.
- Hilbert R. (1990) Ethnomethodology and the Micro-Macro Order. *American Sociological Review*, vol. 55, no 6, pp. 794–808.
- Hilbert R. (1992) *The Classical Roots of Ethnomethodology: Durkheim, Weber, and Garfinkel*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hüwelmeier G. (2011) Socialist Cosmopolitanism Meets Global Pentecostalism: Charismatic Christianity Among Vietnamese Migrants in Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 34, no 3, pp. 436–453.
- Korbut A. (2014) The Idea of Constitutive Order in Ethnomethodology. *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 17, no 4, pp. 479–496.
- Kothari U. (2008) Global Peddlers and Local Networks: Migrant Cosmopolitanisms. *Environment and Planning Developments*, vol. 26, no 3, pp. 500–516.
- Leeper G. (2000) *Categories in Text and Talk: A Practical Introduction to Categorization Analysis*, London: SAGE.

- Leitner H., Peck J., Sheppard E. (eds.) (2007) Contesting Urban Futures: Decentering Neoliberalism. *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers* (eds. H. Leitner, J. Peck, E. Sheppard), New York: Guilford Press, pp. 1–25.
- Levitt P. (2001) *The Transnational Villagers*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Massey D. (2005) *For Space*, London: SAGE.
- Ni M. (2017). Transnatsionalizm i povsednevnyy kosmopolitizm v optike mikrosotsiologii [Transnationalism and Everyday Cosmopolitanism through the Optics of Microsociology]. *Sovremennyye problemy issledovaniy transnatsionalizma i migratsii* [Current Issues in Transnationalism and Migration Studies] (eds. A. Rezaev, P. Kivistö), Saint Petersburg: Skifiya-Print, pp. 101–119.
- Nussbaum M. C. (1994) Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism. *Boston Review*, vol. 19, no 5, pp. 3–6.
- Rawls A. W. (1989) Language, Self and Social Order: A Reformulation of Goffman and Sacks. *Human Studies*, vol. 12, no 1–2, pp. 147–172.
- Sacks H. (1972) An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology. *Studies in Social Interaction* (ed. D. Sudnow) New York: Free Press, pp. 31–74.
- Simmel G. (1971) *On Individuality and Social Forms* (ed. D. Levine), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Turner J. H., Stets, Jan E. (eds.) (2006) *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, New York: Springer.
- Van Der Veer P. (2002) *Colonial Cosmopolitanism, Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Urry J. (2010) Mobile Sociology. *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51, no 51, pp. 185–203.
- Zimmerman D, Pollner M. (1970) The Everyday World as a Phenomenon. *Understanding Everyday Life: Towards a Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge* (ed. J. D. Douglas), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 80–103.

Перспективы интеракционистского анализа в современных миграционных исследованиях: случай «космополитического общения»

Максим Ни

Младший научный сотрудник Международной лаборатории «Транснационализм и миграционные процессы» Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета

Адрес: Университетская набережная, д. 13Б, Санкт-Петербург, Российская Федерация 199034

E-mail: jintae@mail.ru

Павел Лисицын

Кандидат социологических наук, доцент кафедры сравнительной социологии факультета социологии Санкт-Петербургского государственного экономического университета

Старший научный сотрудник Международной лаборатории «Транснационализм и миграционные процессы» Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета

Адрес: Университетская набережная, д. 13Б, Санкт-Петербург, Российская Федерация 199034

E-mail: fox_sociology@mail.ru

В статье делается попытка пересмотра концепции космополитического общения (cosmopolitan sociability) с интеракционистских позиций. Термин «космополитическое общение» был предложен Ниной Глик-Шиллер для анализа современных миграционных процессов. Он характеризует формы интеграции мигрантов, которые основаны на открытости и общечеловеческих компетенциях и не предполагают жёсткой связки с этнической принадлежностью или гражданством. Однако концепция космополитического общения не уделяет достаточного внимания тому, как именно возникает и воспроизводится космополитическое общение на уровне конкретных ситуаций повседневного взаимодействия. Мы стремимся заполнить данную лакуну через обращение к этнометодологической традиции анализа категоризации членства, а также к теории ритуалов взаимодействия Рэндалла Коллинза. Этнометодологическая традиция рассматривает взаимное определение того, что происходит в конкретных ситуациях взаимодействия, что дает возможность анализировать устойчивость отношений в рамках космополитических взаимодействий и конкретный моральный порядок, который воспроизводится внутри них. Кроме того, этнометодологический анализ позволяет выявить контексты, в которых космополитическое общение способно/не способно возникнуть. В свою очередь, теория ритуалов взаимодействия рассматривает ситуационные солидарности и групповые символы, возникающие в повседневных взаимодействиях. Она также предоставляет концептуальные ресурсы для анализа влияния прошлого опыта людей (прошлых цепочек ритуалов взаимодействия) на степень их вовлеченности в космополитическое общение. Предложенный подход иллюстрируется на материалах включенного наблюдения за повседневными взаимодействиями трудовых мигрантов в Федеральной миграционной службе.

Ключевые слова: космополитическое общение, повседневный космополитизм, миграционные исследования, транснационализм, социальное взаимодействие, цепочки ритуалов взаимодействия, этнометодология, анализ категоризации членства

Some Features of an Inspiring Book; or: Why Sociologists Should Study Love Despite Its Intangibility*

ILLOUZ E. (2016). WHY LOVE HURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION. CAMBRIDGE: POLITY. 294 P. ISBN 978-0-745-67107-9

Irina Trotsuk

DSc (Sociology), Leading Research Fellow, Centre for Fundamental Sociology,
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, RUDN University
Address: Myasnienskaya str., 20, Moscow, Russian Federation 101000
E-mail: irina.trotsuk@yandex.ru

What is love? 'Tis not hereafter;
Present mirth hath present laughter;
What's to come is still unsure:
In delay there lies not plenty;
Then, come kiss me, sweet and twenty,
Youth's a stuff will not endure.

William Shakespeare

Love hurts, love scars,
Love wounds and marks . . .
Some fools think
Of happiness, blissfulness, togetherness,
Some fools fool themselves, I guess
'They're not foolin' me
I know it isn't true
Love is just a lie made to make you blue.

Boudleaux Bryant

Love becomes no more than an exchange, with
no binding rules except the obligation of full and
open communication.

Robert Bellah et al.¹

It is no secret that scholars love² to attend conferences and meetings of all kinds not only to communicate and exchange scientific ideas and findings, but also to find out what is

© Irina Trotsuk, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-105-118

* The publication of this paper is supported by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

1. *Bellah R., Sullivan W., Swidler A., Tipton S.* (1985). *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press. P. 108.

2. Obviously, this word is to be frequent in a review of a book on love.

new in the non-fiction book market and to hold new editions in their hands to make sure that the books chosen by the title are the “ones”. Usually, the thematic repertoire of the books presented by publishing houses at sociological conferences is predictable for people attending such events or interested in the discipline in general, though surprises can happen. As a rule, the unexpectedness of titles is determined by the traditional topics of national sociological schools, topics that differ among the countries for objective reasons³ and the historical development of the national school⁴. This explains why the book titled *Why Love Hurts*⁵ seemed so unexpected and alien at the 13th Conference of the European Sociological Association “(Un)Making Europe. Capitalism, Solidarities, Subjectivities” (Athens, 2017) for a Russian scholar like me, because my educational and scientific background never let me consider such a topic sociologically relevant to the study of the transformations of contemporary society. Eva Illouz defines sociology in the context of romantic love as “a study of collective forms of sufferings: inequality, poverty, discrimination, diseases, political oppression, large-scale armed conflicts, and natural disasters are the main prism through which it has explored the agonies of the human condition. Sociology has been very successful in analyzing these collective forms of suffering, yet has neglected the analysis of ordinary psychic sufferings that inheres in social relationships... If sociology is to remain relevant to modern societies, it must imperatively explore the emotions that reflect the vulnerability of the self in conditions of late modernity that is at once institutional and emotional, . . . which will take us back to the primary and still much needed . . . vocation of sociology” (p. 15).

There are at least two extremely important concepts of everyday life that are too intangible for theoretical and empirical study — love and happiness. Or rather, the situation is ambivalent: we are well aware of our own happy moments and of falling in love (though happiness can be unexpected and inexplicable, and love can be rationalized as lust, passion, escape from loneliness, desire to prove something, etc.), but when researchers ask us simple questions about either of the two we often feel like idiots incapable of giving a verbal description of such close and self-evident things. Perhaps that is why love poetry has been so highly valued for centuries; providing us with the words for describing the virtues and dangers of love. Both were wonderfully expressed by Shakespeare: “What eyes hath love put in my head, / which have no correspondence with true sight: / or if they have, where is my judgment fled/ that censures falsely what they see aright? / If that be fair whereon my false eyes dote, / what means the world to say it is not so? / If it be not, then love doth well denote / love’s eye is not so true as all men’s: no, / how can it? O how can love’s eye be true, / that is so vex’d with watching and with tears? . . . / O cunning love! With tears thou keep’st me blind, / lest eyes well-seeing thy foul faults should find!”

3. Some social phenomena can be too underrepresented to be worth studying; some can be taboo such as sexual practices and different aspects of dying in Russia; some are traditionally ignored as irrelevant/insignificant despite their acuteness, such as abortion and ethnic conflict in Russia.

4. For instance, the sociology of emotions is not a developed branch in Russia because the relations between sociology and psychology are strained, and the “legitimate” sociological “borrowings” are more psycho-diagnostic procedures and projective techniques adapted for the sociological analysis of social representations.

5. Unfortunately, I missed the first editions of the book in 2012, 2014 and 2015, so it is new for me.

(Sonnet 148). Thus, Eva Illouz is strikingly brave to approach such an intangible and ambivalent object as love and to consider love a legitimate object of the sociological study.

I do not like the popular review style of a provocative enumeration of the book's characteristics, but this is exactly the case for otherwise the review would become too long (because the text is saturated with findings, data and quotes) and boring (the book is intriguing and full of illustrative examples, yet an attempt to fully reflect it in the review would tire the reader). There are many subtitles in the book but the list of contents is rather brief: it starts with an Introduction (Chapter 1) on the misery of love, i.e. on romantic pain, "the agonies of intimate relationships". The second chapter describes the great transformations of love⁶ through the examination of the changes in three crucial aspects of the self, which are the will (how we want something), recognition (what matters for our sense of worth and self-esteem), and desire (what we long for and how much).

The third chapter identifies the origins and consequences of "commitment phobia", i.e. of "cultural performance around the problem of choice", which can be either hedonic — when commitment is deferred by engaging in a pleasurable accumulation of relationships, and a person cannot fixate on one partner; or aboulic — it is a problem of not wanting anyone, the inability to desire a relationship. The author reconstructs the "new architecture" of romantic choice as mainly the consequence of freedom as the "essential trademark of modernity", because the contemporary exercise of sexual and emotional freedom generates different forms of distress and suffering (feelings of ontological insecurity and meaninglessness).

In the pre-modern marriage markets, choice was shaped by the close interaction of the self with family and the work environment, and . . . was binding. Modern marriage markets, in contrast, seem to operate through the seemingly unconstrained, free, and unfettered encounters between people whose faculty of choice is not only exercised, but ongoingly in demand. Yet the faculty of choice, far from being based on pure emotionality, entails a complex affective and cognitive apparatus to evaluate partners, to consult oneself about one's emotions toward them, and to predict one's capacity to sustain these emotions. (p. 90)

The problem is that it is hard to make choices when there is a range of real and imagined options under the collapse of religious, ethnic, racial and class rules of endogamy, and

6. The author uses the term introduced by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944) for the economic process by which "the capitalist market dis-embedded economic action from society and from moral/normative frameworks, organized economy in self-regulated markets, and came to subsume society under economy. What we call the 'triumph' of romantic love in relations between the sexes consisted first and foremost in the dis-embedding of individual romantic choices from the moral and social fabric of the group and in the emergence of a self-regulated market of encounters (the role of mass media in defining criteria of attractiveness and worth became significant). . . . This disentanglement occurred because of a transformation of the content of the criteria for selecting a mate — which have become both physical/sexual and emotional/psychological — and because of a transformation of the very process of mate selection — which has become both more subjective and more individualized" (p. 41). This great transformation determined that "sexuality, desire, and love had become tightly intertwined with social stratification. . . . The triumph of love and sexual freedom marked the penetration of economics into the machine of desire" (p. 58).

one's will and emotions need to be constantly renewed. Moreover, our very capacity to make choices is doubtful because people are ill equipped to engage in "effective forecasting": we cannot be sure about our feelings because of cognitive biases; an extensive process of information gathering to adjudicate between options determines the problem of "information overload", stunts the capacity for strong emotional commitment, tends to dampen the positive appreciation (emotional appeal) of people, and leads to the shift from satisfying (happy with the first available "good enough" option) to maximizing (search for the best possible option, i.e. "pickiness") strategy of choosing the mate.

The fourth chapter reveals the meaning of the demand for recognition of the vulnerable self through love. In pre-modern times, "the center of gravity in courtship referred to propriety, and strongly coded sex and gender conflict; today it focuses on the self disconnected from rank and defined by interiority and emotions . . . ; what is at stake for both men and women . . . is a view of one's worth as bestowed by others through proper rituals of recognition . . . to be in love is to overcome a sense of ordinary invisibility, and entails a sense of uniqueness and an increased sense of self-worth" (p. 112–113). In the nineteenth century, loyalty and commitment were considered crucial testimonies of love, while today they are deemed insufficient and replaced by an ongoing process of "validation", i.e. reconfirmation of one's own individuality and value. "Social worth is no longer a straightforward outcome of one's economic or social status, but has to be derived from one's self, defined as a unique, private, personal, and non-institutional entity. The erotic/romantic bond must constitute a sense of worth, and modern social worth is chiefly performative: it is to be achieved in the course of and through one's interactions with others" (p. 119). The power of romantic love in modernity derives not from the ideology of individualism, but from the fact that it "provides a strong anchor for recognition, perception and constitution of one's worth, in an era where social worth is both uncertain and ongoingly negotiated" (p. 120).

The fifth chapter considers the relations of love, reason and irony under the changing dominant factors of social interactions.

What in earlier age was governed by faith, personal fealty, and charismatic heroes becomes a matter of knowledge, control, and calculable means. This process towards rationalization does not, however, eliminate all manifestations of passion; rather, for Weber, it generates attempts to restore orders of experience dominated by fervor and passion, only vicariously and thinly. . . . But Weber and others understood rationalization to be opposed to and countered by emotions. . . . The challenge for the sociological analysis is to understand rationality and rationalization⁷ not as a cultural logic opposed to emotional life, but rather as working precisely in conjunction with it. Rationality . . . restructured emotional life from within: it

7. Disenchantment follows the rationalization of life conduct which is determined by the prevalence of scientific modes of explaining love (psychoanalytical, psychological, biological and so on), by making love an object of endless investigation, self-knowledge, and self-scrutiny, and by replacement of the Shakespearean "madness of love" by a utilitarian project of securing maximum pleasure and well-being through love (romantic desire was emptied of its mythological content) (p. 162–165).

has changed the basic cultural scripts through which emotions are understood and negotiated. (p. 158–159)

Today the choice of a mate has become far more rational than before, and we are no longer “dysfunctional love addicts”.

Pre-modern rationality involved little or no formal “expert” knowledge; it consisted in a rough evaluation of another’s economic assets; beyond general traits of pleasantness, people reflected very little about the desired traits of another; the search was not systematic . . . ; it was a group or family search, not an individualized one; . . . emotions and self-interest were clearly differentiated categories in martial strategies. . . . Contemporary actors from adolescence to adulthood develop an elaborate set of criteria for the selection of a mate (social, educational, physical, sexual, and emotional) and very sophisticated means to reach their goals. . . . A hyper-cognized, rational method of selecting a mate goes in hand with the cultural expectation that love provides authentic, unmediated emotional and sexual experiences. (p. 180)

Moreover, “the penetration of marketing language and techniques into the realm of interpersonal relationships marks the move to technologies of interchangeability . . . that expand the pool of choices, enable the rapid move from one partner to another, and set up criteria for comparing partners . . . and oneself to others” (p. 183). Because the options and choices are numerous, changing and rationalized, they determine the uncertainty about the very content of one’s feelings and desires, between the norms and estimates of what is actually pleasurable, and such ubiquitous uncertainty generates irony as a dominant trope to discuss love.

The sixth chapter identifies the reasons for romantic fantasy turning into disappointment because of the “regulated, institutionalized, commoditized exercise of imagination” in modern consumer society. In pre-modern times, romantic imagination was a code for the madness which turned love into an irrational and self-generated emotion. “Modern institutions of imagination actively solicit and encourage a low-key form of daydreaming, mostly through the unprecedented production of print and visual media, which provide visual displays of powerful narratives of the good life (utopias of private happiness)” (p. 202). Thus, Tatiana in Pushkin’s *Eugene Onegin* expresses a pre-modern pre-made form of love waiting to be filled by a passing object (the seemingly romantic Eugene), while Flaubert in *Madame Bovary* prefigures the modern form of love; Emma “cannot distinguish between her love and her images of love, . . . her love seems to be nothing but the repetition of empty signs, themselves repeated by the then-emerging cultural industries” (p. 207). “Modern emotions are fictional because of the prevalence of narratives, images, and simulation technologies to engine longing. We have all become Emma Bovarys in the sense that our emotions are deeply embedded in fictional narratives: they develop in stories and as stories” (p. 211). We acquire fictional emotions through our identification with characters and storylines, and the increasing distance between reality and aspirations generates disappointment as a chronic feature of modern lives.

As the terminology shows, the author prefers a macro-sociological perspective to speak about love and related phenomena (flirting, sexual practices, marriage and divorce). The book considers all types of “the agonies of intimate relationships” (loving someone who will not commit to us, being heartbroken when abandoned by a lover, engaging in a Sisyphean search for one’s other half or simpler relations, feeling bored in a relationship which turned into something different from the one we had envisaged, etc.) as “commodities” in the Marxist sense for they are shaped by social relations and institutions and circulate in a marketplace of unequal actors (this is a depressing interpretation of love for those who romanticize it under the massive attack of contemporary movies and love stories in general). “As Karl Marx famously put it, ‘Human beings make their history themselves, but they do not do so voluntarily, not under circumstances of their own choosing, rather under immediately found, given and transmitted circumstances.’ When we love . . . , we do so by using resources and in situations that are not of our own making” (p. 6). “Never before in history have men and women of different social classes, religions, races met as if on a free, unregulated market where attributes of beauty, sexiness, social class are rationally and instrumentally evaluated and exchanged” (p. 242).

The reader may object to such an approach saying that we live in a multifaceted society with a lot more opportunities for individual choice than in the times described by Marx and his followers. However, there is no contradiction because the author’s aim is similar to the Marxist idea of liberation by helping us to see that

psychoanalysis and psychotherapy intended or not have provided a formidable arsenal of techniques to make us verbose but inescapable bearers of responsibility for our romantic miseries. . . . Precisely because we live in a time where the idea of individual responsibility reigns supreme, the vocation of sociology remains vital. In the same way that at the end of the nineteenth century it was radical to claim that poverty was the result not of dubious morality or weak character, but of systematic economic exploitation, it is now urgent to claim that the failures of our private lives are not the result of weak psyches, but rather the vagaries and miseries of our emotional life are shaped by institutional arrangements. . . . What is wrong in contemporary relationships⁸ are not dysfunctional childhoods or insufficiently self-aware psyches, but the set of social and cultural tensions and contradictions that have come to structure modern selves and identities. (p. 4)

So, let us begin an enumeration of the book’s characteristics with the ones mentioned on the back cover. This book is *thrilling* in its endless possibilities for the sociological analysis of social life because its thematic accents are diverse even within the not-very-sociological topic of love. The author “unseats the primacy of individual psychology as

8. As Peter Berger mentioned, the sociologist cannot take any explanation for granted, s/he should consider any phenomenon carefully in order to reveal its hidden preconditions and to see “the general in the particular”, i.e. general patterns in the behavior of individuals (*Berger P. L.* [1963]. *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*. New York: Anchor Books). And as Charles Wright Mills emphasized, the sociologist should study social structures in which small milieu are organized, and in our case, in the “milieu” of intimate relationships agonies became too large to seek explanations for the failure of romantic love in individual behavior and psyche (*Mills C. W.* [1959]. *The Sociological Imagination*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall).

a reigning explanation for the travails of modern love, and demonstrates the profoundly social nature of our most intimate feelings”. The book rejects both biological⁹ and psychological explanations and legitimizations of the difficulties of romantic relations as parts of the problem (the Mars and Venus terminology naturalize the culturally engineered gender differences) and not the answer we seek. Beyond the subjectivity of individuals something fundamental has changed in the institutionalization of the modern cultural category of freedom of choice, which in turn has changed the terms of emotional bargaining of men and women.

Men’s and women’s romantic unhappiness contains, stages, and enacts the conundrums of the modern freedom and capacity to exercise choice. These conundrums are complexly structured around the following key processes: the transformation of the ecology and architecture of choice; the emergence of sexual fields (social arenas in which sexuality becomes an autonomous dimension of pairing, and which are intensely commodified); new models of recognition (love becomes an aspect of the moral inequalities dynamics . . . in one’s self-worth . . . between the sexes and within one’s own sexual group); the cooling of desire and the weakness of will, whose orientation has shifted from the formation of intense bonds to the formation of cool individuality (possessed with irony, commitment phobia, ambivalence, and disappointment). (p. 241–244)

This book is *bold in honesty* which will not be pleasant or accepted by the majority of readers among both professional sociologists and lay readers (although it is not an easy or entertaining reading). This is a *disappointing* book for it destroys the illusion of having the sea of individual and group opportunities which contemporary society tries to convince us of. According to the author, today we only seem to have choices such whether to commit or not, to have sexual relations with one partner or many, to love someone temporarily or permanently or to keep out of any relationship at all, to present these choices as rational personal decisions or to consider oneself and others as suffering victims of the circumstances. Our choices are determined by social rules and discourses no less than in previous centuries, yet differently and as if providing us with a range of socially approved scenarios. In pre-modern society, people followed the dictates of their social milieu, and obedience to their parents and community standards was always in the background or foreground of young people’s decisions to marry, even if they did not demonstrate that obedience in practice. Today we follow the dictates of our heart, which only sounds nice, for in reality there are social others who tell us what to do and what to feel. In contemporary society, we have psychological counseling, couple therapy (these two being rare in Russia), divorce lawyers, close friends or occasional anonymous friends on the internet all of which constitute “a thick flow of words, self-analysis, and friendly or expert advice”. The question is what these people can possibly advise, if they focus on the singular actions and sentiments of individuals and ignore the social structures organizing these actions and sentiments.

9. The intense romantic idealization of a particular partner is determined by serotonin, dopamine and norepinephrine.

The author emphasizes that the main transformations undergone by love in modernity have affected primarily the conditions within which romantic choices are made. The first group of such conditions concerns the “ecology of choice”, i.e. “the social environment that compels one to make choices in a certain direction (for instance, the sexual revolution removed a considerable number of prohibitions on the choice of sexual partner)” (p. 20). The second aspect is the “architecture of choice”, i.e. “mechanisms internal to the subject and shaped by culture: they concern both the criteria with which one evaluates an object, and the modes of self-consultation” (p. 21). The latter group of cognitive and emotional processes includes thoughts about the remote consequences of one’s decisions, the formality of the consultation used in making a decision, the models of self-consultation (intuitive, habitual knowledge or systematic search and evaluation), cultural norms and techniques to hold one’s desires and wants in suspension, and the accepted grounds for making decisions (the rational or emotional modes of evaluation)¹⁰. The “loving selves” in the pre-modern world, by modern standards, were emotionally distant, yet inextricably intertwined and interdependent; while the modern “loving selves” “expect each other to be emotionally naked and intimate, but independent. In a modern marriage, it is two highly individuated and differentiated selves that come together; it is the fine-tuned compatibility of two constituted selves that makes up a successful marriage, not the display of roles” (p. 39).

This book is *sad* and *depressing* for it claims that love always, invariably and inevitably hurts¹¹ despite “the chaos that pervades contemporary romantic and sexual relationships” (p.vii).

In fact, few people living in the contemporary era have been spared the agonies of intimate relationships that come in many shapes: kissing too many frogs on the way to Prince/ss Charming [another problem is lack of guarantees that the Charming does wait for you at the end of the road]; engaging in Sisyphean internet searches; coming back lonely from bars, parties, or blind dates. When relationships do get formed [in cartoons this moment is presented as two loving hearts kissing in a beautiful carriage heading to a happy future], agonies do not fade away, as one may feel bored, anxious, or angry in them; have painful¹² arguments and conflicts; or, finally, go through the confusion, self-doubts, and depression of break-ups or divorces. . . . If the sociologist could hear the voices of men and women searching for love, s/he would hear a long and loud litany of moans and groans [this is a rather horrifying picture to imagine]. (p. 3)

Sexual and emotional freedoms as grounds for choosing mates regardless of their social and economic characteristics did not make us free or happy because they are

10. Honestly speaking, this is a depressing approach to love as a “commodity” for sale because our culture romanticized it too much to calmly look at romantic love’s “dismembered body”.

11. The author does not deny that many people have happy love lives, and warns the readers that the book does not aim to cover exhaustively the many forms which romantic agony takes. However, after finishing the book the reader may wonder if there are many left outside the domain of painful relationships.

12. As the reader may have already noticed the words “pain” and “painful” are more frequent in the review than “love”, which certainly reflects the content of the book.

institutionalized and embedded in a contested but still powerful patriarchy. This has generated new forms of suffering in the shape of inequalities arising from the different ways that men and women feel, experience, and monitor their sexual freedom in competitive sexual fields. Similar to the realm of the market, sexual freedom entails a cultural recording of gender inequalities. . . . Sexual freedom made sexuality a site for the exercise and display of masculinity for men whose status in the three arenas of work, home, and male sociability had been eroded: it transformed sexuality into status. . . . Sexuality was hypertrophied and merged and expressed at once the three aspects of masculinity as status: authority, autonomy, and solidarity. . . . Men are more likely to view the marriage market as a sexual market and tend to stay longer in such a sexual market, whereas women tend to view the sexual market as a marriage market and would tend to stay in it for less time. (p. 61, 73, 78)

One can ask what the point is in reading such a depressing book in the contemporary world which is a hard enough place to survive emotionally without sad books. Well, there are two kinds of sadness — destructive and reviving — and this book is definitely revivingly sad because

understanding the larger set of forces operating on men and women may help avoid the burdens of over-responsibilization. . . . The loss of passion and emotional intensity is an important cultural loss and the cooling of emotions may make us less vulnerable to others, but makes it more difficult to connect to others through passionate engagement. . . . Pain hurts but does not kill. . . . Pain emerges as the natural product and natural indicator of being alive in a resistant world. To go through a life painlessly is to have not lived.¹³ . . . Moreover, passionate loves dispels the uncertainty and insecurity inherent in most interactions. (p. 245–246)

The book is also a *myth-breaker*: it emphasizes the collective character of painful love experiences and accuses the Freudian culture of wrongful and deceitful discourse which declares romantic misery inevitable and self-inflicted, and which blames faulty or insufficiently mature psyches for the agonies of intimate relationships, and forces people to buy countless self-help manuals to better manage romantic lives and erotic careers.

This is a very *feminist* book already by the question-setting. The author wonders why “despite their strength and autonomy, women . . . are baffled by the elusiveness of men; why men seem to have become a puzzle and an ongoing source of bemusement for women¹⁴” (p. vii). Such a feminist emphasis does not turn the book into a politicized women’s manifesto against the structural power of men though it argues that “in conditions of modernity men have far more sexual and emotional choice than women” (p. 241). Yet the feminist accent determines a women-biased perception of love and gender relations despite the aim to describe the ways men and women have agonized about love in the past and present, and to question the assumption that love hurts for psychological reasons.

13. Franzen J. (2011). Liking is for Cowards. Go for What Hurts // New York Times. 2011. May 28. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/opinion/29franz.html> (accessed 26 November 2017).

14. For instance, in Russia the contemporary folklore emphasizes the role of women as elusive and bemusing for men, as being more emotional, less definite and rarely having a strong opinion compared to men.

The author believes that the social context of the encounters of men and women explains the ever-painful nature of love, which is proved by the fact that we have been hurt by love since the beginning of the human history, but it is the social conditions that have been changing in the historical development not the nature of the humankind.

Although the book takes the perspective of women, and . . . explicates their predicaments, under no circumstance it argues that men do not struggle in love. I have focused on women because they are more familiar terrain for me¹⁵; because women have been the endless target of an industry of psychological self-fashioning and urgently need to stop incessantly scrutinizing the so-called 'faultiness' of their psyches; and because I believe emotional suffering is connected — albeit in complex ways — to the organization of economic and political power. (p. 239)

This is also a *confusing* and *thought-provoking* book not because it is unclear about some points when describes the changing patterns of love and marriage, but because it uses a slightly unusual demarcation line in the two historical periods in the transformation of love — pre-modern and modern (or late modern) instead of modern and post-modern. The pre-modern (or early modern) love

was governed by the ideals of chivalry, gallantry, and romanticism. . . . Women's dispossession of economic and political rights was accompanied (and presumably compensated) by the reassurance that in love they were not only protected by men but also superior to them. It is therefore unsurprising that love has been historically so powerfully seductive for women; it promised them the moral status and dignity they were otherwise denied in society and it glorified their social fate: taking care of and loving others as mothers, wives, and lovers. . . . (High or hyper) modernity (the period which followed the World War I) marked the radicalization of the social tendencies inscribed in early modernity, and changed, at times profoundly, the culture of love and the economy of gender identity contained in it. . . . When it put the two political ideals of gender equality and sexual freedom at the center of intimacy, it stripped love of the rituals of deference and the mystical aura in which it had hitherto been shrouded. . . . The two most important cultural revolutions of the twentieth century — the individualization of lifestyles and the intensification of emotional life projects; the economization of social relations . . . disentangled sex and sexuality from moral norms, and incorporated them in individualized lifestyles and life projects, while the capitalist cultural grammar has massively penetrated the realm of . . . romantic relationships. (p. 8–9)

15. The author also mentions that although the book is relevant to many women, it is obviously not relevant to all of them (not to lesbians, or women who are not interested in domesticity or children). The book addresses the condition of love more from the standpoint of those women who opt largely for marriage, reproduction and middle-class lifestyles. Another important analytical limitation of the book is that it considers the Western cultural modernity as "bringing about its own forms of emotional misery and destruction of traditional life-worlds, making ontological insecurity a chronic feature of modern lives, and increasingly impinging in the organization of identity and desire" (p. 13).

Certainly, the author has every right to choose the terms; however, the word “postmodern” seems to be lacking for two reasons. First, the author admits the increased complexity of contemporary life and mentions “the so-called postmodern subject characterized by a multiplication of desires which result from the institutionalization of imagination” that burdens the individual romantic experience with collective mass-manufactured fantasies (p. 198). For instance, “the modern choice of a mate, based on habitus, or the set of bodily, linguistic, and cultural dispositions acquired during socialization, becomes more complex because it now has to internalize different sets of evaluations, some pulling toward the reproduction of social class, others pulling toward media culture which produces a large array of classless images” (p. 49). The author also describes transformations that are generally recognized as postmodern, such as the ousting of the pre-modern ritualized romantic order (determined by social and economic interest) by the emotionally authentic love practices, in which the intensity and irrationality of one’s feelings are an adequate indication of one’s true commitment; or the institutional determination of people wanting conflicting goods — “love and autonomy, care and self-reliance . . . ; culture does not provide a clear sense of hierarchy among competing goods” (p. 97). Postmodernity is the coexistence of pre-modern and modern models: there are as many socially, ethnically, economically or in some other way unequal love-matches as there are marriages of convenience (often happy). For instance, in Russia “residence registration” or an apartment in property often plays the role of the pre-modern woman’s dowry and determines her value in the marriage market.

Second, the author ignores (either accidentally or purposefully) such features of the contemporary world as the strange combination of pre-modern, even archaic love and marriage relations (for instance, traditional arranged marriages and illegal but legitimate polygyny are typical for Chechnya) with new forms of cohabitation and marriages (for instance, today gay marriages are legal in 27 countries¹⁶). Another example: the author believes that “dying, committing suicide, and running away to a cloister no longer belong to our cultural repertoires” (p. 2), yet they still do, perhaps partly due to classic literature that presents these extreme practices as an acceptable choice for the unhappy romantic lover. However, the author settles the critique that the book may have unwittingly elicited by repeatedly emphasizing that its ideas (such as the “great transformation of love”) are just analytical tools designed to grasp the ways in which the social organization of pre-modern and contemporary choices differ. The author also defines the limits of empirical generalizations: for instance, commitment phobia is said to be most common in upper-middle-class men who control social, cultural, and economic resources, and in middle-class educated and economically independent women.

Finally, this book tends to *cross the line between fiction and non-fiction* in a good way of boundary breaking for it introduces wonderful metaphors and easily recognizable allusions, which is a feature of literature and the arts rather than of the scientific discourse. The author provides illustrative examples from classic literature not only for explana-

16. Gay Marriage Around the World. August, 2017. Available at: <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013> (accessed 26 November 2017).

tion but also to support the “non-academic ambition of the book”, which is “to ease the aching of love through an understanding of its social underpinnings. In our times, such a task can begin only if we stop issuing instructions and prescriptions to individuals already overburdened with the tyrannical imperative of living healthy and painless lives and loves” (p. 238). Thus, this is a *reassuring* book for scholars who love to use examples and quotations from fiction and face the misunderstanding of their colleagues condemning such practices as not sociological or scientific. The author uses many quotes, varying from Ovid’s *Amores* suggesting that the book reflects the reader’s passions and private affairs; to John Coetzee wondering in *Disgrace* if “the young still fall in love, or that mechanism is obsolete by now, unnecessary, quaint . . . ; falling in love could have fallen out of fashion” (p.156); to the TV series *Sex and the City* regarded as “the bible on the modern dysfunctional relationships”, and non-fiction works such as Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* emphasizing that “for every successful contemporary love experience, for every short period of enrichment, there are ten destructive love experiences, post-love ‘downs’ of much longer duration — often resulting in the destruction of the individual, or at least an emotional cynicism that makes it difficult or impossible ever to love again” (p. 1).

The appeal to classic literature is justified in that “it articulates, better than other data, cultural models and ideal types; . . . these texts are used not as actual historical documents of romantic practices, but as cultural testimonies of the assumptions that organized the self, morality, and interpersonal relationships of early to mid-nineteenth century” (p. 22). The author provides examples from Emily Brontë’s *Wuthering Heights* as an illustration of the long literary tradition portraying love as an agonizing painful emotion if a socially inappropriate match was involved; and from Gustave Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary* as an ironic description of the unhappy marriage of a romantic woman with a kind-hearted man, who cannot satisfy her fantasies. Leo Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* could also have appeared in the list of historical examples of love regulated by the social milieu rather by feelings, which led the heroes of such stories to sufferings hardly relevant to modern societies.

In the book, there are many examples from the literary world of Jane Austen for she was “notoriously concerned with matrimony, love, and social status”. One of the key aspects of the Austenian world is that

it was impossible to separate the moral norm from the emotional, because it is the moral dimension that organizes emotional love, which thus has also a public dimension. . . . The characters’ sense of inner self and value is not bestowed in them by anyone, but rather derives from their capacity to recognize and enact moral imperatives . . . and bracket their own personal desires . . . whether by themselves or by others, in love and in other matters. (p. 25–26)

Jane Austen criticized the rampant self-interest that governed social matchmaking, and promoted affection, mutual respect, and sentiments, albeit grounded in socially accepted norms (rules, codes and rituals of conduct that allowed men and women to be

proved worthy of each other), but accepted that the woman's self was naturally enmeshed within and protected by her social network and kin. The author calls this ritualized romantic order "a regime of performativity of emotions, i.e. a regime in which emotions are induced by the ritualized actions and expressions of sentiments. . . . The fact that love was highly ritualized protected women from the realm of emotion, which could overwhelm them" (p. 30).

Contemporary love practices are illustrated in the book with the quotes from 70 interviews with people living in three large urban centers in Europe, the US, and Israel (a snowball procedure was used); from a variety of web-based support groups; from a large sample of guidebooks to romance, dating, marriage, and divorce; from internet dating sites; and from the *New York Times* weekly column "Modern Love" for a period of two years. Such a wide range of examples allows the author to explain the specific modern "regime of emotional authenticity": actors know their feelings (either through a great deal of self-scrutiny about the nature and "true" causes of emotions, or through an overwhelming revelation such as "love at first sight"), act on these feelings and use them as the building blocks of a relationship, reveal these feelings to themselves and to others, and make decisions about relationships and commitment based on these feelings. The quotes from the interviews prove the great transformation of romantic love, such as that sexiness became a general trait of personal attractiveness and a central trait in the selection of a mate: "Modern societies offer many more ways for men and women to translate their sexual attractiveness into the field of romance and matrimony" (p. 47); "sexuality became, like beauty, a 'diffuse status characteristic', that is, a characteristic which conferred status" (p. 48).

The examples from the interviews and classic literature supplement and reinforce the author's arguments about endless human suffering, for love always hurts — whether society regulates it or not, whether you prefer to love or to avoid it, whether you strive to find your other half or diligently and successfully avoid such commitments. One can summarize the book's content with the quote from the famous song by Sia expressing the idea of love the reader should get after finishing the book and when feeling hurt by love: "I wanted everything I never had / Like the love that comes with light / I wore envy and I hated that / But I survived / . . . You took it all, but I'm still breathing / I knew what I wanted; I went in and got it / . . . And I'm still breathing, I'm alive"¹⁷ (a bit cheesy but very encouraging).

This book is definitely worth reading as an *ironic critique* of contemporary society that overburdens us with so many musts that we give up the very opportunity of living a full life by fearing or eliminating love as a painful experience. "Under no circumstances does this book make the claim that modern love is always unhappy" (p. 238).

Modern selves are infinitely better equipped to deal with the repeated experiences of abandonment, break-ups, or betrayals than ever in the past through detachment, autonomy, hedonism, cynicism, and irony. In fact, from a young age, most people

17. Written by Sia Furler, Adele Adkins, Tobias Jesso Jr.

expect the road to romantic love to be a highly bumpy one [I would argue they *know* that the road *can* be unpleasant, but *hope* to avoid it and to have a beautiful and happy road for themselves¹⁸]. . . . The point in this book is that because we have developed many strategies to cope with the fragility and the interchangeability of relations, many aspects of contemporary culture deprive the self of the capacity both to enter and to live the full experience of passion and to withstand the doubts and uncertainties attendant to the process of loving and getting attached to someone. Love has changed its form in the sense that it has changed the ways in which it hurts. (p. 240)

This book is *humanistic* for it declares love to be more than a cultural ideal — it is a constitutive social foundation for the self in a society which lacks the cultural resources necessary for love to fulfill the crucial role of determining self-worth. Therefore,

ethics is urgently demanded back into sexual and emotional relations (though recognizes the necessity of values of freedom, reason, equality, and autonomy), exactly because these relations are now so crucial for the formation of self-worth and self-respect . . . Like all waking up after heavy drinking, a sobered endorsement of modernity does not have the fervor of utopias or of denunciation. But it offers the quiet hope that with lucidity and self-understanding, we can better live these times and perhaps even reinvent new forms of passion. (p. 247–248)

This sounds utopian as a social project, but very reassuring for sociology, which has the analytical resources to provide social actors with better self-understanding. “What makes love such a chronic source of discomfort, disorientation, and even despair can be adequately explained only by sociology” which reveals the cultural and institutional core of modernity (p. 12) and links together the individual and the social, “because the contents of thoughts, desires, and inner conflicts have an institutional and collective basis” (p. 12–13).

Какой должна быть вдохновляющая социологическая книга, или Почему нужно изучать столь неуловимую любовь

Ирина Троцук

Доктор социологических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Центра фундаментальной социологии Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики»
 Доцент кафедры социологии Российского университета дружбы народов
 Адрес: ул. Мясницкая, д. 20, г. Москва, Российская Федерация 101000
 E-mail: irina.trotsuk@yandex.ru

Рецензия: *Eva Illouz*. *Why Love Hurts: A Sociological Explanation* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).

18. As Reinhart Koselleck puts it, “in modern times the difference between experience and expectations has increasingly expanded; . . . expectations have distanced themselves evermore from all previous experience”. Quoted in *Habermas J.* (1990). *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge: MIT Press. P. 12.

Anna Yampolskaya

DSc (Philosophy), Leading Research Fellow, Centre for Fundamental Sociology,
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Address: Myasnitskaya str., 20, Moscow, Russian Federation 101000
E-mail: iampolsk@gmail.com

Matthew Ratcliffe's book is not so much a book on depression but rather on the *experience* of depression — on what it means to be depressed. The book's subtitle is "a study in phenomenology", but it targets the general public as well as the academic and clinical communities. It is well written, clearly structured, informative and can serve as an excellent introduction to the phenomenology of mental illness as it illustrates the relevance of phenomenological psychopathology to philosophers, sociologists and everyone interested in the question of what constitutes a human being.

What do we mean by the word "depression"? One possible answer is that depression is what is defined as a "major depressive disorder" in *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, an authoritative and influential source published by the American Psychiatric Association, currently in its fifth edition, known as DSM-5. One could also consult *International Statistical Classification of Diseases* published by the World Health Organization. However, these diagnostic criteria are only used to create a "pre-understanding" of what the depressive experience consists of. Depression is used as an umbrella term to describe a whole range of heterogeneous conditions. Ratcliffe argues that all of them share a common trait: they can be characterized as troubles in the structure of experience.

Depression is more than a just mood disorder; it is first and foremost a disorder of the entire body. In certain cases (and in certain cultures), depressive patients could even be unaware that something is wrong with their mood as most of their symptoms are somatic. From the phenomenological point of view the body is our main instrument of being in the world and the medium of our experience of the world; the disorders of bodily experience in depression not only influence emotional states and cognitive abilities, they also compromise the very structure of being in the world. Ratcliffe, building on the ideas of Ludwig Binswanger, Thomas Fuchs, and Shaun Gallagher, points to a connection between bodily disorders proper to depression and the disturbances of the "sense of what the world has to offer" (p. 62).

© Anna Yampolskaya, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-119-124

* The publication of this paper is supported by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

“Depression involves a disturbance of something that is fundamental to our lives, something that goes unnoticed when intact” (p. 15), it affects the most basic layer of our experience of reality. One can point out two aspects of reality: we are sure that reality is there and that we are part of it. We feel that the world is our home; that we can access the world, we can act in the world, and that a range of possibilities are open to us. This background confidence in the world and background belonging to the world is disturbed in depression, so that we gradually lose the ability to act, we no longer experience a plurality of the *kinds* of possibilities, as Ratcliffe puts it. According to Ratcliffe — and this is the key hypothesis of this book — it is primarily the experience of the possible that goes wrong in depression; we do not *feel* that certain possibilities are still open for us.

Ratcliffe holds that we actually *experience the possible*, and this basic experience, the experience of possibilities, underlies and conditions our access to reality, that is to say, the structure of meaning, of perception, of believing and, of course, the structure of “I can”. This experience is a fundamental bodily experience that is not just there: we can and even must become aware of it, especially if it goes wrong. As Ratcliffe puts it, we can *feel* it, and so he calls this experience or, rather, this type of experience, “existential feelings”.

Normally we feel ourselves situated in the world and involved with the world and with other people; and this sense of “situatedness” and the affective and practical involvement in the shared world is what we lack when we experience depression. Using various narratives of depression, including his own questionnaire, Ratcliffe shows very convincingly that depression is experienced not so much as sadness (as is often assumed), but rather as the poignant feeling of impotence and disconnection from the world of others that is often expressed in terms of hopelessness and guilt.

In his previous book, *Feelings of Being*¹, where the concept of existential feelings was introduced, Ratcliffe opted for unambiguously Heideggerian thinking². In this book, he prefers to sketch two different ways to define existential feelings — a Heideggerian one and a Husserlian one; both ways supposedly lead the reader to the same conclusion. The concept of “existential feelings” appears to generalize that of *Grundstimmungen*, Heideggerian fundamental moods (see p. 55–59). Ratcliffe objects to Heidegger by pointing out that fundamental moods are not integrated into the bodily experience; Ratcliffe’s existential feelings are not emotions, moods or states of mind, because they are also bodily feelings. For him, there are too few examples of fundamental moods analyzed by Heidegger, and the latter does not mention the important example of awe and wonder given in Heidegger’s winter semester 1937/1938 lectures³. This is not, perhaps, a mere omission; there is also a structural difference between existential feelings and fundamental moods.

1. Ratcliffe M. (2008). *Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry, and the Sense of Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. *Ibid.*. P. 41–57.

3. Heidegger M. (1984). *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 45: *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. S. 163–164. See also Held K. (1993). *Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture* // Sallis J. (ed.). *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. P. 292–295 and Staehler T. (2007). *How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?* // *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*. Vol. 15. № 3. P. 415–433.

It raises the question whether one can properly analyze fundamental moods in the Heideggerian context without taking into account the distinction between authentic and non-authentic modes of being in the world, which play a central role in the description of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, fear, anxiety and guilt are important because they force *Dasein* to question its own being; but for Ratcliffe the very question of authenticity falls beyond the bounds of his work, as can be seen from the final chapter where he discusses philosophical despair. Depression is a specifically human kind of suffering; however, depression makes us somewhat less human; Tolstoy's claims that the acute awareness of one's own mortality could lead one to a better understanding of the essence of human life and its meaning, are simply not plausible, says Ratcliffe.

Ratcliffe describes existential feelings as the "configurations of a possibility space" (p. 130). This possibility space has the structure of an "open horizon", which means that we do not just experience some contingent possibilities or impossibilities, but rather there are whole *kinds of possibilities* that are accessible to us. For example, when I see a book, I presume that it could be possible for me to get it, to move it, to read it, to enjoy it. Some of these possibilities could be void for me — for example, this particular book could be written in a foreign language or be too difficult to read. However, such an impossibility is a contingent impossibility rather than the total absence of certain kinds of possibilities. Ratcliffe uses various examples to show that in the experience of depression one is bereft of an entire class of possibilities. For example, I have lost all hope of becoming a ballerina; but this is the loss of a contingent, or *intentional hope*, as Ratcliffe calls it; I still could acquire another profession. The lack of what Ratcliffe calls "existential hope" is lived in a totally different manner. When somebody says that she has lost all hope in herself, it means that she believes that "nothing now can ever come to any good": all meaningful possibilities (for example, all professional paths) are closed to her forever.

The shift in existential feelings concerns the very structure of belief; as Ratcliffe puts it, "a change in existential feeling is a change in the *form* of experience and thought. It is not just that one's belief contents change; the *way in which one believes* changes too" (p. 72, italics added).

Each act of believing is characterized by an appropriate mode of certainty; a normal course of perceptive experience presupposes a discontinuity of intuition, recurring disappointments of intention and conflicts of appearances. I can be quite sure that "this is the case"; nevertheless, my certainty always contains in itself a grain of uncertainty, as it can be "overridden" by some other experience. With one notable exception: one cannot doubt one's own experience of pain: *pain*, as well as any other sense-perception, cannot be disbelieved as it is neither true nor false, but is just there (cf. *De anima* 427a–b). The absence of hope and the presence of guilt in depression are as indubitable as physical pain; they are not, properly speaking, "beliefs" or "convictions" as the depressive patient does not enjoy the freedom to reject them or even to question them.

Ratcliffe is not the first researcher who examines the horrible certainty which is proper to the experience of a mental disorder. Erwin Straus suggested that hallucinations are experienced beyond any doubt because they are felt, experienced as a kind of sensation: a

hallucinating patient is able to doubt that her soup is poisoned no more than she is able to doubt that her soup tastes salty; for her “salty” and “poisoned” belong to the same strata of reality and thus are equally indubitable⁴. Ratcliffe does not explore any possible link between existential feelings as bodily feelings and “feeling-sensations” (*Gefühlsempfindungen*) of the Brentano school; while he briefly compares the experience of depression and the experience of influenza, he definitely does not elaborate on the phenomenology of pain and of somatic illness. Instead he investigates the epistemic value of the aforementioned change in the structure of belief: “The conviction that one cannot recover is closely associated with something else that might otherwise be construed in terms of a belief with a specific content: the sense that ‘depression reveals the world as it truly is’” (p. 69).

As a phenomenologist, I would rephrase Ratcliffe’s description as follows: in depression we become slaves to the manifestation of the world, to the manner in which the world and others appear to us. Once the affective life is stuck, the world stops to evolve for us; we are no longer able to distinguish between the world and its manifestation. The depressed person partially loses her ability to interrupt or even suspend her feelings, impressions or beliefs (about the things that matter to her); the loss of free will, discussed in Chapter 6, is in fact the loss of the ability to perform *epoché*. His analysis shows that *Seinsglaube* is not a purely cognitive belief, as an unsophisticated reader of Husserl may imagine; it has a much more complex structure.

The reflective belief in the world is founded upon a pre-reflective experience of the world as a shared world, claims Ratcliffe: “If belief is construed as a matter of taking something to be the case, our ‘belief’ in the world’s existence is not really a belief. What is interrogated through the phenomenological reduction is not just everything we take to be the case but also the sense of reality and belonging . . . disturbances in this sense of ‘world’ are central to experiences of depression” (p. 20).

The very fact that I experience the world as being *here, now, for me* should not be taken for granted; my belief in the world is my trust in others. The experience of depression is rooted in the feeling of being separated from the dynamic world of others, of being incarcerated “inside a solitary, unchanging bubble” (p. 65). One realizes that the fully meaningful world of others is still somewhere *there*, however one is not able to connect to this *there*, as if one is no longer able to participate in the intersubjective constitution of time and space. As a result, one is trapped in a world where there is no proper *here* and *now*, because *here* and *now* are to be co-constituted with the others. Ratcliffe discusses alterations of the experience of time that are proper to depression, but unlike Minkowski, for whom this was a primary phenomenon, he sees them as a transformation of the possibility space. This approach proves to be extremely fruitful when it is applied to the alterations of agency which are experienced in depression. Ratcliffe shows, and very convincingly, that “the structure of our experience of freedom is changeable, and can be eroded in a number of different ways” (p. 172). He concludes that our experience of the possible is rooted in our connectedness with others, in our participation in the shared

4. Straus E. (1964). *The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience*. New York: London: Collier-Macmillan. P. 356–361.

world: “. . . we have a reversal of Sartre’s claim that the other is the ‘death of my possibilities’. Other people do not just offer the potential to take away my possibilities. The world is experienced as a dynamic space of significant and enticing possibilities in virtue of our potential and actual relations with them” (p. 220). Ratcliffe argues that it is depression that forces me to see the other only as a threat, only as a merciless judge or as a witness of one’s worthlessness; it is the feeling of being estranged from others that leads to such an impoverished view of other human beings.

Ratcliffe stresses the need to describe the experience of depression in order to explain his use of the phenomenological method, although the role of phenomenological analysis in his book is not restricted to methodology. Ratcliffe not only justifies his use of the phenomenological approach; he tries to justify phenomenology itself and thus he puts classical phenomenology on trial. He has to deal with a methodological challenge: how to apply transcendental notions to the empirical, how to speak the language of transcendental phenomenology while describing psychological realities.

Applying Husserl’s notion of horizon to his descriptions of the experience of depression, Ratcliffe persistently employs the language of experienced possibilities rather than the language of constitution and/or sense-formation. Such an approach is perfectly vindicated insofar as one confines the analysis to the question of how one is dealing with the sedimented, stabilized layers of sense. However, the possibilities that constitute the whole horizon of sense are not necessarily my own and are not necessarily experienced as my own. The range of these possibilities is not restricted to the factual possibilities of any empirical subject; the transcendental concept of horizon exceeds and transcends the experience of mundane subjectivity. In Husserl’s phenomenology the transcendental horizon is first and foremost the horizon of sense-formation; it is essentially linked to the productivity of sense, which is crucial to our experience of novelty. As Geniusas puts it, “the horizon’s subjective reference implies the horizon’s constitutive and transcendental dimensions”⁵. The practical and facultative possibilities are only part of the more complex and rich horizon structure of consciousness which always transcends itself; one cannot deduce its self-transcendence from the experienced possibilities of an empirical subject. Transcendental subjectivity can be called a *blown-up* subjectivity, and this refers to the dimension of sense.

From Ratcliffe’s descriptions I would derive a different conclusion: depression makes one a prisoner of one’s own possibilities, of one’s own feelings; one cannot go beyond one’s own experience because the participation in transcendental life is somehow lost. The feeling of the lack of possibilities points not just to the troubles in the structure of possibilities, it also indicates a distortion in the underlying structure of sense-formation.

In sociology “situatedness”, agency and the ability to make judgments are often taken for granted, but Ratcliffe’s analysis shows, and very convincingly, how fragile these key characteristics of the social actor are, how easily they can be diminished and altered, and to what extent the fundamental structures of intersubjectivity can be deformed. One has

5. Geniusas S. (2012). *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology*. Dordrecht: Springer. P. 95.

to be constantly aware of these matters when studying social interactions. Mental health issues are only prevent us, human beings, from becoming a “happy and productive workforce” (as the British Cabinet Secretary Sir Jeremy Heywood gracefully put it), they also constitute a significant scientific challenge for all who do social science. I am sure that sociologists would benefit from more attention to this important and indeed pressing theoretical problem.

Рецензия: *Matthew Ratcliffe*. *Experiences of Depression: A Study in Phenomenology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

Анна Ямпольская

Доктор философских наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Центра фундаментальной социологии
Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики»
Адрес: ул. Мясницкая, д. 20, Москва, Российская Федерация 101000
E-mail: iampolsk@gmail.com

Political Augustinism Revival*

VILLACAÑAS BERLANGA J. L. (2016). *TEOLOGÍA POLÍTICA IMPERIAL Y COMUNIDAD DE SALVACIÓN CRISTIANA: UNA GENEALOGÍA DE LA DIVISIÓN DE PODERES*. MADRID: TROTTA. 717 P. ISBN 978-84-9879-627-8

Alexander Marey

PhD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Leading Research Fellow, Centre for Fundamental Sociology,
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Address: Myasnikskaya str., 20, Moscow, Russian Federation 101000
E-mail: amarey@hse.ru

José-Luis Villacañas, professor of the Complutense University of Madrid, has published a book dedicated to the problems of the imperial political theology. The author is well-known in the field of political philosophy and over the last decade, he has made a name as a specialist on Carl Schmitt and as an editor of his works. He has also written books about Hans Blumenberg and the imperial idea in the Spain of Charles V Habsburg. Therefore, when one meets a new book by Villacañas called *The Imperial Political Theology and the Community of Christian Salvation*, one expects another text about Early Modern political culture. However, this expectation would not be met. Based methodologically upon the conceptions of Max Weber, Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt, Villacañas writes about the Roman Republic and, further, the Roman Empire in the context of the birth of Christendom and Christian theology. If one of the first heroes of this book is the Roman dictator Sulla, its last hero is the famous theologian of the 5th century AD, Aurelius Augustine.

Villacañas structures his book in seven big chapters, each of them divided into sections. The first chapter covers questions of the genealogy and the logic of the Roman *ratio imperii*. The first section gives a brief excursus on the origin of the principal concepts of the Roman world, such as a *patrimonium*, *paterfamilias*, *princeps*. The author further analyses the main algorithms of the evolution of the Roman Republic in the 1st century BCE. He shows that the formation of the Principate was, in fact, an inevitable result of the processes initiated by the Sullan dictatorship and his lack of legitimacy (p. 45–47). The Empire, being born, became the second column of the Roman world, where the first was its traditional patrimonialism.

The political constitution of the Principate was too weak and needed additional support to make the emperor's rule stronger and more prosperous. This support was found, according to Villacañas, in the political religion and, particularly, in the deification of the *princeps*. The *princeps* was considered as the father of the fatherland, *pater patriae*,

© Alexander Marey, 2017

© Centre for Fundamental Sociology, 2017

DOI: 10.17323/1728-192X-2017-4-125-128

* The publication of this paper is supported by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

which gave rise to the one of essential traits of the Roman constitution, its political retro-spection. Here Villacañas gives a brilliant metaphor, defining the political culture of the Roman Principate as a retrospective look. As the deification of August, for example, was conditioned by the precedential deification of Julius Caesar, while Alexander the Great, who also was declared a god, did not initiate the deification process of his father, King Philip. August was deified as a representative of the Julius-Octavius kin, while Alexander as a personal ruler, who received his crown and status directly from the gods and not from his father (p. 13, 607).

The detailed analysis of the reigns of Octavian August and his successors to Nero and the end of the Claudian dynasty made by the author in the last section of the first chapter, show that traditional Roman resources were insufficient for achieving this objective. The Principate, affirms Villacañas, evolved towards the Eastern Hellenistic monarchies, such as the Sirian and Egyptian, but this evolution referred above all to the elaboration of a political imaginarium. This was only a change of political symbolism not a transformation of the practices of *potestas politica*, and this became the main reason for the failure of this project (p. 74). The deification of the first Roman emperors had, Villacañas explains, mainly a literary character. Beginning with the same Octavian August and his *Res gestae Divi Augusti*, Roman historians and poets started to create an image of the pious emperor, who lived the life of the ideal Roman citizen and died a peaceful death, worthy of him. Because of August, there are many descriptions of various visions, where the people saw him as the son of Jupiter or as a Jupiter himself (p. 82–83). But the other emperors of the Claudian dynasty lived severely and often died violently, so the Augustan image did not work in connection with them. They rather were scapegoats in the Biblical sense, the *hominines sacres* than the gods (p. 84–85). The lack of personal charisma gave the emperors a feeling of insecurity, which they tried to overcome with magic. But, as is well-known, the magical is strictly opposed to the political and always weakens it, so the power of Roman emperor weakened, with only some exceptions (p. 87). Moreover, the Roman religion, that was a cult of the *patresfamilias* could not transform into a religion of the salvation, appropriate for all the people of the great Empire.

The emperors who came after Nero, understanding (or, rather, feeling) the insufficiency of their traditional religion, adverted to the eastern religions of the Hellenistic reigns, but these reigns did not have patrimonial traditions, so, they were not appropriate for Rome. Villacañas describes the strivings of the Roman emperors and shows how they finally approached Judaism. Only this was able to become a religion of salvation, and precisely Judaism made possible the concept of the division of powers, one of the key concepts of Western culture (p. 14, 127–143, 601–603). Judaism also gave an opportunity to construct a political theology, an opportunity which the Roman emperors had lost. The author analyses two (in effect, three) versions of Judaism in connection with the Roman Empire: one expressed by Philo of Alexandria in the face of Caligula, the second the theocratic project of Joseph Flavius, the third in the preaching of Jesus Christ. It is crucially important that later, in the sermon of the apostle Paul, Philo's and Jesus's versions were united (p. 15, ch. 3 entirely), which Villacañas calls "the Pauline revolution".

Leaving aside Villacañas's analysis of the doctrines of Roman stoicism and Marcion (ch. 4), and his considerations about Diocletian, Arnobius and Lactantius (ch. 5–6), I will focus on his examination of Augustinian theology, since, in my opinion, the seventh chapter of this book, dedicated to Aurelius Augustine, is the key section that crowns his conception of political theology.

Augustine emphasized the main Paulian principles but also introduced some new points of the crucial importance. First, he postulated the existence of two churches, one visible and the other not. These made possible the idea of the division of the powers. Governmental power belonged to the imperial administration and the visible, external church. This power had a normative character and was founded on various laws and regulations (p. 19, 587–589), but it only had an outer, temporal character. Neither the visible church nor the imperial administration could, according to Augustinian theology, save souls, which was only possible for the inner, invisible church. In this sense salvation and deification were the real cornerstones of the separation of powers and this was fixed by Augustine. In this sense, the habitual notion of the *civitates permixtae*, of the *Civitas Dei*, which wandered through time and space, and of the *civitas terrena*, fixed in the time and space, receive other interpretations, more sophisticated than usual (p. 578–581).

Augustine proposed a cardinal new vision of human nature. Instead of man overburdened with passions and affects needing to get rid of them, he proposed man whose life is constituted by his libido. Such a man needs to recognize his nature and its weaknesses and to try to orientate his passions towards the God. The same action made by a multitude of men together creates a new type of the community, which Augustine himself calls the Church (p. 595). From here develops the Augustinian concept of the people as a political community. In book 19 of his treatise “the City of God” Augustine enters into the polemics with Marc Tully Cicero about his definition of the people and, consequently, of the *respublica*. Where the Roman *rhetor* looks at the people as at a multitude united by juridical consent and common utility (De re publ.I.XXV.39), Augustine proposes another formula. According to him, the people can be defined as a multitude united by the Concord to objects of common love (De civ.XIX.24). The only difference in this sense between the political and ecclesiastical communities is the object of the common love. While in the first case it could be an emperor (although I'm sure that Augustine himself did not suppose such argumentation) or, later in the Middle Ages, a king, in the second case it was a God. Such a love for common things created a new order, *ordo amoris*. This brought some of the most prominent medieval Augustinians to a new conception of power, which was interpreted as the strength and ability to create and then sustain some order. From here, particularly, grew the conception of *potestas absoluta* and *potestas ordinata*, which is beyond the scope of this review.

The construction of this dichotomy between the celestial and the mundane cities, according to Villacañas, changed the whole system of coordinates of the Roman world. Instead of the Roman retrospection, typical as mentioned, for a patrimonial society, Augustine proposed a prospection. The Augustinian man no longer looked backwards, to *generatio*, but forward to *regeneratio*, not to ancient *forma*, but to future *transformatio*

(p. 596). This prospection was, according to Villacañas, one of the principal innovations of Augustine and this became an important reason for the impossibility of constructing a political theology within the framework of Augustinian doctrine. Schmittian political theology looked backwards and tried to save the past, while the Augustinian men looked forward and upwards and hoped to deserve the celestial reign.

Eighty-three years ago, in 1934, a book *Political Augustinism* by the French historian and philosopher Henry Arquilliere was published for the first time. He first raised political Augustinism as an autonomous problem worthy of detailed analysis and scrutiny. Much later, at the end of the 20th century, political Augustinism became a popular subject of investigation, mainly in French humanitarian science. Now we can fix the next step in this examination. I think that Villacañas's book will take its worthy place in the political and theological studies of the Augustinian thought.

Возрождение политического августинизма

Александр Марей

Кандидат юридических наук, доцент школы философии факультета гуманитарных наук, ведущий научный сотрудник Центра фундаментальной социологии

Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики»

Адрес: ул. Мясницкая, д. 20, г. Москва, Российская Федерация 101000

E-mail: amarey@hse.ru

Рецензия: *José Luis Villacañas Berlanga*. Teología política imperial y comunidad de salvación cristiana: una genealogía de la división de poderes (Madrid: Trotta, 2016).