The Philosophical Foundations of the Russian Sociology of War at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries

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In this article, we are interested in the philosophical foundations of the Russian sociology of war. The philosophical foundations of science and humanities belong to the meta-theoretical level of knowledge and leave their imprint on the theoretical and empirical levels of research. The philosophical foundations involve ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological underpinnings. The study of these aspects reveals the following features of the sociology of war: general ideas about the nature of the phenomenon of war; criteria of veracity of knowledge in the sociology of war; rules for forming the source and derived concepts and assertions; and methods of discovery and development of new and true knowledge. The sociology of war as a new direction of social and humanities studies appeared in Russia at the end of the 19th century. It was the result of two processes taking place in philosophy. On the one hand, the appearance of the sociology and psychology of war was a logical step in the development of Russian military thought. The evolution of this branch of knowledge in Russia of the 19th century made researchers treat war as a social phenomenon. Also, the rapid development of the doctrine of positivism and the birth of sociology in the middle of the 19th century attracted the attention of many military and civil professors and academics.

Keywords: philosophy of war, sociology of war, military sciences, Genrih Leer, Nikolay Korf, Pitirim Sorokin, Nikolay Golovin

Today the sociology of war is one of the branches of sociology which studies the armed forces as a social institution, and military action (war) as a social phenomenon. The responsibilities of this discipline are very broad. The sociology of war studies a wide range of issues such as the social composition of the armed forces, values, motivation and outlook of military and civilian personnel of the armed forces, the relations of the army and other social institutions, the structure and characteristics of the control of the military collective, the influence of military operations on the society and the individual social groups, and the social rehabilitation and adaptation of veterans of the armed forces and war veterans. The development of this discipline developed in two ways, as one of a specific military science, and as a branch of civil sociology.
The history of Russian sociology of war has repeatedly been the subject of humanitarian studies. There are a number of papers in which the authors studied various aspects of the formation and development of sociological ideas and theories in Russia in this historical period. However, most of the authors were interested in specific sociological theories rather than the philosophical foundations of social science. In this article, we mainly use works and original sources which enables us to analyze the philosophical foundations of the Russian sociology of war and allows our bibliographic basis to be supplemented. For a broader view of the history of the problem, papers by several authors can be used. For example, the methodological aspect of formation of the military sociology was researched by Alexander M. Belyaev (Belyaev, 2002). Another researcher, Sviatoslav S. Brazevich, studied the common history of the appearance of military sociology in Russia (Brazevich: 1997). Igor A. Golosenko studied and developed the history of Russian sociology from the perspective of the historical-sociological approach (Golosenko, 1988). Finally, a team of authors has created a bibliographic reference edition of the main representatives of Russian sociology (Toshchenko, 2014).

The development of the military sociology of military science was carried out in parallel with the development of other particular military disciplines. It promoted an understanding of military science as a positive discipline, that is, having a particular subject of study in which the laws are implemented unchanged. This approach in European military thinking goes back to the works of the famous English strategist Henri Lloyd (1729–1783), but in Russia, it was established through the efforts of one of the greatest strategists and military theorists of the first half of the 19th century, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869). However, the domination of Jomini’s views was not predetermined. Immediately after the end of the Napoleonic wars in Russia, there was an alternative in choosing the path of the development of military science. In addition to the ideas of Jomini, the views of the Prussian general and military thinker Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) became famous in Europe. Both of these thinkers were in the Russian military service, although at different times.

In the first quarter of the 19th century, a new military science and philosophy of war began to form in Russia. These research areas were significantly different from the analogous branches of knowledge of the 18th century. Military science began to consolidate from a collection of disparate views and individual disciplines into a holistic system. This system of military knowledge relied on well-developed theoretical principles. There was a clear understanding of the hierarchy of the military sciences and their interrelationships. At the same time, the most prominent representatives of the Russian military science at the time, such as Ivan G. Burtsov (1794–1829), formulated an idea about the role of the philosophy of war. In their view, the philosophy of war should take the place at the top of the hierarchy of military knowledge, play a role of the general theory of the military science, and engage in the generalization of the facts collected by specific military sciences. At the same time, they stressed the fact that military science is closely linked with the social disciplines. Burtsov wrote: “Political sciences . . . have a great similarity with the military [sciences]” (1819: 9). As a political scientist, he understood political economy, statis-
tics, and political history as part of the generalized political science (Burtsov, 1819: 4). All these sciences and the moral science,” provide rules for the control of the human heart” (Ibid.: 17), should become the theoretical basis for the education of a military leader and his actions. Burtsov’s philosophical views are based on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and John Locke (1632–1704). Burtsov took Locke’s important idea about the human experience: “Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself” (Locke, 1999: 87). Additionally, Burtsov based his theories on some of Hobbes’s thoughts about human nature. Burtsov believes that the main reason of all wars derives from human passions and almost quotes one of Hobbes’s work verbatim when he writes about the causes of war. Hobbes wrote that, “If to the natural tendency of men to exasperate each other, the source of which is the passions and especially an empty self-esteem, you now add the right of all men to all things, by which one man rightly attacks and the other rightly resists . . . it cannot be denied that men’s natural state, before they came together into society, was War . . .” (1998: 29). Burtsov used Hobbes’s idea to verify the need to develop military science because war is an integral part of society.

An interesting question is why the development of military science in Russia did not incorporate the theories of the Prussian general, Karl von Clausewitz, who is recognized today as one of the greatest European military thinkers of the 19th century. There are several reasons for the neglecting of his views in Russia.

First, the logic of the development of the Russian military art at the end of the 18th century was very different from the Prussian system. After a period of admiration and respect for the Prussian military art and military systems during the reign of Emperor Paul I (1754–1801), a period of the «cooling» down of the enthusiasm for Prussia followed, while the position of the outstanding Russian commander Alexander V. Suvorov (1730–1800) was actively promoted. He believed that the Russians did not have anything to learn from the Prussian military; since the Russians consistently defeated the Prussians, why did the Russians want or need to imitate the Prussian military’s methods? In addition, the intellectual legacy of Suvorov actively affected the formation of Russian military science because the most active efforts in this direction were undertaken by people who considered themselves disciples of Suvorov and his successful traditions.

Secondly, during the Napoleonic Wars, Prussian diplomacy and a large number of officers of Prussian origin actively aspired to influence Russia’s military policy. They offered a large number of strategic plans for Russia’s war with France, the main essence of which consisted of retreating deep into the country and thereby prolonging the war. The Russian general and military thinker, Andrew E. Snesarëv (1865–1937), noted that while these plans “may differ in details, the idea remains the same—all authors have little regret about the loss of Russian regions and the associated pain and suffering with it, and it was easy to do strategic experiments on a foreign ‘people’s hump’” (Snesarëv, 2007: 129). These facts formed a certain cautious attitude in Russia towards the military-based theoretical ideas of Prussian origin.
Thirdly, when Carl von Clausewitz was in the Russian military service, he became involved, albeit in an indirect way, in the intrigues of the Russian headquarters (Snesarev, 2007: 126). As well, staying with the Russian army caused the Prussian military thinker disappointment at the neglect of the Russian art of war and of the Russian military leaders. This attitude was reflected in his 1815 work *Der Feldzug 1812 in Russland*, written before his basic work *On War* (Snesarev, 2007: 127). All of these factors, more personal than conceptual in nature, influenced the Russian lack of attention to the thoughts of Karl von Clausewitz.

The institutional design of military science in Russia took place in the same period. The Imperial Military Academy was founded by the French general and military-thinker, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869), in 1832. At the same time, the main efforts of Russian military theorists focused on the developmental problems of military science and philosophy in keeping with Jomini’s views. The further development of Russian military thought in the 19th century, including military sociology at the turn of the century, continued under the influence of Jomini and the followers of his scientific tradition. Among them, Genrih A. Leer, Nikolay A. Korf, and Nikolay N. Golovin must be noted as a few of the most important proponents of Jomini’s views. These men made great contributions to the development of the philosophical foundations of the Russian military thought, and military sociology as a positive science.

The main features of the concept of military art of A.-H. Jomini are as follows: (1) “The war is always carried out in accordance with the great principles of the art” (Jomini, 2009: 10); (2) “Military science is based on principles that can never be freely broken in the presence of an active and experienced enemy” (Ibid.: 13), and (3), “I do not pretend to establish these principles, because they have always existed” (Ibid.: 131). This approach brings military art and science together because the eternal and immutable principles of military art, as a form of theoretical knowledge, are almost the same as the laws of nature in the natural sciences. It must be pointed out that they relate to a specific area of human activity, that is, war.

Jomini formulated a very important philosophical principle which concerned the ontological base of military disciplines. He spoke about the relationship between politics and war. Military policy is a special part of state management, and is separated from other policy areas (Ibid.: 11). This means that the political existence of the state is ambivalent. This allows us to talk about the lack of a clear and direct link between politics and military activities. Subsequently, this approach often manifests itself not only in the mindset of military theorists, but also in political practice.

According to a number of researchers of Russian military thought, the most consistent successor of A.-H. Jomini was Genrih A. Leer (1829–1904). He was an outstanding Russian military theorist and historian, General of the Infantry, and a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. He is the author of several major tactics, strategy, and military-history works. These works became the foundation of Russian military thought at the beginning of the 20th century, including military sociology.
The methodological basis of Leer’s doctrine of war was the historical method, because he believed that only the study of historical facts would make it possible to deduce objective laws. His logic was as follows: “General signs, derived from a large number of studied phenomena, exactly will give the actual laws that serve a solid foundation of science. From that moment science enters into a positive period of its existence” (Leer, 1869: 1). The historical method can be used in all branches of military science. Studying the history of warfare provides the primary material for scientific analysis. Leer understood the difficulties of historical research well, which requires the consistent application of the principle of historicism, not only to the subject matter, but also to the personality of the historian: “The ideal is reduced to that as far as possible to think and feel all that person thought and felt” (Leer, 1894: 68). In fact, the researcher must achieve a complete mental «incorporation» in the historical event (the military operation or combat) as its protagonist—the commander. Another essential part of the methodology of military science is the method of classification. Leer states that “classification—decomposition of the complex to the simple—is a very important method in all sciences, and especially in the social (observational) disciplines, which include military disciplines” (Leer, 1894: 4). For a complete study of its properties, an object of research “must be studied in its full purity, while eliminating all external conditions of time and place . . . i.e., place it into a kind of vacuum, as do mathematics and natural scientists” (Ibid.: 7). However, Leer has been criticized for a lack of attention to the dialectic, and to the idea of evolution. Accordingly, his views on the development of society were often abstract. His writings concerning military history facts are often deprived of their specific content in favor of the possibility of using these facts to confirm eternal and immutable principles (Svechin, 1926: 273).

This point of view correlates with the position of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the founder of positivism. According to Comte, “Actual science is in laws of phenomena, for which the facts . . . are always only a necessary raw material” (Comte, 2003: 79). One of the main distinguishing features of the philosophy of positivism is its attention to the history of society. Due to the principle of historicism, which was recognized by Comte to be the most important principle of philosophy and the social sciences, positivism “can adequately represents all the great historical eras as the different phases of the same main evolution, where each step follows from the preceding stage and prepares them for the next step in accordance with the constant laws, precisely determining its special part in the overall chain of facts” (Ibid.: 160–161). In addition, the main goal of scientific knowledge, both in terms of Auguste Comte and from the point of view of G. Leer, is the human. Various aspects of the study of human personality is the basis for creating a hierarchy of social sciences. Comte pointed out this fact directly when he wrote that all the sciences are, in fact, a parts of a whole—the science of mankind (Ibid.: 71). Man is the main driving force of war, so man should become the major subject of military science (Leer, 1894: 27). Social phenomena, and the military in particular, are the most difficult to learn. In this, both thinkers agree. By combining the historical method with the theoretical (philosophical) study of the subject, it is possible to “study the main thing . . . in particular in the individual events, samples of art, and this way not only gives the specific
content for the abstract truths, but also allows us to get acquainted with the infinitely varied using the same immutable principles, which using is dependent on the continual changing the situation” (Leer, 1960: 323). Leer offers to adhere to this scientific approach as much as possible. The Russian thinker emphasizes the importance of foreseeing events, and the scientific forecasting of various processes in the war. In this regard, Leer follows Comte, although the extreme complexity of the phenomena of war only slightly allows for the realization of this possibility of military science (Leer, 1880: 12–13).

However, G. Leer was faced with a serious problem in formulating the laws of war as a social phenomenon. It turned out that all the laws which he formulated do not apply to the field of war as a social phenomenon, but to the field of military art, i.e., to a variety of human activities. The author writes that “the number of laws which are the basis of military art is not large. They are eternal and unchanging, but its application, depending on the situation, goes to infinity” (Leer, 1869: 14). The author was most heavily criticized for the use of the term of ‘law’ in military science. The major part of this criticism came from military leaders and journalists. Even anonymous publications in periodicals were critical of Leer. As a result, Leer published a special article to answer the criticisms of his views. He thought that military science is not “a systematic set of rules for action... but a systematic set of laws” (Leer, 1870: 8). He continued his self-defense by writing that these laws are eternal, immutable, independent of time, place, and weapons (Ibid.: 11).

In developing his ideas of the methodology of military science, Leer came to the conclusion that the theory of military art is not designed to give ready-made recipes of decision-making on the battlefield. The task “of the theory of the military art is reduced to an explanation of the essence of military objects (properties, the nature of military elements), their interaction and . . . the nature, the essence of the military phenomena” (Leer, 1894: 3). All of this suggests that Leer created the science of war throughout his scientific life, a science which dealt with the most general theoretical and even philosophical questions of the study of military phenomena. He formulated the most important thesis for the development of the general science of war: “War obeys not only to the requirements of the situation, the conditions of a different era, but it mainly . . . obeys higher laws (principles), deriving from its very nature (essence)” (Leer, 1960: 332). When the existence of a specific object of research is proven and recognized by scholars, it is a key moment for the development of a scientific discipline and its demarcation that is separate from other related sciences.

In Leer’s opinion, war and military activities refers to the social sphere and, accordingly, should be the subject of the social sciences, the laws of which are the most complex. Finding and studying the eternal and immutable causal relationships in the military sphere necessarily requires their correlation with the understanding of the social laws. It was difficult because of the slow development of social sciences in the second half of the 19th century. However, it is necessary to investigate war as a social phenomenon, because war, according to Leer, is a powerful engine of social development and improves the material and moral aspects of society. From this point of view, Leer is the successor of a very long tradition of “war apologists” (Snesarev, 2013: 74).
Thus, we can conclude that the doctrine of war and military art of G. Leer was greatly influenced by the classical positivism of Auguste Comte and other representatives of this school of thought. Thus, Russian thinkers began the tradition of positivism in Russian military-philosophical thought.

A disciple and follower of Leer’s ideas in the development of military science as a branch of social knowledge was Nikolay A. Korf (1866–1924). He was a Russian military theorist, a lieutenant-general, and an active member of the Society of Adherents of Military Knowledge. His contribution to the development of Russian military sociology deserves close attention. His theoretical views are the striking embodiment of the specific features of the line of the military thought in Russia in the middle of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century. The philosophical foundations of N. Korf’s scientific views also belong to the tradition of positivism. Korf is quoted in the works of a number of philosophers-positivists. However, his views have no condemnation of the role of metaphysics in human cognition. On the contrary, he believes that “philosophy has the task of coordination of metaphysical conclusions with the facts, with phenomena, which are delivered by sciences” (Korf, 2012: 90). This is the ontological basis of his views, and is closely connected with his epistemological views about the nature of truth. The completeness of true knowledge is obtained by summing up the scientific facts into the categories of metaphysics. In this case, knowledge will be based on the facts on the one hand, and on the laws of cognition on the other. The metaphysical laws of cognition receive an acknowledgment of their evident truth, and the phenomenon will have a rational basis (Korf, 2012: 91). In this sense, metaphysics is moving closer to the positive sciences, but will never be equivalent to them. Despite this, Korf does not completely deny the role of metaphysics, as does Comte and his followers. In addition, Korf believes that positive sciences will never reach the ideal in aspect of the accuracy of their predictions (Korf, 2012: 93).

With regard to the military sciences, “metaphysics will study the essence of war and military phenomena, philosophy will consolidate conclusions of the metaphysics with the conclusions of military sciences, reaching the “completeness” of truth and verification of the metaphysical conclusions” (Korf, 2012: 96). The tasks of philosophy of military science as formulated by Korf are as follows: (1) internal domain distinction between particular military sciences, (2) formulation of the final objectives of particular military sciences, (3) revealing the relative value of specific findings of military sciences for the formation of an integrated system of military knowledge, (4) the logical design of the specific findings of military disciplines in general conclusions, (5) conceptual assistance to specific sciences if they are undeveloped (Korf, 2012: 96–97).

N. Korf pays great attention to the study of the interaction of various military sciences with each other and their mutual hierarchy. First of all, he wrote that “the totality of science, which we have designated as the general name “social,” can be divided into two clearly different department—psychology science and social sciences (“social” in the narrow sense), and each of them are grouped around one basic science,—namely, psychology and sociology” (Korf, 2012: 40). The main theoretical bases of military psychology
necessary for its occurrence are military history and common psychology (Ibid.: 46). The same can be said about military sociology. For its appearance, a military history which will be the source of the specific facts in the initial stage of development of military sociology, and a common sociology as a theoretical basis of this science, are also required.

In N. Korf’s opinion, the main areas of research can be transferred from the common sociology to the study of military issues. From the perspective of social statics, the range of questions included the studying of the influence on war by “the dismemberment of society into separate groups,” “the attitude of social groups to personalities, who forming parts of them,” “the general trend of social connection,” and the influence of the “social connections on the goodwill of fellow members” (Korf, 2012: 64–65). From the perspective of social dynamics, it is also necessary to study the influence on the war by “the natural tendency of social groups,” and “the interaction of groups arising from their aspirations” (Ibid.: 65). In addition, it is necessary to research “the value for the military affairs of origin, development, characteristics and the nature of social groups, their activities and mutual relations” and arising from this “social and spiritual factors—religion, law, morality, polity” (Ibid.: 66).

Among other sources, Korf used the views of the best-known Russian sociologist of the late 19th—early 20th centuries, Evgeniy V. De-Roberti (1843–1915), as a theoretical base of his works. He believed that the place of the psychology and the specific history of knowledge is a part of the particular sociology (De-Roberti, 1914: 6). Moreover, “Sociology entirely based on psychology and history, as the two branches of the empirical or purely descriptive knowledge (or, in other words, a Natural Science of Society has its base and point of departure on the Natural History of Society)” (De-Roberti, 1914: 18). This position has been very productive for military sociology. The historical method has long been actively used by military science, and the methods of psychology allowed the exploration of the spiritual side of military activity, insisted on by leading military thinkers.

To substantiate the necessity of military sociology, N. Korf formulates his philosophical thesis with ontological content—the existence of a specific object of research, which is not subject to other sciences. Firstly, despite the trend towards a broader understanding of the subject of military sciences, especially strategy, they do not deal with the above problems. Secondly, military sociology is a branch of common sociology, which has its own subject of study (Korf, 2012: 67–68).

In N. Korf’s opinion, military sociology should methodologically focus on the historical method. The deductive method of cognition, in which the conclusions of common sociology would fully apply to specific military realities in the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, was still not effective due to the weak development of common sociology. Inductive, empirical methods for the young science was applicable only through observation which, however, could be complicated by combat operations. Therefore, military history should provide military sociology primarily with an array of facts to analyze and derive empirical laws and fundamental laws (Korf, 2012: 69–70).

The possibility to study war with military sociology came after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. It was the heyday of military psychology. This discipline could now
organically combine theoretical research and the possibility of applying them in practice. In the period from 1900 to 1917, more than 100 publications devoted to the psychology of combat activity appeared in the press (Seniavskaya, 1999: 4–6). The Society of Adherents of Military Knowledge quickly embarked on a study of the war to remove without delay all possible expertise and to prevent the recurrence of national shame of this magnitude in the future. The Department of Military Psychology of the Society sent combatants extensive questionnaires to gather information. Respondents were asked to provide information on more than 20 aspects of the mental state of officers and men in various combat situations. For this purpose, the questionnaire contained 36 standard questions, and an opportunity to express their views in free form (Obshhestvo, 1993: 64–67). The authors of the questionnaire based the fundamental theoretical position that the “Personality psychology obeys to certain laws, after studying them, will be able to some extent to reduce the art of genius to the public science” (Ibid.). This approach has characterized the development of many branches of military science of the era and reflected the general trends in science. In addition, in February-March 1906, at the initiative of the Chief of General Staff and the Head of the Academy of General Staff collected written questionnaires from officers and generals of the Russian army. The questioning concerned the identification of shortcomings in the training of officers, and accounts of experiences in the war for the development of academic education (Obraztsov, 1993: 15). Also, N. Korf published a book in 1906 titled On the Education of the Will of Commanders, in which he realized his project on psychological research, and based on his own experience of fighting in the Russo-Japanese War (Korf, 1906). These studies have shown that in Russia in the early 20th century, military sociology and psychology began to transform from speculative projects into real scientific disciplines.

The most consistent development of the sociology of war was found in the works of Nikolay N. Golovin (1875–1944), lieutenant-general, Professor of the Academy of General Staff, a military scientist, historian, and researcher of military affairs. His scientific activity, both in Russia and in exile, was aimed at the creation of the sociology of war in the conceptual and organizational sense. According to I. Obraztsov, one of the most consistent researchers of his creativity, “Golovin's views on war, as a phenomenon of social life, over many years of his research activities have evolved from symbiosis between Psychology and Social Darwinism to positivism . . . and vulgar materialism. The effect of various sociological trends allowed to form their own original approach to the analysis of social phenomena and contribute to the methodological foundations and methods of the future concept of sociology of war” (Obraztsov: 1994, 92).

Golovin wrote one of his first scientific work Research of Combat: Research of the Activity and Abilities of Man as a Fighter in 1907. In his dissertation, he formulated a number of ideas that he developed over the next 30 years. He begins his reasoning with the definition of “science.” According to him, science is the “objectively true and systematic knowledge about the actual phenomena” (Golovin, 1995: 11). This short definition has a profound ontological and epistemological sense. Firstly, in an ontological meaning, the Russian scientist claims that the need to complete the science is not only through
presence of a specific object of research, or the field of “real phenomena.” What is more, these phenomena must submit to a special kind of determinism in their cause-effect relationships. The idea of the necessity of conforming to the laws of the natural order of phenomena requires a constant referral to the science of the concept of “hard” determinism, proposed by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827), and used in the classical natural sciences, in particular, in mechanics. It follows that “the answer to the question about the possibility of the science of war is directly dependent on the answer to the question of the existence of regularities in the phenomena of war” (Golovin, 1995: 11). According to Golovin, all scientific development was carried out in ways to change the perceptions of randomness and regularity in the phenomena of nature and society. Moreover, even an accident is subject to eternal and immutable laws (Golovin, 1995: 17).

N. Golovin, as well as N. Korf, thinks that “the phenomena of social life are directly related to the phenomena of immaterial life” (Ibid.: 19). The main part of his scientific work of 1907 was devoted to the study of the man-fighter in terms of its psychological characteristics. This line of research of the Russian military thinker continues in the wording of the laws of war in a 1908 lecture for the students of the Imperial Military Academy, *The History of Military Art as a Science* (published in 1913). In it, he argues that “the fundamental law, which we believe, is the law of dominating of the immaterial element in the phenomena of war” (Golovin, 2008b: 132) because “every battle ends with one of the sides’ refusal to fight” (Ibid.: 134). In addition, the second law follows from the findings of individual and collective psychology, which is the law of a particular victory: the result of the battle is determined during the crisis in one of the individual sections of the front line. (Ibid.: 135). The third law is the claim that “all aspects of social life are so closely interconnected that none of them can not be changed, so that has not changed all the other” (Ibid.: 135–136). This law must take the investigation of war into account. As well, the consequence of this law is not only a conclusion on the relationships of all social phenomena. It follows that the “epistemological arbitrariness” of many scientists dealing with the war and often investigating military history to confirm their hypotheses, although excluding changes in social institutions, is significantly limited. Reflecting on the laws of war, N. Golovin, in his 1938 work *The Science of War: On the Sociological Study of War* returns to the old debates of the second half of the 19th century about laws and principles as forms of military theoretical knowledge. In contrast to G. Leer, he believes that “the science of war (the sociology of war) will tend to the discovery of laws. Meanwhile, the science of waging war (the theory of the art of war), even if broad generalizations, can be reduced to only those principles” (Golovin, 2008c: 33).

In epistemological terms, the science of war must be “objective and reliable” and consist of “systematic” knowledge. The criterion for the reliability of scientific concepts of the sociology of war are objective phenomena, and the degree of consistency of the knowledge must be high. N. Golovin selecting the term “reliable” instead of “the truth” to describe scientific knowledge is not accidental. Against the background of the discussion in the science about the criteria of the verity of knowledge, held in the late 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, many scientists have redefined the epistemological basis
of their disciplines. N. Golovin believed that “social sciences (and the military) will never reach the same degree of development and precision as a simpler science, such as mathematics” (Golovin, 1995: 34). This idea is far from the optimistic view of Comte and his followers on the possibilities of sociology and its predictive capability. As Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) noted, Golovin believes that sociology can only be based on real facts and “can not be built on the basis of general principles or ideas, which are derived a priori” (Golovin, 2008c: 42). Thus, this discipline can only use inductive methods to build a system of knowledge.

In addition, Golovin, in some sense, anticipated the coherent concept of the verity of knowledge. He claimed that “the science will greatly benefit, when basing on the study of natural phenomena of the war, if she tells everyone summarizing the framework in which it will be reliable” (Golovin, 1995: 27). That is, the most general principles of the “science of war” concerning the nature and characteristics of military phenomena will not only play a backbone role for particular disciplines about war, but will also be a criterion of the internal consistency of the totality of the scientific knowledge about war. He repeats the same idea in his 1935 work On the Sociological Study of War. In this paper, N. Golovin comes to the idea that the sociology of war should act as a “customer” of the facts of the military history. Thus, military history is freed from the framework of current maintenance practices and political interests and will be able to operate with true facts, rather than tendentious ones (Golovin, 1992: 144).

In the methodological sense, the science of war must be based on statistics, since it was this discipline that comes closest to being able to quantitatively investigate qualitative phenomena (Golovin, 1995: 12–13). This view is a logical development of the features of the study of war in Russia. A record of military statistics has existed in the Imperial Military Academy since its 1832 inception. However, while this discipline should form the basis of the methodology of the science of war, it remained a secondary discipline of the theory of the art of war and solves other tasks. To solve this problem, N. Golovin returned to it after the First World War and the Revolution of 1917, while he was in exile. The studying of the experiences and results of the war from the perspective of sociology has encountered serious difficulties in the analysis of statistical data. It required much work in all areas, including clarifying the meaning of the terms and concepts used in the preparation of statistical documents in different countries in order to develop methods for their analysis. (The military statistics on the extent of their development should be separated from the sociology of war [Golovin, 1992: 146].) The same idea is approved by them in his fundamental work The Science of War: On the Sociological Study of War (Golovin, 2008c: 119). As a result, he creates “a system of social indicators to analyze the effects of war (such as ‘military tension of the country’ and ‘moral resilience of troops’)” (Obraztsov, 1994: 93).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the scientific community widely discussed the issue of the role of biological factors in social life and human behavior. Golovin also paid attention to this issue. In his 1909 work Natural Selection and Social Assortment in Social Life (though published in 1913), he argues that “the sociality is the result of adaptation
in the form of habits, instilled through a number of generations of separate individuals” (Golovin, 2008a: 146). According to Golovin’s views, social life is preceded by biological forms of life that start with the simplest forms of organic life, but relies on other mechanisms. First of all, it is the mechanism of social assortment. This assortment “is expressed primarily in the union of people thinking the same way, believing the same way, together stakeholders, and therefore working together and fighting against those who oppose them” (Ibid.: 148). Social assortment is manifested at all levels of society, and represents a number of ‘threads’ such as religious, national, and others. Similar national threads in a modern society began to become generalized and unite with the others. Here, the author apparently defines the worldwide distribution of the national state as a form of organization of the state in mind. The mechanism of natural selection starts again at the level of the struggles of the nation-states. Eventually, the “struggle of these threads gets the ultimate expression in war” (Ibid.: 158).

Among other things, Golovin has made great efforts to institutionalize the sociology of war. He gave presentations in European and American universities, participated in sociological congresses, and organized the teaching of the sociology of war in military educational institutions of Russian immigrants. However, his plans have met opposition from some leaders of emigration. The press has begun a debate on the methods of military education in its pages. Soon, the discussion turned to philosophical questions, a discussion which took place in a spirit of confrontation between “Slavophilism” and “Westerners” (Domnin, 2012: 13). According to some scholars, Golovin had a great influence on the formation of military sociology in the United States (Kultygin, 1993: 133), and polemology (the science of war) in France (Solovyov, 1996: 32). In 1908, he was sent to France to study the teaching methods and the organization of research of the Higher Military School (L’école Superieur de Guerre) (Obraztsov, 1992: 135). Immediately after his return from France, he actively began teaching, and his research. He began the reorganization of the teaching of the art of war and its methods, which most older professors considered revolutionary. As a result of the confrontations in the teaching environment of the Military Academy, Golovin and his followers had to leave (Ibid.: 136).

In addition to Golovin’s research, there were other scientists who made great contributions to the development of the sociology of war. One of these scientists was Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968), one of the representative of the ‘civil’ direction in the sociology of war. His sociological views on the war can be divided into three distinct periods, in which his philosophical bases and methodological approaches are quite different. The first period includes his work before the 1917 revolution in Russia. At this time, Sorokin formed his basic views and methodology of sociology, its goals, and objectives. P. Sorokin raises issues of war and the army in his fundamental work Crime and Punishment, Service and Reward: A Sociological Study of the Basic Forms of Social Behavior and Morals. This work was published in 1914, and so does not bear the stamp of the enormous shock of the First World War. Among the major philosophical foundations of this work, it is necessary to highlight its positivism, evolutionism, moderate behaviorism, and psychology in understanding social processes.
The positivist approach to science in general and sociology in particular has been a feature of many scholars of the historical period under review. The recognition of the science of social phenomena as a “positive,” that is, having a solid foundation for a real facts, specific laws, and methodologies tending to the ideal of the natural sciences has become a powerful impetus for its development. For Sorokin, the idea of war as a typical phenomenon is not normal, and goes beyond the natural course of social life. The normal situation in society is an agreement between the people and their understanding of that agreement. For Comte, for example, it was the understanding based on positive philosophy, especially ethics. This was particularly characteristic of the proletariat, because, according to Comte, their inclinations, interests, and status across Europe were similar. This community of interests was pronounced and strong so there are no delusions that could destroy this unity. War is one of these delusions which is trying to destroy the unity of these views (Comte, 2012: 53); therefore, all its immaterial benefits are false, not to mention the fact that the material consequences of the war are always associated with the destruction involved. This axiological base is found in all of the Sorokin’s subsequent works.

In speaking of crime, Sorokin states that “currently, a number of murders (murder during the war, in the case of self-defense, the death penalty, etc.) is not only considered to be criminal acts, but, on the contrary, has been awarded as valiant acts” (Sorokin, 2006a: 148). The negative influence of war on society, in this case, would be that the reward for the killing is, in Sorokin’s terminology, the ‘train’ effect. It starts with a conscious understanding of the rewards and punishments for a particular behavior, as “aspirational and utilitarian reasons of a person can somehow influence the behavior of the individual” (Sorokin, 2006a: 229). However, the notion of the possible public reaction to a particular behavior “accordingly puts pressure on the psyche of man and forces him to commit an act or refrain from doing or to endure something, that without this effect would hardly have happened” (Ibid.: 230). Sorokin expresses this idea most clearly in his later works, in which he consistently pursued a behaviorist understanding of human behavior.

In the above-mentioned work, Sorokin examines the nature of social phenomena. This question is fundamental to all types of sociology and forms the ontological foundation of this science. Sorokin formulates the following thesis: “a social phenomenon is a connection of mental origin and it is realized in the minds of individuals, leaving at the same time the content and duration beyond” (Ibid.: 90). He then writes that “any social phenomenon can be decomposed into two elements that must be separated from each other: (1) a certain psychic experience or pure psyche, and (2) non-mental signs by which the mind is objectified or symbolized” (Ibid.: 103). Thus, Sorokin goes beyond the approach that reduces social phenomena to the phenomena of the mental. However, reliance on psychology in his understanding of social phenomena plays an important role, which brings its position in line with that of military sociologists. The principle of evolution in Sorokin’s early works was manifested in his understanding of the driving forces of social development. He rescales the consideration of social processes and from the analysis of the behavior of the individual, and proceeds to analyze the interactions within the group and between groups. He consistently finds the same pattern, that is, “a
different understanding of the proper, recommended and prohibited behavior leads to fighting, the same—to peace and mutual consensus” (Ibid.: 276). He notes that a merger and consolidation of groups usually occurs through a war. War in this case is the method of collective punishment of one group by another. The reason for the war, then, is the “inappropriate behavior of another group, in other words, its criminal behavior” (Ibid.: 290). Social evolution is a result of conflict and poverty. P. Sorokin emphasizes that a society without war “would be possible only when the social life would stand in one place and hasn’t evolved, or when changes in intra patterns of behavior committed by and at the same time in the same direction among all members of the group” (Ibid.: 299).

Sorokin’s new period of creativity began with the end of the First World War and the revolutionary upheavals in 1917. He pays the greatest attention to the sociological analysis of the axiological value, and the causes of war and peace. He sees the main reason for the war of unprecedented cruelty and casualties among military and civilians as a tragic incompatibility between the value systems of different societies. In his 1917 article “The Causes of War and Peace Terms,” he writes: “The main reason, or foundation, of internal social peace is the presence of coherent core values and relevant norms of behavior in the society, which are permanently included in the life” (Sorokin, 1994a: 491). The same condition is necessary for intergovernmental relations, although these values do not necessarily have to be the same for all societies. Value systems must be compatible with each other. In this article, there is a new philosophical basis of his sociology of war—the principle of systems. It is expressed in emphasizing the importance of the integrity of the system of values in order to maintain internal and external peace. Moreover, “one or other an isolated value is not makes peace or war itself, and the whole system of higher values acts as a whole” (Ibid.: 492). In a study of the degree of integrity of the system of values, the important place belongs to sociology. In Sorokin’s scientific views, this stage of history already plays an important role in the principle of holism (the primacy of the whole over the part), and the principle of non-reducibility of the system to the simple sum of its elements.

Sorokin continued the thread of moderate behaviorism in his later works. For example, this can be seen in his 1922 article “War and the Militarization of Society,” which also contains a large number of emotional assessments of the impact of war on human behavior. This is more typical for journalism than for rigorous scientific text, but the topic is clearly perceived as very emotional after the First World War. The author’s rejection of the war is manifested in three ways, Firstly, a long standing in a state of war leads to the assertion in a society of military-socialist model of management, since according to Sorokin, “The longer and more difficult a war is, the closer social organization develops to a military-socialist model” (Sorokin, 1994b: 356). This type of organization is necessary for society’s survival in the time of war, but at the same time, it prevents the development of arts and sciences, suppresses freedom and creativity, and makes society a “disciplinary army” (Ibid.: 357). Secondly, war changes people’s behavior for the worse: “The war . . . has taught people to behavior that is opposite to actions of peaceful life” (Ibid.: 357–358). It should be noted that both war and peace “teach” the person to act one way or another.
The author clearly returns to his idea of the “training” effect of rewards and punishments, extending this approach to all social phenomena. Thirdly, the war “not only reduces the population, but also dramatically change its qualitative composition. It takes the best from the field of life and leaves to survive the worst human material” (Ibid.: 358). This affects future generations since surviving “second-rate people” will procreate. Of course, such views could not remain unnoticed by the Soviet authorities, since, in addition to the scientific content, there was strong criticism of the Bolsheviks’ policies in Sorokin’s articles. One of his works was strongly criticized by V. Lenin, who questioned a number of statistical facts Sorokin used, and the methodology for the analysis of these facts. As a result, Lenin, in his usual manner, called Sorokin “the feudal,” “reactionary,” and one of the “graduated flunkeys of clericalism” (Lenin, 1950: 208–210).

In 1921–1922, shortly before his expulsion from Russia, P. Sorokin published a number of articles and monographs on the impact of mass starvation on society, and on the interconnection of starvation with global social upheavals of wars or revolutions. For example, in the article “The Impact of the War on the Part of the Population, Its Property and Social Organization,” he clarifies his understanding of the concept of the “quality of the population.” Sorokin wrote “As ‘the best’ I mean the elements of the population, which (a) bio—more healthful, (b) energy—more employable, (c) socio—a more moral, (d) mentally—a strong-willed, more talented, more gifted and developed intellectually” (Sorokin, 2003b: 557). Here, he continued the line of behaviorism and even biologism in the analysis of war. War distorts human behavior. This distortion is based on “a biological principle: the function creates the organ; the produced act is rebound reflected in the soul and the body of his actor” (Ibid.: 572). In his biologism, Sorokin’s comments on the arguments of the superiority of one race over another. Speaking about the influence of the First World War on society, he notes that “the war weakened the white, the most talented race in favor of the colored, the less talented” (Ibid.: 561). This thesis are not subscribed to in modern science, but they were quite common at the beginning of the 20th century, dating back to the ideas of social Darwinism. A number of modern Russian scholars researching Sorokin underscore the fact that he first called attention to the phenomenon of negative selection during the war. This is especially evident in his research of the civil war in Russia (Azarov, 2014: 59; Reviakin, 2008: 75). However, so-called positive selection also acts during wars and revolutions. Some statements of the proponents of negative selection caused doubt, and Sorokin wanted them to investigate further (Osipova, 2013: 97). Perhaps the theory of social solidarity and altruism as a positive deviance behavior resulted from this desire. Such behavior, in his view, is able to resist aggression, wars, and revolutions (Efremova, 2014: 72; Osipova, 2013: 104).

P. Sorokin continued the line of study of biological prerequisites of war in an important 1922 book, Hunger as a Factor. He reveals all aspects of the impact of starvation and all “eating behaviors” on the development of society, its organization, etc. In this paper, the author expressly declares “real reason for the war is hunger” (Sorokin, 2003a: 303). In addition, there is the positive feedback between these two phenomena: hunger creates war, and war creates hunger and other social evils. The longer a war lasts, the more dif-
It is difficult for a society to break out of this vicious circle. In his book, P. Sorokin explores the impact of war on the natural movement of the world’s population with extensive statistical material. Ideas about the dangers of the war, which until then were perceived as intuitively true, received a serious scientific rationale. The author studied all three indicators, the number of marriages, birth rate, and mortality. As a result, even this incomplete investigation reaffirmed his belief in the extreme hazard of war on society.

In 1922, P. Sorokin was expelled from Russia, and with this expulsion, the next stage of his scientific work began. In the sociology of war, he was associated with the final formation of the sociocultural approach (Obraztsov, 1993: 8). In the years 1937–1941, Sorokin wrote and published the book that has brought him worldwide fame, Social and Cultural Dynamics. First of all, the author formulates a number of key issues which should be engaged in the study of sociology. How often do sociocultural fluctuations accompanied by the destruction of the established system of social relations occur? How strong are the outbreaks of violence that occur? How long do these disorders last? Is there a trend when war breaks out, as well as a number of other issues (Sorokin, 2006b: 678–679).

The answer to these questions requires a large amount of statistical data and empirical evidence. However, P. Sorokin concludes that the study of war is faced with the difficulties in obtaining such evidence, or the inability to obtain this evidence (Ibid.: 680–681). Even in modern science, the problem of counting military losses is faced with great difficulties, and gives rise to conflicting schools of thought. P. Sorokin made a great contribution to the methodological foundations of sociology when he examined this issue. He noted that the main methodological difficulty in the study of war is the inability to “make an ‘accurate translation’ in a purely quantitative language of any phenomenon, which has a qualitative-quantitative essence. And the large part of social and cultural phenomena, including such as wars and revolutions, have precisely this property” (Ibid.: 681). This thesis should be an important epistemological foundation of sociology, namely, the representation of the truth and validity of the knowledge gained. According to Sorokin, “the study, and possibly inaccurate in many details, might still be valid in its most significant findings, if appropriate to apply to it the criterion of reliability” (Ibid.: 682). This criterion is the scale of the consideration of phenomena. Inaccurate data of the study of a particular war may enter the same set of data on other wars and used to identify a particular trend, and the dynamics of war of a century and era. It is necessary to choose the right indicators to measure these dynamics. Most researchers of the history of wars most commonly used indicators of the duration of the war to bring about its scale. In the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, a number of works were written which calculated the total “peaceful” and “military” time in the history of society, and made appropriate conclusions about the increasing or reducing the military burden on society. However, a simple comparison of the Hundred Years War with its sporadic military operations, and the First World War, during which the fighting took place for four years, shows all the inadequacies of such an approach. P. Sorokin proposed to assess the extent and dynamics of war by using these variables, showing the size of the army and the number of victims relative to the population (Ibid.: 687). Such an approach is productive, but, as noted above, is faced
with great difficulties in the selection of relevant statistical data. Application of this research methodology has led Sorokin to an unexpected conclusion about the dynamics of the wars in the history of Europe: “Our study did not reveal the presence of any kind has been a steady trend (based on relative terms) for all the considered centuries” (Ibid.: 703).

In his book, Social and Cultural Dynamics, Sorokin first uses the principle of ‘integralism’, which “is an epistemology, a theory of human nature, and a philosophy of history. While each element is analytically separate, in Sorokin’s discussion, they combine into complex cultural supersystems, and give great insight into the dynamics of society, and the process of history (Johnston, 1999: 27). Therefore, we can use this principle for the study of various social phenomena, including war. Moreover, Sorokin was trying to give his work the function of bringing people together in the face of present and future conflicts and upheavals. His research methodology allows for the prediction of the nature and content of historical global events, but not the specific times of these events. This possibility was based on the understanding of the processes that occur during the change of the type of dominant culture in the society: “Along with the war studies, they were attempts to inform and mobilize people for action. They combined analysis with moral injunctions and wrapped Sorokin in the cloak of prophetic sociology” (Ibid.: 32).

P. Sorokin’s conclusion has implications for the formulation of the ontological foundations of the sociology of war. The author concludes that the concept of «cyclical» and the concept of “linearity” in explaining the dynamics of the wars in the history of the society (Sorokin, 2006b: 712) are unacceptable. All attempts to justify the cyclical effects of war and peace, as if these cycles are tied to the periodicity of natural phenomena (such as the solar cycle), lead to the tendentious selection of facts and distort the real situation. The same thing happens in the case of linear representations. The idea about the growth or reduction of the burdens of war in the history of society is very often made in favor of a concept that has an ideological, religious, or populist basis. Furthermore, P. Sorokin’s calculations showed that the fluctuations of military activity had no clear periodicity or cyclical patterns.

V. Jeffries, the American researcher of Sorokin’s science legacy, noted that “the system of sociology contained in Sorokin’s writings is based on a comprehensive program of professional sociology. His ideas make three particular contributions to this form: a basic orientation to the nature and organization of the discipline, a close correspondence of theoretical development and empirical research, and the ontology and epistemology of integralism” (Jeffries, 2005: 68). Sorokin dedicated his scientific life to the idea of the integrated study of social processes. He never admitted to the possibility of explaining the phenomenon of war from the perspective of a single factor. For this, he was seriously criticized by Marxism and other philosophical and sociological schools of the monistic type (Osipova, 2013: 100). As a result, Sorokin’s integralism became one of the main philosophical foundations of the sociology of war in his papers. One of the main thesis of integralism is “that the reality that is the subject matter of the social sciences contains empirical-sensory, rational-mindful, and superrational-supersensory components” (Jeffries: 2005, 69). This approach allows us to examine the role of spiritual and psychological
factors during war. Also, if we want to study the nature of war, we can use integralism, because the phenomenon of hatred is based on the characteristics of cultural interaction between people and societies: “Sorokin explains solidarity and antagonism by cultural factors characteristic of the interacting parties: the nature of norms and values, whether they are concordant or discordant, and the degree to which they are expressed in behavior” (Ibid.: 74).

Other fundamental problems the author studied were the questions of the causes and the nature of wars. A condition for the possibility of any war is the breaking of organized relations between states. The character of a particular war depends on the type of society that begins any military actions. For ideational societies (i.e., based on the priority of immaterial needs), wars are typically religious, and war is fought for an idea. Societies of sensate cultures (the priority being physical needs) often start economic, utilitarian, or imperialist wars (Sorokin, 2006b: 719). Thus, the philosophical question about the nature and the character of the war, in essence, is dealt within the field of social sciences. However, the reasons that lead the society to sever relations remain quite uncertain. P. Sorokin admitted that all commonly enumerated reasons for war do not give a full explanation of such. It appeared impossible to identify a single cause or a single class of causes that can be used to explain the majority of military conflicts (Krotov, Dolgov: 2011, 38). However the approach is the so-called “multiple causation” also lacks in explanatory potential. This is the other extreme, a relatively monistic approach, which was previously mentioned. In this case, “say everything” means “do not say anything” (Ibid.: 42). The basis for the understanding of the causes of war is in Sorokin’s study of the causes of militarization of society during and after war. Militarization does not start at the beginning of the war. In the study of the militarization, Sorokin puts forward three factors: the survival instinct of society, changes on a personal level, and the loss of the best part of the population (Ibid.: 21–22). The same factors can be used in the investigation of the causes of war. Sorokin does so when he studied the role of starvation in social development, changes in behavior that occur under the influence of military service, and the impact of the incompatibility of cultures on the interaction of societies.

All of the above leads to several conclusions about the development of the sociology of war in Russia in the late 19th to the early 20th centuries and its philosophical foundations. Firstly, the sociology of war has developed in two ways: on the part of military science, and by civil sociology and philosophy. The military branch of the sociology of war was based on a long tradition of studying the phenomenon of war, formed at the beginning of the 19th century through the influence of French military thought. In addition, Russian military theorists were strongly influenced by the philosophy of positivism. At the beginning of 20th century, the sociology of war was used to analyze the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War.

Secondly, the civil branch of the sociology of war actively explores the negative effects of this phenomenon on society. This trend was characterized by a clear moral and ethical condemnation of the war. Through his efforts, P. Sorokin significantly advanced the research into the nature of war, depending on its nature from different conditions and
parameters of its dynamics. He had a great influence on the philosophy of positivism, evolutionism, social Darwinism, and recognized the seriousness of the role of psychological phenomena during the war. The main result of his many years of research was the creation of a unique sociocultural approach to the study of the problem of war.

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Философские основания русской социологии войны на рубеже XIX–XX веков

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В данной статье исследуются философские основания русской социологии войны. Философские основания науки относятся к метатеоретическому уровню научного знания и оказывают влияние на теоретический и эмпирический уровни. Философские основания включают в себя онтологические, гносеологические, аксиологические и методологические основания. Их исследование позволяет сделать вывод о целом ряде особенностей данной науки: основных идеях о природе и сущности феномена войны, о критериях истинности знания в военной науке, о правилах формулировки и вывода общих понятий и терминов, о методах получения нового знания и т.д. Предпосылкой к появлению социологии войны в России была русская военная мысль и философия войны. Собственно же социология
войны в России начала формироваться в конце XIX века. С другой стороны, развитие общей психологии и социологии повлияло на становление их разделов — военной психологии и социологии, так как война все чаще становилась предметом исследований, особенно после серьезных вооруженных конфликтов. Этому способствовала и логика развития военных наук, согласно которой военные явления рассматривались как социальные. Также бурно развивающаяся в данный период философия позитивизма обратила на себя внимание многих русских военных мыслителей и гражданских философов. Это привело к использованию концептуальных и методологических наработок этой философской школы в исследовании войн.

Ключевые слова: философия войны, социология войны, военная наука, Г. А. Леер, Н. А. Корф, П. А. Сорокин, Н. Н. Головин