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From Conceptual History Towards Studies of Social Ontology”

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- To provide a forum for fundamental issues of social sciences.
- To foster developments in social sciences by enriching theoretical language and vocabulary of social science and encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue.
- To provide educational materials for the university-based scholars in order to advance teaching in social sciences.

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The *Russian Sociological Review* invites scholars from all the social scientific disciplines to submit papers which address the fundamental issues of social sciences from various conceptual and methodological perspectives. Understood broadly the fundamental issues include but not limited to: social action and agency, social order, narrative, space and time, mobilities, power, etc.

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- History of sociology
- Russian social theory
- Sociology of space
- Sociology of mobilities
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Цели

- Поддерживать дискуссии по фундаментальным проблемам социальных наук.
- Способствовать развитию и обогащению теоретического словаря и языка социальных наук через междисциплинарный диалог.
- Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

Область исследований

Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильности, власть, нарративы, события и т. д.

В частности, журнал «Социологическое обозрение» публикует статьи по следующим темам:

- Современные и классические социальные теории
- Теории социального порядка и социального действия
- Методология социального исследования
- История социологии
- Русская социальная мысль
- Социология пространства
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- Нарративная теория и анализ
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Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудитории, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

Подписка

Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: <http://sociologica.hse.ru/>. Чтобы получать сообщения о свежих выпусках, подпишитесь на рассылку журнала по адресу: farkhatdinov@gmail.com.

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Sociologists in Search of a Social Glue

At the beginning of this year, the editorial team of the *Russian Sociological Review* and the Centre for Fundamental Sociology announced the special issue with a call for papers “Friendship, Trust, and Conflict: From Conceptual History Towards Studies of Social Ontology.” We wrote:

Warfare, social conflicts, revolutions, shifts of national borders, and mass migration continue to transform the existing social order that emerged in Europe by the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. The previous special issues of the *Russian Sociological Review* on borders and warfare discussed these transformations of social order that is now in jeopardy, and thus may change unexpectedly. However, the notion of social order is a complex one, and has other crucial aspects. Although dissolved and disintegrated, social order is still omnipresent despite all the challenges facing it. States and global state systems are not the only fundamental phenomena that maintain social order. While solidarity was the essential feature of civil society within the borders of nation states, theories of global society have emphasized the phenomena of mobility and touristic gaze on social worlds. However, to understand recent social and political transformations, one needs to go beyond this agenda and to focus on those aspects of interpersonal relations that are still important for social order, even within the spaces of conflicts. Among other phenomena that continue to define and maintain the “grand orders” are trust, friendship, and conflict. With this special issue, we aim to draw attention to the phenomena of friendship and trust, in which honor, reputation, and glory are fundamental features rather than observation of laws, or the gratification of egoistic needs and interests. These notions and phenomena, crucial in ancient times and in feudal society, continue to be relevant topics and the central concern in the writings of scholars of the Modern Era and the 20th century.

There is always a kind of preconception concerning the social world which lurks beyond any Call for Papers, although one can never be sure what will be caught in effect. Our preconception was the old and famous sociological dichotomy, *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft*, coined by Ferdinand Tönnies 130 years ago. It was simple, and at the same time, very artificial. Tönnies constructed two main ideal types of the social roughly corresponding to the two main epochs in history as seen by early sociologists. One of these types, “community,” was in a sense “natural,” as family, the “community of blood,” or rather traditional, as are the communities of neighbors or civic communities of the antic poleis, or the burghs in the Middle Ages. Tönnies supposed the other ideal type, “society” or “associ-

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ation,” to be rather modern, based on self-interest and contracts. Two great thinkers with their different visions of the social seemingly spoke in an imagined argument on behalf of each of those ideal types: Aristotle and Hobbes. Therefore, this construction, oversimplified and unsatisfactory, but deeply rooted in the history of political thought, still remains a hidden mechanism of many conceptual contradiction in social science. Friendship and trust were two important constituents of *Gemeinschaft* for Tönnies (although at different stages of his intellectual evolution), they still may seem contradictory to contractually and rationally organized modernity. If we look at this contradiction more closely, we see one of the most intriguing theoretical problems in sociology. Hobbes repeatedly said that the virtues of men are not the same as the virtues of citizens, and we should take these words seriously, just as Tönnies did. All the natural bonds, all the ties between individuals established without civil help and state violence, were supposed to be possible or a rather inevitable source of quarrel in society that, according to Hobbes, only preserved itself by the force and authority of the state. War of all against all as a “natural condition” should be thought of not as being *before* and passed away, but as being *after*, and still remaining under lawful sovereignty. The state did not come to establish peace instead of war. It came to substitute natural bonds between the now-isolated individuals that were rarely portrayed by Hobbes as members of their families or clans, as friends of their friends, as those who, even being subjects of their sovereigns, still remained proud of their natural power and deserved glory. Tönnies once confessed that the people of his *Gesellschaft* were, in fact, the “Hobbes’s people.” It was an extremely important statement because he was confident that any kind of *Gemeinschaft* cannot be eliminated from society forever. He wanted to say that we still need more traditional, premodern, natural bonds to hold our social life intact, and that no state would be able to do it without this primordial, additional force. In fact, he said something more important and more dangerous: friendship, trust, and maybe also glory) are still there, not only to support the modern forms of social life, but also to be an alternative social glue, something that is both produced and reproduced *and* remaining an inner threat and a source of uncertainty to modernity. It is the same with Max Weber and his conception of charisma and ideas concerning political communities based on war ethics and the prestige of power. It is the same with many important social thinkers. There is an ambivalence in the idea of modernity. It cannot but try to eliminate elder forms of sociality, and even though it still needs them, they are still there, notwithstanding changes and transformations, because they produce and reproduce modern societies but also create problems. We need to continually reflect and screen them. This was the idea of our special issue. Now you can see the results.

The paper by Nicolas Hayoz opens the section with the theoretical discussion of the political dimension of friendship. He is not interested in the phenomena that social scientists and analysts are usually looking for, namely, the influence of informal relations on political decisions (e.g., bribery). For Hayoz, the term friendship, which is often associated with the private realm, relates to the idea of trust and civic friendship considered as a key premise for contemporary democracies to be sustainable in the age of globalization and migration. Focusing mostly on political theories, Hayoz reconstructs the notion and

then shows its importance in defining “how to live, to work together or how to communicate politically in order to influence politics, or to change things.” The next paper, entitled “Topology of Communities of Trust,” continues the exploration of the notion of trust. Proceeding from Hobbes’s definitions of the state of nature, Mark Alfano shows the ambivalence of what he describes as “communities of trust.” On the one hand, these small communities enable close relationships between members, and thus may serve as sources for various goods which are usually not easily available outside of these communities. On the other hand, their size can bring problematic features into being, e.g., an isolation from large society and relational distrust. The exploration of trust continues in the paper by Irina Trotsuk who provides an overview of how sociologists study trust from different standpoints. In details, she shows how trust is studied within qualitative and quantitative research. She advocates a narrative analysis as the methodological way to overcome the limitations of the existing approaches. The life of rural dwellers, as Trotsuk points out, can be an ideal research case for the study of trust using narrative analysis. The research paper by Elena Omelchenko does not directly engage with the topic of trust. Yet, it can be viewed as a valuable contribution to the understanding of how social order emerges within small and highly hierarchically-organized communities, i.e., ones that can be observed in prisons. Using the data from the interviews with female prisoners, she describes how the “male” (in social terms) system of recognition, power, and authority is installed within female communities. This empirical case once again shows that, beyond legal and rationalized regulations, there are also rules which shape communities and relations on a fundamental level; in the case of female prisons, these rules have an impact at the bodily level. Another empirically based paper addressed the notion of political glory by exploring the political myths of current political discourse in Russia. Maria Shteynman looks at recent public politics of history, and argues that contemporary political myths in Russia communicate the message of historical glory, and thus “the past takes precedence over the present.” In her study, Shteynman deconstructs several myths and corresponding memes of contemporary culture in order to indicate their sources, those of Soviet history and the glory of this Past. Three papers that close the section present studies in the field of the history of philosophy. The paper by Bystrov, Dudnik, and Kamnev details the history of 19th century Russian philosophical tradition that reflects on the notion of friendship. The authors argue that Russian tradition is specific since it tries to establish the relation of friendship with such notions as enmity and brotherhood. However, it was a fatal mistake of Russian thinkers to put more emphasis on brotherhood, not on friendship; they did not see that enmity, to a larger extent, is a dark side of brotherhood. The next paper of the section is dedicated to the political sociology of Bertrand de Jouvenel. In his paper, Daniel Rosenberg reflects on the distinction that de Jouvenel drew between two types of authority. Close reading of the works by Jouvenel is supported by the comparison of his notions with those of other key thinkers in the field, though primarily M. Weber. Alexandra Makurova explores the writings of Gadamer with a specific focus on what friendship is, and its key place in his draft of political philosophy. Since the paper discusses the connection of friendship with the ideas of solidarity, it may be of a particular interest to

contemporary cultural sociologists in the sense that Gadamer's political philosophy can be viewed as fruitful theoretical source for their studies. Makurova's paper can be a starting point for this kind of research.

After we put all the papers together, we realized that we still have many gaps to fill within the broad topics of friendship, trust and, social order, which belong to the fields of political philosophy and sociology. In the forthcoming issues of the *Russian Sociological Review*, we will try to cover some of those aspects. Ultimately, the papers in this section may be viewed as valuable sources of new theoretical and empirical insights. We hope that the papers will provoke scholars from a range of disciplines to join the debates on the contemporary relevance of the notions of trust, glory, and authority.

Alexander F. Filippov, Nail Farkhatdinov

Political Friendship, Democracy and Modernity

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In modern society, friendship seems to be relegated to the private realm. When friendship enters the public space, it is usually associated with corruption. This is particularly the case when speaking about friends in politics, where friendship is part of informal politics which is focused on accessing or keeping political power. This relational aspect of political friendship must be distinguished from a more structural and institutional aspect of political friendship, which political philosophy presents in terms of civic friendship. This is the very meaning of the political, where a public space exists with the conditions that must be guaranteed for conflictual political communication or collective political action. In this sense, the idea and the theory of civic friendship points to the relational and organizational aspects of collective action, as well as to those shared norms that are expressed and negotiated in the public sphere. No serious sociological theory can ignore the fact that, nowadays, democracies in many regions of the world are put into question because it is no longer clear where the boundaries of trust, and therefore of citizenship are, or what holds people together, particularly in the context of globalization and immigration. In relation with the theories of trust, civic friendship is civil society, the civic and political culture about the practices and expectations in society about how to live, how to work together, how to communicate politically in order to influence politics, or how to change things. Finally, the political theory of friendship is also a warning against the abuse of power and the reintroduction of unity and enemies in a society based on the differences and multiplicity of perspectives.

Keywords: friendship, enemies, trust, politics, modern society, Niklas Luhmann, Hannah Arendt, citizenship

I

Looking at the structures of modern society, it would be difficult to find a “social place,” or a social function for friendship, personal ties, or networks. A common-sense-oriented observation would have already come to this conclusion. Friendship is no longer a condition for the good life in the polis as it was in ancient times or in traditional societies. However, friendship does not have only this social function, as Niklas Luhmann (1981: 224) underlined it. It was also a relationship between people with its own rules. In this sense, friendship was made possible by the political society, whereas in the former sense, it formed the basis of the political society. With the radical transformation of the old traditional society into a functionally differentiated society, the “old” conception of “politi-

cal friendship” or political society based on friendship was no longer convincing. Modern society can no longer be represented by a central idea, a basic value, or a function such as the political. Where is friendship in all of this? In this sociological perspective, it definitely became a private matter, a relationship based on sympathy or other values, but first of all, a private social relationship, in any case.¹

Interestingly, the ongoing discussion about the return of friendship not only reveals a renewed interest in friendship as a social relationship based on specific values (Devere 2011; Schobin et al., 2016; Münch, Reidenbach, 2015; König, 2013; Nixon, 2015). In the perspective of political theory, it reveals that friendship is more than a private matter; it is also political. In the literature on friendship, one can find many references to classic authors pointing to the multiple political meanings of political friendship, best understood as collective representations and practices of social relatedness and common values. This paper observes and interprets these ideas of political friendship in the perspective of modern society. By describing the underlying ideas of political, and particularly civic, friendship as a political theory, the paper will try to reconstruct the link between friendship, trust, and the political. Moreover, it does not neglect the relational approach to political friendship, that is, friendship as part of informal politics, which democracies “share” with non-democracies. If political friendship is a defining feature of the political, then non-democracies must try to build their imagined community differently, for example, as unity, as “us against them.” This would be exactly the contrary of what authors like Hannah Arendt have imagined as political friendship, as a plurality, or as a public space of dialogue (Nixon, 2015: 28, 188, 194; Gebhardt, 2008: 336). Non-democracies share at least one common feature with so-called populists: they both need enemies and their exclusive conception of friendship which implies enemies, which is a kind of Schmidtian dialectics of friendship and enemies. Therefore, since non-democracies are necessarily personalized regimes with dominant informal structures, they maintain and produce many friends, particularly around leading positions. On the other hand, having abolished the political, they have also neutralized the public space, the space where the “interconnectivity” of citizens can be symbolized and expressed. It is rather typical and a kind of irony that authoritarian regimes such as in Russia where personal networks and, with them, friendship were and are so important in society *and* in politics, have abolished the public space, the space of friendly dialogue. Here, one could support Hannah Arendt’s conclusion that if friendship is a condition for democracy, then “all other forms of political regimes deny friendship or shape it to their own ends and purposes. . . . And autocracies distort friendship through their demand for unconditional loyalty to the autocrat” (Nixon, 2015: 194). Such a political perspective can be integrated in a political sociology presenting political friendship not only on a relational level, but also on a more structural and institutional one, where the conditions for conflictual political communication or collective political action have to be guaranteed.

1. For a discussion and presentation of Luhmann’s theory of the evolution of the semantics of friendship see Schobin et al., 2016: 48ff.; Krass, 2016: ch. I.1; Kersten, 2008: 18ff.

At first glance, such a perspective does not seem to fit well with the historical change of the relationship between friendship and the political society in modern society. Politics is now the field of a specific function system focusing on political communication and decisions. Politics, at least in a democratized context, is about strategies to access power and to influence political decisions by building up winning coalitions and negotiating acceptable solutions. If friendship as a personal relationship belongs to the private realm and politics to the public sphere, then the former does not seem to be compatible with politics (Schobin et al., 2016: 157ff.). Indeed, is politics not the “battlefield” of enemies and antagonists rather than the field of friendship? Heather Devere indicates this by underlining that “Friendship in politics is associated with nepotism and favoritism, allowing unjust and unequal access to decision makers and resources” (2011: 17). Additionally, Jürgen Gebhardt (2008: 315) summarizes a more positive variant of political friendship for established democracies: “At best the power game of politics might allow for friendships of utility. Political friends do not love each other in themselves, but only insofar as some benefit accrues to them from each other as Aristotle had already observed.” Such a utilitarian form of political friendship representing “politically motivated and politically used relationships of exchange” can be analyzed, for example, in the case of parliaments (Leuschner, 2011a: 212; 2011b). It can also be studied on the level of political friendship between political leaders (Gurr, 2008). Similar conceptions of friendship can, of course, be found in authoritarian regimes where key political leaders also control power through networks of friends, placing them in positions where they can and should be useful (“Putin’s friends,” for example). Moreover, analyses of networks of cooperation in the civil society sector can also be presented on this relational level of friendship (König, 2013: 899ff.; Devere, 2011: 19).

If this meaning of political friendship as an utility-oriented relationship focuses on politics, the second one relates political friendship to the political order as such, to the political as the core of political order. For example, this is what Jürgen Gebhardt has in mind when he states that “Western discourse on trust and friendship is a theoretical and practical discourse on the human condition of political order and as such it is an inherent element of Western self-understanding from its origins in the Greco-Roman world onward” (Gebhardt, 2008: 342). In this extended conception of political or civic friendship, political philosophy points to the goodwill between citizens, which makes it possible to live together (Hartmann, 2011: 436). If citizens share certain values, they should also be able to go beyond personal friendships based on trust, and express a more general trust towards strangers and authorities.

This paper will precisely elucidate the relationship between trust and political friendship. Moreover, it supports the idea that a modern conception of a political, public-space-oriented notion of civic friendship needs to be linked to the question of trust. It aims at describing the elements of a political theory of civic friendship from the perspective of a sociological theory of modern society. The notion of civic friendship, which can also be presented as an “extended notion of friendship” (Hartmann, 2011: 463), can be found in the ideas on political friendship of classical authors such as Aristotle, Locke, Durkheim, Toc-

queville, or Arendt. Their focus is on republican virtue, of civil society, solidarity, or pluralism. These notions form elements of a political theory of a politics of friendship (Derrida, 1999), or of politics as friendship, as Jon Nixon presents it in his study on Hannah Arendt's conception of friendship (Nixon, 2015). They also point to the multiple political meanings of political friendship best understood as collective representations and practices of social relatedness and common values. We will come back to these perspectives after an analysis of friendship in a relational perspective.

II

Despite the fact that friendship is praised everywhere, and that almost everybody has friends, speaks about them, or “likes” them as we see it on social media where the semantics of friendship is used in an inflationary manner, friendship does not seem to be socially useful more than as a private matter. Most people would confirm that it is good to have friends, but would they also say that friends should be useful, particularly when things are going bad? In an individualized society, people seem to rather rely on themselves when it comes to advance objectives and careers in life (König, 2012: 896). On the other hand, popular proverbs such as “to have a friend in high places,” “that’s what friends are for,” or “better a hundred friends than hundred rubles” point to the utilitarian aspect of friendship. Friends should also be able to help in order to “getting things done.” These seem to be current expectations which can be observed in many parts of the world, particularly in so-called peripheral regions of modern society, or so-called societies in transformation (Luhmann, 1995).

In the systemic perspective of a more complex sociological perspective, friendship as a personal relationship based on sympathy and trust is no longer a structuring principle for social relations as in traditional aristocratic societies. Modern society is, without any doubt, a depersonalized society. It is no longer an inclusive community with predominantly personal contacts. It is no longer vital to have friends and relatives in order to survive, although they may still be important in certain regions of the world. According to Niklas Luhmann, modern society has radicalized the difference between personal and impersonal relationships, and “without this difference it would not be possible to glean from the other’s behavior information relevant to his intimate sphere” (1986: 162). Luhmann speaks of love as opposed to friendship here, of course, which has “won the race and ultimately determined the code for intimacy” (1986: 81f., 116f.). Friendship could not follow love in the direction of intimate relationships connected with sexuality. It could not be institutionalized as it is in the case of marriage based on love. Friendship was probably a too general and a too diffuse concept to allow such an institutionalization. Friendship in such a society definitely belongs to the private realm. However, in the private sphere, having friends does not mean that one has to share privacy or intimacy with them, even if they are so-called close friends (Hahn, 2012: 70). Additionally, as Alois Hahn (2012: 69) has observed, friendship no longer corresponds to the romantic vision of an exclusive totality shared between two individuals. The simple fact of individual dif-

ferences would make that impossible. Individuals take so many roles in modern society that it would be exceptional to “find” friends with whom one could share more than a couple of aspects of his or her own personality. The togetherness of friends may still exist and be an ideal. However, sympathy and particularity cannot be used any longer as basic values of friendship, at least not without difficulties when used as a resource to get access to privileges, and possibly considered as corruption or nepotism in western democracies.

The limits and opportunities of friendship today are influenced and, to a certain extent, even determined by the structures of modern society, its principle of functional differentiation. Helmut König points in this direction by observing that the history of liberal society starts by rendering friendship superfluous (König, 2013: 897). He quotes Adam Smith and Thomas Hobbes, both who have already observed how friendship became obsolete in a monetary and market-based economy or in a power-based political system. Sympathy and friendship can no longer be the “currency” in function systems following their own logic and codes in order to successfully solve their specific problems. Money and power are much more efficient devices than friendship. The logic of exchange and the logic of power are simplifying communication and increasing the performance of the function systems. In this sense, power is the means of communication in politics in order to make decisions, to agree, or to overcome resistance.²

Another aspect concerns role-taking. Luhmann writes that assuming public roles in the political system introduces a social distance by interrupting the normal links of everyday life: one cannot interfere in power by referring to family links, friendship, or other particular obligations (Luhmann, 2010: 430f.) This is the reality of function systems.

However, friendship is not disappearing. Instead of being a totality or a resource to be mobilized in almost every sphere of life as in traditional aristocratic societies, it becomes “sectoral.” Looking at friendship in the perspective of function systems of modern society such as politics, the economy, science or education confirms the picture of “functional friendships.” You may have friends in politics (party friends), in business (business partners), in research (project partners), and so on. Such friendships get their meaning precisely because they follow the logic of function systems. No one would expect that such friendships should be extended to the private sphere, even though that this may be the case. In politics, it is useful to build up friendships in order to gain access to power positions, to advance political projects, or to get support for these projects (Leuschner, 2011a, 2011b; Gurr, 2008, 2011). Political friendship is part of informal politics, opening the door to professional politics. It follows that personal networks in politics can also be described as political friendships (Leuschner, 2011a: 205). The importance or “value” of informal networks and the corresponding practices of political friendship may vary from one political system to the other. Here, one may ask to what extent are they functional with regard to formal structures, or to what extent they confirm or not confirm the objectives of formal rules (Pannes, 2011: 40; Helmke, Levitsky, 2004). On the other hand, when focusing more on

2. In the systemic perspective of Luhmann, one would speak here of “symbolically generalized communication media” such as power or money functioning as catalysts of communication and for the differentiation of the functional systems of society (Luhmann, 2012: 214).

countries in “transition” or so-called hybrid regimes, scholars are more interested in the fate of democracy and the question of whether informal personalized structures are strengthening or undermining democracy. Moreover, in certain cases, personal networks can be so dominant that they characterize the whole “regional society” with huge implications for social change or economic development.

III

As authoritarian regimes reveal daily, political friends can also mean that political and economic organizations can be used to control power through personalized networks together with political friendships. This observation brings us not only to informal politics, but to specific dysfunctional forms of informal institutions such as patronage, clientelism, neopatrimonialism, all of which undermine democracy and, more generally, the logic of functional differentiation. Certain countries such as Russia may function like a large bureaucratic corporation, combining highly personalized leadership structures with organizational power and networks of power (friends, loyalties, and clients) which are instrumental in keeping incumbents in power. Corruption, clientelism, or personalism are just “byproducts” of a much larger structure of politico-economic power aiming to “reach out” to society by trying to control the economy, the judiciary-legal system, the media, and even the education system. Such power structures based on organization and networks exploit the functional differences of modern society in the sense that they instrumentalize them through their personalized networks. Having friends in the right positions is helpful and even indispensable if you want “to get things done” the right way, be it in the judiciary system, in banks and companies, in parliaments, or in NGOs. Old-new distinctions such as friends and enemies or the loyal and the disloyal are concealing. This means that the established differences of the functional systems, for example the legal/illegal distinction, can be handled in an opportunistic manner in the absence of a rule-of-state based state. Obviously, such a system cannot survive without corruption. It is also evident that corruption inevitably means de-differentiation only for those who are not part of the corresponding networks. For those participating in the networks, the question is about having friends in order to get access to or to keep control of assets. Informal networks and the corresponding friends are particularly important in peripheral countries of modern society in order to get things done, to accelerate processes, to get answers to requests, or to receive a “fast track” entry for specific treatments in hospitals or schools, etc. The corresponding contacts or “friends” that help or provide good will and informal services are to be found in positions in organizations, for example, hospitals or state administrations, but no longer in families (Luhmann, 1995: 22, 24). Such informal networks of friends are exploiting organizations and, with them, functional differentiation: the informal “system” of favors, services, generosity, and responsiveness is as important as or more important than what the organization allows with its formal hierarchy. The networks are using the function systems as media for their own objectives (Leanza, 2014: 168).

To this point, it can be seen that impersonal rule or depersonalized societies may well be a core feature of modern society. However, on a regional level, when looking at country-specific peculiarities, for example, we may observe highly personalized societies. It is possible to put it differently: if countries realize specific mixes of distance and proximity, and of personalized and depersonalized relationships, certain of these countries are coming closer to the personalized pole, whereas others are rather on the depersonalized side. Consequently, when living on the side of personalized relations, one would also favor a world view based on two related distinctions: those of exclusion and inclusion, and friends and enemies. In this perspective, the world is populated by people who are a part of your networks of contacts and friendship, and those who are not. On the other hand, it is also a world of people who are either with you or against you.

At this level, we may also say that we are living in societies (so-called “cold” societies), at least in the West, where indifference, the principle of arm’s-length relations, universalism, or the difference between private and public are the very conditions for successful cooperation. In his analysis of corruption, Vito Tanzi describes the concept of arm’s-length relationships as a principle requiring “that personal relationships should play no part in economic decisions involving more than one party” (Tanzi, 2000: 88ff.). It corresponds to the values of Max Weber’s bureaucrats who would follow universalistic principles and rational procedures and in no way accept personalism, cronyism, and the confusion of the public with private interests (ibid.: 89). The arm’s-length principle can be considered as one of the devices in modern society that protects the autonomy of different social spheres against “alien” interference, be it politics with its specific interests, economic interests, or interests related to clientelism, familialism, or other forms of favoritism. These devices are part of the organized checks and balances in place in society to control and regulate power and interest-motivated interferences from one social sphere to others.

Obviously, there are groups of countries coming closer to the Weberian ideal of “cold” and depersonalized societies, with public administrations being based on universalism and the arm’s-length principle. On the other hand, most countries from the former Soviet Union, for example, are much closer to the opposite pole, on the side of regimes with weak institutions, strong personalism, old-boy networks, clientelism, and so on. High rates of corruption are an inevitable by-product of such informal and personalized network structures. The yearly-updated maps of Transparency International shows the distribution of corruption in different regions of the world, confirming such a differentiation of countries leaning either to the depersonalized or the personalized pole.³ Moreover, in many world regions, the arm’s-length principle conflicts with social norms that family and friends come first. Here, State officials are expected to distinguish their clients according to the degree of family relationship or friendship. Corruption is the necessary outcome of such a personalized logic. In this regard, Tanzi concludes “that the very fea-

3. In this regard, see the map presented by Transparency International with bribery rates across Europe and Eurasia (www.transparency.org/news/feature/governments_are_doing_a_poor_job_at_fighting_corruption_across_europe).

tures that make a country a less cold and indifferent place are also those that increase the difficulty of enforcing arm's-length rules so essential for modern, efficient markets and governments" (ibid.: 92).

This would suggest that "cold" societies based on a "Protestant ethic" with a particular political culture and specific effective institutions have a better chance of fighting corruption and establishing good governance rules than the "warm" personalized societies from the south. To this list, we may add those countries from East-Central and Eastern Europe where good governance practices, including the implementation of effective anti-corruption rules and the establishment of a clear-cut border between the public and the private sectors, are either still not the first priority of state action or are being diluted by forms of cooperation such as personal ties and sympathies combined with clientelism. However, informal politics and personalized relationships are not features that should be played off against governance principles. The question is rather to what extent personalized relationships in politics or in the economy pervert universal principles, or whether these apparently contrary principles positively reinforce each other. The answer to this question also clearly depends on whether we are speaking of rule-of-law-based democracies or autocratic regimes where personalism is part of the power structure and governance.

IV

In leaving this ambiguous field of personalized politics and "political friends," we can return to the political conception of friendship, which should not be mixed up with the observations on "having friends" or "relying on friends" in order to keep power or to getting things done. The political aspect of friendship in a civic sense must be put on a completely different level from the level of political friends. Its public-space-focused meaning can be revealed when asking why people are cooperating. They cooperate not only for profits, but also because they are sharing values and specific ideas, because they want to change things, or solve problems in different fields. They may protest for more democracy or simply realize common projects such as more democracy, associative life, fight for the protection of the environment, a more citizen-friendly city, and so on (König, 2013: 899). In doing so, they have to trust each other. They can produce and reproduce social capital which may generate a kind of social or civil friendship. In that sense, political friendship is also about civil society. Obviously, such a conception of political friendship that focuses on relational aspects does not have much in common with political friends in power networks. It is rather the result of the collective experience, and a resource for collective action in the public space. John Nixon describes this in Hannah Arendt's terms: "Friendship sustains that world by acknowledging its plurality. Our friendships provide a private space within which to explore the plurality inherent in the friendship itself and from which to re-enter the public space of plurality. They connect us to the world, while enabling us to cope with its complexity" (2015: 188).

Indeed, it is in this passage from the private to the public sphere or in the conflation of the distinction of private/public where the different meanings of political friendship

can be revealed. These meanings are either in the sense of power networks or corruption avoiding or marginalizing the public space, or in the sense of collective action in the public space based on the mobilization of private networks. This is particularly relevant when considering the fact that the private/public distinction as a necessary condition of a modern rule-of-law-based liberal state points to the meaning of the political in society, that is, to the distinction between the political sphere and other social spheres (Sales, 1991). Rule-of-law-based political regimes are supposed to protect and maintain the private/public distinction, whereas autocracies have abolished it or simulate a fake copy of the public space. When the political is disappearing or when even a distorted version public space is no longer visible, then the space for collective action and for civic political friendship is also fading away. That is also what Hannah Arendt has in mind when warning against the disappearance of the plurality of the world and the free play of power represented by the public realm. Then, friendship would lose its access to the world and violence would become a substitute for power (Nixon, 2015: 189f.). We may add here that friendship would be reduced to networks of power or private friendships disconnected from the public realm. A personalized power structure is consubstantial to authoritarian regimes. It would not be an exaggeration to state that autocracies are aiming at personalizing politics and other social spheres, for their obsession is control of plurality, and the control of deviation.

Therefore, we may once more underline that depersonalized relations and the public realm are ideally expected to coincide in modern society. Modernity can certainly not be located on the side of personalized or the proximity side of the distinction of personalized/depersonalized. This does not mean that modern society is based only on depersonalized contacts. On the contrary, modernity requires specific distinctions, particularly the possibility of making a distinction between private and public communications or spaces, and between personalized and depersonalized relations. In fact, society would not be possible without personal relations consisting of everyday contacts based on personal interaction. As such, however, such relations must be reproduced in a sea of depersonalized relations. A functionally differentiated society with highly complex systems for the solution of specific political, economic, or scientific problems could not be understood simply based on personal interactions. It is precisely in modern society where personal relations may become a problem, as for example, old-boy networks or clientelism in the political or the economic system where they might be identified as corrupt behavior. It requires established democracies and markets in order to discover that too many "good connections" may undermine democratic and market rules, if they avoid or short-circuit established and legal procedures to gain an advantage.

On the other hand, we can also see how the structures of a modern democratized political system ideally represent the *depersonalized* background in form of institutions, organizations, and procedures, which not only enables the *personalized* political games of political actors (political parties and the corresponding networks of political friends) focused on gaining political power, but also offers the space for collective action (civil society), and the mobilization of *personal* networks in the sense of civic friendship.

In fact, political friendship as we have already presented it in terms of civic friendship implies a depersonalized society in a modern sense. This can be specified with the help of the concept of trust which is consubstantial to friendship in the relational sense, as well as in the more general sense of a public-space-oriented civic friendship. Trust, depersonalization, and the arm's-length principle go together, at least in rule-of-law-based democracies. What can be seen is that the depersonalization of society implies also a depersonalization of trust, a shift from personal trust to general and systemic trust. Personal trust towards relatives and friends may still be important in every day personal interactions, but society is no longer based on personal relations held together by personal trust. Generalized or extended trust among strangers is the adequate form of trust in a depersonalized society of strangers (Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein, 2005; Reiser, 1999). Some authors present this form of trust as moralistic since it is not based primarily on personal experiences, but can be considered as "the belief that others share your fundamental moral values and therefore should be treated as you would wish to be treated by them" (Uslaner, 2002: 18). Generalized trust, then, is about sharing basic values with regard to reliable and honest behavior. Generalized trust is about norms of reciprocity, and about the expectation of reciprocity. This is, in fact, part of a definition of social capital, which points to these specific values shared by the members of a community allowing them to cooperate. Obviously, these values cannot be the values of a criminal gang which also needs a great deal of social capital in order to be efficient. Rather, they point, again, to universal moral values in society, to virtues such as truth-telling, meeting obligations, and reciprocity (Fukuyama, 2000: 99).

The radius of trust in society depends on the degree to which people share common values when it comes to solving collective problems by cooperating with each other. Such values of reciprocity should not be mixed up with the values of reciprocity shared by most families in the world. In this case, one speaks of personal trust, not of trust among strangers, and that is the point here, which depends on the conditions of trust outside the family systems (kinship) or of personal networks between friends. General, systemic, and institutional trust are aspects of modernity. Thus, looking at how specific countries in different regions of the world society have realized different mixes of private and public relationships, personalism and depersonalized institutions, or of personal and general trust conveys much about how these regions cope with modernity. According to the "radius of trust" in a particular society, one could distinguish, with Fukuyama's distinction (1995: 61ff., 149ff.) between "low trust societies," with familialism and personalism representing one pole, and "high trust societies" representing the opposite pole. This approximates what could be called Max Weber's ideal of arm's-length relations, of trust in public life, or with regard to organizations such as state bureaucracies, social security systems, political parties, interest groups, or companies. This distinction overlaps with the distinction between "warm" and "cold" societies to a certain degree. To be more precise, it points to the importance of traditional values in modern or modernizing societies. A country

dominated by personalism and a lack of general trust can also be expected to fail in its fight against corruption. Conversely, where political, economic and legal institutions have, through their symbolic efficiency, created cultural settings which allows generalized trust to develop between people (“high trust societies”), one should also expect that the mutual reinforcement of institutional efficiency, shared values, and trust should work against corrupt behavior.

Moreover, we should keep in mind that the evolution from a culture of distrust to a culture of trust will be difficult in countries where society is considered by many as fundamentally unequal, as populated by “hostile strangers,” or dominated by “alien values.” Why should you trust the institutions, politics, the elites, or simply the world beyond your family and the wider “family” of your friends if this world is, if perceived in “Hobbesian” terms, full of discriminations and exclusions, inequalities, greed, crime, and corruption? On the other hand, things are different from a “top down” perspective since personal trust and trustworthiness are means of achieving and maintaining power for political elites and their networks of power.

VI

At this point, we can return to civic friendship and relate it to general trust. Sharing values and mutual goodwill are also key aspects of personal and intimate friendship. However, in the political context or in modern society where individuals and citizens do not know each other, political friendship can manifestly not mean personal relational friendship, as in the case of generalized trust with regard to personal trust. This is why Martin Hartmann (2011: 463) speaks of an “extended notion of friendship” which he integrates in a theory of a praxis of trust. He points here to John M. Cooper’s interpretation of what Aristotle presented as civic friendship, a special kind of friendship: “Where civic friendship characterizes a population there exists, as a recognized and accepted norm, a certain measure of mutual good will, and also mutual trust, among the people making up the population” (Cooper, 1999: 370f.). Citizens do not need to know each other personally to know about the mutual good. In the political context, knowledge of the nature of the constitution and “of what’s generally expected of people in that society is the normal way of knowing about these things, and it is sufficient, sometimes, to establish a reasonable presumption of good will on the part of one’s fellow-citizens generally” (Cooper, 1999: 371, fn. 18; Hartmann, 2011: 436). Similarly, John von Heyking observes that “political pluralism is embedded within a like-mindedness expressed in terms of constitutionalism, which itself expresses social friendship and hence agreement concerning the highest things human ought to do. Ambition counteracting ambition is constrained by agreement on constitutional fundamentals, expressed as a social friendship that prevents such conflict from degenerating into fratricidal war” (Von Heyking, 2016: 11).

Indeed, citizens are supposed to share certain values or agree on what is expressed by their Constitution, and therefore should be able and willing to express a kind of generalized trust vis-a-vis strangers and the authorities. However, it is not clear nowadays what is

meant by sharing certain values or, said differently, to fix the “radius of trust” (Fukuyama 2000: 99) in a national society. Obviously, trust is only possible within certain boundaries which are also the boundaries of citizenship (Hartmann 2011: 464). Democracies run into difficulties when the radius of trust and the common good orientation are no longer convincing criteria in explaining to the citizens of a political community what holds them together, or why they should live together as a nation.

In any case, we can see that these different strands of the notion of civic friendship focusing on good will, shared norms, general trust, and the common good are parts of the classic legacy founded by Aristotle’s typology of friendship. These parts are attempts to describe society, and moreover the political, the political community, or the classical “polis,” based on a notion of friendship combining its private and public aspects. Friendship realizes circles of a moral community encompassing primary personal friends, as well as the citizenry of the “polis” (Nixon, 2015: 51). In this perspective, the extension of friendship from the private to the public points to the moral conditions of civic and political order. This is confirmed by Hannah Arendt’s conception of “politics of friendship,” where “Politics is, as it were, ethically grounded in the “truthful dialogue” that constitutes friendship” (Nixon, 2015: 52). To be sure, modern society can no longer be described in terms of the classical political and moral community. Modern politics is not rooted in a normative premise where its objective should be the realization of the normative good, although constitutions may describe such objectives. Nevertheless, political systems operate on a specific territory as Nation-States. As such, political systems cannot avoid establishing descriptions of what they are good for, for example, to guarantee their citizens prosperity, or freedom, or to define who can and should be citizens based on well-defined criteria. In a democratized context, nations are constantly reflecting the question of whether or to what extent the established political order is adequate and corresponds to what citizens want. In other terms, they produce political theories about the conditions of democracy, or imagine themselves as political communities based on shared values as expressed through civic friendship.

Civic friendship then could denote several things. It is first a political discourse about the public space in democracy. Political philosophy starts its reflection on political friendship by pointing hypothetically to the consequences of the absence of friendship and its correlates, be it plurality, diversity, dialogue, public, or collective action in the sense of Hannah Arendt (Nixon, 2015: 28, 189; König, 2013: 901ff.). As a matter of fact, the political theory on civic friendship, in either aspect of its civil society of collective action or as political community, is a critique of authoritarian and even totalitarian conceptions of society, of homogeneity, hierarchy, and conceptions of unity. All such conceptions negate the very idea of the political which needs the political space to express social autonomy and its conflicts.

In fact, any description of politics or society that pretends to be the only right one is totalitarian and inevitably provokes opposition. Unity necessarily produces differences and new identities based on different distinctions. This fits quite well with what Claude Lefort expresses in the idea of “disincarnation.” Social reality can neither be incarnated

nor represented by a hierarchy, whether the state or a party organization. This comes close to Hanna Arendt's idea about the "free play of power" and the corresponding diverse perspectives, that if restricted, would give access to violence (Nixon, 2015: 189). Power is inevitably an empty place. As Niklas Luhmann puts it in a sociological perspective, state power is an exchangeable, unstable, and divided position based on the distinction between government and opposition (Luhmann, 1990: 167ff., 231ff.). Under modern conditions, sovereign power is nothing more than the contingent possibility to remain in power or to be in the opposition. This is the very essence of democratized power. Such a double codification of the political system works against the moralization of the power position, which would reintroduce the distinction of friends and enemies based on the pretension of being in a morally superior position.

Modern politics, however, needs and involves antagonists and opponents. This crucial difference between enemies and opponents (Edelmann, 1991: 131) and between antagonism and agonism (Mouffe, 2005) points to the core of the political in modern society and also to the problem of morals in politics. As soon as opponents are conceived of in categories of good or bad, or friend or enemy, eliminating the other becomes the main aim of political action. In this case, friendship also would disappear, for friendship cannot be defined with regard to enmity as Helmut König (2013: 903f.) correctly points out; the brother and not the friend would be the correct term in this positioning of "we against the others." On the other hand, the acceptance of the other as the antagonist implies competition focused on political victory, and not on elimination. Political victory can be obtained only by respecting the rules of the game and established procedures which are shared and respected by all players in the political game. The political and the public realm are definitely not the space of the Schmittian distinction friends/enemies, but a structure institutionalizing the idea of talking, dialogue and discussion. This is diversity against unity. The actually observable "revival" or "return" of nationalist and populist parties and leaders are bringing back the contrary: unity instead of diversity, an obsession with exclusive homogeneity-concepts such as the nation, brotherhood, ethnicity, kinship, family, and more. Populists need enemies as scapegoats, whereas civic friendship insists on plurality and diversity excluding enmity. The political theory of civic friendship is also a warning against the destructive consequences of exclusive populist political discourses and ideologies for democratic politics. The risk of the abuse of power is continuously evoked by this political theory, but it is not really integrated in a more general or classic conception of the countervailing powers in the political system.

The prevention of the abuse of trust and power is certainly among the most important functions of political institutions in a complex web of countervailing powers. Therefore, in a modern and complex society, the common good along with the public realm are as much the however-aggregated result of one sphere of action as it is the result of effective state institutions, like the markets, for example ('self-interest'), or of civil society (volunteering). In this perspective, the idea of civic friendship would point to several aspects of civil society as described by Edward Michaels (2014). Michaels writes that civil society is about the practices of associative life as well as about shared norms, the common good,

and the public sphere which are the loci of dialogue politics already evoked by Hannah Arendt. That fits quite well with the idea of civic friendship relating to the relational and organizational aspects of collective action *and* shared norms to be expressed and negotiated in the public sphere.

Moreover, civic friendship expresses many aspects of the notions of political culture, and civic culture in particular focuses on the cultural conditions for citizens to cooperate (Lichterhann, 2012: 208). Civic friendship is also a reflection of the possibilities of collective action, or on the underlying conditions and representations making cooperation possible or more difficult, depending on the political context in which civic actions take place. Civic friendship is also a political theory, reflecting democracy in a time of the erosion of democratic politics and culture, and of the “politics of truth” in a populist “post-truth” arena. Finally, it is a genuinely democratic political theory which as “republican friendship binds together the citizens of good judgment communicating their mutual judgments on the basis of truthfulness” (Gebhardt, 2008: 336; Nixon, 2015: 52, 182ff.). In this regard, Jürgen Gebhardt (2008: 342) concludes accurately that citizens are living together by virtue of the binding force of trust. This is also the final destination of political friendship, the linking of friendship to the political order as a common order implying common meanings, purpose, and action. This could also be formulated with a “Durkheimian approach” in the sense that the “discourse of friendship is not personal, except in the sense that it confirms the sacredness of the person and links the individual to the “personality” of the collective” (Mallory, Carlson, 2014: 8). In such a “French approach,” friendship is a “collective representation” of beliefs and ideals about living together which are instituted in institutions and practices, and can be analyzed. However, the political of the political theory of friendship is not simply a normative program “prescribing friendship as a normative ideal which strangers and citizens should adopt” (Mallory, Carlson, 2014: 13). Civic friendship is not just something that is translated into constitutional norms. In relation with theories of trust, civil society, civic, and political culture, it is much more about the practices and expectations in society about how to live, to work together or how to communicate politically in order to influence politics, or to change things. After all, protests against specific policies or political regimes or other forms of collective action *publicly* express real claims about how democracy should work. Moreover, a look at authoritarian politics reveals *e contrario* what society loses when the public space of the “truthful dialogue” is abolished. In a personalized informal power structure, political friends may be helpful to stay in power or to reproduce networks of corruption. These “political friends” will also resist the democratization of politics, for such a change would also mean the loss of their power. It would mean the re-establishment of a public space where society and its citizens can again reflect on what holds them together and what they want to share. Even if the perspectives of political theory and political sociology are different, the reflection on civic friendship and the conditions of democracy may produce the same conclusions.

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Политическая дружба, демократия и модерн

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В современном обществе дружба по-видимому относится к области частного. Возникновение дружбы в публичном пространстве связывают с коррупцией. Это тем более применимо к друзьям в политике, то есть к ситуациям, когда дружба является частью неформального политического процесса, направленного на получение доступа к политической власти или ее удержанию. Этот реляционный аспект политической дружбы необходимо отличать от более структурного и институционального понимания политической дружбы, которое политическая философия дает в терминах «гражданской дружбы». В этом и содержится смысл политического, в рамках которого публичное пространство существует в условиях, которые должны быть обеспечены для конфликтной политической коммуникации или коллективного политического действия. В этом смысле идея и теория «гражданской дружбы» указывает на реляционные и организационные аспекты коллективного действия, а также на те разделяемые нормы, которые выражаются и обсуждаются в публичной сфере. Ни одна серьезная социологическая теория не может обойти тот факт, что сегодня демократии во многих регионах мира находятся под угрозой, поскольку утрачено понимание, где пролегают границы доверия и, следовательно, гражданства, а также того, что позволяет людям сосуществовать, особенно, в контексте глобализации и миграции. В отношении теорий доверия гражданская дружба представляет собой гражданское общество, гражданскую и политическую культуру, включающую практики и ожидания в обществе по поводу того, как жить и работать вместе, как общаться политически, чтобы влиять на политику, и как менять вещи вокруг себя. Наконец, политическая теория дружбы также предостерегает от злоупотребления властью и возрождения единства и вражды в обществе на основе различий и множественности перспектив.

Ключевые слова: дружба, враги, доверие, политика, политическое, современное общество, Никлас Луман, Ханна Арендт, гражданство

The Topology of Communities of Trust

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Hobbes emphasized that the state of nature is a state of war because it is characterized by a fundamental and generalized distrust. Exiting the state of nature and the conflicts it inevitably fosters is therefore a matter of establishing trust. Extant discussions of trust in the philosophical literature, however, focus either on isolated dyads of trusting individuals or trust in large, faceless institutions. In this paper, I begin to fill the gap between these extremes by analyzing what I call the *topology of communities of trust*. Such communities are best understood in terms of interlocking dyadic relationships that approximate the ideal of being *symmetric*, *Euclidean*, *reflexive*, and *transitive*. Few communities of trust live up to this demanding ideal, and those that do tend to be small (between three and fifteen individuals). Nevertheless, such communities of trust serve as the conditions for the possibility of various important prudential epistemic, cultural, and mental health goods. However, communities of trust also make various problematic phenomena possible. They can become insular and walled-off from the surrounding community, leading to a distrust of out-groups. They can lead their members to abandon public goods for tribal or parochial goods. These drawbacks of communities of trust arise from some of the same mechanisms that give them positive prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health value, and so can, at most, be mitigated, not eliminated.

Keywords: trust, distrust, community, flourishing, epistemology, topology, emotion, social epistemology

Introduction

Edwin Curley's 1994 edition of Hobbes's 1668 work emphasized that the state of nature is characterized by a fundamental and generalized distrust. Exiting the state of nature and the conflicts it engenders is therefore a matter of establishing trust. When communities of trust function smoothly, they foster various goods related to the flourishing of humanity. Just how important these communities are becomes clearer when we realize that they are our route out of the state of nature. In the most famous passage of his *Leviathan*, Hobbes compares the state of nature to the state of war (1994: XIII.9):

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of

moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

While we might quibble with the details of Hobbes's portrait, it is clear that it is difficult, if not impossible, to pursue, promote, preserve, and protect certain goods constitutive of flourishing in the state of nature. As Hobbes emphasizes through enumeration, these goods come in several varieties:

- *prudential*: capital ("fruit" of "industry," "commodious buildings," and "instruments of moving and removing"); agriculture ("culture of the earth"); trade ("navigation" and "use of commodities that may be imported"); security (protection against "danger of violent death");
- *epistemic*: science ("knowledge of the face of the earth" and "account of time"); technology ("building," "instruments");
- *mental health*: relief from anxiety ("continual fear");
- *cultural*: "arts"; "letters"; "society."

I contend that Hobbes is right to identify a key psychological mechanism of the state of nature as generalized distrust or what he calls "diffidence" (Hobbes, 1994: XIII.4). The harms and limitations of the state of nature arise in large part because no one can reasonably trust anyone. Life in the state of nature is poor, nasty, brutish, and short, and it is so because it is solitary. If this is right, then exiting the state of nature depends on establishing trust. Unlike Hobbes, I find it implausible that communities of trust are constituted all at once into a Leviathan. Instead, it seems much more naturalistically plausible that they build up from dyads, triads, and other small, tight-knit groups, exactly the small groups theorized here as communities of trust.

Discussions of trust in the philosophical literature, however, focus either on isolated dyads of trusting individuals (Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996, 2012a; McGeer, 2008; Pettit, 1995), or trust in large, faceless institutions or the government (Potter, 2002; Govier, 1997; Townley, Garfield, 2013; Hardin, 2002). In this paper, I begin to fill the gap between these extremes by analyzing what I call *communities of trust*. My focus is on small groups (three to fifteen individuals). Further research will be needed to continue filling the gap in philosophical literature. I focus on the *topology* of communities of trust, understood as directed networks in which the nodes are individual agents and the edges represent dyadic trust. I argue that such communities play an ineliminable role in escape from the state of nature because they furnish the conditions for the possibility of various prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health goods.

I describe trust as a dyadic relation between agents, and define the notion of a field of trust, and introduce the concept of a community of trust, which is a set of agents structured into a network through pairwise relations of trust. I explore the topology of communities of trust, addressing extensions and enrichments that make trust in the network more symmetric, reflexive, Euclidean, and/or transitive. I argue that communities of trust

make various problematic phenomena possible. They can become insular and walled-off from the surrounding community, leading to distrust of the out-group, or even outright conflict. They can lead their members to abandon public goods for tribal or parochial goods. These drawbacks of communities of trust arise from some of the same mechanisms that give them positive prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health value, and so can at most be mitigated, but not eliminated.

Types of Trust: Dyadic and Communal

Dyadic Trust

Trust is a relation in which a trustor trusts a *trustee* in respect of a *field of trust* (Baier, 1986). For example, when I trust you with the keys to my car, I rely on your competence, goodwill, and good sense in safely and securely operating my car.¹ This involves my believing, or taking it for granted, that you have sufficient skill to drive in ordinary and somewhat extraordinary circumstances. I believe or take it for granted that you can handle my car on both local roads and highways, in sun, rain, wind, and perhaps even with snow and ice. My trusting you with my car also involves believing or taking it for granted that you will refrain from negligent and reckless behavior while driving. You won't get behind the wheel if you're very tired or emotionally overwhelmed. You certainly won't talk on the phone or text while driving, let alone drink and drive. My trusting you with my car also involves a broader assessment of your goodwill and good sense.² I won't give you my keys if I expect you to steal the car or to gamble it away as collateral during a high-stakes poker game. I won't give you the keys if I think you're likely to leave the car unlocked in an area prone to property crime. I won't give you the keys if I think you're the irascible sort who's likely to get into a dispute that leads someone to vandalize it. I won't give you the keys if I think you're disposed to lend them in turn to someone I distrust.

In a trusting relationship, the field of trust is a domain of valued practical concern and activity. In giving you my keys, I trust you with respect to taking care of my valued possession. Trust essentially involves vulnerability. If I didn't care one whit about the car, I couldn't trust you with it. I might lend it to you, give it to you, hand you the keys out of curiosity with where you'll go and what you'll do, and so on. However, it wouldn't be apt to describe any of these as an act of trust unless I also placed some value on the car.

Note that I might say, while giving you my keys, "But don't take it out on the road if the temperature is at or below freezing. You don't have any experience driving in wintry

1. I will take it for granted that the attitude of trust is not simply a belief (Hieronymi, 2008) but something more affect-laden (Faulkner, 2011; Becker, 1996). Because goodwill is a component of trust, "forced trust" (e.g., in loveless shotgun marriages) in which there is no goodwill does not qualify as genuine trust. Thanks to an anonymous re-viewer for raising the issue of forced trust. In addition, I am focusing primarily on trust versus lack of trust, rather than trust versus distrust. For present purposes, we can define distrust analogously to trust, substituting *malice* for *goodwill*.

2. Competence and goodwill are commonly associated with trust in the literature. It will become clear below why I am adding good sense.

conditions.” In doing so, I limit the scope of the field of trust. Negotiating the scope of the field of trust is tricky business for several reasons. First, it’s impossible to spell out all relevant contingencies in advance. If you’re fleeing kidnappers, I will forgive you for driving on icy roads while impaired and using your phone to call or text for help. If someone puts a gun to your head and says, “The car or your life,” I will understand and endorse your giving away the keys. Trying to enumerate and categorize every relevant counterfactual possibility is hopeless. This is one reason why trust also relies generically on the trustee’s goodwill and good sense. It’s also why, in the typical case, the trustee has a rough idea how much the trustor values the field of trust. Secondly, obsessively staking out the boundaries of the field of trust draws attention to the ways I don’t feel comfortable relying on your competence, goodwill, or good sense. This can undermine the warmth of our relationship and lead you to reject my limited trust as offensive or insulting. “Here are my keys. Feel free to take the car out for a spin whenever you like. Unless it’s icy or snowy. Or dark. Or rainy. Or you’re going to a destination you’ve never driven to before. Or you’ve just watched a scary movie. Or . . .” Thirdly, pointing out all the ways in which I might wish to constrain the field of trust may lead you to distrust yourself. Just as trust and hope in another person can be empowering (McGeer, 2008; see also Alfano, 2016; McGeer, Pettit, forthcoming), drawing sharp lines around one’s trust can be disempowering.

The field of trust might involve a valued artifact like a car, but it can also involve human beings, non-human animals, other living things, and more abstract values. I could trust my babysitter to look after my child. I could trust you to feed my pet rabbit while I’m out of town. I could trust you with the password to my email account or my online banking account. I could trust you with my hopes, my secrets, and my sins. In a well-functioning relationship of trust, the trustee *knows* that she’s been entrusted with something valued by the trustor. This is one of the reasons why actively putting your trust in someone is a sign of esteem (Pettit, 1995). Indeed, it is often the case that the trustor knows that the trustee knows that she’s been entrusted with something valuable. Alfano (2016; see also Alfano, 2015; Faulkner, 2011; Nickel, 2012) argues that such interlocking attitudes can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies in which the trustee qualifies as trustworthy in part because she has been trusted, knows it, and knows that the trustor knows it.

The greater the value I place on the field of trust, the more I need to rely on your competence, goodwill, and good sense before initiating such a relation. Maybe I think that you’re generally reliable but prone to bouts of forgetfulness. In that case, perhaps I’d trust you to water my houseplants but not to feed my child or my pet. This indicates that the esteem expressed by trust also comes in degrees: trusting you with something I hold very dear is a sign of higher esteem (or greater desperation) than trusting you with something I value only a little.

In paradigm cases of trust such as deep friendship and marriage, I trust my trustee in an open-ended way that is sometimes referred to as *absolute* or *implicit* trust. In so doing, I trust my trustee to look after my wellbeing and core interests generically and without restriction on the scope of the field of trust. This is presumably one reason why traditional wedding vows go to such lengths to dilate the scope of the field of trust (“in good times

and bad, in sickness and in health”). Such trust is consistent with not trusting my friend or spouse with some peripheral field distinct from my core interests. For instance, I might trust my perpetually-tardy friend to keep my secrets and stand up for my reputation, but not to arrive to a party punctually. I might trust my spouse with just about everything other than the cooking because I know that she is as likely to burn the house down as to prepare something edible and tasty. In cases of absolute trust, I expect my partner often to act in my core interest and rarely to act against it, especially without good reason and without warning me in advance.

Finally, trust has both practical and epistemic aspects. This is clear if we examine cases that might at first blush appear purely epistemic or purely practical. Consider trust in testimony as an example of the former. If I trust you to tell me the truth, I must believe or take it for granted that you are a competent inquirer. However, inquiry is an active and practical process, so trust in testimony also has a practical aspect. Conversely, if I trust you to water my plants while I am out of town, I must believe or take it for granted that you know or will find out how much water is too little, how much is too much, and how much is within an acceptable range. In this case, trusting you to know or find out means that there is an epistemic aspect to my practical trust.

Thus far, I have largely followed the literature inspired by Baier’s seminal article on trust (1986) in viewing it as an attitude that one agent directs towards another agent in respect of a valued field. I have added a good sense criterion to her competence and goodwill criteria; in addition, I have relativized the trust relation to a field of trust defined and delimited by a scope that is sometimes explicitly negotiated, and sometimes only implicitly understood.

Communities of Trust

Now consider cases of trust that involve multiple agents with a common field of practical concern and activity, such as dance partners, a sports team, a happy family, a scientific collaboration, a business, a motorcycle gang, a terrorist cell, or a police department. In such small-scale communities no larger than thirty-five (Dunbar, 1992) and typically fewer than a dozen (Buys, Larson, 1979), multiple people know, rely on, and trust one another in the promotion, preservation, and protection of a mutually-recognized field of trust. At first pass, let us call the agents involved in such a group a *community of trust* with respect to the shared field of practical concern and activity in question, a definition I will refine below. Recent work in social psychology and related fields distinguishes four types of communities (Arrow, 2010):

- (1) cliques, understood as dense clusters of people linked by dyadic bonds,
- (2) coalitions, understood as strategic alignments of people linked by dyadic bonds for mutual advantage,
- (3) comrades, understood as people united through collective action, joint membership in a group, and shared commitments, and
- (4) colleagues, understood as people united by common interests and shared identities.

Since it builds from the notion of dyadic trusting relations, this paper focuses primarily on cliques and coalitions (more so the former than the latter), which are especially amenable to analysis using the tools of social network theory (understanding agents as nodes and relations between them as edges). In their review paper, Katz et al. (2004: 311–12) identify five primary tenets of this approach, four of which are relevant here. First, the network approach is appropriate when people's behavior is best predicted not by their individual characteristics, but by their position in a web of relations. Secondly, the focus of analysis is on relations rather than monadic properties of individuals. Thirdly, conventional assumptions of statistical independence among members of the community do not hold. Fourthly, aggregating dyadic ties alone are not sufficient to explain the behavior of the community or its members: the structure of the network also matters.

Not all cliques and coalitions are communities of trust, but all communities of trust are either cliques or coalitions. Broadly speaking, when such communities of trust function smoothly, everyone does their part in the group's shared field of trust, everyone knows that everyone is disposed to do their part in the group's shared field of trust, everyone trusts everyone to do their part in the group's shared field of trust, and everyone knows that everyone trusts everyone to do their part in the group's shared field of trust. Lack of trust or distrust outside the shared field of concern and activity is compatible with this. I might think my dance partner is a fraud in business or incompetent at the flute. That said, distrust tends to undermine the generic reliance on others' goodwill and good sense, so trusting someone in one sphere tends to be in tension with distrusting them in another.

Such communities needn't be symmetric in all details of their implementation. Symmetry doesn't rule out a division of labor. In a football match, for instance, I can trust the goalkeeper to defend our goal while I rush forward to attack our opponents' goal. However, if I don't trust the goalkeeper, that will lead me to hang back, warping the geometry of our attack and making it less effective. In a scientific collaboration, you can trust me to collect data reliably while I trust you to analyze it carefully. However, if neither of us trusts our third collaborator to write up the results without introducing a huge number of typos and misinterpretations, we are likely to start taking on portions of his task, thereby slowing down the collaboration and potentially leading to a conflict with the third collaborator. In a business, I can trust you to develop new products for our company while you trust me to market them effectively. If we don't trust the driver who delivers our products to not to steal the whole lot of them, our venture will fail for lack of sales. In a police department, you can trust me not to snitch when you kill an innocent civilian, while I trust you not to report my taking bribes and fixing parking tickets, and so on.

Idealizing somewhat, we can say that communities of trust involve a shared understanding of the scope of the field of trust. If I think the scope is much greater than you do, we have a problem. I will expect more of you than you're perhaps prepared or willing to give. You will be likely to do things that flout my expectations, even without failing by your own standards to exhibit competence, goodwill, and good sense. In addition, in communities of trust, we typically have the same level of trust in one another and place the same value on the field of trust (or, barring that, at least appreciate the value placed

on it by the other party). This is important because, as I have explained above, trust typically comes with caveats and exceptions. I trust you to water my houseplants, unless, of course, there is an emergency that keeps you from doing so. What qualifies as a sufficiently urgent problem for you to let my houseplants wither is something that, in the ideal case, we both implicitly or explicitly understand. Unless I know how committed you are to our community and you know how committed I am to it, we're likely to find different caveats appropriate, leading to confusion, conflict, and perhaps even a dissolution of the community.

In addition, members of a community of trust bear one another goodwill, and they often know it and know that they know it. This mutual goodwill, which is established and maintained through activities like social grooming (Dunbar, 1993), laughing together (Dezecache, Dunbar, 2012), singing and dancing together (Dunbar, 2012; see also Slingerland, 2014), or enduring traumatic loss together (Elder, Clipp, 1988), should sometimes help them to resist the temptation to defect in mixed-motive interactions. Moreover, the presence or potential for mutual knowledge of one another's goodwill introduces a second-order motivation to maintain one's reputation (Dunbar, 2005). A one-off defection in a mixed-motive interaction exposes one to loss of reputation, and thereby to exclusion from the benefits of further cooperation and coordination. In a community of (epistemic) trust, reputation-relevant information is likely to travel quickly. Dunbar (1993) estimates that at least 60% of human conversational time comprises of gossip about relationships and personal experiences. When the sense of identity stretches into one's ancestors and descendants, as Richman (2006) argues it does among Jewish merchants in the diamond trade, even the last transaction of one's life redounds not only to one's reputation but also to one's prospects. As Alfano and Robinson (forthcoming) argue, these phenomena make the disposition to gossip well a sort of virtue, being a disposition that protects both oneself and other members of one's community from betrayal while punishing or ostracizing systematic defectors.

This brings us to an epistemic benefit of communities of trust: they are highly effective ways of disseminating knowledge through testimony and other means (Sterelny, 2012). In the case of gossip, the information in question concerns the actions, intentions, and dispositions of another person, but communities of trust are able to transmit not only reputational information, but all kinds of information. In computer science, it has been shown that, depending on the topology of a communicative network, almost everyone gets the message even when the probability of any particular agent gossiping is between 0.6 and 0.8 (Haas, Halpern, Li, 2006). Furthermore, bottlenecks and biases can result in the effective silencing of some people who would like to broadcast a message through the testimonial network (Alfano, Skorburg, 2016). These considerations make the topology of the network an object of essential concern.

Furthermore, in complex inquiries that require specialized intellectual skills, collaboration and teamwork are necessary for knowledge acquisition and transfer. As Hardwig (1991: 694) has emphasized, this means that "the trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is the ultimate foundation for much of our knowledge." Epistemic

communities need trust in order to coordinate and cooperate effectively in inquiry, to transmit and distribute knowledge amongst themselves, and to communicate it effectively with others.

Mutual knowledge and common knowledge are technical concepts in social epistemology. A proposition is the object of mutual knowledge in a group if everyone knows it. Furthermore, mutual knowledge comes in degrees. We might all know something, but I might not know that you know it. This can lead to breakdowns in coordination and cooperation. Suppose that I am deathly allergic to peanuts. I know about my allergy, as do you, but I don't know that you know about my allergy. Now imagine a scenario in which you kindly bake me some cookies and leave them on my office desk. I arrive at work the next morning to find your thoughtful gift, but I cannot reasonably enjoy it because, for all I know, there are peanuts or peanut oil in the cookies. If I knew that you knew about my allergy and I trusted you not to intentionally or accidentally poison me, I could go ahead and eat the cookies without fear. To coordinate more effectively, we need not just mutual knowledge but also a second degree of mutual knowledge: I need to know that you know about my allergy.³ More complex cases can be constructed in which what is required is third-, fourth-, or even higher degrees of mutual knowledge (Gerbrandy, Groeneveld, 1997). In the limit, we all know, know that we know, know that we know that we know, and so on, out to infinity. This limit is called common knowledge, which, even if it is unrealizable in finite minds, serves as a kind of ideal.

There are three main reasons that communities of trust foster mutual knowledge among their members and help them to achieve multiple orders of mutual knowledge. First, because communities of trust effectively facilitate testimonial knowledge-transfer, they make it likely that any important information in the community eventually makes the rounds. Second, to the extent that the members of the community have at least an implicit understanding of the effectiveness of their own testimonial network, they are in a position to achieve second- and even higher-order levels of mutual knowledge. They can reasonably make "If that were true, I would have heard it by now" judgments of the sort explored by Goldberg (2010), and can go further by making judgments like, "Because that's true, everyone in my community must have heard it by now." Finally, communities of trust tend to have occasional plenary meetings during which they are arranged in an inward-facing circle, making for easy eye-contact among all those in attendance (Chwe, 2001). Such plenary meetings are common evening rituals around the campfire in contemporary small-band hunter-gatherers such as the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen, and were probably also common among paleolithic humans (Wiessner, 2014). Such meetings are ideal settings for public announcements, and can be modeled as bases of mutual knowledge and common knowledge. When a proposition is publicly announced to a group, not only does every member of the group come to know that proposition, but also, because of the publicity of the announcement (e.g., its volume and the fact that everyone can look around and see others paying attention to it), everyone is in a position to know that

3. For a formal study of the epistemic conditions for cooperation, see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).

everyone knows it, and to know that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on (Gerbrandy, Groeneveld, 1997; Baltag, Moss, Solecki, 1999; Pacuit, Parikh, 2004). However, a public announcement can only play this role if it is trusted and everyone in the group expects it to be trusted. If this is right, then communities of trust may be the best and perhaps the only way for humans to systematically generate mutual and common knowledge.

Such communal rituals are also crucially involved in recovery from grief and trauma. For instance, Blustein (2008: 290) argues that rituals of remembrance for family and friends who have died “are essentially and importantly interpersonal. They are undertaken not only in relation to others or in the presence of others, but *with* others in a common action of communalization, and they join the individual in solidarity with others.” If this is right, then there is a bi-directional relation between psychological healing and communities of trust. Therapeutic rituals of remembrance essentially require a community that responds with solidarity and trust. At the same time, as I have mentioned above, communal bonds are created and enhanced through such rituals, and through enduring loss together. The necessity of trust for effective therapeutic rituals is made clearer by Blustein’s discussion of the testimonial interdependence of speaker and hearer. He argues that “bearing witness is associated with finding and registering one’s “voice,” that is, with telling one’s own story *and having it heard in the right way*” (p. 302, emphasis mine). He claims, moreover, that “bearing witness is a type of address to an audience in need, crucially dependent on *trust* in the witness, who has the relevant authority or competence to serve as a witness” (p. 305, emphasis mine).

If the bereaved does not trust his community to respond appropriately to his grief or trauma, he may not bear witness in the first place. This is one reason why victims of sexual assault often do not report their abuse (Sable et al., 2006). By the same token, if the community does not trust the bereaved to tell the story with authority and competence, the ritual is liable to fail and may lead to alienation and re-traumatization. Elizabeth DeVita-Raeburn, the sister of the famous “boy in the bubble” who suffered and died from aplastic anemia in the 1970s, gives poignant expression to this problem in *The Empty Room* (2004). Drawing on dozens of interviews with other bereaved siblings, she quotes “Amber,” whose younger brother died in a car crash when she was nineteen, saying “I felt like there were a lot of outlets for my parents, but I felt like there was nothing for me. People would interrupt my grief to say, ‘Boy, that must be really hard for your parents’” (p. 50). When grief is interrupted in this way or met with “institutional betrayal” of another kind (Smith, Freyd, 2014; see also Shay, 1994, 2003), people who have experienced loss and trauma tend to withdraw into their own suffering. They sever whatever bonds of trust formerly connected them to the community that trivialized or exploited their grief, and the process of mourning must be undertaken alone and often ineffectually.

This pattern is perhaps even more familiar to combat veterans than to civilians. In *Achilles in Vietnam*, Veterans’ Administration psychiatrist Jonathan Shay says that, for his patients, “healing from trauma depends upon communalization of the trauma—being able safely to tell the story to someone who is listening and who can be trusted to

retell it truthfully to others in the community” (1995: 4). Listening in a perfunctory way, he claims, “*destroys trust.*” Veterans in a civilian society face a nearly-insurmountable problem in this regard because people who have never experienced anything like combat tend to find it difficult to empathize, and may respond instead with disbelief, shock, or blame. This all-too-human reaction, like the reaction to Amber quoted in the previous paragraph, leads some veterans to wall themselves off from civilian society. As Shay says, it destroys trust. He goes on to argue that “any blow in life will have longer-lasting and more serious consequences if there is no opportunity to communalize it. This means some mix of formal social ceremony and informal telling of the story with feeling *to socially connected others*” (p. 39).

Although he does not give a detailed explanation for this psychological generalization, Shay does offer a topological insight in *Odysseus in America* (2003), in which he argues for the importance of what he calls “social trust.” Such trust, he says, “requires at least *three* people. Dyadic trust between two people, no matter how many times it is created pair-wise, does not make a community. A community begins with the addition of the third person, and with the belief of *each* individual that, when alone together, the other two will continue to safeguard the interests of each even when that person is *absent*” (pp. 175–6).

It is clear that cultural knowledge, both propositional and practical, depends on communities of trust. We do not have to learn everything from scratch, reinventing the wheel with every generation because we can take advantage of the learning of our contemporaries and predecessors. Naturally, this is most effective when the learner trusts teachers, role models, and other pedagogues. It is even more effective when the teachers trust their students. If, for instance, I don’t trust you not to turn around and kill me with the weapons I show you how to make, I will be, at best, a reluctant teacher. Thus, cultural goods depend on symmetric trust.

Cultural forms related to collective identity also depend essentially on communities of trust. Such identities inform our self-conceptions. They give us a sense of belonging, home, and history (Nietzsche, 1874). They provide us with heroes and villains on whom to model our behavior and practice moral judgments. They help to solidify bonds of trust within a community. The rituals that help to build collective identities often involve the same inward-facing circles mentioned above. Indeed, Wiessner (2014) estimates that upward of 80% of fireside chat among small-band hunter-gatherers concerns topics like *what makes us who we are and how we differ from them.*

Thus, once again, we see that dyadic trust, while an essential building block, is not sufficient to understand how communities of trust work, or fail to work. Let us redefine a community of trust, then, as whatever social structure is the *best path* out of the state of nature. In other words, a community of trust is whatever set or structure of social arrangements is the best way to pursue, promote, preserve, and protect the prudential, epistemic, mental-health, and cultural goods we have been cataloguing in this section. The concept of community as I use is therefore functionally defined in terms of its facility in fostering certain values and goods. When the people involved in such a community

cease to systematically reap the benefits it is meant to furnish, the community is defective. Should such defects persist, it becomes unclear whether there really is a community at all.⁴ In such an eventuality, distrust may be more appropriate than trust (Krishnamurthy, 2015). Furthermore, because relations of trust are interconnected, a breakdown in one part of the network can ramify out into other parts of the network; this makes trust a “fragile commodity” (Dasgupta, 1988). In addition, the normative facet of the concept of community as I use it here is “path-dependent” (Russell, 2015: 105; see also Russell, 2014) rather than “path-independent” in the sense that it takes biological and psychological facts about human animals as a starting point, then attempts to plot a normatively acceptable “best path” (Besser-Jones, 2014) constrained by these facts.

Topology of Communities of Trust

As McLoed points out in her 2015 entry on trust in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, one of the central philosophical questions about trust is under what conditions it is warranted. McLoed has unidirectional dyadic trust in mind, but we can expand the question to ask what reasons there might be to enrich a minimal network of trust (i.e., a unidirection, or a dyadic relation), either by extending it to a new member, or by increasing its density by establishing new connections within it. To answer this question, we need to reflect on the topology of trust.⁵ Think of individual people as nodes in a directed network, where an edge from node A to node B represents A’s trusting B with respect to some exogenously-given field of trust. Four of the most important properties in such a network are symmetry (being trusted by those you trust), reflexivity (trusting yourself), Euclideanism (your trustees trusting each other), and transitivity (trusting those who are trusted by those you trust). Figure 1 illustrates a minimal network, in which A trusts B, B doesn’t trust A, neither A nor B trust themselves, and no one else is involved.

Figure 1. Basic dyadic trust



In a minimal network like this, the prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health goods canvassed above are mostly unavailable. Testimonial knowledge can be transferred from B to A. A may not suffer from the fear of death at B’s hands. A certain amount of coordination and perhaps even cooperation may be possible. Beyond this, however, a minimal network delivers few of the goods that communities of trust are meant to provide.


4. See also Turri (forthcoming) and Miller (2010).

5. Things become more complicated when the field and its scope are endogenously determined. I will not deal with such complex cases in this paper.

Symmetric Trust

One way to enrich the minimal network is to add a link from B to A, making them equal partners (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Symmetric trust



To illustrate this, let the field of trust be navigating from their current location to a place neither has been before by car. A doesn't know how to drive, but does have a facility with reading a map. B is a capable driver and knows how to read a map. It should be obvious how they will proceed: B will do the driving, following the directions given by A. It should also be obvious that this arrangement would not work if B didn't trust A's competence, goodwill, or good sense in giving directions. If B doubted A's competence, she would probably try to do both the navigating and the driving. In the best-case scenario, she would end up a bit stressed-out, but otherwise no worse for wear. We can easily imagine, however, cases in which the increased cognitive load leads B to get lost or to crash the car. Even if neither of these bad outcomes results, A might be insulted by B's lack of trust and withdraw his own trust from B, perhaps leading him to abandon the joint trip. If B doubted A's goodwill (for instance, she thought A might direct her to some other location, such as a destination he preferred, or an isolated spot where he could rob her), B would presumably refuse to embark in the first place. Such a rebuff is liable to lead A to withdraw his trust from B, disintegrating the minimal network. If B doubted A's good sense (for instance, she thought A was likely to be distracted from the task of navigating, tempted by scenic routes, or indulgent towards creepy hitch-hikers), she might decide to embark but resolve to double-check every instruction B gives her. Once again, such an arrangement could work out, but it is fragile. It is not hard to imagine A becoming annoyed or resentful over the incessant double-checking and demonstrations of contempt of his good sense.

Coordination and cooperation between A and B will be greatly enhanced and made more modally robust if they both trust each other, rather than A trusting B but not receiving reciprocated trust. What might warrant B's trusting A? There are three arguments, one for each component of trust (competence, goodwill, and good sense). First, competence in a domain is highly associated with meta-competence in making judgments about competence in that domain (Collins, Evans, 2007: ch. 2). Pianists are better than the average person at judging the expertise of pianists. Medical doctors are better than the average person at judging the expertise of medical doctors, especially within their own specialization. If A trusts B to do the driving, and B thinks that this trust is well-

placed, then B has some evidence that A is capable of identifying competent drives. This in turn suggests that he might know enough about transit to competently read a map.

Secondly, B could have *pro tanto* reason to believe in A's goodwill if they have engaged in some of the bonding activities discussed above, such as laughing together, singing and dancing together, enduring trauma or grief together, or sharing a mutually recognized collective identity. In addition, B could have memories of A's past conduct in similar situations or testimonial knowledge (derived from her network of trusted gossipers) about A's track-record in similar situations with other people.

Thirdly, B might be warranted in trusting A by her own sense of fairness or reciprocity, or by her faith in humanity (Preston-Roedder, 2013). If someone has made it clear that they are willing to make themselves vulnerable to B, then she may naturally feel that it is only fair for her to make herself vulnerable to them. Likewise, the optimism associated with faith in humanity may lead B to think that anyone who, like A, is open with their trust deserves the benefit of the doubt, giving her warrant to return A's trust. These considerations, like the others just considered, clearly are not decisive, and there may be additional considerations that defeat them. Nevertheless, something like default reciprocity or a faith in humanity may also play a role in warranting the construction of symmetric trust.

Reflexive Trust

There is a remarkable near-consensus that, unless you have particular reasons to the contrary, you ought to trust yourself. For example, Pasnau (2015) argues that self-trust justifiably influences how we should react to peer disagreement. Lehrer (1997) argues that self-trust grounds reason, wisdom, and knowledge. Govier (1993) argues that self-trust grounds autonomy and self-respect. Jones (2012b) positively evaluates self-trust from a feminist perspective. Goldberg (2013) argues that self-trust is a good model for trust in others. Completely isolated self-trust may be psychologically possible, but it is unlikely that any human animal has ever developed it. The main questions for us in this section are, first, whether someone's trusting themselves or not provides additional warrant for another person to trust them, and secondly, whether being trusted by someone provides additional warrant to trust yourself.


Let us return to our navigation example above, in which A trusts B to drive to their destination while B trusts A to navigate. Suppose that A experiences a moment of self-doubt. He starts to worry that he isn't a competent navigator after all. In such a case, B's explicitly trusting him could function in a therapeutic way, giving him reason to restore his own self-trust. Next, consider the truism that one's possibilities for action are constrained by one's modal knowledge and beliefs. If you think that something is impossible, even if it's not, you can't try to accomplish it. A's impression of his own possibilities for action (and thus the range of actions he can actually take) is expanded by B's confidence in him. When she signals that she trusts him to do the navigating, she opens up the possibility of navigating for him (Alfano, Skorburg, forthcoming). If this is right, then thera-

peutic trust can be effective by influencing someone's confidence, and thereby their competence. However, it can also work through the goodwill component of trust. As McGeer (2008) reminds us, human motivation is often complicated and confusing. Sometimes we don't know what we really desire, value, or love. In those cases, it is helpful to refer to a normative lodestone, a model of good conduct. According to McGeer (pp. 248–9),

For help in this regard, we are sometimes encouraged to look outside ourselves for role models, finding in others' thoughts and actions laudable patterns on which to fashion our own. And this may serve us pretty well. However, something similar can occur, often more effectively, through the dynamic of hopeful scaffolding. Here we look outside ourselves once again; but instead of looking for laudable patterns in others' behavior, what we find instead are laudable patterns that others see—or prospectively see—in our own. We see ourselves as we might be, and thereby become something like a role model for ourselves. The advantage in this is clear: Instead of thinking, "I want to be like her,"—i.e., like someone else altogether—the galvanizing thought that drives us forward is seemingly more immediate and reachable: "I want to be as she already sees me to be."

Starting from a symmetric network like the one picture in figure 2, therapeutic trust may lead to reflexive trust as pictured in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Symmetric and reflexive trust




Next, consider the question of whether someone's trusting themselves could provide warrant for extending trust to them socially. This is a more difficult case. We can easily imagine a wildly overconfident person who has total self-trust, and who should therefore be avoided rather than trusted. By the same token, it would be imprudent to put your trust in someone who actively distrusted their own competence or strength of will to resist self-serving temptations. In between these extremes, someone who has measured trust in their own abilities and willpower might reasonably inspire trust in others. This perspective fits well with research by Justin Kruger and David Dunning (1999) which indicates that people with middling competence are fairly reliable in estimating their own competence, while highly incompetent people tend to overestimate their own abilities. If this is on the right track, then the second question about reflexivity receives a qualified positive answer.

Euclidean Trust

Consider next the networks of at least three individuals. What reasons might there be by to enrich such a network so that it is (closer to being) Euclidean? We can begin with the simple case illustrated in Figure 4.


Figure 4. Symmetric, but non-Euclidean trust



Under what conditions is it warranted for B to trust C, and C to trust B? At first blush, it might seem like this will be an especially troublesome link to establish. When A forms a symmetric link with C, B might be tempted to ask what makes this new friend so special. Rivalry, competition, and jealousy loom. However, in many cases, B and C will have good reason to establish relations of trust with one another, primarily in order to ensure that A remains trustworthy. To see why, consider the somewhat more complex “star-network” pictured in Figure 5.


In his seminal work on social networks, Freeman (1978) described the “star-network,” in which all other nodes are connected to a single central hub but not each other, and is the most unequal topology possible. Sexual predators and their targets often form a star-network, with the predator at the center and the victims on the points of the star. This keeps the victims from effectively communicating with one another, and coordinating or cooperating against the predator (Fire, Katz, Elovici, 2012). Star-networks are also associated with financial fraud (Šubelj, Furlan, Bajec, 2011), academic fraud (Callaway, 2011), and terrorist activities (Reid et al., 2005; Krebs, 2002). In a recent paper, Savage et al. (2014) categorize star-networks and near-star-networks in an effort to make their online detection more effective. Mutual and common knowledge, especially about problematic behavior by the hub of a community, is greatly enhanced by the gossip that occurs in Euclidean connections in that community.

Figure 5. Star-network



Naturally, not every relationship is in imminent danger of turning into sexual harassment, fraud, or terrorism, but for many sensitive relationships, these considerations suggest that making networks more Euclidean is warranted and may increase warranted trust in other members of the network (e.g., B's trust in A, in Figure 6).


Figure 6. Symmetric and Euclidean trust



Transitive Trust

This leaves us with transitivity, which is extending one's trust out into a network of trust. What reasons might there be to do this? If that network is already characterized by symmetry and reflexivity, then adding transitivity will make trust an equivalence relation in the community in question, as illustrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Trust as an equivalence relation




The philosophy of emotion tends not to bother much about logic, but in computer science, trust between computers is formally modeled as an equivalence relation (Kramer, Goré, Okamoto, 2010). As we saw above in Shay's definition of social trust, he believes, on the basis of clinical experience, that recovery from grief and trauma is only possible in a context where trust extends transitively for at least one step. These observations suggest that we have reason to find or construct small communities that have this characteristic.

Small-scale communities in which everyone knows everyone can sustain the literal transitivity of trust. As the community increases, the need for vicarious or mediated trust increases with it. X vicariously trusts Y through M with respect to the field of trust of F, just in case X trusts M with respect to F, M trusts Y with respect to F, and X trusts M's judgment about who is trustworthy with respect to F. Vicarious trust has a distinctive counterfactual signature in the sense that, if X vicariously trusts Y through M, then were X to become directly acquainted with Y, X would continue to trust Y non-vicariously. We can think of this in terms of *delegation* (empowering someone to extend your trust vicariously) and *ratification* (explicitly confirming an instance of delegation). In cases where an acquaintance with Y leads X to withdraw rather than ratify her vicarious trust in Y, she may also begin to doubt M: perhaps M lacks goodwill or good sense after all. To illustrate

this, suppose that I trust you with my secrets. You trust your sibling with your secrets, but I explicitly distrust your sibling. If I find out that you tell your sibling everything, I'm going to be motivated to avoid telling you things I don't trust her with. Or, suppose my boss trusts me to complete a task, and that I sub-contract out a part of that task to someone she distrusts. Again, if she finds out that I've done this, she will most likely withdraw her trust from me, at least regarding this task and perhaps more, generally. She might conclude that I lack goodwill or good sense. Or, she might question my competence to perform the task in question, given that I sub-contracted it to someone she considers untrustworthy.

Shy of such a highly demanding approach to transitivity, we might ask about extending one's trust one or two steps out into a community (Figure 8). What reasons are there for C to trust D, who is trusted by someone she trusts (B)?

Figure 8. Transitive extension of trust



In addition to *delegation*, we might focus on the phenomenon of *vouching*. B vouches for D to C if B makes himself accountable for any failure on D's part to prove trustworthy, either via outright betrayal or via incompetence or lack of good sense. Thus, one reason for C to trust D is if B vouches for D. How is such vouching meant to work? It relies on the (apparent) rationality of extending trust transitively. If C trusts B and B trusts D, then C has a reason to trust D.

This reason needn't be compelling. C can withhold her trust from D even as she gives it to B. As above, my hypothesis is that transitivity provides a *pro tanto* reason to extend trust, not an all-things-considered reason. Why would it do so? There are three arguments, one for each component of trust (competence, goodwill, and good sense). First, as we saw above, competence in a domain is highly associated with meta-competence in making judgments about competence in that domain (Collins, Evans, 2007: ch. 2). If C

trusts B, that means C deems B competent or even an expert with respect to their shared field of trust. It stands to reason, then, that C should expect B to be better than the average person at judging the competence of others in that field. So if B gives his trust to D, C has a reason to think that D is competent.

Secondly and thirdly together, it is psychologically difficult and perhaps even practically irrational to consciously engage in efforts to undermine your own values in the very process of pursuing and promoting those values. Imagine someone locking a door while they're trying to walk through the doorway. Someone could do this by mistake, but then they lack good sense. Someone could do it as a gag, or in pretense, but it is hard to envision a case in which someone does this consciously. Likewise, it is hard to envision a case in which someone genuinely bears you goodwill, and consciously expresses that goodwill by recommending that you put your fate in the hands of someone they expect to betray your trust. They might do so by mistake, as a gag, or in pretense, but a straightforward case is difficult to imagine. If C trusts B, that means C judges that B bears her relevant goodwill. It stands to reason, then, that C should expect B to act on that goodwill in a practically rational way. So if B gives his trust to D, C has a reason to think that D would act consistently with B's goodwill. Putting these together, if C trusts B and B trusts D, then C has a reason to think that D is competent, bears (people like) C goodwill, and has good sense. In other words, C has *pro tanto* reasons to trust D.

Drawbacks of Communities of Trust

Returning to Hobbes's taxonomy of the goods furnished by communities of trust, I shall now argue for a more systematic taxonomy, structured as follows:

- *prudential*: coordination; cooperation;
- *epistemic*: testimonial knowledge; collaborative inquiry; mutual and common knowledge;
- *mental health*: recovery from grief and trauma;
- *cultural*: art & letters; collective identity.

I understand coordination in terms of approximation of Nash's 1951 work on equilibrium and cooperation in terms of mutual benefit (refusing to defect) in mixed-motive contexts. Ignoring transaction costs, people can only benefit from coordination, whereas cooperation is beneficial on the whole but sometimes requires partners to incur costs. It should be immediately clear from what has already been said that communities of trust foster both coordination and cooperation. As I have explained above, members of communities of trust have a shared understanding of the scope of the field of trust and confidence in one another's competence in respect of the field of trust. This makes it possible for them to coordinate their activities harmoniously, in turn allowing them to reap such benefits of coordination as Hobbes mentions (capital, agriculture, trade, or security).

However, communities of trust make various problematic phenomena possible, such as collective betrayals and alleged collective betrayals. They can become insular and walled-off from the surrounding community, leading to distrust of the out-group. They

tend towards nepotism, cronyism, and other forms of parochial altruism. These drawbacks of communities of trust arise from some of the same mechanisms that give them positive prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health value, and so can at most be mitigated, though not eliminated.

Perhaps the best fictional reflections on the dynamics, functions, and pitfalls of communities of trust are zombie apocalypses. This is because in a zombie apocalypse, the characters lose access to the infrastructural and institutional benefits (and harms) that pervade contemporary life. They return to a state of nature which is exceedingly dangerous. There are all of the ordinary difficulties associated with acquiring access to scarce resources like water, shelter, and food. There are ordinary threats like bad weather, wild animals, and disease. There are, of course, the zombies themselves, which elevate the level of existential threat and engender distrust even among comrades who have to worry at all times that one among them has been bitten (and either doesn't know it or is hiding the injury). Perhaps most importantly, there are other bands of survivors who have the same fears and compete for the same resources. Should outsiders be incorporated into the group, potentially strengthening it while increasing its needs and vulnerability to betrayal? Should other groups be resisted, merged with, tolerated as independent entities, or raided for resources? These questions arise naturally in this genre of fiction, which can help us to vividly imagine what it is like to be in and trying to escape from the state of nature.

Furthermore, these questions revolve around the question of trust, so it should come as no surprise that *The Walking Dead* (a television series based on a critically-acclaimed series of graphic novels), a recent exemplar of the genre of the zombie apocalypse, explicitly references the necessity and the difficulty of establishing trust within a community and of extending trust to outsiders. For example, in Season 4, Episode 1 (Gimple, Nicotero, 2013), a central character named Rick Grimes institutes a new ritual. Potential recruits of his beleaguered community must satisfactorily answer three questions: "How many walkers [zombies] have you killed? How many people have you killed? Why?" As I have pointed out above, trusting someone involves believing or taking it for granted that they have competence, goodwill, and good sense. In the context of a zombie apocalypse, allying with someone who is incompetent at killing zombies could be deadly for oneself and one's community. Such a person is liable to undermine coordinated efforts at mutual defense. Beyond that, they are more likely to become infected themselves, putting the community at risk from an internal threat. The first question Grimes asks addresses competence. If you have haven't killed enough zombies, you're probably incompetent.

The second and third questions address goodwill and good sense. Murder is *prima facie* wrong and contrary to goodwill, but in a state of nature such an act may be prudentially required to protect oneself, or morally required to protect members of one's community from raiders. In a state of nature, someone who claims not to have killed any other people faces suspicion of lacking good sense, or of lying. Either way, they're not trustworthy. In a state of nature, someone who cannot provide an inter-subjectively acceptable answer to the question "Why?" faces suspicion of lacking goodwill. Note that

the answer might be deemed unacceptable in virtue of its content (e.g., “He looked at me funny.”), or in virtue of the manner of its delivery (e.g., responding too quickly, too slowly, too tersely, too longwindedly, or with shifty eyes). As Slingerland (2014) argues, hard-to-fake embodied signals are essential to establishing trust in interpersonal contexts.

In Season 5, Episode 12 of *The Walking Dead* (Powell, Nicotero, 2015), the tables are turned: Deanna Monroe, the leader of a well-resourced community called Alexandria, is considering whether to recruit Rick Grimes’s group. Here is a telling exchange between the two leaders:

RICK GRIMES: You put up the wall [around Alexandria]?

DEANNA MONROE: Well, there was this huge shopping mall being built nearby. And my husband Reg is a professor of architecture. . . . He got the first plates up with our sons. And after a few weeks, more people arrived and we had help. We had a community.

RICK GRIMES: You’ve been behind these walls this entire time?

DEANNA MONROE: We need people who have lived out there. Your group is the first we’ve even considered taking in for a long time.

RICK GRIMES: You should keep your gates closed.

DEANNA MONROE: Why?

RICK GRIMES: Because it’s all about survival now. At any cost. People out there are always looking for an angle. Looking to play on your weakness. They measure you by what they can take from you. By how they can use you to live. So bringing people into a place like this now . . .

DEANNA MONROE: Are you telling me not to bring your people in? Are you already looking after this place? Aaron [a recruiter for Alexandria] says I can trust you.

RICK GRIMES: Aaron doesn’t know me. I’ve killed people. I don’t even know how many by now. But I know why they’re all dead. They’re dead so my family, all those people out there, can be alive, so I could be alive for them.

DEANNA MONROE: Sounds like I’d want to be part of your family.

Even though he hasn’t been asked the three questions, Grimes volunteers answers to the second (“How many people have you killed?”) and third (“Why?”). Perhaps without meaning to, he convinces Monroe that he is trustworthy. In doing so, he induces her to extend her trust and, to the extent that she has power over it, the trust of her whole community to Grimes and his group.

Thus, zombie apocalypse stories are perhaps the best fictional reflections on the dynamics, functions, and pitfalls of communities of trust in a hostile world. In the Alexandria plot, the community is literally walled off from the outside world. This is a natural reaction for communities of trust. After all, one of the benefits of their coordination and cooperation is the accumulation of capital, including movable capital. This makes them a target of opportunity for other individuals and communities. A successful community of trust, unless its coordination and cooperation somehow produces only infinite or intrinsically non-transferrable goods, will face this challenge. Assuming they recognize the

challenge, they will inevitably have reasons to distrust outsiders and make preparations for their mutual defense.

Next, as I have mentioned above, one of the psychological mechanisms that relies on communities of trust and enhances the bonds within them is a sense of collective identity. Collective identities tend to be contrastive. They primarily concern what we are like, but they often also concern what *they* are like, where the third-person pronoun references one or more out-groups. For obvious reasons, such contrasts tend to be invidious, leading to or reinforcing biases against out-groups and their members. In addition, as Dunbar (1993) points out, one of the main aims of cooperation in communities of trust has been military success, from the Roman maniple to the current day. Violent inter-group conflicts inevitably lead to shared traumatic loss, a key psychological mechanism for building communities of trust. Such conflicts naturally also lead to and reinforce hostility to other groups. Finally, recent works by De Dreu, Balliet, and Halevy (2014) suggest that one of the psycho-biological mechanisms of trust-formation within a group is the hormone neuropeptide oxytocin.⁶ Oxytocin is associated with both parochial cooperation, which is oriented towards the in-group and explicitly exclusive towards others, and derogation of and hostility towards members of rivaling out-groups (ibid.: 4).

If these cautionary points are on the right track, then communities of trust, despite their desirability, should be approached with ambivalence. They make possible a basket of essential prudential, epistemic, cultural, and mental health values, but the mechanisms that foster them ineliminably engender regrettable conflicts. As such, the benefits of communities of trust can at most be mitigated, but not eliminated.

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6. Though see Nave, Camerer, and McCullough (2015) for a critical review of this research program.

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Топология сообществ доверия

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Гоббс считал, что естественное состояние — это состояние войны, поскольку оно определяется фундаментальным и обобщенным недоверием. Выход из естественного состояния и конфликтов, которые оно неизбежно влечет, предполагает установление доверия. Однако обсуждение «доверия» в философии чаще всего фокусируется либо на изолированных диадах индивидов, доверяющих друг другу, либо на доверии в больших безликих институтах. Задача данной статьи — заполнить пробел между этими двумя крайностями путем анализа «топологии сообществ доверия». Такие сообщества можно лучше всего представить как взаимосвязанные диадические отношения, которые приближены к идеалу поскольку они симметричны, рефлексивны и транзитивны. Немногие сообщества доверия соответствуют этому описанию, и те, что приближаются к нему, это, как правило, небольшие сообщества (от 3 до 15 индивидов). Именно в таких сообществах доверия возможно появление различных важных рациональных, познавательных, культурных благ и душевного спокойствия. Однако в сообществах доверия становятся возможными также многие сомнительные феномены. Сообщества могут изолироваться от окружающего общества, и тем самым стать источником недоверия со стороны окружения. Они могут вынудить своих членов отказаться от общественных благ в пользу родовых или частных благ. Этими недостатками сообщества доверия обязаны тем же самым механизмам, которые придают им положительную, рациональную, эпистемическую, культурную и психическую ценность, поэтому последствия работы этих механизмов можно только смягчить, но не исключить целиком.

Ключевые слова: доверие, недоверие, сообщество, процветание, эпистемология, топология, эмоции, социальная эпистемология

“To Trust or Not to Trust” Is Not the Question; “How to Study Trust” Is Much More Challenging Task*

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The article considers trust as one of the most teasing and vague notions in sociology for it is widely used in both everyday language and scientific discourse as taken for granted and not presuming any special interpretations or situational definitions. In the first section the author identifies key elements of the sociological study of trust (causes and effects; determinants and practical implications of different “types” and “levels” of trust; the prevailing definition of trust as a means of coping with uncertainty, etc.). The second and the third sections consider the empirical study of trust within quantitative and qualitative approaches pointing briefly to their focus of interest, which is social and political trust measured in large-scale surveys, often in the comparative perspective, in the former case; while the latter seeks to understand what trust means for people and why they prefer to speak about trust using specific words in particular situations. The fourth section discusses the discursive construction of trust; the author believes that narrative analysis is a perfect methodological decision (provided there is enough “quantitative” and “qualitative” data to contextualize its findings for correct interpretation) to identify the typological discursive constitution of trust in everyday practices; and illustrates such a potential of narrative analysis on a small example of semi-structured interviews with the Russian rural dwellers. The article ends with a few concluding remarks to summarize key findings and challenges of the trust research for now, which is justly enough considered to be at the crossroads.

Keywords: trust, distrust, quantitative approach, qualitative approach, narrative analysis, discursive practices, everyday language, scientific discourse

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“But it does not seem that I can trust anyone,” said Frodo. Sam looked at him unhappily. “It all depends on what you want,” put in Merry. “You can trust us to stick with you through thick and thin—to the bitter end. And you can trust us to keep any secret of yours—closer than you keep it yourself. But you cannot trust us to let you face trouble alone, and go off without a word.”

J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Fellowship of the Ring*

Relationships are mysterious. We doubt the positive qualities in others, seldom the negative. You will say to your partner: do you really love me? . . . You will ask this a dozen times and drive the person nuts. But you never ask: are you really mad at me? . . . When someone is angry, you do not doubt it for a moment. Yet the reverse should be true. We should doubt the negative in life, and have faith in the positive.

Christopher Pike, *Remember Me*

We all and always live in a verbally and visually discursively constructed world. We quite often do not pay any attention to the meaning of the words we use (a) to communicate with each other, (b) to describe ourselves as unique personalities or typical social creatures, and (c) to make many different things around us clear, even for ourselves. Undoubtedly, the words we use in everyday life and in scientific discussions are not (always) the same. As scientists we seek, with the help of specific notions and categories, the “higher” level of generalizations so as not to drown in the swamp of insignificant details, and to make social life look clear, reliable, and predictable as a collection of skillful models. However, there are words of everyday language that are used in scientific studies as well. The most important words for the sociological study of social and personal well-being seem to be “happiness” and “trust” (of course, there are many more important notions, but these two have attracted recently more sociological attention and heuristic resources than any others). Although the words “happiness” and “trust” could compete in vagueness and multiplicity of (contextual) meanings, the latter is more difficult to work with. The former is perceived and defined quite easily in everyday life. We all occasionally think about how happy we are when referring to different media, advertising, or examples of literature or the arts that form the basis and the framework of national traditions and mass culture. Trust is an awkward notion, for we are not used to a constant everyday reflection on the criteria of trusting people, groups, or institutions, and to the identification of the levels of trust in them. On the contrary, we are rather used to referring to family links, traditions, or previous experience in explaining our decisions, without appealing to the notion of trust in all such cases.

Thus, the aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that, at the theoretical level, sociologists (and social scientists in general) do accept the vagueness and ambiguity of the notion “trust.” However, at the empirical level we pretend to forget (or ignore) that there

is no certainty in the “content” of trust since we use this notion as a valid and reliable empirical indicator of current social and political situations. Certainly, the aim of the article is too ambitious and impossible to achieve, so one goal is not to “give a diagnosis,” but rather to draw attention to the problem of not understanding what we really “measure” under the name of “trust.” Another goal is to suggest some ways to clarify the empirical interpretations of trust in sociological research. To do so, the article starts with a kind of systematization of the theoretical conceptualizations of trust, followed with the listing of the more frequent empirical frameworks and methodological decisions to identify the level of trust in different real life contexts. Additionally, there is a possible solution to bridge the gap between the quantitative and qualitative approaches in the study of trust (primarily to evaluate political or economic situations, or make prognoses on the development of social capital, or the insurance industry, etc.), i.e., a narrative analysis of the discursive construction of trust in everyday communication. Finally, there is a kind of conclusion on the reasons why trust research seems to be at the crossroads nowadays, regardless of its long history of interdisciplinary development. It must be noted that these conclusions are rather a starting point for further debates and research than proper and final conclusions.

Trust as a Hard-to-Define Concept of Scientific Discourse (Unlike Non-necessary-to-Define Common Words of Everyday Language)

Undoubtedly, to be considered a true (and probably trustworthy) sociologist, one should ask awkward questions such as “What do we really mean by naming some relationship as trust and by considering some man trustworthy?” In everyday life, we quite easily warn our companions who trust us by saying that we should or should not trust someone, without providing proofs of this person being a broken reed. We may simply label the other one as obscure or strange. In everyday communication, we usually choose our “trustees,” relying on them in developing our own estimates of people around us without any extra considerations and further discussion. However, the situation is much more complicated in social sciences in general, and in the sociological study of trust, in particular. Sociologists strive to “measure” concepts such as trust that elude definitions. Sociology cannot claim to cover the trust topic entirety for the field of trust research is truly interdisciplinary (see, e.g., Lyon, Möllering, Saunders, 2015). The field of trust research includes psychology, political science, anthropology, management (economic, more generally, and organizational trust, in particular), and computer science, all with their own unique perspectives on trust. This results in significant, yet differing, theoretical and practical contributions and implications to the field of trust studies, considerably blurring the disciplinary boundaries within it (see, e.g., Lane, Bachmann, 1998).

Trust is a recurrent theme in social sciences, especially in the last decades. It has become the focus of a great deal of empirical studies aiming, on the one hand, to identify the causes and effects of trust (or distrust) in social life, and on the other hand, to describe the determinants and practical implications of different “types” of trust. These

types include interpersonal, organizational, inter-organizational, and institutional trust; thoughtless and reasonable trust, spontaneous and voluntary; personal trust—among those who know each other intimately, and trust among strangers—interpersonal, social, generalized; cognitive trust—an estimate of the trustworthiness of those with whom one has relationships, and non-cognitive trust—dispositional or moralistic interpretation of trust as a value. There is also dyadic trust, which depends upon the expectations or social bonds with a particular other, while embedded trust depends upon social networks and institutional arrangements. There is trust in modern and pre-modern societies, and “levels” of trust (e.g., individual, community, population, organization, and at a societal level) for specific fields of social life (economics, politics, finance, self-management, cooperation of all forms, social capital, or civil participation). As a sociological concept, trust has become increasingly important in recent decades (it is considered an essential source of good government and skillful management, economic growth, and social harmony). However, it still lacks a widely agreed-upon definition or commonly shared understanding regardless of the numerous attempts to distinguish it from other semantically similar concepts such as familiarity, confidence, dependence or trustworthiness (Levi, 2015: 667), of the widely accepted theoretical conceptualizations of trust (see, e.g., Jalava, 2006) in terms of its social functions as a part of structure and agency rendering (see Giddens, 1991; Luhmann, 1979).

The concept of trust has a long intellectual history within the sociological tradition, mainly as a key source of the construction of social order, cooperation, institutions, organizations, and the majority of everyday interactions. Such a wide range of interpretations can easily be tied together by the prevailing definition of trust as a means of coping with uncertainty with a conditional way of implementation determined by the specific domains of taking the decision to entrust someone. For instance, one can trust a schoolteacher to care about one’s child, but would not trust a schoolteacher with a large sum of money to hide from one’s spouse. Here, trustworthiness is a conditional attribute of a person or institution that has two obvious dimensions; either the trustor is considered to act in my interests due to some moral values and relations, or the trustor is believed to be competent in the domain of my trust. However, there is still no agreement among scientists on the sources of such function of trust (coping with uncertainty), or on the kinds of interactions which either enhance trust or are enhanced by it (see, e.g., Levi, Stoker, 2000; Tyler, 1998).

Nevertheless, for all representatives of the contemporary sociology of trust (see, e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Govier, 1997; Sztompka, 1999), trust is primarily, though only partly, connected with risks and uncertainty. It is considered to be a kind of remedy from an uncertain future, “a simplifying strategy that enables individuals to adapt to complex social environment, and thereby benefit from increased opportunities” (Earle, Cvetkovich, 1995: 38). Trust is “possible because we are not only knowing and believing creatures but valuing creatures who relate in a profound and profoundly natural way to others” (Govier, 1997: 9). Social norms, values, and familiar behavioral patterns of others alone are not enough to make us feel secure (or comfortable) in today’s society that is full of risks. It fol-

lows, then, that Giddens (1991: 244) defines trust as “the vesting of confidence in persons or in abstract systems, made on the basis of a “leap of faith” which brackets ignorance or lack of information.” To enhance this point of view, Piotr Sztompka writes that “trusting becomes the crucial strategy for dealing with an uncertain and uncontrollable future . . . that has generally beneficial consequences for the partners in social relationships, and the groups to which they belong, as well as for the peaceful, harmonious, and cohesive quality of wider social life” (Sztompka, 1999: 25, 115).

I believe this is a perfect definition of trust for understanding everyday interpersonal interactions, and for explaining complex political, economic, and social issues at the theoretical level. However, this is not the case at the empirical level of sociological analysis. As a respondent, I agree that I do (completely or rather) trust in the national government, in the church, in the army, or in Sberbank of Russia. As for my beloved person, I certainly mean very different things under the same label of “trust.” Certainly, sociologists soundly ignore such a difference of implied meanings for empirical research aims, since similar ignorances make empirical sociology possible. Otherwise, we would have already given up hope and attempts to reach compromises regarding many empirical indicators. However, ignoring such differences does not eliminate the necessity to discuss the problem as it is.

A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Social and Political Trust

As a rule (at least in the Russian sociological tradition), trust is primarily perceived as political and/or social trust being in the sustainable decline in the post-Soviet period. This is a rather sad and depressing fact given the argument that trust is an essential source and obligatory guarantee of a good society. As a rule, such pessimistic estimates of post-socialist transformations in the Russian society are based on the comparisons of decades of responses to the same national survey questions that indicate an obvious reduction in political and social trust. This reduction in trust has been declared the most important empirical indicator of the absence or insufficiency of social capital basically relying on trust as its critical element (see, e.g., Coleman, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). For instance, G. Hosking argues that the Soviet Union destroyed trust by creating such a repressive Communist regime that made distrust the key element of the totalitarian state, even at the level of ruling political elites (Hosking, 2014: 17).

Undoubtedly, the most universal version of quantitative study of trust in sociology and political science is a kind of statistical analysis of different empirical indicators of trust (designed for varying goals, social-economic circumstances, and political-electoral situations). This type of analysis identifies its variations, their causes and consequences over time, and reconstructs the “ideal” attributes of trustworthy government, economic exchanges, or social interactions in general. In most countries of the world, there is a huge amount of data obtained through national surveys attempting to measure either political or social trust, or both. However, there are probably as many controversial debates about how well they measure data in terms of validity, objectivity, and reliability, as

discussions on whether social surveys can measure social trust at all and not some other issues such as social anxiety or fears (see, e.g., Nannestad, 2008).

Sociological surveys of the last decade indicate the dual nature of social trust in Russian society. On the one hand, there is a high level of everyday practical distrust expressed towards others (strangers in the crowd, people I do not know that are around me). On the other hand, there is high declarative trust in three significant symbolic institutions: (a) the head of the state (the Russian president), (b) the church, and (c) the army (Gudkov, 2012). National opinion polls show that, in general, the credibility of the social institute coincides with the mass recognition of its symbolic role, i.e., with its functional significance in an imaginary picture of reality, and with its importance for the maintenance of social structure and organization of Russian society. In other words, the above-mentioned duality is an indicator of the vast discrepancy between the political sphere and everyday life. This leads to the lack of trust necessary for joint action, to the lack of solidarity, common symbols, identities, civil participation and activity (including mutual responsibility).

The majority of quantitative trust studies in the form of national surveys aims to provide estimates of the level of social or political trust in the comparative temporal perspective, but there are no guarantees (except for bad sociological faith) that we adequately capture (and do capture at all) real changes in trust. This is because people can understand the same questions and response options differently at different points in time due to changing social contextual frames and discursive games of a political or other nature. Obviously, the comparative spatial perspective is no less exposed to the same methodological problems (see, e.g., Narbut, Trotsuk, 2015; Trotsuk, Savelieva, 2015). However, there are many interesting observations on the variations in trust within and across populations and countries based on survey evidence (see, e.g., Yamagishi, Yamagishi, 1994; Rothstein, 2011). For instance, cross-national surveys consistently show that the majority of the population in only a few countries believes that “most people can be trusted,” those of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Dutch, Anglophone Canadians, and the Australians. On the other end of the scale, the least trusting people live in Turkey and most countries of Latin America and Africa, which is usually explained by the strong dependence of generalized trust on the economic equality, since greater equality leads to greater trust (Uslaner, 2002).

Another illustration from personal research projects is presented in the table below. The data has been obtained from the surveys on different (but representing the metropolitan universities' student population) samples in a number of countries through the same questionnaire. Sociologists from all countries involved use this data as a basis to evaluate the social confidence of the younger generations in the key social institutions of their countries, regardless of the obvious differences in the interpretations and even perception of such (there is no other way to work within the quantitative approach which seeks the “scale” through the standardization of questions–answers format and omitting the semantic nuances). As can be seen in the Table 1, the figures open an unlimited scope of interpretations (even ideologically biased), provided that the data is considered “trustworthy” in regards to the research procedures and organizers. For instance, there is a

huge difference in the level of the younger generations' trust in the key governing bodies. In Russia and Kazakhstan, about 60% of respondents claim to trust the government and the president, while in Serbia and the Czech Republic, the share of such is four to five times less. However, the other data does not allow making conclusions on the similarities of the post-Soviet countries' student youth worldview as compared to the post-socialist countries of Europe. The levels of trust in social institutions are too different in all of the mentioned societies. This probably points not only to real discrepancies in perceiving social institutions of contemporary societies, but also to the differing expectations for each of them, and the mismatching definitions of trust regarding each institution mentioned in the Table 1.

Table 1. "To what extent do you trust in . . ."
(%, "completely trust" and "rather trust" options combined,
other options left out, not all objects of evaluation presented)

Objects of trust	Moscow students (2015) ¹	University of Belgrade (2014) ²	University of Kosovska Mitrovica (2014)	Charles University in Prague (2015) ³	L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University in Astana (2015) ⁴
Government	56.8	12.4	13.5	17.5	58.8
President	63.4	9.0	13.0	9.4	69.2
Political parties	34.3	4.1	5.4	17.2	49.1
Local NGOs	41.8	13.2	11.1	58.1	51.4
International NGOs	37.4	13.5	12.0	51.5	46.7
Police/law enforcement agencies	44.8	25.8	36.6	48.5	44.8
Courts	51.1	23.9	26.2	57.3	48.6
Banks	43.9	20.2	30.1	50.4	50.5
Big business	40.2	9.5	20.3	29.2	55.2
Mass media	31.8	11.2	22.6	26.3	44.8
Church/religion	52.2	48.3	74.9	16.3	59.0
Army	46.5	57.0	64.5	56.3	54.7

1. The survey was conducted on the sample of 1000 Moscow students in different universities of the Russian capital by the Sociological Laboratory of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia.

2. The data on Serbia was provided by the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Priština with the temporary Head Office in Kosovska Mitrovica.

3. The data on Prague was provided by the Department of Social Sciences of the Sociology Institute of Charles University in Prague.

4. The data on Kazakhstan was provided by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University in Astana.

Trust is a too-multifaceted issue to consider it so generally and to be so clearly determined. There are opinions that trust is the default position in a democratic society; the population trusts public officials, for these officials can be removed with understandable procedures (Hosking, 2014: 177). Even so, trust in the government is consistently higher in China than in the United States. Trust rises and falls in time due to different political, economic, and other events of national importance (Pew Research Center, 2014). The situation in Russia is very specific in this perspective, for trust is very differentiated. On the one hand, in recent years, the level of society's trust in the Russian President is consistently high (about 70–80%, depending on the time of survey and the objective social, economic, political, and even geopolitical circumstances). On the other hand, the trust of the population in almost all social institutions has declined, especially in the last year. The most significant decline is typical for such political institutions as the government (45% in 2015 vs. 26% in 2016), the State Duma (40% vs. 22%), and regional authorities (38% vs. 23%) (Levada-Center, 2016). Such a distribution of social trust is a feature of the Russian society in general, and of different social-demographic groups in particular. Thus, the survey conducted on the sample of 1000 Moscow students in 2009 revealed a similar distribution of answers, though with a higher level of trust in all social institutions. The survey showed that 60% of the respondents trusted the president, while only about 30% trusted the government, 20% trusted the State Duma, 26% trusted the Federation Council (26%), 23% trusted the Public Chamber, and so on.

In general, the scientists claim that there is worldwide growing public distrust in official and professional institutions in which we used to place our confidence. R. Putnam suggests, that since the 1960s, membership in associations of civil society has drastically declined (Putnam, 2000). Though the decline in trust is partly illusory since trust is not necessarily at a lower level than it was previously, but it is taking different forms (see, e.g., Giddens, 1991). A “culture of suspicion” is developing ubiquitously, evidenced in such indicators of growing distrust as rising crime rates, the weakening of family institutional functions, an increase in the distrust in scientific and medical knowledge, police, state and municipal officials, and so on (Fukuyama, 1999: 49–52). However, such conclusions do not problematize the meanings that people put into or associate with the word “trust” when evaluating their personal “trust” in very different social “bodies.” For instance, the president of the country is a “real” person most citizens know by sight, by name, and by citations. This is different from “the government” which is rather an abstract concept you prefer to trust or not to trust on very different grounds, including the estimates of the situation in the country in general, in one's municipality in particular, or even on the basis of one's emotional perception of some key representatives of the government (given that you are aware of them). In other words, the quantitative findings call for a qualitative “filling” for the correct interpretation of what the figures in the surveys actually hide behind sustainable and stereotypical generalizations regarding different issues in the countries differing by traditions, their historical paths, and statistical data on the political involvement and civil engagement of the population.

Qualitative Approach to the Study of Trust as a Basis of Everyday Life

Probably, trust is a perfect topic and concept to illustrate the most common perception of the distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches in sociological research. The former focus on the “quality” of society as measured through the scale and types of trust and distrust within it (such as what shares of the population claim to trust the government, the church, the politicians, the media, the president, or the police). The latter seeks to understand what trust really means for people, and why members of society prefer to speak about trust using specific words in particular situations, thereby explaining their choices, decisions, and actions. In other words, the dividing line is between the aims of the research and its techniques rather than between the prevailing interpretations of trust. In either a quantitative or qualitative case, we can combine elements of dispositional, moral, social, and instrumental/calculative definitions of trust. However, regardless of one’s interpretational preferences, the empirical researcher must somehow identify all the important elements of trust. These elements include an object of trust, that is, a person/persons or organization/institution being trusted/distrusted; a domain of trust, that is, what the social actors are being trusted to do; the prevailing sources/motives of trust (emotions, traditions, rational reasons, personal relations, impersonal relationships embodied in bureaucracy, market or formal law); and the factors determining the relational character of trust in the situation under study.

Within the qualitative approach, trust is taken for granted as “existing” in many different forms. There is no need in discussing whether trust relies mainly on personal or impersonal/interactions, whether it exists primarily in personal relations with incentives and interests, or is rather an attribute of institutions regulating political, market, and large-scale social interactions. There is no need to discuss whether it exists only in a limited set of cases (when the trustor knows the trustee well enough to believe in their aims and values compatibility), or whether trust relies more on confidence and familiarity or on assurance or coercion of third-party insurers, contracts, and other legal and institutional arrangements. No attention needs to be given to whether trust is essential to a well-ordered society constitutive moral glue, or rather an instrumental and cognitive means to achieve given ends. The vital sociological question is why people trust (or mistrust) one another, which implies clear, everyday interpretations and an understanding of the mechanisms of trust.

For instance, in traditional Russian village communities in previous centuries, peasants were welded together by the so-called “joint responsibility.” If one household failed to pay its share, the community provided a necessary substitute (products, labor, or a recruit for the army) willingly (for reasons of altruism or common sense) or unwillingly. Forms of land tenure and village administration were designed to ensure that the custom of mutual aid would benefit the rulers by collecting taxes and conducting recruitment campaigns relatively easily. The benefit to the peasants was to survive natural, economic and social difficulties, and emergencies. The resulting customs were so strong and sustainable that they re-emerged after the Revolution in Soviet society in the forms of collec-

tive farms or communal apartments. Even today, in post-Soviet society, such structures of trust reconstitute themselves. In the case of emergency or any life trouble, people prefer to look for rescue or solace among their beloved ones or social network (their group of solidarity) and not among formal bodies (law enforcement, courts, etc.). As the results of the last decade's repeated surveys on the representative students' samples in the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia have shown, when young people feel intense fear or anxiety, about 40% usually go for advice/support/comfort to their families and relatives and more than 40% go to their friends, with every fourth respondent discussing one's problems with friends on the Internet. In general, the key source of support for Russians in difficult moments are family members and relatives (87%), and friends (59%) (Kuchenkova, 2016). In other words, Russians prefer to share their difficult life experiences with the most trusted people in their lives, which are parents and friends, that is, the people they feel an affinity with and feel confident to generate, renew, and reinforce the mutual trust resource.

Though these numbers do not fit into the qualitative approach at all, they represent the most widespread format of the sociological study of trust, even in personal relations. Nevertheless, there are examples of "true" "quality" in the sociological evaluation of essential features of trust in our everyday life. For these examples, narrative analysis seems to be a perfect methodological decision and a technique to identify key features of trust as narrated into existence in everyday talks and in more artificial communicative forms, such as non- and semi-structured interviews. Unfortunately, even "purely" qualitative topics in today's sociological research tend to be substituted by quantitative "measurement," making the study of the discursive construction of trust in everyday narratives a necessary step in the interpretation of what people really mean when they talk about trust in different social situations and local contextual frames. Of course, there is a serious restriction that a researcher must always keep in mind: if you ask a person directly about trusting in something/someone, such questioning provokes socially-approved and normatively-determined answers. This negates the attempts to find out everyday "natural" and spontaneous perception of trust issues. Therefore, it is better not to articulate trust topics openly, but rather to direct a respondent to such perceptions accurately and without verbal coercion.

Discursive Construction of Trust in Everyday Narratives

Due to the fact that methodological bases of sociological work with textual data are not summarized in any explicit form, one can apply definitions of narrative analysis in sociological research to any relevant conceptual frames. However, J. Brockmeier and R. Harré (2001) seem to have developed the most "sociological" interpretation of narrative as a general category of linguistic production. Narrative is too often used as a word for identifying an ontology, whereas it is just a name for a number of regulations and standards within communication practices that organizes and makes sense of our everyday experiences, and a condensed set of rules that guarantees us social acceptance and successful

actions within a given culture. Our actions, experiences, and lives in general are too fragmented, formless, and incomplete, so we need narratives to consistently (re)construct and (re)constitute social reality by integrating any individual case of our personal life into the established and approved social and cultural scenarios. We do this through narrative by binding together personal and social modes of life, by expressing our emotions and opinions about what this world should be, and representing our identity and society (Fraser, 2004: 180).

Sociological interpretation of narrative as a textual mode of personal and social life eliminates the traditional restrictions on the choice of conceptual framework, methodological approaches and technical procedures to study social practices as narrated into existence. This gives a researcher a phenomenal freedom in combining conceptual models and techniques under the “label” of narrative analysis. To qualify for conducting narrative analysis, it is sufficient to study real “texts,” that is, recorded narratives, and to choose analytical tools and interpretative models depending on one’s priorities and interests and on the tasks of the research. In the study of trust as discursively constantly (re)constituted in everyday narratives, we are to define any community under study not only as an objective fact of social reality, but also as a set of shared symbolic meanings that form the “life-world” of each of its members (in a rather ethnomethodological interpretation, according to Garfinkel [1963]).

To show the potential of narrative analysis to identify the typical discursive construction of trust in everyday relations and practices and only for exploratory-illustrative purposes, I conducted the simplest narrative analysis of a very specific collection of texts. These were transcripts of semi-structured interviews with local populations (not experts in management or administrative staff of municipal and regional bodies), and conducted in rural regions of Russia over the last decade (2006–2015). This collection is interesting and specific because the issues of trust have never been the focus of the Center for Agrarian Studies projects which aim to identify social and economic strategies of daily survival in rural areas. Thus, the interviewees have never been provided with any “narrative impulses” to reveal common interpretations of trust in the course of interview. If we see any such “narrative impulses” in the transcripts, it is only thanks to their commonality in everyday life stories, or corresponding behavioral and relational patterns when narrators discursively (re)construct common definitions of trust.

Undoubtedly, there is no chance for representativity of the data or for generalizability of the conclusions made. However, the reconstruction of common interpretations of trust (or distrust) and the identification of the so-called “typological syndromes” in considering different types of interpersonal relations as trust-based or trust enhancing is a possibility. The proposed approach has pros and restrictions. On the one hand, we can reveal the fields of everyday life which cannot be described by social actors without addressing the issues of trust in one way or another. On the other hand, the apparent lack of the topic of trust in the interview guide inevitably leads to its ignorance in the course of an interview. This is because the sociological rule that “you get answers only to the questions

you ask and not the answers to the questions you do not ask” works perfectly in studies not focused on the issues of trust.

Here are a few figures. The collection of texts consists of more than 260 transcripts, and in almost every tenth narrative (28 in total), there are mentions of trust as an important element of everyday life. The pieces of texts were selected using the simplest procedure of looking through the narratives for mentions of the root of the Russian word “trust” in all possible contexts, except for notarial documents’ names. The selected narrative fragments indicate that trust becomes an explicit issue when it comes to the explanation how formal relations can work efficiently and “trustworthy,” only if they are based on the habitual confidence in others’ possible actions in close relations. For instance, one respondent said:

An investor in fact is trust and not just a man with big money, . . . we need a person who is interested not only in making money, money, money . . . but who’s not indifferent to our local community, culture, and history . . . though it may seem a kind of an idealistic dream . . . However, otherwise, without trust, there is no way to organize cooperatives . . . or even worse, there will be someone the most cunning and dishonest, who will steal all the cooperative money and disappear.

The issues of distrust appear in the rural dwellers’ narratives mainly when they consider the consequences of today’s market economy for traditional forms of everyday social and economic relations in rural communities. Additionally, the causes of distrust up to the political “power vertical” ruining the previously sustainable forms of economic activities and rural cooperation were sometimes generalized. Another respondent claimed that

our current system keeps people apart, creates the atmosphere of total distrust . . . This mechanism, this structure is called the “vertical of power,” and it intentionally incites small and large farmers against each other, provokes quarrels between monopolists . . . this “vertical of power” is based on submission, on the principle “divide and conquer” . . . Therefore, it is against cooperation, because when people trust each other they unite and easily reach agreements, thus resisting the vertical and insisting on developing and implementing measures in their personal and communal interests . . .

Moreover, according to the narratives, totally and historically sustainable distrust (and not just a lack of confidence) is a typical estimate of the relationship of ordinary people and officials of all types and levels. This is primarily due to the stereotypes both groups have that determine their prevailing perception of each other. Still another respondent answered:

The officials say: “These people are stupid, they are not active, they cannot control their drinking, they must always be given instructions and can never be trusted.” So, people, in their turn, think: “These officials, bureaucrats, they do not under-

stand anything, they cannot be trusted, and, thus, we'd better stay away from them.” And this is a typical situation throughout Russia.”

Besides, the distrust to those at the social top is nurtured by a conviction that the state and the business are strongly interconnected in the mutual interests of each other, thus ignoring ordinary people's needs:

It is very difficult to identify, where the state finishes and the business begins. The boundary is very vague . . . while there is a strong distrust in the state and all its institutions . . .

One of the reasons of lack of trust to those who are in power is the course of post-Soviet reforms in the agriculture and rural areas in general. An opinion was recorded as

Well, you know, to be honest, I lost trust to our leaders and the power after the reforms, which proved to be disastrous not only in agriculture, but also in the education and so on. These reforms increased corruption and shortage of staff and nothing else . . .

However, considering the entrepreneurship, the distrust is based rather on the stereotypic perception of it:

There is a general distrust to the entrepreneurs in the society and not only in our region. Everywhere in Russia people are used to think that if one is an entrepreneur, one is totally unscrupulous, his goal is to deceive, to cheat and to grab as much money as possible . . .

Long time ago there was an expression “an honest merchant word,” and today entrepreneurs are considered grabbers.

The only thing that can break such distrust is the personal trust transferred to the sphere of formal relationships. Many people still believe that personal trust is the only “trustworthy” foundation of all other relationships (see, e.g., Seppänen, Blomqvist, Sundqvist, 2007). A response illustrates this idea:

Everyone has one's own circle of friends and well-known people. According to statistics, everyone knows about one and a half thousand people to say “hello” from time to time . . . Your acquaintances have their acquaintances, their own circle of friends . . . Therefore, whenever you start some business you rely on word of mouth to trust people you have not known before . . . To survive at the market you have to find partners—permanent and trusted: I trust them, they trust me . . .

In some fields trust depends on the generational proximity: middle-aged and olders prefer to trust their coevals but not the youth that “cannot be trusted for they were raised

in different circumstances compared to those who are over fifty.” In other situations trust depends on the familiarity of some common practices, for instance, there are still

lists of debtors in many small rural shops . . . Well, if I just returned from vacations and do not have money, I just come to the shop and take whatever I need without paying money for the seller knows that I will pay later and puts me in that list . . . Of course, this is possible only if people trust you and feel confident that soon you will repay . . . Therefore, this works only for well enough known people and not for those who come to the shop for the first time . . .

Thus, without a specific narrative impulse and relevant thematic context, rural respondents mention “trust” very rarely and not to describe personal relations. This is probably because trust is believed to be inherent in such relationships, or otherwise there are no personally significant relations. Trust is clearly articulated and discursively constructed only when narrated relations (personal or not initially) are connected with some formal obligations or institutional functions, i.e., when trust is a strong guarantee that some formal procedures would necessarily work.

A Few Concluding Remarks (If You Believe There Can Be a Conclusion in Discussing Trust)

Trust is a very teasing term, which is both difficult to define (as a theoretical conceptualization) and to observe (in empirical studies), despite its wide use for different purposes, and for naming various phenomena (Gorlizki, 2013). One of the difficulties associated with the sociological interpretation of trust is that the more sophisticated definition we use, the harder it is to choose the empirical content for it. In this case, we have to make compromises that inevitably generate debates even on the most “innocent” definition of trust as a reasonable expectation that the other will cooperate with me in certain situations, the terms of which is impossible to foresee. Such an anticipation must be based not only on interests coincidence, but at the same time, on current personal relations highly valued by all parties involved (Gambetta, 2009: 37).

In 2011, R. Bachmann defined the position of trust research at the crossroads referring to the excessive focus of the dominant stream of literature on the micro-level of trust-building. He suggested placing considerably more emphasis on the “constitutive” embeddedness of trust actors in the institutional environment/context. It should be noted that despite this just criticism, the author aimed primarily to overcome the limitations of mainstream trust research to more accurately describe the role and functions of trust in modern business systems. Bachmann believes that “institutional-based trust develops in concrete relationships between two actors who not only unavoidably orient their behavior to the relevant institutional arrangements but also enact and constantly reproduce the meaning, power and legitimacy of the institutional order in which their decisions and actions are embedded” (Bachmann, 2011: 208). This statement seems to excessively polarize the subject of trust research into the two extremes of either interaction-based trust

or institution-based trust. However, it is necessary to take both views into account for analytical reasons (researchers separate two types conceptually to have stronger foundations for analysis; for instance, within micro-perspectives on trust, one can rely on moral, psychological, or game factors of personal interaction) and applied purposes (two types of trust are actually not separate in practice).

Narrative analysis seems to be a perfect connecting link between micro- and macro-perspectives on trust. This is because narratives are models of the world and of our own "I" at the same time, which binds personal and social modes of human life together. As we get older and accumulate the baggage of life experiences and memories, this helps us to modify our self-esteem and the extent of embeddedness in the existing social order and discursive canon. Narratives of personal experience reveal common psychological definitions of interpersonal trust. This turns out to be a solid place to start formal relations, and in general for organizational and inter-organizational trust. Regardless of the type of trust, it is always a relationship presupposing some reciprocity and interdependence, involving some risk (a possibility of a loss, a vulnerability that the other will act in his selfish interests) and "freedom to disappoint" the other's expectations (Gambetta, 1988: 218), though the expectations are mainly positive (Gudkov, 2012). The point here is not in the predictability and reliability. An expectation of something good to happen due to the free and goodwill decision to trust each other and to take efforts to build and maintain trusting relationships is more important. Moreover, narrative analysis is a perfect technique to demonstrate the multi-dimensional nature of trust. Narrative analysis combines psychological elements (natural or cultural predisposition or tendency to trust), calculative elements (reliability, dependability, predictability, or reputation), social factors, or social influences on the decisions made by individuals about whether to trust others who might be relative strangers, in their respective societies (Singh, 2012), and the identity work. Quite often, one's definition of trust is a discursive representation of one's life experience as being deceived by a trustee, i.e., a narrative of trust violations, which helps the narrator to validate one's identity (see, e.g., Driver, 2015).

Undoubtedly, trust, along with other forms of social interactions such as conflict, domination, exchange, tradition, social differentiation, fashion, or flirting, has always been one of the most important sociological categories for interpreting and explaining social structures. The current scientific interest in the issues of trust is determined not so much by a pursuit for a more precise understanding of the nature of this phenomenon, but rather by the aim of a causal interpretation of the relationship and interdependence of the features of trust and institutional structures (economics, politics, etc.), and often in the comparative perspective. The relative success of such attempts gives hope to develop new means of understanding the cultural influence on the evolution of political and economic relations for both theoretical and applied reasons. To achieve such ambitious aims, sociologists define trust as a social interaction based on the high probability (chance) that the actions of partners (not only individuals, but also social groups and institutions) will take place in accordance with the expected order based on mutual values, moral ob-

ligations, coercion, customs, traditions, social conventions, ideological beliefs, material interests, or common views.

There are different approaches to study trust empirically. Perhaps the optimal analytical strategy would be a narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews (though taking quantitative data into account). The optimal objects of research, under the same conditions, would be people living in small towns and villages (milieus of the surviving pre-modern type of trust). The bases of social trust here are obvious, and may be explicitly transferred to the communal and institutional levels (micro-macro approach in action, as defined by Wilkes [2014]). The informal connections, group and neighborly relations, ethnic or confessional solidarity, are embedded (including discursively) in the routine of everyday obligations, common interests, and mutual support (see, e.g., Kozyreva, 2009). In this perspective, rural respondents are also perfect for demonstrating the heuristic potential of the Bourdieusian theory of interpersonal trust (see, e.g., Frederiksen 2014). It focuses on the relational rather than the cognitive, behavioral, or emotional aspects of trust, emphasizing the constitution of interpersonal trust within the dual temporal dynamics of the social aligning of interaction and meaning, which, together, constitute the process of trusting as an anticipation of forthcoming events.

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«Доверять или не доверять» — не в том вопрос; что такое доверие и как его изучать — суть социологической проблемы

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Автор рассматривает доверие как одно из самых интересных и в то же время неоднозначных социологических понятий, поскольку оно широко используется и в повседневной коммуникации, и в научном дискурсе как само собой разумеющееся и не требующее специальных разъяснений и ситуативных конкретизаций. Кроме того, социология вряд ли может предъявить претензии на монопольное владение данным понятием — исследования доверия междисциплинарны, что порождает разнообразные его концептуальные и операциональные определения, размывающие дисциплинарные границы между теоретическими и эмпирическими исследованиями доверия. В первой части статьи обозначены основные компоненты социологического анализа доверия (причины и последствия социального доверия и недоверия; детерминанты и практические результаты разных «типов» и «уровней» доверия; попытки отличить доверие от иных, близких ему семантически понятий; общепринятые концептуализации доверия; базовые трактовки доверия как способа избегания неопределенности и т.д.). Во второй и третьей частях статьи охарактеризованы цели эмпирического изучения доверия в рамках количественного и качественного подходов. В первом случае, как правило, измеряется уровень социального и политического доверия в ходе масштабных опросов общественного мнения, нередко в сравнительном или мониторинговом формате. В рамках качественного подхода исследователи пытаются понять, что доверие означает для людей, как и почему они выбирают те или иные слова для описания доверия в разных ситуациях. Четвертая часть статьи посвящена повседневному дискурсивному конструированию доверия: автор считает нарративный анализ оптимальным методологическим выбором (при условии контекстуализации его результатов данными количественных и качественных исследований) для обнаружения типичных механизмов дискурсивного конституирования доверия в повседневных практиках и иллюстрирует свое предположение полуформализованными интервью, проведенными в сельских поселениях России. Статью завершают несколько выводов о тех достижениях и проблемах социологического анализа доверия, которые определяют его неоднозначное нынешнее положение в предметном поле нашей дисциплины.

Ключевые слова: доверие, недоверие, количественный подход, качественный подход, нарративный анализ, дискурсивные практики, повседневный язык, научный дискурс

Gender, Sexuality, and Intimacy in a Women's Penal Colony in Russia

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This article explores sexuality and intimacy in a women's penal colony in Russia. Russian researchers rarely focus on the Russian prison system as a whole, or on women's experiences in colonies, female identities, and punishment practices in particular. These topics therefore remain marginalized, out of the spotlight of critical public debate and sociological research. The present article contributes to the current debate on the meaning and consequences of close relations in women's colonies, varying in context from friendship and love to exploitation under the tough control of the gender regime from both the prison administration and the informal system of power typical of a prison hierarchy. The female body becomes an additional mechanism of supporting the repressive nature of a penal colony, strengthening patriarchal traditions, and maintaining a high level of homophobia in Russian society as a whole. Based on the analysis of 33 in-depth interviews including biographical elements with women between 18 and 55 years old convicted for various crimes, I argue that the gender regime in correctional facilities for women becomes an additional mechanism aimed at strengthening discipline, control, and the patriarchy in a patriarchal society. Whilst the regime is not prescribed by law, it becomes the law because of the extreme objectification of women, the female body, and the status of the female.

Keywords: Russian prison system, women's colonies, patriarchal gender regime, female body, gender, sexuality, intimacy

Introduction

The prison experience of isolation, correction, and excessively-regulated bodily discipline not only adjusts and deforms the modes of intimacy (physiological, psychological, and sociocultural), but also makes their analysis complicated. Social researchers discuss the interdependence between sexual practices in society and prison sexuality. There is also a connection with the experience of numerous other countries where homosexuality was considered "criminal" and was punished by law, as it was in Russia (Healey, 2002). The Russian context is dominated by patriarchal regimes (Temkina, Zdravomyslova, 2014) and homophobia, peculiar features of Russian society (Stella, 2008; Wilkinson, 2013; Essig, 2014; Stella, Nartova, 2015; Omelchenko, 2015). The topic of this article requires that

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both the gender regimes in Russia and the logics and structures of prison subculture be taken into account.

At the beginning of 2014, Russian correctional facilities for adults contained 650,600 people, including 720 penal colonies where 526,300 people (including 42,300 women) were serving their terms (FPS, 2016). This is one of the highest rates in the world (Yasaveyev, 2010). Sociological research rarely focuses on the Russian prison system as a whole and even more rarely on women in colonies (Piacentini, 2004; Pallot, 2005, 2010; Pallot, Piacentini, 2012; Piacentini et al., 2009; Moran et al. 2009; Katz, Pallot, 2010; Moran, Pallot, Piacentini, 2013; Pallot, Katz, 2014; Omelchenko, 2012). The main reason is that the image of a convicted person is subject to comprehensive social stereotyping and marginalisation in contemporary Russian society (Omelchenko, 2015). Female prisoners are at the very bottom of the social hierarchy. Punishment practices and female identities in colonies remain marginalized and exoticized, out of the spotlight of critical public debate and social research.

This article focuses on the analysis of gender hierarchies and sexual practices that emerge in Russian penal colonies, in the context of isolation and punishment. It argues that the gender regime in correctional facilities for women becomes an additional mechanism aimed at strengthening discipline, control, and the patriarchy in a patriarchal society. Whilst it is not prescribed by law, it becomes the law because of the extreme objectification of women, the female body, and status of the female. At the same time, women find resources for subjectification (among other things, through the tactics of adjustment and resistance in the forms of partnerships, families, and sexual relationships), creating an intimate and private space in the public context of tough control and discipline.

Female Intimacy in the Prison System: Lines of Theoretical Research

The construction of gender regimes and sexualized relationships in correctional facilities is closely connected with the study of similar phenomena in other isolated social systems, such as assisted-living facilities, monasteries, and so on. Some of the most important aspects of this issue are the formal and informal boundaries between the private and the public in isolated systems, bodily control and discipline (physiology, hygiene) through corporal punishment and rewards, the influence of a homosocial environment on emerging emotional relationships, and the idea of humanism in the context of confinement.

The first early-1900s study of sexuality in women's prisons used such terms as "perverse relationships" and "abnormal tendencies" (Hensley et al., 2000: 360–367). In 1934, Joseph Fishman, a former inspector for U.S. federal prisons, wrote: "We are living in a frank and realistic age, yet the subject of sex in prison—so provocative, so vital, so timely . . .—is shrouded in dread silence" (Fishman, 1934: 5). There is research (surveys) that focuses on various forms of close relationships (including sexual practices) among women in correctional facilities (Lauren, Hensley, 2013). This research has revealed such forms of relationships as friendship, play families, pseudo-homosexual relationships, and

lesbianism (Ward, Kassebaum, 1964). However, the topic of prison sexuality is still ignored by both society and sociologists (Hensley et al., 2000: 361).

Most recent studies are aimed at exploring violence and aggression, (both covert and direct), which has resulted in the dominant opinion that close relationships between female inmates usually take the form of sexual exploitation. This research has both followed and increased dominant discourses and policies of punishment, placing an emphasis on the extreme deprivation of privacy as the basic principle of correction. Research on female victims of sexual harassment and violence in correctional facilities has become a powerful mechanism for the development of this approach (Baro, 1997; Struckman-Johnson et al., 1996). However, works on this subject are still few in number. It is especially evident in the empirical material, which often leads to unfounded conclusions, and the use of popular, stereotypical images and scandalous, almost pornographic, texts.

Even after the criminal penalty was repealed, the concealment and taboo of these practices were reinforced by academic and popular discourses which presented the “prison origin” of homosexuality as a consequence of forced isolation (Kunzel, 2008; Mondimore, 1996). The Russian scientist, Igor Kon, holds an important place in the research and analytical work on the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Russia (Kon, 2003).

Furthermore, importation and exportation theories linking sexual practices in correctional facilities with women’s experience in their life in general constitute a separate line of research. There are works that deal with the idea that prison sexuality is determined by the importation of one’s previous (pre-prison) sexual identity. Other works focus on the influence of prison practices on inmates’ sexual behaviour after their discharge. These studies point out that the exportation of prison identities and practices can influence social norms about sexuality, including masturbation and homosexuality, in wider social environments (Lacombe, 2008; Smith, 2006).

The work of Angela Pardue and her colleagues on the typology of sexual practices and sexuality in correctional facilities for women (Pardue et al., 2001) proposes the classifications of suppressed sexuality, autoeroticism, true homosexuality, situational homosexuality, and sexual violence. Each category is characterized by the level and type of sexual involvement, as well as by a corresponding degree of potential violence.

The suppression of sexuality may be an adaptive response to the prison environment, and not a result of sexual dysfunction. The researcher Kimberly Greer refers to the results of the analysis of 35 in-depth interviews with women, and argues that intimate relationships in prisons for women are characterized by an atmosphere of distrust (Greer, 2000). Most studies that deal with female sexuality in prisons focus on same-sex relationships and the formation of play families. Research in European and American academic communities on homosexual relationships among female inmates was given very little attention until the 1960–1970s. Thus, compared with homosexuality in male prisons, lesbianism was considered trivial and harmless. Homosexual relationships among prisoners may be described as “true,” typical of those women who have identified themselves as lesbians prior to imprisonment, or “situational,” which a woman only experiences in prison due to the absence of heterosexual opportunities (Pardue et al., 2001). “True” homosexuality

is attributed to the importation model, while “situational” homosexuality is explained through the model of deprivation and isolation.

Some authors list the following roles and statuses among those emerging from female same-sex activities: *butch*, *femme*, *trick*, *commissary hustler*, *square*, and *cherry* (Ward, Kassebaum, 1964: 168). The *butch*, *stud broad*, *drag butch*, or *daddy* have a distinctively masculine appearance and are usually the dominant partner in same-sex relationships. On the other hand, the *femme* or *mommy* has a feminine appearance, plays a passive role in the relationship, and acts in a manner that corresponds to what is considered as traditional female behaviour. *Tricks* are the least respected inmates as they allow themselves to be sexually exploited by others, while *commissary hustlers* maintain long-term meaningful relationships with some prisoners while exploiting or manipulating others at the same time. *Cherries* are inmates who have never engaged in same-sex intercourse, whereas *squares* refuse to participate in homosexual behaviour. It is obvious that female prisoners can be subjected to various types of socially dangerous behaviour, such as harassment, assault, and rape.

Some researchers point out special (and even more discrete) types of sexual interactions that develop between female inmates and the staff of correctional facilities. Prisoners can manipulate and even coerce prison staff to engage in sexual activities in order to receive special treatment for a variety of reasons, such as pleasure, trade, transgression, procreation, safety, and love. In addition, convicts may view sex as an expression of freedom, especially as sexual intimacy is one of the few aspects of their lives that they can control. For instance, some say that sexual interactions with correctional staff “is the ultimate way to thwart the system” (Smith, 2006: 192).

The analysis of the construction of specific types of masculinity in colonies for women is promising not only for the topic discussed in this article, but also in the wider context of gender studies in general. The data presented in this article can be used to continue this analysis, thus expanding the boundaries of the description of different sexual/gender displays in correctional facilities for women. The following analysis relies on the above-mentioned positions in order to test the ways they manifest themselves in the Russian context.

The analysis of the current academic agenda gives us an opportunity of critical involvement in the theoretical debate on the nature of prison intimacy. Most of such studies focus on finding violence and aggression, (both covert and direct), which results in the dominating opinion that close relationships between female inmates mostly take the form of sexual exploitation. The concealment and taboo of these practices were reinforced by academic and popular discourses about the “prison origin” of homosexuality as a consequence of forced isolation (Kunzel 2008; Mondimore, 1996) which promotes the dominant discourses and policies of punishment, laying an emphasis on the extreme deprivation of privacy as the basic principle of correction.

The lack of research on everyday life in women’s prisons that would reveal the entire palette of friendship, love, and trust scenarios leads to the replication of stereotypical scandalous, almost pornographic, images of a female inmate. The present article also

contributes to the debate between advocates of the importation and exportation theories: one claims that prison sexuality can be explained through the importation of one's previous (pre-prison) sexual identity (Irwin, Cressey 1962), while the other focuses on how prison practices influence one's sexual behaviour after discharge, affecting social norms in different social environments of the society as a whole (Lacombe 2008; Smith 2006). A detailed analysis of women's narratives allows us to offer an extensive analysis of the models of intimacy beyond the scope of importation and exportation theories' explanations of privacy.

Penal Colonies and Social Research in Russia

In Russia, the subject of prison is still taboo; it is simply off-limits. It is extremely difficult for researchers to gain access to correctional facilities. The Russian penal system is guarded, both literally and metaphorically, as one of the last bastions of Soviet-style punishment and correction (Omelchenko, 2015). Russia has its own contexts of the "prison issue." Historically, it is associated with the legacy of the punitive, repressive system of the Gulag (Pallot, 2005). The institutional context reflects the current situation in the penal system. The social policy is aimed at disadvantaged groups of the population, where previously-imprisoned women are not a priority (Omelchenko, Sabirova, 2013). Finally, there is public opinion that stigmatizes prisoners (Yasaveev, 2010).

There are 35 female colonies in Russia today. First-time female offenders are sent to prison less frequently than male offenders. However, they are not treated leniently if an offence is committed for the second time, especially if it happens during the parole period—hence, the large percentage of recurrent prisoners among women in colonies. Analytical texts underscore a change in the structure of female criminality (the proportion of violent crimes is increasing) as well as the feminisation of crime, which is viewed as a threat to the well-being of society. Research that emphasizes the individual criminological features of women is involved in the production of panic around the "deteriorating moral image of a woman."

In Russia, the research surrounding sentenced women, their criminological features, factors affecting crime rate, and inmates' re-socialisation after discharge is carried out by criminologists (Antonyan, 2009), psychologists, teachers, and (more recently) social workers. Researchers often resort to questionnaire-type surveys which address very specific disciplinary tasks, whereas the everyday life of women in prisons and colonies is often side-lined. Sociological and cultural studies of everyday life in prison are scarce (Gusejnova, 2013, Oleynik, 2001), especially those that represent convicted women (Alpern, 2000, 2004; Tishchenko, 2007). Three discourses can be distinguished in the current Russian academic tradition of female crime and post-prison rehabilitation research: medical, psychological, and criminological. All of these discourses regard female criminals as a pathological phenomenon in that they are unable to control themselves and exhibit "unnatural" features. The criminological discourse on female criminality is a kind of a bastion of authorized gender stereotyping, and the production of moral expectations

and accusations aimed at women. The range of social phenomena that shapes the identity of a female criminal is defined in terms of a psychological/medical pathology, or through the concepts of distress, deviation, and asocial behaviour.

There are practically no Russian works on sexuality in prison, except, perhaps, those of Lyudmila Alpern. However, her texts rarely touch upon the topic of close relationships in correctional institutions for women, and they are mostly done in the context of human rights, not sociology. It should be pointed out that, overall, gender issues in Russia meet a number of difficulties, and research on (homo)sexuality is becoming a taboo subject. In their description of the modern neoconservative turn in Russia, Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina, known researchers of gender regimes in Russia, underscore the strengthening patriarchal discourses and practices in modern society (Temkina, Zdravomyslova, 2014).

Sexuality became the subject of theoretical thinking and empirical investigation in the USSR only in the 1970s. Discussion of the topics of sexuality and sex were taboo, and the saying “There’s no sex in the USSR, there is love” became a catch phrase. The unavailability of professional discourses, the public silencing of sexuality, and the absence of education and of public discussion of sexual practices shifted sexuality into the sphere of shady folklore. The Soviet discourse of sexuality was hypocritical (Omelchenko, 2015). In the period of Gorbachev’s Perestroika (1985–1991), when there was weakening state control over all spheres of society, the perception of sexuality in public discourse changed. In Russia today, despite the public declarations of the state and political leaders against sexual discrimination, we observe that there is a widespread policy of homophobia, which is promoted as an expression of anti-Western orientation. There is a growing conservatism in Russian society accompanied by the increasing influence of the Orthodox Church in regard to the formation of new paradigms of bringing up children and the education of youth, silencing issues of sexuality (Omelchenko, 1999, 2000, 2015; Stella 2010).

Methodology and Empirical Data

This article is based on the secondary analyses of the data and was conducted within the project “Differences, Exclusions, and Adaptations in a Russian Penal Colony.” The empirical data was gathered as a part of the project “Return: the Post-Penitentiary Experience of Young Women.” The empirical study was conducted in four Russian cities: Saint Petersburg, Ulyanovsk, Nizhny-Novgorod, and Saratov. The selection of both capital and provincial cities was determined by the restricted access to this research field and by the initial hypotheses. As the interview collection presents women from different colonies, it helped to avoid homogeneous data. The interviews were conducted between 2011–2012. A total of 33 interviews were conducted with women between the ages of 18 and 55 years-old who had been convicted for various crimes (drug sales, theft, fraud, murder), either for the first time or as a repeat offender, and having been discharged in the last three to five years. On average, the interviews with biographical elements lasted 1.5 to 4 hours. More than half of the informants had previously used hard drugs. There

were also women infected with HIV, hepatitis, and tuberculosis. It is obvious that such a difficult field required an additional effort to find women with such experience and to obtain their consent. Informants were recruited through researchers' personal contacts and using the "snowball" method, with the help of the social and personal networks of the informants themselves. Social-security authorities, psychologists, and social workers involved in various inmate rehabilitation projects rendered some assistance in conducting the interviews.

To cover the research topic more thoroughly and to understand the rehabilitation field, ten expert interviews were conducted with the staff of crisis centres for former prisoners, representatives of social services, doctors, psychologists, social workers, or law enforcement officers, that is, the professionals from various rehabilitation and adaptation programs for women released from prison. The women's narratives were analysed according to "grounded theory." We took into account that some elements of the women's stories were targeted at the researchers. Even though sexuality is a sensitive topic, the women were quite open. We acquired a whole range of stories from different representatives of the hierarchy, displaying various ideas about sexual relations in the colony. Due to certain limitations of this method of studying gender and sexuality, the sample and analysis did not present many situations or practices of violence.

Body, Hierarchies, Guardians

This section describes the important contextual circumstances that define intimacy practices in colonies. Here, practices of bodily control, social hierarchies that emerge in colonies, and relations with the guards are all touched upon.

Conditions in prisons vary, but most often they are demeaning and harmful to women's health and dignity. Such conditions are the low professional level of gynaecological care, the degrading practices of medical examinations, the absence or lack of sanitary materials for menstruation, unjustified prohibitions, severe punishments for soiled bed sheets and a lack of opportunity to wash them (only at night or during work hours), and the need to hide blood-stained sheets and underwear in order to avoid being abused by guards and ridiculed by neighbours. Problems with both hot and cold water make it virtually impossible to maintain personal hygiene during menstruation. Basic hygienic conditions present real problems. "Toilet collectivism," a carefully protected additional mechanism of stripping inmates of their dignity and completing the destruction of their private space, is probably one of the most amazing discoveries of the Soviet penal system:

These foreigners should come here and try to use the toilet here! All the restrooms have been renovated, "European-style." Why the hell do we need this "European" crap? The restroom is all white and beautiful . . . and no doors, nothing. Mirrors everywhere. . . and the wash space has three washbasins for 120 people. . . people are standing there, in front of the mirror, putting their mascara on, while you are trying to do your thing. I can get used to anything, but this beats me! I don't get it:

okay, you took away my freedom, but why do you think that it somehow changes me physiologically? That I can see in the dark, that I can wash without water?!

(Lyuda, 55, prison term: 2 years)

Staff in female prisons are free women who hold a special place in the inmates' stories. They are guards, medical staff, heads of administrative departments, and checkpoint and inspection point officers. They appear in stories about additional humiliations that start with the first inspection after the verdict and includes the tolerance and support of informal fights between women in the cells and barracks, as well as covering up for those who are loyal to the administration and perform additional supervisory functions. The peculiar power regime, reinforced by a homosocial environment and interconnected formal/informal gender hierarchies, makes women's female problems seem even tougher. These regimes are built into the hierarchical homosocial penal system, where the exploitation of female physiological features becomes an additional resource for the repressive patriarchal power.

Social hierarchies that develop in colonies, and, consequently, the distribution of power, are important for looking into gender and sexual relations. Interpretations of various status positions may vary, but it is possible to distinguish the following categories:

- (1) *Blatnye*: unit and brigade leaders, those who have connections with security guards or prison authorities. They have the right to monitor relationships between inmates and have to report violations, which means that they have informal power, deciding what and who to report and who to hold in fear.
- (2) "*Sherst*": inmates that have real privileges connected with their pre-prison status that includes rich relatives, frequent care packages, and support from the administration.
- (3) *Activists*: those who try to earn their parole establishing a second, self-organized, authority system in a colony (voluntary discipline and cleanliness checks, or participation in amateur performances).
- (4) "*Griby*": the lowest caste in the prison hierarchy. These are the inmates who have been in prison for a long time such as homeless people, alcoholics, or women from extremely poor environments and rural areas that do not receive care packages.
- (5) Those with the lowest social background before incarceration who are known as the "*Gorokhi*," the "youngsters," the first-time inmates without the social or psychological resources necessary to fit into the existing system. "*Griby*" and "*gorokhi*" are used (forced) or employed to carry out service work for the *blatnye*, such as tidying bedrooms, cleaning wash spaces and toilets, and so on. This work may be done in exchange for protection, out of fear or in return for a fee (normally not for money, but for necessities such as cigarettes, coffee, tea, sanitary pads, or clothes).

It is important to point out that this hierarchy is supported and encouraged by the administration:

So, they are *blatnye*; they have everything, like, a position; they are first everywhere. God forbid you go against them. They live in comfort, everything's lined up—with the police, with other inmates. Everyone knows and remembers them. And “*sherst*”—they stand out anywhere; they are *blatnye* in female prisons. Those who have a certain status even without those, activists. . . . So, if you are chosen to be an activist, you automatically butt in everywhere, you have an easier time, like, smoking when and where you normally can't . . . And then, there are so-called “*griby*.” Some don't even treat them like human beings, while they are mostly just kind, pure people. Even if they are somewhat weak in the head. They don't have this nastiness in their soul. And activists all work just to get parole.

(Galya, 36, prison term: 3 years)

A parallel, sometimes alternative, hierarchy emerges among those who receive care packages and those who do not, i.e., it depends on one's economic status and support received from one's family. Here, one inmate recounts a story of a young girl who had special treatment in prison because she had very rich parents who constantly sent her care packages, and actively helped the colony:

They came from the city of Nefteyugansk to visit her every month, they sent her packages every month, gave money to some woman to bring those packages . . . She had bags full of stuff; she lived large. Her mother installed computers in every office . . . all the curtains in the unit, everything—her mum, her mum, her mum, as long as her daughter doesn't get sent to the isolation cell; so, there you go. . . . she plays family with some people, then leaves them for others; there was a fight for her in prison, for her stuff. People didn't like her, but they played nice, tried to win her over because of her bags.

(Yulia, 37, prison term: 8 years)

The Right to Love, and “Boys” in Women's Penal Colonies

The research has demonstrated that the inner structure of penal colonies for women is largely defined by the interconnections between sexual and gender dimensions and power relations whereby a variety of forms and types of inmates' relationships with each other and with the administration are integrated into the existing hierarchy.

The gender display in colonies is incredibly varied, contradictory, and complicated. According to the regulations, there is no gender in prison:

Here, these are her [prison warden's] words: “Inmates have no gender.” We are inmates. That's it. When we told her, “We are women, we need to shower. Do you understand?” She said, “Inmates have no gender.” And that's it; it doesn't matter, you are inmates. Who are you? Men, women—it doesn't matter.

(Oksana, 33, prison term: 5 years 3 months).

The research encountered different, sometimes contradictory, interpretations of male (masculinized) images and sexual/gender interactions in the women's penal colony. They were defined not only by an informant's status and her views on homosexual relation-

ships, but also by implicit codes of honor in different colonies, their features of gender regimes, and the administration's attitude. For instance, romantic stories about relationships between inmates and female guards mean that homosexual couples are considered normal in this particular colony, even if it is not talked about. On the other hand, informants from colonies where the unwritten laws follow official regulations more closely say that such women are caught, punished, and put in punitive isolation cells.

The right to love is also connected with the status of those who love and are loved. For instance, *blatnye*, activists, and "*sherst*" can practically live openly as couples, while "*griby*" and "*gorokhi*" do not have the right to do so. We see that the degree of an inmate's security and her right to private (personal or intimate) space and time, as well as her everyday practices, directly depend on different hierarchy combinations. It was not always easy to understand which branch of power has the most influence. Those loyal to the administration are in the most secure position, and vice versa. However, no positions are stable and permanent. The lives of activists, *blatnye*, and "*herst*" depend just as much on the attitude of other inmates towards them. Emerging oppositions and, consequently, "more problems" for a colony's administration can trigger instant reconsideration of the situation and switch the positions of its main actors. This fragility and instability of any status, except perhaps for the lowest ones, becomes an additional mechanism of maintaining an atmosphere of fear, mistrust, and insecurity.

Women who expressly define themselves as men are called *patsany* ("guys") in colonies. Despite the prejudice that this image is used solely for personal gain, each prison history mentioned a "guy." They are usually described as follows: cropped hair (or bald), dressing up "like real men," their body language and facial expressions correspond to the image, and they work as prison electricians, plumbers, and equipment adjusters. Their gender performance has clearly sexual connotations. They present themselves as sexually active, experienced "men" who are ready to have sexual relations with women and to take the dominant role:

God help you if there is an inspection; the unit leader might get it in the neck . . .
 "Come on, wear the uniform."—"I don't want this headscarf, I'm a guy." These "*patsany*" are usually bald: "I'm a tough guy." Curtains; they shag girls all day long, don't do shit—not a single thing,—don't care about anything . . .

(Nadya, 34, prison term: 9 years)

The *patsany* community has its own unspoken rules. Habitual offenders are treated with more respect because they know everyone and everyone knows them; they have a certain reputation, gender, and sexual history. Some young first-time offenders cut or shave their hair to raise their status, but they are usually crack very soon. To pretend to be a *patsan* to get "undeserved respect" is considered to go against the rules.

Despite their tough macho image, *patsany* are still women. Women who lived in prison as couples say that only "first-timers" try to look like a man; they think that it is customary, but it does not matter in real couples. Such "guys" are in demand; they help

women to keep in shape, take care of their appearance, fantasize, act out romantic stories, create “fictive” families, and fulfil their need in emotional support:

Some love those “studs”: “I’m so girly, I’m in love.” She is putting make-up on and doing her hair all day long; it’s like mating season, she’s in love. Everybody falls head over heels in love with those bald “guys.” Well, basically, yes, their life is easier—girls feed them. For love.

(Nadya, 34, prison term: 9 years).

The women’s stories also mention the image of an old *patsan*, or “old man.” Generational hierarchies are quite important in colonies. On the one hand, old female convicts have certain advantages: they do not work, they receive retirement benefits, and they can relax. On the other hand, they can trigger negative reactions: they usually serve longer terms for murder; it is harder for them to look after themselves, so they are held in contempt as “dirty slobs,” which is an important factor of hierarchy formation in colonies for women. Consequently, most inmates describe their sexual relations in a condescending manner:

They are so sly, you know. These old women are the filthiest, with their washbasins with clothes soaking there for so long they turn sour. They are usually old alcoholics; they are dirty, they have epilepsy, fits, and they still manage to shag each other, to make each other jealous. Well, one is shaking with an epileptic seizure, and another is at watch: (sings) “We while nights away . . .”—she will come to feel up someone else on purpose. They do all kinds of things, these old women and “men.”

(Nadya, 34, prison term: 9 years)

Intimacy in Women’s Colonies

The topic of “families” is a key point in the research and descriptions of female relationships in correctional facilities in different countries. “Fictive” families, couples, and close partners (*semeynitsy*) are particular (although not necessarily sexual) social forms that help women cope with the everyday problems of deprivation and isolation. It is a sort of agreement on joint household and emotional work, where mutual favors are defined not only by inmates’ desires, but also by the rules of a given prison or colony. For instance, certain hierarchies emerge among families, according to the status of couples:

I’m in a couple . . . so, I am waiting for my girl. She kind of switched, too. Those with longer terms, they kind of find a partner, so to say. And when you live with someone, it is easier to go through it together. Those who are visited by their husbands, they are on their own, yeah. And mostly, you know, loners—they don’t have any visitors. . . . there are those who do it occasionally, for a care package. So, for example, she gets packages. She will make her fall in love with her, and that’s it—she uses her. There are many women, manlike, you know; sometimes you can’t even tell if it’s a boy or a girl. They usually live at other people’s expense. . . . And there are many couples that are actually based on love.

(Zhenya, 28, prison term: 6.5 years).

Another form of close relationships is the “*vzaimka*,” a relationship of mutual support, aid, and assistance. Such relationships may include sexual intimacy, and the name is supposed to exclude them from the prohibited space, to avoid discussions of a sex change or switching one’s sexual orientation. Women in these relationships do not designate who is the girl and who is the “guy”:

Most often, people have “*vzaimka*.” Two girls live together, sleep together, and they are just girls who help each other. Everything they show in films is rubbish. . . . It is crazy, shame on them! And it is outdated now; of course, we laugh at these “guys.” “No, I’m surely not a man,”—this is much more popular now. “I’m a normal person, it’s just the way I look.” . . . Just a woman, like me, just like me. It’s all bullshit that they do it in some special way . . . grinding on a leg. They caress each other like others do . . . prison makes them hungry [for sex], there is an edge to it, many want some. Someone, like, some men come to your prison to work there—everyone flocks around them, and so on. And others—mind your business; girls are just friends, you know. They are husband and wife?! No, it is laughed at, it’s not like that . . .

(Nadya, 34, prison term: 9 years)

Another woman was trying to find the right words and definitions for her and other inmates’ relationships in the course of the interview, while trying to figure out the extent of risk that faces women in homosexual relationships with no such pre-prison experience. It is obvious that this question did not just arise in the course of her conversation with the interviewer, and that neither in prison, nor during the interview could she find the exact and correct terms to distinguish true feelings from exploitation, emotional and household assistance, and support:

During my first time in prison, there was this really forgiving colony warden; the only thing he used to put us in punitive isolation cells for was precisely this, lesbianism. . . . Since I’d had some sexual experience with a woman before prison, yes, back then I wondered what his problem was—who cares? And now, in hindsight, I see that this guy was really wise, because the consequences are so terrible . . . It’s one thing when it’s free and consensual, and it’s completely different when it happens out of hopelessness, because your maternal instinct requires application. . . . And I myself have a partner, we have been together for 22 years . . . she used to have nothing to do with crime. And then, at some point, she broke down and began to shoot up, so, she got here, too. But we are together. There you go.

(Lyuda, 55, prison term: 2 years).

These quotes show how contradictory and overlapping relationship concepts, images, and names can be. This secretive contextual knowledge, which makes it difficult for outsiders to see the true meaning, is, to a great extent, a response to the continuing stigmatization of close relationships not only by prison administration, but also by many women. It has to do with the closed nature and latency of many practices, not only for fear of disclosure, but also because of the problems of sexual identification in isolation, complicated

by the regime, and in addition to popular discourses that criminalize female intimacy in correctional facilities, viewing it as entirely situational, “fake,” and “abnormal.” We did not find any definitive distinctions between cohabitation types designated with different names. For example, “*semeynitsa*” may mean both “a couple” and a “*vzaimka*.”

At the same time, not all women are part of a couple or a family, since some simply have meals together (“*odnokhlebk*”):

Yeah, I’m alone. I have breakfast if I want to, or maybe I don’t; breakfast with you, dinner with her, and for lunch I can just drop by, have a bite of bread and sausage—I have no time for a meal. So that’s why I have always lived alone—it’s a lot of fun. And new girls come in, they try—all alone, like a castaway—to find a friend, a partner. And I am both alone and with everyone; it’s the easiest way. I’ve had one “*odnokhlebka*,” that’s it.

(Nadya, 34, prison term: 9 years)

One of the most popular themes in female intimacy is cheating and betrayal. Cheating means finding another partner in the colony. Betrayal relates to one partner being discharged first. Usually, everyone promises to wait, visit and be faithful, but there were more stories about betrayal than about faithfulness. This moment may become critical for one’s adjustment to “normal” life, especially if the person in question has drug issues:

My friend was still in prison. I used to drop by, well, bring packages . . . The friend I used to live with . . . well, it’s really bad. I mean, I am going through a betrayal now; she, she’s betrayed me. I have just found out recently . . . I trust people too much. Get burnt and trust again. And I believe them 100%. I got a word from there. Well, there had been rumors before, too. They called me, told me: “Don’t come. Well, don’t be stupid. You bring her care packages. It’s just for show. Don’t,” she said, “Don’t come.” . . . no names, nothing—just told me not to come. That’s it. But I still thought that maybe they are just talking rubbish . . . turned out, it was true . . .

(Oksana, 33, prison term: 5 years 3 months)

Close (although not necessarily sexual) relationships are often interfered with by commercial interests, as when someone “narcs out” a friend (for example, reports some prohibited practices), commits fraud in order to receive parole points, or sets the score with someone and establishes her own rules. Interviewees talked about the practice of love “scams,” meaning that someone wins the love of another inmate (most often, “*pat-sany*” are the ones who take advantage of such scams) in order to live at someone else’s expense, have certain privileges, and guaranteed daily care and assistance.

Practices of courtship and displays of affection have their own contextual codes. Many people may read such codes, but they remain cryptic—a private, personal matter in the open repressive space of general guilt and violence:

Cards are really valued in prison because you can use them as a hint, and now there are especially many cards with special meaning. Well, like, “miss you”—anything

like that. Well, it depends on the stage of the relationship, how far it has gone already. Or there are a lot of cards with meaningful jokes . . . And, well, you can put it, like, in your bag if they mean something to you; well, yeah, you can't put it on display, with the police and everything. Well, if you care, you keep them . . . If you don't . . . I threw them away.

(Oksana, 33, prison term: 5 years 3 months).

Homosexual relationships are persecuted and may result in a very severe punishment, on the one hand, and on the other, they are informally legitimate; everyone knows they exist. These relationships are a space for real feelings, an exchange (not necessarily equal), and a power resource, all at the same time. Couples that do not have a special status in prison are in constant danger because they may be reported and put in punitive isolation cells, which leaves them with no chance of parole. As to those who rank higher (*blatnye*, activists, or "*sherst*"), they are allowed to have such relationships. This is where the gap between gender and regime power closes. Discussion of intimacy is a kind of prison tabloid. The news is discussed both in the barracks and in the administration offices, yet it is still prohibited, and the punishment is too severe to ignore it completely. There are special techniques of protecting these relationships, which, of course, are not available to everyone, but only to those with resources of power:

People were reported only when they were actually seen on a bunk together. So, they write this report. . . it is a very nasty, grave report. . . it always comes up when you apply for parole. Even if it is three years old. So, everything happens when the police is not there. And when they go into the house, there is a girl on guard, and if she sees them come, they shout all around the house that the police are there, warning everyone.

(Zhenya, 28, prison term: 6.5 years)

One of the most controversial and problematic questions is that of the nature and the source of sexual desire (giving it a name and direction), as well as the factors and sources of homosexual identity formation: is it biological or social, inherent or acquired?

It was my way of escape, falling in love there. It's just that when you . . . you see everything in a different light, you understand that you can be happy anywhere, even here. . . . When a woman lives there with another women, it's easier, and it isn't just about sex, it's about some sort of well-being. Though, sex is important as well because it relieves stress, even though sometimes, on the contrary, it makes it worse, because it is still not normal under these conditions. . . . The only thing that helps you survive and not lose yourself is . . . when you don't just think about yourself, but also about another person next to you; then you don't just survive, you don't lose yourself. Because if you only think about yourself, you might just become obsessed and go mad or become a real asshole.

(Galya, 36, prison term: 3 years).

Discussion and Conclusion

It can be seen that the rules and regulations of female prison experience, on the one hand, reproduce homophobic sentiments typical of the “free” life, and on the other, include a system of “excuses” that stem from the forced nature of the prison lifestyle. Prisons and colonies are constructed as a “male” space, not in the biological, but in the social, sense, with a strictly patriarchal gender order. “The man,” an undisputed, powerful, though temporary authority, is the one who has access to significant resources.

One of the features of the female homosexual experience in prison is its romanticization, which consists of the fear of being discovered and, at the same time, the display of affection (gifts or cards with meaningful hints, kissing, or dating); the formal prohibition of “lesbianism” that some colonies comply with and romantic love stories of female guards and inmates; the acute and tender perception of sensuality and violent fights; and the fidelity of those inseparable couples who help in dealing with everyday needs (water, hygiene, food), and those engaged in open cheating and betrayal. This creates a very particular atmosphere of courage, toughness, and insubordination. However, unlike a soap opera or a TV show, all the characters and victims are real. The closed nature of the prison lifestyle, its regime of violence and repression, the violation of human dignity by legitimate authorities, and the suppression by the internal authority of activists, *blatnye*, and colony leaders builds up the intensity of passion, and teach inmates to live in a state of constant risk.

At the same time, these rules cannot be trusted fully, that is, they should not be mistaken for real life. Many inmates explained that the most important thing for them was not to get used to the prison lifestyle, and not to start thinking that what was happening to them was real life. This is prison, and therefore it cannot be real. The sincerity of desire, faithfulness in love, vows and promises becomes dramatically real on the one hand, and temporary and changeable on the other. Female intimacy, including friendship, eroticism, sex and sexualized practices, becomes almost the only accessible (albeit dangerous) space of free will, as well as a way of maintaining one’s self-esteem, a way of remembering that you are a human being, and a way of exercising your right to be in control of your own female body. However, prison reality often (if not always) bursts into this space in the form of betrayal, reports, cheating, “scams,” deceit, and violence.

The gender dimension of women’s life in prison is a difficult and extremely sensitive topic for both the research and subsequent interpretation and analysis. When we talk about the gender dimension of the feminine, it is obvious that the categories of the female and femininity are the focus of not only attention, but also criticism. In prison, women’s networks of emerging and splitting families and couples, affection, and sexual relations existing in an all-encompassing publicity, an atmosphere of suspicion, danger, risk, distrust, and deceit, and the practices of the exchange of goods, services, and feelings are vital for survival. Not everyone is involved in these relationships, but all female inmates take part in various activities, supervision, and control, at least to some extent. Women’s statuses entail different types of power. Below is a description of the main branches of

power that are based on the stories that were heard. The vector of official power suggests a hierarchy that goes from free women to female inmates (as a separate subtype: from free men, such as plumbers, locksmiths, and so on, to female inmates). In terms of the vector of semi-official power, this extends from real authorities (the warden, medical staff, and security officers) to self-regulatory (female inmates that have become activists, brigade leaders, and inmates on duty). Based on outside and pre-prison resources, power goes from those who receive care packages to those who do not. In terms of generations, power goes from habitual offenders to first-timers, and also from long prison terms to shorter ones. Another branch of power is based on sexual/gender identities and activities. It is difficult (and hardly appropriate) to talk about the extent of female power in this intertwined space. Women's power is incredibly fractional; its hierarchy is very fluid and dominant, and subordinate roles and statuses are temporary, unstable, and unreliable.

Understanding the feminine in prison makes the contradiction between the role of the "eternal woman" as the protector and the "guardian" of public morals and ethics, its inherent extreme vulnerability and purity, and the actual display of the female in a variety of gender regimes in the context of regulatory practices of tough discipline and punishment systems all the more apparent. The reproduction of the topic of "betrayal" prescribed by the natural female destiny in analyses of female criminality in general, and the features of women's imprisonment in particular, is typical for even less popular images. More or less harsh interpretations of this topic can be found in both political discourse and academic debate. Here, female criminality is reduced to biology that is expressed through women's refusal to act in accordance with their biological fate and their sociosexual body that belongs both to a man (the family as a social unit) and to the state (the reproduction of the nation). As a result, women in prison do not only break the law, but also violate gender expectations; if they take part in homosexual relationships, they destroy the very notion of "the female" as a mandatory and subordinate counterpart of "the male." Thus, such a woman is considered different in three ways: she is "not a real woman," "not a real criminal," and "not a real pervert."

The penal system for female inmates is built not only in accordance with the law in the sense of regulations on measuring the degree of an offence and its danger to society, but also according to the principles of gender violations. Therefore, female criminals, being "not-a-woman" in three different ways, are deprived of their basic social benefits and respective practices of the care of the feminine, treatment of the feminine, and recognition of the feminine. Prison policy aims to suppress and sometimes even to "kill" inmates' femininity. It is a kind of a social castration of "wrong" and "fake" female bodies, which counts neither on physiological compliance (they should not menstruate, experience sexual desire and strive for pleasure, and should not/cannot give birth) nor on a sociocultural recognition of femininity (the desire/urge to care, to love significant others, and to raise a child).

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Гендер, сексуальность и близость в российских женских колониях

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В статье рассматриваются режимы близости и сексуальности в российских женских колониях. Российская пенитенциарная система в целом и, опыт осужденных женщин, женские идентичности и практики наказания редко оказываются в фокусе интереса отечественных исследователей, оставаясь в пространстве маргинализации и отсутствия критического общественного обсуждения и социального исследования. Данная статья является вкладом в актуальные дискуссии о значении и последствиях близких отношений в колонии, контекст которых варьируется от дружеских и любовных — до использования и эксплуатации при жестком контроле гендерного режима, как со стороны администрации, так и неформальной системы власти, характерной для внутритюремной иерархии колонии. Женское тело становится дополнительным механизмом поддержания репрессивного характера исправительной колонии, укрепления патриархальных устоев и поддержания высокого уровня гомофобии в российском обществе в целом. Эмпирической базой анализа стали 33 глубинных интервью с элементами биографического с женщинами от 18 до 55 лет, отбывавших наказание по разным статьям (распространение наркотиков, кража, мошенничество, убийство). Я утверждаю, что гендерный режим в исправительных учреждениях для женщин становится дополнительным механизмом усиления патриархального режима в российском обществе. Несмотря на то, что режим не предусмотрено законом, оно становится законом из-за крайней объективации женщин, женского тела и женского статуса.

Ключевые слова: российская пенитенциарная система, женские колонии, патриархальный гендерный режим, женское тело, гендер, сексуальность, близость

Political Myth and Political Glory: Shaping Media Reality

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Today we cannot but notice the sequence of the considerable changes in the present-day social and cultural order through the obvious process of its invasion by certain semiotic constructs, possibly described as political myths, and nearly all of them closely connected with the issue of past/present/future glory. This glory could be lost (e.g., the collapse of the USSR), or gained anew (e.g., the joining of Crimea in 2014). The concepts of glory and victory in Russian political discourse are bound up with each other so closely that it is difficult to divide them. Besides, glory and victory are being gradually possessed by the establishment. At the same time, political myths are the means and the aim of this process. Myth comes forward as a universal code, and moreover, as a universal social-cultural matrix which contains patterns of ethics that are to be installed into the society. Besides, myth is a structure based upon the category of shaping the reality in which people may believe, not the category of belief. In the sphere of the media, myth broadcasts itself mainly through memes, using them both as instruments and as a certain communication channel. The structure of a meme is semiotic, while there is still a communicative difference between a meme and a myth. The idea of political glory is closely connected with the sphere of myth and with the concepts of time and space. This kind of integration makes up what Bakhtin called a “chronotope.” Three main myths of historical glory in present-day political discourse can be distinguished: the myth of Byzantium and the so-called “The Fifth Empire,” the myth of the “Polite People,” and the myth of “Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight.”

Keywords: political myth, mythologem, mythology, chronotope, meme, media reality, history, ideology

Introduction

We face different communicative trends today in political discourse, especially in the sphere of the media, the most important and ambiguous one being the question of political myth. A considerable number of attitudes to the concept of political myth exist, such as in the context of narrative (H. Tudor, Ch. Flood, Ch. Bottici), through the prism of a connection with language and symbol (E. Cassirer, N. Frye), and from the viewpoint of semiology (R. Barthes). At present, the most relevant approach to the political myth needs to combine both the symbolic and semiotic aspects. These seem to provide most efficient instruments to deconstruct ideologically engaged and politically motivated statements in the social and cultural spheres. Then, a working definition would be “political myth is a

special kind of ideologically transfigured sign that has the potential of transforming the sociocultural reality (or perhaps even create an alternative one).”

In a period less than of a year, the terms “myth” and “political myth” have become a core point in the heated debate in which nearly all levels of society from scientists (the head of the State Archive of the Russian Federation Sergey Mironenko) to ministers (the Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky) appear to be involved in. What is even more significant is that this issue of political myth obviously has been raised in connection with the matter of political glory and the problem of “sacred” history and “sacred” victory. As a result, the category of science and historic facts are de facto possessed by and included in the sphere of politics. For instance, J. Lull calls such phenomenon “patriotic symbolism” (Lull, 2008: 21).

In its turn, the discussion mostly took place in the media, from mass media to social media. According to Lull, the ideas circulate in society via modern communicative technology (ibid.: 17). It is then possible to assume that political myth is a special way of shaping media reality, or, as McLuhan put it, political myth is the medium and the message at one time.

In essence, the main foci of this work will be to place the conception of political glory into the framework of cultural time and space (or M. Bakhtin’s chronotope); to fix the boundaries of political myth; to observe the phenomenon of the meme as a communicative instrument of myth in order to shape media reality; and to track the messages and the structure of three main political myths, those of the Byzantium Empire, the “Polite People,” and the myth of “Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight.”

Myth and Other Key Concepts of Political Discourse Analysis

The concept of political glory is closely connected with the sphere of the myth by means of the concepts of time and space. The “inseparability of space and time” of Bakhtin’s chronotope apparently could be applied not only to the field of literature but to the field of culture as well.¹ In his *Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel* he focuses on a historical inversion when mythological thinking “locates such categories as purpose, ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society in the past” (Bakhtin, 2004: 147). That is why “the future is here portrayed as something out of the past” (ibid.: 158), especially out of a heroic or Golden Age.

Hence, the special role of the past and the future lead us to the reduction of the category of the present. The present is nothing but an intermediate locus between the heroic past and the blissful, but vague and uncertain future. The future itself is not “homogeneous with the present and the past . . . it is somehow empty and fragmented—since everything affirmative, ideal, obligatory, desired has been shifted, via the inversion, into the past” (ibid.: 147).

1. Chronotope is considered from different angles in: Nielsen, 2002; Bemong et al., 2010; Flanagan, 2009; Cohen, 1998; and Sungurov, 2003.

Today, the category of historic as well as political glory obviously belongs to the past, whereas the past itself has shifted from the field of scientific facts into the field of political myth, which Cassirer would have called the myth of the state.

It is essential to define the frames of the political myth. There is an established tradition of understanding political myth in terms of narration and plot. Nevertheless, myth, and political myth as well, is more of a sign than a narrative. Another important point is the creativeness of myth.

Henry Tudor considers political myth as a feature of advanced societies (Tudor, 1973: 14). This is why some authors adhered to the concept that political myth belongs to the field of history. The considerable changes in the perception of political myth appeared in the works of Georges Sorel where he elaborates that “the hallmark of the myth” that “provides a vision of the future which makes crude but practical sense of present” (ibid.: 15). Tudor himself suggests the attitude to myth as an “interpretation of what the myth-maker (rightly or wrongly) takes to be hard fact” (ibid.: 17).

Tudor’s conception of political myth has three main points: the ability to be believed in; a grip with reality; and being “a story, that is a narrative of events in dramatic form” (ibid.: 16).

Paradoxically enough, Tudor comes to the conclusion that there is “nothing distinctive about the political myth” but the “subject matter” (ibid.: 17). At the same time, Christopher Flood (Flood, 2013) distinguishes two aspects of myth, those of “sacred” and “political.” However, this division does not look convincing as it is based upon the bare communicative function of myth as connected with the field of its usage.

Reflecting on the term of myth, Flood combines the terms “narrative” and a “mode of thought” (Flood, 2013: 27). It would appear that he understands myth in a narrow mode, putting it into the ideologically marked field of political narrative (ibid.: 46). However, the author later tries to combine the concepts of belief, ideology, and myth in one working definition when he writes: “An ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group” (ibid.: 44). Flood also defines mythopoetic political discourse with almost the same words. To him, then, myth is equivalent to “mythopoetic discourse.”

The issue of political discourse is based upon several key concepts, one of the most important belonging to Norman Fairclough. He stresses the connection between discourse and different social practices such as the political, the cultural, and so on. Another key idea is that of “the dialectual relationships between discourse (including language but also other forms of semiosis) and other elements of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001: 231–242).

Political discourse as well as Critical Discourse Analysis today focuses upon communication in its variety including the institutional, media, and the political. According to Ruth Wodak, the main aim of Critical Discourse is “to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance” (Wodak,

Ruldof, Liebhart, 1999: 8). This goal is obviously based upon Barthes's approach to myth as an ideological construction.

Meanwhile, discourse as such is understood as "a form of social practice." This is why any kind of discourse is affected by different political and social contexts and, in their turn, different discourses may have a considerable influence upon different dimensions of social and political reality (ibid.: 8).

In her turn, Ciara Bottici (Bottici, 2007) stresses the connection between philosophy and political as well as non-political myth. According to her, one of the most important features is that "myth has to be open to a process of continual retelling," but at the same time myth, being narrative, stimulates people to act (ibid.: 183). In its turn, the retelling of the myth is based upon "mythologem" (ibid.: 127) as the building material of myth. Therefore, the existence of mythologemes gives myth a chance to become adjusted to contemporary changes in social, cultural, and political reality.

Secondly, the theory of contemporary political myth is largely based on Ernst Cassirer's works on language, myth, and state (Cassirer, 1953, 1973). In his *Language and Myth*, Cassirer stresses the connection between myth and the symbol. For him, one of the most important features of myth is creating a reality; he writes that "myth, art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the sense of mere figures which refer to some given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical renderings, but in the sense of forces each of which produces and posits a world of its own" (Cassirer, 1953: 76).

Perhaps that is exactly why Ernst Cassirer spoke about "the appearance of a new power: the power of mythical thought" in his *Myth of the State*. This kind of thought becomes increasingly important in crisis situations. Cassirer draws a special distinction between the sphere of society where stability can exist, and politics, where the equilibrium is utterly unstable. This is why he says that "in all critical moments of man's social life, the rational forces that resist the rise of the old mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these moments the time for myth has come again" (Cassirer, 1973: 280). Cassirer speaks about it with distinctly negative emotions, using expressions such as "the demonic mythical power." Moreover, his views here coincide with those of Roland Barthes, expressed eleven years later in *Myth Today* (Barthes, 1991).

It is highly significant that even Northrop Frye (1982) is of the same view, underlining this idea in *The Great Code*; Frye writes that "myth is a form of imaginative and creative thinking, and is therefore autonomous" (ibid.: 35). Frye also sees the bonds between myth and history, as mythology "contains a great deal of legendary and traditional history, it also helps to foster the growth of what we should call history" (ibid.: 34).

Thirdly, according to Roland Barthes (1991), myth is a sign that has already been transfigured and even corrupted by the current ideology. In his work *Myth Today*, Barthes stresses the political component of the process of mythologization. Thus, the whole reality is penetrated by myths, that are, in their turn, political matrixes. The whole process would have been impossible without the media. Moreover, the media can be considered as a primal condition of the existence of any myth.

Barthes's attitude to the phenomenon of political myth is based upon both semiology and post-structuralism. The idea of deconstruction provides a steady methodological instrument. In other words, political myth can be detected and deconstructed by means of semiotics. According to Barthes, myth is based upon the tri-dimensional pattern, consisting of the signifier, the signified, and the myth. He argues that myth is "a peculiar system," as it is "constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second-order semiological system" (Barthes, 1991: 111). This second-order system appears because myth needs to build its own system in order to transmit its own meanings. Myth itself is a sign both transfigured and transformed by ideology. To put it another way, myth is an ideologically corrupted sign and, at the same time, a special system of such signs.

Barthes's concept seems to be most suitable on two grounds. First, Barthes's myth correlates with Frye's "great code" as a universal key to the interpretation of historic events. On the other hand, understanding myth as a sign could explain the fact that a semiological system is gradually becoming a background for memes (as will be shown below). Finally, the ideas of Barthes, Cassirer, and Frye have one common feature: myth can create a new alternative reality.

Features of the Present-Day Russian Political Myth

Let us try to give the description of today's Russian political myth. Firstly, it is based upon the main cultural models, and these models could be understood in terms of nuclear elements, or semiotic mediations of time and space according to Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of the chronotope. Secondly, these based components need some narrative details, or mythologems, which have their source either in traditional culture or in postmodern mass-culture. Thirdly, political myth uses the new media as a communication channel for the viral expansion of memes.

It is highly significant that the meme is closely connected with belief and ideas. Memes have a rather curious structure in that they are semiotic, narrative, and digital at the same time. Of the myriad of memes, one of the most interesting examples is the "Hymn to Polite People."

As the process of establishing of a myth begins, the important point is to use the sphere of mass culture as a special communication field. In the refrain of "Hymn to Polite People" (Kalinin, Khokhryakova, 2014), the whole vector of the temporal frame has an irregular direction, that is, not from the Present to the Future, but from the Present to the Past. Thus, the idea of any kind of future life in Russia is either absent or replaced with the "sacred past."

Then what is the mechanism of the dissemination of a myth? In the sphere of the media, myth broadcasts itself mainly through memes.

The meme as a cultural phenomenon of the 21st century belongs to the digital media reality that tends to form its own ideological network. While the similarity between myth and meme is obvious, especially in the context of the attitudes of Cassirer and Barthes, both myth and the meme have the power of shaping a society. Still, there is a serious

difference. Though the meme belongs to the sphere of beliefs, just as myth does, it has a different way of functioning and different communicative modes. Lynch says that “beliefs affect retransmission in so many ways that they set off a colorful, unplanned growth race among diverse ‘epidemics’ of ideas. Actively contagious ideas are now called memes” (Lynch, 1996: 5). Memes are most effective in a so-called “motivation mode,” implying the situation when “the larger the number of people who want to hold a specific idea, and the more strongly they want it, the greater will be its motivational advantage” (ibid.: 9).

It is highly significant that the meme is closely connected with belief. As Lynch (1996) stresses in his book, “like a software virus in a computer network . . . thought contagions proliferate by effectively ‘programming’ for their own retransmission” and “beliefs affect retransmission in so many ways” (ibid.: 5). In other words, the meme needs to be the object of belief. Lynch also gives the following description, writing that “actively contagious ideas are now called memes.” Memes have rather curious structure; it is semiotic, narrative, and digital at the same time. It follows that present-day myths that form a kind of the mythosphere also have meme-like features.

Therefore, memes as “contagious ideas” resemble “demonic mythical power,” since, according to Cassirer, “in desperate situations, man will always have recourse to desperate means—and our present-day political myths have been such desperate means (Cassirer, 1973: 279).

The fundamental difference between them, though, is the ability to create a secondary reality. Myth has the capacity not just to influence the human mind, but also to build up an elaborated system of values which is easy to believe in. Memes, in their turn, may serve as a kind of building block for this system of values. Such kinds of construction materials also provide the system with a perfect communication channel.

In the period of 2008–2016, three such myths appeared: the Myth of the Byzantium Empire, the myth of “Polite People,” and the myth of “Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight.”

All of these are included into the greater myth of the Sacred Empire, and are disseminated through the meme of “spiritual bonds.” This meme came to life when President V. V. Putin, in his annual 2012 address to the Federal Assembly, mentioned that Russia is facing “an obvious deficit of spiritual bonds such as charity, compassion, support, and mutual aid”—in other words, a lack of “what for all time has made us stronger and more powerful, what we have always been proud of” (Putin, 2012). From this point forward, the expression “spiritual bonds” has become a kind of Internet meme in Russian social media. Moreover, the area of its usage has considerably widened since then. For instance, a Google search for “духовные скрепы” (spiritual bonds in Russian) gives more than 348,000 results. The term “spiritual bonds” has become a part of the political, cultural, and social discourse in Russia. It must be noted that these “spiritual bonds” are first and foremost based upon the idea of the sacredness of the past.

The Three Main Myths of Historical Glory in Russian Political Discourse Today

The Myth of the Sacred Empire

The myth of the Sacred Empire is surely the other name for the The Russian Empire in a contemporary cultural paradigm. It is one of the most powerful concepts in present-day political discourse. In 2012, this idea was predicted in Joe Right's film *Anna Karenina*, which begins with the shot of an enormous dark-red drop-curtain embroidered with the golden words "Imperial Russia." This attitude provoked a heated discussion in Russian social media as a considerable number of the audience declared themselves "offended" by the director's attitude of Russia as a shabby theatre. Regardless of the obvious fact that Joe Right had the allusion to Shakespeare's "All the world's a stage" in mind, he was accused in "being hostile to the great Russian culture" (Shteynman, 2014: 292).

Actually, the hostility of a significant part of the Russian audience has another explanation, that of a kind of patriotic jealousy. People have a non-verbal but distinct feeling that the concept of the "Russian Empire" belongs to their country, and personally to them. No foreign interpretation should be allowed. Such an idea is closely connected with the process of the "sacralization of the Russian Past."

The process started in 2008 when a well-known docu-fantasy *The Fall of Empire: The Lesson of Byzantium* appeared. The author of the film is the Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, the Superior of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow. The script is based upon the well-known and widely-used opposition between the East and the West, where the East is the center of culture, and the West is an accumulation of chaos and destruction. The film's author writes that "one can only imagine—indeed, history records it as such—how crude, ignorant Scandinavians, Germans, Franks, and Anglo-Saxons, whose chief occupation at the time was primitive sacking and pillage, after arriving from some town like Paris or London (which had populations of some tens of thousands) to this megalopolis of millions, a city of enlightened citizens, scholars, and elegantly dressed youths crowding imperial universities, dreamt of only one thing: invading and robbing, robbing and invading" (Shevkunov, 2008). Moreover, the "barbaric West became the civilized West only after it had taken over, stolen, destroyed, and swallowed up the Byzantine Empire" (ibid.).

This idea of glory and grandeur is closely connected with the ideas of sacredness. The author of the film claims that "the greatest treasure of Byzantium was God." According to him, Russia is the spiritual successor to Byzantium. The description of this revelation definitely shifts the emphasis from Byzantium to Russia, and specifically to Prince Vladimir: "Prince Vladimir's ambassadors experienced only in Byzantium that a true relationship between God and man exists; that it is possible for us to have living contact with another world" (ibid.).

The ideological intention of the film is clear, which is to stress the idea of the likenesses between Byzantium and Russia by drawing a number of quasi-historical parallels between them. However, the main intention is much more important and less obvious. It

is to build up a myth of the common history, and thus to equate Russia with Byzantium as the same Sacred Empire.

The imperial ideas in present-day Russia have been further developed in the area of political discourse of “radical” conservatives such as A. Prokhanov, who declared “the rise of the Fifth Empire” (Budaragin, 2012), since Stalin’s Soviet Union was the Fourth Empire, in his opinion.

The eighth bike-show, organized by Alexander Zaldostanov (also known as the Surgeon) and his bike club the Night Wolves, represented the institutionalizing of this concept. In 2016, his bike show was entitled “The Fifth Empire.” The head of the Night Wolves stressed two important points, those of the connection between the Soviet Union and present-day Russia, and the connection between the past and the future. According to him, “Stalin era attracts by heroes. People believed in dream, believed in idea and were ready to be killed and kill for it” (Dremova, 2016).

The main message of the show was built upon the opposition between “friends” and “foes,” where “friends” were represented by quasi-Soviet citizens, and the appearance of “foes” included a distorted Statue of Liberty and dancing skulls.

Being the guest of honor at the show, A. Prokhanov gave the clue to the whole event: “There is a lot of fire, light, music, power, dancing. This is what happens in a temple. In the temple that was built by the Surgeon the new reality is coming to life. Because the Fifth Empire is our present-day Russia. Our aboriginal imperial identity is waking up in the consciousness of the young audience. The Surgeon is a magician, sorcerer, wizard!” (Meduza, 2016). Prokhanov’s words formed a comprehensive picture of the hidden messages of the show: this “new reality” is a political myth that has the clear characteristics of a neo-religious cult.

The whole case clearly illustrates the passage from *The Power and Society*, where the authors say that “group consciousness initially increases with conflict with other groups with equal or higher degrees of consciousness. Such conflict strengthens existing patterns of solidarity: the ‘we’ becomes crystallized and important as over against a blatant ‘they.’ The most familiar example is the increase of patriotism in wartime, involving not merely a strengthening of identifications, but of interests, faith, and loyalties as well” (Lasswell, Kaplan, 1950: 46).

The Myth of Polite People

The Myth of Polite People is one of the most interesting examples of the process when myths transmit the new version of political reality by means of memes. The myth about the “Polite People in Crimea” provides us with one of the most relevant examples.

Actually, this expression consists of two different groups, the Polite People and the Little Green Men. The former is mostly used in Russian political discourse, whereas the latter can be found in the mass media outside of Russia.

The meme “Polite People” appeared on February 24, 2014, in Boris Rogozin’s report which was one of the first reports of the situation, and titled “Polite People Blockaded

Two Airports in Crimea.” There was a sentence in the report where “a security officer said: ‘They politely asked me to leave’” (Rozhin, 2014). Then, the first appearance of the expression was clearly occasional. Later, though, several journalists and bloggers gave a different version of the meme’s origin: “According to a popular blogger Ilya Varlamov, the term ‘polite men’ was invented by spin doctors who arrived in Crimea from Moscow” (Shevchenko, 2014).

Irregardless, the term “Polite People” seemed to be extremely useful for the authorities since it helped to build a positive image of ostensibly-unknown masked and unmarked soldiers who were wearing green army uniforms and wielding Russian military weapons. The adjective “polite” characterized both their manner and their positive intention. In order to enforce the myth, a new meme was added. This time, it was a popular networking image of a cat (“kotik”). Many users of the most popular Russian social network VKontakte posted photos depicting Crimean residents, especially children and young girls, embracing the soldiers as well as military people holding a big and fluffy ginger cat. The main goal was to create the image of the soldiers as peaceful, but powerful, troops.

The institutionalization of the meme was completed in April, 2014, when the Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu added a final touch to the glossy image of the Polite People by saying that it is impossible to find a black cat in a black room, “especially if the cat is smart, bold, and polite” (Skibina, 2014).

The process of establishing of a myth had just begun. The next step was to use the sphere of mass culture as a special communication field. In April, Anton Gubankov, the Head of the Culture Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense, wrote a poem in a night, “being inspired by the return of Crimea” (Kalinin, Khokhryakova, 2014). It was no wonder that several days later, the Russian Army Choir released a song glorifying the military troops in unmarked uniforms. By this time, though, the Polite People were obviously marked as belonging to Russia. The performance of the “Polite People Song” appeared on the official YouTube site, and the video received 100,000 hits per day.

A year later, on May 6, 2015, the first monument honoring the “Polite People” had been erected in the Far Eastern city of Belogorsk (Sindelar, 2015). The monument is based on the image of a soldier passing a ginger cat to a teenager, and was taken by TASS photographer, Alexandr Ryumin.

What is the hidden meaning of the Polite People? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the text of the “Hymn to Polite People.” From beginning, the entire song is written in accordance with the folklore genre of incantation chanting. The goal of any incantation is to transform reality, and Anton Gubankov’s poem is no exception.²

2. Вежливо люди с вежливым взглядом
Вежливо смотрят, вежливо просят.
Просто стоят они вежливо рядом,
Просто оружие вежливо носят.

Припев:
Все будет хорошо, отлично будет!
Победы предков нас вперед зовут.

The song is as follows:

These polite people with polite glances
Staring politely, asking politely
Just standing politely so close to you
Just carrying politely their big guns

Chorus:

Everything will be all right, really fine
Our sires' victories are calling us ahead
Long live, our country, and your polite people
Keep safe your peace, your honor and your fame

Polite are the helmets, polite are the faces
Polite are the steel vehicles as well
Polite is the capital composing bylinas³
About the people that are most polite

Polite are the distances, polite is the sky
Polite is the wind waving the banner
Polite is the Motherland with bread-and-salt-welcome
The triumph ahead us predicts happiness.⁴

The text has all the constitutive features of an authentic incantation, those of the commencement, the culmination, and the denouement. It also has a special refrain, the main function being a “holdfast,” a kind of hook to plant the message into the audience’s minds.

The message is based upon the spatial/temporal frame by M. Bakhtin. In his *Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel*, he gives several models, one of which is so-called “Dream Time” (Bakhtin, 2000: 76) that is the Sacred Past. There is exactly the same model in the refrain of the “Hymn to Polite People”; it is “Our sires’ victories are calling us

Живи, страна, а вежливые люди
Отчизны честь и славу сберегут.

Вежливы каски, вежливы лица,
Вежливы даже стальные машины.
Вежлива наша родная столица,
О вежливых людях слагая былины.

В вежливых даях вежливо небо,
Вежливо ветер знамя полощет.
Вежлива Родина вежливым хлебом
Ждут нас победы и счастье пророчат

3. Bylina—Russian epic.

4. Translated by me.

ahead.” This means that the whole vector of temporal frame is not from the Past to the Future, but from the Present to the Past. The idea of a future life in Russia is either absent or replaced with the “sacred past.”

What about the spatial frame? Again, it is clear that the incantation tries to turn the whole country from the space of present-day Russia to imperial/Soviet Russia. The marker of such an intention is the line “Polite is the capital composing bylinas.” A “bylina” is one of the genres of the Russian epic, depicting the heroic exploits of Russian warriors. The concept of the Sacred Past is then completed with the concept of the Sacred Space inhabited by heroes, here represented by the Polite People.

The word “bylina” is highly significant in this song as it is an unintended cultural reference familiar to any Soviet citizen born before 1975. The verse implies another song, that of “Budyonny’s March”⁵, with lyrics by Anatoly D’Actil, and music by Daniil and Dmitry Pokrass. The March was written and composed in 1920. The popularity of the song among Red Army soldiers was so great that, in later years, it was included in numerous collections of folklore songs.

From the very beginning of the “March,” the similarity of the songs becomes obvious:

We are the cavalrymen of the Red Army,
and the stories are told
about us
by the eloquent bylinniks (narrators).⁶

The refrain is equally interesting: “We are the heroes, all of us, and the whole life of us the just struggle.” Thus, the word “bylinnik” unites the two songs and the two historic loci of the heroic past and the heroic present. Therefore, both the Red cavalrymen and the Polite People belong to the concept of epic heroes, and, hence, to the epic time frame.

In other words, the “Hymn to Polite People” represents a profound gap between the spheres of the Past, Present, and Future dimensions in the Russian mentality. O. Matveeva and I. Melik-Gaikazyan have recently undertaken a research project concerning the model of time in Russian culture (2005: 164) and they have come to a rather pessimistic conclusion. According to the research, there is no connection between the different spheres of time in the mental background in Russia and, moreover, the concept of the Present as such seems to be highly insignificant.

Thus, in present-day Russian political discourse, the myth of the Polite People is based upon the epic chronotope where the Present is totally absent, and the Future is re-addressed to the heroic, dream-like Past.

5. In the original — «Марш Буденного».

6. Мы—красные кавалеристы
и про нас
былинники речистые
ведут рассказ.

The Myth of Panfilov's Twenty-Eight

On April, 20, 2015, in his interview to the *Kommersant* the head of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, Sergey Mironenko, argued that historical facts can hardly be falsified because it is always possible to check the archives. He also stressed the point that history is not the same as “political games” (Khamraev, 2016). It is most noteworthy that one of the key issues of the interview is the case of the “28 soldiers of General Panfilov.” According to the historian, the legend was fabricated by a reporter named Koroteev and a literary editor named Krivitsky for the *Krasnaya Zvezda* newspaper. The reaction of the journalist in this interview is highly significant. He simply denies the accusation of invention, saying “I have been considering them as heroes from my childhood and I don't want to change my mind” (Khamraev, 2016).

In the other words, this dialogue shows the widespread rejection throughout the general public of historic facts in favor of legend. The explanation of this phenomenon, again, lies in the area of myth rather than logic and rationality. Moreover, the journalist pays no attention to the real soldiers; the whole regiment was involved and more than 100 soldiers were killed. He says “the feat is the feat, no matter if the reporters embellished or embroidered the story.” S. Mironenko responded in saying: “Most grievous problem of the Soviet Union was that fictitious heroes seemed to be much more important than the real ones” (ibid.).

Thereby, Sergey Mironenko's interview marked the beginning of the period when “legend” is replacing “fact,” and the period when political myth starts domineering in the field of historical sciences.

In June, 2016, the State Archive published the referenced report on the case of 28 soldiers of General Panfilov on its web-site. The author of the digitalized document issued on May 10, 1948, was Chief Military Prosecutor Nikolay Afanasiyev, who came to the conclusion that “the feat of 28 Panfilov's guardsmen is fictional” (State Archive of the Russian Federation, 2016). At the same time, the author of the report had to state that the memory of these soldiers had been already perpetuated in a large number of schools, factories, and collective farms of the Soviet Union. Now even historic document contains the seeds of myth since its author has no intention to suggest any variant of renaming it.

The seeds of myth were planted in 1945, sprouting in 1975 when the great memorial devoted to the “Feat of the 28” was erected near Dubosecovo. The majestic memorial of six colossal statues made of grey granite symbolizes the six nationalities represented in the famous regiment. Six titanic figures wearing long greatcoats were intended to have a resemblance with the epic warriors (*bogatyr*s). Thus, the idea of the sacred defenders of Moscow was embodied in stone.

On October 4, 2016, the Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky commented on the issue of Panfilov's 28 soldiers, saying that “this is a sacred legend that cannot be touched.” He also added that even discussion on the theme is “blasphemy.” The Minister called the feat “symbolical” and put it with the same rank as “300 Spartans.” It seems that the Minister referred to Zack Snyder's famous film *300 Spartans* (2006), and probably to its 2014

sequel with an even more specific title of *300 Spartans: The Rise of an Empire*. The Minister stated: “This is the legend. Were there 28, 30, 38, even 48 of 130 soldiers? We don’t know. And nobody knows. And nobody will have ever known. And there is no reason in trying to know it” (RIA Novosti, 2016a).

It is also necessary to note that the screening of the film *28 Panfilovtsev (Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight)* followed the meeting of President V. Putin and President N. Nazarbayev (RIA Novosti, 2016b). Officially, the film came out on November 24, 2016.

Such statements demonstrate a significant point in the reception of historical facts. The use of such words as “legend,” “sacred,” “blasphemy,” and “symbolical” can be considered as a part of the ideologically-marked process of sacralization in the fields of social and cultural discourse.

Similar expressions such as “legend,” “feat,” “memorial,” and “symbol” can be seen on the film’s web site. Moreover, there is a contradistinction between the feat and its dethronement, known as “undermining.” The text actually says: “Today, any adolescent who Googles ‘Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight’ will find articles—laden with ‘facts’—about how and why the myth of the 28 soldiers who stopped the German tanks was fabricated” (Panfilov’s 28 Men, 2016). The text contains the widely-used opposition of “us” and “them”: “In the 21st century, the tide of historical ‘truth’ has turned away from the heroes.” Putting the word “truth” in double quotation marks means that history is gradually transformed into a kind of sacred structure and part of the “spiritual bonds” mentioned in 2012.

The case of Panfilov’s Twenty-Eight indicates a perfect myth according to Roland Barthes’s conception; the current ideology transfigures the meaning of a sign whereas the form remains untouched. Hence, the form is the existence of the soldiers of General Panfilov’s regiment who defended Moscow at the Dubosekovo crossroads. The primal meaning, in its turn, is that the reporter invented the story where 130 fallen defenders was reduced to 28 in the article for the front-line newspaper. The secondary, ideological meaning is that the article has become a sacred text, and those who cast doubts and question the details are renegades.

Indeed, the form of historic fact that can be discussed and examined is filled with rather different meanings of sacred legends. Moreover, the whole story becomes a part of a new mythology.

As well, the famous words allegedly said by Klochkov the political commissariat of “We have nowhere to retreat. Moscow is behind us” actually represents a famous literal allusion to Mikhail Lermontov’s “Borodino” (1837). Lermontov wrote (2016):

And eyes aflame, he spoke his mind:
“Hey lads! is Moscow not behind?
By Moscow then we die
As have our brethren died before!
And that we’ll die we all then swore,
And th’ oath of loyalty ne’er tore
Neath Borodinian sky.”⁷

7. Translation by Peter Solovioff.

It is obvious that either or both the reporter Koroteev and the literary editor Krivtsov referred consciously or subconsciously to the epic theme of the Patriotic War of 1812, as well as to its well-known reflections in Russian literature. By that time, “Borodino,” and especially the recognizable quotation “Hey lads! is Moscow not behind?,” had become the part of the literature curricula in Soviet schools. “Borodino” was used as a perfect example of patriotism. This was mostly due to the poetic tone of the text where the heroic past is opposed to the un-heroic present. Lermontov expresses it in the refrain: “The men in my time weren’t like this weak folk—bogatyrs they were, as you are not.”

Conclusion

The term of political myth today must not be restricted within the narrow limits of narration and plot. Even “discourse” cannot be considered as a synonym. Today, political myth constitutes a new area connected with the categories of semiotics, beliefs, and power. Moreover, political myth uses the meme as a part of social media to shape its own reality, in human minds as well as in the media. The most wide-spread political myths in Russia broadcast the same message of sacred historic glory, where the past takes precedence over the present (and the future).

Three political myths, those of the “Fallen Empire,” of the “Polite People” and of “Panfilov’s Twenty Eight,” reveal different dimensions of the same system. This system ideologically possesses historical categories and transforms them into a secondary reality that can exist only in the sphere of the media.

Thus, the Fall of the Byzantium Empire has a mass culture alternative of the Night Wolves bike show “The Fifth Empire,” and is extension and cultural back-up at the same time. The memetic instrument for it is the “spiritual bonds” meme.

The “Polite People” case is even more representative, as the meme appeared spontaneously, and was immediately built into the already-existing chronotope model of the Heroic Past (or Dream Time). One of the hidden ideological messages is time looping: the Soviet Past and Soviet glory is the same as present-day heroism.

The “Polite People” myth has its continuation in the myth of “Panfilov’s Twenty Eight.” The memetic instrument is the “sacred past” in the sphere of public discussion. The category of the historical past is again dissolved in the secondary reality of myth. Moreover, historical facts are denied and despised in favor of a mass culture product, the film having been released in November, 2016.

All three examples illustrate the same attitude of the establishment to the issues of “spiritual bonds” and the “sacred past,” which is the creation of an invented reality designed to be believed. There is no realistic time frame; it is replaced with a “heroic dream time” that is indisputable. Today, the glory of the Past seems to be mostly a reflection of Soviet glory.

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Политический миф о славе: создание медиареальности

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В настоящий момент наблюдаются серьезные изменения в социокультурном пространстве. В первую очередь, речь идет о процессе проникновения в него особых семиотических конструктов. Их можно описать как политические мифы. И значительная их часть тесно связана с концепцией славы (прежде всего, государственной) — как в прошлом, так и в настоящем и будущем времени. Эта слава может рассматриваться как утерянная (развал СССР) или же возрожденная (вхождение Крыма в состав Российской Федерации в 2014). Концепции славы и победы (прежде всего, победы в Великой Отечественной войне) настолько тесно связаны в российском политическом дискурсе, что все заметнее становится процесс своего рода их присвоения истэблшментом. Понятие политического мифа давно вышло за рамки нарратива, и теперь особое значение приобретает его семиотическая структура. Миф представляет собой знак, трансформированный идеологией, и, с другой стороны, является актором, который создает (или, по меньшей мере, трансформирует) социокультурную реальность вокруг себя. В качестве инструмента здесь выступает мем, который укоренен в сфере медиа. При этом организации пространства мифа, как правило, соотносятся с понятием хронотопа, предложенным М. Бахтиным. В современном российском политическом дискурсе содержится три доминирующих политических мифа, активно апеллирующих к концепту славы. Во-первых, это миф о Византийской империи и утраченной славе, которой противопоставляется так называемая «Пятая империя». Во-вторых, речь идет

о мифе о «вежливых людях», при создании которого был задействован соответствующий мем. Наконец, особое место занимает миф о двадцати восьми героях-панфиловцах.

Ключевые слова: политический миф, мифологема, мифология, хронотоп, мем, медиа реальность, история, идеология

Friendship Policies in Russian Religious Philosophy

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In antiquity, the phenomenon of friendship became the object of steadfast attention from philosophy. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle connects the political existence of man with friendship since he believes the city (polis) can be built in analogy with friendly unions. Cicero also saw a social prototype in friendship. A gradual change in such a representation resulted in a romantic concept of friendship that is understood as the subjective, sensual bringing together of individuals, but is only accessible to few. Kant and Hegel also adhered to the romantic concept. Russian religious philosophy, on the one hand, is formed under the influence of German romanticism and the understanding of friendship peculiar to it, but, on the other hand, it returns immediately to the concept of friendship as a social construct. Kho-myakov believes that friendship is first of all established between the power and the people, and this friendly union distinguishes Russian culture from the West European culture. However Russian religious-philosophical thought is distinguished by the aspiration to understand the phenomenon of friendship not in itself, but in its connection with the concepts of enmity and brotherhood. There is an image of brotherly unity emanating from a Far Eastern civilization which V.I. Solovyov posits as the main threat to Christianity, whereas N. Fyodorov, believes that a brotherly unity and an unspoken pledge of rescue from “the not brotherly” West that has remained in the Russian and in the Chinese agrarian communities. The relationship between the concepts of friendship and brotherhood becomes clearer in 20th century Western European thought, particularly in the representations of the “mystical acosmism of brotherhoods” by the sociologist and philosopher M. Weber and the political philosopher H. Arendt.

Keywords: friendship, political, enmity, brotherhood, Russia, Europe, East, acosmism

In classical antiquity, the phenomenon of friendship became a subject of profound philosophical study. Aristotle distinguished three types of friendship, the friendship of utility, the friendship of pleasure, and the friendship of the good, with the friendship of the good being regarded as the fullest and best form of friendship as it is linked with the

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moral improvement of the human being (Aristotle, 2004). Using the language of modern philosophy, it means that the phenomenon of friendship presents an important ethical, anthropological, and, following from Aristotle's reasoning, a political problem. Friendship is seen as an embodiment of virtue since a dialogue of philosophers offers a greater measure of wisdom in terms of quantity as well as quality than any of its participants. On the other hand, a military alliance ("hetairos") offers a measure of bravery exceeding that of the most courageous warrior. Friendship of the good does not exclude the other two types of friendship. Rather, it encompasses friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, combining and satisfying all human desires in full.

Cities (poleis) and communities are also based on the bonds of friendship. Moreover, Aristotle holds that the three types of friendship correspond to three forms of constitution (ruling systems), as well as their corrupted and perverted versions. The friendly relations between father and son correspond to kingship; the friendship between husband and wife corresponds to aristocracy, while timocracy can be compared with the friendship between brothers; with tyranny, on the other hand, the friendship between rulers and the ruled becomes impossible. In Aristotle's philosophy, the different types of friendship provide the best model for describing political systems, and what is readily understandable about friendships between individuals can be extrapolated onto state regimes. Cities are also built around friendships, so the political importance of friendship for Aristotle is without doubt.

Aristotle begins his reasoning with the question of whether friendship is a positive attribute or if it arises from deprivation (a lack of communication, the weakness of an individual in need of external support, etc.). Aristotle and Cicero both see friendship as a prototype of sociality as such. Friendship is preferable to any form of human collectivity such as the tribe, a civil community, or a community based on blood kinship. Cicero writes "But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none friendship, more noble, none more powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in intimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends to the one in whose character it seems to dwell" (Cicero, 1913: 59). Cicero's well-known and often-quoted work does not add anything radically new to Aristotle's understanding of friendship.

The Aristotelian concept of friendship has a complex history in philosophy. In Immanuel Kant's ethic, the reality of friendship is questioned as "friendship is only an Idea (though a practically necessary one) and unattainable in practice, although striving for friendship (as a maximum of good disposition toward each other) is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an honorable one (Kant, 1991: 261). Additionally, Hegel limits the possibility of friendship to young age, while in the age of maturity "it is inherent essentially in the principle of our deeper life that, on the whole, every man fends for himself, i.e., is himself competent to take his place in the world" (Hegel, 1975: 1154). This understanding of friendship was predetermined by the Romantic canon, which is clearly elitist in nature. This elite, subjective, and ecstatic character of the Romantic ideal of friendship largely ignored friendship's sociogenic and political (i.e., polis-building)

content. In the modern age, few would dare support Aristotle's statement that a political system must be understood through the type of friendship it is based on.

German Romanticism has been acknowledged of having a decisive effect on the development of Russian religious philosophy (Vorobyeva, 2015; Maslin, 2016; Sizemskaya, 2012; Filatova, 2010). It is all the more surprising that the Romantic canon of friendship did not attract any considerable interest among Russian philosophers. Instead, friendship is interpreted as a phenomenon characterizing society in general rather than subjective aspects of interpersonal relations. This interpretation is placed in an unusual for the early 19th century context, linking the idea of friendship with both its opposite (enmity) and the phenomenon of brotherhood. The context forms itself spontaneously, and is seen as natural by Russian religious philosophy which does not attempt to reflect on the origins of this context or even recognize its uniqueness. As Russian religious philosophy places all three concepts ("friend," "enemy," and "brother") into the field of political relations, these concepts and the specific links between them are relevant to the interpretation of the category of the political in Russian philosophy. In this interpretation, the political is constructed not only along the "friend-enemy" axis, but also along the intersections formed by each member of this binary with ideas and practices of brotherhood. This diversity enables us to talk of friendship policies rather than a single policy. It should be noted that Western European philosophy turned to friendship policies much later, during the second half of the 20th century (Blanchot, 1971; Derrida, 1994).

At the same time, there are grounds to believe that the phenomenon of friendship and its interpretation by Russian religious philosophers are crucial to understanding the historical development of Russian religious philosophy as a whole. According to a belief shared by many Russian religious philosophers, the principal value of philosophy lies in metaphysics, i.e., in the holistic, extrasensory, and free knowledge of universal truths. It is implied that prominent philosophers must necessarily have recourse to intense metaphysical experiences, and are able to find the absolute and the metaphysical principle in everything. The only question that remains is whether this ability to find absolutes is a personal achievement of each philosopher, a gift not unlike a poetic genius celebrated by Romantic authors, or whether it characterizes philosophical knowledge irrespective of who approaches it. Russian religious philosophy clearly gravitates to the former viewpoint. However, to openly recognize that metaphysical gift characterizes an individual philosopher as a "living psychological being" would mean acknowledging the dependence of metaphysics from psychology and experience, and, consequently, the dependence of the eternal and absolute on the transient and relative. In this case, the methodology used by philosophy to comprehend the absolute would have to be made explicit, something Russian religious philosophy has consistently refrained from doing throughout its history.

It should be acknowledged that Russian humanitarian knowledge is frequently constrained by the exaggerated and inadequate understanding of the role of Russian religious philosophy in the Russian ideological atmosphere of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Sometimes this understanding is described via an impressive metaphor: "Russian reli-

gious philosophy is the Biblical spirit of creation hovering above the waters of our chaotic existence" (Mailov, 1997: 11). Nevertheless, the intention to present Russian religious philosophy as the sole carrier of the creative principle in Russia can be easily put into doubt. As a matter of fact, the ordering and differentiating principle must itself be orderly and differentiated if we are to regard philosophy as a science rather than as practical wisdom. One cannot fail to notice that the phenomenon of friendship for Russian religious philosophy is, on the one hand, too simple to look for the absolute in it, and on the other hand, too tightly linked with common sense to become a primary object of study for emerging scientific philosophy. The study of friendship is a domain where the simplicity and even naiveté of Russian religious philosophy is manifested in full. Yet, this very simplicity may have enabled us to identify the connections between friendship, enmity, and brotherhood which will later serve as an object of reflection for Western European philosophy.

The friendship concept first emerges as a historiosophical problem in the works by Aleksey Khomyakov. His article "About the Old and the New" argues that social relations in Russia cannot be effectively regulated by legal mechanisms. Khomyakov believes that the Russian soul is home to beautiful traditions which, however, have receded and faded away in the collective memory. The moral significance of these traditions resulted in a friendship between the people and state leadership (*vlast'*). There was a period when the social system was based on the law of justice and mutual love:

The state leadership proves its own existence through the growing influence of Russia and through the fact that Russia has managed to triumph over numerous strong enemies; *friendship between the state leadership and people* [italicized by us] is manifested in an old custom which had survived until the reign of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich when representatives of all social classes assembled to discuss issues of state importance. (Khomyakov, 1994: 458)

For Khomyakov, this friendship between the Russian state leadership and the Russian people is a unique phenomenon in the history of humankind. The friendship forms the essence of Russian political organization, and ensures an effective substitute for the institutions of European representative democracy. What is crucial, though, is that the bond of friendship between the state leadership and the people has enabled Russia to defeat many strong enemies. Friendship and enmity are linked into a whole, and mutually reinforce one another. The more enemies, the stronger the friendship between the state leadership and people, and vice versa: the stronger the friendship between the leadership and people, the more dangerous and stronger enemies there are in the outside world. With such reasoning, Khomyakov emphasizes the idea of popular unity while ignoring some obvious historical facts. However, as demonstrated by the history of the Slavophile movement and the whole of Russian conservatism of the 19th century, no amount of historical facts is likely to undermine a convenient concept linking friendship and enmity.

The friendship between the state leadership and the people is based on the same mechanism as church unity. Georges Florovsky pointed out that Khomyakov and the Slavophiles shared a type of natural ecclesiology revolving around a charismatic pastor

(a role filled by Christ during the times of the Gospels), or “*starets*” (literally, “elder,” or a spiritual mentor), who revitalized souls owing not so much to his position in the hierarchy and the related authority of one that administers sacraments (Florovsky, 1991) as to the existential penetration into the soul of the mentee by joining him in active and compassionate love. This motif resonates with Khomyakov’s ideas concerning the “love bond” However, while Khomyakov focuses on brotherly love, emphasizing the equality of parties in friendship, the 20th century theological concepts see the pastor as a “strong personality,” or a “superman” capable of absorbing the personality of the other and transcending this otherness, although commonly interpreted as a consequence of sinful self-isolation.

Khomyakov used the Romantic ideal of friendship built on equality and reciprocity as his point of reference. He reproaches Western Christians of “spiritual fratricide” where the bonds of friendship between Christians are neglected and replaced by authority. The theme of friendship as an important phenomenon to Christianity will be further elaborated by Pavel Florensky in *The Pillar and Ground of the Truth* (Letter 11) (Florensky, 2012). Led by Florensky’s example, Sergei Bulgakov also addresses the concept of friendship, following the trend started by Khomyakov, writing:

Friendship is a *personal* relation in love, rooted in the life of the Church. . . . Even though the relations of friendship have a pairwise character in each particular case, they can be repeated since one and the same person can enter into different alliances of friendship; and a natural hierarchy is established among these alliances such that one true Friendship is realized among many friendships and friends. . . . The foundation of churchly friendship is Christ’s Friendship with us. He tells His disciples: “Ye are My friends . . . I have called you my friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you’ (John 15:14, 15).” (Bulgakov, 2003: 317)

Yet, the ideal of friendship between the state leadership and the people, as well as the ideal of church unity, are only loosely linked with reality. Khomyakov shares a Platonic conviction that church unity or the friendship between the people and state leadership are only incomplete analogues or copies of the respective original ideas. The rational discernment of ideal essences is made possible by the perseverance of the community (“*soborny*”) spirit in Russian history; however, no evidence was provided that this spirit persevered in the first place. Like Khomyakov, Aksakov failed to see that

in the Moscow state, these consultative forms of governance were superseded by purely Tatar slavery from top down, from the first boyar to the last peasant—something Aksakov would not see. He created a fantastical idyll without thinking that this idyll destroyed the spiritual wholeness which Slavophiles regarded as the main characteristic of the Slavs: thought and will were attributed to different entities—an impossible relationship under any political system, which inevitably led to the suppression of free thinking. And yet, this ugly fantasy was offered as an example for all nations. (Chicherin, 2009: 201)

According to Khomyakov, enmity as an opposite of friendship is the last barrier to universal well-being. The history of humankind is full of enmity; constant disagreements between ancient gods symbolize the eternal enmity between peoples and religions. Quite unexpectedly, Khomyakov claims that this law of universal enmity only applies to the West, and logically leads to the universal enmity between West and East (more specifically, between Orthodoxy and Catholicism).

Moreover, along with other Slavophiles, Khomyakov is more interested in the phenomenon of enmity than in friendship. An automated word search in electronic copies of works by Slavophiles shows that the word “enmity” is 3–4 times more prevalent in their writings than the word “friendship” or its derivatives. Nikolay Danilevsky extrapolates the pervasive enmity of the West towards the East from the religious sphere onto the field of intergovernmental relations. “Why is Europe hostile towards Russia?” is the recurrent theme of his well-known book *Russia and Europe*. In this seminal work, Danilevsky assures his readers that Russia never pursued expansionist policies towards the West. Judging by historical facts, he continues to claim that ethnicities such as the Chud, the Meria, the Ves, or the Mordvins were assimilated peacefully; Ingria was part of Russia since the times of Yaroslav the Wise; the acquisition of Siberia occurred peacefully, with the consent of the indigenous leaders; the Polish lands annexed by Russia historically used to belong to the latter; Finland did not play any dramatic part in history before joining Russia, and its colonization was therefore permissible; the conquest of the Caucasus so widely criticized in Europe was less significant than the annexation of Poland, and numerous wars led by Paul I and Alexander I were consistent with the interests of Europe. Although Danilevsky does admit that the territories of Bessarabia and Crimea were annexed by Russia forcibly and contrary to the wishes of the local population, he stresses that the territories used to be strongholds for the enemies of Russia, and that the annexation of these territories was the only possible choice for Russia. According to Danilevsky, its adversaries often refer to Russia as the world policeman that destroys any emergent areas of freedom, consistently suppressing revolutions in Europe by force. Danilevsky believes, however, that this problem used to be irrelevant prior to the French Revolution since Russia had never previously threatened the liberal achievements of European culture. After the French Revolution, the Russian army, headed by Suvorov, was deployed in Europe, although only for a short while, and only at the request of the European monarchs who feared a mutiny of the Third Estate. In the post-revolutionary period, during the Congress of Vienna which had to decide the future destiny of the defeated France, it was Alexander I that suggested introducing constitutional monarchy in France, despite the efforts of the Europeans Metternich and Talleyrand to restore the French monarchy. Danilevsky writes:

What is the reason for this mutual enmity? Can it be because Europe simply does not know Russia? Then how come Europe, which knows everything from the Sanskrit language to the Iroquois dialects, from the laws of motion of complex systems of stars to the structure of microscopic organisms, does not know only Russia? . . .

Europe does not know Russia because it does not want to know, or, rather, it knows Russia the way it wants to know it, that is, in a way consistent with its preconceptions, passions, pride, hatred and contempt. (Danilevsky, 2011: 43)

Danilevsky argues that Europe, following its “historical instinct,” will be reluctant to acknowledge Russia as long as Russia preserves its cultural core which cannot be assimilated by European culture.

Danilevsky sees friendship as an opportunistic political concept required to achieve a temporary truce in the eternal conflict of states and peoples. Enmity is absolute, while friendship is relative. This principle is key to understanding Danilevsky’s frequently cited statement of “Differences in political principles cannot serve as a barrier to friendships between governments and nations” (Danilevsky, 2011: 36). If the governments are at odds, the people may remain friends; however, these very friendly relations preserved against the will of the governments may later play an important role in peace-making or, alternatively, be used to weaken the hostile government.

Vladimir Solovyov (Soloviev), the loudest and most consistent critic of Danilevsky’s historiosophical theory (Solovyov, 1988, 2007: 406–414), examines the same correlation of friendship and enmity. Friendship is only mentioned in connection with international relations; the existence of friendships between countries and peoples must be analyzed depending on whether the alliance is targeted at good or evil. The triumph of enmity over friendship is due to the domination of centrifugal and “divisive” natural forces aiming to break the continuity of human existence and its link with the supreme principles of being. These centrifugal forces rule over individuals and society in general; consequently, relations between peoples and states are hostile rather than friendly. In Solovyov’s vision, the epicenter of hostility is associated with the East rather than with Europe.

“The national idea,” “the Russian idea,” and “the soul of the people” are notions inextricably linked with Solovyov’s understanding of the Christian culture. Vyacheslav Ivanov defines Vladimir Solovyov’s mission in Russian culture fairly broadly: “Through Solovyov, the Russian nation by means of Logos became aware of its mission—to serve the principle of the Universal Church even at the cost of losing the nation’s soul” (Ivanov, 1994: 61). The mission of the Russian people is, therefore, to overcome the schism between religious confessions and establish a single Universal Church. The Russian nation is suited to perform this ecumenical mission. This is due in part to its characteristic responsiveness and sensitivity to issues of world history, and in part to its geographical position, i.e., geopolitical factors like the emergent threat of Pan-Mongolism and the necessity for the Orthodox East and Catholic West to resist Pan-Mongolism with a joint effort. In one of his last works, *A Short Tale of the Antichrist*, written four years before the Russian–Japanese war, Solovyov outlined the key features of Pan-Mongolism, predicting the future invasion of the Asian hordes in the West with the aim to drive out “the white devils” from Asia, and establish “the true Middle Kingdom” over the whole world. Vladimir Solovyov predicted the future role of East Asia and believed that it is in this region that world history will be made. Russia, being a great fringe district of Europe at the Asian border, is

destined to play a crucial part in the conflict between West and East. The same factors explain Vladimir Solovyov's critique of Slavophilia, which, in his opinion, rashly opposes the Slavic world to Western Europe. Russians have long made their choice in favor of the West; they are Europeans "with an Asian streak deep in their hearts." He saw 21st century Europe as an alliance of democracies, as "a United States of Europe."

Solovyov linked "the Eastern menace" not so much with the religious tension between Christianity and Islam as with the growing influence of the Far East (the latter was never involved in any conflicts with Russian Orthodoxy in the religious sphere). For Solovyov, the social organization typical of the Far Eastern civilization is deeply alien and potentially hostile to the Christian world, and emanates from the cult of the Family. Rather than being a bond of affection, the Family in the East is seen as a wide-branching social hierarchy ascending from son to father, from father to grandfather, from grandfather to great-grandfather, and earlier ancestors. Ancestors never lose their importance or influence. On the contrary, they are vested with sacred authority and absolute power:

The private way of life, the state regime and religion, and the moral worldview of the Chinese all grew and developed from one common route, from the family principle, or more precisely, from the absolutism of paternal power . . . The entire complex political organization of today's China is considered by the Chinese themselves as a concentrated expansion of paternal power. (Solovyov, 1890: 184)

The father of the family enjoys full power over his children while recognizing the full power of his dead father and the whole of his ancestry over him. Any virtue or any idea of order are based on filial respect of the forefathers, both living and dead. Thus, the Chinese never use personal autonomy or act in their own name; instead, they perform the will of their ancestors. Therefore, the Far Eastern civilization is oriented in the past, which determines both the present and the future. The Christian world, on the contrary, is intrinsically forward-looking.

Chinese society, while being incredibly cohesive, is completely alien to the humanistic universals of the West. However, Vladimir Solovyov is so suspicious of the unity which is typical of the Far Eastern civilization and contradicts European (Christian) values that he never questions the positive nature of brotherhood. Solovyov's ecumenical ideal can ultimately be reduced to the ideal of universal brotherhood of all people. At the same time, Solovyov offers an impressive image of brotherly unity of all people in the Far Eastern civilization, where individuality is superseded by forces of the clan.

The theme of brotherly unity is further developed in *The Philosophy of the Common Cause* by Nikolay Fyodorov (Fedorov). Despite Solovyov's enthusiastic reaction to Fyodorov's idea of the physical resurrection of ancestors (an idea that Solovyov, who named Fyodorov his teacher, accepted without reservation and interpreted as a project targeted at world brotherhood (Solovyov, 1995: 100–102), Fyodorov himself remained fairly sceptical about Solovyov's theory of undivided humanity (Fyodorov, 1995: 378–386). The idea of brotherly unity rejected by Vladimir Solovyov is central to Fyodorov's *The Philosophy*

of the Common Cause and is associated with the Far Eastern civilization. Fyodorov's principal political idea is the development of the Russian–Chinese axis in continental Asia. The alliance of two ancient agricultural civilizations and their balanced friendly influence in Middle Asia must curtail the destructive energies of Turkic–Mongol “nomadism.” In addition, there is an obvious similarity between Fyodorov's cult of forefathers and the Confucian cult of ancestors. This similarity integrates seamlessly into Fyodorov's global strategy of harnessing the blind forces of nature.

Fyodorov also provided liturgical rationale for the idea of brotherhood:

The very essence of the Liturgy of the Catechumens, adelphopoiesis, was ritualized as a brother-making ceremony; however, when detached from liturgy, adelphopoiesis lost public significance and became a private matter; brotherhood was now established between two individuals; likewise, baptism, which used to indicate the adoption of the child by the whole of the church community, transformed into a private affair when performed outside liturgy: the baptismal sponsors (i.e. godparents) were no longer seen as representatives of the church since they were appointed by the baptizand's parents, not the church . . . Judging by the prayers used during the brother-making ceremony as well as the ektenes quoted by Goar, adelphopoiesis had universal rather than private significance as blessing for brotherly alliance was requested so that a human being may be created after the image and likeness of God and for the sake of apostolic alliance; only after that friendships between Sergius and Bacchus, Cosmas and Damian, Cyrus and John were remembered . . . The brother-making ceremony is a perfect likeness of liturgy. (Fyodorov, 1995)

The key originality of Fyodorov's ideas lies in his dream of resurrection of every human being that has ever lived, which, in his opinion, was necessary to ensure sustained historical progress and victory over death. He was convinced that it would be possible to restore the state of the world before the Original Sin was committed by regulating nature through science and technology. Fyodorov described the current state of humanity as a “non-brotherhood.” Death is an attribute of non-brotherly existence, where each life must be paid for by another person's demise. The blind, often hostile, forces of nature must be transformed into tools and organs for humanity by means of scientific discovery and human activity. By conquering nature, humanity will also conquer death. The harnessing of natural forces, the reformation of the human organism, space exploration, and the control of cosmic processes will enable humanity to raise ancestors, or “fathers,” from the dead. The attainment of immortality is the “common cause” for all humanity. In humans, the resistance to the environment and the elements brings about an obsession with self-preservation, which results in hostile, “non-brotherly” relations between individuals and peoples. This hostility precludes the effective resolution of the vital problem of human dominance over nature. Fyodorov describes the social system based on egoism as “zoomorphic.” Due to the conflict between knowledge and action, the caste of scientists engaging in pure and objectless contemplation generates a false understanding of the world and sets false priorities in scientific research. In a zoomorphic society, even great discoveries and inventions are used for a mutual struggle rather than the mutual

good. Fyodorov believes that the ideal social system (“psychocracy”) must be based on the unity of mind and action. When humanity learns to control the forces of nature and thereby putting an end to hunger, it will also eradicate the causes of enmity. Humanity will focus its efforts on the shared task of controlling nature on the planet, and even in the whole of the Universe.

Similarly to Khomyakov and Danilevsky, Fyodorov describes Western Europe as a global source of hostility resulting from conditions of human existence. Unlike Solovyov, who regarded German militarism as the only force capable of warding off “the yellow danger,” Fyodorov interprets the militarist trends present in the development of Prussia (and, later, united Germany) as the principal threat to Russia and, more importantly, for the prospective return of humanity from non-brotherhood to brotherhood. Fyodorov is one of the few thinkers who warned that Germany would pose a danger to the European world, doing so two decades before World War I. Later, after the onset of the First World War, Nikolai Berdyaev wrote an article “The Prophecies of N. F. Fedorov Concerning the War,” stressing that Fyodorov’s prophetic visions had come true with surprising accuracy, and especially concerning Fyodorov’s evaluation of the figure of German Emperor Wilhelm and his fatal role in world history (Berdyaev, 2008: 469–474). Germany as a leader of industrialized urban civilization is naturally hostile to Russia and humanity; whereas Russia relies on the Christian ideal of theanthropism, Germany gravitates towards the ideal of anthropotheism. The German spirit manifests itself most dramatically in Nietzsche, the philosopher of the Dark Kingdom, the prophet of *Übermenschheit*, the advocate of will to power, and the “philosopher of struggle and advocate for the extermination of the weak so that the new type, the *Übermensch*, could emerge” (Fyodorov, 1997: 118). Fyodorov names Emperor Wilhelm the Dark King who is destined to fulfill Nietzsche’s projections.

It is noteworthy that Fyodorov was little concerned by the possible threat to the existence of the Russian state from the enmity between Russia and Germany. For him, any modern state was an embodiment of “non-brotherhood,” and the Russian monarchy was no exception. The Russian state cannot be named the Fatherland since it has yet to become one. However, the Russian state has a special historical mission, and the Russia’s gathering of lands and peoples was targeted at protecting the nation from the peril of nomadism.

Apart from the gathering of lands and peoples, the Russian state also performs a protective function, and therefore plays a positive role in restoring the brotherly condition. At the same time, the incomparable political might of the Russian state and the vast space and numerous ethnicities in care of the Russian Tsar acquires a special providential meaning as proof of the exceptional role Russia will play in “the common cause” of resurrecting ancestors and restoring the universal brotherhood of all people. Thus, Nikolay Fyodorov includes the concepts “brotherhood” and especially “non-brotherhood” in his unique scientific and religious theurgy, and fundamental reform of the laws of the universe. The concepts “friendship” and “enmity” are identified with the notions of brotherhood and non-brotherhood. This identification is determined by the whole evolution of

the concept “friendship” in Russian religious philosophy, from Khomyakov, who saw the unity of monarchy with the people as the model of friendship, to Fyodorov, who believed that friendship and brotherhood were possible either in the prelapsarian state of humanity or as a result of the physical resurrection of ancestors. In any case, friendship and brotherhood are regarded as universal conditions encompassing all people.

The concept of brotherhood represented one of the fundamental political values in the ideological spectrum of the Modern Age, where three influential ideologies of nationalism, liberalism, and socialism could be singled out. These three ideologies correspond to the three principles of the French Revolution, *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* (Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood). The three ideologies recognize the importance of each of the concepts, yet differ in the understanding of their relative significance and hierarchy. Thus, liberalism does not reject equality or brotherhood, but claims that they can only be achieved through freedom. Socialism, in turn, stems from the belief that freedom and brotherhood can be attained through equality. In this framework, nationalism can be interpreted in a relatively neutral way, and does not necessarily have to be linked with national liberation or national separatism. Nationalism may be defined as an ideology based on the value of people’s brotherhood in blood or “soil” (i.e., background, encompassing culture, history, and language), whereas freedom and equality are considered to be attainable only in brotherhood. The value of brotherhood may be construed in different ways as racial or ethnic unity or, more broadly, as social solidarity, with freedom and equality seen as derived from brotherhood.

As brotherhood (i.e., the ethnic unity of the Russian nation) directly or indirectly became the definitive value of nationalism as an ideology, new themes emerged that were fairly uncomfortable for the crown. First, the lower classes were declared as the carriers of supreme religious and moral values. In practice, the idea of the people as the epitome of spiritual health spawned the belief that the peasantry had preserved the unifying forces which may bring about the ideal of national brotherhood. Hence the second “uncomfortable” topic, which is the idea that the aristocracy is subject to the pernicious influence of values alien to Russian culture, and therefore acts as a barrier to the attainment of the national ideal. In this context, the ideas of world brotherhood favored by Russian philosophers can be interpreted as an antithesis to nationalism. This approach is best summed up by Dostoyevsky’s well-known claim that a Russian will never agree to anything less than world brotherhood in Christ. The idea of world brotherhood could adopt quite unusual forms, such as Nikolay Fyodorov’s philosophy of the “common cause,” which involves escaping from the destructive urban civilization to space and other planets. The leading role of Russia in achieving world brotherhood is always associated with self-restraint.

Quite naturally, if a nation has “no specific objective,” and “has no need in any special privileges,” this may justify social apathy or an inclination towards social regress. Moreover, beliefs about a special historical mission of the Russian people may be used to rationalize the cruelest repressions on the part of the totalitarian regime, causing suffering primarily to Russians themselves. The idea that totalitarianism (so alien to Russian

civilization) was supposedly transformed in keeping with traditional mentality is an acceptable logical consequence of Vladimir Solovyov's historiosophy.

Russian religious philosophy has put the idea of brotherhood in all its many forms to serious testing. This journey cannot be reduced to a single lonely movement in the catacombs of history, and its achievements have yet to be evaluated. Meanwhile, it may be useful to draw some parallels between Russian religious philosophy and some concepts of 20th century Western European philosophy, which continue to generate acute interest even today.

The first parallel can be drawn between Vladimir Solovyov's descriptions of individuality subsumed by collectivity and Max Weber's meditation on the "mystical acosmism of brotherly love" (Weber M., 1920). The mystical ethic of brotherhood as described by Weber is an ethic based on the rejection of inequality in the charismatic distribution of grace between members of the religious community, rather than a force alien to Christianity. Weber does not attribute the mystical acosmism of brotherhood to the non-Christian world; on the contrary, he links it with certain Protestant communes. Albeit rare, such communes do exist in Christendom and are usually built around a shared mystical experience:

Wherever genuine mysticism gives rise to social action, such action is characterized by the acosmism of the mystical sentiment of love. In this sense, mysticism may exert a psychological effect on the formation of community in opposition to its "logical" conclusion. The core idea of the mystic oriental Christian church was a firm conviction that Christian brotherly love, when sufficiently strong and pure, must necessarily lead to unity in all things, even in dogmatic beliefs. In other words, the Christians who sufficiently love one another, in the Johannine sense of mystical love, will also think alike and, because of the very irrationality of their communal sentiment, act in a solidarity which is pleasing to God. (Weber, 1993: 175)

Later, Hannah Arendt connected the idea of the acosmic brotherhood with the historical destiny of the Jews. As Arendt points out, "acosmic" brotherhoods are inevitable in those periods described by historians as "dark times." However, acosmism generally results from forced exile rather than a free choice on the part of a given community. Historically, acosmic brotherhoods frequently emerged from enslaved "pariah" peoples, and groups such as the Jews. In sum, Arendt links brotherhood with the concept of "worldlessness," or the loss of the world for pariah groups. To some extent, this constitutes a return to barbarism; however, this return is preferable to group destruction. Brotherly attachment involves excessive closeness between people forming the brotherhood. For such brotherhoods, the world disappears twice, once as an unmeasurable external space, and again as the interspace within brotherhood, where freedom of personality is rendered impossible (Arendt, 1970: 13).

This interpretation of brotherhood is in stark contrast with the understanding of friendship. Indeed, the world which manifests itself fully in friendship and becomes a political world (the world of a polis) disappears in brotherly unity. However, human rela-

tions in brotherhood acquires a special warmth, a certain archaic humanity springing from dark barbarism. This dark humanity, extending solely to the underprivileged ones, is inseparable from insult and injury. In addition, the idea of brotherhood exonerates people adhering to this idea from a responsibility for the world, and therefore

humanitarianism of brotherhood scarcely befits those who do not belong among the insulted and the injured and can share in it only through their compassion. The warmth of pariah peoples cannot rightfully extend to those whose different position in the world imposes on them a responsibility for the world and does not allow them to share the cheerful unconcern of the pariah. (Arendt, 1970: 16)

Brotherhood, which manifests itself in the darkness of worldlessness, makes insults and injuries bearable, but its political meaning, according to Arendt, is irrelevant. In the light of the public and the political, brotherhood may only pose as something it is not; it may only be a surrogate of friendship as genuine humanitarianism. In this context, it may be useful to undertake a retrospective analysis of Khomyakov's, Vladimir Solovyov's, and Nikolai Fyodorov's ideas of brotherhood, whereas the idea of world brotherhood may be perceived as an instinctive aspiration of Russian religious philosophy breaking away from the darkness of worldlessness as described by Hannah Arendt.

In retrospect, the obvious predominance of the idea of enmity over the idea of friendship in 19th century Russian religious philosophy acquires a special significance. Naturally, this predominance cannot be interpreted as a symptom of some persecution mania affecting Russian philosophy. Carl Schmitt provides a key to the correct interpretation of enmity (Schmitt, 2007): as we know, he believed that the friend/enemy distinction is what marks the borderline between the political and the non-political. This foundational opposition lies at the heart of the political domain, for when this opposition disappears, the political vanishes with it.

The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion, but not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event, it is independent, not in the sense of a distinct new domain, but in that it can neither be based on a single antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these. If the antithesis of good and evil is not simply identical with that of beautiful and ugly, profitable and unprofitable, and cannot be directly reduced to the others, then the antithesis of friend and enemy must even less be confused with or mistaken for the others. The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as

an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. Nevertheless, he is the other, the stranger, and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that, in the extreme case, conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party (Schmitt, 2007: 26–27).

In this understanding, enmity in Russian religious philosophy is not so much the opposite of friendship as a method to construct the political domain. If the political is understood in the Aristotelian sense of a shared space for joint action by friendly alliances (as opposed to diplomatic strife or court intrigues), the idea of enmity acquires new, unexpected connotations when juxtaposed with the concept of brotherhood. The ideal of world brotherhood is only possible in the political space which, as Khomyakov, Solovyov, and Fyodorov sense, is still non-existent. The figure of the common enemy opens possibilities for joint actions for friendly alliances; even Danilevsky, who leaves Russia alone face to face with hostile Europe, never ceases to hope for the emergence of a friendly alliance of all Slavs in the nearest future. The enemy is of importance as an external enmity disrupts the sleepy placidity of brotherhood and compels it to make the first steps towards global unity.

Construction of friendship policies in Russian religious philosophy is a highly versatile and, therefore, instructive experience. Naturally, the methodological inventory used in this construction suggested traditional metaphysical assignment of essences, an intellectual technique which had become obsolete by the 19th century. Given this, the idea of world brotherhood contains a contradiction that is apparent today. However, the mental paths leading to this idea which were so fully explored by Russian religious are still attracting many thinkers. In this context, the evolution of Russian religious philosophy, a journey full of victories and defeats, will definitely remain a subject of interest.

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Политики дружбы в русской религиозной философии

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Феномен дружбы еще в античности стал объектом пристального внимания со стороны философии. Аристотель в «Никомаховой этике» связывает с дружбой политическое существование человека, так как полагает, что и сам полис строится по аналогии с дружескими союзами. Цицерон также видел в дружбе прообраз социальности. Постепенно на смену такому представлению приходит романтическая концепция, где дружба понимается как субъективное, чувственное сближение индивидов, доступное весьма немногим. Романтической концепции придерживались и Кант, и Гегель. Русская религиозная философия, с одной стороны, формируется под воздействием немецкого романтизма и свойственного ему понимания дружбы, но, с другой стороны, сразу же возвращает концепту дружбы социальное содержание. У Хомякова дружба устанавливается прежде всего между властью и народом, и этот дружеский союз отличает русскую культуру от западноевропейской. Однако русскую религиозно-философскую мысль отличает стремление понять феномен дружбы не сам по себе, а в его связи с понятиями вражды и братства. Возникает образ братской сплоченности, с которым Вл. Соловьев связывает главную угрозу христианству, идущую от дальневосточной цивилизации, тогда как у Н. Федорова, наоборот, в братской сплоченности, сохранившейся в русской и в китайской аграрной общине, таится залог спасения от «небратского» Запада. Связь концепта дружбы и братства проясняется в XX столетии в западноевропейской мысли, в частности, в представлениях о «мистическом акосмизме братства» у М. Вебера и Х. Арендт.

Ключевые слова: дружба, политическое, вражда, братство, Россия, Европа, Восток, акосмизм

Bertrand de Jouvenel on Power, Authority, and Trust

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The paper will examine Bertrand de Jouvenel's account of political authority and its relation with the question of trust. Jouvenel's work offers a provocative and unique account of political authority, viewing it first and foremost as a type of instituting regular and reliable social relations between different members of a social community. As part of his thesis, Jouvenel distinguishes between two major types of political authority, which are referred to in the course of his writings as "power" and "authority." While power, generally speaking, proceeds through the containment of individual agency in given fields, primarily through an appeal to personal interests or direct coercion, authority is manifested primarily in a charismatic or informal type of leadership influencing the agent's behavior at a more implicit level. The distinction between power and authority, as Jouvenel emphasizes, implies a double conception of trust as an ethical and epistemic principle. While power provides the necessary regularity by means of mediated information which is normally embedded in certain bureaucratic organization, authority provides a more immediate type of regularity by instituting "hubs" of social regularity, especially through the quality of personal character. The relation between the two types of political authority can be seen as involving a type of equilibrium. While power deals with reducing the externalities and risk that are encompassed in human interaction and allows for basic subsistence, authority allows for a wider array of human choices, while at the same time keeping power from overwhelming the social fabric. The main focus of Jouvenel's political theory is the conservation of the elusive and implicit social tie which allows authority to play its unique role, while keeping it distinct from the more mediated forms of political power at the same time.

Keywords: power, authority, trust, knowledge, charisma, individualism

Introduction

Bertrand de Jouvenel's political and social theory centers on the relation between trust and authority, particularly in the context of a modern pluralistic society.¹ Jouvenel's main

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1. Jouvenel's work has been the subject of complex academic reception. As Robert Grady helpfully summarizes, "the political thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel may seem quaint and out of place on first reading. His writings are often greeted with cordial befuddlement: the cordiality due a wise and insightful author; the befuddlement given an obscure writer. Indeed, he is an obscure political theorist. A highly regarded contemporary more highly regarded in Europe than America he is not obscure because unknown. Nor is he obscure because obscurantist, although this is the gist of more than one assessment. He is obscure, rather, because the sum of his major works appears to be diversified, disjointed, and to lack a coherent thread tying it together. One sees both romantic and realist, idealist and scientist, critic of income redistribution and advocate of planning, conservative and liberal" (Grady, 1981: 365). This difficulty, which arises in part on account of Jouvenel's elusive vocabulary, should not be taken as a mere inconsistency.

impetus is to rescue the idea of authority from two dominant interpretative tendencies, one which is to trivialize authority and to regard it as a mere functional appendage and the other, the tendency to regard it as a completely independent and constitutive, almost transcendent political form. In lieu of opting towards one or another approach, Jouvenel introduces a different conception of authority which emphasizes the way in which authority operates as a propagator of trust in society. Authority is not a purely prohibitive instance, as it has a productive quality. Authority produces a certain type of social regularity which arises from a unique individual position, and cannot be reduced to a mere service or commodity. As such, this authority acts as a unique type of vehicle which is indispensable for the formation of trust across various social spheres.

I begin my paper by clarifying the epistemological and conceptual fundamentals of Jouvenel's thesis which centers on the use of knowledge in society, and its relation with various mechanisms of social regularity. I continue by addressing the different types of power which Jouvenel identifies in society, with an emphasis on the way in which they generate, or hinder the growth of social trust, a process which is accomplished through the creation of voluntary groups. I then conclude the paper by pointing out certain institutional and political considerations which emerge from my discussion on Jouvenel's political theory, and the way these considerations correspond to the overarching theme of trust.

Knowledge and Freedom

Jouvenel begins from an epistemically-defined assumption which views knowledge as the cornerstone of all social institutions and processes. For Jouvenel, it would be accurate to say that the individual is first and foremost a data-processing animal. All social action consists of influencing the thoughts, feelings, and primarily, the behavior of other people. Therefore, it requires a special type of knowledge, that of the human persona, which is usually implicit in human relations and does not come to the fore in any express way: "The regular and foreseeable behavior of . . . others and the possibility of anticipating their reactions with the smallest margin of error are the pillars on which every individual calculation rests" (Jouvenel, 1963b: 115).

For Jouvenel, there is a strong affinity between knowing and doing. Before one does anything, he or she must have a clear idea of the results and consequences of their action:

There is nothing of which we are more aware, whatever philosophers may say, than our ability to bring about certain situations by our choice served by our efforts. I can, if I want to, raise this glass to my lips. When I raise it, I am aware that I am "causing" its new position. But, to speak more accurately, the very notion of "cause," common to all men, is a product of such experiences. From my earliest childhood, I have found that I can change something, however little, in my environment, by my action, and from this microcosmic experience of a relation between my effort and this change arises the general idea of "cause and effect." (Jouvenel, 1963a: 6)

The concept of freedom naturally calls into mind its opposite, that of coercion. Jouvenel has a very un-typical view of the notion of coercion. Rather than being merely a form of violent intrusion, coercion implies the limiting of one's ability of forecast by altering the predictable actions of other social agents. Understood in such a way, it is not entirely clear individuals are in fact capable of coercing each other in the direct sense, since the others' actions are normally taken into account in our "probability matrix" of social life. Where coercion does appear is in the emergence of an inhospitable environment. Jouvenel alludes to Kafka and Dostoyevsky and those authors' depictions of the loneliness and anxiety brought about in those individuals permanently residing in "Otherdom" (ibid.: 61).

It is then clear that not all knowledge advances one's freedom to the same degree; this knowledge needs to be valid, relevant, and applicable. As part of Jouvenel's epistemology, he does not consider all knowledge about society to be encompassed in scientific formulae.² For Jouvenel, all of our knowledge on society and social processes arises from concrete experience.³ Accordingly, he criticizes the attempt to circumscribe the full extent of social relations by means of normative or scientific theory. Jouvenel also emphasizes the way in which the goals of different agents is what complicates our ability to predict human behavior, as opposed to the causes of their actions (the *ut* as opposed to the *quia*). It is because humans have "projects" that they are able to carry out free actions, or projects that are themselves impossible to predict according to any objective factors (Jouvenel, 1967: 26–30).

Since absolute and complete prognostication is never truly possible, the abilities required to plan one's actions is knowledge of the existing state of affairs in society, in particular, the relatively static or regular factors, and to distinguish those from the more dynamic and less predictable social elements. Jouvenel calls the former "datum" and the latter "casuels" (roughly, French for "casual" as in "happening by chance"). These two types of variables are used to construct a "map of the present," according to which the individual can navigate society (ibid.: 37–39).

Jouvenel generally considers the two approaches as two social arrangements, one that is rooted in "order," and one that is rooted in "organization" (Jouvenel, 1999d: 65–76). While order emerged from a process of habitual usage through an extended period of time ("a process of action"), organization is rooted in conformity with an external principle ("process of thought"). While the former emerges mostly unintentionally from the

2. Jouvenel, who was a professional economist, dedicated some of his efforts to criticize some of the dominant paradigms of neoclassical economic science. Among his translated works on the subject are *Efficiency and Amenity* (1999a), *The Political Economy of Gratuity* (1999b), and his seminal essay *The Ethics of Redistribution* (1990).

3. Jouvenel's political theory was developed almost in tandem with that of Friedrich Hayek, another famous continental liberal. It is in Jouvenel's idea of social knowledge in particular that one can sense strong Hayekian overtones; compare it with Hayek's famous formulation which hails authentic social knowledge as the result of a "process of experimental interaction of widely dispersed, different and even conflicting beliefs of millions of communicating individuals" (Hayek, 1989: 80). Michael Polanyi's concept of "personal (or tacit) knowledge" is also a relevant point of comparison (Polanyi, 1962).

mere cumulative usage on the part of different persons, the latter is always a result of an intentional act. It would be wrong to assume, however, that the former is devoid of reason; order represents a type of rationality that characterizes the actors themselves, while organization represents the rationality of an external (usually third party) evaluation. Jouvenel brings up the example of an owner of a library whose daughter rearranges his library alphabetically while he is on vacation; the old, useful order was destroyed in favor of a more or less abstract principle. What Jouvenel describes is, in fact, two types of knowledge; one that directs the thought of the “organizer,” and one that is implicit in the process of the action itself.

Note that Jouvenel does not mean to say that two types of societies exist, but two types of social attitudes. One of these attitudes is more sensitive to nuances and the tacit forms of social minutiae, while the other deduces social rules from abstract ideas. While both approaches are valid in the sense of internal compatibility, it is clear that the latter approach misses something of the social experience; it may not really be outright absurd, but rather lacking in a very important sense of acknowledging the subjective meaning of social behavior. The individuals who took the task of organization upon themselves do not experience the real order of things or grasp its various advantages or shortcomings for its members. Rather, they are interested mainly in its appeal to their subjective taste, to their “feeling of orderliness” (ibid.: 66). The social engineers are thus unable to envision the full consequences of the order they propose, since they do not take an actual part in it. The distinction between the two types of knowledge can be seen in the following paragraph, wherein Jouvenel uses theological language to demonstrate the two approaches to knowledge (Jouvenel, 1945: 359):

When the intelligence, unsupported by either study or revelation, applies itself to its essential objective, the knowledge of God, it forms by a natural process two antithetical connections. One is that of a miraculous Providence, which is reached and set in motion by prayers for particular objects and then intervenes to disturb for the benefit of its invoker the natural course of things. And the other is that of a supreme Wisdom, which has subjected everything to laws of a majestic regularity and then leaves them to operate unchecked.

These two theological forms correspond to the two different epistemic forms: one operates via discovery, or “revelation,” and the other operates via the setting of abstract rules. Between the two, it is the former that actually achieves positive knowledge, while the latter merely reorganizes or reinterprets knowledge according to some principle. In the realm of ethics or human behavior in general, the former type corresponds to “unceasing vigilance,” or a perpetual awareness to the change and mutation in social rules (ibid.: 360), while the latter indicates a process of abstract reflection, which may be arrived with only a minimal examination of the real world.

The conceptual distinction introduced by Jouvenel thus taps into an important intellectual tradition, one which emphasizes the primacy of practical over theoretical knowledge. Practical knowledge quite paradoxically enjoys this primacy because it allows for

more regularity in concrete social matters, unlike abstract knowledge that is grounded in the concrete and consistent experience of the world. This is what Hayek means when he invokes the “knowledge of some regularities in society” which “create[s] a preferences for those kinds of conduct which produce a confident expectation of certain consequences, and an aversion to doing something unfamiliar and fear when it has been done” (Hayek, 1978: 79).

When translated into the language of social behavior, these types indicate two different ways of acquiring social knowledge, either theoretically or practically. The theoretical one is fairly simple. It is concerned with the deciphering of social processes by means of reflection, that is, rational and conscious assessment. The other, the “revelatory” type of knowledge is trickier, implying a direct experience of social life. It is knowledge that is acquired through the imitation and gradual adaptation to social norms and institutions, usually by the simple fact of taking an active (or passive) part in a given social arrangement. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this type of knowledge is completely devoid of mediation: it is mediated through selected social agents who we imitate. This very distinction is what lies at the heart of Jouvenel’s idea of authority.

Power and Authority

Jouvenel calls the cornerstone of every form of social mediation the “imperative.” An imperative is essentially a plea for action, for acknowledge, for expenditure of effort, and so on. It can take the form of a political appeal, an advertisement, or even a cry for help (Jouvenel, 1963a: 73). In accordance with his classification of social knowledge, Jouvenel identifies two different modes of transmitting information in society via the “imperatives” of power and authority. The first type, power (at times capitalized in Jouvenel’s corpus as “Power”) represents the “organizational” type of knowledge-power by the continuous rearrangement of social relations on the basis of some external paradigm. It is essentially a notion of power as a deterministic force which belongs to nature and to which individuals belong to merely as moving parts.⁴ The second type, defined as “authority,” does not involve correspondence with some external pattern, but is rather the imitation of existing social patterns. As such, authority is manifest in other human beings as living agents, in certain institutions, symbols and groups, and primarily in individuals. Between the two, the first one is highly abstract and is addressable only in metaphoric language, or through mechanistic or organic analogies, while the second is direct, real, and highly concrete. In its logic, the first type unifies different phenomena, which it regards as parts of a long causal chain, while the second emphasize the distinctiveness of different social agents and their separate natures.

A good way of understanding the distinction between the two forms of power is by addressing their different explanatory structures. Power is justified by a concrete inter-

4. Like many French thinkers, Jouvenel uses a notion of power that travels a long way back in European thought. The notion of power as a pure structure of functionality that is at odds with agency goes back to Émile Durkheim, and perhaps even to Joseph de Maistre.

est, usually (although not necessarily) formulated in individualistic terms; power exists because one wants to do something which he or she is unable to achieve through an individual effort. It is an accessory or an instrument; think, for example, about Hobbes's *homo artificialis*. Authority, on the other hand, is gratuitous; it has no end other than itself. It cannot be propelled by private interest since it cannot be founded by the receiving agent, who encounters it already-formed. Accordingly, it also cannot be established by formal agreement between members, since this agreement implies an anterior function that needs to be served. Jouvenel explains the idea of authority in his passage (Jouvenel, 1963: 92):

While the term [authority] has a great variety of meanings, the simplest is that which is closely linked with the word "authorship": a statement is authoritative by virtue of the credit afforded to its particular author. Should I state that there can be a speed no greater than that of light, I should provoke laughter; but should Professor Heisenberg say so, his authority would command world-wide attention.⁵

These two types can be seen as expressed in different types of human activities. The first type lies at the heart of common material and economic activities, of labor, reproduction, and certain types of warfare. The individual encounters it when he or she is complying with an external command for fear of physical violence, or when he or she is entering into formal contracts or employment in a business firm. It is, however, in the relation of civic obedience that power exists in its most undiluted form. The state, whether it is socialist, liberal, oligarchic, or democratic, exists only for some external end, be it the defense of rights, the redistribution of property, the serving of some group interest, and so on. It is nothing but a social instrument for the "expression of society, a mere conduit, by means of which society rules itself" (Jouvenel, 1945: 21).

Authority, on the contrary, is not established by means of any general institution, but by personal agency. It remains embedded in a certain time and place, and most of all, in the individual in whom authority is vested. Jouvenel defines the *auctor* as "the man whose advice is followed, to whom the actions of others must in reality be tracked back; he instigates, he promotes" (Jouvenel, 1963b: 30). When authority is founded, there is nothing to guarantee its success other than the personality and charisma of its founder. Unlike power that relies on professional expertise or function such as an economic or

5. This account of authority might sound familiar to readers of Hans-George Gadamer, who, in the second volume of *Truth and Method*, describes authority in the following way: "[I]t is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is ultimately based on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgement and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one's own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot be bestowed but is earned, and must be earned if someone is to lay claim to it. It rests on the acknowledgement and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, trusts to the better insight of others" (Gadamer, 2004: 281). While a more extensive comparison might be in order, it would suffice here to remind that Jouvenel regards authority as facilitating a particular type of knowledge, namely, one about concrete social conditions, while Gadamer is addressing knowledge in general. As such, Gadamer's account can be seen as more general and formal, while Jouvenel's is more functional and specific.

judicial one, there is no prior institutionalized set of rules which determine the obligation of a person towards authority. Accordingly, there is also no easy possibility to alienate or transfer authority from the *auctor* to a third party.

Since the holder of authority is not designated by another instance, obligations towards him or her similarly cannot also be derived from an existing principle. We have already seen that, for Jouvenel, obedience is not that mark of authority, but of power. The individual who commits his or herself to authority does it not out of utilitarian or existential grounds, but out of internal accord: authority begins for an imperative that is grounded in “the prestige, personal or institutional, of the man speaking—a prestige linked to the guarantee furnished by the exalted character recognized in him” (*ibid.*: 75).⁶ Authority, then, does not begin at the moment the command (or “imperative”) is given; rather, it begins the moment a holder of authority is recognized by its would-be subjects. The initiator of this process is not the agent of authority but actually its recipient, who, by his or her own personal choices, “delegates” authority upon the other agent of his or her choice (Jouvenel, 1963a: 92).⁷

Authority as Personal Character

As we have just seen, what lies in the center of the notion of authority is the individual’s ability—and necessity—to adapt to his or her environment, a process requiring the mediation of other agents. The mechanism described here, in fact, is one of selection and imitation. The subject of authority is exposed to a myriad of appeals on the part of other individuals, or “suggestions” in Jouvenel’s terminology (*ibid.*: 85). The choice of whether to accept or decline those suggestions lies squarely with their addressee; while some choices might be easier to make (Professor Heisenberg’s scientific authority in the last example), other choices, namely those that pertain to social behavior and are completely devoid of objective content, are more difficult to make. The major question here lies in the “fitness” of the other agent to serve as an object of imitation, which would put him or her, by definition, in a position of authority. In contrast with forms of more theoretical knowledge, the fitness of the holder of authority lies rather squarely in his or her ability to reflect and to transmit social rules of behavior, a trait which Jouvenel associates with personal agency and character.⁸

6. Interestingly, Jouvenel notes that the imperative of authority might also be directed from a lower rank in the social hierarchy to a higher one in the form of an “imperative of supplication”: he lists the examples of a cry for help, an appeal of debtor to his creditor, and even that of a prayer (*ibid.*: 73–74).

7. There is a strong similarity between Jouvenel’s concept of obedience as establishing, and in a certain way, preceding authority, and Weber’s notion of selection defined as a “struggle . . . for advantages . . . but without a meaningful mutual orientation in terms of conflict” (Weber, 1963: 38). The main practical distinction, here and elsewhere, lies in Jouvenel’s latent teleology with respect to his concept of authority. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer of my manuscript for bringing this and other references to my attention.

8. A case can be made for comparing Jouvenel’s idea of authority with the Weberian notion of charismatic leadership. While both thinkers’ notions are descriptively similar, Jouvenel uses the term to designate behavioral modes rather than institutional forms; as such, his system allows for more flexibility and even hybrid authority types. Jouvenel’s idea of authority is also different in the way in which it contains a weak but prominent teleological aspect, in the way he addresses authority and power as knowledge-propagating instances.

It is no coincidence, Jouvenel tells us, that authority, foundation (*auctoritas*), and authorship are semantically related in denoting personal responsibility that is essentially irreducible and inalienable (*ibid.*: 20–22). Authoritative persons are those whose actions and behavior are determined by their own autonomous volitions, and not by the pressure of social forces. Jouvenel associates this type of behavior with the assuming of responsibilities. For example, when discussing authority in the ancient world which lies with the Roman freeman, Jouvenel emphasizes the patrician sense of voluntary obligation. The ethos of responsibility is both what creates as well as limits the personal freedom of the member of the patriciate. The ability to take on obligations, in the concrete sense (that of monetary debt is one example), is what made the nobleman into a free agent, as encompassed in the saying “*etiamsi coactus, attamen voluit*” (even though compelled, he decided) (Jouvenel, 1945: 320).

In such a way, it may be said that what both creates charismatic authority and maintains it as a “hub” of social knowledge is one’s character. Jouvenel defines this as follows: “a man’s character is what reconciles his freedom with the predictability of his actions by others. A man who acts according to his character surely acts freely; but also his action can be foreseen by another party who knows his character” (Jouvenel, 1963a: 87). Acting according to character corresponds to acting upon one’s autonomy, as opposed to acting under the influence of circumstances or passions, as has been marked by philosophers throughout the ages.⁹ Character is not only used here as an ethical quality, but also as a political and an epistemic one. Since the person of character is autonomous, he or she does not fall into the deterministic trap of power, and is thus able to reflect something more than just a myriad of abstract social forces.

This notion of personal authority as character has a slightly more latent second aspect, which pertains to the adaptation of behavioral patterns through imitation. As noted by certain theoreticians of spontaneous order,¹⁰ there is actually very little possibility of changing one’s behavior via explicit decrees on the part of other social agents. Jouvenel introduces a way in which individuals alter and successfully adapt their behavior with the social environment, which is done via consistent and regular personified input (the fact that Jouvenel himself frames this process in somewhat conscious terms is, I think, typical for his rhetoric but does not change the core of the argument). In other words, it is compatible with our understanding of ourselves as free and autonomous agents precisely because compliance with personal authority relies on seemingly “irrational” motives.

What this idea calls into question, of course, is the very possibility of a rational or “rationalized” authority. Under this prism, authority can never truly be “rationalized” in the strict sense of arising from an existing set of explicit formulae. The holder of rational-

9. See, for example, J. S. Mill: “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character” (*On Liberty*, III.5).

10. As put most eloquently by Friedrich Hayek: “[The formation] of superindividual patterns or systems of cooperation required individuals to change their ‘natural’ or ‘instinctual’ responses to others, something strongly resisted” (Hayek, 1989: 13).

legal authority is thus merely an operative or an executioner, never a leader, since his or her aims and behavior cannot be traced to their own volition or responsibility. Every authority is, in the final instance, a moral authority.

Institutionalization of Power and Authority

The one institution in which power and authority are combined is the household. As a child, the individual encounters the two forms of social power: power in the form of the strong and capable adult with the ability to act, and power as the promotion and defense of a certain ethical way of life: "Ask a child to describe 'the ways of the home': if he can be induced to the intellectual feat implied, you will find that the result looks somewhat like the 'Twelve Tables' of the Roman law. The child will have picked out the way some things are done 'when they are done right'" (Jouvenel, 1963a: 51).

The household is an exceptional case, since in the household, the individual's dependence on others does not lead to those others' objectification; the relation between the parents and the child is both a "downward flow of services and goods" and that of ethical tutelage (ibid.: 47). However this is a unique social form that is essentially irreproducible. The social world is essentially divided between agencies of power and agencies of authority, which differ fundamentally in their internal structure as well as in their social function.

We have already seen that the structures Jouvenel attributes to the two types of social power correspond to their different functions. Power is the guarantor of capacity, in the sense of greater physical security or material advantage, while authority provides one with a familiarity with his social environment. The two types are also institutionalized in different and opposite ways. The former is perpetuated through different bureaucratic agencies and through state power, while the latter is centered on the individual "instigator" and his or her agency, which is in turn achieved through that instigator's own character, or charisma.

In political science literature, charismatic leadership is often regarded as a kind of momentary "flash in the pan," a sudden disruption that is unstable and even revolutionary. This is quite the opposite from how Jouvenel perceives it. Not only is charisma a more consistent element in society in the wider sense, but in rationalized authority, or power, it is the promoter and main beneficiary of instability. This effectively means that the main drive, or "efficient cause" of authority, cannot be transferred or delegated to an established bureaucratic body. Jouvenel describes the process in which authority is consolidated into an institutional form as contradictory and dangerous with respect to the essence of authority. Jouvenel illustrates this point by saying that "authority is institutionalized; artifice prolongs the effects of nature, just as a weak voice is strengthened by such helpful devices as the rostrum and the loud speaker . . . when majesty goes out, the police comes in" (Jouvenel, 1963b: 72–73).

This does not, however, preclude the possibility of the institutionalization of personal authority through less formal means. What authority creates is what Jouvenel calls a

“team,” or a “group of action.” A group is not an egalitarian structure. It operates both on a horizontal axis, a relation of egalitarian peage between the members of the group, and a vertical axis that operates between the members and the leader of the group. While groups of action may very well have an external goal, as its name suggests, this goal is mediated by its internal hierarchical division of labor. Every formation “gets into gear through the initiative of a single man, who sows among others the seed of his purpose; some of them, in whom it rises, turn into a small group of apostles for the scheme, and these form the nucleus that preaches and recruits” (ibid.: 28).

What Jouvanel describes, then, is a process of imitation or “contagion” through which knowledge and accordingly forms of behavior are disseminated. Since the group is, after all, a concrete institution, it means that norms are never entirely self-sustaining but rather require the continuous affirmation within the group’s structure. What this means is that forms of behavior can never truly be generalized since such a generalization would entail losing their source and thus, their legitimacy. It also means that Jouvanel’s model is not evolutionary after all, but functionalist. There is thus a very strict limit on the institutionalization of authority, whose extent is more or less equal to the ability of the individual to communicate naturally, without the mediation of third parties or institutionalized agencies. This is what Jouvanel means when he remarks that “the more distant that an authority is, the more it needs a halo, or, if no halo is available, the more policemen are needed” (ibid.: 77).

It is then the vertical structure which relies on personal communication that prevents the association from becoming a merely utilitarian combination of interests. Jouvanel presents the relation of the group members with the holder of authority as essentially an ethical one, which implies a sense of common values and participation of a common lifestyle. Jouvanel formulates this appeal as: “‘Join up behind my white cockade’ is imperative in form, and this imperative is explained by what follows: ‘you will find it always following the path of honour’. Here there is also something implied: assuming that men such as you are, or want to be, are determined to take the path of honour, and that I for my part am embarked on it, then my cockade is the sign that teaches you the path which you should logically follow” (ibid.: 74).

What the group promotes, then, is not necessarily an external cause as much as an internal, immanent cause which is inherent in its own existence and its manner of operation. Individuals who take part in such a group do not necessarily feel that they are protected or that their interests are served in the strict or immediate sense. Rather, they feel a kind of “epistemic security,” a sense of reliability and predictability that Jouvanel defines as a way of life, or “common bonds, which assure that they are naturally drawn together . . . a natural community which, in turn, inspires individual conduct” (1999a: 112). This, instead of any express interest, is the “efficient cause” of the group.

It is possible to understand this double role if we keep in mind that the functional element of authority is always the dissemination and sustenance of social knowledge. Social knowledge within a group is manifest as forms of trust and mutual reliability, which in themselves begets new forms of relations, and a closer and more intense dynamic among

the members of the group (Jouvenel, 1963b: 125–126). It is thus no coincidence that Jouvenel describes the initial experience which rescues the individual from a state of anomy in a new environment not as tutoring or instruction, but friendship. Only a non-formal or established relation allows for a veritable transmission of social knowledge: “The formation of friendships is like the surging-up of hospitable islands in the open sea of Otherdom” (Jouvenel, 1963a: 65).

This concept of a group is opposed to the other type of institutionalization which Jouvenel describes, that of power. The institutionalization of power can be described as a response to a state of emergency which breaks out once all other authorities have failed. Let us remember that power does not introduce us to knowledge of the world, but rather reinterprets existing knowledge according to some external and alien principle. This form of knowledge is also not our first choice, but actually appears in times of social indeterminacy or “anomie.” Despite its attempt to appear as a regulative and orderly apparatus and its tendency to see the social world in terms of mechanical constructs, it cannot but constantly affect changes, re-organize and revolutionize ways of life (Jouvenel, 1945: 160–162).

As such, power does not disseminate knowledge throughout society but reshapes, reinterprets, and centralizes such knowledge. In contrast with authority whose zone of jurisdiction is extremely limited, the range of operation of power is essentially universal. It creates new centers of control of knowledge by promoting itself as a mediating body between individuals and the general society. By increasing the individuals’ ability to act, it has actually ceded the place of social certainty. As Jouvenel puts it (*ibid.*: 362):

It goes without saying that, thanks to the ingrained habit of legality, the interventions on which Power now embarks take on at first the form of laws. But these [regulations of power] are but counterfeit laws, concerned only to provide for the situations of the moment, owing the imperious sway of current passions and requirements. Under the cloak of objective legislation, every subjective desire enjoys a saturnalia, as is shown both by the rapidity and the inconsistency with which these so-called laws multiply. Principle and certitude are things of the past; the desires of the moment become “your only lawgiver,” no respecters these of the notions of moral good and natural necessity, which they confound with that of utility in its most transitory shape.¹¹

Jouvenel then describes the process in which power grows in what can be labeled as an indefinite feedback loop, when centralization creates further anomie by disrupting spontaneous social processes, which in turn makes individuals turn to power as a means of maintaining a semblance of public order. Once power becomes imbedded as an ob-

11. This account corresponds with Axel Honneth’s important description of the process in which the demands for individual self-realization paradoxically undermine the social trust which allows for individualization in the first place, a development in which “processes which once promised an increase of qualitative freedom are henceforth altered into an ideology of de-institutionalization, is the emergence in individuals of a number of symptoms of inner emptiness, of feeling oneself to be superfluous, and of absence of purpose” (Honneth, 1996: 467).

jective and abstract need, it transforms into a self-sustaining mechanism. This is what Jouvanel calls a “social protectorate,” or the grand mediator in society that embodies “The interests which uncertainty has frightened, the reason which disorder has offended, the feelings which misery has revolted, the imagination which the vision of future possibilities has inflamed” (ibid.: 353).

The institutionalization process of power, as opposed to that of authority, culminates in something very akin to the Foucaultian notion of power as a dispersed functional mechanism; this power is produced “from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” (Foucault, 1978: 93). Since knowledge disseminated by power essentially corresponds with individual capacity, it can be seen as a form of “subjection” in the Foucaultian sense of “constitution as subject in both senses of the word” (ibid.: 60). Thus, it is precisely this ubiquitous and formless structure which makes power impossible to contain, as it lacks center and agency in any meaningful way. Since power tends to reduce social knowledge to matters of physical or material security, it means that it does not proceed by the establishment or the sustenance of norms, but only through arbitrary commands. Since it is by definition devoid of personal character, the institutional mechanism of power lacks the internal coherence needed to articulate itself in a consistent manner. Because power is merely a rationalized form of personal interest, and because interest itself is bound to the vacillations of society and human life, it is rendered in a constant and indeterminate state of flux.

The institutionalization of power is a process tinged with irony: it is the will to empower individuals and their ability to act which undermines intermediary powers and eventually take over ever-larger segments of the social edifice. At the opposite end, it is the recognition of the heteronomous nature of authority which actually institutes it as a separate instance and limits its zone of interference. What prevents the group from becoming a bureaucratic and opaque form of domination is the personal character of its founder which imbues the group with his or her authority. On the contrary, the structure of power is devoid of this authority-alterity, and by identifying itself in a non-mediated way with its subjects, encroaches heavily on their autonomy.

Since the dissemination of knowledge is always a process which involves interpersonal influence, it can never elude a significant degree of politicization. The question here pertains to the manner in which this politicization is accomplished, whether through a semi-institutionalized social authority that relies on personal responsibility, or through an impersonal and therefore ubiquitous mechanism. Paradoxically, the more the political aspect of social knowledge is manifested in the process of its production and dissemination, the more reliable it is, while the truth value of knowledge that is neutral, i.e., devoid of context and “speaker,” is virtually null.

Authority, Trust, and Politics

As has been noted, Jouvanel’s system can be seen as a reinterpretation of some of the classical concepts of political sociology (namely of a Weberian orientation), and their

application in a specific political ethos. Thus, rather than a comprehensive sociological theory of authority, Jouvenel's explicit aim is to define a set of terms which could be used to protect an independent civil society from the incursions of a centralized state power, even if it is a democratic state. This problem has been analyzed most eloquently by Alexis de Tocqueville in the chapters of *Democracy in America* that speak about the cultural and psychological aspects of majority rule. The democratic citizens "all see each other at very close range; and, not noticing in any one of them the signs of incontestable greatness and superiority, they are constantly brought back to their own reason as the most visible and nearest source of truth" (Tocqueville, 2010: 700–701). The consequence of this reality, however, is not so much the empowerment of individuals as much as the destruction of any authentic trust between members of society; as Tocqueville puts it, "it is not only confidence in a particular man that is destroyed, but the taste to believe any man whatsoever on his word" (ibid.: 701).

Instead of relying upon any particular person as the center of confidence and trust, the democratic impetus promotes confidence through a different type of subjective common sense, what Tocqueville calls "the doctrine of the interest well understood." This doctrine replaces the imperatives of specific duties and obligations with a type of enlightened egoism (ibid.: 920). The process which Jouvenel proposes in order to explain the emergence of the social tie is remarkably close to that of Tocqueville. For Jouvenel, it is primarily through collective agency as part of a voluntary group that the individual receives his own personal value, as well as an internal sense of regularity and cohesiveness. However, unlike Tocqueville's system which underestimates the ability of a post-aristocratic society to introduce intermediate sources of authority, Jouvenel regards the emergence of those alternative centers of authority as part and parcel with the psychological and sociological dynamic of a decentralized polity via the action of prominent individuals.

In such a way, Jouvenel's model proposes both an explanatory and a normative idea of social dynamics and the solidification of social trust. While the constellation of social groups may seem like an overly static and homogenous arrangement, it actually allows for the diversity of ends, and as such represents a highly pluralistic-leaning idea of society. Indeed, Jouvenel considers the "inevitable diversity of men" as the cornerstone of every viable political model, and affirms that "life in society is altogether sweeter and richer when social positions of eminence can be reached from various starting places than when they reflect a single hierarchy" (Jouvenel, 1963b: 70).

What emerges here, in fact, is a model for the radical decentralization of political authority. Since the potential of authority to gather and unite individuals is almost inversely proportional to the coercive power it holds, it means the opportunities for the formation of independent groups and association are enormous in number. Since the variability of factors which influences the emergence of elements like charisma and personal character is almost infinite, and since the stakes of belonging to each association are rather trivial (associations usually do not require exclusive loyalty or significant material sacrifice on the part of their members), each individual can belong to a vast number of associations at any given moment.

To a large degree, Jouvenel's project then appears as a response to the Tocquevillian challenge which seeks to reconstruct the social bond under conditions of modern individualism. Jouvenel's conception of authority as a trust-propagating instance allows for the construction of a relatively solid and consistent social bond without sacrificing crucial aspects of social pluralism. The idiosyncrasy of Jouvenel's theory is that by presenting authority as a spontaneous social institution, it stresses its ethical dimension and its "embeddedness" in normal human relations. As such, it allows us to see authority not as disruptive, but as conducive of trust.

Since Jouvenel's understanding of authority is centered largely, even almost purely, on the constructive relations between individuals, it also represents an amicable relation (albeit not a symmetrical one) which precludes coercion or any type of non-pacific intervention. As such, it also showcases the irreducible nature of trust, which cannot be constructed intentionally through any effort of social or political planning, and distinct from any type of deliberative model. While authority involves communicative action, it is not a form of communication formed by rational deliberation through the exchange of opinions but on a tacit and non-conscious type of consideration and approval (or rejection) of forms of cooperation. In such a way, it allows for a nuanced and complex understanding of the concept of social trust and its political ramifications.

Jouvenel's thesis thus can be said to introduce a vital element of politicization into social life. While authority is regarded as voluntary and decentralized (as opposed to bureaucratized Power), it is also extensive in a way institutionalized power is not. Since social life is never free from the influence of learning, emulation, and selection, all social relations are tinged with hierarchy to some degree. By stressing the indispensable nature of influence in society, Jouvenel vindicates politics and its immanent importance in virtually all forms of communication and cooperation.

By placing authority in the context of social trust and friendship as an instance which promotes rather than disrupts social relations, it is possible to re-insert the notion of authority into constructive political sociology. It might be possible to ask, for example, what types of authority are conducive to trust at the local and voluntary level, as opposed to the level of established politics. Alternatively, it would be possible to ask whether the notion of authority as propagator of trust can be institutionalized in a more rigid and systematic way than in the informal group-association. While Jouvenel is more or less silent on those points, this discussion can be teaching in light of the developments in early 21st century political discourse, especially with the reintroduction of the notion of populism.

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Бертран де Жувенель о власти, авторитете и доверии

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В статье рассматривается понимание политического авторитета и его отношения с вопросом доверия, представленное в работах Бертрана де Жувенеля. Он предлагает провокационный

и особенный взгляд на политический авторитет, рассматривая его в первую очередь как способ учреждения регулярных и надежных социальных отношений между различными участниками сообщества. В рамках своей аргументации Жувенель выделяет два типа политического авторитета, которые обозначаются как «власть» и «авторитет». В то время, как власть в целом возникает в результате сдерживания индивидуального действия в какой-либо области в основном посредством воззвания к личным интересам или прямого повеления, авторитет проявляется в первую очередь как харизматический или неформальный тип лидерства, влияющий на поведение человека косвенным образом. Различие между властью и авторитетом, как отмечает Жувенель, предполагает двойную концепцию доверия как этического и эпистемического принципа. Если власть обеспечивает необходимую регулярность при помощи опосредованной информации, которая обычно встроена в определенные бюрократические организации, то авторитет организует более косвенный тип регулярности, учреждая «узлы» социальной регулярности, в частности, через качества личного характера. Соотношение двух типов можно рассмотреть как предполагающее некое равновесие. Пока власть имеет дело с сокращением внешнего эффекта и рисков, которые предполагаются человеческим общением, и позволяет базовое существование, авторитет дает более широкий набор для человеческого выбора и в то же время удерживает власть от перегрузок социальной ткани. Основной фокус политической теории Жувенеля состоит в сохранении неуловимой и скрытой социальной связи, которая позволяет авторитету играть свою особенную роль и в то же время сохранять дистанцию от более косвенных форм политической власти.

Ключевые слова: власть, авторитет, доверие, знание, харизма, индивидуализм

Gadamer on Friendship and Solidarity: The Increase in Being in Communal Human Life

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This article discusses Gadamer's conception of friendship as a part of his draft of a conception of practical philosophy. His starting point is Greek philosophy, specifically Plato's and Aristotle's views on friendship. He adds significant nuances to the understanding of friendship that were first laid down in his doctrine of philosophical hermeneutics. It allows him to place the notion of friendship in the context of modern philosophical debate and social criticism, and thus to make an original contribution to the discussion. Gadamer understands friendship as a necessarily reciprocal structure. He emphasizes the fact that only reciprocity or a kind of relation to someone other than "me" can serve as a sufficient basis for the explanation of the possibility of a community, as opposed to neo-Kantian and a phenomenological adherence to self-consciousness. The notion of friendship is closely connected to the notion of solidarity. The first one is considered as a more universal and thus grounding type of interpersonal communication, whereas natural solidarity is a specific kind of bond that can grow into the true friendship. Furthermore, friendship is seen as an accession of being (*Zuwachs an Sein*) from a teleological point of view, i.e., the true friendship is a contribution to and the realization of life. The outcome of this practice cannot be differentiated from its process.

Keywords: Gadamer, philosophical hermeneutics, friendship, solidarity, increase in being, understanding, practical philosophy

The issue of friendship cannot be considered as entirely new for social philosophy, since it was a subject of interest in Ancient Greece, and discussed in the poetic treatises of Hesiod and Homer. Friendship was the main topic of Plato's dialogue *Lysis*. Aristotle paid significant attention to this problem in his three works on ethics. Later, Cicero addresses it in his treatise *On Friendship*, while Plutarch dedicated a special treatise entitled *On Having Many Friends* to the question of friendship. This topic has re-appeared in recent modern philosophy. Its renaissance can be attributed to the critique of modern society, and to the pursuit of alternative ways for thinkers to consider the possible forms of society or forms of power that would be free from the necessary oppressive implementations. The names that come to mind first are those of Arendt and her discussion of friendship in *The Human Condition* (1958), Derrida with his book *Politics of Friendship* (1997), and Agamben, who wrote the essay *The Friend* (2007).

Among these philosophers, the name of Gadamer may sound alien. Indeed, his approach to the question of friendship is different as compared to that of Derrida.¹ If the strategy of the latter can be called negation, then Gadamer's approach is better described as affirmation, or making it visible through affirmation. Why negation? Since Derrida tries to find an alternative to already-existing power relations, i.e., he negates them and strives to suggest a strategy to overcome them by suggesting the notion of friendship to come (*à venir*). Gadamer, on the contrary, turns to the ever-enduring examples of positive relations that existed once, and can be found in every community of every historical epoch and culture.

It is not a common idea to see Gadamer as a thinker in the sphere of practical philosophy. However, a brief insight in his writing besides *Truth and Method* already provides enough evidence of his deep interest in the issues of ethics and politics throughout his long academic career. If at the beginning his engagement was more of a speculative character, it is especially noticeable how this involvement grew increasingly concrete with time in the examples of his later writings. Starting from the 1960s, his attempt to contribute to the self-understanding of society can be seen as a twofold movement. On the one hand, he openly criticizes certain aspects of it, namely, the prevalence of expert knowledge and the lack of social reflection² which lead to the incapability of citizens to create social bonds on the basis of common interaction. Instead of trying to manage the problems on their own, they delegate this function to experts. On the other hand, he tries to make a positive contribution to the texture of common social life with his own work. It is a performative gesture of which the initial purpose is not stated explicitly, so it is the responsibility of a reader to notice it.

Thus, those who want to evaluate Gadamer's position may fall into a contradiction. Although Gadamer wrote about some politically relevant topics and suggested an original interpretation of friendship, solidarity, and ethics on the whole, it would still be inconsistent to label him as a political thinker. He did not strive to achieve the level of an expert. Rather, his contributions were and should be regarded as performative attempts to bring to life that which was at the same time the subject matter of his theoretical considerations. This may be particularly clear in the case of his reasoning about friendship and solidarity.

Both topics are regarded in their relevance for the contemporary situation, characterized by the philosopher as a lack of natural solidarity. However, as opposed to the critique of the Frankfurt School directed to the very grounds of modern culture, for example, Gadamer's skepticism is not so pervasive. He does not draw a fixed border between authentic and inauthentic forms of cooperation, and still assumes the possibility of demonstra-

1. For a more detailed comparison of the two authors, see Caputo, 2002. According to Caputo, Derrida tries to escape the necessity of any *grounding* politics on friendship, whereas Gadamer remains close to the metaphysical tradition. Caputo ascribes certain essentialism to Gadamer. However, as it will be shown, Gadamer himself emphasized the specific character of friendship as a relationship that can never be completely fulfilled. So, it is worth noting that Caputo's presentation of Gadamer's ideas is inadequate in some aspects.

2. See, for instance, his articles "Über die Planung der Zukunft" (On the Planning of the Future) (1965), "Hermeneutik" (Hermeneutics) (1969), and "Replik zur Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik" (1971).

tions of genuine forms of friendship and solidarity in contemporary circumstances. What he aims at is not to attack the existing, perhaps corrupted, forms of social organization, but to point out possible productive forms of interactions which would require some conscious effort for their realization.

This claim conforms with the general attitude of hermeneutics as a practical philosophy which consists of the idea of understanding as “a form of realization of a human social life” (Gadamer, 1971: 289). It means that understanding is not restricted to the experience of texts, works of art, and conversations with other human beings. Understanding is a way to deal with reality that underlies social relationships as well, due to its universality. This universality, however, refers only to the applicability of understanding. In other words, everything can become an object of understanding. From this, however, we cannot conclude that understanding itself emerges anywhere at any occasion. On the contrary, it requires the wakefulness (*Wachsamkeit*) of an agent. By placing friendship and solidarity in the context of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer highlights this universal hermeneutic aspect as a significant part of social relationships. The specificity of Gadamer’s interpretation of friendship is to be regarded in a broader and more systematic context than Gadamer’s intention to turn philosophical hermeneutics into practical philosophy. He achieves an alternative view on the issue that directly addresses the issues of modern society, precisely due to the synthesis of philosophical hermeneutics with the classical Ancient Greek conception of friendship

In order to accurately understand Gadamer’s idea of friendship, it is important to situate this concept properly in the whole context of his thought. There were some attempts to build ethics on the basis of philosophical hermeneutics that appeal to traditional notions of language, play, and dialog. For example, in *Gadamer’s Ethics of Play: Hermeneutics and the Other* (2010), M. Vilhauer tries to ground ethics in Gadamer’s concept of play. However, the very idea of play as it is represented in *Truth and Method* stems from Gadamer’s major claim of philosophical hermeneutics as practical philosophy.³ In other words, the notion of play is derived from earlier ideas, and if one wants to develop the ethics of play, one has to trace back its origins. In his book *Nächstenliebe, Freundschaft, Geselligkeit: Verstehen und Anerkennen Bei Abel, Gadamer und Schleiermacher* (1998) (Love to the Neighbor, Friendship, Socialness: Understanding and Recognition in Abel, Gadamer and Schleiermacher), M. Hofer tries to elaborate a notion of friendship that would be in accordance with the basic ideas of philosophical hermeneutics (Hofer, 1998: 119–198). However, he completely ignores Gadamer’s views about ethics, practical philosophy, and friendship, and limits the consideration mainly to the ideas expressed in *Truth and Method*. Such approaches distort the way Gadamer’s thought developed and, therefore, usually miss the core point. As R. Sullivan states, one can see Gadamer’s early writings in the light of his magnum opus *Truth and Method*, but it will lead to a narrow and inadequate understanding, whereas acknowledging the early Gadamer as a “political theorist” helps to achieve “a simpler and more elegant interpretation” (Sullivan, 1989: 8–10).

3. See Gadamer, 1986.

Even at the beginning of his career, Gadamer was occupied with the questions of ethics and politics (see, for instance, his dissertation *Platos dialektische Ethik* [Plato's Dialectic Ethics] [1931], his articles *Praktisches Wissen* [Practical Knowledge] [1930], *Plato und die Dichter* [Plato and the Poets] [1934], and *Platos Staat der Erziehung* [Plato's Educational State] [1942], to name a few). This interest goes back to his studies of Plato and Aristoteles. However, it was not restricted to a pure theoretical investigation; it was always connected to the question of what the good is. This question should not be seen as a highly abstract metaphysical question, but rather as the one that everyone asks in his or her everyday life.

Friendship and solidarity are parts of a more general conception of practical philosophy. Although there is no systematical text that would present it in an exhaustive way, the idea of hermeneutics as a practical philosophy runs through the entirety of Gadamer's thinking. This inclination exhibits itself most vividly in the 1980s and the 1990s. Initially, it started with the polemics between Gadamer and Habermas in the 1970s. In a context that was a reaction to Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, Habermas argues by his emphasizing the significance of authority and tradition, Gadamer fails to adequately understand the reflexive moment of philosophical hermeneutics (Habermas, 1971: 51). Gadamer's answer was that philosophical hermeneutics aims at making one conscious of its own prejudices first of all, but it is impossible to eliminate prejudices, as Habermas claimed. Gadamer argued that one should at least become conscious of it (Gadamer, 1971b).

This reflexive and critical attitude is what Gadamer understands under practical philosophy and not as a specific academic discipline among others. The object of reflection here is the knowledge and skills (*das Können*) as they are. Philosophical hermeneutics poses the question of the application of certain skills in a transcendental mode, and reveals the condition of the application of the skills. This condition is the reasonableness (*Vernunftigkeit*) that is intrinsic to every human being.

The claim of practical philosophy as Gadamer states it is the claim for universality: it means that understanding is not a mere scientific method but "a form of realization of a human social life" (Gadamer, 1971a: 289). Thus, he expends the limits of philosophical hermeneutics.

Being a kind of reflection, practical philosophy also contributes to the self-understanding of an individual. Regarded from the perspective of social interactions, it means a very specific thing for Gadamer. This is social consciousness or conscious awareness of an individual, which signifies that his or her actions can be meaningful only in the context of a concrete community. Hence, they are meaningful, they can be judged as good or bad, or as appropriate or not. There is no objective value prior to community. However, this does not mean sheer relativism. The hermeneutical claim for universality presupposes that one acknowledges not the particular content of the morals that remain unchanged, but the fact that human beings are reasonable, and therefore, moral creatures.

These are basic premises of practical philosophy that were expressed in full, though detached from the philosophical-historical analysis of the 1980s. Before this period, one can find a mixture of contemplations concerning the subject matter together with the

examination of textual evidence. However, it is to be noted once again that the practical bias of philosophical hermeneutics originally stems from the genuine interest in practical philosophy, and not the other way around.

Even if one admits to the influence practical philosophy had on the origins of Gadamer's thinking, it does not mean that he could be labeled with a title of an ethical or a political philosopher or theorist, as R. Sullivan does, for example. Apart from the fact that such labeling is rather useless to understand Gadamer's project, Gadamer had himself consciously tried to avoid theoretical one-sidedness, as well as abstraction and labeling. This attitude had an immediate effect on the way Gadamer presented his thoughts.

In the pursuit of an integral presentation of Gadamer's ideas about practical philosophy and the problem of friendship in particular, one should take the following condition into consideration. Gadamer's late writings often have the character of a dialogue, be it a response to a social discussion relevant at that time, or a reaction to a book or an event, or a public speech. It means that an immediate life-context served as an occasion to touch upon some philosophical issues. This is the case with the two texts in which he addresses the question of friendship directly. The first, published in 1985 as an article entitled "Friendship and Self-Knowledge: Reflections on the Role of Friendship in Greek Ethics" was presented as his inaugural speech at the University of Marburg in 1928. The article represents an extended version of the speech. The second, titled "Friendship and Solidarity" (1999), aims at discussing the role of friendship and solidarity in modern society under the conditions of a new social order and habits of coexistence. Both texts treat the topic in various ways, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, from the current perspective, and from a theoretical angle.

Despite the essay-like character of reflections and the lack of systematic approach, these two texts allow the selection of a number of significant aspects, and to form a coherent and detailed notion of friendship according to Gadamer. The features to regard are the structure of friendship, its meaning in the context of communal human life, and its essence.

Friendship as a Reciprocal Relation

One of the problems Gadamer wants to answer in his discussion of friendship is the problem of the possibility and grounds of social interaction. As a philosopher, he is restrained to the philosophical scope and does not deal with sociological theories. However, he cannot find a sufficient explanation in the philosophical theories of his time. When the paper was first presented in 1928, his research context was defined by Kant's deontological ethics and phenomenological ethics of value in Scheler's version, as well as neo-Kantian transcendental idealism, of which he was quite critical. He notes that the more-or-less common point of departure of all three theories was self-consciousness. As opposed to both phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, he chose to follow what he calls "Heidegger's way," and to resign from the idea of self-consciousness as the starting point for philosophical considerations (Gadamer, 1999: 129). It may not be quite clear from first sight in what

way Heidegger can be helpful for the formulation of a theory of social interaction, since it was never his strong point or point of interest. What is important for Gadamer is not the content or some specific method, but Heidegger's general philosophical attitude (Gadamer, 1987: 187–188). First of all, according to Gadamer, Heidegger stressed the necessity to read the Greeks anew, which was what Gadamer then pursued during the 20's and 30's. Secondly, he was influenced by Heidegger's idea of the hermeneutics of facticity, where the preference is given to the fore-structures of understanding, and not to the consciousness and to the "situatedness" of a human being in each specific time (*jeweilig*) and context of one's life. It is the clue to understanding Gadamer's notion of ethics. It is likewise important to him that Aristotle grounds practical philosophy in the concrete moral and political experience and the way they are expressed, and not in metaphysics (Gadamer, 1999: 132). Gadamer takes the same position in his view on practical philosophy.⁴

In Aristotle's understanding of ethics, politics, and friendship, it is common that it is not "the business of the one or the other." The acknowledgement of this fact is the feature of practical philosophy and an aspect that makes it different from the modern philosophy of self-consciousness. Thus, Gadamer declines the latter position because it cannot provide any plausible explanation of "the ontological constitution of society" (Gadamer, 1999: 131). For him, the Greek practical philosophy might play a role of "a paradigm for the critique of subjectivity (*Subjektivitätsdenken*)."⁵ The alternative to subjectivity is "the structure of self-relatedness." Thus, for instance, self-love and self-sufficiency are of particular importance for the understanding of friendship.

In Gadamer's description, one can differentiate three of types of relations. The first is self-love, or a relation to oneself or between parts of the soul which is the precondition of friendship. The second type is the reciprocity (*Gegenseitigkeit*), or a relation between persons based on mutual utility, pleasantness, or interest. The third type is life together (*Zusammenleben*), the highest type of organization of communal human life.

The term "philautia" refers to the concept of self-love, and is an ambiguous term in the Greek tradition. On the one hand, it was used as a negative attribute to characterize someone who is too enclosed or immersed in one's own self. For Aristotle, however, self-love acquires a positive connotation since it makes one close to the ideal of self-sufficiency, or autarchy of a divine pattern. Self-love allows for the resolution of the conflict between reason and passions, and to achieve the unity of two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational (Gadamer, 1999: 135–136). Thus, this experience of reconciliation is what one first experiences in oneself and can be transferred later in the sphere of relationships with others. It would be problematic to live with others if one is not united with oneself, leading Gadamer to state "friendship must exist first and foremost with oneself" (Gadamer, 2009: 8). It is only under this condition a person can be united with others.

If one then moves to the interpersonal level, there are two further, distinct kinds of relations. It is possible to characterize them as inauthentic and authentic. As for Gadamer, there is the authentic that is more preferable and has positive outcomes for the well-being

4. M. Kelly, in his article "Gadamer and Philosophical Ethics," gives a detailed description of Gadamer's ethical project that includes both Aristotelian and Kantian elements (Kelly, 1988).

for the community, whereas the inauthentic remains deficient in some way. The basic structural feature of any kind of friendship is reciprocity (*Gegenseitigkeit*) (Gadamer, 1999: 134). However, it remains that one has to differentiate between friendship and mere friendliness. The latter can be reciprocal, but still lacks a kind of openness towards the other. It is not enough to have sympathy or good will towards one another to establish friendship. Thus, there can be a reciprocal relation between human beings based on the mutual good will, but it will still not be friendship.

The other significant feature of friendship is openness (Gadamer, 1999: 134). The actors of friendship are no longer concealed from each other. There is one important consequence that follows from this claim for openness, which is that it leads to the recognition of the “other” as the “other,” or as Gadamer puts it, “we grant to one another our being as Other” (Gadamer, 2009: 9). Thus, the Hegelian idea of striving for the recognition is realized for Gadamer when friendship is the recognition of equals. It allows otherness to be retained together with the experience of unity. In order to be united, one does not necessarily need to be unanimous. The ground of unity lies not in the similarity of opinions, but in the initial intention to be united. Thus, this third superior kind of relation is primarily characterized by the existence of the bond (*Verbundenheit*) that leads to the establishment of a life together (*Zusammenleben*) (Gadamer, 1999: 134).

Now, one could ask about the status or essence of this bond. Does Gadamer mean something similar to the social contract? The answer would be no, since in this case, Gadamer’s strategy is that of phenomenology. He traces back to the possibility of creating bonds to some initial experience, and his example is the experience of the homeland. According to Gadamer, a homeland is something that could be grasped as connection itself (Gadamer, 2009: 7). Our experience of a homeland is the experience of an attachment of the “genuine” kind, when we perceive the scenery as unconditionally beautiful, when we already belong to the community, and are solidary and joint.⁵ Starting from this initial experience, we can then interact with others on the same basis.

To sum up, since friendship is understood as a relation, we can discern three various types of relations that Gadamer introduces. He starts with intra-personal relation of self-love that serves as a precondition of friendship. Self-love, or *philautia*, can then lead to friendship, or *philia*. Furthermore, there is a difference between the two kinds of interpersonal relationships that are necessary reciprocal. Whereas friendliness is a reciprocity

5. In his 1945 article “The Homecomer,” Alfred Schütz analyzed this type of social bond, addressing the problem of the process of adaptation by soldiers returning home from war. The author introduces the concept of the primordial *we*-relation which is based on accessibility of a certain sector of the outer world (space) and the continuation of this common life (time) as the grounding point for any social relationship. The problem of the soldier at war consists of the impossibility to share everyday experiences with the members of the community that remained at home. Thus, even if the latter are informed by newspapers or movie reports about life at front, they cannot share this experience in full. Schuetz diagnoses a “separation” between the home-comer and his close circle that is hard to remove and to “re-establish the disrupted *we*-relation” (Schütz, 1945: 373–374). One can assume that a similar separation may well occur to people who do not participate directly in warfare but their daily lives are still significantly influenced by the war event. Thus there is no place for a habitual continuity of relationships in space and time. As a result average citizens also face the problem of adaptation, not only home-comers.

that requires good will but lacks openness, friendship is reciprocal, and at the same time, it is expected that the persons are opened towards each other. This means that they are ready to share life together but still retain an independence of opinions, interests, and life goals.

Friendship as Solidarity

As already mentioned, the question of friendship for Gadamer is not a matter of theoretical consideration. He appeals to the Greeks not only as a source of knowledge, but also as an example of how particular ideas were brought to life. If the stance on the problem in the 1985 article "Friendship and Self-Knowledge" was more general, then he directly addresses the problems of today and brings his own conception of friendship with the prevailing ideas of solidarity together in the article "Friendship and Solidarity." His starting point is the modern mass society in which he diagnoses the lack of "natural" solidarity. Gadamer's speculations about friendship are not in a broad historic-philosophical context, but in specific circumstances. According to him, these circumstances are deficient. He is critical about modern society which he calls a society of "anonymous responsibility," after K. Jaspers (Gadamer, 2009: 3). It means that social bonds in modernity are created on alternative grounds as compared to earlier periods. This is why there is still solidarity and, therefore, responsibility, but this solidarity is an "avowed" (erklärt) one.

Gadamer admits that there is a certain tension between the concepts of friendship and solidarity in modern thought. His goal is to prove that these two concepts are not opposite but, on the contrary, inseparable (Gadamer, 2009: 5). In order to do this, he first shows the inconsistency of the modern representation of solidarity, and then offers his own understanding. It is worthy to note that Gadamer's analysis of solidarity does not take pre-existing theories of solidarity into consideration, such as Durkheim's differentiation between mechanical and organic solidarity, or Tönnies' ideal types of community and society. Furthermore, the way Gadamer interprets solidarity is hardly compatible with these conceptions. If Durkheim and Tönnies both emphasize the role of the interpersonal source of solidarity, be it the social common consciousness in case of the former or a special type of common will in the case of the latter, Gadamer ascribes solidarity to individuals. Moreover, he does not tie solidarity to a particular, more preferable social order, but claims that solidarity can emerge in different types of communities, traditional and modern, and based on personal, or mediated and indirect interactions. Gadamer's concept of solidarity stresses its conscious character, and, at the same time, the fact that solidarity is an event, a kind of experience that is supposed to seize the participants.

Gadamer contrasts natural and avowed solidarity, which differ in the way they emerge. Natural solidarity is something one "feels." As an example, Gadamer recalls the situation during the war period, when a significant transformation occurred in the way people related to each other. Under the circumstances of the bombing of city-dwellers who were otherwise strangers, the normally anonymous inhabitants of a big modern city "were awoken to life" (Gadamer, 2009: 10). To express it in a stricter way, they were all united

by the common goal of survival, aware that that this kind of unity emerged from the common need. Thus, natural solidarity makes one recognize the right of the other to be the other. The most radical example of this is when every person is willing to risk their own life, and then the participants immediately acknowledge that each and every one of their counterparts has the same pretension as they did. In this situation, if a danger or a constraint is perceived as shared, than solidarity emerges. In other words, to be able to act in accordance with others on a natural basis, an individual must admit that others have the same claims and each person is in the same situation in which the individual's right of these claims is challenged. As G. Warnke correctly admits, only friendship allows to see the others precisely as others, whereas "Under the conditions of mass society we fail to be others to one another because we are undifferentiated parts of a mass" (Warnke, 2012: 11).

As opposed to natural solidarity, an avowed solidarity is not felt, but "declared." One can declare solidarity, binding themselves to an external obligation. Although it originates from an internal commitment, it is not the power of one's intention that forces one to stay true to what has been promised, but rather this external duty from the moment it has been expressed. Gadamer asks whether "not too many things in which we could really recognize (wiedererkennen) ourselves are being withheld (vorenthalten) from us?" (Gadamer, 2009: 10), meaning that the mechanisms in mass society governing this society are created outside of it with the help of statistics and expert evaluation. The citizens are no more responsible for developing bonds.

The origin of the word "solidarity" can be traced back to its roots in the Latin word "solidum," which means "solid," or "hard." In German, it also refers to "Sold," which means "salary." From this, Gadamer concludes that the modern understanding of solidarity rests upon the idea of constancy. Like a payment that is made not using counterfeit money and retaining its value in any circumstances, it is also expected that solidarity ensures "a sterling and reliable inseparability" (Gadamer, 2009: 11). That is to say, an individual will remain loyal to what he or she has joined, but in order to be capable to remain "inseparable," one has to abandon one's own interests and preferences. Using this logic, avowed solidarity is more an artificial state in which one limits his own will for the sake of the common will. This is also why such solidarity has to be enunciated in order to persist.

Gadamer finds this strategy of the declaring of solidarity erroneous, as it leaves no place for the needs of an individual. For him, the basic principle of a community would be a mutual recognition and reconciliation of common and individual interests that is realized through a constant elaboration of ways to act. This is why he claims that "authentic solidarity must be conscious" (Gadamer, 2009: 11). By this, he means that conscious awareness presupposes that every member of a community makes a conscious decision when he or she chooses to participate in a communal action. If this condition is fulfilled by every member of the community, then the communal action itself will be realized consciously, and not merely on the grounds of the earlier declared agreement. Thus, this solidarity will regularly receive a new confirmation, and remains something that can be lived through and felt. For Gadamer, the ultimate source of solidarity lies in individuals:

he writes that “real solidarity depends on the individuals who have avowed themselves to it and stood up for it” (Gadamer, 2009: 11).

Such an interpretation of solidarity brings it closer to the notion of friendship. Gadamer draws a line from solidarity via camaraderie (Kameradschaft) to friendship to emphasize the commonality of the two notions. Both friendship and solidarity depend on good will (Gadamer, 2009: 12), and could not be established from within. On the contrary, they require effort and engagement from those who strive to create bonds and, at the same time, to allow the other to pursue their own goals.

Gadamer does not pay any special attention to delimiting friendship and solidarity. There are three ways of defining the correlation between friendship and solidarity that can be deduced from his discussion: (1) friendship and solidarity are the same; (2) friendship is opposed to solidarity; (3) friendship and solidarity have a common ground, but serve to describe social interaction on different levels. The evidence for the first interpretation consists in the fact that Gadamer himself suggests the Greek word “*philia*,” which is normally translated as “friendship,” be translated with the term “solidarity” (Gadamer, 2009: 12). This indicates that these two notions are closely connected for Gadamer. However, he does not go so far as to declare that they are one and the same, since there are still differences between them. The second possibility would be to say that friendship, as a kind of immediate and confidential relationship without evident practical purpose, is opposite to solidarity which originates as a relationship between strangers and serves to fulfill everyday needs. If one adheres to the understanding of solidarity suggested by Gadamer as a description of the modern state of affairs, then, indeed, solidarity would be contrary to how Gadamer represents friendship. The most plausible explanation would be to say that friendship and solidarity initially share common premises, but are used to characterize different types of interpersonal interaction.⁶ Thus, the notion of solidarity is attributed to characterize social bonds in larger groups, and as Gadamer sees it, becomes especially important under the condition of modern mass society. While the notion of friendship is primordial, this delivers a general idea of what counts as an authentic interpersonal relationship.

Friendship as Increase in Being

Gadamer’s elaboration of the notion of friendship is multidimensional. It includes a historic-philosophical stance as well as an applied approach. It contains a descriptive aspect together with a prescriptive touch. It addresses epistemological issues and, at the same time, aims at practical tasks. As it has been noted earlier, Gadamer’s considerations are initially conceived as a part of practical philosophy, called “practical” not because of the subject it deals with, but because of the contribution to the communal life and the impact it is supposed to have. Therefore, Gadamer does not confine himself to a mere theoretical

6. D. Walhof, in his article “Friendship, Otherness, and Gadamer’s Politics of Solidarity,” comes to a similar conclusion, drawing on Gadamer’s difference between friendship and solidarity precisely on the basis of the scope of interpersonal interaction (Walhof, 2006: 584).

analysis, but also sets up a kind of normative horizon. It would be an exaggeration to say that he introduces a deontological ethical system; his claim is far more modest. However, one can speak of a certain teleology of friendship. That is why, apart from the structural analysis of friendship as presented in the first part of this article, Gadamer's discussions allow for the regarding of the concept of friendship in an anthropological and teleological perspective, as compared to previous structural analyses.

As it has already been partly shown, Gadamer gives a particular preference to one kind of relation, namely friendship, as opposed to simple friendliness. Now, among various types of friendship that is based on competition between young boys or older men, or friendship between family partners, there is one superior type which Gadamer calls life friendship (*Lebensfreundschaft*). He adopts Aristotle's taxonomy of friendship which presupposes three species of friendship: the one based on utility or profit, the other based on pleasure, and the third and the highest one based on excellence or virtue (Aristotle, 2014: 163–164).

There is a strict, unsurpassable qualitative limit between the first two species taken together and the third species of friendship. Only friendship based on excellence fulfills it, but perhaps it is better to say strives for and is capable of fulfilling the idea of friendship. The other two kinds are only "analogous" to the life friendship (Gadamer, 1999: 133). Here, analogous means that other kinds of relations based on mutual use or pleasure can be interpreted by appealing to the example of the friendship of excellence.

In Aristotle's works, this confusion is cleared up with the example of soul and body, in which a "medical" (or "healthy" in an alternative translation) body is analogous to a "medical" soul. Both participate in the universal idea of "medical" (Aristotle, 2014: 164). Then, the two first types are also called friendships, since true friendship is partially present in them. However, at the same time, they lack the opportunity to participate in this "perfection" to be comparable or equal to the friendship of excellence. Although it may seem that the difference between the three kinds is quantitative, it turns out that the perfection of the third type, the excellence, makes it qualitatively different as well.

The friendship of virtue is grounded on the mutual excellence of two friends. It means that the goal of this relationship, although it includes reciprocal pleasure and also profit, nevertheless surpasses the limits of what is good in specific life circumstances. and strives to the good in general. The distinctive feature of life friendship, as Gadamer represents it, is its fundamental incompleteness (Gadamer, 2009: 10).⁷ There is a certain anthropological premise behind this claim. Just like Aristotle, Gadamer places the human being between god and animal. The latter does not experience a conflict between needs, urge, and rational choice. A human being, on the contrary, is challenged with the necessity of making a decision, he is initially incomplete and has to fill in this lack. As compared to a god, a human being is unable to achieve the divine completeness or autarchy on his

7. B. Bryan, in his detailed article "Approaching Others: Aristotle on Friendship's Possibility," defends the idea that friendship as something "unfinished" was already proper to Aristotle himself. He argues that friendship, for Aristotle, exists only as possibility and never as an actuality (Bryan, 2009). It is partly in keeping with Gadamer's own understanding of friendship.

own. Some individuals can approach this state, others can be very far from it, but an isolated individual can never succeed in acquiring it alone. According to Aristotle, a friend is someone who can better understand a person than that person themselves. Gadamer explains it by appealing to the fact that a human being usually tends to have self-illusions (Gadamer, 1999: 137). Thus, the claim for self-knowledge becomes a difficult task that is never to be fully achieved.

A friend is supposed to be someone who helps to eliminate this lack. For Gadamer, friendship has a twofold or dialectical structure. On the one hand, it presupposes that one is brought to “being at one with another” (*des anderen inne ist*)⁸ (Gadamer, 1999: 137), while, on the other hand, it allows to “discern” or to preserve and to feel one’s own self (*das eigene Selbst ist mitgewahrt und mitgeföhlt*) (Gadamer, 1999: 137). This dynamic is structurally similar to the process of “understanding” as it is depicted in philosophical hermeneutics. Through the understanding of a text or a work of art, one acquires access to the tradition, and becomes part of it. At the same time, every understanding is reflective and allows one to understand himself. In other words, in order to obtain an agreement with the other, one has to become conscious of similarities there are between the two. By doing this, one better understands oneself.

Not only can such relations never be fully completed because of this dialectical or oscillating movement, but it also has a specific type of presence. The other characteristic feature of friendship is the accession or increase in being (*Zuwachs an Sein*). Gadamer uses this concept in *Truth and Method* when he describes the peculiar way of being of a work of art distinguishes it from a mere sign or a symbol. If a picture is not simply a copy, than it represents the original, and at the same time, presents itself (Gadamer, 2004: 134), whereas a sign is “pure indication” (*Verweisung*) and a symbol is “pure substitution” (*Stellvertreter*) (Gadamer, 2004: 145). It means that a sign only serves to point to a being outside of itself. Thus, a sign on its own as an independent being should dissolve. On the contrary, a symbol represents something that is not given to sense perception, like a political or religious unity of people, for instance. However, the content of a symbol is always schematic; it is not due to its inherent content that a symbol can serve as a substitution (Gadamer, 2004: 148). Thus, it would be just to claim that the matter performs a function of an intermediary and is perceived as secondary for both the sign and the symbol. In the case of a work of art, it is impossible to break the connection between what is “being represented” and what “represents,” and, therefore, between representation and presentation. It is only due to presentation of a particular subject that representation

8. It is worth quoting the entire passage here: “Die *energeia*, in der *eudaimonia* und *philia* bestehen, ist nicht so sehr in dem Sinne Tätigkeit; dass es dabei auf ein *ergon* ankäme, als vielmehr auf den Vollzug der eigenen Lebendigkeit selbst. *Energeia* mag immer beides enthalten, Hingabe an den anderen oder das andere und Hingabe an den Vollzug selbst. Aber auch dann bleibt das Wesen des Lebensvollzuges, dass man des anderen inne ist, der Andersheit der Dinge wie der anderen Menschen“ (Gadamer, 1991: 403–404). It is then translated as follows: “The *energeia*, consisting of *eudaimonia* and *philia*, is not really activity in the sense of depending on an *ergon*, but rather of realizing its own vitality. *Energeia* can always involve both: devotion to others or another and devotion to the realization itself. But even then the essence of the realization of life is still being at one with another, whether the otherness of things or other people” (Gadamer, 1999: 138).

becomes possible. Since such a presentation does not immediately point to some external being but adds something to this being that was not already present in it, a perceiver is encouraged to actively engage at the same time with what is being presented. It does not serve to arrange a connection between a perceiving subject and what already exists but is itself a contribution, or an addition of something entirely new to being. Thus, a work of art leads to an increase in being, because it suggests such forms of interaction that would enforce an accession. As Gadamer states, "What comes into being in it [a portrait] is not contained in what acquaintances can already see in the person portrayed" (Gadamer, 2004: 142).

Gadamer uses the same term, *Zuwachs an Sein*, or an increase in being, to characterize friendship. In the case of the work of art, the possibility of the increase is connected to a specific possibility of this work to overcome the boundaries of the original. In friendship, it is the friend who allows one to expand one's own limits. As has already been mentioned, Gadamer emphasizes the finite essence of a human being and the fact that he or she alone will never be able to achieve the divine ideal of autarchy. If an individual acknowledges this fact, he is compelled to seek the possibilities of connections with others. It becomes possible to prevail over this initial condition of finiteness by means of a reciprocal relationship in which the two participants act as mirrors to each other

Gadamer connects friendship with the idea of "realization of vitality" (*Lebendigkeit*) (Gadamer, 1999: 138). For him, friendship, as well as other ways of social interaction and even broader interactions in general such as, for instance, the experience of a work of art, is a kind of practice in which the process and the product remain indiscernible. They contribute to the increase in being not by providing a separated embodied output but by transforming the reality. The final effect of friendship consists in establishing a social connection and creating the reality which was previously nonexistent. It is described as an encounter which differs from a demand, a duty, or a command. One meets another person (*ein leibhaftiges Gegenüber*), and the way to interact with her or him is to increase trust and devotion. In the interaction, Gadamer sees "the full stream of self-forming commonalities" (*Strom sich bildender Gemeinsamkeiten*). For him, this practice underlies "a real embedding in the texture of communal human life" (*eine reale Einbettung in das Gefüge der miteinander lebenden Menschen*) (Gadamer, 1999: 139).

Conclusion

The notions of friendship and solidarity are parts of Gadamer's conception of practical philosophy. Although it does not receive a systematic elaboration, there is still strong evidence for the claim that Gadamer's project of philosophical hermeneutics was always concerned with the ethical dimension of philosophy as well as the epistemological dimension. In his discussion of friendship and solidarity Gadamer synthesizes Greek thought, Heidegger's early philosophy, and his own ideas to formulate a concept of friendship that would address the issues of modern society. He sees friendship as a structure of a certain meaningful interpersonal relationship. It is significant for a formation of an indi-

vidual person, but also serves as grounds for the emergence of social bonds. Gadamer's approach is deliberately interpersonal as opposed to those who try to explain intersubjectivity with the help of structures of consciousness. Furthermore, it is seen as a relationship that contains a certain ideal of human realization which can never be reached but, nevertheless, serves as a horizon for moral orientation. Although Gadamer emphasizes the role of tradition, it is important to identify the role he ascribes to it. Tradition serves as a precondition or a fore-structure of possible future bonds. It is not considered as an invariable substrate that carries random and mutable forms of social interaction. There is a significant difference between context and essence. Tradition functions as the former, whereas there is no place for a classical notion of essence in philosophical hermeneutics. On the contrary, its main claim is to involve and participate in relations that did not exist before this engagement, and to bring the being itself into being. Being is understood here not metaphysically, but rather as facticity in Heidegger's terms, or as ethos, the constellation of morals of a certain society, as Gadamer himself defines it. Despite the fact that the true friendship will always remain incomplete, it contributes to the increase in being through establishing and experiencing unique social connections. Gadamer's message is not normative in character but rather performative. His aim is to discuss certain aspects of human common life, making his own contribution to what he calls the texture of this life, and perhaps encouraging others to follow this strategy.

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Гадамер о дружбе и солидарности: прирост бытия в совместной человеческой жизни

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В статье рассматривается понятие дружбы в статьях Х.-Г. Гадамера. Идея дружбы является частью его концепции практической философии. Отправной точкой его размышлений является греческая философия, в частности, взгляды Платона и Аристотеля на феномен дружбы. Гадамер дополняет концепцию дружбы идеями, которые традиционно связываются с философской герменевтикой, а именно трансформативный аспект понимания, взаимосвязь понимания и самопонимания. Понятие дружбы рассматривается Гадамером в контексте актуальных проблем современного сообщества, которое он оценивает, как общество анонимной ответственности. Предлагаемое им понимание дружбы является вкладом в современную дискуссию о дружбе. Он противопоставляет свое представление тем философским школам, которые в качестве возможного источника социальности видят

самосознание. Гадамер, напротив, подчеркивает необходимость межличностного взаимного отношения, которое становится основанием любых социальных связей. Дружба в понимании Гадамера имеет значение не только в рамках общества или сообщества, но обладает также характерной телеологией. Значение дружбы состоит в том, что она, как и вообще всякий аутентичный опыт, по Гадамеру, будь то опыт понимания, взаимодействия с произведением искусства, или то, что Гадамер в поздних работах понимает под практической философией, приводит к приросту бытия. Дружба сама по себе является некоторым особенным видом практики, в котором невозможно различить процесс и результат этого процесса.

Ключевые слова: Гадамер, философская герменевтика, дружба, солидарность, прирост бытия, понимание, практическая философия

From People to Community: A Description of the Social Order by Thomas Aquinas. Part 1: *Populus, Respublica, Multitudo**

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In this article I will analyze the central categories of Thomas Aquinas's social thought, such as a people (*populus*), multitude (*multitudo*), and Commonwealth (*respublica*). The next article (Part 2) will contain an investigation of the categories of a community (*communitas*), communication, and society (*societas*). I stress the immediate readiness of the question in existing Thomistic literature. Despite the active investigations of Aquinas's political theory, the social theory remains almost forgotten. The works of Ignatius Th. Eschmann, Yves Congar, and Jeremy Catto represent some exclusions from this assertion, but not one of them has paid enough attention to the terminological peculiarities of Thomistic thought. Between the main results of this work, it is worth to focus on the next aspects of the dissipation of the people's concept, its equalization with the multitude, and the break of the connection between the notions of a people and a Commonwealth. The *populus* in Thomas's theory loses its political nature ascribed to it by Cicero and Augustin. Having lost its subjectivity, the People convert into an organized multitude united by common territory and the same mode of everyday life. Aquinas ignores the creation of the Commonwealth by the People and establishes a connection of another type between these concepts. According to him, the People is a kind of Aristotelian "materia," while the Commonwealth is the "form." In compliance with the precedential assertion, the Respublica becomes eternal and unchangeable, where only the content—i.e., the People or the multitude—can change. In effect, Aquinas formulates the concept of the proto-State here.

Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, social theory, the People, *populus*, Commonwealth, *respublica*, multitude

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The Concept of the State remained unknown in Medieval European political theory until at least the beginning of the 14th century.¹ This situation was created in many respects by the domination in the sphere of political culture by the main antagonist of the State, i.e., the People. It seems clear that the concept of the People (*populus*) as a political actor is strictly opposite to that of the State. Each of them presupposes political unity and, at the same time, political uniqueness. However, if the State can, in theory, communicate with other States, the People remains unique all of the time. All other communities external to it may be considered as tribes or clans, but never as the People. The People, in turn, constructs a proper sphere of social communication between its members, called the public sphere or the “*res publica*.” The existence of such a sphere presumes, first of all, the direct participation of the citizens in the government and in public affairs, among other things. The State, in turn, absorbs all governmental activity, alienating it from the citizens.

In this article, I will begin the analysis of the central socio-philosophical concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas. I will stress some peculiarities of his terminological apparatus and continue with the changes of the concept of the People, which suffered in his work. According to my position, the theological thought of Aquinas would be considered as one of the first steps towards the crash of Medieval political theory and the birth of Modern Social Philosophy. With that end in view, I will begin with a very brief analysis of the traditional medieval concept of People, then continue with the exposition of the historiographic panorama. I will continue with an attempt to expose the Thomistic paradigm of sociality.

A Brief Introduction

The main frame of Medieval Social Theory was formulated between the first century BC and the 5th century AD.² The first point was created by Cicero, who, in his famous treatise *On the Commonwealth*, defined the People as a multitude of men united by juridical consent and common utility.³ This definition already signified an important step forward in comparison with Greek political theory, which did not know a concept of the People (despite St. Augustine’s affirmation, a *populus* was never the same as a *demos*⁴). Instead

1. From this time, according to Otto von Gierke, become possible to meet the concepts of the *status reipublicae* or *status regni* in the different texts of the jurists like Bartolo and Baldo or of the political theoreticians like John of Paris, Marsiglio of Padua, etc. (Gierke, 1913: 171, infra 246; Post, 1964: 9–11). Quentin Skinner, with the particular references to F. Ercole, J. Hexter and N. Rubinstein, proposed to move this boundary to the end of the 14th century (Skinner, 1989, 2002). Contra vid. the position presented by Gaines Post, Ernst Kantorowitz, and Joseph R. Strayer who, basing their point of view on the analysis of the Medieval theories of the public law, dated the birth of the State by the midst of 13th century (Post, 1964; Strayer, 1970; Kantorowitz, 1957). But both Skinner and his opponents, who tried to implant the State’s concept in the more ancient time, acknowledged that the modern State in the proper sense of this word appeared only in the midst of the 16th century.

2. About the medieval fate of the Ciceronian and Augustinian definitions of the people see the article: (Kempshall, 2001)

3. De re publ.LXXV,39: Res publica est res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communitate sociatus.

4. Aug. Sermo 218 augm.15: Nichodemus autem, quia nomen est graecum, pluribus notum est, quod ex victoria et populo sit compositum, quia nicos victoria est, demos populus.

of the model of a closed civil community, which was known as a *polis*, Cicero proposed an alternative known as a *civitas*, an open community created by the free consent of its members. The membership here took shape not by the right of blood and soil, but by some factors of external and formal character, such as the citizen being freeborn and accepting some the juristic rules which regulated civil life in the *civitas*. Thus, when Cicero formulated his definition of the *populus*, he broke the old spatial limits of the citizenship erected by his Greek predecessors. His *populus*, I should repeat, was the open formal construction which embraced a whole civil community of some city. However, from the other side, the main characteristics defined by Cicero, such as the rational nature of the *populus* and the law as its basis, inevitably constricted the boundaries of the *populus* by the collective of the citizens of one particular city.

This constriction was broken by St. Augustine. The Hipponian bishop severely criticized the definition given by Cicero. According to St. Augustine, the People cannot be united by any agreement on the law because the law is based on justice, and justice, in turn, cannot exist in a pagan society.⁵ So, the Ciceronian definition in the Augustinian conception could be applied only to the Church, considered as a spiritual community united by an idea of the supreme justice. As for the People, Augustine proposed to remove both the juridical consent and the common utility from Cicero's formula, and change it from the concord to objects of common love.⁶

Such changes permitted the taking off of the spatial limits presupposed by Cicero. Indeed, if rational consent meant giving this responsibility to a rather limited number of its members (for making a reasonable agreement, it is essential to discuss its conditions, etc.), the emotional concord could be extended all over the Empire. In fact, it is worth it here to repeat the fact that St. Augustine invented the formula of modern representative democracy (for example, the famous slogan of the 1996 election campaign of Boris Yeltsin was "Vote with your heart!"). Thus, the People, in becoming the real *populus*, would have one object (*res*) of the common love, that which Augustine called *res publica*. Without such an object, the People would be converted to the multitude or, more correctly, to the crowd.⁷

5. De civ.XIX.21: Quapropter ubi homo Deo non servit, quid in eo putandum est esse iustitiae? quando quidem Deo non serviens nullo modo potest iuste animus corpori aut humana ratio vitiis imperare. Et si in homine tali non est ulla iustitia, procul dubio nec in hominum coetu, qui ex hominibus talibus constat. Non est hic ergo iuris ille consensus, qui hominum multitudinem populum facit, cuius res dicitur esse respublica.

6. De civ.XIX.24: Si autem populus non isto, sed alio definiatur modo, velut si dicatur: "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus," profecto, ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda, quae diligit. Quaecumque tamen diligit, si coetus est multitudinis non pecorum, sed rationalium creaturarum et eorum quae diligit concordi communione sociatus est, non absurde populus nuncupatur; tanto utique melior, quanto in melioribus, tantoque deterior, quanto est in deterioribus concors. Secundum istam definitionem nostram Romanus populus populus est et res eius sine dubitatione respublica.

7. De civ.XIX.21: Quocirca ubi non est vera iustitia, iuris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse et ideo nec populus iuxta illam Scipionis vel Ciceronis definitionem; et si non populus, nec res populi, sed qualiscumque multitudinis, quae populi nomine digna non est.

The Ciceronian and the Augustinian definitions determined the *populus*'s conceptual frame from the Middle Ages until the 17th century. It is quite enough to remember the famous definition of the State made by Thomas Hobbes in the 1660 revised English edition of his *Leviathan*, writing that this "is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man" (Hobbes, 2010: II.17). The concepts of the Consent and Concord are easily identified with the formulae of Cicero and Augustin.

Thus, the People was the political subject formed by the Republican or, what was the same, by the Imperial organisation. The alternative interpretation of the People's concept presupposed the same essence—*Populus Romanus Christianus*—but in another form, i.e., the Christian Church. However, another paradigm of political thought arose from the last third of the 13th century. The struggle between the Popes and Empire (known as the fight for the Investiture) ended de facto with the temporary victory of the Pontiffs. The last strong emperor, Friedrich II the Sicilian, died around 1250, and his successors could not withstand the ecclesiastical attack. At the same time, it was possible to mark the rise of the new kingdoms and, from another side, the fast development of Italian and Dutch cities. The new socio-political reality, not yet conditioned by unity but, on the contrary, being familiar with the plurality of the political subjects, needed a new language to describe an emerging social order. It was also connected with the rise of the universities and the rediscovery of Aristotelian philosophical works, most important of which in this context was the *Politica*, translated into Latin by Willhelm of Moerbeka around 1270. Aristotelian political logic was based on another philosophy than the Ciceronian or the Augustinian schools of thought, and this difference certainly had a significant influence upon the conceptions of the commentators of Stagirit's texts, beginning with Aquinas's thoughts.

Historiography

Taking the total number of the investigations dedicated to the various aspects of the Thomistic philosophy into consideration, it seems strange that the social theory of Thomas Aquinas was the object of only a few studies in the history of theological and political thought. One of the first authors who turned his attention towards the concept of society developed by Aquinas was Ignatius Theodor Eschmann (O.P.) (1898–1968), an eminent scholar and interpreter of Thomistic thought. In 1949, he became one of the first editors of the English translation of *De Regno*, where Gerard B. Phelan's translation was revised and completed by Eschmann's foreword and commentaries (Thomas Aquinas, 1949). Two years before, Eschmann had published a two-part article on the social philosophy of Aquinas and, more concretely, on the concept of society (Eschmann, 1946, 1947). It is worth noting that Eschmann's methodological approach devoted more attention to the theological aspects of the problem than to the terminological ones. The concept of society that he studied in the works of Thomas Aquinas was, in effect, created by Eschmann himself and he, it seems, did not pay enough attention to the lexical analysis of

St. Thomas's texts. That Eschmann did not realize a complete examination of the concept of society as itself in the Aquinas's theory is especially important. Some 30 years later, in 1974, an article was published by another Dominican researcher, the famous theologian and historian Yves Congar (O.P.) (1905–1995) (Congar, 1974). Congar showed the conceptual architecture of the formula *populus Ecclesiae* within the works of St. Thomas in the framework of his investigation. Despite some exciting and stimulating conclusions, I cannot agree with Congar's central theme since he equates the concept of the People in the Thomistic texts with other terms, such as *collegium*, *congregatio*, *collectio*, etc. This is a serious methodic error, because a congregation and so on can signify only some meeting or an assembly of men, while the *populus* may represent the political personality, some the *corpus politicum*, which are different things, in my opinion.

In an article published almost at the same time, Jeremy Catto in *Past and Present* highlighted the connection between Aquinas's socio-political theory and his practical experience (Catto, 1976). Catto stressed the conceptualization of the term *communicatio* by Albert the Great and Aquinas himself. According to Catto, this concept was initially used by Robert Grosseteste to translate an Aristotelian word *κοινωνία* from Greek into Latin. Later the term *communicatio* entered into the philosophical and theological dictionaries of Albert and his great disciple, where it was used for describing the “bonds of the association,” the necessary foundation of each society (Catto, 1976: 10). As with the Yves Congar article, I have found some discrepancies with Catto's conception, beginning in the field of terminological analysis. I think that his interpretation of the term “*societas*” as some organized human multitude is erroneous with respect to Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas, as I will show later in this paper, this concept signified the communication process, not the human congregation, but that in itself has resulted in the creation of some community.

Finally, 30 years later, in 2007, Nicholas Aroney centred his attention on some of the peculiarities of Aquinas's political theory concerning its principal concepts, i.e., the *regnum*, *provincia*, and *civitas* (Aroney, 2007). The author stressed the problem of the subsidiarity of the political orders and, maybe, for this reason, did not give enough attention to the conceptual analysis. Aroney extended the Thomistic political philosophy to the Empire, although Aquinas almost never mentioned this form of political order in his writings. Moreover, as J. Catto and other researchers have observed earlier (Catto, 1976: 8; Stetzura, 2010: 38–42), Thomas's political sympathies were on the side of the Papacy, as he tried to not be involved in the relations between the emperor and the Pope. This notwithstanding, Aroney equates the concepts of the *communitas* and the empire, using Aquinas's constructions of the first to confirm his ideas about the second.

Some minor but interesting commentaries made to the text of the treatise *De Regno* by one of its translators, Gerald Bernard Phelan (1892–1965) (Thomas Aquinas, 1949), should be added to this brief list. In his translation of the above-mentioned work of Aquinas, Phelan marked some key concepts of the Thomistic social and political philosophy, such as the *multitudo*, *communitas*, and *civitas*. Thanks to the genre of his text—this was the commented translation from Latin into English—Phelan paid more attention to the purely terminological aspects of the problem, explaining his choice of one or another

word. From another side, the extremely abbreviated format of the commentary did not give G. B. Phelan an opportunity to give his point of view on Aquinas's social theory.

This being said in total allows for the affirmation that Thomas Aquinas's social theory needs a new description. Such analysis, in turn, should begin with the review of the main concepts used by the Dominican scholar for explaining the crucial categories of sociality.

Populus and Respublica

I will begin the analysis of Aquinas's social terminology with the concept of "*populus*." This word is one of the most often used in his vocabulary, which makes its analysis rather boring. The quantity of quotations containing the word *populus* is more than 1,700, not including the more than 1,000 citations of the other authors using this term.⁸ It is significant that more than two-thirds of the quotations containing the term *populus* is used in the objective cases (first in Genitive, then Dative and Accusative). The use of this term in the Nominative case is relatively rare and, in turn, the major part of these contexts is accompanied by the verbs in the passive voice. It suggests, that for St. Thomas, the *populus* was the object of the judgement rather than an active and perceptive subject, what was common for almost all of ancient political theory. From the other side, a frequent use of *populus* along with an absence of its definition in Aquinas's texts (the unique exception is analyzed in some lines below), makes the People in his social theory a sort of empty set, a concept with almost-lost meanings.⁹

Among other mentions of People by Aquinas, the most famous, without doubt, is his definition of *populus* that figures in the first part of the Theological Summa. According to this formula, the People is the human multitude organized towards some order¹⁰ and, as Aquinas added in another place, united by the same territory of inhabitation, the unity of its laws, and the mode of its life.¹¹ This is the unique, formal definition that St. Thomas gives to the People. In some other cases, he repeats the same thought in other words (*multi homines unus populus dicuntur*),¹² but always has the objective to describe, but not to define, the People. This is entirely apparent from the passage of the first part of Summa Theologiae, where Aquinas equates the concepts of the *populus*, *exercitus* and *collegium*

8. All the calculations were made on the base of the search machine of the Corpus Thomisticum (www.corpusthomicum.org/it/index.age).

9. The indirect confirmation of this point can be found in the famous Lexicon of the Aquinas's works (Schütz, 1895), which does not include any mention of the *populus*.

10. ST, I, q. 31 a. 1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod nomen collectivum duo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, et unitatem quandam, scilicet ordinis alicuius, *populus enim est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum*. Quantum ergo ad primum, hoc nomen Trinitas convenit cum nominibus collectivis, sed quantum ad secundum differt, quia in divina Trinitate non solum est unitas ordinis, sed cum hoc est etiam unitas essentiae. See the interpretation of this text by Yves Congar (1974).

11. De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9 ad 10. Ad decimum dicendum quod sicut fluvius Sequana non est hic fluvius propter hanc aquam fluentem, sed propter hanc originem et hunc alveum, unde semper dicitur idem fluvius, licet sit alia aqua defluens; ita est idem populus non propter identitatem animae aut hominum, sed propter eandem habitationem, vel magis propter easdem leges et eundem modum vivendi, ut Aristoteles dicit in III Politic.

12. Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 6 q. 2 a. 1 ad 3; ST, I, q. 39 a. 3 co.; Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 8 n. 3. etc.

because all three are the different kinds of the human multitude's assembly.¹³ From his practical experience, the Dominican scholar certainly knew about the legislative prerogatives that the people of the different Italian cities sometimes had, but he always restricted himself to mention such possibilities without entering a sophisticated analysis.¹⁴ In turn, the introduction of the territorial argument made Aquinas's conception of the People entirely different from the precedent of the Ciceronian-Augustinian definitions.

Despite this, Thomas Aquinas sometimes addressed the Ciceronian-Augustinian definition of the People in his works. In these references, he always interpreted the *consensus juris* as a consent under the Divine Law and not as human positive laws. For example, in the Commentary on the Psalms, and more precisely, the Second Psalm, he affirmed that the People is a "*multitudo hominum juris consensu sociata*".¹⁵ He did it at this particular point to explain that only the Judaic people were really the *populus*, while the others who did not know the Divine law were *gentes*, but not the People.

One more exception is the context where the People is considered as a Church.¹⁶ In this quotation, Aquinas mentions that the meeting of the men who belong to one People can be considered as a political assembly. Thus, the affirmation that the People in its entirety is a sort of a political community is made possible. However, Aquinas never developed such an assumption or discussed the political essence of the People and, as a logical consequence, the question of the People's subjectivity. The authentication of the *populus* with the *Ecclesia* served other objectives for him. Speaking about the People-Church, he distinguished the *populus Dei* or the *populus fidelis* (either the *populus Christianus*) from other *gentes*, or the *populi infideli*.¹⁷

13. ST, I, q. 39 a. 3 co. Unde nomina significantia talem formam, si sint substantiva, praedicantur de pluribus in singulari, non autem si sint adiectiva. Dicimus enim quod multi homines sunt collegium vel exercitus aut *populus*, dicimus tamen quod plures homines sunt collegiati. In divinis autem essentia divina significatur per modum formae, ut dictum est quae quidem simplex est et maxime una, ut supra ostensum est.

14. p.e.: ST, I-II, q. 97 a. 3 ad 3. Si enim sit libera multitudo, quae possit sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad aliquid observandum, quem consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem, nisi in quantum gerit personam multitudinis. Unde licet singulae personae non possint condere legem, tamen totus *populus* legem condere potest. Si vero multitudo non habeat liberam potestatem condendi sibi legem, vel legem a superiori potestate positam removendi; tamen ipsa consuetudo in tali multitudine praevalens obtinet vim legis, in quantum per eos toleratur ad quos pertinet multitudini legem imponere, ex hoc enim ipso videntur approbare quod consuetudo induxit.

15. Super Psalmo 2, n. 1.: *Populus* est multitudo hominum juris consensu sociata. Et ideo *Judaei* dicuntur *populus*, quia cum lege et sub lege Dei sunt. Alii dicuntur *gentes*, quia non sunt sub lege Dei. Alii dicuntur *gentes*, quia non sunt sub lege Dei.

16. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 20 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 1 co.: Sed in *Ecclesia* tota est indeficientia meritorum praecipue propter meritum Christi; et ideo solus ille qui praeficitur *Ecclesiae*, potest indulgentiam elargiri. Sed cum *Ecclesia* sit congregatio fidelium; congregatio autem hominum sit duplex; scilicet oeconomicam, ut illi qui sunt de una familia; et politica, sicut illi qui sunt de uno populo; *Ecclesia* similatur congregationi politicae, quia ipse *populus* *Ecclesia* dicitur.

A detailed investigation on the concept of the *Populus ecclesiae* in the works of Thomas Aquinas see in the above-mentioned article: (Congar, 1974).

17. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 4; Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 8; ST, I-II, q. 102 a. 6; ST, II-II, q. 87 a. 1 co.; ST, II-II, q. 99 a. 1 ad 2. etc.

So, in all other cases, the People in Thomistic social theory serve only as an object which is deficient of any subjectivity, and unable to perform any political action. The people could (and should) be ruled by a king or by princes or priests.¹⁸ Aquinas sometimes interpreted the People as the king's thing,¹⁹ stressing this provocative metaphor that the People can be punished for the king's sins, and vice versa, that the king could suffer for the people's sins and crimes. Finally, using the word *populus* several times, Thomas designated the common People as opposing the aristocracy.²⁰

Thus, the People in Aquinas's socio-political theory lost its political subjectivity and became only an object of the cognition. The return of the territorial argument into the conception of *populus* (*est idem populus . . . propter eandem habitationem*) planted a bomb with a delayed action under the construction of the Augustinian political conception of the Empire. The People, considered as an organized multitude of human beings, deficient of any political personality and limited by spatial limits, was some of the possibility, or *materia* in Aristotelian terms. It necessarily required some external political organization or the forma for the conversion from the *dynamis* to the *energeia*, from the possibility to the substance. In other words, it required the State, or, in the Aquinas's terminology, the *respublica*.

Before continuing with the *respublica's* analysis in Thomas's texts, I should offer one more reservation. It is clear that Aquinas never meant the State in the modern sense of this word. He certainly knew the set expression *status regni*, but he used it only a few times, and each time in the Commentaries on the Psalms.²¹ With these words, Aquinas mainly expressed the common idea of that time, that political power within the kingdom should belong to the king personally. To describe a wholly political entity, Thomas used exactly the word *respublica* (naturally, in the sense of the Commonwealth, not the Republic), which I will analyze below.

The concept of *respublica* in Aquinas's terminology had some remarkable peculiarities. From a socio-political point of view, the *respublica*, according to Thomas, is a sort of political community.²² This is a very broad definition, because in this sense, almost every type of an assembly can be named the *respublica*, including, for example, the Church, which Aquinas sometimes defined as *respublica omnium Christianorum*.²³ The "*respubli-*

18. ST, I-II, q. 105 a. 1 s.c.; ST, II-II, q. 174 a. 6 ad 2; Quodlibet II, q. 6 a. 1 co.; Quodlibet III, q. 5 a. 2 arg. 5; etc.

19. Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 33 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5; etc.

20. Just for example see the famous definition of democracy taken from the treatise On the Rulership: De regno, l.2: Si vero iniquum regimen exerceatur per multos, democratia nuncupatur, id est potentatus populi, quando scilicet populus plebeiorum per potentiam multitudinis opprimit divites. Sic enim populus totus erit quasi unus tyrannus.

21. Super Psalmo 17, n. 28; Super Psalmo 41, n. 1; Super Psalmo 50, n. 1; about a value and signification of such citations see Skinner, 2002: 30–31.

22. ST, I-II, q. 100 a. 5 co.: respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sicut praecepta legis humanae ordinant hominem ad communitatem humanam, ita praecepta legis divinae ordinant hominem ad quandam communitatem seu rempublicam hominum sub Deo. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis in aliqua communitate bene commoretur, duo requiruntur, quorum primum est ut bene se habeat ad eum qui praeest communitati; aliud autem est ut homo bene se habeat ad alios communitatis consocios et comparticipes.

23. See for example: ST, II-II, q. 187 a. 4 co.; Contra impugnantes, pars 2 cap. 6 co.

ca” always has its good and its common good²⁴ as its final goal²⁵, which every member of the community was obliged to defend. As to the political administration of the Commonwealth, it can take diverse forms (for example, the *respublica* can be ruled by the king or emperor, or prince, or even the people) and does not have any influence upon the community’s essence.

From an ontological position, Aquinas defined the *respublica* as the form, while the group of men represented in this context is the *materia*.²⁶ The Commonwealth, according to this formula, is eternal; it was never born and it will never die. All the changes, which can be detected in the *respublica*, pertain to the temporal, material side, since one man can appear, and another can disappear. Nevertheless, all of these changes cannot affect the eternal form.

Aquinas never said anything about the people’s role in the organisation or in the legislation of the *respublica*.²⁷ This fact, along with all that has been aforesaid about the people in his socio-political theory, suggests and even affirms that the *respublica* was entirely another thing for Thomas than what it entailed, for example, for Cicero and Augustine. He used the same word for express a completely different idea. I think that it is worth to say that Aquinas described a proto-state structure under the name of *respublica* of which some of the political, spatial order, its borders, its ruler or rulers, and its final goal can be different from the aims of another *respublicae*. The People, or the multitude, in this case, is only the *materia*, the inconstant and unsteady content of an eternal form.

Multitudo

One more category of Aquinas’s social thought which deserves to be analyzed, is, without doubt, the multitude or the “*multitudo*.” For later political philosophy, this concept received the crucial importance (it is worth it to remember the Hardt and Negri’s book of the same name dedicated to the analysis of the *multitudo* in Spinozian texts). For Aquinas

24. Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 38 q. 2 a. 4 qc. 1 ad 1; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 151 n. 3; ST, I-II, q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4; ST, II-II, q. 32 a. 6 co.; Quodlibet XI, q. 10 a. 2 co.; etc.

25. Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 144 n. 4; Contra Gentiles, lib. 3 cap. 151 n. 3; Quodlibet XI, q. 10 a. 2 co.; etc.

26. Quodlibet VIII, q. 3 co. Ponit enim haec opinio quod utrumque, scilicet et quod ex alimento generatur, et quod a parentibus trahitur, indifferenter et aequaliter forma humana perficitur, et utrumque indifferenter manet vel consumitur; manet quidem secundum speciem, consumitur autem et restauratur secundum materiam. Sicut in aliqua republica diversi homines numero ad communitatem pertinent, quibusdam morientibus, et aliis in locum eorum succedentibus; et sic non manet una respublica secundum materiam, quia sunt alii et alii homines; manet tamen una numero quantum ad speciem sive formam, propter ordinis unitatem in officiis distinctis: ita etiam in corpore humano manet caro et os unaquaeque partium eadem numero quantum ad speciem et formam quae consideratur in determinato situ et virtute et figura; non autem manet quantum ad materiam: quia illa materia carnis, in qua talis forma erat, prius consumpta est, et alia in locum eius successit; sicut patet de igne qui continuatur secundum eandem formam et modum, per hoc quod consumptis quibusdam lignis alia supponuntur quae ignem sustinent. Et secundum hanc opinionem, de utroque praedictorum indifferenter, scilicet generato ex alimento et a parentibus tracto, tantum resurget, quantum est necessarium ad speciem et quantitatem debitam humani corporis.

See also the same argument in: Super Sent., lib. 4 d. 44 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 4 co.

27. The unique exception is the STh, I-II, q. 97 a. 1 co., where Aquinas cited the Augustine’s text.

nas, in turn, this concept was not so important as a technical term, although Thomas used it frequently (there are more than 3000 occurrences). The largest part of the usage interprets this word in the literal sense, as a “high number of something,” but some other cases allow for the making of further observations.

From various ontological positions, every *multitudo* in Aquinas’s theory is formed from diverse unities²⁸ and, at the same time, could be reduced to a unity and, sometimes, opposed to it.²⁹ Such an interpretation transferred to the field of social theory gives an image of the multitude as a congregation of autonomous individuals,³⁰ which, in turn, becomes some sort of a whole.

In Thomas’s socio-political language, the *multitudo* served as one of the principal synonyms for the concept of People. As mentioned above, the *populus*, according to the definition given by Aquinas, was no more than the human multitude organized towards some order.³¹ In order to make a more penetrating analysis of this word, it seems possible to pick out six additional smaller groups from the citations, each of them containing a one word-combination using the term *multitudo*: M. humana; M. hominum; M. civilis; M. domestica; M. civitatis; and M. populi. It is worth noting that the combinations like M. regni, M. provinciae, M. imperii or even the M. politica were never used by Aquinas, what indicates, among other ideas, a non-political nature of the multitude, and its pertinence to the pure social sphere.

The concepts of the human multitude (M. humana) and the multitude of men (M. hominum) are similar enough to allow analyzing them as one. First of all, I will omit all the multiple citations, where the “multitude of men” was used by Aquinas to designate only a large quantity of people but no more. As for the rest, Thomas used the construction *multitudo hominum* most often to describe the human community. In some texts, he also stressed that all the men within the frame of the multitude are diverse,³² and that their goals are also different. However, there were two principal aspects where Aquinas emphasized the unity of the human multitude. The first of these modes of discussion can be defined as “ethical,” while the other can be defined as “political.”

28. Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 24 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5: Praeterea, privatio nunquam constituit habitum, nec e converso et similiter nec affirmatio negationem, nec unum contrariorum alterum. Sed multitudo constituitur ex unitatibus. Ergo videtur quod unitas non privet multitudinem, nec e converso.

29. Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 2 q. 1 a. 1 co: Respondeo dicendum, quod cum omnis multitudo procedat ab unitate aliqua, ut dicit Dionysius, oportet universitatis multitudinem ad unum principium entium primum reduci, quod est Deus; hoc enim et fides supponit et ratio demonstrat.

30. See for ex.: Sentencia De sensu, tract. 1 l. 8 n. 9.

31. ST, I, q. 31 a. 1 ad 2, etc.

32. In De divinis nominibus, cap. 12 pr.: ...Per nomen regni datur intelligi non unius tantum directio, sed totius multitudinis humanae, quae quidem non est uniformis, sed habens multas varietates secundum diversas hominum condiciones et diversa officia, quae ad bonum statum multitudinis pertinent, ideo, quamvis sit unus communis totius multitudinis finis, tamen sunt multi et differentes diversorum fines particulares; puta: medici, sanitas; militis, victoria; oeconomici, divitiae; et sic de aliis. Ad consequendum autem diversos fines, necesse est homines diversas facultates habere ex diversis bonis quibus oriuntur et diversis legibus regulari: aliae enim leges imponendae sunt militi; aliae emptori; aliae venditori; et sic de aliis. (see also Sentencia Politic., lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5; Sentencia Politic., lib. 2 l. 5 n. 6).

First, the men who form the multitude, says Thomas, have some common points, such as common needs,³³ a common weakness for temporal and corporal goods,³⁴ and, what is more important, common moral imperfections. The multitude, for its major part, consists of imperfect and vicious men, whose circumstances determine the quality of human laws. The latter neither can be bound to high morality actions nor forbid all illicit acts. The human legislation's main goal, according to Aquinas's position, is to forbid only the most harmful actions, allowing, at the same time, some minor offences because any human multitude can hardly exist without them.³⁵

On the other hand, within the framework of the interpretation of the human multitude as a political object, Aquinas noticed that it ought to be united by the bonds of peace³⁶ and by the enjoyment of Divine goods as a common goal.³⁷ If the ties of this kind do not exist, the multitude begins to destroy itself. Without inner peace, the members of the multitude start to persecute one other and, as a consequence, will be afraid of each other. Aquinas does not use the formula *bellum omnium contra omnes*, but he describes this situation, for example, in his Commentary to the Book of Job,³⁸ among other works. The existence of such bonds supposes, on the one hand, the common goal's presence and, on the other, the appearance of the governor of any kind.³⁹ The latter is necessary because only the emergence of the political power as some sort of the *vis* (or *virtus*) *regitiva* can transform the multitude into a political object. This assumption is substantiated by Aquinas

33. *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3 cap. 136 n. 9: In his autem quae necessaria sunt multitudini, non oportet quod cuilibet de multitudine attribuat: neque etiam est possibile. Patet enim multa esse necessaria multitudini hominum, ut cibus, potus, vestimentum, domus, et alia huiusmodi, quae impossibile est quod per unum procurentur. Et ideo oportet diversorum esse diversa officia: sicut et in corpore diversa membra ad diversos actus ordinantur. (see also DRG, I.1)

34. *Sententia Ethic.*, lib. 9 l. 8 n. 9: Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui in opprobrium reputant esse amatorem sui, illos vocant sui amatores, qui tribuunt sibiipsis plus in bonis corporalibus, scilicet in pecuniis, et honoribus, et in delectationibus corporalibus, quales sunt ciborum et venereorum. Huiusmodi enim bona multitudo hominum appetit. Et attendunt ad ipsa homines, ac si essent optima. (see also: *Sententia Ethic.*, lib. 9 l. 12 n. 6; *Sententia Ethic.*, lib. 10 l. 10 n. 12; and *Sententia Ethic.*, lib. 10 l. 13 n. 6).

35. *Quodlibet II*, q. 5 a. 2 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum, quod praecepta legis sunt ductiva ad perfectam virtutem: tamen actus perfectae virtutis non cadunt sub praecepto legis humanae; sed prohibet quaedam graviora, ut gradatim homines retracti a malis per seipsos ad virtutem exercentur. Permittit autem quaedam minora peccata, eis poenam non infligens, quia sine his non facile invenitur hominum multitudo; et de talibus est deceptio quae est inter vendentes et ementes: quia plurimi sunt qui volunt vili emere et care vendere, ut Augustinus dicit in *Lib. de Trin.* (see also: *ST*, I-II, q. 96 a. 2 co.)

36. *De regno*, lib. 1 cap. 16 co.: Secundo, ut multitudo vinculo pacis unita dirigatur ad bene agendum. Sicut enim homo nihil bene agere potest nisi praesupposita suarum partium unitate, ita hominum multitudo pacis unitate carens, dum impugnat se ipsam, impeditur a bene agendo. Tertio vero requiritur ut per regentis industriam necessariorum ad bene vivendum adsit sufficiens copia.

37. *De regno*, lib. 1 cap. 15 co.

38. *Cfr.*: *Super Iob*, cap. 31.

39. *Cfr.* for example: *De regno*, lib. 1 cap. 3 co.; *Sententia Politic.*, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5.

nas's reference to human nature, which is political,⁴⁰ and by his note on the politic as a directive principle of any human multitude.⁴¹

Furthermore, the main difference between the simple human multitude and the civil multitude (*multitudo civilis*) is that the latter is the *multitudo ordinata*; the same can be said about the domestic multitude or the household, which is the necessary part of the former.⁴² Each ordered multitude, beginning from the human individual, makes part of some other of greater size: so, some persons form the household, from the latter's assembly, in turn, appears the city, the union of the cities creates the province or the kingdom, and so on. Here Aquinas follows Aristoteles, but does not limit himself with the concept of the city or polis, including the whole world can be interpreted in his theory as a well-ordered multitude. However it is clear that in Aquinas's theory, the order is not enough for create the political multitude, but it should be completed with the convenient goal. Finally, with the concept of *multitudo civitatis*, Aquinas always described the population of the city, sometimes stressing its quantity,⁴³ in the same way he used the word-combination "citizen's multitude" (*multitudo civium*),⁴⁴ and the *multitudo populi* (the latter, certainly, with respect to all the people).⁴⁵

Concluding Remarks

In concluding this first part of the investigation of Aquinas's social philosophy, I would like to reiterate some points that have a crucial importance for understanding the political and social theory of the great Dominican thinker.

First of all, the introduction of the Aristotelian argument in the theory of the *populus* broke the old paradigm of political thought represented by Marc T. Cicero and Aurelius Augustin. For Cicero, the people was a sort of civil assembly united by the common sense of justice, while for Augustin, the multitude had some common object of their love. The

40. Sententia Politic., lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5: Quaecumque sunt ex pluribus constituta, in his est aliquid principans et aliquid subiectum naturaliter, et hoc expedit. Sed hominum multitudo est ex pluribus constituta: ergo naturale est et expediens quod unus principetur et alius subiiciatur. Huius autem rationis minor manifesta est ex praemissis: in quibus ostensum est quod homo est naturaliter animal politicum, et ita naturale est quod ex multis hominibus constituatur una multitudo.

41. Sententia Ethic., lib. 6 l. 6 n. 5: Oportet autem esse solam unam sapientiam, quia ad eam pertinet considerare ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus. Unde relinquitur, quod politica, quae est gubernativa humanae multitudinis, non potest esse sapientia simpliciter; et multo minus prudentia communiter dicta, quae est gubernativa unius.

42. ST, III, q. 8 a. 1 ad 2: Capitis igitur naturalis non est caput aliud, quia corpus humanum non est pars alterius corporis. Sed corpus similitudinarie dictum, idest aliqua multitudo ordinata, est pars alterius multitudinis, sicut multitudo domestica est pars multitudinis civilis. Et ideo paterfamilias, qui est caput multitudinis domesticae, habet super se caput rectorem civitatis. (see also: Sententia Ethic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 4; Sententia Ethic., lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5).

43. Sententia Politic., lib. 2 l. 5 n. 5; Sententia Politic., lib. 2 l. 5 n. 6; Sententia Politic., lib. 2 l. 7 n. 2; Sententia Ethic., lib. 9 l. 12 n. 5.

44. Sententia Politic., lib. 2 passim.

45. ST, II-II, q. 69 a. 2 ad 1; ST, III, q. 80 a. 12 co.; Super Isaiam, cap. 9 l. 2; Super Psalmo 3, n. 4; Super I Cor., cap. 11 vs. 7; etc.

Ciceronian beliefs were the foundations for the Republican theory, while the Augustinian philosophy was the basis for political emotionalism and classic imperialistic thought. The social theory of Aquinas gave another view of the *populus* as the de-subjectified multitude united by the territory and the mode of life. In other words, for Aquinas, the people could be only the *materia*, while its form was the Commonwealth or *respublica*.

Furthermore, the concept of “*respublica*” in Thomas’s theory was completely separated from that of the *populus*. The Dominican theologian never mentioned that the *respublica* was created by the people or even ruled by it. In fact, the Commonwealth described by Aquinas was some formal spatial order, inside which the *populus* or the *multitudo* existed.

It follows that the place occupied by the people in the Ciceronian-Augustinian paradigm remained empty in Thomistic theory. Some other social substance should take up this position of the active social and political subject. As I will show in the next section of this research, this area was occupied by the concept of the *communitas*.

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От народа к общности: описание социального порядка Фомой Аквинским. Часть 1: *Populus, Respublica, Multitudo*

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В рамках данной статьи анализируются основные категории социальной философии Фомы Аквинского, такие, как народ (*populus*), совокупность (*multitudo*) государство/республика (*Respublica*). В следующей статье (Часть 2) будет представлено исследование понятий общность (*communitas/communicatio*) и общество (*societas*). Обращает на себя внимание серьезный дефицит исследовательской литературы по социальной мысли Аквината. Учеными в основном осмысляется политическая мысль великого доминиканца, в то время, как социальная остается практически забытой. Работы И. Т. Эшмана, И. Конгара, Дж. Катто, представляющие собой исключение из этого утверждения, подробно анализируются в статье. Среди основных результатов проведенного исследования можно указать следующие. Во-первых, для философии Фомы характерна десемантизация понятия «народ», которое, по сути, уравнивается в значении с понятием «совокупность», что приводит к потере связи между понятиями народа и республики. Народ в теории Аквината теряет свое политическое значение, характерное для теорий Цицерона и Августина, господствовавших в политико-социальной мысли предшествовавшего периода. Взамен народ определяется как совокупность людей, проживающих на определенной территории и объединенных общими законами и общим образом жизни. В онтологическом смысле, народ определяется Фомой как материя, тогда как *Respublica* как форма. По сути дела, Аквинат формулирует одну из первых теорий протогосударства.

Ключевые слова: Фома Аквинский, социальная теория, народ, республика, государство, совокупность

The Temporal Structure of the Activities of Priests and the Substantive Effects of Religious Life in Contemporary Russia*

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The article employs theoretical perspective of religious market to discuss the gap between the indicators of religious identification (69%) and indicators of engagement in religious practices (3%) in contemporary Russian society and the linked issue of insignificant influence of religiosity on population values and behavior according to mass surveys data. As the subsample of practicing Orthodox Christians demonstrates that religiosity has a very strong influence on values, marriages and reproductive behavior, rates of social diseases, etc. (I. Zabaev, E. Prutskova, D. Oreshina), the absence of religiosity effects in mass surveys data demands deeper investigation. Majority of studies interpret the gap between religious identification and participation in religious practices in the perspective of the secularization theory. We suggest reinterpretation of religious processes in Russia within the framework of the religious supply-side model. On the basis of the theory of religious economy (R. Stark, W. S. Bainbridge, R. Finke, L. Iannaccone, and others) we develop model of the religious market in the countries with religious monopoly. Depending on the average time spent on the confession, we model different evaluations of the religious market supply-side. Our analysis reveals that religious supply in Russia is significantly restricted by inaccessibility of given population of priests for regular participation in confession. The model of religious supply suggests the alternative to mainstream secularization discourse hypothesis for the explanation of the gap between Orthodox Christian identification and participation in confession and communion practices in contemporary Russia.

Keywords: measurements of religiosity, secularization, theory of religious market, model of religious supply, priest's time budget, social effects of religion, Russian Orthodox Church

Introduction: The Problem of the Lack of Dynamics among Practicing Believers in the Russian Sociology of Religion

The results of sociological studies carried out by the Institute of Socio-Political Research of RAS, the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the Levada-Center, and others show a significant gap between those who identify themselves with Orthodox Christianity (between 60% and 80%, according to various surveys) and practicing church-going Orthodox Christians, estimated from 3% to 15% of the population regularly attending church services, going to confession,

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
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and taking communion (Zorkaya, 2009; Kaariainen, Furman, 2007; Sinelina, 2006, 2013; Chesnokova, 2005).

Figure 1. Dynamics of those who consider themselves Orthodox Christians and those who regularly take Communion, 1991–2010 (Levada-Center, 2011)



Considering that the number of priests in the Russian Orthodox Church has more than quadrupled from 6,674 in 1988 to 27,216 in 2008, and the number of parishes has grown 4.25 times from 6,893 to 29,263 for the same period¹, the simple explanation associated with the availability of parishes cannot be accepted as satisfactory.

The result seems to be rather negative in the cases when the studies included additional questions for detecting the influence of religion on other areas, since the impact of religiosity was practically indiscernible (Prutskova, 2015). The available analytical tools do not make it possible to observe the growing social importance of religion with a significant increase in religious self-identity.

The tendency taking hold in Russian sociology in explaining the growth of religious identity can be formulated in the following way: those who call themselves Orthodox Christians in Russia are not the actual believers. By calling themselves “Orthodox Christians,” they rather indicate their identity as subjects of the state (Zorkaya, 2009: 65), and their national and ethnic identity.² K. Kaariainen and D. Furman wrote about the “pro-

1. This number of priests in the entire canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church includes the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the clergy serving in other countries (Kirill, Metropolitan of Smolensk, 2009).

2. Thus, V. Karpov, E. Lisovskaya, and D. Barry describe the phenomenon of “ethnodoxy,” a mixed religious and ethnic identity typical for the Russians: “Ethnodoxy: a collectively held belief system that rigidly links a group’s ethnic identity to its dominant faith” (Karpov, Lisovskaya, Barry, 2012: 644).

Orthodox consensus,” a positive attitude towards religion and the Russian Orthodox Church formed in the public consciousness, expressed in terms of confidence in the ROC and the growth of religious identity, but unaccompanied by an increase in religious practices and personal faith in God (Filatov, Lunkin, 2005: 44). M. Mchedlova noted some differences between Russian believers and non-believers, but these differences rarely transcended the boundaries of confidence intervals. This can also be explained by the gap between high level of self-identification with Orthodox Christianity and the low level of practicing religious life, which is behind this self-identification (Mchedlova, 2009: 83).

V. Lokosov and Y. Sinelina noted the validity of explaining confessional self-identity with socio-cultural and ethnic factors, but made the reservation that such theories did not account for the difference in the paces of quantitative and qualitative changes in the level of religiosity. They predict that the extensive capacity for growth in the level of religiosity in Russia is about to reach its limit, while the next step of intensive growth (the churching of the population, and engaging the population into religious practices) will require much more time. They write: “The level of religiosity has ‘used up’ the extensive capacity for growth and is reaching its natural limit, which, in our opinion, is about 80%. Further intensive growth—the churching of the population—is beginning, which also has its limitations” (Lokosov, Sinelina, 2008: 137).

These explanations are based on the assumption of the secular nature of religious processes. Research of secularization in the twentieth century has led to the understanding of how both the term “secularization” and the processes designated by it are contradictory and ambiguous. By the 1970s, this notion became the ruling dogma in the sociology of religion. In the 1960s, B. Wilson defined secularization as “The process whereby religious thinking, practices and institutions lose their social significance” (Wilson, 1966: XIV). At the same time, Wilson’s understanding of secularization transcends the scope of this definition, implying not only the loss of the social significance of religion, but also that the decline of faith that cannot evolve in the contemporary rationalized and pluralistic world. A similar position was expressed by P. Berger (Uzlaner, 2008).

By the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that the idea of the gradual disappearance of religion, the irreversibility of secularization, and the decline of religion depending on the degree of modernization of the society was absolutely wrong, and was refuted by indisputable facts (Berger, 2012). Secularization ceased to be understood as a global process which can give a universal answer to the question of the impact of modernity on religion. Moreover, it was becoming evident that it was necessary to raise the question of the reverse process of the influence of religion on the formation of modernity. S. Eisenstadt’s concept of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2000), based on the notion of the fundamental heterogeneity of modernity and its dependence on civilizational contexts, makes it impossible to simply place religious life into the secular worldview (Uzlaner, 2012: 22). An approach to the study of the correlation between modernity and religion from the viewpoint of the theory of rational choice (the theory of religious market) was offered in the late 1990s. This approach makes it possible to draw conclusions which are directly opposite to those which follow from the theory of secularization (see,

for example, Stark, Bainbridge, 1987; Stark, Iannaccone, 1994). Unfortunately, this approach is not reflected in the Russian mainstream sociology of religion.

A more complex picture of the situation in Russia emerges from the studies of the internal mechanisms of religiosity. Following the ideas of R. Stark about religion as a “social structure” (Stark, 1996), E. Prutskova showed that early religious socialization³ had a significant impact on the fundamental values of European countries (Prutskova, 2013). Among European countries, Russia ranks last with its 6% level of early religious socialization.⁴ This fact gives grounds in suggesting that the social effects of religiosity can only result from a slow process of overcoming the consequences of forced secularization (Prutskova, 2015: 77).

The method of social network analysis (Zabaev, Prutskova, 2013; Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2014) can demonstrate the importance of the social network of parish communities as an instrument of influence of religiosity on behavioral attitudes, including those outside of religious communities. The key factor is not the level of individual religiosity, but the strength of such connections, as well as the size and type of the social network of religious communities (Zabaev, Prutskova, 2013: 132). The study of strong Moscow communities (Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2012: 37–40) shows that the influence of individual religiosity is particularly evident in the core and periphery of the community.⁵ This conclusion assesses the dynamics of religiosity in contemporary Russian society as a complex and slow process, directly dependent on the formation of church communities.

A discussion of the presence or absence of the social effects of religion in contemporary Russian society requires alternative approaches that takes both the specific measurements of Orthodox Christian religiosity in the Russian context, a set of factors which inhibit or facilitate the engagement of believers into religious practices, and the expression of social effects emerging from that religiosity into account. The development of such an approach is the goal of this article.

Objectives

This article is aimed at developing a model for assessing religious supply in Russia.

The main part of the article (1) provides an overview of the theory of religious economy and models for assessing religious supply in the countries with a competitive religious market and countries with religious monopoly; (2) describes the indicators which define

3. Early religious socialization was evaluated according to the practice of attending religious services at the age of 12. Such a question was asked in the European Values Study.

4. As opposed to 14% in Georgia, 62% in Western Germany, 63% in France, and 93% in Poland (European Values Study–2008).

5. Presently (in the early twenty-first century), the parish of an Orthodox Church can be divided into three parts: (1) the community core, (2) the community periphery, and (3) the extra-parochial Orthodox Christians. The three following groups of criteria can be applied in identifying a person as belonging to a specific part of a parish: (a) participation in religious practices (taking communion, attending church services, and so on), (b) self-identification as a member of the community, and (c) participation in the extra-liturgical activities of the parish (or awareness of them) (Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2012: 7).

the religious supply of the dominant confession in contemporary Russia (the number of priests and the orientation of the priestly action), as well as indicators of the level of the population's engagement in religious practices (going to confession and taking communion); (3) presents a model for assessing religious supply, depending on the type of parishioners and the average time of confession (communication with the priest). In the conclusion (4), we propose a hypothesis to explain the gap between the identification as Orthodox Christians and the engagement into the practices of confession and communion. In the section "Discussion," we will discuss the limitations and possible extensions of the proposed model.

A Model for Assessing Religious Supply in Russia

Religious Economics: A Theory of Religious Mobilization and the Supply Model

In the 1990s, R. Stark, R. Finke, W. Bainbridge, L. Iannaccone, S. R. Warner, and several other scholars proposed an approach to the study of the interrelation of modernity and religion, based on the theory of rational choice (Stark, Bainbridge, 1987; Stark, Iannaccone, 1994). The basis of this approach was the idea of religious market. Stark and Iannaccone introduced the concept of religious companies and religious economy: "Religious economy consists of all religious activities, operating in any society. Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market of current and potential customers, a set of firms serving that market, and religious 'product lines' offered by various firms" (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994: 232). Additionally, the authors proposed the theory of religious mobilization consisting of seven assumptions describing religious economy, and placing the main emphasis on the behavior of "religious firms," not on "religious consumers." This makes it possible to assess the level of possible religious mobilization depending on the supply in the religious market. The main thesis of this theory is the assumption that "to the degree that a religious economy is competitive and pluralistic, overall levels of religious participation will tend to be high. Conversely, to the degree that a religious economy is monopolized by one or two state-supported firms, overall levels of participation will tend to be low" (ibid.: 233).

Preliminary testing of the model reveals that countries with high levels of regulation⁶ and high monopolization of the religious market⁷ show less religious engagement, simply operationalized as weekly church attendance (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994: 240–241).

6. M. Chaves and D. Cann evaluated the degree of regulation of religious economy in eighteen countries on the scale from 0 to 6, using six measuring items: "(a) there is a single, officially designated state church, (b) there is official state recognition of some denominations but not others, (c) the state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders, (d) the state directly pays church personnel salaries, (e) there is a system of ecclesiastical tax collection, and (f) the state directly subsidizes, beyond mere tax breaks, the operating, maintenance, or capital expenses for churches" (Chaves, Cann, 1992: 280).

7. Monopolization of the religious market was operationalized by the Herfindahl Index which is applied to the economic analysis of markets. $H = S_1^2 + S_2^2 + \dots + S_N^2$, where S_X is the share of those engaged in the Church X in the total amount of the engaged people in all Churches ("religious firms"), active in the given territory. The Herfindahl Index ranges between 1 and $1/N$, where N is the total number of Churches ("religious

A Model of Supply in the Conditions of Religious Monopoly

The model of religious market describes the American situation well, where there is a zero index of religious market regulation, and a wide variety of competing Protestant Churches with an easy and repeated transition of adherents between the Churches throughout their lifetimes. However, there are some studies which give examples of the effective application of this model in countries with a rigid regulation of the religious market and a high degree of its monopolization. E. Hamberg and T. Pettersson use the model of religious market for studying the religious situation in Sweden (Hamberg, Pettersson, 1994). In 1990 the Church of Sweden was practically a monopolist in the religious market. Over 90% of the population considered themselves to be members of this Church, while only 4% went to church every week. Until 2000 the Church of Sweden was a state Church with very strong direct management and support.

In Sweden, 2,550 parishes distributed over 284 municipalities were taken as the units of analysis. In each municipality, the study evaluated (1) the number of religious services a year *per capita* and (2) the diversity of religious services.⁸ As a result, each parish and each municipality was distributed according to the following four types in relation to the median values across all parishes:

	Few services	Many services
Dominated by traditional types of services	1. Few and mostly traditional services	2. Many and mostly traditional services
Dominated by alternative types of services	3. Few and varied types of services	4. Many and varied types of services

The level of engagement as a percentage of weekly church attendance in each municipality was taken as a dependent variable. The result showed a positive and stable dependence of the level of engagement from the type of municipality under controlled socio-economic indicators. The engagement was higher in the municipalities with many and more varied services *per capita* of the fourth type, and services not limited to the traditional types.⁹

firms”). The higher the Herfindahl Index is, the higher is the monopolization of the market. The index equals 1 in the conditions of absolute monopolization by a single “religious firm.”

8. Both indicators—frequency and type of divine service—were rigorously recorded in official Church statistics. At the time of the study, the Church of Sweden had about ten different types of services which could be divided into traditional and alternative, introduced in a relatively recent times (Hamberg, Pettersson, 1994: 211).

9. The results of the analysis may cause many complaints and questions. The authors themselves recognized that one could not assert direct dependence of the level of demand on the level of supply. It is possible to interpret the data in the opposite direction: the variability of the supply is higher where the demand is higher. At the same time, the authors believe that in fact the supply precedes the demand, and it is possible to prove it (Hamberg, Pettersson, 1994: 213).

Thus, the Russian situation of a gap between religious self-identity and religious practices is not unique in the world. According to Hamberg and Pettersson, the situation in Sweden in the late 1990's was characterized by an even more striking gap between the 90% of the population who affiliated themselves with the state Church of Sweden and the 4% of those who regularly attended divine service. G. Davie raises the problem of the reduction in the number of those attending church services in England, which is not accompanied by a drop in the number of believers (Davie, 1990).¹⁰

However, even with the external similarity of the situations in Russia and in some Western countries, the situations differ significantly. In addition to the differences in the content of religious life, it is obvious that the current religious situation in Russia remains strictly conditioned by the previous period of forced secularization associated with persecutions and ideological repressions. The application of concepts and approaches, elaborated for the countries of Western Europe and the Americas, requires caution and substantial clarifications.

Indicators of the Model for Assessing Religious Supply in Russia

The model of religious supply elaborated by Hamberg and Pettersson makes it possible to pose the question about the impact of religious supply on the level of engagement in religious practices of the dominant denomination, though requiring significant modifications.

A specific feature of the Russian Orthodox Church is that a significant indicator of religious supply is not the number of services or parishes, but the number of priests *per capita* of potential parishioners. Another scale for assessing religious supply will be not the variation of services, but the orientation of the priest toward the ministry or performing sacraments of the Church. The level of engagement is determined by the frequency of participation in the practices of confession and communion.¹¹

Therefore, the model of religious supply for Russia should describe the level of engagement of believers of religious practices depending on two indicators, those of the number of priests, and the available time which the priest has for confession and conversations with people.

Indicators of Parishioners' Engagement: Frequency of Going to Confession, Taking Communion, and Attending Church Services

Russian sociology has several approaches to the classification of Orthodox Christian believers depending on the degree of their engagement in Church life. In accordance with

10. A. Day (2011) polemicizes with her.

11. This thesis is associated with two factors. Firstly, according to the practice of the Russian Orthodox Church, participation in the sacrament of communion is possible only after confession. Confession is administered only individually and requires personal communication with the priest. Secondly, taking communion is the indicative factor for assessing individual religiosity. Therefore, the possibility for individual communication with the priest and the priest's readiness for such communication is exactly the determining factor which limits the religious supply. The article will provide all necessary justifications and explanations below.

the methodology of V. Chesnokova, believers can be divided into five groups based on five scales of being in church: going to church, going to confession and taking communion, reading the Gospels, praying, and keeping fasts (Chesnokova, 2005). The two scales of going to church and going to confession and taking communion differ in their content and method of measurement. These scales are associated with *public worship* and are frequency-oriented (once a month or more frequently, several times a year but less frequently than once a month, definitely once a year, rarely, occasionally, every few years, never in the age of reason). The other three scales describe individual practices and focus not on the frequency of specific religious practice, but on how it is expressed (Sinolina, 2013: 110).

Another typology of Orthodox Christian believers was proposed by Zabaev, Oreshina, and Prutskova (2012: 7–8). Based on the studies in the sociology of parishes in Europe and the USA (Oreshina, 2010a, 2010b), they proposed using three groups of criteria: (a) participation in religious practices (taking communion, attending church services), (b) self-identification as a member of the community, and (c) awareness about the life of the parish and lives of the parishioners. The authors identify three types of believers: community core, community periphery, and Orthodox Christians who are not a part of the parish community (Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2012: 8). An important result was the discovery of the fact that a number of indicators, such as the behavior of the family, the share of those in a registered marriage, the number of children, the level of social diseases, and the understanding of patriotism, differ significantly from the general national numbers both in the core and in the periphery of the community (ibid.: 37–40). Again, the determining factor of this typology was the frequency of *taking communion* and *attending church services*, since even in the periphery of the community, the number of those who attended church services several times a year and more often was almost 98%, and the number of those who took communion one to two times a year, or more often, was 76% (ibid.: 10–11).

These two indicators of attending church services and taking communion have rigid external constraints in terms of religious supply. Attending church services is rigidly restricted by the availability of a permanently operating church within walking distance, or at least within reach, with sufficient capacity regarding the potential number of parishioners.

Taking communion is only possible after confession, except in very rare cases of frequent communion (more than once a week) while maintaining a mandatory weekly confession. Confession may be very brief, but it always and fundamentally requires individual contact with the priest.¹² Confession and communion are limited by the availability of priests, which primarily depends on the ratio of the number of priests to the number of parishioners.

12. See, “On the Participation of the Faithful in the Eucharist,” approved at the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on February 3, 2015 (Russian Orthodox Church, 2015).

Indicators of Religious Supply: The Orientation of Priestly Actions and the Structure of a Priest's Time Budget

From the perspective of religious supply, the opportunity for regular confession and communion requires an assessment of time-costs of the priest relative to the number of the parishioners. This assessment faces a number of challenges and can only be done on the basis of several important assumptions and limitations.

TWO COMPONENTS OF PRIESTHOOD AND PRIESTLY ACTION

Analysis of the current practice of confession shows its extraordinary complexity and diversity (see Vorobiev, 1997). Confession can take place in the church and outside of it, during and in connection with the church service, and outside of this connection. The practice of confession is highly dependent on the priest, his pastoral tradition, and even the practice of a specific church and community (see Vorobiev, 2000).

The analysis of confession is further complicated by the fact that it always involves some related actions and meanings. For example, confession, as a rule, involves subsequent communion, but not always. Moreover, such an association is not normative (Russian Orthodox Church, 2015). On the other hand, any pastoral action is always related to the issues of two principal components of priesthood, those of pastoral care and administration of the sacraments,¹³ which are always connected and related to each other.¹⁴ In

13. The Orthodox Christian understanding of the priesthood fundamentally emphasizes two of its sides, administering sacraments, and pastoral care: "The priesthood is the Sacrament in which the Holy Spirit entitles the correctly chosen [candidate] to *administer the sacraments and shepherd* (highlighted by the author) Christ's flock" (Filaret [Drozdov], 2006). Administering the Sacraments corresponds to the notion of the "appearance of Christ," when the priest acts only as a "servant of Christ" and the "agent of the Mysteries of God," whose true performer is Christ (1 Cor. 4: 1). Shepherding corresponds to the notion of "community leadership" and goes back to the Gospels' image of the shepherd and the flock of which the priest must "take heed" and "watch" (Acts 20: 28). Each of these aspects of priesthood is its integral component. The initial distinction between these two modes of action is associated with the accentuation of one of the components of the priesthood. The mode of action which focuses on performing divine service, administering Sacraments and prayers on request is based on the self-understanding of its function as the "manifestation of Christ" by the priest. A pastoral mode of action emphasizes the ministry, but first of all, the practice of pastoral care [lit. "care of souls"]. It is based on the understanding by the priest of his function in the Church as a "community leader."

14. Administering sacraments and pastoral care are two components of the priestly ministry, in a sense, orthogonal to each other. Administering sacraments determines the place of the priest in the Church, while pastoral care defines his position in the world. It is exactly the interaction of these two components that marks the specific action of the priest. While the administering of sacraments is objectified through the very notion of the sacrament and can be observed through the performance of a strictly defined set of rites, the definition of pastoral care raises serious difficulties. Pastoral care is associated with the management of the ecclesial community, that is, it includes the concept of authority and responsibility for the other, and can be carried out in relation to the individual person and the community as a whole. Pastoral action in relation to the individual person is usually referred to as *dushepopechenie* ("the care of souls"). The care of souls in the proper sense of the word refers to pastoral action (that is, the action produced by the authority of the priest and implying responsibility for the other): (1) active and conscious, (2) directed to a specific person (that is, entailing the establishment of personal relationship), (3) responding to this person's specific request (about his internal state or pain), (4) helping to solve a specific problem (aimed at his internal change), and (5) directed to the future (that is, implying continued personal relationship with the person in the prospect of his future life). It is easy to see that in this sense, any conversation of a priest with any person can, in practice, often have the nature of the "care of souls." Moreover, the care of souls can also be carried out without verbal communication.

the situation of confession, these two components may, in a sense, become opposed to each other.

Confession is always a sacrament and its administration in the ecclesiastical consciousness has a self-sufficient and objective nature.¹⁵ An extreme manifestation accentuating the objective nature of this sacrament is the practice of “general confession.” This practice originated and was possible only in extraordinary circumstances,¹⁶ and today is recognized as an unacceptable distortion of pastoral care (Vorobiev, 1997: 17). In that case, confession is reduced to a formal administering of the sacrament, which excludes the care of souls and personal contact with the priest.¹⁷

The opposite extreme of pastoral action in relation to confession is the so-called “mladostarchestvo,” that is, the abuse of pastoral power manifested in an irresponsible emphasis on obedience to the priest. This practice has been repeatedly subjected to extremely harsh criticism of the church hierarchy.¹⁸ In this case, confession is reduced to a subjective communication with the priest excluding free participation in the sacrament which is understood as the personal standing before God.

THE STRUCTURE OF A PRIEST’S TIME BUDGET

Estimation of the time spent on an individual parishioner requires careful research into priests’ time budgets. In addition, information about the structure of Orthodox Christian worship and cycles of Orthodox Christian life, as well as a number of previous and ongoing field studies¹⁹ allow us to make the following observations. These observations are associated with the *structure of a priest’s time budget* and primarily depend on the organization of the service, and therefore can be generalized regardless of the specific features of the priest and parish. Quantitative evaluations of these time costs can significantly vary.

Constant parishioners who take communion more than once a month usually confess only in connection with the evening service on Saturday and the morning service on Sunday. Believers of this type tend to strictly observe the rule of compulsory attendance

15. In the sacrament of confession, “the person who confesses his sins, with the visible testimony (expression of will) of forgiveness from the priest, has his sins invisibly forgiven by the Lord Jesus Christ Himself” (Filaret [Drozdov], 2006).

16. This practice has emerged due to the obvious lack of priests and the persecution during the Soviet period (Vorobiev, 2000: 301–302).

17. By the very meaning of the sacrament, confession can only be individual. Its beginning is described in the *Trebnik* as follows: “The spiritual father brings the person who wants to confess alone, not two or many . . .” (Moscow Patriarchate, 1991: 71). Cf., for example, Grigory (Chukov), Metropolitan, 1954.

18. The Holy Synod issued a special Statement “On the cases of abuse of power to ‘bind and loose’ (Mat. 18:18) given to priests from God on the part of some priests, which has recently increased” (mospat.ru/archive/1999/02/sr291281). See also the report of the Anniversary of the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13–16, 2000 (mospat.ru/archive/page/sobors/2000-2/369.html).

19. We mean the data from the completed and ongoing empirical studies of the Sociology of Religion Laboratory at St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University, such as the “Organization of Social Activities in the Parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Sociological Analysis” (2012–2013, supported by the Russian Foundation for Humanities), “Ways of Pastoral Action: Analysis of Priests’ Time Budgets,” and “The Liturgical Ledger of the Priest (Case Study)” (accomplished within the framework of Research Program of the Foundation for the Development of St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University in 2016).

of Saturday and Sunday services and, moreover, they come to the services of all major feasts. In this mode of attending divine service, it becomes almost impossible to come to the church regularly for confession at some other time.

Parishioners who take communion several times a year are divided into two groups. Some come to church only on major feasts, and thus the time for their possible confession is even shorter than for the previous group. Others feel uncomfortable (Zabaev, 2011) at services on major feasts due to the large number of parishioners in the church, and attend specially on weekdays, which is possible to combine with their working schedule several times a year.

Finally, those who take communion once a year or less can come to church any day, although a part of such parishioners come to church on the greatest annual feasts of the Nativity or Easter, when the time for confession is limited to the greatest extent.

The overwhelming majority of the priests serve in their parishes alone²⁰ and are forced to conduct the divine service and hear confessions simultaneously, or set aside some time before and after the service for hearing confessions. In practice, this time is limited to 1 hour in the morning and 1 or 2 hours in the evening on weekdays. This time can be increased to 2 to 6 hours on Saturday nights, and remains 1 to 3 hours on Sunday mornings. In the conditions of the present-day parish, setting aside some special time for confession not associated with the divine service, does not exclude the need to hear confessions during the service or directly before the service from those who came to take communion.

THE UPPER BOUNDARIES OF A PRIEST'S TIME WHICH CAN BE ASSIGNED
FOR CONVERSATIONS WITH PARISHIONERS DURING CONFESSION

The indicator "Priest's time available for conversations with the parishioners" imposes a very strict upper boundary on religious supply.

Regardless of the confession practice, pastoral tradition, specific features of worship schedules in a particular church, or its location and the type of settlement, we can roughly estimate the upper boundary of time which the priest can assign for hearing confessions.

For the group of permanent parishioners who take communion more than once a month, this time is estimated as the number of Sundays and feast days multiplied by the time possible for confession before communion on the very day of the feast and at the evening service of the previous day. This time amounts to not more than 335.5 hours a year.²¹

20. By the beginning of 2011, the Russian Orthodox Church had 30,675 parishes and only 29,324 priests (Kirill [Gundyayev], Patriarch, 2012: 193).

21. 52 Sundays a year, 12 Great Feasts, 5 major feasts (specially designated in the official Church Calendar), and 3 revered feast days (the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God, two days of St. Nicholas); from 7 to 10 feasts, depending on the year, fall on Sunday. The priest may spend four Sundays and/or feast days on vacation, which gives us the total of 58 to 61 feast days. On each feast day, the priest may hear confession up to 4 hours on the eve of the feast day and up to 1.5 hours in the morning of the feast day, if the priest is alone. This gives us not more than $61 \times 5.5 = 335.5$ hours a year.

For those who take communion several times a year, this time can be increased at the expense of weekdays up to 483 hours per year.²²

For those who take communion once a year or less, this time may be hypothetically increased at the expense of the remaining working day of the priest during the weekdays. This will give an additional 547 hours per year.²³

In fact, there will be even less time. A priest serving alone in a parish performs a number of duties which will never allow him to set aside that much time for church services and confession on weekdays. The calculation of time for holiday and Sunday worship and confession, which is associated with serving the liturgy in the morning and the all-night vigil on the previous evening of every Sunday and the days of church feasts and required of every priest, is only close to the real life situation.

A Model for Assessing Religious Supply Depending on the Type of Parishioners and the Average Time of Confession

An accurate assessment of time spent by the priest for hearing the confession of one parishioner depends on a number of factors. The most obvious factor is the frequency of confession. If a parishioner regularly communicates with the priest, confession can be very brief and does not entail any conversation with the priest at all. If even a short conversation is included into the confession, the confession cannot be shorter than 5–10 minutes. The confession of a person who has come to church for the first time in his life may last for 1–2 hours. Thus, the time of one confession may range from 0.5 minutes to 2 hours. It can vary considerably depending on whether the confession is associated with a request to give advice or consolation, to discuss a situation in life, etc. Such factors as gender, age, or psychological type of personality are of obvious importance. Therefore, in the model for assessing religious supply below, the ratio of the number of priests to the number of parishioners is calculated from various durations of one confession, which removes the problem of determining its real median value.

As one axis, we will take the variation in the time of confession: 1, 5, 15, 30, or 60 minutes.

22. The number of weekdays does not exceed 161. 365 days a year minus 58 feast days, 16 days of Bright Week and Christmas time, when regular confession is not performed; 2 days in the week before and 21 days during the Great Lent, when people cannot receive communion, 2 non-working days a week (except for 4 non-working days on vacation, 7 weeks of the Great Lent and 2.5 weeks of the Bright Week and Christmas time, in total 77 days) and 30 days of vacation ($365 - 58 - 16 - 2 - 21 - 77 - 30 = 161$). Time for hearing confessions is limited to 3 hours on weekdays, giving us not more than $161 \times 3 = 483$ hours a year.

23. In the proposed calculation, a weekday is composed of 2 hours of divine service (in the morning and in the evening) and 3 hours of hearing confessions (partially during the evening service). There remains 3 more hours of working time; 6 working days during 6 weeks of the Great Lent are added (2 non-working days, 4 days for divine service, and 1 day for receiving people) as well as 2 days in the week preceding the Great Lent (Wednesday and Friday), which were deducted in the calculation of weekdays, since there is no communion on these days. Therefore, they can be hypothetically considered as an 8-hour working day, during which the priest can receive parishioners. In total, this gives us $(161 \times 3) + (8 \times 8) = 547$ hours a year.

The other axis will represent different values of the number of parishioners, depending on the type of the parishioner: (1) those who take communion once a month or more frequently (2% of Orthodox Christians); (2) those who take communion several times a year, but less frequently than once a month (10% of Orthodox Christians); (3) those who take communion once a year or once every few years (39% of Orthodox Christians); (4) all those who identify themselves as Orthodox Christians and believers (73% of Orthodox Christians); (5) all those who identify themselves as Orthodox Christians (72% of respondents); (6) all of the ethnic Russian population of the Russian Federation, numbered at 111,017,000 ethnic Russians out of the 142,857,000 population of the Russian Federation, according to the 2010 Census.²⁴ Variations along this axis will be equal to 111,000,000; 102,900,000; 75,900,000; 41,100,000; 40,100,000; 10,300,000, and 2,100,000 people.

Furthermore, we will construct the tables where the number of priests needed for hearing confessions from the number of parishioners in the given time will be indicated in the intersections of the rows and columns. In Table 1, these numbers were obtained on the assumption that all parishioners take communion once a year; in Table 3 (see Appendix), the numbers were obtained on the assumption that all parishioners take communion several times a year (the median value is taken equal to 6). In Table 4, the numbers were obtained on the assumption that all parishioners take communion once a month or more frequently (the median value is taken as equal to 24 times a year).

Table 1. The number of priests needed for speaking
with the given number of people once a year, provided that each conversation
takes a fixed amount of time from 1 min. to 1 hour

(it is assumed that the priest, being on permanent duty in the church on all weekly service days,
continuously receives people, that is, at the rate of 1360.5 hours a year per priest)

"Those who take communion once a year"	Thousands of people	1 min.	5 min.	15 min.	30 min.	1 hour
1. Russians	111,017	1,360	6800	20,400	40,800	81,600
2. Orthodox Christians (72% of the population)	102,857	1,260	6,300	18,901	37,801	75,602
3. Believers (73% of Orthodox Christians)	75,086	920	4,599	13,797	27,595	55,190
4. Have never taken communion (40% of Orthodox Christians)	41,143	504	2,520	7,560	15,120	30,241
5. Once a year or less frequently (39% of Orthodox Christians)	40,114	491	2,457	7,371	14,742	29,485
6. Several times a year (10% of Orthodox Christians)	10,286	126	630	1,890	3,780	7,560

24. The data is based on Sinelina, 2013: 105, 111.

7. Once a month of more frequently (2% of Orthodox Christians)	2,057	25	126	378	756	1,512
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Only 1360 priests are needed for hearing confession for 1 minute once a year for 111 million people (row 1, column “1 min.”), provided that people would go to all priests in a uniform endless stream without stops and breaks for all days of the year, and at all times being free from performing religious services, without regard to any further workload of the priest. This is the roughest upper estimate, unrealistic in actual practice. In order to speak with each of 75 million Orthodox Christians who consider themselves believers once a year at least for half an hour, 27,595 priests are needed (row 3, column “30 min.”). For hearing the first confession in a confessor’s life for the duration of 1 hour from the 41 million Orthodox Christians who had never taken communion, 30,241 priests are needed (row 4, column “1 hour”). Even for simply hearing confessions once a year for 15 minutes from those who take communion once a year or once every few years, 7,371 priests are needed (row 5, column “15 min.”).

If we try to evaluate the same time costs in terms of the time which the priest can assign to liturgical service without regard to his time on duty in the church between services, the numbers become much higher (Table 2 in the Appendix). This estimate is much closer to reality than the estimates in the Table 1. An army of 126,500 priests are needed for a one-hour conversation once a year with those who consider themselves Orthodox Christians.

To make it possible for all Orthodox Christian believers who attend church only several times a year to go to a priest for at least five minutes on the greatest feasts, 46,150 priests are needed (Table 3 of the Appendix). This is possible provided that all attendees are strictly distributed on Sundays and feast days of the Church Calendar, and the load on the priests is absolutely uniform. For hearing confessions for only 5 minutes from about 10 million people who take communion several times a year, 6,322 priests are needed.

For hearing confessions for 1 minute from those who take communion once a month or more frequently, only 2490 priests are needed (Table 4 of the Appendix). If we assume that those who take communion once a month or more frequently have the opportunity to speak with the priest for at least 5 minutes, this would require 12,499 priests (Table 4 of the Appendix; row 7, column “5 min.”). The same opportunity of frequent confession for 5 minutes for those who take communion several times a year requires 62,243 priests. Finally, if we assume that all Orthodox Christians have the opportunity to come to church twice a month and speak with the priest for at least 5 minutes, 672,000 priests are needed.

We should mention that all estimates of priests’ time costs are made in such a way that the required number of priests is underestimated in the proposed model, and all priests who receive people have an equal load. Nevertheless, even these estimates make it possible to formulate a number of hypotheses and remarks for discussion.

According to exaggerated estimates, no more than 17,000 priests²⁵ currently serve in Russian parishes. Under the assumption that parishioners actually do not have an opportunity to speak with the priest, and confession is limited to 1 or 5 minutes, the number of the priests needed to meet the religious demand according to the proposed model is 12,921. The required number of priests rises to 16,183 if we assume that those people coming to church for the first time, once every several years, or once a year speak with a priest for at least about 15 minutes. Finally, if we imagine that permanent parishioners who go to confession frequently are able to speak with a priest for at least 5 minutes, the required number of priests would reach 22,880.²⁶ There is an obvious gap between the existing number of priests and the number of priests needed for individual pastoral work. This gap must inevitably lead to a method of pastoral action aimed at providing religious services on demand (“treboispolnitel’stvo”), excluding personal contact and attention on the part of the priest, which has been repeatedly criticized by Church authorities.²⁷

In response to the question “Do you know a priest whom you could turn to for advice in a difficult situation? And if you do know, is there one or several?” (Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), 2011), only 22% of those who called themselves Orthodox Christians responded positively. According to our model, this roughly corresponds to the number of parishioners with whom 17,000 priests can speak at least once a year for 15 minutes on Sundays and feast days, when each participates in the services, and when the parishioners generally come to church.

The comparison of the ratio of parish priests and parishioners in various countries also shows that the number of clergy in Russia limits the opportunity for regular participation in parish life and in the main Christian sacraments of confession and communion. In 2014, in the USA, 76,700,000 people called themselves Catholics, and there were 38,275 Catholic priests²⁸ (one priest per 2004 Catholics). According to the official report of the Catholic Church in Germany, the overall number of Catholics in 2013 was 24,170,754 (29.9% of the population), with 14,490 Catholic priests (including administrators and those on special assignments), which gives a ratio of 1:1168 (Deutschen Bischof-

25. Despite the difficulty of obtaining accurate statistics on the number of priests in Russia, we can use generalized data from the reports at the Bishops’ Councils. The total number of priests (29,324 in 2011) includes not only parish priests, but priests from monasteries (about a thousand priests reside only in stavropegial monasteries, that is, in the monasteries under direct administration of the Patriarch), as well as priests from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Byelorussian Exarchate, and the foreign dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church. If we deduct Ukrainian (about 10,000) and Byelorussian (1485) priests, and monastery priests (about 1000), the total number of parish priests in Russia will not exceed 17,000 (Kirill [Gundyaev], Patriarch, 2012: 385; Vladimir, Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine, 2011; Filaret, Metropolitan of Minsk and Slutsk, 2012).

26. This number was obtained assuming that people who frequently take communion spend at least 1 minute for confession (Table 4, row 7, column “1 min.” = 2490), or 5 minutes (Table 4, row 7, column “5 min.” = 12,449); those who take communion several times a year spend 5 minutes on confession (Table 3, row 6, column “5 min.” = 6322), and those who take communion once a year or once every few years spend 5 minutes in confession during the time of the divine service (Table 2, row 5, column “5 min.” = 4109) or 15 minutes in the time when the service is not being performed (Table 2, row 5, column “15 min.” = 7371).

27. Kirill (Gundyaev), Patriarch, 2012: 277–278, 331; 2015: 21, 23–24, 25.

28. At the same time, only 66,600,000 people were affiliated with parishes (CARA, 2016).

skonferenz, 2014: 12, 20). In Europe as a whole in 2012, this ratio was 1:2177 (CARA, 2015: 20). In Russia, this ratio is about 1:6050²⁹ (ibid.), and it is necessary to take a very different situation with uneven distribution, remoteness, and an inaccessibility of parishes into account as opposed to the case with Europe and the USA.³⁰

The rapid growth in the number of clergy in the first twenty years after the fall of Soviet power essentially did not result in the growth in those church members who frequently take communion, apparently due to a very rapid growth of the groups of beginning believers. If so, the specific religious situation in Russia characterized by a low level of religious practices will persist for a sufficiently long time. To have the growth of practicing believers reach at least a statistically determinable 3%, it is necessary to increase the body of clergy by 12,620 priests, that is, more than half as much the current number of priests.

With a stable growth of the body of the clergy,³¹ the prospects of a qualitative change in the situation cannot be expected earlier than twenty years, when and if the number of priests will reach 25,000–30,000. The number of priests in Russia needed for reaching the same ratio of priests to parishioners as the ratio in the USA is 51,000, requiring a 300% increase in the existing number of priests. As long as the situation with the accessibility of priests remains the same, which primarily depends on the number of parish clergy, there is every reason to believe that this limiting factor will be decisive for the formation of the religious situation in Russia, and the influence of religion on other areas of life will remain virtually imperceptible at the level of the quantitative surveys and statistical data.

Discussion and Conclusions

It is obvious that the proposed model does not account for many factors. The pastoral practice of each individual priest is not the same and is highly dependent on many factors, the main factors being the method of pastoral activities, the liturgical and extra-church load, and the term of the priest's service.

In Western studies, the typology of priests explores the differences in the practice of pastoral care as one of the key factors of typology construction (Blizzard, 1985; Zulehner, 2001). Field studies of the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church also show a fundamentally different attitude toward pastoral care, its value, and place in the structure of

29. In 1915, the ratio of priests to the Orthodox Christian population of the Russian Empire was 1:2058, and the church authorities noted the lack of priests and churches. For comparison, in 1840, this ratio was 1:1203 (Orekhanov, Posternak, Terentieva, 1997: 206).

30. For example, in Moscow in 2015, weekly liturgical services were performed in 475 parishes with parish priests numbering 1,231, which gives the number of 17,400 Orthodox Christians per one permanently operating church, and 6730 Orthodox Christians per one priest. If we apply this pattern to those who call themselves Russians, this ratio will be 20,900 people per one church, and 8,066 people per one priest (according to the 2010 Census, the population of Moscow was 11,503,500, which gives a rough estimate of 8,282,500 Orthodox Christians) (Kirill [Gundyayev], 2015: 3).

31. In the three years from 2011 to 2013, the number of priests increased from 29,324 to 30,340, or 1.9% a year (Kirill [Gundyayev], Patriarch, 2013: 20).

priest's time budget.³² Finally, the 2009 report of Patriarch Kirill at the Moscow Diocesan Assembly directly opposed the modes of priestly action, depending on different attitudes towards the practice of pastoral care.³³ We may assume that there is a certain type of priest who practically does not provide pastoral care.³⁴

The extra-church load can vary greatly depending on a variety of circumstances such as the participation of a priest in extra-liturgical activities, the number of services on demand, that is, the rites and sacraments performed outside the church at the request of parishioners, and other conditions of a priest's service. Even a superficial analysis of the ledgers with priests' time budgets shows that the differences in the structure of time budget and, accordingly, the difference in the time of confession or conversation with parishioners can vary greatly.³⁵ In addition, it must be remembered that the vast majority of parish priests in the Russian Orthodox Church act as the administrative head of the parish, the Rector,³⁶ which entails a very time-consuming engagement in administrative, organizational, financial, and economic issues.

Another significant factor is the type of settlement in which the parish is located, and the type of parish.³⁷ The former factor obviously affects the hypothetically-possible size of the parish and the number of people in it. The latter factor is more complex. First of all, it is associated with the location of the parish in the settlement (Zabaev, Prutskova, 2012). Is it situated in an area with a large or small number of resident houses, near a transportation hub or away from it, near other frequently visited public places or far from them, as a separate building and on a separate territory, or on the territory of other organizations (for example, hospital or prison churches)? Depending on all factors, each parish is formed in a given church in various ways: permanent parishioners or constantly new people, a limited or a more-or-less constant but very broad circle of people, etc.

32. In the study "Patterns of Organizing Social Activities in the Parishes of Moscow" (2010), 32 interviews with priests and parishioners of Moscow and the Moscow region were taken. The interviews clearly demonstrated almost opposing attitudes towards pastoral practices. The main research results have been published in Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2010.

33. In a special section, "General Question of Pastorship," administering religious services on demand is set against pastoral care ("the care of souls") (Kirill [Gundyaev], Patriarch, 2012: 277–278).

34. Such a type was described by the Protopriest Vladimir Vorobev as a relatively ordinary phenomenon of church life; "Certain passivism on the part of the spiritual father is traditional among us" (Vorobiev, 1997: 15).

35. In a study of the methods of pastoral action, five pilot weekly ledgers of the time budgets of Moscow priests were obtained through participant observation with subsequent interviewing. The results are striking and reveal completely different pastoral practices. One priest spent almost all his time in the church conversing with parishioners; the second priest participated in youth events and other parish activities; the third priest focused on Sunday school for adults; the fourth—a hospital priest—devoted a significant amount of time to giving communion and hearing confessions in the hospital, and the fifth priest spent most of his time at academic seminars and administrative meetings (N. Emelyanov, I. Zabaev, T. Krikhtova, D. Oreshina, "Ways of Pastoral Action: Analysis of Priests' Time Budgets." Research Project of the Sociology of Religion Laboratory at the St. Tikhon's Orthodox University, 2015).

36. In 2011, the Russian Orthodox Church had 29,324 priests, 30,675 parishes, and 805 monasteries (Kirill [Gundyaev], Patriarch, 2012: 193).

37. The typology of parishes is no less complex than the typology of priests (see Oreshina, 2010a, 2010b, 2014).

Secondly, the type of parish³⁸ significantly differs in terms of the time of existence (has never been closed, opened over a decade ago, recently opened, or an emerging parish), the number of clergy in the parish (a parish with several priests is organized fundamentally differently in terms of pastoral work than a parish with only one priest). A special type of parish and a special practice of pastoral care emerges in cathedrals where many official ecclesiastical events take place and festive services are performed. The parishes which are focused on a special ministry (hospital, prison, or military churches) have their own specific features.

All these factors can influence the structure of a priest's time budget and make it very difficult to more precisely assess the time for the "care of souls" available to each individual priest. It should be noted that all additional adjustments of the model only limit the hypothetically maximum available time which the priest would spend on the "care of souls," and thus only strengthens our main thesis on the insufficient number of priests and the limited religious supply in present-day Russia.

Appendix

Table 2. The number of priests need for speaking with a given number of people once a year provided that each conversation takes a fixed amount of time from 1 min. to 1 hour

(it is assumed that the priest receives people only at Sunday, holiday, and weekday services immediately before and after the morning service and during the evening service, that is, at the rate of 813.5 hours a year per one priest)

"Once a year"	Thousands of people	1 min.	5 min.	15 min.	30 min.	1 hour
1. Russians	111,017	2,274	11,372	34,117	68,234	136,468
2. Orthodox Christians (72% of the population)	102,857	2,107	10,536	31,609	63,219	126,438
3. Believers (73% of Orthodox Christians)	75,086	1,538	7,692	23,075	46,150	92,299
4. Have never taken communion (40% of Orthodox Christians)	41,143	843	4,215	12,644	25,288	50,575
5. Once a year or less (39% of Orthodox Christians)	40,114	822	4,109	12,328	24,655	49,311

38. The existence and importance of these factors follows from the primary analysis of the data array obtained in two projects of the Sociology of Religion Laboratory at the St. Tikhon's Orthodox University. For the main results of the first project of 2011, "Three Parishes on the Feast of Protection," see Zabaev, Oreshina, Prutskova, 2012. The second study of 2012–2013 was titled "Organization of Social Activities in the Parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Sociological Analysis." A series of in-depth interviews was conducted in fourteen parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Moscow Region, Kaluga Region, Yaroslavl Region, Samara Region, Irkutsk Region, Altai Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Khabarovsk Krai (147 interviews in total).

6. Several times a year (10% of Orthodox Christians)	10,286	211	1,054	3,161	6,322	12,644
7. Once a month or more frequently (2% of Orthodox Christians)	2,057	42	211	632	1,264	2,529

Table 3. The number of priests needed for speaking with a given number of people six times a year, provided that each conversation takes a fixed amount of time from 1 min. to 1 hour

(it is assumed that the priest receives people only at Sunday, holiday, and weekday services immediately before and after the morning service and during the evening service, that is, at the rate of 813.5 hours a year per priest)

"Several times a year"	Thousands of people	1 min.	5 min.	15 min.	30 min.	1 hour
1. Russians	111,017	13,647	68,234	204,703	409,405	818,810
2. Orthodox Christians (72% of the population)	102,857	12,644	63,219	189,656	379,313	758,626
3. Believers (73% of Orthodox Christians)	75,086	9,230	46,150	138,449	276,898	553,797
4. Have never taken communion (40% of Orthodox Christians)	41,143	5,058	25,288	75,863	151,725	303,450
5. Once a year or less (39% of Orthodox Christians)	40,114	4,931	24,655	73,966	147,932	295,864
6. Several times a year (10% of Orthodox Christians)	10,286	1,264	6,322	18,966	37,931	75,863
7. Once a month or more frequently (2% of Orthodox Christians)	2,057	253	1,264	3,793	7,586	15,173

Table 4. The number of priests needed for speaking with a given number of people twenty-four times a year, provided that each conversation takes a fixed amount of time from 1 min. to 1 hour

(it is assumed that the priest receives people only at Sunday and holiday services immediately before and after the morning service and during the evening service, that is, at the rate of 335.5 hours a year per priest)

"Once a month or more frequently"	Thousands of people	1 min.	5 min.	15 min.	30 min.	1 hour
1. Russians	111,017	134,362	671,812	2,015,437	4,030,874	8,061,749
2. Orthodox Christians (72% of the population)	102,857	124,487	622,433	1,867,299	3,734,598	7,469,195

3. Believers (73% of Orthodox Christians)	75,086	90,875	454,376	1,363,128	2,726,256	5,452,512
4. Have never taken communion (40% of Orthodox Christians)	41,143	49,795	248,973	746,920	1,493,839	2,987,678
5. Once a year or less frequently (39% of Orthodox Christians)	40,114	48,550	242,749	728,247	1,456,493	2,912,986
6. Several times a year (10% of Orthodox Christians)	10,286	12,449	62,243	186,730	373,460	746,920
7. Once a month or more frequently (2% of Orthodox Christians)	2,057	2,490	12,449	37,346	74,692	149,384

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Временная структура деятельности священников и субстантивные эффекты религиозной жизни в современной России

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В данной статье с позиции теории религиозного рынка обсуждается проблема разрыва между показателями религиозной самоидентификации (69%) и показателями вовлеченности в религиозные практики (3%), а также связанное с этим отсутствие следствий религиозности на данных массовых опросов в современном российском обществе. Напротив, влияние

религиозности на ценности, социальные болезни, семейное и репродуктивное поведение оказывается очень сильным для практикующих православных (И. Забаев, Д. Орешина, Е. Пруцкова). Существующие исследования, посвященные анализу разрыва между показателями самоидентификации и вовлеченности, интерпретируют ситуацию с позиции теории секуляризации. В статье предложено переосмысление религиозных процессов в России со стороны предложения. На основании теории религиозной экономики (Р. Старк, В. Бейнбридж, Р. Финке, Л. Ианнаконе и др.) предлагается модель религиозного рынка для стран с религиозной монополией. Моделируются различные оценки религиозного предложения в зависимости от среднего времени исповеди. В статье показано, что существенным ограничивающим фактором религиозного предложения в России остается недоступность священника для регулярного участия в исповеди. На основании модели религиозного предложения предлагается альтернативная по отношению к существующему научному дискурсу гипотеза для объяснения разрыва между православной самоидентификацией и вовлеченностью в практики исповеди и причастия в современной России.

Ключевые слова: измерения религиозности, секуляризация, теория рынка религий, модель религиозного предложения, бюджет времени священника, социальные эффекты религиозности, Русская Православная церковь

Fatherhood Models in the Middle Class of Contemporary Russia*

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Drawing on in-depth interviews with married Russian fathers, this paper focuses on the gender contracts and fatherhood models of the middle class of contemporary Russia. It shows that while the ideal of fathers heavily involved in day-to-day parenting is widespread, the reality is somewhat different despite the active participation of Russian mothers in the labor market. Still, for most Russian men, fathering as a set of everyday practices of engaging with their children has more value than for the generation of their fathers. The research shows that modern Russian society can be characterized by the co-existence of egalitarian and traditional tendencies in gender relations. On the one hand, the practices of involved fathering are evolving, and on the other hand, the traditional patterns of masculinity are enforced, excluding fathers from the sphere of parenthood. Economic factors and rigid notions about the family gender contract are the main obstacles which prevent Russian men from “doing” involved fatherhood. The liberal phenomenon of “new fatherhood” which appeared in Western countries turned out to be much more conservative in Russia. The modern family is still the “space of struggle,” and this struggle is counter-directed: it can be a fight for survival, or for power, or for an egalitarian gender order, against the discrimination of men as secondary parents, against old-fashioned traditional views on the father’s and the mother’s roles in the family, or for the preservation of those views.

Keywords: parenthood, fatherhood, masculinity, gender contract, involved fatherhood, fathering practices

Background and Methodology

The problematics of gender studies takes a prominent place in the field of modern social research. However, the discussion of gender problems is mainly focused on the understanding of the new role and place of women in society, and on the topic of work-life balance for women. The topic of fathers/fatherhood and fathering practices is less popular among researchers, which deepens traditional gender inequality in family relations and makes the role of the father seem secondary compared to that of the mother.

According to many authors, fatherhood in the Soviet past used to be a set of practices and concepts which pushed fathers to the providing and bread-winning spheres, but underestimated them as fathers. In some works, Soviet gender policy is described as discriminatory: parenthood was considered to be women’s social liability and a sphere of men’s deprivation (Chernova, 2007).

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A transition from a mainly state upbringing to a family one began to emerge in the new social conditions of the 90's. According to S. Kukhtherin, in the transition period of Russian history, a struggle to redefine family functions and gender relations was taking place in families. Men recognized that more was being demanded of them, but it was difficult to live up to their new role. Earning money in post-Soviet Russia required time and effort, while at the same time, many men were not used to participating in family life. Their wives, meanwhile, were socialized in a society in which women were expected to work, and the authority of their husbands was not taken too seriously. In this environment, it was not easy for Russian men to be respected as the heads of their families (Kukhtherin, 2000).

Modern Russian society can be characterized by both egalitarian and traditionalistic tendencies in gender relations. On the one hand, we are facing the emergence of new interpretations and practices, while on the other hand, the strengthening of traditional patterns of masculinity and fatherhood is occurring. Formally speaking, there are no legislative barriers in the Russian Federation for the realization of "involved" fathering practices. In reality, though, men are constrained by the possibility of negative sanctions applied to them from their environment and employers, as well as by a common point of view existing in public discourse that "looking after children is not for real men."

Modern social conditions put women into a dependent-on-men position: they get maternity leave payment only for the first 1.5 years of a child's life, the shortage of kindergartens is extreme, the divorce rate is still high (60% of marriages break up during the first 5 years, and every third child lives in a single-parent family), and many families do not get financial support (alimony) from the fathers (Russian Government, 2014).

The aims of this paper are to discover the main development tendencies of the institution of fatherhood in Russia, and to describe the basic features and characteristics of fatherhood models present in the middle class of contemporary Russia. The main goals of my research were to figure out the criteria of a father's efficiency, in what ways the present generation of fathers differs from the previous one, what gender contracts exist in contemporary families and what these contracts' advantages and disadvantages are, what fathering practices are present in families with different gender contracts and, finally, to determine if involved fatherhood exists in contemporary Russia.

The quantitative research on Russian families, their division of labor, and parenting styles is rather scarce. The only research project that could be turned to in order to investigate fathering practices existing in modern Russia is "Parents and children, men and women in family and society," namely its third wave of 2011 (Shalaginova, 2016). The path analysis of the data regarding married men with children under 14 (the total sample is 588 fathers) gives us several findings concerning their parental behavior:

- employed fathers tend to be more involved in playing with their children and spending their free time with them than unemployed ones;
- fathers who have more than one child are more likely to take them to kindergarten, school, and extra activities, as well as stay with them while they are ill, and help dress them, compared to men who have only one child;

- men who have only sons are more eager to do homework with them, and help dress them than fathers who have both sons and daughters;
- men who live in cities are more likely to play, help dress their children, get them ready for bed, and make decisions about their future as compared to men from rural areas;
- more-educated men are more eager to take their children to school and do homework with them than their less-educated counterparts.

Obviously, this data is not enough to answer our research questions, so we turned to qualitative methods, namely the theme-centered, narrative-oriented interview. The advantages of this type of interview for this particular research are, firstly, the possibility to approach the topic from different methodological angles and, secondly, the possibility to combine the individual constructions of meaning and societal conditions (Scheibelhofer, 2005). In the context of the research topic, this method allows us—as far as it is feasible with a modest sample—to combine technological, value-emotional, and institutional angles of studying fathering practices of men at the levels of social structures, social dispositions, and individual meanings.

The number of interviews conducted with the representatives of middle class is 23 (10 with the representatives of the core middle class, and 13 respondents from the lower middle class). According to the recent research on social structure of modern Russian society, the core middle class comprises of managers, entrepreneurs, and professionals in all sectors of the economy, while the lower middle class consists of semi-professionals and service workers (Anikin, Tikhonova, 2016). The size of the sample was not defined in advance, and is constructed according to the principles of theoretical sampling (Strauss, Corbin, 2008). However, the number of interviews is in line with the directing principles of qualitative research which sets 15 interviews as a minimum sample size (Rozhdestvenskaya, 2012: 105). It is assumed that this size is essential to achieve the stage of “saturation” and comprises the number of sets of typical cases (the sample of typical cases) (Shteinberg, 2009). This principle is broadly represented in the foreign research of family practices, as it allows to show the variety of the existing patterns “without privileging one type of family as the norm” (Hertz, 2006).

One of the methodological constraints of this particular research was that I, being a woman, could not count on my male respondents to be completely sincere and open with me. For example, on several occasions, the fathers did not tell me that they got married after their partner became pregnant (“a marriage for good measure,” as it is called in Russia, is commonly perceived as something improper), and I only realized it after studying their interviews more precisely. As Terry Arendell puts it, the respondents defended and proved their masculine identities in their interactions with a woman-interviewer (Arendell, 1997). Gender identity was a crucial issue in their narratives, and gender was both displayed and accomplished during our contacts (West, Zimmerman, 1987). This means that they were both presenting themselves as masculine persons, self-defined as being authoritative, competent, assertive, controlling and rational, and worked on proving their

manhood in their conversations with me. I did not expect that the issue of their gender identity would be so significant in these interviews.

Gender Contracts in Russian Families

Each family has a so-called gender contract that sets the rules of interaction, rights, and obligations which define the gender division of labor in both the public and the private spheres, as well as responsible relations between men and women (Rotkirch, Temkina, 2007). In particular, the gender contract sets the principles according to which the family decides who and by what resources conducts the housework and family chores inside and outside the family. Based on normative notions of gender roles, men take on more of the provider role, while women take on more of the caregiver role, especially when children become part of the family unit. After the birth of a child, women are generally the “adapters,” that is, the ones who change their work hours and schedules to suit their families. Eva Bernhardt argues that “Work and motherhood are incompatible precisely because work and fatherhood are perfectly compatible” (Bernhardt 1993: 36). Some research has shown that the contributions of men to domestic labor are positively related to country-level gender-egalitarian attitudes. For example, the Nordic countries display both a high gender equality value and high levels of paternal time spent with children, while at the other end of the scale, ex-communist Eastern European countries display a low level of gender equality and low levels of paternal time (Gauthier, DeGusti, 2012). Thus, the level of the father’s involvement in child care practices can be regarded as a consequence of the existing gender order in the family: an egalitarian division of family labor forms a more active parental practices from the father’s side, and vice versa.

The current research allowed for the defining of the following types of gender contracts in Russian middle-class families (Aboim, 2010):

- (1) the male breadwinner model, in which the man provides for the family, and the woman is a housewife;
- (2) dual earner/unequal carer (double shift for women): both partners work outside the household but the bulk of the housework and childcare is still conducted by the woman;
- (3) dual earners/dual carer: the partners share the financial provision of the family, housework duties and nurturing of the children equally;
- (4) female breadwinner—male helper/modified provider: a situation in which the woman takes the greater part of the responsibility of bread-winning, and the man takes an active participation in doing housework and looking after the children.

According to Sofia Aboim who analyzed data from the International Social Survey Programme (2002), the predominant gender contract present in Russian families is “dual earner/unequal carer” with different degrees of the housework load on women (65%), followed by “male-breadwinner model” (19%), and “dual earner/dual carer” arrangement (16%) (Aboim, 2010: 102). Judging by this data set of 2002, the gender contract in which

the woman took the bread-winner role was an anomaly and almost a non-existent situation. Referring to our qualitative data, we can argue that this is no longer the case.

The interviews show that the following gender contracts are typical for Russian middle class families:

- *Core middle class: male breadwinner model or dual earner/unequal carer:*

I absolutely didn't want her [my wife] to stay at home and do the housewife work, it was her who wanted it.

(Int. #4, 35 y.o., 2 children)

. . . it is going to be difficult to get back to the initial position, when she [my wife] goes back to work, I will have to take some of the housework . . . Initially she didn't want to stay at home all the time, she is not eager to be a housewife, she is interested in doing something of her own.

(Int. #14, 33 y.o., 1 child)

- *Lower middle class: male breadwinner model or female breadwinner—male helper/modified provider:*

A girl must be beautiful and have a child. That's it, nothing more is required from her. It is the man who has to earn money. Basically, the woman doesn't have to work.

(Int. #13, 27 y.o., 1 child)

The man must be strong, he makes decisions, leads his family and the woman follows him humbly.

(Int. #16, 34 y.o., 1 child)

Eventually we happened to exchange our economic roles . . . And due to it the mother's opinion became somewhat more authoritative in our family . . . I came to live with it . . . and besides my ambitions I have nothing to challenge it.

(Int. #15, 44 y.o., 1 child)

The researchers of the new or intimate fatherhood point out that with the birth of children, men start to work more, and the length of time they spend in fathering work is not used by these men to evaluate the quality of their fathering. Additionally, fathers who spend relatively less time with their children do not express feelings of guilt about being worse fathers (Dermott, 2008). Employment is still considered the most socially appropriate form of successful masculinity. If a man, for some reason, stops being a breadwinner and provider (as in one of my interviews), he has to establish his status as the head of the family anew. It is much easier for many men to be a good father by financially providing for a family, since it is an important aspect of masculinity. As the interviews showed, the fulfillment of a breadwinner role can serve as an excuse for the types of employment which could be considered unsatisfactory and unacceptable in other circumstances (e.g., one of my respondents who is a graduate of one of the leading arts universities now works as a taxi-driver to provide for his family).

Fatherhood Models in Contemporary Russia

Views on the normative roles of women and men in the family and the type of gender contract result in the fatherhood model and fathering practices. The interviews' analysis allows to define three main types of fatherhood models in contemporary Russia's middle class:

- The "Sunday dad" model, in which the father considers bread-winning as his most important responsibility. Parental roles are strictly gender-divided, and the father has the secondary role as the mother's helper in everyday childcare.
- The "available father" model, characterized by the father's reflexivity on his role in the family, his attempts to take on some "women's" tasks, the difficulties connected with those attempts, self-doubts of his competence, and the wish to be an active and responsible father.
- The "involved father" model, the main feature of which is a father's substantial participation in the everyday practices of care and nurturing, an equal division of parental duties, and a gender contract which satisfies both parties.

"Sunday dad" model (male breadwinner)

In this model, the fathers' involvement in caregiving, especially with young children, is a fraction of that undertaken by mothers. "Sunday dads" do spend time with their children, but it is dominated by play and leisure, while the mothers' time is more dominated by housework and care-taking tasks. The fathers' time with children is also more likely than the mothers' to be in the presence of the other spouse. There are a number of complex and interrelated reasons why this happens, including drawbacks of social policy, the workplace culture, and the wage gap between men and women. From the human capital theory perspective, the time allocated to children depends on the preferences and relative resources of the members of a given couple (Baizan et al., 2014). Thus, the partner with the higher resources (i.e., human capital or work experience) may be well prepared to bargain on the share and distribution of time spent with children. The group of the respondents whom I refer to as "Sunday dads" were usually higher-educated and much more ambitious than their wives. In this case, the low "bargaining power" of these women did not allow them to decrease their share of routine and supervisory activities with children, since these activities are less pleasant and rewarding for parents.

I assigned all the functions of family planning on her [his wife], and she is happy to do it, and I delegated these responsibilities to her.

(Int. #7, 35 y.o., 4 children, core middle class)

We have a strict arrangement that my wife deals with the child. And I deal with earning money. She tried to talk it over, but I initially put it straight, it is useless to argue with me in this respect, I have enough problems at work.

(Int. #13, 27 y.o., 1 child, lower middle class)

I go to work when he [his son] is still asleep and come home when he is already asleep . . . I am very well aware that I am no more than a Sunday dad.

(Int. #4 , 35 y.o., 2 children, core middle class)

The “Available Father” Model (male breadwinner / equal earner/unequal carer)

The respondents whom I labeled as “available fathers” produced more diverse and complicated narratives than their “Sunday” counterparts. On the one hand, these men tend to stress the mother’s primacy in infant nurturing and care-giving:

Interviewer: What is your wife’s job?

Respondent: Oh, she’s got the most important job in the world—she is a mother.

(Int. #1, 32 y.o., 1 child, core middle class)

As children grow out of infancy, this usually leads to a situation in which men help their wives by taking a share in primary childcare activities, i.e. developmental activities (face-to-face parent–child interactions, teaching something to a child, helping with homework, reading, playing, or talking with children), and high-intensity activities (face-to-face parent–child interactions related to physical care of the child, such as feeding, bathing, putting to bed, or taking care of the child when sick) (Baizán et al., 2014). However, fathers remain subordinate to their spouses who continue to make sure that everything is under control (Eerola, 2015). On the other hand, “available fathers” demonstrate a certain confusion about whether to be a “traditional” breadwinner who remains at some distance from the daily care-giving routines, or a “new” nurturer. They try to challenge the primacy of the mother, who often acts as a “gatekeeper,” who always knows better, and prevents the father from learning parental caring skills (Fox, 2009). This striving towards more active and responsible fatherhood is especially typical of younger and more-educated fathers.

In order to be a good father in my own eyes, I try to play with my child and choose the games that are useful, so that through the game he is directed not at idleness or useless things but something interesting. What my child is doing depends on what I am offering to him. I try to offer him something that is going to help and develop him and so on.

(Int. #14 , 33 y.o., 1 child, core middle class)

The “Involved Father” Model (equal earner / equal carer / female breadwinner—male helper/modified provider)

As defined by James Pleck, father involvement has three core components:

- positive engagement (development-promoting activities with the child):

I trained him [his son] . . . And then I helped him with the school subjects which he wasn’t good at, and I had to work with him a lot. He finished school with a golden medal, and I think I deserve some credit for it.

(Int. #15, 44 y.o., 1 child, lower middle class)

- warmth and responsiveness:

My father never hugged or kissed me and I felt the need for it. I always hug and kiss my sons. My friends ask me: “Why do you kiss your boys? They won’t grow up as real men . . .” But I think it’s important.

(Int. #23, 30 y.o., 2 children, lower middle class)

- control, a multifaceted concept that includes monitoring, limit-setting, anticipating the child’s needs, and participation in making important decisions about the children (Pleck, 2010):

We were watching her [his daughter] during the preparation for school, she liked mathematics, everything was OK, but at the same time she likes various creative activities. Now she often brings “C”s for math, but “A”s or “A”s with a plus for literature reading. So she is a creative person and I see that she has stopped liking math. So I want to talk to my own first school teacher so she could tell me what psychological tricks I may use or something else, because it is sometimes difficult to convince Lisa [his daughter] to just sit and do math, she is distracting, dreaming or looking to the window.

(Int. #8, 33 y.o., 1 child, core middle class)

Some research has shown that warmth and responsiveness, as well as control and monitoring, are significantly correlated with the frequency of positive engagement activities (Pleck et al., 2003).

The “involved fathers” turn out to be as capable as mothers with regard to children rearing, including the situation of “solo care,” when the father provides nurturing to the child in the absence of his partner.

If she [his wife] is, say, busy with the younger daughter or doing something around the house, I am busy with the elder daughter . . . If she has to go somewhere, I deal with the children, if I have to go—she is with the children. It is equality.

(Int. #2, 28 y.o., 2 children, core middle class)

“Involved fathers” emphasize that their share in nurturing and caregiving is equal to that of the mother, and their shared parenthood is based on mutual spousal support. However, even for these fathers, the idea of gender equality does not go further than their family life. The interviews proved a hypothesis present in some research: involved fathers do not necessarily share egalitarian views on women’s roles and rights in the public and private spheres. The realization of new fathering practices, the attitude to women’s employment, and the division of the instrumental and expressive role in the family (according to T. Parsons) are not interconnected, but independent aspects of men’s mentality (McGill, 2014). One can be an involved father and simultaneously demonstrate rigid views on women’s rights for career self-fulfillment.

Some of the respondents belonging to the available and involved fatherhood models turned out to be religious people with traditional or even patriarchal views on the preferred life trajectory of their daughters. Some research also shows that, for religious fathers, childcare is not a way of self-fulfillment, but a tool of preserving and transferring of family values. The father's active participation in his children's lives is not a sign of egalitarian family relations, but a means to strengthen existing family patterns (Johansson, Klinth, 2008).

Almost all respondents highlighted engagement in caring and responsible fatherhood in their own way. While the "involved fathers" are the closest to the concept of a new father, the idea of fathers as active parents was also present in the two other models.

Past vs Present

To analyze the continuity of parenthood values and fatherhood models, the respondents were asked to evaluate their own fathers' style of upbringing, and to try to formulate a symbolic message received from them. Very few respondents had no criticisms of their father's behavior. There were several patterns here:

- *Denial/rejection of the father's way of life:*

Due to him I know what I am never going to do. He didn't interfere in my life and I am grateful for that . . . It is difficult to transfer something you know nothing about.

(Int. #4, 35 y.o., 2 children, core middle class)

- *Criticism of the father's behavior:*

It seems to me he hasn't given me enough as a son, he should have given me a more masculine upbringing . . . Sons should be raised in a tougher way, you should even spank them, I think, beat them.

(Int. #2, 28 y.o., 2 children, core middle class)

- *Total acceptance:*

Well, my father is my hero, I am following his path.

(Int. #13, 27 y.o., 1 child, lower middle class)

- *Choosing another member of the family as a role model (grandfather / elder brother / step-father):*

My grandfather wasn't interested in wealth, he never gained anything either by career or relationships with people or money and he didn't want to, and probably I inherited that.

(Int. #15, 44 y.o., 1 child, lower middle class)

- *Distrust to the mere idea of continuity:*

I don't remember. Probably he just wanted me to study not to become an idler.

(Int. #5, 32 y.o., 1 child, core middle class)

The relationship of my respondents with their fathers cannot be called an easy or warm one. For a long time, intimacy and emotions were not considered as an acceptable part of father-son interactions. Many generations of Russian men were raised to be tough, stable, and emotionally detached. On top of that, the previous generation of Russian fathers was brought up in a so-called "fatherless society," caused by World War II. Without a sustainable pattern of a father-figure in their childhood and adolescence, many Soviet fathers were unable to establish loving and respectful bonds with their sons.

So, as far as the symbolic message received from the previous generation of fathers is concerned, only a few respondents caught it and reflected on it. In many cases, it was not the father who served as a role model (as he was always at work / left the family / died young), but another male member of the family such as a grandfather, an elder brother, or a step-father.

Discussion

In general, the majority of the respondents pointed out that in the terms of fathering (i.e., direct childcare and the housework connected to it, or intensive time with children), parenthood for their fathers was not of a great value. In a way, modern fathers try to break this pattern though economic conditions and the necessity to constantly earn money stand in their way. The negative, narrow discourse of fatherhood left from the Soviet Russian past still influences the views and self-awareness of modern fathers.

We can conclude that the phenomenon of new fatherhood, which appeared in Western countries as a liberal one, put roots in another, rather traditional ground in Russia. Egalitarian views on the family gender contract, as expressed by the fathers belonging to the lower middle class, have the economic necessity of a double income coming from both parents as their first cause, and the mother's right for career self-fulfillment as the second priority.

Regardless of their employment status, women spend many more hours on housework than their male partners. This means that whether or not women are working outside the home, they are shouldering the bulk of the responsibility for keeping the household in order. Because our society attaches greater value and financial award to activities carried out in the public world, women's greater attachment to the home can limit both their status and economic resources. As a result, women's household responsibilities increase the likelihood that they will be in subordinate positions to their male partners.

When children are raised in a home environment in which women are subservient to men, they are more likely to accept these unequal gender roles (Larkin, 1997). Thus, the current gender order replicates itself.

Our understanding of fatherhood is fundamentally bound to our understanding of a “man” as a gendered category. While many men still consider caring for children “sissy stuff” which should be done by women, we cannot speak about egalitarian relations in family life. Besides, not only men hold rigid views on gender roles in the family. Mothers, especially young ones, often act as “gatekeepers,” and involuntarily deny the idea that their partners can be good nurturers. Nowadays, researchers talk about “aware parenthood” which implies a reflexive and active participation of both the mother and the father at each stage of planning, birth, and the up-bringing of a child. Using contraception, the decision to conceive a child, a pregnancy and childbirth, and the up-bringing of a child should be mutual spousal activities. With this approach, it is the pair who gives birth to a child, not only the mother. In this case, the child is planned and wanted, and both the mother and the father pay attention to him or her (Leshkevich, 2013).

In today’s modern, fast-changing society, the traditional gender identity faces great challenges, while simultaneously, many gender norms and roles are becoming less rigid and more flexible. Many men feel uncomfortable when they compare their real self with the traditional norms of masculinity, which often were not transferred to them in their own family. Russian men are beginning to understand that it is impossible to solve many crucial problems with the old patriarchal means. The situation in modern society makes men use “feminine” practices, rethink their attitude to childcare, housework, and employment.

The modern family is still the “space of struggle,” and this struggle is counter-directed. The struggle can be a fight for survival, for power, for an egalitarian gender order, against discrimination against men as secondary parents, against old-fashioned traditional views on the father’s and the mother’s roles in the family, or for the preservation of those views.

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Модели отцовства в среднем классе современной России

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В статье описываются гендерные контракты и модели отцовства в современном российском среднем классе. Приводятся результаты анализа глубинных интервью, на основании которых делается вывод о том, что для современных мужчин — представителей среднего класса отцовство носит большую ценность, чем для поколения их отцов. Показывается, что для современного российского общества характерно сосуществование эгалитарных и традиционалистских тенденций в гендерных отношениях: с одной стороны, наблюдается появление новых интерпретаций и практик, таких как вовлеченное отцовство, а с другой — усиление традиционных образцов маскулинности и отцовства, исключающий отцов из сферы родительства. Распространению вовлеченного отцовства в России препятствуют экономические факторы и ригидные установки относительно внутрисемейного гендерного контракта. Отцы традиционного типа склонны дублировать ролевую модель поведения своих отцов. Явление «нового отцовства», возникшее на Западе как либеральное, в России легло на другую, скорее консервативную, почву. Эгалитарные установки относительно семейного гендерного контракта у отцов «нового» типа, принадлежащих к периферии ядра среднего класса, больше связаны с экономической необходимостью в доходе, поступающем от обоих родителей, чем с признанием права матери ребенка на карьерную самореализацию. Можно сказать, что негативный, «узкий» дискурс отцовства, оставшийся с советских времен, до сих пор влияет на самоощущение и мировоззрение отцов. Современная семья во многом остается «пространством борьбы», причем борьбы разнонаправленной — борьбы за выживание и за власть, борьбы за эгалитарный гендерный порядок, борьбы против дискриминации мужчин в сфере родительства и устаревших традиционных установок относительно ролей отца и матери или, наоборот, борьбы за сохранение этих установок.

Ключевые слова: родительство, отцовство, маскулинность, гендерный контракт, вовлеченное отцовство, отцовские практики

MORRIS A. D. (2015) *THE SCHOLAR DENIED: W. E. B. DU BOIS AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY*, OAKLAND: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS. XXVII, 282 P. ISBN 9780520276352 9780520286764

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Today, W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963) is considered to be a classic scholar of American sociology. However, he has been overlooked by generations of sociologists in the USA. Aldon Morris, the author of *The Scholar Denied: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology*, recalls how he talked about Du Bois with his graduate school mentor, Lewis Coser: “Coser, always graceful and gentle when it came to students, softly replied, ‘Du Bois was not a master of sociological thought’” (p. xv). Du Bois used to be one of the “forgotten” sociological geniuses. Thus, the situation in Russian sociology is not surprising: references to Du Bois are rare in syllabi; his works have not been translated into Russian. Some of the existing mentions are erroneous. For instance, Batygin wrote¹ that race research in the US was initially not university-based and refers to *The Philadelphia Negro* that, in fact, was commissioned by the University of Pennsylvania and written while Du Bois was working there as a researcher. This neglect in Russian sociology is understandable, given that even in American sociology, Du Bois is primarily seen as a sociologist of race, a less popular field in Russia. Morris wrote a book to challenge the limited understanding of Du Bois’s heritage. He states that Du Bois was more than a sociologist of race; he was one of the classic scholars of American sociology and sociology in general. Moreover, there was nothing accidental in the “forgetfulness” of American sociology—it was deliberate and political.

Aldon Morris is a well-known scholar of social movements, including his studies of the civil rights movement. *The Scholar Denied* was published in 2015 and has already drawn a lot of attention. It has won several awards, including the PROSE award from the Association of American Publishers. Reflections on the role of Du Bois are timely. Du Bois’s prediction that the social problem of the century would be “the color line” seems to have been proven true, since the studies of race are very prominent in American sociology. Some of the most acclaimed sociological books are dedicated to current race relations in the USA, including Alice Goffman’s *On the Run* and *The New Jim Crow* by Michelle Alexander.

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1. Batygin G. (1995) *Lekcii po metodologii sociologicheskikh issledovanij* [Lectures on the Methodology of Sociological Research], Moscow: Aspekt Press.

The goal of the book is threefold. First, Morris shows Du Bois's contribution to the understanding of race relations and to the sociology of race. Second, he shows that Du Bois's influence was far broader than believed in that he was an innovative researcher who implemented new qualitative and quantitative methods earlier than most sociologists. Finally, Morris suggests amendments to the theories of knowledge production. Using Du Bois's career as an example, he shows how a lack of political and financial capital can impede the advancement of scholarly work; however, there are means to partly overcome these drawbacks due to activist capital.

Du Bois was the first African American sociologist with a degree from Harvard University. Yet, he could not get a job except at the Atlanta University in the southern American state of Georgia. Morris claims that it was not due to a lack of credible work, since Du Bois produced quality research. Moreover, Morris suggests that Du Bois was the first to outline a sociological theory of race, battling the eugenics and social Darwinist approach. Basically, he started describing race as a social construct. Thus, in his view, black population needed education as much as white did. These views stood in harsh contradiction with the dominant concepts of white superiority of the time, and, specifically with ideas of Booker T. Washington, a black scholar with established reputation at the time. "For Washington, Du Bois and Atlanta University represented precisely the type of liberal arts education that was irrelevant for solving the race problem" (p. 98). Morris describes Washington as the main gatekeeper, who, due to his conformity with the dominant social Darwinism ideas, was strongly supported by white scholars and philanthropists. Washington's ideas in Morris's rendition become simplified echoes of racial politics. Morris does not go into much detail about Washington's theories. He briefly discusses that Washington believed in the dominant position of the whites and that the black population needed to be educated over time to even have a chance of becoming equal. Thus, an industrial education should be the goal for black people, not a general education as Du Bois advocated. Morris underscores that these ideas were beneficial to have. Du Bois, being on the other side of the argument, found a powerful foe in Washington, one that deprived the Atlanta school of so much funding that it almost ceased to exist.

Here, a renowned classic scholar of American sociology comes into play. Robert Park, before becoming one of the pillars of the Chicago school, worked as a secretary and possibly as a ghostwriter for Washington at his Tuskegee Institute. Morris suggests that Park's job included publishing discreditable materials about Du Bois in the press. More importantly, Morris claims that working with Washington shaped Park's understanding of race relations and built the foundation for his scholarship for years to come. On the basis of the facts that Park worked with Washington and enjoyed his support and a letter in which Park does not really go into details of his views on race relations, Morris draws the conclusion that Park aligned himself with Washington's views: "The first principle he adopted from Washington was that blacks were a primitive people lacking the advanced civilization possessed by American whites" (p. 102). However, Morris rightly observes that Park and Du Bois, despite being contemporaries and working on similar issues, did not cooperate or even refer to each other. Morris attributes this fact to the Washington-

Du Bois rivalry and, more importantly, that Du Bois was fighting against academic and scientific racism. It is amazing Park was hired by Chicago University without having any publications, and that Du Bois, who was already well-published, worked in the underfunded Atlanta University. It is also curious that Du Bois was generally ignored by the Chicago school and was rarely, if ever, cited.

Du Bois had a chance to experience a different academic culture. He studied in Germany where he was surprised to be seen as an equal to white scholars and judged by his talents and work. Moreover, Morris claims that Du Bois influenced Max Weber to change his mind on the question of Polish migration. It must be noted that this statement seems a bit far-fetched because it is based on very little evidence: a letter from Weber and the fact that the maître changed his mind several times on this question in the course of his life. Nevertheless, Du Bois was obviously valued there. Weber invited him to publish in his journal and referred to him as one of the more important American sociologists. Indeed, Du Bois's reputation allowed him to gather influential thinkers to his Atlanta school conferences. Despite this, it is the Chicago school that is considered to be the flagship of American empirical sociology.

Morris shows that Du Bois's study of the black community in Philadelphia preceded not only that of the Chicago school, but also Thomas and Znaniecki's study of Polish peasants. In fact, *The Philadelphia Negro* was published two decades earlier. Methods and scope of the research were similar, and yet, later scholars attributed the innovations in empirical sociology to the authors of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. Morris estimates that this groundbreaking achievement was not the only one made by Du Bois. He created a unique atmosphere in his Atlanta school and trained many young scholars to produce quality empirical research. Additionally, he managed to create a community of activists and leaders that participated in work of his "laboratory" (as Du Bois called his research undertakings in the Atlanta school). Morris notes that Du Bois's school was the first sociological center focused on the studies of the African American population: the Chicago school produced a dissertation about race relations two decades after its establishment and, thus, much later than Du Bois's students.

Du Bois was often criticized for his activist stance as a factor biasing his scientific research. Morris argues that there were benefits to Du Bois's activism. It is surprising that, even while being underfunded, the Atlanta school and Du Bois, in particular, produced a large body of work, including reports and a journal, and managed to organize a series of conferences over the years. This was accomplished not only with little funding, but also under political pressure. "Research funds were bountiful at Chicago, supported by enterprises such as the Rockefeller Spelman Foundation, the Social Science Research Association, and other local and national philanthropic organizations. Chicago professors were highly paid, receiving salaries far above those of their counterparts at other universities. Department heads such as Small were hired in the early 1890s with a salary of \$7,000, nearly six times the \$1,200 received by Du Bois for heading a sociology department and a research center for twelve years beginning in 1898" (p. 111). This supports Bourdieu's

view on knowledge production²: its success relies not only and necessarily on the quality of work, but on access to other forms of capital. Du Bois's work was strongly impeded by a lack of resources, and it was not accidental. On the one hand, his line of thought was marginal at the time, on the other—Washington as well as the Chicago school scholars fought with Du Bois. Nevertheless, he produced a considerable body of work. Morris claims that Du Bois managed to accumulate a different type of capital, the activist capital. Du Bois cooperated from the early years not only with black activists, but also with feminists. These people were eager to volunteer and conduct research, even though the Atlanta school lacked the resources to pay them. The activist capital could not overcome structural limitations, but partially compensated for the lack of resources.

Morris's book is a bold attempt to re-write not only the history of American sociology, but the history of sociology in general. He claims that Du Bois was the pioneer of empirical sociological research and many methods and approaches that he had already used were wrongly attributed to other scholars. Morris shows that the "forgetfulness" of sociology's history is not accidental. It is a result of the ideological struggles of the time, in which Du Bois was losing. However, he was not losing because of the weakness of his scholarly position or a lack of scientific evidence. He was losing because he was fighting against the dominant ideology of white superiority. He criticized the "value free" sociology propagated by the Chicago school: in his view, the underlying understanding of the inferior role of black population translated into the scholarly work of Chicago sociologists.

Yet, even though many of Morris's claims appear to be convincing and valid, one cannot help but wonder if the writer did not overdramatize his narrative while trying to right the wrongs. In Morris's description, Du Bois seems to be an ideal scholar who had no superstitions or misconceptions of his time. Morris easily undermines the arguments about the ambiguity of Du Bois's views. As an example, Morris writes off Du Bois's views about the inferiority of 90% of blacks in comparison with the 10% of talented blacks as a class argument (which, for some reason, is acceptable for Morris). In Morris's book, Washington's views are presented in a simplified manner. In fact, it is almost impossible to reconstruct his ideas. A reader is left with curiosity of why Washington, born a slave, reaffirmed white domination, and disdain towards Washington's comfortable conformity. Was there more to his ideas? If he was considered a black leader, were any of his ideas supported by the black population, and if so, why? Whatever the case, Morris does not speak of it. He also does not go into details about Park's ideas about race. We learn about Park's questionable employment at the Tuskegee Institute and his possible role in undermining Du Bois. In addition to Park's employment at the Chicago school, despite an apparent lack of credentials, this does not bode well for his reputation. However, it also does not lead us to believe that he promoted an aggressively racist approach to the study of race. Morris does not go into detail studying Park's work. On the contrary, every positive feedback Du Bois received is seen by Morris as a clear sign of Du Bois's genius. The lack of references to Du

2. Bourdieu P. (2004) *Science of Science and Reflexivity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bois's work in Weber's writings, for instance, does not stop Morris from claiming that it is obvious that Weber was Du Bois's student and not the other way around on the basis of their correspondence, and Weber's change in beliefs.

Morris unveils a very interesting story and brings up a crucial question. This question is about value-free scholarship. Morris shows that the names of the founding fathers of sociology are involved in a very particular ideological struggle. In his view, Park and his followers, though called for a value-free research, were, in fact, propagating the dominant ideology. Morris suggests that Park was influenced by Washington and his very specific political standpoint. Du Bois, on the other hand, used his scholarship to find a solution to the social problem he saw as the most significant one. In fact, he left academia to focus on activist work that was informed by his research. His commitment to value-heavy scholarship had its benefits: his supporters and activists were able to help with the Atlanta school's projects despite a lack of funding and political power. In other words, Morris shows that there might not be a value-free sociology and might have never been one. Moreover, the results of a researcher committed to a cause can be, and in case of Du Bois, were more valid than results of the preachers of a neutral stance. While these particular conclusions might be debated by students of American sociology, the general question remains. Is biased research produced by a proclaimed ideological stance or is any research biased? Is value-free sociology possible, or does any scholar that studies social facts cannot avoid taking a stance? These questions, though almost as old as sociology itself, seem to still divide the scientific community. Morris's study of the biases and discriminations among the "classic scholars" of the discipline calls for a reconsideration of its history and foundations.

Aldon D. Morris, *The Scholar Denied: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015)

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Emeritus Professor of Sociology Richard Jenkins is known as the author of books about youth life-styles, labour markets, the hidden economy, Pierre Bourdieu, ethnicity, social identity, and other socially important topics.

The idea for his recent book was informed by local rumours circulating of black magic practitioners across the author's home region in the northern part of Northern Ireland in the second half of 1972, with initial reports of sheep being cut open, followed by a case of a murdered child occurring that remained unsolved. The book tells the story of how the local moral panic rose and fell during the half-year wave of rumours about allegedly-actual evidence of practicing witchcraft and black magic rituals, taking place in the early times of the Northern Ireland Trouble, which was the ethno-nationalist conflict¹ at the end of the 20th century between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Of course, a low intensity of background discussions about supernatural forces is usual even in space-age everyday life, especially on the eve of such events as Halloween, but the cases when the dangers from supernatural forces become a public concern are far from usual. Thus, the story tells about a series of unusual events.

Beginning when the author was a student, the story has been being written for some 40 years to show “an example of an open-minded approach to data collection, relying on what Erving Goffman called evidence of ‘mixed status’: newspaper cuttings, archival material, published secondary sources of many different kinds, formal and informal interviews, and a smattering of observational field-notes” (p. xiv).

A four-decennial, thorough investigation allows for the comparison of the first-hand data of interviews and observations collected long ago with every possible documented piece of data available long after the events occurred. As a result, this raises factual issues rather than just discursive issues. Having compared the entirety of the pertinent press articles of that time with unsystematic conversations and rare academic evidence, it was strongly inferred that the moral panic had been raised not only by the journalists' lust for sensationalism: “Something was going on, something other than merely the newspapers

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1. “Although religion has a place—and indeed an important one—in the repertoire of conflict in Northern Ireland, the majority of participants see the situation as primarily concerned with matters of politics and nationalism, not religion” (Jenkins R. [1997] *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations*, London: SAGE, p. 120).

printing stories” (p. 24). Despite denying the evidence of witchcrafts in the major papers, the grass-root circulation of rumours stimulated concerns of the “vulnerability of children and the risks of childhood” (p. 31), and was active and richer in details than the local press covering the topic. This in itself generated public concern.

Having the research questions of *what, how, and why did it happen?* shaped, the author “stepped out of the local context” to discover “helpful comparative perspectives” offered by social science: “analyses of rumour by social psychologists and sociologists, the sociological concept of ‘moral panics,’ modern folklorists’ discussions of ‘contemporary legends,’ and anthropological accounts of witchcraft” (p. 25, and the whole of chapter 2), and “symbolising conflicts” (p. 34–36). These referents of these concepts are theoretically ascribed with more or less definite social functions of the discontent societies: rumours “fill an information vacuum” (p. 26) in “twilight of gossip” (p. 28); moral panics “flourish in the light of day” to appoint, stigmatise and exclude the “devils” to “strengthen ‘our’ identity” (p. 28); contemporary (urban) legends “reduce collective anxieties which result from rapid social change” (p. 32)²; and symbolizing conflicts, here being accusations of witchcraft, are “to prevent major strife by facilitating minor conflict” (p. 35), offering “a ‘safety valve’ for tensions that might otherwise boil over” (p. 34–35). All of these functions could be demanded by the religious communities of Northern Ireland in 1973, since both “lived in an ‘enchanted’ world” (p. 36) in “a violent and risky place to live” (p. 27). In the contemporary world, all of the listed conceptions imply “complex relationships between public moral issues and private fears”, and can help to equally reveal a “manipulation by elites and interest groups in the pursuit of their own agendas”, or “the ‘bottom up’ working-through of everyday moral concerns and ambiguities” (p. 39) in the cases.

The author does not intend to annoy the reader examining all the relevant concepts since the readers can easily familiarize themselves with them. In Chapter 3, Jenkins hurries to take stock of all the evidence of the supernatural forces at play published in the press. Instead of trying to establish “whether there were practising Satanists, witches or other occultists in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s,” the author attempts a more adequate task related to social science. He asks “was there any evidence in the public domain at the time that might reasonably have led people in Northern Ireland to fear Satanism, black magic and witchcraft?” (p. 53). The rather negative answer is accurate and definite. If so, it is to find “other reasons why people might reasonably have been frightened of satanic, occult forces” (p. 54).

As it follows from the findings of Chapter 4, the Satanist interpretation of the child’s assassination which started the journalist discourse of the verity of black magic practices and dangers was prepared by an earlier fierce murder of two political activists, one representing the Catholic community, and the other, a Protestant. As the author infers, “in the absence of a local category of acceptable political violence which could be applied to such killings, the ferocious brutality with which [the activists] had been murdered could

2. Cit. from: Victor J. S. (1996) *The Sociology of Contemporary Legends: A Review of the Use of the Concept by Sociologists. Contemporary Legend: A Folklore Bibliography, Vol. 3* (eds. G. Bennett, P. Smith), New York: Garland, p. 75.

only be described” in terms of an “inhuman” or “diabolic” deed. In the social context of discontent and despair, a concept of “ritual killing” was ready at hand to be sounded as soon as it was possible (p. 68). The child assassination provided the opportunity.

To make such an inference, the author needed to widen the temporal and spatial framework of his investigation, and answer the question of how did the local communities prepare to accept the idea of ritual assassinations? As a plausible answer, Chapter 5 suggests the use of the British Army’s “black propaganda,” which had a documented experience of a related type during Kenya’s War of Independence against Britain in the 1950s (see p. 69–72). The suspicion is not the result of a pure “qualitative abduction,” but has grounds in press materials of the very case. A quotation from a local paper reads that “one priest said that, in the opinion of some, such rumours [about witchcrafts and so on] were started in the North of Ireland by the powers that be for the purposes of keeping the kids off the streets at night” (p. 70). A large part of the chapter contains the analysis of an interview by the author with a former captain who “was involved at the same time [and the same region where the events the book narrates] in a psychological operations (‘psy ops’) unit called Information Policy, which attempted to undermine loyalist and republican paramilitary organisations by spreading disinformation about their activities” (p. 73). The captain said that, particularly during the mid-seventies, they tried to discredit the paramilitary groups “in terms of the two cultures, both republican and loyalist” (p. 76). Since the captain did not remember all the operations he had been involved in, it is inferred that his participation in the case was quite possible. Considering that the captain’s services included starting rumours, organizing simulacra of black masses, and news publications among other disruptive operations, the reader gets a plausible version of the manner in which the local communities could have been prepared to accept the idea of ritual assassinations.

The next chapter shows us that no plausible reasons can substitute causal explanations. Even if a sociologist does manage to collect interviews with various protagonists of an Army “psy ops” unit with detailed descriptions of their “ops,” s/he can tell rather nothing about “social facts,” those actual consequences of the deeds reported in the interviews, and the consequences which had been incorporated inside the communities by the intersubjectivity. In other words, a good sociologist cannot stop his/her investigation once having revealed some traces of conspiracies by secret/military agencies. This is because naked references to secret/military agencies hide rather than explain the machinery of social interactions. To manage, secret/military agencies have to use far from secret/military means. In propagandist uses of mass media, the quoted “authoritative experts” play their key roles; propaganda involving the occult naturally recruits moral entrepreneurs under its banner. Chapter 6 deconstructs the expertise of this kind after the same collection of the newspapers articles, though taken for a new analytical task.

Chapter 7 continues deconstructing the expertise of those journalists who wrote the articles both constructing and reporting news of the presence of the occult. To focus his studies on local journalism, the author utilizes memoirs of those journalists who had visited Northern Ireland to give a general representation of making news in the times of

the Troubles (p. 111). This was the same collection of newspapers articles supplemented with a detailed interview of the journalist who had published a key article designed to untwist the moral panic (p. 135–140) 36 years before. The chapter finishes with a reiterative intimation, that “not everything that was rumoured found its way into print” (p. 140). That means another turn of the story, which means to have a look at the widely known tendency of the superstition of the Irish people.

Chapter 8 represents the Irish beliefs in “other world” phenomena and agents, largely in the perspective of happy childhoods when the “other world” is mostly framed with festivals and wise and powerful parents. Frightening shadows of the unknown vaguely appear only for short times. It is commonplace knowledge that the adults of the Eire are prone to superstition and the supernatural, for “Northern Ireland in 1973 can, in some senses at least, be described as an enchanted world” (p. 165). The main festival in the province under study is Hallowe'en, which is directly connected both with “witches” and “the Devil” (p. 158). Thus, the research question for the chapter is, is it possible to discover evidence “that everyone in the north of Ireland in the early 1970s was ‘in the grip’ of either a pervasive fear of witches and black magic, or were simply ‘superstitious’ more generally?” (p. 163). The clearly negative answer is gleaned from the analysis of the Hallowe'en discourse of the regional newspaper, where cheerful recipes, advice, instructions, and nothing particularly anxious are to be found. However, the question arises of why did the author neglects his own maxim that “not everything that was rumoured found its way into print”? Why did not he interview any old-timers who remembered the Hallowe'en of 1973?

If it was possible that no-one could remember those specific events, the author casts a spell over a dense description of the cultural context in Chapter 9 to reveal “the ways in which violence and trouble became themes in northern Irish supernatural lore” (p. 166), a new supernatural lore, which emerged by 1973 during the times of the Troubles (p. 164) with the most usual themes for any supernatural lore, those of “death, illness, uncertainty, morality, and the ambiguous status and vulnerability of children” (ibid.). The point is that many different people, whether alone, in dyads, or in triads, reported meeting the ghosts of killed or dead people. The author writes that “the increased number of ghosts since the Troubles was explained by people in Belfast during 1986 and 1987 as due to several factors: ‘the sheer frequency and randomness of violent death within a limited space and time’; untimely deaths, of the young for example; and, for Catholics, deaths without benefit of the last rites” (p. 170).³ Violence generates fear, apparitions of ghosts, spirits, Bogeymen, and the sharing of rumours and stories about these encounters.

Chapter 10 focuses on the fact that “the Northern Irish black magic scare of the early 1970s was, among other factors, shaped by local supernatural lore and organised religion”. This chapter reveals the religious landscape of Northern Ireland where the Catholic majority and the Protestant minority are similar in the level of religiosity and beliefs in God's miracles, but historically dissimilar in the patterns of community life organisation, and

3. With the reference to: Feldman A. (1991) *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 67.

the reactions to the rumours about the presence of the occult. Nevertheless the author argues that the moral panic would not have shown up so clearly without external influences.

As it can be seen from Chapter 11, external influences were cultural. There were mass-culture pieces and stories of black magic, witchcraft and occultism, horror fiction and cinema “from England,” and especially the allegedly youth life-style patterns of sex, drugs, and so on, which were not well received in the 1970s by the rather conservative and much more religious population of Northern Ireland. The crucial point here is that “mass communications media may [might] be significant producers and transmitters of supernatural lore” in the north of Ireland during the early 1970s (p. 234).

The plot development of the book is unpredictable and keeps the reader in suspense. The eleven chapters actually represent eleven (or just a little fewer) criss-crossed perspectives of the same 3D picture drowning always in the same empirical data. From the point of view of the post-true rhetoric, the author might seem too neat and perhaps vanilla in his references and conclusions. This is due to the reason that the study started in 1973, and was not completed until 40 years later. As the author confesses, “whatever the study’s shortcomings are, they cannot be blamed on unseemly haste” (p. xiii).

I can give at least three reasons why I would advise a reader to spend the time to read this book attentively, even if rumours, black magic, military tensions, and the Eire are far from the reader’s interests. The first reason is rather ethical, since the author instructs a sociologist to refrain from hasty and facile causal explanations, even when a researcher has the moral ground to righteously declare of having spent 40 years on the research. The author differentiating between those journalists who reported the events from those who constructed them is very relevant for the actual state of the social sciences. The second reason is methodological. The book shows that a really accurate, unhurried, theoretically supported and disenchanted qualitative research can achieve its limits in finding real, factual whats, hows and whys it happened to get satisfied with a general revealing all the social forces having possibly been involved in the particular constellation in which the rest is veiled. The final reason is necessarily consolatory: as legated by C. Wright Mills, who says that the “art of bringing together public issues and private troubles” does not start “over there”; good research starts immediately.

**Richard Jenkins, *Black Magic and Bogeymen Fear, Rumour and Popular Belief in the North of Ireland 1972–74*
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