The results of the project "Emergent vs Imposed Order of Social Life: The Modes of Interaction and Transformations", carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2014, are presented in this work.
About the Journal

The Russian Sociological Review is an academic peer-reviewed journal of theoretical, empirical and historical research in social sciences.

The Russian Sociological Review publishes three issues per year. Each issue includes original research papers, review articles and translations of contemporary and classical works in sociology, political theory and social philosophy.

Aims

• To provide a forum for fundamental issues of social sciences.
• To foster developments in social sciences by enriching theoretical language and vocabulary of social science and encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue.
• To provide educational materials for the university-based scholars in order to advance teaching in social sciences.

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В данной научной работе использованы результаты проекта «Спонтанные и навязанные порядки социальной жизни: модусы взаимодействия и трансформаций», выполненного в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2014 году.
О журнале

«Социологическое обозрение» — академический рецензируемый журнал теоретических, эмпирических и исторических исследований в социальных науках. Журнал выходит три раза в год (в апреле, августе и декабре). В каждом выпуске публикуются оригинальные исследовательские статьи, обзоры и рефераты, переводы современных и классических работ в социологии, политической теории и социальной философии.

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• Поддерживать дискуссии по фундаментальным проблемам социальных наук.
• Способствовать развитию и обогащению теоретического словаря и языка социальных наук через междисциплинарный диалог.
• Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

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Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильность, власть, нарративы, события и т.д.

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• Методология социального исследования
• История социологии
• Русская социальная мысль
• Социология пространства
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Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудиторию, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

Подписка

Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: http://sociologica.hse.ru/. Чтобы получать сообщения о свежих выпусках, подпишитесь на рассылку журнала по адресу: farkhatdinov@gmail.com.
Contents

EDITORIAL
Political Nation and Spatial Order: Towards a New Recombination of the Old Concepts................................................................. 7
  Alexander F. Filippov

ARTICLES
The Logic of the Border........................................................................................................ 18
  Ioannis Trisokkas
The Emergence of Borders: Moral Questions Mapped Out......................................... 42
  Joel Walmsley, Cara Nine
Practical Relevance as an Issue for Contemporary Border Studies........................... 60
  Serghei Golunov
Logic of Intersubjective Limits in Habermas Community........................................... 80
  Tatiana Weiser
Living in-between: The Uses of Marginality in Sociological Theory.......................... 94
  Svetlana Bankovskaya
Territoriality, State, and Nationality in the Making of Borders of Finland:
The Evolving Concept of Border in the Peace Treaties between Russia and Sweden, 1323–1809............................................................. 105
  Ilkka Liikanen
Bordering Wastelands.................................................................................................... 116
  Kateryna Pashkovska
Engaging Autobiography: Mobility Trauma and International Relations.................... 137
  Amanda Russell Beattie

BOOK REVIEWS
Limits of the National Surveys Predictive Capabilities, or, The Future of America....... 158
  Irina Trotsuk
## Содержание

### ОТ РЕДАКТОРА

Политическая нация и пространственный порядок: к новой взаимосвязи старых понятий ................................................................. 7
*Александр Филиппов*

### СТАТЬИ

Логика границы ........................................................................... 18
*Иоаннис Трисоккас*

Эмерджентные границы: разметка моральных вопросов ........ 42
*Dжоел Уолмсли, Кара Найн*

Практическая значимость как проблема современных исследований границ ..... 60
*Сергей Голунов*

Логика интерсубъективных границ в сообществе Ю. Хабермаса (или Почему мы не должны быть единым целым) ................. 80
*Tатьяна Вайзер*

Между границ: понятие маргинальности в социологической теории ........ 94
*Светлана Баньковская*

Территориальность, государство и гражданственность в создании границ Финляндии: возникновение концепта границы в мирных соглашениях между Россией и Швецией в 1323–1809 гг ................................................. 105
*Илка Лииканен*

Сортировка ценностей на Карельском пограничье ................................ 116
*Екатерина Пашковская*

Привлекая автобиографию: травма мобильности и международные отношения ................................................................. 137
*Amanda Russell Bittti*

### РЕЦЕНЗИИ

Пределы прогностических возможностей общенациональных опросов общественного мнения, или Возможное будущее Америки ........ 158
*Ирина Троцук*
The paper compares opposite approaches to the study of spatial order in contemporary societies. On the one hand, theories of globalization and world society argue that states and their borders are not relevant anymore. Globalization means world without borders, therefore contemporary global cities, being located within state borders, do not belong to their territories. In a global city, there is no room for common solidarity among citizens—those who go beyond state borders cannot become integrated to world society. On the other hand, there is much empirical evidence that states do not disappear. They still play a significant role. The state border delineates a part of space which people can feel emotional attachment with. The states can use legitimate violence against those who reside within its borders as well as enforce feelings of solidarity with those who live on this territory. This logic brings two notions of nation and nationalism. In a more traditional understanding of these notions based on kinship (“consanguinity”), culture and language, the state is defined as a tool for the constitution of nation, which needs territory with clear borders for survival. In contrast, the civic understanding of nation suggests flexibility of any identities, including the national one. Those who follow the second definition usually do not recognize its implications. On the one hand, a territorially located group can demand statehood to assert and guarantee its identity. On the other hand, a group, which has freely chosen its identity, also can demand spatial borders and, in the same vein, a state. These demands are connected with each other. Spatial definition of any group, which can proclaim itself as a nation and demand a state, contradicts contemporary organization of global cities. In this respect, sociology may be interested in how these two modes of space intersect, i.e. how the world society with its fluids and networks interacts with new states, being constituted within new borders.

Keywords: nation, nationalism, global city, world society, state, border

This is the first special issue of the *Russian Sociological Review*. Herewithin, the Editorial Board of the journal and the Fellows of the Centre for Fundamental Sociology of the Higher School of Economics begin a new series of our online publications. Every year, in addition to the regular three issues of each volume, we will prepare one to two special issues dedicated to the most interesting and contested themes of the social sciences. The present issue includes papers that focus on the problem of “border.” Their authors differ in research strategies and theoretical attitudes; they belong to different disciplines and
institutions. Now, they meet under the virtual cover of the *Russian Sociological Review*, not only due to the arbitrariness of the editors, and the rather vague thematic similarity implied by the term “border.” In an old-fashioned mode, I would say that it is life itself which breaks through our concepts and theories. The problem of “border” has its own moving force overriding our intentions and ambitions. Contemporary political, cultural, and economic situations change the spatial figures of the social world dramatically; new borders emerge; old borders acquire new transparency or, conversely, a new rigidity; new modes of bordering and different kinds of borders become relevant just here and now. All these transform the very idea of territory and place. Every process, every border emerging and disappearing, is a challenge. We have no convincing answers for these challenges; we only attempt to find these answers.

That was the reason to disseminate our call for papers in different social networks for social scientists. Surprisingly, we had received a few dozen proposals very soon. Almost all of them were very interesting; however, different obstacles prevented us from publishing more than half of the papers that were received. We shall publish another part of them next year in our regular issues. Now, I would like to express my deep gratitude to all those who responded to our call for papers, and to those colleagues who wrote reviews.

I also cannot fail to mention one significant event that gave me, as the editor-in-chief of the RSR, an additional impetus to start our publication series with this “borders” issue. Early in June of 2014, I participated as a keynote speaker at the first World Conference of the Association of Borderlands Studies in Joensuu, Finland. I was deeply impressed by the variety and quality of research presented there. I am grateful to the Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, and to Professor Ilkka Liikanen, who is one of the authors of this issue, for their invitation. I would like to take the opportunity to publish my slightly-modified short paper here, instead of a more conventional editor’s introduction.

I

It was not by coincidence that the theories of a new, borderless world began their short but bright career in the social sciences in the early 1990s, an extraordinary time, especially in Europe. A number of the old borders disappeared, for example, the border between East and West Germany, and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, at the same time, new borders emerged. For example, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the union republics became states with their territorial borders (these borders stayed transparent for a short time and then became more established, at least in several cases). As well, other countries like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia disintegrated. As a result, the number of states and borders has not diminished, but increased. What is more intriguing in this regard is that, in the social sciences, the concept of globalization has dominated. Globalization was seen as the emergence of a united world without borders.
The title of the famous book by Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (1990), was the motto of the nineties. However, sociologists were largely cautious about it; they tried to demonstrate that globalization does not mean the unification and total Westernization of the world. Roland Robertson argued in his famous *Globalization* that the time of the early nineties was the “phase of uncertainty” and that globalization does not mean integration. Such terms as “glocalization” and “hybridization” were attempts to counteract the very tempting ideas of a new homogeneous unity of the world as a huge financial-economic system, in which people, information, and cultural patterns (not to mention money, information, etc.) move more and more freely. To put it bluntly, the feeling of a new unity of the world with its state borders melting into the air was more powerful than all these vague concepts and subtle distinctions. The social scientists were more fascinated by the destruction of the old borders than they were interested in the new borders emerging in a seemingly borderless world. As Joachim K. Blatter formulated, “I argue that insights from border regions are useful contributions to the debate on ‘debordering the world of states’” (Blatter, 2001: 179). Thus, the “debordering of the states” was the main trend of the decade.

However, theories go their ways; they do not (only) mirror reality, but often say something very important in advance. Theories of globalization had their predecessors in times of firm borders that were taken for granted, at least in Europe after the World War II. In the middle of the seventies, Niklas Luhmann suggested a concept of the world society that was more sophisticated and, seemingly, had nothing to do with the world divided into territories controlled by the large military blocks (Luhmann, 1975). World society, according to Luhmann, was not identical with global society. Theoretically, he had constructed the concept more accurately. Luhmann described the same phenomena as the proponents of globalization. The old notion of society, Luhmann said, suggested that society is territorial because the main system of society is the political system, i.e., the state, and the state is a territorial entity. Then, in the course of the socio-cultural evolution, the economic system is prioritized over the political system. Society would then be considered as an economy that is not limited to the territory of the state; at the same time, it is becoming increasingly international. However, the differentiation of social systems

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1. In his next book, Ohmae proclaimed the “end of the Nation State” (Ohmae, 1995).
4. Luhmann elaborated and modified his theory until the end of his life, and his arguments of the 90ties are not the same as they used to be in his early writings. However, several general points concerning world society did not change significantly.
5. Other theories of the world society were elaborated largely without noticing Luhmann’s argument. Cf. Greve, Heintz, 2005, on the “parallel discovery” of the world-society by Niklas Luhmann, Peter Heintz and John Meyer. I think, their contribution is significant enough to be mentioned here. However, they are far less rigorous in their arguments than Luhmann. Cf. e.g.: “A considerable body of evidence supports our proposition that world society models shape nation-state identities, structures, and behavior via worldwide cultural and associational processes” (Meyer et al., 1997: 173). It is right, but hardly needs a sophisticated theory of space and territory.
continues. Now, you cannot say that a society is primarily state, or primarily economy (Wirtschaft). Society is the largest social system, which encompasses all systems, except territorially. It means that all the systems of the world society are world systems; economy and science, news information systems, and even education become international. In developing the concept of the world society, Luhmann emphasized that space loses its value. The development of telecommunications systems allows one to almost instantly overcome vast distances. This means that there is no difference between large and small distances; it means that everything occurs simultaneously. Now, changes on the New York or Tokyo stock exchanges have an immediate worldwide effect. Now, information comes immediately via television and the global electronic network. Now, one can live in one place and work thousands of miles away through the same communication network. These arguments have been repeated many times by many scholars. They combine empirical evidence, at least partly incontestable, with theoretically more vulnerable reasoning. What makes them vulnerable is their logical purity.

The global world has no boundaries. The world society definitely has no boundaries. This may seem trivial. However, if the global world has no external borders, it cannot be composed of restricted areas. It means that all the bordered areas of the global or world society are not its parts. At first glance, this seems to be a purely logical paradox; through the addition of a limited amount of locations (areas of limited size) you will never get as a result an infinite space. Then, the global world has to have borders. There are no outer borders of the global society, however, because there are no other territories behind, that is, no territories except those included into the space of the global society. There is only one way to overcome this difficulty. It must be recognized that the space of the global world is of a different nature. It is impossible to divide this space into separate fragments to get a set of several territories, say, of different states. It is an un-territorial space that cannot be divided into smaller territorial parts.

Therefore, the territorial principle of the organization of social life and the design of the world society are fundamentally different. When we travel and leave a territory, when we cross a border of any state, we do not find ourselves in a global society; we find ourselves in another state, in contested zones, or in some neutral area. However, we never get into the global society, which has no place, and no places at all. Where is the “world-societal”, or the “global”, then?

Is it possible that cities, especially modern global cities, are the sites of this kind? According to Saskia Sassen, cities are those territories which “are subnational”, but are of particular importance for the functioning of global networks as their central places. This is one of her crucial arguments; “In the 1980s, finance and specialized services emerged as the major components of international transactions. The crucial sites for these transactions are financial markets, advanced corporate service firms, banks, and the headquarters of transnational corporations (TNCs). These sites lie at the heart of the process for the creation of wealth, and they are located in cities” (Sassen, 2000: 11). She confronts cities and nation-states, their territoriality being “understood as exclusive institutionalized authority over its territory”; what is located in cities “cannot be seen as constitutive
of the state’s exclusive territoriosity. This is the type of framing of the relationship between territoriosity and state authority that comprises forms of globality constituted via localized actors encased in local places. The relationship between territory and state authority today can accommodate the existence inside national territory of denationalized spatialities” (Sassen 2006, 418). Social scientists often describe similar phenomena in a similar vein. For example, in the middle of the eighties, David Harvey wrote about the city as a “competitive unit within the uneven geographical development of global capitalism” (Harvey, 1985: 198). More recently, he draws attention to the “urbanization process that has now become genuinely global, in part through the astonishing global integration of financial markets” (Harvey, 2012: 12). In global cities, there are organizations located within that are included in international relations; “the corporatization of economic life across territorial boundaries is taking many forms” (Amin, Thrift, 2002: 64). Therefore, “We cannot claim territorial integrity for cities in this context” (ibid.: 65). I will not multiply quotations. You see, historically, the city was the place of power and solidarity; the very idea of the citizenship was born from city life. Now, they are spatial formations without boundaries, giving place to the nodes of international networks, and different movements that are global but localized in some spots of the cities. What about nation-states then? Craig Calhoun answers the question with a rather moderate argument; “We need not leap to the conclusion that globalization is fatally weakening the nation-state to see the prominence of both solidarities and activities that cross borders and ways in which transnational organizations and links may work to empower subnational regions or other groupings” (Calhoun, 2007: 108). It is a reasonable, well-balanced argument, but it hardly encourages us to formulate more risky conclusions. Nation-state and globalization are not balanced in reality as well as they are balanced in theory.

II

Twenty years ago, when the proponents of globalization proclaimed the decline, if not the end, of the state, Michael Mann wrote “The nation-state is thus not in any general decline, anywhere. In some ways, it is still maturing. However, even if it were declining in the face of the supranational forces . . . it is still gaining at the expense of the local, the regional, and especially the private forces. The modern nation-state remains a uniquely intense conception of sovereignty” (Mann, 1993: 118). This sovereignty covered, according to Mann, military, economic, and “other civilian” issues. He saw the nation-states activities and agencies intermingling with international, mostly European, institutions, everywhere. He was sure that states would not disappear in the next decades. We can say now that Mann was right. The states are still there as territorial political entities. Only states, (at least large powerful states), despite globalization, can combine their special kind of solidarity of large groups of people (their political nations) with financial, military, and police resources, which no city, no corporation, and no international organization possess. As seen by the classical sociological tradition, the territories of the sovereign states are the true places of society. In what follows, I shall combine two classical, well-known,
and seemingly, very simple arguments to demonstrate, in a purely formal, ideal-typical way, a couple of logical consequences of this view for contemporary sociological discussions.

In a classical definition, Max Weber wrote: “[T]he state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory—and this idea of ‘territory’ is an essential defining feature” (Weber, 2004: 33). These are well-known but often misunderstood words. At least sociologists would pay much more attention to the “legitimate violence” and “monopoly” than to “particular territory.” They fail to consider, in a due way, that this “monopoly of legitimate violence” exists only in a certain area (the translators added the word “idea” that is absent in the original German version). This means that the physical violence of the state in peaceful times (because wars do not know either legitimacy or monopoly of violence), cannot reach behind the state border. The state territory is a space separated from the spaces of other states. This is the area where the bodies of the citizens stay (the bodies of the citizens are the majority of the people’s bodies, strictly speaking). The state territory is a kind of container for them; the majority do not go in “outer spaces.” Traveling is a rare privilege of a minority, and has no influence on the main features of the state-territory-container. This is how the most obvious fact is constructed; a state has its own territory, no other states can occupy the same territory at the same time, and most people there are the citizens of the state who can be legitimately reached in this territory with the state’s tools of physical violence. This makes the state a rare, if not a unique, social formation. Other social formations, such as organizations, may jointly dispose of buildings or move from one building to another; as well, families can change their living quarters in modern societies, etc. Even a city, (more precisely, an urban community), while keeping its name, can move to a new location. A state, in most cases, cannot be divorced from its territory. If it changes its locale, it means a change of the state itself. Weber’s contemporary, Georg Simmel, called this feature the “exclusivity of space.” One “piece of space” (Raumstück) or “space area” (Raumgebiet), say, entails that a place excludes all the other areas simply due to its location. If a social entity belongs to this piece of space, the exclusivity of space, according to Simmel, becomes its specific feature. State, he continued, has this exclusivity. To some extent, ancient cities had this exclusivity, too, because they also had boundaries. The territoriality of states is the same as the exclusivity of their spaces. They have their sovereignty over these areas. The most important definition that Simmel provides in his article “The Sociology of Space” is as follows: “The boundary is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself spatially” (Simmel, 1997: 143). What is the state border then that separates one area from all the others? On the one hand, this is a spatial fact, a real object-in-space. On the other hand, it is a social (and political) fact. The languages, the customs, or the laws are not spatial things; that is, why they cannot be placed only on one side of the spatial border. They are not spatial, so then how can they stay in a spatial container? It is possible because social life consists, according to Simmel, not only in associations, but also in differentiations and separations of people. Simmel believed that spatial boundaries help people to objectify their social
differences. A border, according to Simmel, is one of the cases of the “spatial projection of social forms”. After a border between groups is established, they are better aware of their own identities as territorially-fixed groups. He introduced the notion of “solidarity with a piece of space” to describe people’s attitude to the (limited, bordered) territory where they are used to living for a long time. That is why the citizens of a state, closed by its border from the outer world, are not only accessible to the violence of the state, but also can have strong feeling of belonging to its territory. They not only obey the commands of the state, but also love their motherland with its landscapes, cities, and villages.

This argument may seem too abstract and ahistorical to be true. I think it can be partially true in a more complicated and historically substantiated system of arguments. I would like once again to reiterate this logical, formal-sociological approach to make it clearer.

Imagine that there are some more-or-less important differences between large social groups. To give more weight to these differences and to stand apart from each other, they build a wall, or let their border guard watch over the symbolic line that separates them, or agree that a river or a lake would be considered as a boundary between them. If this happens, a river, a lake, or a wall, or a conditional guarded line becomes the most evident feature of their differences. Each group becomes entirely aware of its unity, because it is located on the respective side of the border and feels solidarity with it, i.e., with the area where they are used to living, where the whole way of life is their own. The groups within a state can be still very different, however, even if they are subjected to the same legitimate power. They are made to live together as a single nation, though being far from any true homogeneity. This living together within a restricted state territory may influence their identification with this area.

It is a special kind of solidarity, not of citizens with each other, but of groups with their “pieces of space”. This, in turn, can become the basis of further identifications of groups. Formally, those who belong to the territory are the citizens of the state. Their solidarity with each other is strengthened and/or conditioned by their solidarity with the space. This is an ideal type; citizenship, feelings of territorial belonging, culture and language, and the resident location of population coincide, implying each other. The most interesting cases for sociology are those where something goes wrong, and the scheme does not work. In the modern world, we know of groups that have no territory, and no solidarity with any space. There are groups that identify their territory as an area that does not cover any territory of existing states. There are also groups that are residents on the territories of the states, consisting of people only having feelings of their belonging to the states and their landscapes, but without full citizenship there. Their awareness of border and their social actions and communications only partially refer to the existing borders of nation-states. However, the ideal-type construction of citizenship coinciding with the resident belonging, and civic solidarity would be a useful fiction for a modern state. In other words, national belonging would be identical with the respective citizenship, with

6. Cf. e.g., Todd, Le Bras, 2012, on the diversities of the regions of the classical, seemingly very homogenous nation-state.
all the other features of nation being pure products of education or the re-education of the people. The state would be the acting force of this education of the citizens. The state has its monopoly to violate not only the bodies of the subjects, but also to decisively influence the subjects’ feelings of belonging, and the subjects’ solidarity with a space.

Nationalist ideologies, however, draw on quite other assumptions. For them, the state would only be a tool of a nation to keep itself alive. Any large group that they are ready to call nation, needs, they say, its own territory. It can only retain its identity on this territory, and it needs a state to keep as their own. Only a state would prohibit any strangers from getting in and becoming aliens-in-the-state. Only a state would introduce rules of “consanguinity” in order to preserve the indigenous culture and language, and to support the economic activities of those who belong to the “nation” on their own territory. These are the principles that the proponents of the modern state would reject because, as they say, the culture itself can be a culture of the free choice of citizenship, and of the principles of association with others. A civic nation is built on the principle that is contrary to the principle of “blood”. For a civic nation, its spatial order, the bordered territory of its state is, in fact, the basis of homogeneity; the unanimity of the nation means the solidarity of those who are inside. The formal principle of border thus becomes the basis of solidarity.

Now, we can see the dark side of the arguments both in favor of a nation of blood and culture, and in favor of a civic nation. The formal principle of border can become the basis for free choices of group identity and homogeneity. Any large group that will assert itself as a nation-like one can declare its homogeneity as a nation within its borders, and struggle to be recognized as a state. It can be, in fact, a matter of free choice, but at the same time, it can be presented to the world as a narrative of blood and culture. The only reason for this group of people to be there is their identification and solidarity with the bordered area, a region, or a piece of space they have chosen as their motherland. However, they would be able to construct a number of narratives about blood, language, culture, and history to present themselves for themselves, and for the outer world as the indigenous population that has its rights of territory and state. Well-known conflicts of the last years provide us with much evidence of this kind; the borders of existing states would be contested by the groups that chose another cultural/national identity for themselves. They would like to reshape the borders, and this is the most important thing. They

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7. I can only mention here the discussion of—to use Michael Ignatieff’s dichotomy—blood or belonging (Ignatieff, 1993). Two critical arguments seem to be especially relevant and well-formulated here. In a few years after Ignatieff published his book, Bernhard Yack wrote: "It may be reasonable to contrast nations whose distinctive cultural inheritance centers on political symbols and political stories with nations whose cultural inheritance centers on language and stories about ethnic origins. But it is unreasonable and unrealistic to interpret this contrast as a distinction between the rational attachment to principle and the emotional celebration of inherited culture" (Yack, 1996: 197). Yack argued that a liberal construction of the nation-state is false, even for the modern Western States, where national traditions and cultural memory is the basis of what seems a consequence of a free decision of an enlightened citizenship. A few years later, Taras Kuzio, criticizing Hans Kohn, states emphatically: "Western states have evolved from ethnic to civic states only in the last four decades of the twentieth century. Without an understanding of this evolution of Western ethnic into civic states we cannot understand the nature of the civic state as containing tension between its universal liberalist and national particularist components" (Kuzio, 2002: 36).
converse their territorial identity into the national identity, and reinforce their ambitions by referring to culture and history. A nation has the right to territory, a territory is what a nation wants to have to survive, and a nation is what is there on its territory (or wants this territory, once lost, to be won back). The underlying principle of border can hardly be isolated here as a driving force; however, it helps us to disentangle social constructions from what seems to be the historical and/or natural core of a nation.

III

Any principle of a political nation is, in the long run, the principle of the territorial nation-state. The ambitions of new groups to become a political nation in the modern world run contrary to the processes of globalization. They cannot be described in the well-balanced manner as the remnants of nationalism, as new regionalisms, etc. This is simply another trend in the time of globalization. Borders between groups re-emerge as state borders, and nations re-emerge as nation-states and state-nations, but they do it in the globalizing, borderless world.

Sociologically, this is most intriguing. Global networks and flows exist in a borderless world; nation-states exist in the world, full of stable and changing borders; world cities enter into new combinations with the bordered world of the nations. That is why borders cannot divide the people with their fragile solidarity living in the world cities. No one acting in the networks of the global world would have a feeling of solidarity with the pieces of territory, or with people who are visible there. However, his house, his body, and the bodies of his relatives are accessible to state-violence. And the state where the respective world-city is placed would be able, nevertheless, to try to imbue the feelings of solidarity in all of its citizens.

The borders are born in the narrative, and objectified in political action.

It depends on a complex constellation of sociological factors whether these borders will remain an important part of the political rhetoric of social movements, or acquire the status of the new state borders in the course of struggles, or even wars.

References


Политическая нация и пространственный порядок: к новой взаимосвязи старых понятий

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Статья представляет собой отредактированную версию доклада, сделанного на первой всемирной конференции Ассоциации исследователей приграничных земель (Карельский Институт Университета Восточной Финляндии, Йэнсуу). В статье сопоставлены противоположные подходы к пространственному порядку современного общества. С одной стороны, теоретики глобализации и мирового общества настаивают на том, что государства и государственные границы уже не имеют значения. Глобализация означает мир без границ. Поэтому современные глобальные города, хотя и расположены на территориях государств, не включены в их пространства. В мировом городе нет обычной солидарности граждан, в мировое общество не может попасть тот, кто вышел за границы государства. С другой стороны, многое свидетельствует о том, что государства не исчезают. Они по-прежнему играют незаменимую роль. Два классических определения позволяют продвинуться дальше в теоретическом исследовании. Макс Вебер говорил о монополии на физическое насилие, которым располагает государство на своей территории. Георг Зиммель утверждал, что границы в пространстве — это объективация присущего людям стремления к обособлению друг от друга. Граница государства — это часть пространства, с которой они могут испытывать солидарность. Поэтому государство может не только применять легитимное насилие против тех, кто находится на его территории, но и внушать им чувство солидарности как принадлежности к тем, кто живет на этой территории. Здесь возможны два понятия нации и два вида национализма. Для более традиционного, ориентированного на «кровное родство», культуру и язык, государство — это орудие самоутверждения нации, которой требуется территория с четкими границами для самосохранения. Второе понятие — это понятие «гражданской нации», которое основано на идеи свободного выбора идентичности, в том числе и национальной. Однако приверженцы второго понимания нации не видят его оборотной стороны. Дело в том, что требование обособленности, осознание пространственной границы группы, требование государства для группы, у которой есть границы, и требование границ и государства для группы, свободно выбравшей свою идентичность, тесно связаны между собой. Эта пространственная определенность любой группы, которая может объявить себя нацией и потребовать государства, противоречит современному устройству мировых городов. Для социологов интереснее всего наблюдать за тем, как пересекаются два принципа пространства: мирового общества с его сетями и потоками и новых государств, утверждающих себя в новых границах.

Ключевые слова: нация, национализм, глобальный город, мировое общество, государство, граница
The Logic of the Border

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In his *Science of Logic* Hegel purports to give an account of a dialectical logic that generates the totality of being's fundamental structures. This totality does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness. *Any* phenomenon, whether cognitive, scientific, social or political, is based upon some or all of those structures. The paper presents and examines the logic of a structure which pervades *each and every* phenomenon: the border (*die Grenze*). It is analyzed as an advanced manifestation of "determinateness," an even more primitive structure of being, which makes explicit its intrinsic connection with not-being. What is distinctive about Hegel's analysis is that it establishes a logical character concerning the concept of "border" that precedes empirical observation and a connection with space. The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Hegel's dialectic of the border in such a way as to make this logical character apparent and convincing to contemporary audiences, who begin from the assumption that all discourse about border has an empirical basis and presupposes reference to space. It will be argued that, contrary to received opinion, the very phenomenon of "border" has certain universal and necessary features which explain its very possibility, are completely a priori and are established prior to any reference to space. A discussion about "borders" that excludes any a priori investigation into this phenomenon from its domain simply fails to illuminate its most important dimension: its logical core or, if you will, its universal and necessary attributes.

*Keywords:* Hegel, border, logic, determinateness, self-relation, something, other, negation

The purpose of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, "which constitutes metaphysics proper or purely speculative philosophy" (SL 27 / WdL I 16; SL 63 / WdL I 61), is to generate the totality of the fundamental structures of being. A "fundamental structure" is necessary and, therefore, a priori. In contradistinction to Kant, Hegel takes the generation of the a priori structures of being to be an immanent, though not transcendental, deduction of these structures from the concept of pure, indeterminate being. The totality of the fundamental structures does not exhaust the richness of being, but it exhausts the basis of this richness; any phenomenon whatsoever, whether cognitive, scientific, artistic, social or political, is ultimately based upon some or all of those structures and their interrelation. To put it differently, there is no phenomenon which is not pervaded by some or all of the fundamental ontological structures.

The paper endeavours to present and examine the logic of a structure that pervades *each and every* phenomenon. In this case, it is the structure of the border (*die Grenze*) (see Enz. I 197 [§ 92] Zusatz: "the border totally permeates everything that is there;" see also

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Taylor, 1975: 236 and Lakebrink, 1979: 122). It is, then, a structure which is not only necessary but also unrestrictedly universal. Hegel analyzes the border in “the logic of being,” the first part of the Science of Logic, the other two being “the logic of essence,” and “the logic of the concept” (on this distinction see Trisokkas, 2012: 333–334). It is analyzed as an advanced manifestation of “determinateness” (Bestimmtheit), an even more primitive structure of being, which makes its intrinsic stable connection with not-being explicit.

The concept of “border” is the dominant concept in the logic of being; it appears on almost every page after the inauguration of its defining content (SL 126 / WdL I 135). It comes into view only rarely in the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. In the logic of being, Hegel distinguishes between the “qualitative border” (developed in the sphere of quality and exemplified mostly, but not solely, as a feature of species-species, species-genus or genus-genus relationality, or, if you will, simply as a feature of property-relationality) and the “quantitative border” (developed in the sphere of quantity and exemplified as a feature of magnitude and number). In the domains of nature and culture (or “spirit”) which follow the domain of logic (viz. the domain of logos), the structure of the border keeps making frequent appearances, displaying itself as a fundamental ingredient of each and every natural and cultural phenomenon (for example, as a feature of bodies, communities and states).

What is idiosyncratic of Hegel’s treatment of the notion of “border” is that its very first appearance as a logical structure provides the core of each and every subsequent manifestation of the border. It is exactly the presence of this structure in all subsequent forms of the border that allows us to describe them as “border.” This logical core is more qualitative than quantitative (Hegel will show, surprisingly, that quantity follows from quality; see SL 111 / WdL I 118), but, still, its very essence is even more primitive than species-, genus- or property-relationality; it concerns simply the relation between something and its other.

Additionally, Hegel develops this logical core independently of spatial and temporal considerations and means it as a ground that makes even space and time possible. In his view, space and time acquire substance only in the domain of nature, which is derivative of the domain of logic (Enz. II 41–54 [§§ 254–259]). In this Hegel opposes Kant, for whom space and time, the a priori forms of intuition, are equally primordial and constitutive of knowledge as the a priori concepts (the categories) (KrV A19–49 / B33–73).

The article is addressed more to researchers in the field of border studies than to Hegel scholars. Hegel studies followed a rather awry path for a long time, concentrating on the “architectonic” and “absolutist” dimensions of Hegel’s project, neglecting thereby its minute details and local analyses of concepts. Recent studies, however, have changed this, with the result that such neglected concepts as “the border” have finally gotten the attention they deserve (such studies include Burbidge, 1981; Houlgate, 2006, and Winfield, 2006). The reconstruction of Hegel’s analysis of the structure of the border offered in the present paper may add to the insights of those studies and help us gain an even better understanding of this structure.

As noted, the article’s main concern is to convey Hegel’s “logical” understanding of the border to researchers in the field of border studies. The study of borders and border
discourse has acquired central place in the social sciences (but also, to a lesser extent, in the humanities) precisely because “borders have captured the fancy of the peoples of the world and they function as a grand motif in everyday life, everywhere” (Wilson and Donnan 2012b: 2). But while geography, history, political science, sociology and anthropology are universally considered as disciplines that can contribute to the understanding of borders (Wilson, Donnan, 2012b: 3, 5), philosophy, especially traditional, metaphysical philosophy, is almost never thought as having any usefulness to this project. There are two main reasons for this assumption. First, whereas for all the above disciplines being “rooted in space” (Wilson, Donnan, 2012b: 4) is the essential feature of borders, metaphysics, especially Hegel’s, has a tendency to determine the fundamental structures of the world independently of space. For Hegel, as we will see, it is not space, place, region, territory or any other spatial dimension that fundamentally characterizes the structure of the border, but rather the qualitative (or, if you will, “logical”) relation between something and its other. Second, no border discourse spoken within the limits of the aforementioned disciplines fails to include reference to the state; in fact the notion of the state is the dominant notion in border studies and determines all border discourse from the bottom up. As we will see, however, for Hegel, the most important discourse about border, the one that concerns its logical core, contains no structural use of the notion of the state (or any of its cognates: “agency,” “power,” “control,” etc.). The present essay, then, aims at putting this unorthodox understanding of “border” on the map of border studies and thereby enhancing the latter’s claim for interdisciplinarity.

The first part of the essay gives a dry, sketchy account of the development of the fundamental ontological structures from pure being to the emergence of the structure of the border. This is mandatory because Hegel’s analysis of the border depends heavily upon what comes before, and, therefore, will be incomprehensible without such an account. Moreover, Hegel believes that the only criterion of the truth of an ontological structure is that it has emerged immanently from structures that came before it. Analyses that begin from empirical or common-sense or encyclopaedic (i.e. not systematic) observations quickly disintegrate into endless disputes that hide rather than disclose the phenomenon under investigation (critique of the empirical, common-sensical and encyclopaedic starting-point in both philosophical and scientific inquiry is frequent in the Hegel corpus; see especially Phdg 11–67 and WdL I 19–34, 42–43, 86–87; see also Trisokkas, 2014). This is significant because if the question “is there a single and necessary logical structure of border?” is raised, one should not give a negative answer based on the opinions or empirical investigations of the various border theorists or even the opinions of the people who live around the border (as, for example, Green (2012) does; see my remarks in the final section of the paper). The way in which the logic of the border is derived in the Science of Logic is the alpha and omega concerning its truth. What prevents this logic from being false or dogmatic is its presuppositionless derivation from pure, indeterminate being. The second part describes the logical moves that give content to the structure of the border, and culminates in the latter’s separation from both “something” and “its other.” In the third part, some of the themes that emerged in the second part are further illuminated,
and particular emphasis is paid on what it means for the border to have a life of its own. I conclude with some reflections on what Hegel’s logic of the border means for inquiries into this phenomenon that lie outside philosophy.

I

The absolute beginning of the immanent derivation of the fundamental ontological structures is sheer being (Sein), that is, “pure being, without any further determination” (SL 82 / WdL I 82), the very subject-matter of the derivation posited in its utmost generality. But sheer, indeterminate being can be thought of only as nothing (Nichts), so “being . . . is in fact nothing” (SL 82 / WdL I 83). This thought of nothing is not the negative thought of the absence of being; it is rather the positive thought of absolute nothingness, sheer, indeterminate nothing (see Henrich, 1971: 88). When we are thinking of being with no determination, we end up thinking of nothing with no determination. Sheer being is sheer nothing.

The thought of sheer nothing, however, has the immediacy of being; nothing is (or, as we say, “there is nothing”). By thinking of nothing we come to think of being, because nothing is. Pure nothing, then, comes out of pure being, and pure being comes out of pure nothing. The one vanishes into the other. This constant movement of vanishing of being into nothing and of nothing into being Hegel calls becoming (Werden). Being, the subject-matter of ontological thought, has proven to be not only being and nothing, but also becoming. Being-as-becoming is the endless parade of being followed by nothing, and vice versa.

The event of becoming has certain ramifications that lead to its “sublation” (on this notion see SL 106–107 / WdL I 113–114) and the emergence of the structure of being-there (Dasein), which provides the domain in which determinateness will develop. First, by being the vanishing of being and nothing into one another, becoming entails their distinctness. Without this distinctness, there would be no becoming (SL 106 / WdL I 113; see also McTaggart, 1910: 17). Second, however, by vanishing into one another, being and nothing prove to be indistinct. If their distinctness did not vanish, they would not vanish into one another. Their vanishing simply means the cancellation of their distinctness. Third, the vanishing of the distinctness of being and nothing entails the vanishing of becoming, the vanishing of the vanishing; for without being and nothing being distinct there would be no movement from the one into the other (which is exactly what becoming is). Thus, the event of becoming has the logical consequence that (a) being and nothing are distinct, (b) being and nothing are indistinct, and (c) becoming vanishes.

This last point (c) pushes the dialectic forward, for thought is now obliged to consider the vanishing of becoming (SL 106 / WdL I 113). It is not the case that all is becoming. But what is the structure of being when the vanishing of being into nothing, and vice versa, vanishes? It surely cannot be nothing, for then becoming re-emerges. And it surely cannot be pure being, for again becoming re-emerges. But the dialectic has revealed nothing else than being, nothing and becoming—and the latter vanishes, so we are left with nothing else
than being and nothing. We have to reflect on the cause of being and nothing generating becoming. The cause is their purity, which makes them, while being distinct, indistinct, and thereby vanish into one another. Thus, if becoming is to vanish, the purity of being and nothing has to go. The vanishing of the purity of being and nothing does not result in the vanishing of being and nothing (for this would again be becoming); it results rather in their stable unity, their settled inseparability and coexistence (SL 106 / WdL I 113). This is the only possible result of the vanishing of becoming.

Being, then, is not only sheer fleetingness. What structure does this stable unity, which Hegel calls being-there (precisely because it denotes a stable element, not because it is “in a certain place,” “the idea of space is irrelevant here” (SL 110 / WdL I 116)), necessarily exhibit? Being and nothing are inseparable from one another, but they do not vanish into one another. The “inseparability” of being and nothing is their stable connection or unity. Being is no longer pure; it is being-that-is-not-being (or simply “being that is not”). Nothing loses its purity as well; it is not-being-that-is. The moment of “not-being” in this structure is called determinateness; thus, what makes being-there determinate (bestimmnt) — to wit, an element that is not simply being, that is something more than simple being — is the not-being included in it, the not-being that is inseparable from being. In other words, exactly because of the not-being it contains, being-there is determinate being (SL 110 / WdL I 116; see also Houlgate, 2006: 298). Determinate being is “the unity of not-being with being” and “on this as ground all further determinations are developed” (SL 111 / WdL I 118; here, the phrase “all further determinations” denotes all characterizations of being beyond the simple repetition of “being” and its falling into “nothing”).

Determinate being, the unity of not-being with being, is quality (Qualität) when the emphasis is on not-being (determinacy) (SL 111 / WdL I 118; see also Trisokkas, 2012: 114); it is being-that-is-not-being or, if you prefer, not-being-that-is. Simply, quality is the same as determinate being, but with the emphasis on the fact that it is determinate. When the emphasis is on being (being-that-is-not-being), determinate being is immediacy (Unmittelbarkeit). Determinate being is immediate when the emphasis is on the fact that it is instead of on the fact that it is so-and-so.

The not-being, however, which is emphasized in the structure of quality, generates a distinction in the domain of quality. This happens because it is a compound and the emphasis can be placed in either one of the two constituents; it can be not-being, but it can also be not-being. By this distinction Hegel wants to direct our attention to the fact that not-being, the quality of being, can manifest itself in such a way that the fact that it is inherently negative is hidden and what appears is only its immediate presence (SL 112 / WdL I 119-120). To use — perhaps inaccurately — an empirical example, we can think of this apple as being red without explicitly thinking that this is so because it is not green. The unity of being with not-being is affirmative quality; the unity of being with not-being is negative quality. Hegel calls affirmative quality reality (Realität) and negative quality negation (Negation) (SL 111 / WdL I 118). What the dialectic has now shown is that the
determinateness of being is both a reality and a negation. It should be noted that this reality is distinct from determinate being; it is its reality but is not identical with it, for it contains also a negation (i.e. a negative quality, the is-not). Reality and negation are the two sides—the two constitutive moments—of determinate being’s determinateness (SL 111 / Wdl I 118). Being is determinate in that it is what it is (reality) and is not what it is not (negation).

The development of the dialectic demonstrates that determinate being must be something (Etwas). Reality is distinct from negation (SL 114 / Wdl I 121–122), but what underlies their distinctness is one and the same structure, namely not-being (to wit, quality/determinate being): “Reality itself . . . is determinate being. . . . Similarly, negation is determine being . . .” (SL 115 / Wdl I 122). Thus, the distinction between reality (not-being) and negation (not-being) is internal to determinate being (not-being); when reality negates negation in order to be what it is (i.e. an element that is not negation), what appears is not pure being or pure nothing but rather determinate being itself, and the same holds when negation negates reality. The differentiation of determinate being proves, then, to be self-relating; it starts from and returns to itself. It is a self-relation precisely because it returns to its own self after it has been differentiated: it is simplicity that is “again equal to itself” (SL 115 / Wdl I 123), “a reconstituted identity,” in Burbidge’s words (Burbidge, 1981: 47). Determinate being is an identity-and-difference which, however, has the structure of the movement of self-relation. This exact structure of self-relating determinate being is what Hegel calls something (SL 115 / Wdl I 123).

Something is a self-relating determinate being that has quality (note here that Hegel speaks of quality in general, not many qualities; the thing-with-many-qualities comes much later in the Science of Logic; see SL 484 / Wdl II 129) which exhibits itself both as reality and as negation. As a reality-with-a-negation, something asserts itself as an immediate determinate being. In other words, the self-relation of something asserts itself simply as something that is. But as a reality-with-a-negation, the being-that-is-not-being, something is obliged to negate its own self, its very own self-relation; this is so because all there is at the moment is something (hence there is nothing else to be negated). The negation of something generates a not-something. But this not-something cannot be pure nothing, for this has already vanished, giving its place to determinate being. Therefore, it must be the case that the not-something which results from the negation of something is itself determinate being. Yet, as shown, determinate being is necessarily something. The negation of something, then, creates a not-something, which, however, proves to be itself something.

This move is significant because it is mediated by the negation of something. Hegel calls the not-something that emerges the other (das Andere). The other proves to be itself something; a self-relating determinate being that has quality which exhibits itself as reality and negation. But still, the other is something that is not-something (SL 116 / Wdl I 124). This is the first time in the dialectic that two stable structures have emerged as distinct: something can be an other only if there are at least two somethings, to wit, two self-
relating determinate beings. Moreover, the dialectic has proven that something comes always in par with an other; there can be no something without an other.

Something and its other stand next to one another indifferently; each relates only to itself by starting from and returning to itself (SL 116 / WDL I 125). Thus, as Houlgate (2006: 323) puts it, “negation is a constitutive moment that falls within something, but the otherness that something necessarily brings with it must form an interior sphere of its own that stands apart from something.” Yet, the other is itself something, for it is self-relating determinate being; this makes something itself an other. Thus, something is both something and other and the same holds for the other of something (SL 118 / WDL I 126).

The morale of the story is that the other is part of the identity of something, but also that there cannot be an other without something being there first (Doz, 1987: 65). Both something and its other can have an identity of their own only if they are something and stand next to one another. Reality is always the reality of a multiplicity, of something and its other.

The dialectic focuses on the something-which-is-an-other or, if you will, the other-which-is-something; for each something is, as seen, necessarily an other. By being an other, something makes otherness a property of its own self; it is a dimension of its identity. Something is in itself an other. This feature gives otherness an independence from the other something, in the sense that it applies not only to something else but also to the something which is its own self. As Hegel remarks, “the other . . . although an other in relation to the something, is nevertheless also an other on its own account, apart from the something” (SL 118 / WDL I 126). The idea here is that otherness does not require exclusively relating something to an other something, but it can function also within one something. Something others its own self (SL 118 / WDL I 126).

This self-othering of something manifests itself in two ways. It can be the othering of something, to wit, something becoming an other of itself. But it can also be the othering of an other, which means that something becomes again its own self (i.e. that which is not an other), returning thus to itself from its being an other (Rinaldi, 1992: 148–149). This continuous process of one’s becoming an other of oneself while returning to oneself Hegel calls alteration (Veränderung) (SL 118 / WDL I 127). Something is a self-relating and other-relating determinate being which continuously alters itself and thereby “unites with its own self” (SL 118 / WDL I 127).

The determinateness—the not-being—of something has now shown itself to be the result of a threefold process; (a) the negation of the other something, (b) the negation of something itself and (c) the negation of the otherness of something itself. By negating both the other something and its own otherness, something preserves an identity (SL 119 / WDL I 127). The dialectic now focuses on something’s relation to the other something, which (relation) Hegel calls being-for-other (Sein-für-Anderes). Each and every something—to wit, anything that is—necessarily has a being-for-other.

Recall, however, that something, besides having a relation with its other (i.e. its not-being-the-other), is a self-relation. Insofar as it is a self-relation, something has no relation with its other (SL 119 / WDL I 128); they are both independent, self-enclosed, isolated
spheres of existence. This feature of something, its very independence from its other, Hegel calls being-in-itself (Ansichsein). Being-in-itself stands in opposition to being-for-other, but they are still both “moments of one and the same something” (SL 119 / WdL I 128). Being-in-itself is necessary in order for something to be something, but its being-for-other is necessary for it to be determinate. This is a paradoxical structure, but it necessarily applies to something nevertheless.

Something has being-in-itself, an identity of its own, insofar as it opposes itself to its being-for-other, its relation to the other. As Hegel puts it, “insofar as something is in itself, it withdraws from otherness and being-for-other” (SL 120 / WdL I 128). This is a paradox, for something’s being-for-other becomes constitutive of its identity, its being-independent-from-the-other; without it something could not withdraw from it. Yet, the same holds in reverse; something has being-for-other insofar as it has being-in-itself, an identity of its own. For without something’s being distinct from the other, the other could not be its other. As Hegel notes, being-for-other is “negative determinate being which points to being-in-itself as to its own being which is reflected into itself, just as, conversely, being-in-itself points to being-for-other” (SL 120 / WdL I 129).

Hegel, then, pace Kant, certainly thinks neither that being-in-itself has absolutely nothing to do with being-for-other, nor that it is a “lofty” philosophical notion that designates a content beyond human knowledge (SL 120–121 / WdL I 129–130). His point, rather, is that being-in-itself, the identity of something, is involved in the latter’s relations to the other somethings (being-for-other) and is manifest therein. He calls this involvement of being-in-itself in something’s being-for-other determination (Bestimmung), in contradistinction to determinateness (Bestimmtheit), which, as seen, is simply the general sphere of the not-being-that-is. Determination is the intrinsic character of something that is involved in something’s other-relatedness, in its being-for-other; determinateness is the general domain of other-relatedness (SL 122–123 / WdL I 131–132). Determination, in other words, is only a dimension of determinateness; it is not reducible to it. Again, determination is the element which belongs to the identity of something, but at the same time is shown in its relation to its other; determinateness is simply the relation of something to an other. Houlgate (2006: 349) puts it well: “A thing’s determination is not coextensive with its other-relatedness but is the being-in-itself, or identity, that a thing asserts in its relations to others (in seinem Sein-für-Anderes). The word ‘in’ indicates that a thing’s determination informs but does not completely overlap with or exhaust its other-relatedness.”

It is important to observe that something’s being-in-itself contributes to something’s relation to other somethings, to its being-for-other, but precisely because it does not exhaust this relation, the latter must involve also elements which do not come from something’s identity. Elements which influence the latter instead of being influenced by it. Since there is as yet only something and its other, the elements which contribute to something’s being-for-other and do not come from something’s identity must come from the other. Hegel calls this dimension of something’s being-for-other something’s constitution (Beschaffenheit). In Hegel’s own words, “constituted in this or that way, something is in-
involved in *external* influences and relationships” (SL 124 / WdL I 133). Something’s being-for-other, then, is composed of its determination and its constitution. The first designates a spontaneity, the latter a receptivity.

It has now become clear, though, that determination must alter through constitution, for the reason that they are both *in a single element*, namely something’s determinateness (SL 124 / WdL I 133). If something’s being-for-other *includes* also its being-in-itself (and *vice versa*), the former’s being influenced by the *other* necessarily leads to the *latter’s* being othered (see SL 124 / WdL I 134: “insofar as that which something is *in itself* is also present in it [i.e. in its determinateness], it is burdened with being-for-other; hence the determination is, as such, open to relationship to other;” and “the determinateness which thus holds the other within it, being united with the in-itself, brings the otherness into the latter or into the determination . . .”). Determination is, then, influenced by the other through its connection with being-for-other, which includes constitution, and *exactly for this reason* it must change, to wit, *other itself*. The morale of the story is that by coming to contact with the other, something exhibits its identity, but at the same time it receives elements *from the other* that transform this identity. Something still has a determination, but in the process of relating to the other this very same determination collapses to constitution. This is not an event that cancels determination out, leaving something only with its constitution. Something always has an identity of its own, but every time it comes to contact with its other, its identity is reconstituted. The constitution of something permeates its very core—it does not simply paint the colours of its surface (SL 125 / WdL I 134: “The constitution belongs to that which the something is in itself; something alters with its constitution”).

We have learned that there is no something without an other (cf. Enz I 197 [§ 92] Zusatz: “In something we *at once* hit upon the other, and we know that there is not only something, but also something else”), and that something’s identity (a) exhibits itself in its relation to its other, (b) contributes to this relation and (c) is affected by this relation. As the other is also something, the same holds for it. Both something and its other have a constitution and a determination which are affected by their relation. Yet, all this “contact” of something with its other does *not* reach a point where the difference between them collapses; as somethings, something and its other are self-relating and thus maintain their otherness. Houlgate (2006: 356) puts it well: “Something in its ownmost being must . . . influence and be influenced by its other and *at* its heart it must *not* be that other.” It is exactly at this point that the structure of the *border* makes its first appearance.

This stability of otherness (“the other remains always an other”) adds to something a *border*. Something influences the other and is influenced by it, but this does not cancel something out. The influence passes over into the domain of something, it even alters it, but at that moment it belongs to something, not to the other. The border designates the (logical) point where the other *ends*. As Hegel notes, the border of something is “the
ceasing of an other in it” (SL 126 / WdL I 135). And since the other is itself something, it has a border as well.

Hegel points out that the preservation of something holds even in the event of self-othersing (SL 125–126 / WdL I 135). Something’s being-in-itself negates not only the otherness of the other something, but also the otherness of one’s own self; for, as seen, something is itself necessarily an other. By othering itself, something falls back into itself, which is exactly the characteristic of something (self-relation). Thus, the phrase “ceasing of an other in it” applies also to something’s own otherness, i.e. the otherness that is internal, not external, to it. In short, in all alterations of itself, whether these have their source in the other or in something’s own self, something preserves (erhalten) an identity (viz. its in-itself) by stopping otherness.

The border, then, is a radical negation; it is not that negation that simply generates quality, but rather it is the negation that wholly distinguishes the other, as an other, from something. It is at its border that something affirms its identity and its separation from the other. By having a border, something is able to be something else than its other. Without a border, it would become one with its other (and thereby collapse into pure being and nothing). Hegel makes this point lucidly: “[something] is posited as relating itself negatively to the other and in so doing preserving itself” (SL 126 / WdL I 135).

But, paradoxically, despite its creating a rift between something and its other, the border attaches something to its other. This is so because there is no border without the other; something by itself would not have a border and hence would be no-thing. The border exists precisely because something and other are there as distinct elements. Something needs the other in order to have an identity and it is exactly this phenomenon that substantiates the border.

Further, the border is common to something and its other; it is shared by them. The reason for this is that the border of something, which is the endpoint of something, is the starting-point of the other—but “from the other side.” To put it differently, something stops at its border precisely because the other is there; and the other stops at its own border because something is there. Thus, something and its other share the border that defines and distinguishes them. Radical-negation-of-the-other and attachment-to-the-other are features exhibited in/by both sides of the border. Something and its other have a border which is one.

Hegel collects these essential features of the border into a single definition:

There is a single determinateness of both [something and its other], which on the one hand is identical with the being-within-self of the somethings as negation of the negation, and on the other hand, since these negations are opposed to one another as other somethings, conjoins and equally disjoins them through their own nature, each negating the other: this determinateness is the border. (SL 126 / WdL I 135)

The border is a “single determinateness” precisely because it is shared by both something and its other and is a “single determinateness” because it covers the sphere of not-being
(the border denotes exactly the “logical space” where something is not its other). The border has two main functions. First, it negates the simple not-being-the-other because something, by having a border, has a character of its own, a character that is independent of the other. This character is the being-within-self of something. There is a sense, then, in which the border negates even the negation of the other, precisely because there is a sense in which something has absolutely nothing to do with the other. Second, the border “conjoins and equally disjoins” something and its other. It conjoins them because without the other something cannot distinguish itself as something. In this sense, the border brings something and its other together (in Hegel’s words, “there is an affirmative community of something with its other” (SL 126 / WdL I 135)). It disjoins them because the border is the point where both something and the other stop; the border creates a rift which remains uncrossed by both something and the other, as others. In this sense, the border keeps something and its other apart.

The picture of being that has now emerged is no longer one in which a multiplicity of somethings stand next to one another in a relation of indifference. Rather, the border is a sign of the existence of an interactive plane of character distinctions. It denotes relations-between-somethings that shape their very being, that is, their identity and determinateness. To put it differently, while the primitive notion of something included a being-in-itself which had the function of closing something into itself by withdrawing it from the other, something-with-a-border constructs a barrier that actively stops the other from entering its domain as an other. There is thus a greater degree of interaction with the other in the case of the bordered something than in the case of simple something. This greater interaction increases the amount of determinateness being disclosed.

The difference of something-with-a-border from simple something becomes more apparent if we distinguish between two kinds of negation, namely (a) simple negation and (b) radical negation. Simple negation is a not-being that denotes a withdrawal: something withdraws from its other and exhibits a total self-relation, an “abstract in-itself” or “the immediate identity of something with itself,” as Hegel calls it (SL I 122 / WdL I 131–132). Using observation terms, we would say that what we observe is simply the thing and nothing else. The focus falls solely on something, the other being in its shadow. This simple negation is the one that characterizes a simple something. Something-with-a-border, by contrast, exhibits radical negation. The latter represents more a pushing of the other than a withdrawal. Something-with-a-border visibly denies the other entrance into its domain, and for this exact reason its in-itself is explicitly mediated (vermittelt) by the negation of its being-for-other (SL I 122 / WdL I 132). Radical negation, then, is more of a negation than simple negation and is a feature of something that stems from its having a border. As Hegel puts it, in something-with-a-border “the not-being-for-other becomes prominent” (SL 126 / WdL I 136). The difference, then, between simple negation and radical negation is one of emphasis; in radical negation the other is more explicitly present than in simple negation.

The dialectic has disclosed that the structure of the border is quite complex and ambiguous. The reason for this is that its functions are contradictory. On the one hand, it
aspires to exclude the other and show something as being fully independent (i.e. a self-relating being). On the other hand, it cannot do without the other, because the very character (determinateness) of something is shaped through its distinction from the other (the “not-being-the-other”). Hegel makes this point clearly in a passage where he refers to the individual. The individual denotes a structure that does not belong to the logic of being; it belongs rather to the logic of the concept, the third and final part of the Science of Logic. As a structure, though, that incorporates (or, in Hegelese, “sublates”) the structure of something (i.e. the individual is also something), the individual has a border when it behaves simply as something. This is an underperformance by the individual, which is a structure characterized more by immanence, the “swallowing” of the other, than by opposition, the confrontation with the other (a detailed analysis of the concept of individual in Hegel’s philosophy can be found in Trisokkas, 2012: 187–221). The passage goes as follows:

The individual is a self-relation (Beziehung auf sich) through its setting borders at all [its] others; but these borders are thereby also borders of itself, relations to an other (Beziehungen auf Anderes), it does not have its determinate being within its own self (in ihm selbst). To be sure, the individual is more than merely an entity bounded on all sides (das nach allen Seiten beschränkte), but this more belongs to another sphere of the [Logic, i.e. to the sphere of the concept]; in the metaphysics of being, the individual is simply a determinate something, and in opposition to the independence and self-subsistence of such something, . . . determinateness effectively brings into play its appearance as negation. (SL 113–114 / WdL I 121; translation modified)

The passage confirms what has been said hitherto; the individual, as something, is a self-relation only because it stops the other at its border; but this border stops also the individual from passing over into the other. Yet, the determination of the individual requires the presence of the other, so as the individual to have the self-relation it must have; its determinate being is, then, not within the individual but rather at its contact with the other. All in all, the individual-as-something-with-a-border is a contradiction, an ambiguity; it is a self-subsistence but also an other-relatedness (a “negation”).

This ambiguous nature of the structure of the border has the corollary that it creates a “logical space” which belongs and does not belong to something. Something is the border of the other and the other is the border of something, but still the border is distinct from both something and its other. The border belongs to something precisely because something is the point where the other stops being itself and enters into the domain of something else. But it does not belong to something because the other, which is the border of something, is excluded from something. As, however, the other is also something, there arises the notion of a border or borders which is/are independent of all somethings (i.e. of every-thing). Something, then, is the border, but also, paradoxically, lies outside the border. It is necessary of something to have a border, but it is also necessary of the border to have a substance and identity of its own. In the language of Horstmann and Wadley (2006), the “margins” have now become “centers.”
This is a new development in the dialectic. Something must have a border in order to be what it is, for the border is exactly that element which marks it off from the other and gives it an identity of its own. And yet, since it is shared with the other, the border must be negated by something. Thus, the border comes to light as an element which is (also) distinct from something and has a life of its own. In the third section we will examine this peculiar life of the border in more detail.

III

Something is not a bubble amidst a multiplicity of bubbles; it is influenced by its other and influences the latter in turn. This influence engenders alteration, the alteration of something’s being-in-itself, its identity. Nevertheless, despite its continuous change through the other, something always remains what it is, namely itself; something always has an identity, even if that identity is altered. The border is exactly that element that allows this to happen. Something-with-a-border maintains its identity as the something that it is while it is being influenced and changed by the other. Having-a-border means stopping the other from entering, as an other, the identity of something. Crossing a border means crossing into an other’s identity. As a border, something is, in Hegel’s words, “the not-being of the other” (SL 126 / WdL I 136).

It is perhaps the right place to note that the structure of the border has, firstly, emerged purely a priori and, secondly, acquired a content that is prior to any reference to space (which is distinct from what we called “logical space,” a purely conceptual element) (for an opposite view see Theunissen 1980: 269). The border is, as seen, an advanced manifestation of quality and the same holds for something. The dialectic shows that in the logical domain quality comes before quantity. The border, then, denotes a structure that is first and foremost qualitative (see Enz I 197 [§92] Zusatz; Stace, 1955: 143; Harris, 1983: 103), the resistance to “othering,” to the intrusion of the other-as-an-other. Of course, as the dialectic develops, there will be quantitative manifestations of the border and in the philosophy of nature the border will acquire an explicitly spatial form. The reader, however, must always keep in mind the much richer, purely qualitative inner core of the border, a core that allows it to manifest itself in diverse fields of everyday life and scientific inquiry.

The disclosure of something as a border initiates a whole series of logical moves which culminate in (a) the separation of the border from both something and its other and (b) the characterization of such a separate element. First, it is acknowledged that not only something but also its other is a border. The other thus resists the force exercised on it by something and thereby maintains its identity (while at the same time remains open to something’s qualities). Something stops the other at its border, but it is also the case that the other stops something at its own border. In the same way, then, that something is “the not-being of the other,” so the other is “the not-being of something” (SL 126 / WdL I 136: “But the other is itself a something . . . therefore . . . its border . . . keeps the first something as its other apart from it, or is a not-being of that something”).
Second, the impression that we are now talking about two borders proves to be an illusion, for there is just one border. The other stops at the border of something, but the latter also stops at the border of the other. Yet, at the point where something stops the other begins, and there where the other stops something begins. Thus, the border is one and the same; it denotes exactly the same point. This means that something both resists to othering (i.e. asserts its identity) and is affected by the resistance of the other (i.e. is stopped from intruding the other) at the same border. The border, then, appears as a rich plane of interaction; it is at the border where each something becomes what it is, but also feels the aggressive presence of the other.

Third, insofar as something and its other have proven to be the single border of each other, this border appears to be an element that rises above the singular negativities of somethings (viz. the border is no longer as something or as an other). This is so because both something and its other stop being themselves at the border; so the border is certainly not them, it has acquired an existence that is independent of them. As Hegel puts it, “[the border is] not only not-being of the other, but not-being equally of the one and of the other something, consequently of the something as such” (SL 126 / WDL I 136).

Fourth, this separate border appears not only as a “place” of interaction, but also as a highly paradoxical structure. For it is at the border where something asserts its identity, but also stops being what it is! The sphere of something and the sphere of the other determine each other’s quality, but also cancel one another out. Hegel could not be any clearer: “[The border] is the mediation through which something and other each as well is, as is not” (SL 127 / WDL I 136). Note that this paradox is a necessary condition for the possibility of something. In order for it to be the determinate thing that it is, something must both have a relation with its other and stop where the other begins. This holds for everything; humans, plants, states, social groups, artifacts, imaginary objects, neurons, or quanta (Enz I 197 [§ 92] Zusatz). Something is what it is by both finding and losing itself at the border.

Fifth, insofar as something stops being what it is at the border, its identity separates itself from the border; and the same holds for the other, which is also something. In Hegel’s phrasing, “something has its being-there outside (or, as it is also put, on the inside) of its border” and “the other, too, because it is something, is outside it” (SL SL 127 / WDL I 137). In this way, the border becomes an element which is not something. It is what-lies-between-something-and-its-other, the middle ground, a Lichtung: “The border is the middle (die Mitte) between the two of them in which they cease” (SL 127 / WDL I 137). Hegel emphasizes that this in-between is beyond something and its other, a fact that places, as a consequence, something and its other beyond each other (SL 127 / WDL I 137). This adds to the paradoxical structure of the border; something has an identity precisely because it has a border, but in order to have a border it must be outside the border (SL 127 / WDL I 137). Houlgate (2006: 365) expresses this quite nicely: “The [border] thus detaches itself logically from whatever something and its other are and shows itself to be other than the two spheres of being between which it falls.”
The question is this; what logical content does the detachment of the border from something and its other produce? Since without the border something loses its contact with the other, what is lost in this instance is the determinate being of something in relation to the other. As, however, the other is also something, it loses its determinate being in relation to something. This does not mean that something and its other become pure being or pure nothing, precisely for the reason that they are now stably determined against the border itself (i.e. they do not vanish into it). Something and its other are the not-being of the border and vice versa. They both have a determinateness, then, but this is so in relation to the border, not to each other. Further, since they do not have a negative relation with one another, something and its other collapse into one determinate being, viz. something in general, or in terms of their otherness against the border, the other in general. Here is how Hegel puts it:

But further, something as it is outside the border, the something without a border, is only a determinate being in general. As such, it is not distinguished from its other; it is only determinate being and therefore has the same determination as its other; each is only a something in general, or each is an other; thus both are the same. (SL 127 / WdL I 137)

The main significance of the detachment of the border from something is that the difference between something and its other collapses. They are no longer “aggressive” against each other, but become “one” against the border. This happens when the border appears alien to both something and its other, an element that is much bigger than they are, an element that “encompasses” or “opposes” them both. It is certainly important that the border does not here mediate between somethings, but rather stands against them. There is nothing beyond the border besides itself. Every-thing there is finds itself staring at the endless abyss of the border. This is the pure infinite, the dark hole which contains nothing but itself. (By this I do not mean that the border is indeterminate; only that there is no something beyond it.) In this dimension of itself, the border can quite appropriately be called “the limit” (rather than simply “the border”); it is that which limits something as such.

Besides being the limit of something, however, the border is also its beginning; for there where something finds its end, it finds also its beginning. Hegel gives us an example from the sphere of mathematics: “The point is . . . the border of the line, not merely in the sense that the line only ceases at the point, and as a determinate being is outside it; . . . on the contrary, at the point the line also begins; the point is its absolute beginning” (SL 128 / WdL I 138). This is important because it shows that the border, whatever character it has, affects and moulds the determinate being of something. Even when confronted with absolute darkness, something acquires a character through this confrontation. The line is what it is and develops the way it does exactly because its border is the point and not an altogether different element (SL 128 / WdL I 138). Although spatial examples are inappropriate here, the same, one could argue, holds for, let us say, a people whose land
is surrounded by the ocean instead of by a forest. This people will acquire a character shaped by the nature of its border.

Sixth, the relation of something to the border is equally one of non-detachment, precisely because it always holds that “the border is essentially equally the not-being of the other, and so something at the same time is through its border” (SL 126 / Wdl I 136). Hegel repeats the phrase “at the same time” three times, stressing thereby that the non-detachment of the border from something is an irreducible feature of the border (and the same holds, of course, for its detachment): “. . . at the same time its border is, as the ceasing of the other in it, itself only the being of the something; through the border something is what it is, and in the border it has its quality” (SL 126 / Wdl I 136). What the reader must note here is that it is not only that something behaves paradoxically at its border, but also that the border itself is paradoxical. It is both detached and not-detached from something; it has and, at the same time, does not have a life of its own.

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the independence of the border from something designates only a dimension (or “moment”) of the, admittedly highly paradoxical, structure of the border. For the border, despite its independence, is still the border of something. Without something there is no border, just as without border there is no something. Hegel expresses this contradiction very clearly in his Philosophical Propaedeutic: “[Something and other] are (1) distinct from the border or from their difference which is their middle, outside of which they are something [in general]. But (2) the border belongs to them because it is their border” (PP 128 [§ 20]).

Seventh, the simultaneous “detachment” and “non-detachment” of the border from something whose border it is affects how it appears to this something. Something feels “at home” at its border because it is there where its determinate identity is affirmed. But it also feels the presence of the other there, as the other has the same border with something itself. Still, something feels the danger that looms at the border because it understands that crossing the border means losing its identity and becoming an other. Finally, as the border has detached itself from something, the latter, being unaware of another something, feels the danger of losing itself completely in the border when it enters its domain; it also feels awe (Hegel calls it “unrest” (Unruhe); see SL 128 / Wdl I 138) in front of an element which has no something beyond it. All these dimensions characterize, in a paradoxical fashion, how the border appears to something.

Eighth, it is the first time since the appearance of something that an element appears which explicitly is not something. Hegel’s ontology is thus enriched with an altogether different type of entity; the in-between, the middle, the boundary, or what the Presocratics tried to capture by referring to the void or the ether. Until now we were talking about a universe full of somethings, as if there was nothing between them. Now we have discovered that between them lies an element, which, on the one hand, is not something, but, on the other hand, is not nothing either. One must be careful at this juncture not to apply representational or picture thinking (Vorstellung) to the idea of a “third element” (besides something and its other), which insists that “all there is must be something” (see
Rinaldi 1992: 151). The border, as proven, is, in some of its dimensions, the *not-being* of something; so, it cannot be something.

**IV**

At the very beginning of the dialectic of the border Hegel warns us that this structure “manifests itself . . . as an entanglement (*Verwicklung*) and a contradiction (*Widerspruch*)” (SL 126 / WdL I 136). Indeed, what we have encountered is nothing but a highly paradoxical phenomenon. Yet, while we acknowledge the contradiction of the border, we do not seem able to pinpoint an “error” in what has been disclosed. In fact, it seems what we have learned is what we knew *all along*. In Hegel’s words, the truth of the border “is everywhere before us” (*allenthalben vor uns ist*) (SL 85 / WdL I 86). A kind of “recollection” (*Erinnerung*), then, seems to have been at play in our interaction with the dialectic of the border (on the function of “recollection” in Hegel’s philosophy see the essays in Ricci and Sanguinetti 2013). This should not come as a surprise, since, as noted, “the border totally permeates everything that is there” (Enz. I 197 [§ 92] Zusatz).

Hegel believes that what has been revealed as the structure of the border is a *primitive* ontological structure, in the sense that it necessarily underlies each and every manifestation of border, whether this be in the social, political, biological, physiological, artistic, or any other domain of inquiry. He also believes it is a structure that characterizes being itself, not simply our thought of being. Whether we existed or not, there would be borders in the universe (as long as there is *being* and *something*); but, of course, elements that belong peculiarly to manifestations of the border in a *cultural* domain (such as the border of the state or of the community) would be absent in the absence of humanity.

What does Hegel’s logic of the border mean for inquiries into this phenomenon that lie outside philosophy?

(1) First of all, it should make all those investigating “borders” aware that the concept of the border is *not* altogether “subjective” and/or “arbitrary,” and that it has a logical core that is *not* “up for debate.” Moreover, despite statements to the contrary (Wilson and Donnan 2012b: 4), border studies must take into consideration not only the fluid and changeable aspects of borders, but also their everlasting, unchangeable logical content. This logical concept of the border, exactly because it is an *objective* concept and has a *timeless* content, must be taken into consideration by every researcher of the phenomenon.

That there is a single and necessary “logic of the border” is a thesis explicitly denied by Sarah Green. Green grounds this denial in a couple of empirical observations. She notes that borders show themselves as being “capable of taking different forms in almost every respect,” including “their officially intended purpose and meaning” (Green, 2012: 575). This meaning is heavily affected by “historically changing . . . political and economic conditions” (Green, 2012: 575). Yet, Green is quick to point out, there are known cases of borders whose meaning has remained the same for long periods of time; as she puts it, “the long-term maintenance of particular border configurations and dynamics is com-
mon” (Green, 2012: 576). There is, then, variability, but also permanence concerning the meaning of empirical borders. From this Green concludes that “there is little that could be inherent about their characteristics as borders”—“not even the tendency for borders to change regularly is an inherent characteristic of borders” (Green, 2012: 575). She also universalizes her conclusion, stating that “everyone is aware that no borders have yet proven to have eternal properties” (Green, 2012: 576).

Based on this variability of meaning, Green claims that historically the understanding of borders has been filtered through that aspect of meaning which has been emphasized each time. Emphasizing one aspect results in one “logic of border,” while emphasizing another aspect results in another “logic of border.” Thus, the variability of meaning concerning empirical borders results in the existence of a variability of “logics of border.” The “Westphalian logic of border,” for example, which is “a European invention dating back to the Middle Ages” (Ben Slimane, 2010: 37), “focuses strongly on binary distinctions: the qualities and character of each side being defined by its diametrically opposed difference from the other side” (Green, 2012: 577). The “Maghreb logic,” in contrast, does not divide sides in this way. The edges of the Maghreb dynasties remained undetermined, for “there was no restriction on people or goods moving across their regions,” and “there was no explicit, singular or coherent meaning for these peripheral regions” (Green, 2012: 578).

Green is not always consistent in her expression, as at one place she tells us that “borders always involve a form of classification and categorization of the world, because otherwise they would not be recognized as borders” (Green, 2012: 576–577, my emphasis). This, however, is certainly a slippage, as it is followed by statements such as the following: “[T]here is nothing inherent about the character or nature of borders; there is no universal ‘borderness’ that applies anywhere and everywhere. . . . [I]nstead, they are the outcome of a particular way of understanding, constructing and performing them as border” (Green, 2012: 579). And she makes the point clearly and very strongly in the following assertion: “[T]he obvious point that borderness can be multiple, even to the extent of some people recognizing a place or a thing as a border while others do not see anything except landscape, is a crucial aspect of what could be called ‘borderness dynamics’” (Green, 2012: 581).

Green’s argument fails on two fronts. On the one hand, she seems to derive the thesis that the border does not have “eternal properties” and a “single logic” from the fact that authorities and “borderlanders” alike frequently change their behaviour toward a landscape that is characterized as a “border.” This, however, is a category mistake, for it implies that one goes about proving or disproving a logical category (“the border”) from human experience in nature. Indeed, since all nature is fundamentally characterized by change, how could the unalterable and eternal be derived from it? This is simply impossible. Such a conclusion does not have anything to do with one’s empirical findings, but with the very essence of nature and the human experience in it, namely that they are driven, by definition, by change. Green’s mistake reminds us of Hume’s mistake, who attempted to disprove the necessary (to wit, a priori) existence of the logical category of causality in nature while basing his argument on empirical observation!
On the other hand, Green seems to derive the thesis that the border does not have “eternal properties” and a “single logic” from the fact that empirical manifestations of “border” exhibit opposing logical characteristics. In “Westphalian logic,” for example, a border denotes a sharp distinction between this and the other side of the border. In “Maghreb logic,” by contrast, this distinction is blurred and the border denotes rather an open space, both an intersection and an independent region between something and its other. However, to derive from this that there is no single logic of border presupposes that no logic can contain opposing or differing logical properties. This, though, does not hold for the logical system generated in Hegel’s Science of Logic. The universal category of “border,” for Hegel, is a dynamic element, a logical organism that develops through the incorporation of opposing and differing properties; it is persistence rather than static instantiation (I have defended this interpretation of the Hegelian universal in Trisokkas, 2009). This has been proven also in our preceding exposition of the logic of the border. Indeed, what Green shows to be opposing properties of a border have been shown to be necessary, a priori features of a single logic of border. Thus, all different “logics” which Green conceives as arbitrarily imposing an understanding of borders actually have as their basis the single presuppositionless logic of the border. They are differentiated precisely because they emphasize one rather than another feature of this (one and only) logic.

(2) Second, by taking the logical notion of the border seriously, every researcher is obliged to pay attention to the immense complexity of the phenomenon. This will help them heed unsuspected dimensions of empirical manifestations of borders, such as the fact that while they are intrinsically linked to the identities of “things,” they also have a life of their own. There is, it is true, a certain correspondence between the a priori findings of the logic of the border and the empirically-based theoretical results of border theorists. Mark Salter, for example, distinguishes between three instances of border performativity (Salter, 2011: 66); (a) formal: borders are delimited and defended, (b) practical: people, goods and ideas cross the border, and (c) popular: the meaning of borders is challenged and thereby changes. We have seen that Hegel’s logic of the border contains “moments” that correspond, more or less, to these three empirical manifestations of border. First, borders are delimited and defended when the identities of something and other are at play (this is a feature of borders highlighted by Anderson, 1996). Second, people, goods and ideas cross the border when something is determined by its other, and vice versa. Third, the meaning of a border is dramatically changed whenever a different logical component of the structure of border is emphasized (this, again, is highlighted by Green, 2012: 573–576). But while these empirically-based theoretical constructions have an air of contingency and arbitrariness, Hegel’s analysis shows that such logical features of the border are necessary, universal and systematically interconnected.

Reflecting a bit more on the logical feature of the border having a life of its own, we can detect an affinity between this idea and such hegemonic concepts in border studies as “border landscapes” (geography), “borderlands” (history), and “border regions” (sociology and anthropology). Through these concepts scholars attempted to grasp the content of a border that is independent of those elements which it itself distinguishes. Strassoldo
(1982), for example, conceives life within a border region as ambivalent and torn between the distinguished sides. Baud and van Schendel (1997: 235) point out that there are cases for which it holds that borderlands have the upper hand in their relation with their states rather than vice versa. Wilson and Donnan (2012b: 9) note that borderlands “encapsulate a variety of identities, social networks and formal and informal, legal and illegal relationships which tie together people in the areas contiguous to the borderline on both of its sides” (my emphasis). Anzaldúa (1987), Alvarez (1995), Danforth (1995), Ballinger (2003), and Zartman (2010) all stress that there is a moment when people living at borders acquire a character that transgresses the character of both sides of the border. Roitman (2005: 137–146), defines the “people of the border” as a “floating population” (population flottante), precisely in order to emphasize the distinctness of their character vis-a-vis the populations occupying the sides of the border.

(3) Third, Hegel by no means wants to maintain that his philosophical analyses of the various “conceptual” manifestations of the border exhaust everything that can be said about it. Quite the contrary; his view is that anthropological, ethnographic, political, sociological, literary, historical, and other studies of “borders” enrich our knowledge of this phenomenon. The same holds for empirical case studies of particular borders, border peoples and border programmes and policies. But Hegel is adamant that studies of such kinds do not eliminate the logical concept of the border and the content it has acquired in the Science of Logic. This is a recurrent theme in Hegel’s philosophy. As he shows the utmost respect to and appreciation of the non-philosophical sciences, he expects the latter to show the same degree of respect and appreciation to philosophy (on this see especially Houlgate, 2005: 115–121). And it must be admitted that researchers in contemporary border studies do not seem to include (metaphysical) philosophy in their programmatic statements concerning an interdisciplinary study of borders. Anssi Paasi, for example, writes that border studies researchers need

to reflect on our concepts of the theory rather than trying to develop a general theory of borders. This is best done in relation to other categories inherent in geography and the social sciences, such as region, place, space, territory, agency and power, to social practices such as politics, governance and economics and to cultural processes such as ethnicity or national socialisation (education). (Paasi, 2005: 670)

This statement by Paasi reflects the general sentiment of border theorists, namely that the study of borders is restricted in the domain of the social sciences and is hegemonically determined by notions such as space, state, and economy. Developing “a general theory of borders” is something to be avoided (on this see also Newman, 2006: 156). This is exactly where Hegel would disagree with Paasi and Newman, for in Hegel’s opinion, a general logical theory of border, first, can be beneficial to a collective attempt to understand borders and, second, does not necessarily undermine all other empirical approaches in the field.
Of course, there are issues of controversy here. Whereas Hegel expects empirical scientists to conduct their empirical research within conceptual frameworks determined by logical (to wit, a priori) inquiry, there are scientists (such as Green) who deny exactly this idea, to wit, that borders have a universal logic. For these researchers, real world events and real contexts provide the starting-point of any theoretical construction and not simply the instantiation of a logical structure. This is always a fundamental difference between hardcore empirical approaches and Hegel’s logical project. For Hegel, case- and comparative studies of borders cannot take place unless there is already a logic of border at hand. This must be so precisely because what unites all studies and analyses, namely the very notion of “border,” must have a logical core that determines its minimum meaning, and thereby the very possibility of applying it to different empirical contexts. For example, Hegel would find the early attempt in border studies to generalize from the examination of a single case of border (a “hyperborder”), such as the Mexico—US border, to a general theory of borders (see especially Martínez, 1994, but also Romero, 2008 and Almaráz, 1976: 10) unacceptable and much worse than the beginning from a logical theory of border.

(4) Finally, Hegel’s logic of the border may open new pathways of research into this phenomenon. Indeed, current research seems to begin its investigation of “borders” by placing it immediately and uncritically into the horizon of space. Hegel has shown that even before we think of a border as embedded in space, we assign it a rich conceptual, purely logical content. Our manipulation of borders-in-space can never lead to the annihilation of this logical content and for precisely this reason it must always be taken into consideration whenever this phenomenon is researched.

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В «Науке логики» Гегель ставит задачу описать диалектическую логику, которая порождает тотальность фундаментальных структур бытия. Этой тотальностью не исчерпывается все богатство бытия, но ею исчерпывается то, что лежит в основании этого богатства. Любой феномен, будь то когнитивный, научный, социальный или политический, основан на некоторых или даже всех этих структурах. В статье показана и исследована логика структуры, которая предшествует каждому феномену, а именно границы (die Grenze). Она понимается как проявление той «определенности», которая является еще более простой структурой бытия, что эксплицирует ее внутреннюю связь с небытием. Особенностью гегелевского анализа является то, что он обнаруживает логический характер понятия «границы», которое предшествует и эмпирическим наблюдениям, и связи границы с пространством. Задача статьи заключается в реконструкции гегелевской диалектики границы, чтобы убедительно продемонстрировать ее логический характер для современных исследователей, которые предполагают, что любой дискурс о границах имеет эмпирические основания и предполагает связь с пространством. Статья показывает, что сам феномен «границы» имеет определенные универсальные и необходимые характеристики, которые объясняют саму его возможность и являются в полной мере априорными и схватываемыми прежде любой отсылки к пространству. Обсуждение «границ», которое исключает любое априорное исследование этого феномена, таким образом, не способно прояснить его самое важное измерение: его логическое ядро или, если угодно, его универсальные и необходимые атрибуты.

Ключевые слова: Гегель, граница, логика, определенность, самосоотнесенность, нечто, другой, отрицание
The Emergence of Borders: 
Moral Questions Mapped Out

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In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence”—advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997)—is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the discussion of territory. In particular, we argue, weak emergentism about borders allows us to distinguish between (a) using a theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying whether or not it is justified (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Many authors conflate these two factors, or identify them by claiming that having one without the other is in some sense incoherent. But on our account—given the concept of emergence—one might unproblematically be able to have (b) without (a); at the very least, the distinction between these two issues is much more significant than has often been recognised, and more importantly gives us some reason to prefer “statist” as opposed to “cultural” theories of territorial borders. We conclude with some further reflections on related matters concerning, firstly, the apparent causal powers of borders, and secondly, the different ways in which borders are physically implemented (e.g., land vs. water).

Keywords: emergence, explanation, prediction, borders, statism, cultural nationalism, territorial rights

Introduction

The concept of emergence has a rich and detailed philosophical history; the 20th century saw something of a rise and fall in its popularity, but the last couple of decades have seen resurgent interest in defining the concept in general, and applying it to specific cases in particular (see McLaughlin, 1992). Whilst the concept has been most popular in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, it has been applied in fields as diverse as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, AI and sociology. This paper aims to extend that application even further, by considering the nature and moral justification of territorial borders from within what we will call an emergentist framework.
For whilst the diverse applications of the concept of emergence have led to a proliferation of different definitions (surveyed in section 2), there are nonetheless some common features that make for a natural application to the explanation and justification of territorial borders. All conceptions of emergence are attempts to characterise a kind of hierarchical dependency relationship where—it is claimed—the “higher” level depends on, but cannot be reduced to, or predicted from, the “lower” level alone. Thus, three features of territorial borders seem to provide good prima facie reasons for discussing the matter in emergentist terms: (1) borders seem to depend on social, psychological, historical and geographical contingencies, but (2) once borders are drawn or formed, they may be discussed and contested in their own right, because (3) borders seem to exert a causal-functional influence on the very people and societies that determine them. Furthermore, the interactions between social, psychological and historical factors that give rise to borders are extremely subtle and complex. Thus, even if one had substantial information about those “lower level” factors, it would still be very difficult to predict (or stipulate) a priori where borders would (or should) be drawn. We argue, therefore, that the vocabulary of emergentism is ideal for a discussion of borders, and provides substantial insight into some of the central moral and political questions surrounding them.

We start by canvassing the major extant varieties of emergentism, and draw out one particular conception—“weak emergence”—that we argue is particularly useful for the discussion of territorial borders. We subsequently go on to examine the contrast between “statist” and “cultural” theories of borders. Putting these together, we note that the distinction between prediction and explanation in weak emergence maps onto a distinction—between using some theory of borders to say where they should be drawn in advance, and using some theory of borders to examine the justification of existing borders retroactively—in the discussion of borders. Accordingly, since we argue that borders may be regarded as weakly emergent features, this distinction may be invoked to defend “statist” theories against the charge that they are deficient in virtue of being too retrospective. Rather, the fact that statist theories can only evaluate the justification of existing territorial borders is exactly what one would expect, given their status as weakly emergent. We conclude with some further reflections on the causal powers of territorial borders, and the way in which territorial borders are physically implemented.

**Emergence: A Taxonomy**

It’s sometimes said that the concept of emergence is an attempt to make philosophical sense of the old truism—often attributed to Aristotle—that in some cases, “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” In particular, the concept is often applied to examples where wholes, systems, or higher levels display properties that are not possessed by the parts or lower levels that make them up. Thus, we find informal characterisations referring to phenomena such as the “sponginess” of cake (entirely absent from eggs, flour, butter and sugar) or gridlock in a road network (not possessed by any particular car, intersection or set of traffic lights). There are various ways of metaphorically characteris-
ing this, but all display the same kind of tension (if you’re a sceptic) or middle-ground (if you’re an advocate) between two things being simultaneously very closely related or dependent, but also—in a sense—different or autonomous.

Moving away from particular cases in order to put things in more general terms, Mark Bedau (1997: 375–6) notes that there are thus

“... two admittedly vague but nevertheless useful hallmarks of emergent phenomena:

(1) Emergent phenomena are somehow *constituted by*, and *generated from*, underlying processes,

(2) Emergent phenomena are somehow *autonomous from* underlying processes.”

In contemporary discussions of emergence, the first of these hallmarks is usually construed as a kind of dependency claim, whilst the second is usually understood to entail (some kind of) unpredictability. But depending on how one construes the two instances of “somehow” in the above quotation, one can formulate a variety of different precise conceptions of emergence. In this section, we will very briefly canvas this taxonomy of different positions, before turning to the conception of emergence that seems most apt for characterising questions about borders.

The main distinction between different theories of emergence concerns whether they make ontological or epistemological claims, that is, whether emergence is best construed as a relationship between *things themselves* or as a relation between our ways of understanding, theorising or describing those things. Further, the kind of unpredictability displayed by emergent features may vary; a weaker version of the theory sees unpredictability as merely a practical matter (perhaps due to limitations of capacity or speed in our cognitive apparatus), whereas a stronger version of the theory supposes that there’s some *in principle* unpredictability.

The basic idea behind ontological emergence is that in some cases, a system (or higher-level) possesses properties that are distinct from and irreducible to those of its parts (or the lower-level out of which it emerges), but it does *only* in virtue of the parts (or lower-level) having a certain complex structure. Further, so the claim goes, these emergent features possess novel causal powers that are neither present in, nor reducible to, those of the lower level.

Such a set of claims is often attributed to a group of philosophers—around the beginning of the 20th century—that have come to be known as the “British Emergentists.” This group is usually taken to include John Stuart Mill, G. H. Lewes, C. L. Morgan, Samuel Alexander and C. D. Broad, although—as we will point out below—it may not be accurate to regard C. D. Broad as holding quite the same view as the others. Take, for example, the view expressed by C. L. Morgan in his (1923) book *Emergent Evolution*, which explicitly endorse both aspects of the ontological emergentist claim. First, he advances the claim about the novel causal powers of the emergent features, writing that, in cases of emergence: “When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the
way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence—different from what it would have been if life had been absent” (Morgan, 1923: 16). Secondly, in virtue of the novel causal powers possessed by emergents, he claims (p. 207) that: “There is increasing richness in stuff and in substance throughout the stages of evolutionary advance; there is redirection of the course of events at each level” (our emphasis).

Although similar claims have been made more recently (for example, by Roger Sperry (1986) with regard to the relationship between neurophysiology and psychology, and by Silverstein and McGeever (1999) with regard to the part-whole relationships in fundamental physics) it is fair to say that this conception has been widely rejected in the contemporary revival of emergentism. The ontological nature of the claim seems to reify the emergent features in a way that contemporary theorists find unacceptable. For example, List and Pettit (2011: 74) in their recent book that defends realism about group agency, nonetheless reject (this kind of) emergentism, because they see it as a “now discredited theory of what gives life to organic entities, according to which living entities do not live just by virtue of their chemical structure but rather by the presence of some vis vitalis, or ‘life force’”. The idea here is that, in reifying the emergent feature, ontological theories of emergence either dispense with, or render too loose, the dependency “hallmark” that Bedau mentioned above. Vital spirits, entelechies and Cartesian Souls might be novel higher-level features that are (somehow) autonomous and unpredictable with respect to lower-levels, but in virtue of being substances with new causal powers, it is obscure (not to mention metaphysically “spooky”) how they are constituted by or generated from the lower levels at all.

For these reasons, a more promising formulation of emergence—one that still seems to have some credibility in the contemporary discussion—expresses the concept in epistemetic terms. According to this view, emergence concerns the relationship between theories or descriptions and especially highlights the difficulty—or impossibility—of deriving or deducing descriptions of the “higher levels” from descriptions of “lower levels.” According to this view, emergent properties are features of systems (or higher levels) that cannot be predicted from knowledge of the features of, and laws governing, the parts (or lower levels).

A particularly strong version of this claim is advanced by C.D. Broad in his (1925) book Mind and Its Place in Nature. On Broad’s view, emergent features are properties of wholes (or higher levels) that are dependent on and determined by the properties of the parts (or lower levels), but where “the characteristic behaviour of the whole could not, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the behaviour of its components taken separately or in other combinations” (Broad, 1925: 59). Broad explicates this notion of unpredictability-in-principle with reference to something like a “Laplacian Calculator,” or, as Broad puts it, a “Mathematical Archangel.” Concerning what Broad takes to be the emergent status of chemistry with respect to physics, he writes:
If the emergent theory of chemical compounds be true, a mathematical archangel, gifted with the further power of perceiving the microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive haystacks, could no more predict the behaviour of silver or of chlorine or of the properties of silver chloride without having observed samples of those substances than we can at present. And he could no more deduce the rest of the properties of a chemical element or compound from a selection of its properties than we can. (1925: 70–71)

On this view, then, the a priori prediction of the properties of a higher level on the basis of a complete knowledge of the properties of the lower level components is completely impossible. Any statement of the connection between levels would have to be an empirical discovery, and would not be susceptible to further explanation.

Note two things here. First, Broad’s claim does not explicitly commit him to an ontological view of emergence; he does not claim that substances or things emerge, and he does not attribute novel causal powers to the emergent levels (it’s for this reason that it may not be correct to describe him as a “British Emergentist” despite his being both British and an emergentist). More importantly, however, is that—even if his conception of emergence is coherent—it is an exceptionally strong claim, and commits him to a certain amount of mystery as a fundamental feature of both his theory, and the phenomena to which it applies. The “brute fact” inexplicability of emergent phenomena—if it is to be accepted with “natural piety” as Broad recommends—may simply be too strong an assertion to accept, and it’s hard to see what evidence could justify it.

Accordingly, we finally turn to a weaker epistemological conception of emergence; one which strikes us as particularly appropriate to the discussion of territorial borders. It is this view that is advocated by Bedau (1997) himself, under the name of “weak emergence.” According to this view, emergent phenomena are features of systems (or higher levels) that are constituted by or dependent on features of the parts (or lower levels), but practically unpredictable simply because of the complexity of interactions that bring them about. Interestingly enough, although Bedau develops the discussion of weak emergence in a discussion of the field of “artificial life,” it is a strikingly similar concept to that discussed in the sociological domain by R. Keith Sawyer (2002, 2005) concerning the question of how group behaviour emerges out of the individuals that compose those groups.

Consider, for example, the group behaviour of a flock of birds, which tends to form a “V” shape behind a particular leader. We might describe this as a case of emergence, because the “V” shape does not result from one particular bird being explicitly selected as the “leader” with the other birds deliberately falling into formation behind it; there is neither a central executive group-level decision-making procedure, nor an individual-level explicit representation of the desired “V” shape and place within it. Rather, the “V” shape emerges from relatively simple interactions between the individuals; in effect, each bird’s behaviour is a function of its position relative to its nearest neighbours (and this is likely to have evolved because it simultaneously maximises both energy efficiency and the field of vision; it has been adopted by military flight formations for good reason). Sawyer
(2002: 229) writes: “The ‘V’ shape is not planned or centrally determined; it emerges out of simple pair-interaction rules. The bird flock demonstrates one of the most striking features of emergent phenomena: higher-level regularities are often the result of quite simple rules and interactions at the lower level.”

First, note that this particular example sits well with the “hallmarks” of emergence that Bedau mentioned above; the group behaviour is entirely constituted by and generated from the behaviour of individual birds, and yet the distinctive “V” shape is also, in a sense, autonomous from the underlying processes (at least insofar as we may discuss the flock shape in its own right, without further reference to the individuals that compose it). Further, it’s reasonable to say that the flock shape is somewhat surprising; we wouldn’t have expected it to occur, given that the individual birds are not actively seeking or representing it.

Despite this apparent unpredictability, however, Sawyer points out that some emergence researchers in computer science—for example Reynolds (1987)—have successfully developed computer models of the lower-level rules of interaction. In the case of flocking behaviour, the “V” shape can be reproduced if individual birds follow simple rules that (i) maintain a suitable distance from the nearest neighbours, and (ii) maintain a speed and direction that is the average of the nearest neighbours. Computer simulations in which only the lower-level rules are explicitly programmed nonetheless display the higher-level regularity. Theorising this example, therefore, leaves us with a slightly peculiar tension; on the one hand the group- or higher-level behaviour is surprising or unexpected, but on the other hand, we can (albeit with some considerable effort) demonstrate how it arises from simple interactions at the lower-level.

Weak emergence embraces this tension as a central component of the theory. According to Bedau (1997: 378), a macro-state (or higher-level feature) of some system counts as weakly emergent if and only if it can be derived from that system’s microdynamic (i.e., the laws governing the lower level), but only by simulation. It is convenient—but nonetheless accurate—to describe weak emergence as a kind of “run it and see” approach. There may be lower-level regularities that determine the emergence of some higher-level feature, but the only way to figure out the latter is to let the system evolve to display it. To put this another way: there is no way to predict the emergent feature other than by running the system and allowing the emergence to occur. The emergence of the higher-level feature is unpredictable in advance of its occurrence, but after it has been observed, with some effort, we may be able to explain it retroactively.

Thus, the most important thing to note about this conception of emergence is that such an account forces a distinction between (a) predicting the emergent phenomenon in advance of its occurrence and (b) explaining the emergent phenomenon only after it has been observed. According to weak emergentism, (b) is possible, but (a) is not, at least in practice.

For one thing, even drawing this distinction adds a significant nuance to the discussion. Some influential theories of explanation deliberately conflate it with prediction; according to Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) influential “thesis of structural identity” the
ability to explain something entails the ability to predict it. But according to weak emergentism, since it’s possible to explain something after the fact, without having the ability to predict it beforehand, the equation of explanation and prediction cannot be correct.

Further, this distinction between prediction and explanation is particularly important when it comes to the discussion of territorial borders since it is analogous to a distinction between (a) using some theory of territory to say, a priori, where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying, on the basis of some theory of territory, whether or not it is justified. If territorial borders count as weakly emergent features with respect to the lower-level conditions that generate them, then, according to the theory, we might be able to have (b) without (a).

More importantly, two competing accounts of territorial borders—“statist” views and “cultural” views—seem to embody this kind of dialectic. In the next section, then, we examine the contrast between these views in order that we may go on to use accounts of emergence to adjudicate between them.

**Borders: The Moral Question**

Borders mark the domain of the state’s territory. Within borders, a political power may exclusively legislate, adjudicate, and enforce rule of law (Buchanan, 2003: 233). In the contemporary configuration of states, territorial borders are one of the most significant factors in human life. Whether one enjoys basic freedoms, lives above a poverty line, or has access to basic medical care largely depends on where she lives and under which political authority.

A variety of questions probe the morality of territorial borders; yet, since the location of borders makes such an impact on human life, a fundamental question is: Where should borders be drawn? Assuming borders are justified in some form, one cannot ask if a border is legitimate without considering its location.

To justify the placement of borders, an inquiry can follow one of two broad approaches. First, one could take existing or historical borders as a starting point, and use their location to assess the ethical placement of borders. Alternatively, one could use something ethically “pure”—that is, not tainted by historical arbitrariness, such as cultural integrity or nationality—to determine where borders should be drawn. The former approach characterizes statist theories, and the latter approach, cultural theories. Generally speaking, to develop an account of appropriate borders, cultural theories draw on a deep historical connection between culture groups and places, and statist theories instead rely on accounts of legitimate statehood.

Allen Buchanan defends an influential version of a statist view. On his account, the locations of existing state borders are justified except in cases where one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) genocide or massive violations of the most basic individual human rights, (2) unjust annexation, as each being sufficient to generate a right to secede, or (3) the state’s persistence in violations of intrastate autonomy agreements (Buchanan 2004: 351–352).
Buchanan’s argument proceeds on the basis that a morally defensible international legal system is necessary to provide basic conditions of justice for persons globally. The proper goal of a system of international law is to support state agents in securing conditions of (at least) minimal justice. A just institutional order minimizes perverse incentives to destabilize legitimate governments by reducing the likelihood that militarized secessions will be recognized internationally (Buchanan, 2004: 370). Theories like Buchanan’s justify territorial borders on the basis of their effectiveness in promoting moral values like justice (Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). On statist theories, the history of the border—how it came into being with its particular location—does not come into play in the arguments to justify the border. When history does play a role, such as in cases of unjust annexation, it is only as a reiteration of the basic theory. A group that previously held territory must justify their legitimate claim to territory on the same basis that states today base their claims. That is, a previous group must prove that their territorial borders housed minimally just political institutions and did not suffer from any of the three exceptional conditions that delegitimize territorial rights.

Criticisms of the statist’s arguments accuse them of vicious circularity, that the location of territorial borders are justified only because, “that’s where they are now.” Rather than justifying the legitimacy of existing territorial claims, Buchanan’s theory seems merely to endorse them. The statist theory seems to ignore what lies at the moral heart of border disputes; most border disputes tend to be about something more than a concern for the stability of international law. Instead, disputes usually reflect feelings of nationality, culture, and a deep connection to a particular place. Avery Kolers contends that territorial claims must include a prior account of candidate legitimacy: “The right to try to become recognizably legitimate in a place” (Kolers, 2009: 44). To justify a territorial right, the agent with a claim to hold that right must be recognized. Groups must identify as moral claimants of territorial rights; these groups are often identified as nations or indigenous cultures. Further, a legitimate territorial claim should refer to a particular place, and this requires a prior account of a normative link between the candidate and the territory. Theories that justify territorial domains on the basis of the status of existing states cannot provide these prerequisite accounts. Rather, statist theories define the candidate and the relevant place by the status quo division of territory. No explanation is given, then, for why that state is the relevant candidate for evaluation, as opposed to other indigenous groups, for example. And no explanation is given for the attachment of the state to that particular place, except that it currently exists there.

Further, this circularity is said to be morally vicious because it gives in to—perhaps even endorses—historical wrongs. Most current and historical borders resulted from conquest, theft, and hubristic decisions of illegitimate governments. For example, the African continent was partitioned in the 19th century between European powers vying for control of the continent’s natural wealth. The borders were drawn largely without reference to the landmarks, cultural, or political history of the Africans. Since then, these borders have been a major source of conflict and genocide. To take the actual location of
borders as a valid premise in an ethical argument seems to validate historical and ongoing injustice.

Cultural theories of territorial rights, by contrast, hypothesize the appropriate location of territorial claims through an evaluation of relevant group histories. Kolers advances one of the most sophisticated versions of a cultural view; on Kolers’ account, territorial rights should be determined by, first, identifying relevant claimants, second, assessing the appropriate location of the claimant’s territory, and third, evaluating the fitting size of the territory. A valid claimant under this theory is an “ethnogeographic community,” a group of people who share “culturally specific conceptions of the land,” and whose “land-use practices densely and pervasively interact” (Kolers 2009: 3–4). Determining the territory’s location requires assessing where the ethnogeographic community has interacted with resources to create a space that is purposefully “internally diverse and distinct from other places,” with the intention to continue interacting with resources in similar ways in perpetuity (p. 5). Similarly, the size of the territory is determined by comparing the community’s cultural conceptions of the land to the land’s actual use. If the area is not “full”—not being used in a way internally defined by the culture—then the community has only a tenuous claim to that area (p. 173). Similarly, a territory should not be too small; it should be large enough to be resilient against normal, foreseeable crises, such as hurricanes and economic downturn. Thus on Kolers’ theory, territorial borders should be drawn around “full” lands of ethnogeographic communities, containing sufficient social and material resources for resilience.

Nationalism presents a more familiar version of the cultural view. Nationalist theories of territorial rights have a similar historical form to Kolers’ ethnogeographic theory, but under nationalist theories, the relevant claimants are nations. Nations are groups of people who hold similar cultural, historical, and political identities. A national territory includes those lands where the nation has a deep, formative historical connection. A cultural homeland can be an important source of identity and value formation in individuals, and, hence a people’s connection bears significant moral weight. Because of the normative importance of maintaining a connection between the people and their cultural homeland, a nation claims a prima facie moral claim to its national territory (Meisels, 2003; Miller, 2012).

Cultural theories possess the virtue of avoiding the vicious circularity of statist theories. They ground the moral legitimacy of territorial borders in the moral value of our historical connections to place. Nations and ethnogeographic communities are mutually self-identifying groups of people that share certain characteristics. These characteristics include but are not limited to a shared public culture, a shared history, and a desire to be or to remain politically self-determining (Miller, 1995: 22–25). Using the concept of a culture to identify the uniqueness self-determining groups has certain benefits. First, many individuals care about and identify with cultures. From overwhelming allegiance individuals are motivated to perform both ordinary and extraordinary acts, like paying

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1. Kolers’ view regarding the size of territories is laid out in detail in Kolers, 2012. His theory applied to competing claims to territory is defended in Chapter 6 of (Kolers, 2009).
taxes and going to war. Second, the language of culture and nationalism has given many minority groups a position from which they can fight for recognition against oppressive political institutions. Finally, these theories attempt to correct historical wrongs by drawing new borders around morally sanctioned territories—these theories avoid the circularity of assuming their conclusions as premises. Although these benefits (the benefits of group solidarity, relief from oppressive political institutions, and righting historical wrongs) are worth holding onto, they invite levelling criticisms.

First, endorsing cultural theories risks perverse incentives to incite war, genocide, and oppression. Most of the genocidal massacres in recent history have been executed in the name of nationalism. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs strongly identified their nationality with their territory. The non-Serbs were named the internal enemy and became the target of a horrific pattern of extermination and expulsion. Unfortunately this pattern has been repeated in places, infamously: Germany, Poland, Rwanda, and Cambodia.

Second, the problem with using a culture as a definition of a group that can claim territorial rights is that the culture’s descriptive qualities do not align with the normative claim to political power. Typical descriptions of national culture—for example what distinguishes Palestinian from Israeli or Navajo from American—focus on the cultural characteristics of the groups, their current cultural practices and the historical understanding of the pedigree of the groups. By contrast, political descriptions focus on the group’s political aspirations “to demand various forms of autonomy or self-government” (Kymlicka, 1995: 10). Culture is normatively significant because it plays a constitutive part in a person’s individual identity, and a cultural community gives a person a sense of history and background identity against which individual choices can be made. If a person were to lose her culture, she would be either stuck in a cultural vacuum or forced to undergo a painful assimilation into a new culture (Kymlicka, 1995: 85–86; Taylor, 1994). Consequently, groups with these cultural features have normative significance and should be respected by political institutions. However, only focusing on cultural groups casts the net too wide. Religion, political ideology, professional ethos, and club ethos provide meaningful identities for some individuals, “and how well an individual fares will in some cases be more dependent upon the success of these identity-conferring groups than upon the flourishing of her nation” (Buchanan, 2003: 250). Consistency requires awarding normative significance to all of these cultural groups. Doing so, however, would sap the nation (or ethnogeography) of its unique content.

To avoid creating perverse incentives and to reclaim distinct political significance, the cultural group claiming political power over a territory must respect and accommodate a wide variety of cultural beliefs within its borders. However, this accommodation renders the cultural argument ineffective. Culture is neither sufficient nor necessary to ground a claim to self-determination in territory. To see why the cultural argument is not sufficient, look at the requirement that nations possessing a territory must treat members of other nations living within their borders fairly (Moore, 2001: 65; Gans, 2008: 56–60; Meisels, 2009). If nations did not treat members of other nations fairly, they would violate the universality of the principles underlying their territorial claims. Consequently, a
Further essential condition for the territorially self-determining group is that it is capable of fair political institutions. A common cultural identity is not sufficient to ground self-determination rights, rather it is required that a people is capable of creating fair political institutions or be at risk of defeating its own principle.

Further, a common cultural identity is not necessary to ground self-determination rights. As already mentioned, often common cultural identities do not homogenously exist within a contiguous territory. In these cases, multi-national groups come together to form a functioning polity. Examples include Canada, the United States, Belgium, and Norway. Fair political institutions can function without members sharing one common national cultural identity. The citizens of Belgium are comprised of different national groups, and yet the country is capable of fair political institutions. One could respond by saying that the people of Belgium or of Canada are united by a common national culture, but to express that members share a common cultural identity would stretch the concept of “cultural identity” so far as to rob it, and the smaller group’s cultural claims, of much of their content.

Given the difficulties facing cultural theories, it is worthwhile to reconsider the statist view. Recently developed statist theories avoid the circularity objection to Buchanan’s theory. Buchanan’s version of a statist justification of borders can be expressed as follows:

1. Territory X is defined by status quo borders.
2. State X’, shaped by Territory X, is a legitimate state. That is, it secures conditions of minimal justice for its members.
3. If a state is legitimate, then it has a moral claim to territorial rights as defined by status quo borders.
4. Given the above, State X’ has a moral claim to Territory X.

This section’s opening question was, “Where should borders be drawn?” Buchanan’s theory answers this question only in a circular way, in that it relies in Premise 1 on the status quo drawing of borders. Why should these borders be here? Buchanan answers: because they are here. What is missing is the link between borders and a separate moral explanation for why borders should be drawn in particular ways. Two recent theories fill that gap using neo-Lockean and Kantian analysis respectively. Under both theories, a particular territory is justified if the state within the territory secures conditions of justice for its members. In addition, each theory examines the moral conditions necessary to hold a territorial right. On the neo-Lockean theory, the collective capacity to establish justice within and over a territory gives rise to a right over that particular territory (Nine, 2008). This theory draws an analogy between the normative creation of territorial rights and the normative creation of property rights. In traditional Lockean theory, a farmer labouring on the land comes to have property rights over that particular piece of land. The property right is created because of the farmer’s value-producing interaction with the land. Similarly, the state that creates justice within and using the resources of a territory come to have territorial rights over that particular territory. The neo-Lockean theory
draws a connection between the location of borders and the creation of salient moral quality: justice. Likewise, the Kantian view connects borders to the preconditions for just relations. On Kantian views, only legitimate states can claim territory, because states are the only agents that can perform the primary function of territory, that is, enforcing the legitimate rule of law. Because legitimate states are morally justified, and because we have a duty to obey the laws of just states, then the territorial rights of legitimate states are also justified (Stilz, 2011). Each theory avoids the circularity of Buchanan’s view by justifying the location of borders through their moral qualities, their authentic role in establishing justice for the people who live there.

Although these theories improve on Buchanan’s view by demonstrating a response to the charge of circularity, statist theories still suffer from some deficiencies. In particular, the statist theory cannot provide an account of where borders should be alternatively located in advance of their being drawn. Rather, they can only evaluate the justification of existing borders. This feature prompts Margaret Moore to criticize the statist theory as:

. . . limited in its response to a number of questions or controversies raised by the claim to territory. It is not obvious how that view can respond to contested territory, as when two states claim rights over the same bit of territory. It is also not clear how the statist view responds to territory claimed but not yet part of a state, such as in the oceans or uninhabited lands. The statist argument is retrospective, in the sense that it justifies the state in exerting authority across a geographical domain but tends to do so once the state has exerted its authority, but not to do so in advance, when there might be rival claims to the same territory. This is another way of saying that [the statist] argument doesn’t address a fairly fundamental element of any theory of territory, namely, it doesn’t have a theory about which group, which right-holder, gets rights to which bits of territory. And if it can’t do those two things, it doesn’t seem well equipped to answer some of the central questions that arise in political life, connected to the idea of rights over territory. It tells us that states should have control, but doesn’t tell us which state should have control nor where it should do so. (Moore, 2014a: 6; this argument is also contained in her forthcoming book: Moore, 2014b)

This failure of statist theories—the inability to say where borders should be drawn—parallels the failure or inability to predict what we described as “weakly emergent” features above. Instead, weakly emergent features can only be explained after they have emerged.

Borders as Weakly Emergent

Now that we’ve examined both the concept of emergence, and the dispute between “statist” and “cultural” theories of territory, we are in a position to put the two together. It seems to us that the distinction between prediction and explanation that is required by weak emergentism lines up nicely with the distinction between (a) using some theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying, on the basis of some theory of territory, whether or not it is justified. Both
weak emergentism, and statist theories of borders, say that we might be able to have (b) without (a). Accordingly, in this section, we'll start by outlining the reasons for regarding borders as weakly emergent features, and then we'll go on to show how this conception helps to answer the criticism from Moore—outlined at the end of the last section—that statist theories are too “retrospective.” Thus, weak emergentism about borders provides some support for the statist view.

Let us note, first of all, that borders seem to possess many of the features outlined by the theory of weak emergence. Recall that, according to this view, emergent features are those properties of systems that are constituted by or dependent upon features of the parts, but are practically unpredictable. This seems to be a correct characterisation of borders; they are constituted by and dependent on the psychological, legal and political factors that give rise to them, but given the complexity of interactions between these “lower level” features, the borders that emerge do so in ways that are often unpredictable. This can be seen in at least two ways. First, the territorial border is a political phenomenon. While the political event creating territorial borders may be connected with cultural or other historical elements, the border itself is determined by a political process and ratified in international law. This process involves a variety of unpredictable outcomes from negotiation, compromise, consideration of external pressures, and the current balance of political power, etc. The political nature of the border reflects the essence of the territorial right, that it is a right to political power. Thus, the nature of a border’s creation fits with its primary function: both are political. A border’s political creation comes about only after an historical process of emergence. Second, once the border is created, it seems to play a causal role in the development of morally relevant events. The creation of a national culture, for example, often forms around a people and a territory that already exists (Kolers, 2002: 36). The culture is influenced by the borders in ways that it is not influenced before the border comes into existence. Consequently, the effects of the borders seem to be distinct from the effects of the events that cause the borders to come into existence. The individual elements that make up the border do not appear to have the same causal capacities as a border itself, once it has emerged (although we shall have more to say about this in the concluding section).

In effect, we might say—in line with Bedau’s definition of weak emergence—the only way to figure out how these psychological, legal and political features will give rise to a territorial border is to “run them and see.” Nonetheless, once a territorial border is in place—once it has in fact emerged—one might, with some effort, retrospectively pick out the factors that gave rise to it, in order to explain it after the fact; one might, for example, point to a particular clause in a treaty, and note how that was interpreted by a particular individual or group in order to provide a legal rationale for the placement of the border. Thus, like the “V” shape of a flock of birds, the border is practically unpredictable in advance, but retrospectively explainable in terms of the lower level features that give rise to it.

Note also, however, that this is very similar the claim made by statist theories of territory with regard to normative questions about them; one takes existing or historical
borders as a starting point, and only then assesses their ethical character or moral justification. One need not—or indeed, if the criticisms of cultural theories of borders outlined above are cogent, one cannot—start with some kind of “pure” ethical theory (with no consideration of historical factors) and use it to determine morally justified territorial borders *a priori*.

Of further note is that understanding borders as emergent helps to solidify previously discussed criticisms of cultural theories. Simply put, the borders of a cultural group never match the geographical borders of a political unit, and the (theoretical and practical) frustration that this misfit causes motivates oppression, genocide, and mass expulsion. State borders contain heterogeneous groups; no state contains only one culture. Drawing borders according to cultural principles, then, will continue to motivate members of the culture to expel or oppress non-members within the territory. The belief that “this land belongs to one culture” is impossible to implement in real geographical terms without illegitimate force and expulsion. The heterogeneity of geographical groups also belies the drawing of coherent borders. Even if cultural groups wanted to draw borders around their homelands, the final location of the territorial border must be a political decision, negotiated with or around non-members. The determined location is not predictable, even on a cultural theory, because of the emergent nature of political borders.

The inability—or better, *unwillingness*—of statist theories to specify where borders *should* be placed in advance of their being drawn was invoked by Margaret Moore as a criticism as mentioned above. Her claim was that this kind of “retrospective only” theory of territory fails to provide a fundamental part that would be expected of any theory. But if, as we have argued, borders are weakly emergent features, this inability is exactly what one would expect; given the nature of borders themselves, and the complexity of interactions that give rise to them, one simply cannot address the normative question in advance of seeing where the borders have actually been placed.

**Conclusion and Further Reflections**

Our conclusion is thus two-fold. On the one hand, we have good reason to regard territorial borders as emergent features; more specifically, they are “weakly emergent” with respect to the psychological, legal and political factors that give rise to them, in the sense that although they are dependent on those factors, they cannot be predicted in advance of their emergence. At best, they can be retrospectively explained—or justified—by paying close attention to the circumstances of their origin. On the other hand, this conception provides a reason for preferring the “statist” conception of territorial borders, since it answers the criticism—by embracing it—that such accounts are too “retrospective.” In short, this retrospective character is a feature of the theory (not a deficit) and is precisely what one would expect, given the nature of borders as emergent features. We’d like to conclude by reflecting briefly on two further points concerning the apparent causal powers of borders, and the specific details regarding their physical implementation.
First, given what we said above about the way in which a border seems to constrain the events that occur within it, it might seem as if our position ought to be one of ontological emergence—the thesis that emergent features have novel irreducible causal powers. We do not think that our view is committed to this strong claim (indeed, if it were, that might constitute a reductio ad absurdum of our central thesis). Rather, we’d be inclined to say that, to the extent that borders appear to have causal powers, that’s only insofar as they are perceived by individuals and respected by political and legal institutions. The causal powers of borders are only apparent and are in fact explicable in terms of (i.e., reducible to) the causal interactions of the lower level features that make them up.

Second, much more could be said about—and we have not touched upon—the questions of the precise way in which borders are actually physically implemented. And this is a question that calls out for further investigation. It seems, for example, that a territorial border that corresponded to a geographical feature—for example, a mountain range or a body of water such as a lake or a river—would be much more closely dependent on and determined by the non-arbitrary lower level features that constitute it. So, for example, there does seem to be a significant difference in character—purely in physical terms—between (a) the “border” between the island of Ireland and the island of Great Britain (insofar as each of these names a geographical land-mass) and (b) the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (insofar as each of these names a political state).

In such cases, it seems prima facie more straightforward to make predictions about the ways in which such borders will come into existence (and arguably, also, to answer questions about the moral justification for such territorial borders). These cases are less common than one may think. Oceans can readily separate Australia from Great Britain, because the immense geographical feature separating the two states voids the need for political negotiation over the location of borders. In contrast, mountain ranges and rivers, while easily identifiable markers, often unite rather than divide persons living on either side. Mountain communities can form solidarity over the need for common support and friendship during times of hardship. Similarly, communities on either side of a river depend on each other’s good will and cooperation to successfully use the river and its resources. In these cases, political consideration and negotiation remain an essential part of determining the location of the border, because it is not obvious if the border should divide these communities or unite them. Given these qualifications, we’d be inclined to say that in cases where borders are drawn on the basis of some easily identifiable geographical feature alone, such as an ocean, borders might well fail to count as emergent; emergence is, after all, a relational property, and in such cases, the features from which the border arose might well make them entirely predictable (and justifiable) a priori without have to retrospectively consider how the borders have in fact been drawn.

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2. Nine develops an account of territorial rights over rivers that effectually dissolves river borders. On her view, rivers should be areas of shared jurisdictions between states (Nine, 2014).
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В этой статье мы исследуем, в какой степени понятие «эмерджентность» применимо к вопросу о природе территориальных границ и их морального обоснования. В философии это понятие употребляется во многих смыслах, и для ответа на наш вопрос особенно полезным оказывается понятие «слабой эмерджентности», предложенное, например, Сойером (2002, 2005) и Бедо (1997). Благодаря этому понятию, возможно ввести различение между предсказанием и объяснением, которое связано с несколькими проблемами в дискуссиях о территории. В частности, мы показываем как «слабая эмерджентность» в отношении границ позволяет нам отличать (а) использование теории территории, чтобы обозначить где должна быть проведена граница, от (б) рассмотрения существующих границ и вывода о том, обоснованы они или нет (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Многие авторы смешивают эти проблемы или формулируют их таким образом, что они в некотором смысле оказываются взаимосвязанными. Но в нашем случае с учетом понятие эмерджентности существующие границы и их моральные обоснования можно рассматривать без того, чтобы говорить о том, где должны быть проведены границы. В любом случае различение двух проблем более существенно, чем это обычно признается, и дает нам некоторые основания предпочитать «эстатистские», а не «культурные» теории территориальных границ. В завершении мы приводим рассуждения о сопутствующих проблемах: в первую очередь, о кажущемся

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Эмерджентные границы: разметка моральных вопросов
причиняющем воздействии границ, и во вторую очередь, о различных способах, которыми физически устанавливаются границы (например, земля и вода).

Ключевые слова: эмерджентность, объяснение, предсказание, границы, этатизм, культурный национализм, территориальные права
Although border issues are a matter of importance for a large number of people, contemporary Border Studies (dominated by the intertwining of post-modernist, constructivist, and critical approaches) is little preoccupied with finding viable practical solutions, focusing instead on conceptualising the essence of borders and border processes. Meanwhile, previous Border Studies was a practically-oriented discipline focused on helping practitioners delimit borders, and to find an optimal balance between protecting borders against unwanted cross-border flows and fostering desirable cross-border interactions. The article examines the widespread theoretical approaches to studying borders in the light of their practical relevance, and discusses what can be done in order to make Border Studies more capable of generating viable practical solutions. Despite the fact that mainstream Border Studies is currently not much preoccupied with bridging theory with practice, I argue that both contemporary and older approaches have significant practical potential which could be especially helpful in solving delimitation problems, increasing efficiency of cross-border cooperation, better balancing the priorities of strengthening border security and fostering cross-border interaction, cross-border region building, managing cross-border conflicts and mitigating alarmist perceptions of the Other, fighting border-related injustices and human rights violations, etc. In addition, I suggest that drawing new ideas from Management Studies and Communication Studies could be promising ways of making Border Studies more practically relevant.

**Keywords:** Border Studies, border security, constructivism, critical studies, cross-border cooperation, post-modernism, practice, pragmatism

Borders have great importance for a large number of people. While for some people borders are shields or fences protecting them against violence and social disorganization, for others, they are first and foremost barriers impeding mobility, human contact, and economic development. There are many cases when toughening or liberalising border regimes becomes a life-and-death issue, and probably many more cases when it crucially affects people's prosperity. Border issues are often so urgent that even a small delay in solving them could adversely affect many people.

However, it is oftentimes not easy for Border Studies scholars to make valuable contributions to solving practical issues. The problem is that borders and border-related processes are complicated and multidimensional; studying them requires interdisciplinary approaches drawing ideas not only from geography, but also from political science, sociology, economics, history, philosophy, and other disciplines. It is still not quite clear what borders are and how they work; thus, in many cases it is difficult to advise on what should
be done with them. It is therefore understandable why contemporary Border Studies are so preoccupied with conceptualizing the essence of borders and border processes, taking into account recent social sciences’ achievements. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that contemporary theorizing on borders rarely has any evident practical implications that could bring some improvement in the foreseeable future. It looks somewhat useful, therefore, to employ “a pragmatist maxim” (sometimes called “pragmatist razor”), positing that an idea should be evaluated by its practical bearings (Peirce, 1992: 132), for reviewing contemporary Border Studies theories in order to evaluate those theories’ practical implications.

Are there ways to bring back practical relevance to contemporary Border Studies? To what extent can the existing approaches to research on borders be made practically relevant? What other approaches can be potentially employed for this purpose? These are the key questions to be considered in this article. Initially, I consider those conceptual approaches of studying border issues that prevailed until the 1990s. Secondly, I discuss practical implications of the contemporary mainstream approaches, viz. post-modernism, constructivism, and critical Border Studies. Finally, I examine how some other academic approaches that are currently used or can be employed from other disciplines that could make research on borders potentially practically relevant.

**Traditional Approaches**

At the beginning of its history, Border Studies was a discipline close to geopolitics (justifying territorial expansion by national interests and suggesting where a stronger power should draw its borders), and at the same time, was an applied discipline of the findings which were designed to solve delimitation, demarcation, and other relevant practical border-related issues. The primary stress was laid on the art of drawing borders in the way that could allow making them better defensible from invasion by an enemy and less prone to conflicts caused by incorrect political delimitation. Special attention was paid to the delimitations between colonial empires, as such borders were oftentimes vague. The public address of Lord Curzon, commonly considered as the pioneering work in the field of Border Studies, is mostly the classification of the existing types of borders, and analysing their strengths and weaknesses with a strong emphasis of the interests of the British Empire (Lord Curzon, 1907).

One of the key lines of discussion concerned “natural borders,” i.e., the borders defined by natural obstacles—rivers, mountain ridges, deserts, woodlands, etc. The first Border Studies researchers disagreed on what is the most important function of such borders and what kind of natural borders were the best. While Lord Curzon (1907) preferred mountain ridges and deserts and Tomas Holdich (1916: 149–156) preferred mountain ridges as defense lines, finding river borders too vulnerable and unstable (as river beds can change), other authors, such as Lionel Lyde (1915), on the contrary, preferred rivers which, while dividing countries politically, didn’t hinder much interaction between such countries. Other kinds of borders promoted by geographers of that period including Karl
Haushofer (1939), emphasized that national borders should be brought into compliance with ethnic borders that were considered a “restoration of historical justice.”

While some ideas of that time are considered outdated now, other ideas on how borders are better to be demarcated are still useful for politicians and other practitioners involved in negotiations on borders and in settling border disputes. It is also important that early Border Studies researchers (Curzon, 1907; Fawcett, 1918) had already formulated the key and still highly relevant practical dilemma of the discipline, i.e., the dilemma between ensuring border security and allowing a border to be penetrable enough for useful cross-border interaction. While toughening border control better protects a country against illicit and “unwanted” flows (smugglers, illegal immigrants, hostile militants, etc.), it also hinders legal and “desirable” flows (tourists, cross-border entrepreneurs, or high-skilled workers). On the other hand, relaxed border control creates more favourable conditions for legal and “desirable” flows but also opens a wider range of opportunities for law-breakers. Yet, later research (especially on the U.S.—Mexico border) demonstrated that the influence of a tightened border regime on illicit cross-border flows is mixed and controversial: tough border policies oftentimes itself create the ground for smuggling and other illicit cross-border activities (increasing their profitability dramatically) and causes the emergence of skilled and well-organized criminal groups, specializing in exploiting vulnerabilities of border control. All of these conditions can lead to the escalation of competition between those who protect borders and those who try to bypass border control (Andreas, 1999, 2009).

Nevertheless, after the end of World War II, with the subsequent collapse of the colonial system and the entrenchment of the principle of inviolability of borders in international law, a large part of those practical ideas that were advocated by early Border Studies scholars became anachronistic. There was now very little room for arbitrary and one-sided expansion (especially for colonial expansion) and choosing favorable borders, so even strong countries had to deal with existing borders however “bad” they were. The interest of borders as barriers against military invasion also reduced noticeably, as it was admitted that no border fortification lines were efficient against modern weapons. Because of this reason, borders didn’t become an important topic for nascent International Relations Theory, particularly for IRT’s first dominant tradition of political realism (Aron, 1984: 90; Herz, 1957: 482; Wolfers, 1962: 97).

It is then not surprising that post-war Border Studies paid less attention to resolving practical issues than before, focusing instead largely on determining the essence of borders, on classifying them, on relationships between borders and borderlands or between borders, and those state institutions that shape them. More specifically, different scholars focused on sorting borders or cross-border flows by various criteria (House, 1982; Martinez, 19941); a few concentrated on determining the range of functions that borders have,

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1. The classification offered in the latter work is the most known. Oscar Martinez divided borders into four kinds: alienation borders (characterized by closeness and alienated relations between neighboring countries), coexistence borders (where cross-border cooperation develops only to a limited extent), interdependence borders (where cross-border cooperation rests on evident asymmetry between adjacent countries’ economic con-
several focused on the process of their historical evolution (Foucher, 1988), some investigated the conceptualization of borders as “power projections” of state institutions behind them (Foucher, 1988: 22; Prescott, 1965: 76), some on interconditionality or borders and borderlands (Prescott, 1978), and others researched the topic of border-related actors and on the ways these actors interacted (House, 1982; Martinez, 1994). All of these issues still had their implicit practical relevance; classifications of borders allowed the revealing of their strengths and weaknesses, classifications of cross-border flows could allow making border policies more sensitive to various kinds of such flows, investigating evolution of borders could contribute to better understanding of their current issues and help to make better prognoses, examining interrelations between borders and surrounding territories could help to better planning of these territories’ development, and studying borders as projections of institutional power could help to understand how such institutions should be reformed to improve border policies.

All of this does not mean that more explicitly applied issues were not considered by post-war Border Studies scholars. While delimitation and demarcation issues were now given somewhat less importance, the focus of practically oriented research shifted towards studying governance, planning, economic, environmental issues, issues of borderland regions, and especially cross-border cooperation. These issues receiving greater attention were largely stimulated by European regional initiatives since the 1950s. In this light, borders were oftentimes seen as an evil that posed economic and environmental damage, distorted cross-border ties (Bröker, 1984; Hansen, 1981; Petras, 1996), and put border regions in economically-disadvantageous marginal positions (Giersch, 1949), often aggravated by the over-centralization of governance and by the poor consideration of the borderland regions’ interests by their central authorities (Stoddard, 2002: 40). To ameliorate these problems, the removal of unnecessary border barriers, better planning of cross-border projects, and granting more powers to borderland regions were considered to be the most typical remedies.

Generally, post-war Border Studies evolved in a rather typical direction from a largely empirical and applied discipline towards more abstract conceptualizations. It was not only the accumulation of information but also the changing post-war international relations context, discouraging “too creative” approaches to remaking borders, that pushed researchers in this direction. Still, many conceptual findings could be easily connected with practice and, finally, the development of cross-border cooperation provided Border Studies scholars with a large field of practically-oriented research.

**Contemporary Mainstream Approaches**

In the 1990–2000s, a major revolution in Border Studies occurred. The research on borders was incorporated into mainstream social science approaches that made the subject increasingly popular and led to dramatic growth in the number of Border Studies
academic publications in the 2000s. This revolution was overwhelmingly post-positivist: while investigation of objective border-related regularities remained a marginal trend of research, the subjectivity of borders was emphasized in various ways. According to my classification (that, of course, is not the only possible one), the main directions of post-positivist research have been post-modernism, constructivism, and critical studies, though in practice, these approaches are oftentimes intertwined and used in combination. For the sake of greater clarity, let us consider these approaches separately, considering the issues of their practical relevance among other matters.

Post-modernism

Proponents of this approach challenge the notion of contemporary political borders’ rigidness, immobility, and singularity, emphasizing their flexibility, mobility, and plurality.

According to a radical version of this approach, national borders are dying away in the conditions of globalization (Ohmae, 1995) or, at least, losing their importance inasmuch as states can not efficiently control accelerated flows of people and goods at their borders. Thus, such states have to switch increasingly to more deterritorialized forms of control over flows, thus making borders largely irrelevant (Bigo, Guild, 2005). Moderate advocates of a post-modernist approach towards borders are more cautious, arguing that national borders still do matter but that they are less stable (the processes of deterritorialization are followed by reterritorialization, while debordering is followed by rebordering), more intensively multiplying and vacillating, and becoming more selective towards the various categories of people crossing them (Albert, 1999; Balibar, 2002: 88–90).

As does any other approach, post-modernist insights into border issues have typical vulnerabilities. First, there is no convincing proof that the vanishing of national borders is becoming a global trend; while some countries (first of all, the EU member states) erased some borders, other borders (including external borders of the EU) are being fortified instead. Moreover, construction of border fences, reminiscent of ancient fortification practices, is becoming increasingly widespread in various areas of the world (Golunov, 2014).

Secondly, it is not easy to prove that contemporary borders really lose their importance and efficiency in comparison to the past. Though present border control is generally not very efficient, it was also not so efficient in the past. At the same time, now border control becomes generally more comprehensive and sophisticated than in previous eras (Andreas, 2009: 143; O’Dowd, 2010).

Thirdly, most borders can be considered both via the lens of the “traditional” imaginary (emphasizing efficient territorial control practices by respective states, the static character of borders and the fact that spatial movement of people across “hard” borders is still carefully limited), and via the lens of post-modernist imaginary (emphasizing the intensity of cross-border flows, vulnerabilities, and deterritorialized practices of border control, essential differences in border regimes for various categories of entrants, cross-
border spaces and initiatives, etc.) (Golunov, 2012: 77–79). In this case, the argument that “traditional” state-centric imaginary is “old” and “outdated,” while “deterritorialized” imaginary is “up-to-date” (Bigo, 2008: 105; Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 165) looks more stereotypical than a valid reason for preferring the second sort of imaginaries over the first one.

Fourthly, while there are indeed numerous invisible and flexible borders that can multiply and vacillate, the tangible and immobile national border still remains, at least, one of the most important types of borders that seriously influences the fates of a vast number of people. There is a danger that more important national borders can be neglected in favor of numerous less important but “more fashionable” virtual borders.

Lastly, but not least, if not a strategic “above” or a “God’s eye view” but a traveller’s “horizontal” perspective of looking to a border is taken as a reference point, one can argue that for such a traveller, the “hard” national border still does matter virtually as much as it did earlier. Indeed, such a border still confines precisely the territorial limits of a traveller’s movement and a trespasser who ignores this “hard fact,” while relying too much on the assumption that national borders lose their importance, seriously risks being apprehended and punished (Golunov, 2013: 935).

The most important domain of applying post-modernist Border Studies to practically relevant issues is, apparently, cross-border region building. Indeed, in many cases, post-modernist Border Studies offers much in terms of making new cross-border regions with new borders, creating overlapping spaces in which partially coinciding and partially divergent ranges of actors can be involved, or reducing the role of formal territorial limits in cross-border planning. It is noteworthy that the current map of European cross-border regions (Association of European Border Regions, n.d.), dominated by overlapping entities, is strikingly different from the “traditional” political map of Europe on which all territorial entities are clearly delimited. Such flexibility allows participants of cross-border cooperation initiatives to more easily overcome border barriers and adjust specific cooperation projects to various territorial frameworks to ensure these projects’ efficiency.

The problem here is that such approaches work much better in areas where national borders are weak, and evidently worse in cases when national borders are “hard” and persistent. For example, there were some conceptual proposals on how to “post-modernize” the EU’s external borders, including its relevant borders with the Kaliningrad province. Jan Zelionka suggested to make the EU’s “hard” border fuzzy, resembling “the borders of a neo-medieval Europe rather than the borders of a Westphalian Europe.” According to Zelionka, in the new borderlands of the “maze Europe,” “different legal, economic, security and cultural spaces are likely to be bound separately, cross-border multiple cooperation will nourish, and the inside/outside divide will be blurred” (Zelionka, 2001: 518). Pertti Joenniemi suggested applying a similar idea both to the Kaliningrad province

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2. For instance, the Kaliningrad province participates in five cross-border regions; the Baltic (with Danish, Lithuanian, and Swedish partners), Łyna-Ława (with Polish partners), the Neman (with Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Polish partners), the Saule (with Latvian and Lithuanian partners), and the Šešule (with Lithuanian and Polish partners) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013).
(Joenniemi, 2000) and to the regions of the Northern Dimension (Joenniemi, 2008: 172), turning them into “neo-medieval” zones of overlapping spaces. Subsequent developments, however, demonstrated that geopolitical divides and security-related alarmism prevents the blurring of the EU’s “hard” border from both of its sides; while the EU was not eager to weaken its immigration barrier and its Baltic member states to give Russia economic or other leverages for influence, Russia was afraid of separatism of its borderland regions in cooperating “too closely” with their EU counterparts.

Another problem with “post-modernization” of borders should be also taken into account. When relations between neighboring countries are normal and the discourse of cooperation prevails, officials stress that borders are barriers only for criminals but not for law-abiding people, that ongoing cooperation contributes to the erasing of borders, and so on. In such cases, “post-modernization” trends are overemphasized while the remaining pervasiveness of visa, customs, and border-related barriers can be downplayed in official discourses. In such cases, the “post-modernization” trend makes a difference more in official rhetoric than in practice of those who are involved in various cross-border contacts.

Nevertheless, post-modernist Border Studies can be considered as a critically important tool for building cross-border spaces of various kinds. This tool, however, should not be perceived as a panacea for overcoming border barriers and its limitations, and pitfalls should be fully taken into account.

**Constructivism**

Constructivist Border Studies, which gained significant popularity in 1990s after the seminal works of Anssi Paasi (1996), emphasize the importance of border-related norms, meanings, and representations. According to Étienne Balibar, borders are polysemic, as they have different meanings for different people (Balibar, 2002: 81–82). In accordance with constructivist Border Studies, the “material dimension” of borders does not matter per se as even the most impressive border walls only matter inasmuch as and until when they are given the sense of important defensive barriers. The Berlin wall can serve a good example in this case. At the same time, both material and discursive practices that support such norms and meanings giving them importance also are important (Morehouse, 2006: 33; Paasi, 1999: 670).

A distinct line of constructivist Border Studies corresponds to the theory of securitization as proposed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. According to this theory, border-related problems are construed as security issues (meaning problems requiring extraordinary and urgent solutions). Making these issues into matters of security is done via securitization moves addressed to significant audiences that could either accept or reject such moves (Buzan et al., 1998: 25–32). The phenomenon of framing some border-related problems (especially immigration) as border security issues was considered by some authors without employing the conceptual framework of the Copenhagen school.
At the present, constructivist Border Studies do not appear to be preoccupied with the uses of their findings. Firstly, it looks like researchers applying a constructivist approach pay more attention to purely “imaginary” borders (such as intergroup) than to the borders having strong material dimensions. As in the aforementioned case of some postmodernist scholars, there is the risk that the issues as relating to national borders could be put aside as no longer “fashionable,” regardless of the number of people these topics affect. Secondly, deconstruction is oftentimes not the best way for solving practical issues inasmuch that it doesn’t offer many positive solutions if taken alone. It is not surprising that most works emphasizing an constructivist approach to Border Studies issues do not appear to be practically oriented, at least explicitly.

Nevertheless, constructivist Border Studies have potentially significant practical implications in terms of ameliorating cross-border relations and desecuritizing excessively alarmist border policies. In this light, it is important that the same borders oftentimes can be represented both in (more) alarmist and in non- or less-alarmist ways. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Russian-Kazakhstan border (the longest continuous border in the world) was frequently pointed to in connection to various threats to Russian national security through issues of trafficking in heroin, large-scale smuggling of Chinese goods, illegal immigration, transborder extremism, etc. Occasionally, the idea to introduce a visa regime for the citizens of Kazakhstan, or even to construct a border fence, were proposed by Russian politicians. Yet, another representation of the Russia-Kazakhstan border emphasized the friendly character of relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, the profits of integration between the two countries, but also the inefficiency of unilateral border protection against illegal transborder flows finally prevailed (in particular, border guards and customs officers are typically able to reveal just up to several percent of drugs smuggled via checkpoints) (Golunov, 2008). As a result, customs control at the Russian-Kazakhstan border has been abolished since July 1, 2011. The U.S.—Mexico border can be considered polemically; while until the 1980s, illegal immigration and other issues were not prioritized as national security threats. The “war on drugs” in the 1980s and anti-immigrant operations in the 1990s and the 2000s led to the building of sophisticated fences, the militarization of border protection, the criminalization of illegal immigration, the escalation of confrontations between illegal immigrants and growing numbers of border-protection officers, and increasingly sophisticated and organized criminal groups, etc. (Andreas, 2009).

Taking this into account, constructivist Border Studies scholars can contribute to deconstructing negative and alarmist perceptions and representations of the Other, thus undermining the reason why it should be separated by a “hard” border. In terms of the Copenhagen School, constructivist scholars can elaborate and themselves undertake “desecuritization moves” (more specifically, deconstructing alarmist border-related stereotypes by proving their irrelevance and emphasizing, if expedient, the benefits of bilateral cooperation in various fields, including security) and that, if accepted by significant
audiences, could also lead to more relaxed control over routine cross-border movement of people and goods. After deconstructing those perceptions and meanings that underlie “hard” and (if the mentioned classification of Oscar Martinez is employed) “alienation” borders, one can try to reconstruct more friendly and open borders by contributing to the elaboration of more cooperative discourses and common agendas.

However, if a “hard” border is established or securitized as a result of a very serious ethnic or other conflict, a more cautious approach may be needed in order to prevent an uncontrolled and spontaneous reconstruction of some other material or imaginary “alienation intergroup borders,” allowing participants of such conflicts to feel protected. Thus, the most appropriate solution in many of such cases could be not in attempting to erase such a border, but to find an optimal balance between fostering cross-border communication and preserving some type of barrier that signifies security for those who are behind it (Henrikson, 2000). It is sometimes argued, for example, that maintaining limited, manageable, and gradually intensifying communication across both physical and virtual intergroup borders is crucially important. This is evident with such conflicts as the one in Cyprus (Diez, 2003), where in the 1970s, a clear separation line ultimately replaced numerous virtual division lines between conflicting communities throughout the island. In such cases, constructivist Border Studies scholars can potentially contribute to peaceful solutions and elaborations to less ambitious agendas (i.e., oriented to solving small local problems), but over time, to more comprehensive common cross-border discourses, and cooperation agendas.

**Critical Border Studies**

While being applied to Border Studies shortly after post-modernism and constructivism, Critical Studies has become the most dynamically growing trend of mainstream research on borders since 2000. Critical Border Studies considers border issues in terms of power, ordering, exclusion of the Other, injustice towards those who are excluded, and the increasing surveillance of cross-border travelers. Here is a non-exhaustive list of topics covered by Critical Border Studies:

- **Making, maintaining, and reproducing exclusive borders in a threefold process of bordering** (legitimization of location of a border), **ordering** (maintaining order), and **othering** (excluding the Other) (van Houtum et al., 2003; van Houtum, 2010).
- A “legal vacuum” in which travelers find themselves during border control and illegal immigrants find themselves in detention camps. In such situations, travelers and immigrants do not enjoy full-fledged rights, their movement is limited, and officials can make largely-arbitrary decisions on their deportation while possibilities to appeal against such decisions are usually very limited. Some scholars (Salter, 2008; van Houtum, 2010: 970–71; Vaughan-Williams, 2009), tried to apply Giorgio Agamben’s concepts of “state of exception,” “bare life,” and “homo sacer” to such situations, denoting a person who finds himself in the state of exception,
deprived of his/her rights, and reduced to his/her biological existence (Agamben, 1998; Agamben, 2005). Others, however, find the application of these terms to border issues exaggerated, arguing that Agamben’s terms should be applied only to the situations when exceptional violence (detention or arbitrary killing) takes place, while in the respect to the above-mentioned border-related or immigration-related situations, some other terms (such as “grey spaces” or “liminal legality”) are more suitable (Jones, 2012: 691).

- **Surveillance and sorting of cross-border travelers.** Conceptualizing this issue typically rests on both critical and post-modernist insights. On the one hand, it concerns the increasing and largely non-accountable power of a state to monitor the cross-border movement of people using their biometrical information. On the other hand, it posits, that in terms of security, physical national borders lose their importance in comparison to imaginary borders that qualify or disqualify a person on the basis of his/her biometrics and other personal characteristics, such as citizenship, profession etc. (Lyon, 2003; Bigo, 2005b; Zureik, Salter, 2005). It is argued that such surveillance and sorting is proactive, and a decision on a person’s (non)admission is usually made long before a person arrives at a national border he/she intends to cross (Bigo, 2005). The majority of relevant works focus on analyzing how the surveillance and sorting machinery operates; what steps does this process include, what criteria are used for sorting, what is the role of poorly-grounded suspicion in this process, etc. There is also a growing number of works taking into consideration the perspective of those travelers who are the focus of surveillance and sorting practices (Amoore, 2013; Salter, 2008; Salter, 2013), and also the perspective of officers involved in implementing these practices (Aas, 2011; Bigo, 2014; Pratt, 2010).

- **The appropriateness of border and immigration control versus the fundamental principles of liberalism and social justice.** Some scholars argue that border and immigration control is at odds with liberal values as it excludes those who wish to join a community proclaiming its democratic, open, and non-discriminatory character. It also contradicts the principle of social justice as such exclusions that is typically made on the basis of wealth, citizenship, and (indirectly) ethnicity, thus disqualifying poor people and inhabitants of third-world countries, while affirming rich people (Balibar, 2004; Bigo, Guild 2005; Kymlicka, 2001; Steiner, 2001). Strict border and immigration controls turns wealthy Western societies into “gated communities,” closed to poor and disadvantaged immigrants, who in some cases trying to change their fates, risk their lives and sometimes perish while trying to cross borders in dangerous areas to enter rich countries illegally (van Houtum, 2010).

- **Borderwork** as a set of societal activities on making or breaking borders (Rumford, 2008, 2013). This concept demonstrates that not only a state can create and maintain borders or tighten/relax border regimes, but non-governmental actors, including ordinary citizens, can contribute to it (i.e., helping immigrants, lobby-
ing for stricter immigration policies, or even creating volunteer border patrols as it has done at the U.S.—Mexico border).

It seems that at least several following vulnerabilities are typical (though not necessarily intrinsic) for contemporary critical Border Studies. Firstly, most researchers confine themselves to severely criticizing existing policies while not proposing any viable solutions. Meanwhile, practitioners should act in some way, oftentimes choosing not from “good” and “bad,” but from several just “bad” policy options, any of which can be harshly criticized. Thus, these practitioners have a good reason to ignore destructive criticisms when viable alternative solutions are not proposed. Secondly, as well as other mainstream approaches, Critical Border Studies focuses mainly on “grand issues,” usually (though not always) considering them from the “above” (or “God’s eye view”) perspective, and much more rarely from the “horizontal perspective,” taking the border-crossers’ position towards borders as a reference point. As a result, a large part of those mundane practical issues (such as problems of customs control, extortion, or queues at borders, etc.) that matter for many millions of cross-border travelers are neglected. In cases when the perspective of border-crossers is taken into account, they are typically represented as helpless objects of coercive or manipulative practices without considering their chances to defend their interests, either by themselves or with the help of influential allies.

Thirdly, critical Border Studies usually takes an uncompromising stance towards the existing realities, harshly criticizing advocates of tough immigration policies. Meanwhile, the political influence of proponents of the tough approach is growing; it is oftentimes very difficult to change border policy without taking into account such specific interests. While one cannot fully exclude that border policies could become essentially more fair towards immigrants and travelers (it probably could happen, not soon, but in some distant future). Meanwhile, it is also important to contribute to the improvements for those who have to overcome border barriers as soon as possible, even if such improvements are initially half-way and small. Achieving such improvements now probably requires dialogue with opponents of liberal immigration policies, and finding ways how to achieve compromises with them.

In terms of its practical relevance, Critical Border Studies is a useful tool for diagnosing such problems as arbitrary power that consular and border guard officers have over ordinary border-crossers, making decisions on foreigners’ non-admission on the basis of poorly-grounded suspicions, the lack of those legal rights that would allow foreign entrants and immigrants efficiently defending themselves against unjustified decisions about non-admission or deportation, violations of the rights of those who are subjected to uncontrolled surveillance, or to ill-treatment by officers, or in detention camps.

However, as already mentioned, critical Border Studies scholars usually refrain from proposing well-elaborated and realistic recommendations. When recommendations are proposed, they look either too vague or unrealistic in most cases. Trying to solve the problem of “unjust border control,” some scholars proposed to abolish it or reduce it to a minimum (Steiner, 2001: 80). Some scholars advocate that “wealthy countries can only
restrict admissions if they share their wealth with poorer countries” (Kymlicka, 2001: 271), and some suggest to make border control democratic with the participation of immigrants (Balibar, 2004: 117). Unfortunately, the authors of all of these proposals do not seriously try to anticipate or to prevent evident criticism. In the first case, it is not clear how to prevent social disorganization of communities affected by massive immigration; in the second case, the problem lies in how to make monetary donations to the poorest countries efficient; in the third case, the question remains how to reconcile contradicting interests of immigrants and alarmist-minded local inhabitants while ensuring the efficiency of the democratic decision-making process. (Robert Latham’s idea that trusted NGOs could become intermediaries between immigrants and destination-countries, (Latham, 2010), may deserve more serious attention if the questions of how to avoid turning these NGOs into inefficient bureaucratic structures overloaded by huge number of requests and, even more important, of how such NGOs could be really useful in revealing ineligible immigrants, are responded to persuasively).

It seems that Critical Border Studies potentially could make a greater contribution to solving practically relevant problems. Whereas critical scholars already have done much in terms of criticizing suspicion-based algorithms of decision-making in allowing the entry of applicants used by consulates and border guards to deny entrance, they could do more in terms of proposing ways to improve such algorithms and to diminish the grounds of human rights violations. Are there realistic ways to better protect the rights of those who are denied entry without a reasonable basis? Could scholars help practitioners make risk-analysis algorithms that could be applied towards visa applicants and entrants and that are more sensitive towards specific cases and less over-reliant on such criteria as financial solvency3, the region of an applicant’s birth4, and the straightness of the route by which a traveller arrives at a destination point?5

Another possible contribution of Critical Border Studies is to conceptualize the ways of resistance to the unjust sorting and surveillance system, and the enforcement of this system to increasingly respect border-crossers’ interests and rights. Contemporary mainstream Border Studies are evidently sympathetic towards immigrant protest movements and such radical non-governmental initiatives as the NoBorder network6, and sometimes analyze individual cases of protest actions or attempts to disseminate information via alternative “tactical media” (Vukov, Sheller, 2013). However, I have yet failed to identify any well-elaborated conceptual ideas in major relevant academic publications of possible

3. Russian teachers (including university teachers) or doctors, who are typically underpaid and earn about the same as Russian low-qualified workers, are apparently treated by EU consular officers with much more suspicion than heavily compromised but solvent officials.

4. I heard several stories (including one story from a well-informed high-standing Russian provincial official) that give some reason to infer that EU consular officers sometimes use a birthplace as a substitute for the “politically incorrect” risk criterion of ethnicity, thus excluding those who was unlucky to be born in a wrong place.

5. There were many cases when EU member states’ border guards denied entry to those non-EU travelers who travelled by suspiciously unusual routes. Actually, travelers could prefer such routes in attempting to save money (i.e., buying discounted multi-segment airline tickets).

courses of civic actions or other ways of resistance to the unjust order, and about specific and realistic demands that could be presented to those who control borders. Giorgio Agamben’s passive resistance, viz. his refusal to enter the USA in order to disable biopolitical surveillance on him, though being praised by some scholars (Vaughan-Williams, 2009: 144), does not appear to be efficient if considered as the a way of prompting the system to change. Nevertheless, despite the (currently) Critical Border Studies inability to propose clear and efficient ways of resistance to border-related injustice, together with realistic demands on how to reduce such injustices, one cannot preclude that they will be able to propose such ways in the future.

Other Approaches

Of course, the range of already considered approaches is far from being exhaustive. There are many other approaches, probably most of which have some practical potential. Let me consider some of these approaches.

Within policy-oriented research, significant emphasis is made both on cross-border cooperation and on the increasing efficiency of border management. One of the key problems is solving the mentioned dilemma between border security and cross-border interactions. Since the 2000s, the concept of a “smart border,” introduced by the U.S. and Canadian officials (Legislationline, 2001) and recently adopted by EU officials (Europa.eu, 2013), has become an important focus, not only for practitioners but also for scholars. The concept prioritizes both the strengthening of border security and fostering cross-border interactions achieved by very close cooperation between the adjacent countries in the fields of border security and immigration control, increasing the capacity of checkpoints, and by pre-screening some categories of people and vehicles crossing a border, together with reducing border inspections of them to a minimum. Both some “smart border” practices and the overall results of applying the concepts were very critically received by scholars, who argued that making the U.S.—Canada border “smart” didn’t help to prevent a serious decline in economic activities caused by toughening border security after September 11 (MacPherson et al., 2011), and also that “smart border” means privileging elite travelers and poorly controlled surveillance of over-border crossers (Côté-Bouché, 2008). Two more potential problems also are that an efficient “smart border” is very expensive (in the mid-2000s, the U.S.—Canada border security policy was much more expensive than the EU’s (Brunet-Jailly, 2006)), and requires very close and stable cooperation between the participating countries. If such cooperation weakens, the efficiency can also seriously weaken. Still, some researchers propose recommendations on how to improve the existing “smart border” policies in terms of developing border infrastructure, reforming governmental agencies dealing with border security issues, strengthening bilateral cooperation between adjacent countries, etc. (Ackleson, 2009).

While the “smart border” concept prioritizes the interests of involved states and privileged border-crossers, voices of ordinarily law-abiding border-crossers are still poorly heard. Trying to make the theorizing on borders more practically oriented and to find
out if there are some ways to make border-crossers’ voices better heard, I proposed the pragmatist-dialogical approach (Golunov, 2012, 2013). This approach, on the one hand, emphasizes the aforementioned pragmatist maxima and anti-scepticism (something that should be proposed instead of criticized policies), and, on the other hand, focuses on dialogism (the approach that is often employed in combination with pragmatism (Baert, 2005)) for conceptualizing reciprocal communication between border-crossers and those who maintain “hard” borders. My ongoing research suggests that in some situations, some categories of border-crossers are able to make themselves heard mainly by organizing protest actions near checkpoints or in borderland towns, or by resorting to some powerful mediators (their state governments, politicians, journalists, etc.). Still, there are at least two important factors undermining the efficiency of the considered dialogue. Firstly, border-crossers are usually poorly organized, which reduces their capability for joint actions. Secondly, officials are much more politically powerful which gives them a wide range of opportunities to manipulate dialogues, to pressurize their opponents, or simply to avoid communication. Though these obstacles are not insuperable, further empirical research is needed to establish the extent to which border crossers can be heard as a result of their own efforts, and to suggest how to help border-crossers to organize better, and to amplify their voices.

Apart from dialogism and Organizational Communication Studies, some managerial approaches, such as studies of feedback, could be potentially useful for better conceptualizing the problem. The key problem of feedback by border-crossers to officials is in overloaded communication channels, specifically, consulates, immigration services, and customs services in many cases do not have sufficient staff to react to all complaints and suggestions. Another problem is that officials do not always want to deal with uncomfortable questions and complaints, and sometimes forward them to those who are complained about. Thus, the practically-oriented research on feedback by border-crossers could elaborate recommendations on how the government could deal with these and other issues efficiently.

Finally, the question about the possible role of a Border Studies scholar in contributing to practice can be also considered, though there is virtually no contemporary detailed research on this topic. As Kevin Ward argues (2007), there are three major ways in which a geographer could actively participate in promoting social change: policy geography (research aimed at influencing policy-making process), activist geography (research supporting public activism), and participatory geography (research involving “researched” groups as equal partners). While Border Studies scholars also probably could adopt these patterns, conceptualizing the ways in which it could be done would be useful. What is the range of stakeholders to be addressed by policy-oriented research on borders? How to better reach them? What are the ways in which a researcher can contribute to fostering and supporting border-related activism? How and on what basis could equal partnerships between a researcher and “researched” groups (i.e., immigrants, cross-border entrepreneurs, or tourists) be established? These questions await further investigations.
Conclusion

During the last decades, Border Studies has managed to overcome its marginal position and become integrated into mainstream social research, but has largely lost its applied character. Indeed, while earlier it helped practitioners to delimit borders and later improve cross-border cooperation, now it largely concentrates on analyzing the very essence of borders and of other relevant phenomena. That is not to say that Border Studies does not pay attention to practically important issues, but now in most cases, analyzing such issues results in destructive criticism of the existing order without proposing viable and well-elaborated solutions.

However, to make contemporary Border Studies more practically relevant, one should not necessarily abandon the existing mainstream approaches as they have significant, though still insufficiently-explored, practical potential. In particular, such approaches can be useful for solving such urgent problems as cross-border region building; applying, optimizing, or dismantling “imaginary” borders in the framework of border policies; managing cross-border conflicts and reducing alarmist perceptions of the Other; fighting border-related injustices and human rights violations; finding efficient strategies of resistance to such injustices and violations, etc. One should not forget about some previous but still relevant approaches that could help to solve delimitation problems, increase efficiency of cross-border cooperation, or to better balance the priorities of strengthening border security and fostering cross-border interactions. Of course, it is not an exhaustive range of border-related problems and approaches for solving them; for instance, drawing new ideas from Management studies and Communication Studies looks potentially promising. It is also important that the aforementioned approaches, while being applied as practical tools, should not be needlessly considered as mutually exclusive as, at least in some cases, their joint application could bring more fruitful results than applying them separately.

References


Практическая значимость как проблема современных исследований границ

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Связанные с границами практические проблемы имеют самое серьезное значение для огромного количества людей. Несмотря на это, нынешние мейнстримные исследования границ (в которых доминируют постмодернистские, конструктивистские и критические подходы) сосредоточены в основном на концептуализации сущности феномена границ и
пограничных процессов, но не на поиске реалистичных практических решений упомянутых проблем. Следует отметить, что на более ранних стадиях своего развития исследования границ, напротив, были в значительной степени практически ориентированной дисциплиной, уделявшей особое внимание изучению вопросов делимитации границ, урегулирования пограничных конфликтов, развития приграничного сотрудничества и т.п. В настоящей работе рассматриваются современные теоретические подходы к изучению границ сквозь призму практического потенциала этих подходов, а также анализируются некоторые другие возможности повысить степень практической ориентированности дисциплины. Делается вывод о том, что как традиционные, так и современные подходы обладают значительным практическим потенциалом, который может, в числе прочего, оказаться полезным для решения проблем, связанных с делимитацией, повышением эффективности приграничного сотрудничества, нахождением оптимального баланса между контролем над границей и обеспечением ее проницаемости, урегулированием пограничных конфликтов и смягчением негативных восприятий сопредельной стороны, противодействием ущемлению интересов и нарушениям прав пересекающих границу людей и т.п. Помимо этого, автор полагает, что исследования границ в перспективе могли бы почерпнуть новые практически ориентированные идеи из таких дисциплин, как менеджмент и коммуникативные исследования.

Ключевые слова: исследования границ, пограничная безопасность, конструктивизм, критические исследования, приграничное сотрудничество, постмодернизм, практика, прагматизм
Logic of Intersubjective Limits within Habermas’ Community
(or Why We Should Not Be a Unified Whole)

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This article investigates the model of the transnational cosmopolitan moral-legal community of limitless communication. This model, using philosophical means, appears as an attempt to underscore the impossibility of authoritarian monopolies of power which resulted in the dictatoral regimes and national (pro)totalitarian communities of the 20th century. I will reconstruct this model of the supranational community, and analyze the mode of morally-oriented intersubjective interactions within this community. I will show that the differentiation of limits between the “interior” (subjective) and the “exterior” (intersubjective) worlds is an essential communicative and ethical problem in Habermas’ theory. According to this differentiation, subjective “verity” of an individual/local community may be defined and justified by purposes, axiological preferences, and tastes of a particular individual/community; while a claim pretending to be an intersubjective norm should be justified and voluntary accepted by all concerned with this norm. The non-differentiation of limits between what one believes to be “veritable”, and what one claims others should accept as a norm (or imposing on others one’s particular axiological position as a universal norm) underlies most social, (geo)political, ethnical, confessional conflicts, and communicative deformations. Until recently, academic literature did not pay much attention to this key aspect of Habermas’ theory. At the same time, it is this differentiation between the subjectively “veritable” and the intersubjectively valid that makes Habermas’ community anti-totalitarian, and reveals the deep political significance of intersubjective limits.

Keywords: Habermas, J. S. Mill, community, intersubjectivity, egocentrism, intersubjective limits

. . . there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions propounded which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent. (Mill, 1977: 286)

. . . a person’s taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for
any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? (Mill, 1977: 283–284)

We approach to the moral point of view at the very moment when we begin to commeasure the compatibility of our maxims with maxims of other people. (Habermas, 1995: 14)

By inheriting Aufklärung’s belief in reason, German sociologist and political philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1929) formulates the modernity project as the emancipation of our communicative potential. He considers one of the most fundamental problems of the twentieth century to be the crisis of communicative rationality, that is, of our ability to coordinate our claims and intentions by means of intersubjective communication. In his Postnational Constellation, he writes:

... look at the gruesome features of a century that ‘invented’ the gas chambers, total war, state-sponsored genocide and extermination camps, brainwashing, state security apparatuses, and the panoptic surveillance of entire populations. The twentieth century ‘generated’ more victims, more dead soldiers, more murdered civilians, more displaced minorities, more torture, more dead from cold, from hunger, from maltreatment, more political prisoners and refugees, than could ever have been imagined. (Habermas, 2001: 45)

Starting from the 1960s, Habermas works over the concept of communicative rationality that he suggests to be a normative ideal of any social interaction. In a general outline, communicative rationality is an intersubjectively-oriented rationality embodied in communicative activity that can take the form of procedural argumentative discussion, and aims at finding mutual understanding. This type of rationality implies a mutual clarification of alternative positions where all concerned sides are fully engaged, a mutual openness to criticism, an intersubjectively-oriented process of norm acceptance and decision making, and an orientation to mutual coordination of social interaction. ‘Communicative rationality is ideally thought of as a guarantee against communicative deformation, dogmatism, instrumental manipulations, and unjustified power domination, or, in other words, against all manifestations of egocentrism, or, as Habermas calls it, subject-centrism. Totalitarianism, dictatorship, aggression, manipulation of mass conscience by today’s media, fundamentalist terror, or forceful globalization are such modi of social and political life that deform principles of communicative rationality.

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1. In Theory of Communicative Action Habermas postulates that communicative rationality does not refer to a worldview, but resides in the subjects’ ability to clarify their positions, to perceive arguments of another side, and to be open to criticism (Habermas, 1984: 18, 25).
The postwar situation, when all communicative bonds were severed, urged Habermas to seek new forms of solidarity. Tragic consequences of radical nationalism and permanent ethnic wars, mass migration of refugees, postcolonial poverty of “third world” countries, and national and international terrorism impel him to raise the question whether humankind can still imagine itself to be a kind of community. In trying to answer this question, Habermas elaborates a model of transnational, cosmopolitan, and a moral-legal community of limitless communication.²

I will briefly outline what this community model looks like. Communication in this community is supposed to be an open, mutually-oriented argumentative practice. It implies that mutual interpretation, clarification, and justification will prevent the monologism and dogmatism of our claims, intentions, and motivations. This kind of rationality, which resides only in our ability for argumentation, is construed as necessary for all participants of communicative discourse. To be open for argumentation (for producing arguments and receiving argumentative criticism) means to be moral in a Habermasian (formal, logical, and deontological) sense. If a social norm pretends to be (intersubjectively) universal, it should be deliberately, argumentatively, and justifiably accepted by all concerned with this norm. A community of limitless communication resides in the public sphere.³ Public space creates the conditions for open argumentative practices. It allows resistance to the domination of powerful institutions, to the manipulative control of media, and it encourages open and mutually-oriented free-will formations.

The communicative ethos of such a community model was designed to prevent new forms of fascism in Europe, to stop routine violence, unwarrantable war interventions, unilateral ambitions of modernization, and fundamentalist terror, and by that, to compensate for the deficiency of democracy and democratic legitimation. In this article, I aim to show what a community of limitless communication is: (1) how its structure of intersubjective interaction functions, (2) in what way its implicit logic of limits can be embedded in our intersubjective claims, and (3) in the ways we interact with each other.

By the limit, the principle notion of my reasoning, I understand the formal, logical, and imaginary borderline that separates one autonomous subject (a person, a party, a community, a nation, or a state) from another. I will try to show that the ethics of intersubjective limits is a core framework of the Habermasian community model, and that indeed it plays an essential role in our everyday, social, and political communications.⁴

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² “Community of limitless communication” is a concept also widely used by K. Jaspers, H. Arendt, Ch. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead, and within quite another tradition, G. Bataille. Habermas’ specific usage of this term implies moral-legitimate foundations of the community, and argumentative practices providing these moral foundations.

³ Though it is not necessarily broadly public, it can be a local community too, or a spontaneous community of people resolving a conflict through communication on communitarian basis. Its public character resides in the mutual openness itself required by intersubjective perspective.

⁴ In this article I do not aim at reconstructing the principles of argumentative discussion lying in the spotlight of Habermas’ theory of communication. I am interested in what is unfairly deprived of critics’ attention, though not less important aspect of his theory, namely, in how we can constitute ourselves and interact with others on/through intersubjective limits, and what these limits mean for our self-actualization.
First of all, while speaking of the supranational cosmopolitan community in an Habermasian sense, we deal with a community that does not separate itself from other communities by distinct limits; it has no limits at all, not only because it is primarily an imaginary projection, but should it be empirically embodied, it would not have unchangeable limits. It is not attached to a territory or to an institution. To a great extent, the European Union as a supranational, institutionalized organization correlates with Habermas’ theory of multinational moral-legal community.\(^5\) Habermas conceptualizes this imaginary projection as a normative model of the universal moral community in a sense of morality I clarify below. It can (and ideally, in the latest works of Habermas, should) embrace all humankind in its scope.\(^6\) Any person capable of rational, that is, argumentative, discussion may become a member of such a community. As there are no community limits, one cannot be “excluded” from it unless they want to leave it themselves, and proclaim their non-participation in the communicative process.

We can assume that the community experiences its limits when communication stops or breaks, or starts to function in a deformative (asymmetrical) way. Each time we find ourselves capable of constituting an “ideal communicative situation” (that is, a situation free from any domination except that of the best argument accepted by all concerned), a community of limitless communication emerges. Such a community reveals its contours in each concrete communicative situation purposed at a mutual understanding. This community reorganizes each time when a new participant appears, or a new claim arises. In *The Inclusion of the Other* Habermas speaks of a “universalism that is highly sensitive to differences” (1998: xxxv). “The community thus constructively outlined is not a collective that would force its homogenized members to affirm its distinctiveness. Here inclusion does not imply locking members into a community that closes itself off from others. The “inclusion of the other” means rather that the boundaries of the community are open for all, also and most especially for those who are strangers to one another and want to remain strangers” (Habermas, 1998: xxxvi). To sum it up, Habermas’ community of communication is a movable, transformative community, and sensitive to new extensions and configurations limits.

G. H. Mead also states that this community is a “secondary” one. This means that it does not coincide with national, ethnical, or state limits, and is constituted “above” social order.\(^7\) Secondariness, in this case, implies not an inferiority with regard to the more “superior” society, but a particular zone of modulability of social relationships based on al-

\(^6\) See, e.g., Habermas, 2011: 82–96. In many cases he construes community as a pragmatically oriented instrument serving to solve conflicts or to accept an intersubjectively valid norm. It can be, then, practiced as a spontaneous community of quotidian communication, a local ethnical or confessional community, a political community of a nation or an international cosmopolitan community.  
\(^7\) Habermas adopts Mead’s idea of the secondary community. According to Mead, the secondary community of limitless communication constitutes itself “above” determined social order which is more parochial in comparison to the universal secondary community. An individual can become a member of such secondary community in order to mutually resolve a problem, change a behavioral pattern, or redefine intersubjective values.
ternative, rather than societal, principles. This particular, though not limited, zone is constituted through rational intersubjectively-oriented communicative practices. In contrast to the more emphatic natural character of Tönnis’ community, the secondary community has a more “artificial,” a more rationally organized, and a more ethically imperative character than an often-spontaneous, unpredictable, and prone-to-strategic-manipulations society. From the other side, we can think of such communities in the plural, that is, communities that can emerge in any social, political, or geographical zone where “ideal communicative situations” are possible.

A paradoxical moment in Habermasian communitarian theory occurs when this model of “exteriorly” limitless community is based on a very specific and challenging logic of “inner” intersubjective limits “within” community. In order to explore this “inner” limitary space, I suggest to imagine it as a formal, logical drawing of intersubjective relationships where we can clearly see how different participants of interaction correlate with each other in their claims. For this purposes, we should address the essential problem, for Habermas, of differentiation between “exterior” and “interior” worlds, which is often unfairly omitted by researchers.

The problem of confrontation between these two categories, that is, the “interior” world of subjective verity and the “exterior” world of others (other subjects and their verities) appeared first in John Stuart Mill's famous work *On Liberty* (1859), although not described in such terms. Mill first drew this ethical demarcation line between the universal and the private, that is, between social good, and the individual's right to distinguish what is good or bad for the individual by themselves. He first endows the individual with the right to refuse from the “apparently good” social good. He advances an ethical imperative, according to which society should not interfere into the private life of the individual. However, he also prevents the absolutization of a private value as a universal one; it would be ethically wrong if one individual decides for (an)other adult and independent individual(s) what is good or bad for them, and by that, extrapolates one’s own values, opinions, and evaluations onto the life of (an)other person(s).

Mill starts his reasoning with the question of limits: “What . . . is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?” (Mill, 1977: 276). He is saying that in all our judgments and evaluations, we should clearly distinguish limits between what “we do not like” or what “does not satisfy our taste preferences,” and what is a delinquency or can do harm to society. We have the right to interfere into another person's life when and only when the person transgresses a social norm, violates other peoples’ rights, or damages the social good. If a person does not violate the juridical interests of others and carries out their social responsibility, we may feel disapproval towards them, or not endorse them. However, on the interactional level,

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8. As we show later, it does not contradict the idea of a universal international community in the scope of the mankind, or as Habermas calls it in his latest work, a “cosmopolitan reunion of the citizens of the world” or “world community with political constitution,” etc. The difference is that communities in plural, each with its own particular ethics, can coexist within a larger “planetary” community of universal morality.
we may only refuse to communicate with them, or limit ourselves in this communication: “We have a right . . . in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable opinion of any one, [yet] not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours” (Ibid.: 278).

Mill elaborates such a model of an attitude towards others when we should imagine ourselves as an individual and as a representative of society at the same time. I, as an autonomous individual, should be defended from an unjustified interference of society. I as a representative of society, in general, should not be allowed to interfere in the personal interests of other members of the society. I, as an autonomous individual, should know how to stay within my limits, and should see limits of my evaluations and judgments projected onto another autonomous individual. I, as a representative of a society which imposes norms, should see limits of social interference in another person’s life. Such a limitary lens proposed by Mill teaches us to understand that my opinions, convictions, and positions are contiguous with others’ opinions, convictions, and positions, and none of them, mine or theirs, is more significant, or “veritable” than that of the other side.

Mill very precisely, or one might even say “graphically,” delineates the space of limits between various individuals or communities, each of whom have a pathological propensity to interfere into the other’s sphere of life, and to violate their limits. By formulating such ethos of social (interpersonal) credo, he clearly distinguishes limits between what I have right to think and to feel about others, on the one hand, and what I have right to explicitly address, impose, or require from them, on the other hand. We can therefore draw the conclusion that the acknowledgement of limits between having an opinion in regard to others, and advancing one’s claims to others by requiring them to give an account of their position, or to redefine it is a litmus test for any mature democratically-oriented liberal society that values equal rights and the freedoms of its members.

Pathology (Mill does not articulate his diagnosis in such terms, but Habermas does⁹) consists in the fact that, as history often shows, our very notion of Good can be pathological in itself. Its source is usually our immediate psychical, inherent, and proper thoughts, convictions, and feelings which are deeply rooted in our egocentric “me.” Very often, while speaking about the “social good,” we unscrupulously mean that our own intuitive sense or notion of good, with an applicability to the exterior world that does not presume any limits. In other words, we do not allow others to have alternative views, not because we are authoritarian (or not in the first place at least), but just because we refuse them the epistemological ability to have equally valid conceptions of good. ‘Good for me’ is, by default, good for all others, just for the reason that it is good in my opinion. All totalitarian, missionary-religious, and conservative-patriarchal ideologies were (and some of them still are) based on these principles of “natural” expansion and the export of proper “good” ideas, values, and intuitions into other peoples’ worlds.¹⁰

⁹. See Habermas, 2001b.
  ¹⁰. Here it is worth reminding us of Th. Hobbes saying, “To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. . . . It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct” (Hobbes, 1996: 85; put in italics by me—T.W.).
We remember Kant’s imperative that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others” (Rawls, 1985: 227). Two centuries later, Habermas repeatedly reproduces this formula in communitarian terms by saying that none can have freedom if the (other) members of a community do not have freedom in the same way. Mill first demonstrates that the notion of good may be used in plural. My notion of good is as particular and as conditioned as everyone else’s. To generate a unified conception of good for a society, or even for a supranational community, is a much more challenging task if we are concerned about what logic of intersubjective limits is implied in this unified conception (or how exactly it can be absent there).

An essential ethical moment, which can be drawn out of Mill’s reflection, is that we can measure ethical character of a judgment according to the means used for addressing this judgment of others. In other words, according to the logic, this judgment is implemented in an intersubjective space. Mill microscopically analyzes this complex, (indeed elementary, but often undistinguishable, and therefore complex), logical mechanism. He systematically calls violence the good that is imposed on others by force, or by an unjustified interference into their private sphere of life. Social good, when being forcefully introduced into individuals’ lives, turns out to be evil in its essence. Whether a judgment can be regarded as good or evil can be defined by the attitude that the person making the judgment has towards the other’s limits. In case the person neglects these limits and imposes their good by force, for Mill, the protest against the interference is justified, as it would be then a protest against evil. In other words, evil is not something that is “objectively bad.” Mill produces a “subjectively conditioned” image of evil, an image which, before him, had not been articulated. The “subjective” nature of evil derives from the means we refer to other’s limit; he writes, “All errors which [a person] is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good” (Mill, 1977: 277). From this, it follows that evil is just a particular opinion or position that claims to be a universal norm being imposed by force, or without being justified by those concerned.

Mill gives two examples that demonstrate this (in)distinguishability of limits. In order not to go too deeply into detailed accounts, let us reconstruct the formal logical structure of the examples. Muslims consider an action “X” to be immoral both for Muslims and Christians. Catholics consider an action “Y” to be immoral both for Catholics and Protestants. If we take the position of the Muslims, we have the right to persecute Christians; if we take the position of the Catholics, we would have the right to persecute Protestants. Mill draws the following conclusion:

\[ \text{. . . if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out} \]

for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves (Mill, 1977: 285).

To conclude, Mill discovers a very important principle formulated more than one-and-a-half centuries ago, and is continually violated in practice everywhere by everyone; the indistinguishability of limits between what refers to the private life and personality of the individual, and what touches upon universal morality and social good. We suggest calling it the **pathology of egocentrism**, which can be defined as the **incapacity to distinguish or the intentional obliteration of intersubjective limits conditioned by the imagined absoluteness of one's own good or one's own conception of good, and the logical, or political, expansion that follows from this position**. Egocentrism implies the reduction of the exterior world to one's own personal interests, the perception of one's own interests as unconditionally valuable. It “naturally” entails an unwillingness to recognize other persons’ limits. Being introduced into the sphere of intersubjective interaction, this principle of the absolute significance of “me” (my ego, my proper convictions, judgments, values etc.), encourages me to infringe upon other people’s limits, and to subjugate logically- and geopolitically-alien territories.

Though he does not make explicit reference to Mill, it is evident that Habermas borrows his logic of demarcation between the private and the universal. Private individual will, individual verity or logic, is what the individual considers or has the right to consider as “real” and “veritable” for themselves (within the limits of their lifeworld and worldview). As soon as we enter into the sphere of intersubjective relationships, we can-

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12. To finish up with Mill, it is necessary to make a brief remark on a subject that nevertheless requires a full-fledged, separate research. Mill does not pose the problem of who and how will be interpreting concrete contextually conditioned questions of limits between what may be admitted as individual tastes, and what is doing harm to society. For example, is erotic photographic art an affair of private taste, or pornography insulting social morals? There was, for example, a famous case in the Soviet history of art, when a successful renown photographer (Alexander Grinberg) was sentenced by the Soviet regime to five years in the working camps as a result of a sudden reinterpretation of his photographic art by the authorities. “One can hardly imagine,—writes about him a Russian researcher of photography Victoria Musvik,—in which direction Alexander Grinberg’s work would have developed, but the State suddenly interfered in his life. In 1935 one had an illusion that the state control over photographic art mitigated. Grinberg showed his naked models on the Moscow Exhibition of Masters of the Soviet Photographic Art. On this exhibition he was presented as a member of jury . . . In 1936 he was arrested for the ‘propaganda of pornography’ and sentenced to five years of camps” (Musvik, 2012: 22–23). Almost a century later, we face the same problem of interpretation in Russia with regards to homosexuality. Whether the latter is an expression of individual tastes and preferences, an expression of a life style in a liberally oriented democratic society, or an insult made to social morals, is a question of interpretation. Whether it should be publicly accepted or may be (in terms of repressive liberalism) regarded only as a private though not socially desirable practice, is a question of interpretation. How we draw the borderline between the “moral” and the “immoral,” and the “harmful” and the “harmless,” influences the borderline between what will be considered as the “private” and the “public,” what will be allowed as social good, or defended as a social evil. I am thankful to Alexander Filippov, who suggested the idea that Mill does not see the mechanism whereby those who establish a monopoly for interpretation gain the social power to judge, and to draw constituting borderlines.
not only pursue our own ends anymore, though we have the right to argumentatively convince others in our position. If we claim that a norm should be intersubjectively accepted, (whether it be a norm of knowledge, or a relationship of behavioral patterns), we have to take others’ opinions, interests, and perspectives into account, and presume that a norm should not be accepted unless all concerned agree on that norm.

Habermas makes the very logic of demarcation explicit between what refers to me personally, and what can be intersubjectively justified and valid. In most cases of our quotidian, social, and political life, this limit blurs; it is not recognized or is intentionally disavowed on various pretexts. It seems plausible that most of conflicts have this indistinguishability as their *initium et causa*. Should we reconstruct the long history of human conflicts and traumas, we will see that the inability to pass from the egocentric to the intersubjective interpretation of the reality lies in the foundations of most of them. Any explicitly advanced claim puts the subject in relation to the limits of the Other. Whether it be a geopolitical ambition, an unwarranted claim for a social status, or someone’s authoritarian will within a family, we always experience this tension between my own and the other’s limits. In the context of the intersubjective lifeworld, where we are *more-than-one-person* (where the other, others, we, and society emerge), this borderline sharpens as each of us projects their own logic of limits (or of its all-effacing absence) onto the exterior world of others. Each of us is inclined to interpret limits, or to not notice them, in their own way.

Besides Mill, Habermas (2003: 110) first accentuates this epistemological disposition with regard to limits as an essential and problematic one: “We still lack adequate concept for the semantic difference between what is morally wrong and what is profoundly evil” [earlier in the text—the notion of “radical evil” from biblical language—T.W.]. That is, we do not differentiate between a situation, which we like or dislike for personal reasons, from a situation where our intersubjective rights and freedoms are violated. Let us schematically consider the following case; S₁ is at variance with S₂ in their interests. S₁ claims that S₂ redefines his or her position, and is ready to accuse S₂ that he or she is morally wrong. However, if the position of S₂ refers to him or her only and is not imposed on another Sₙ against their will, the position of S₂ cannot be considered as morally wrong with regard to S₁, no matter how much S₁ disagrees with it. Moreover, if S intends to redefine the position of S₂ by force of authority, the action of S should be evaluated as a violation of their individual rights.

What is “morally wrong” refers, in this case, to the intersubjective morality implying that we mutually recognize the rights and freedoms of each other. What is “essentially wrong” refers to ethical values and judgments that may be different for each of us. These are two heteronomous plans that Habermas suggests not to mingle. In order to understand the specificity of this demarcation, we should start with a simpler differentiation between the *exterior* and *interior* worlds, though which is not easy to implement into interaction practices. The simplicity of this division is only all the more apparent as it is usually not articulated in our basic morals and habits. In a broader sense, the interior world refers to our subjective feelings, thoughts, and values. The exterior world refers to
surrounding contexts, events, phenomena, and relationships with other people. It also includes our actions and expressions addressed to other people.  

Habermas conceptualizes this demarcation between the interior and the exterior worlds. The interior world can be distinguished only against a background of the exterior one. The very notion of the subjective world makes sense when and only when we have a sphere of the social “universal” for reference. We only can perceive the subjective world of others in an abstract way, referring to a sphere of the non-universal, or the non-common (Nicht-Gemeinsamkeit). We do not have direct access to it, and cannot judge it according to criteria of the common universal world. It can be thought of only in reference to the world of common order. 

Habermas needs this opposition to show that the world of subjective experience (judgments, feelings, and beliefs) and the world of intersubjective meanings are based on absolutely different grounds. Violation of or insufficient attention to this borderline entails both painful and illegitimate communicative deformations. Returning to the example schematically explicated above, if a religious person imposes a meaning of their subjective world as a norm on a non-religious person, it would mean a shift and a violation of the limits between the interior world of subjective meanings, and the exterior world of intersubjective meanings. In reverse order, if a non-religious person forces a religious one to renounce their religious convictions on the ground that “they are essentially wrong,” it would mean a shift and a violation of limits between the interior world of subjective meanings (secular mentality), and the exterior world of intersubjective meanings (freedom of conscience).

The decision of a state to legalize weapons can be construed as an “essential evil” in another state’s eyes. However, it will not be morally wrong from the intersubjective perspective, each taking the autonomy of the other as a basic presumption. The decision of a liberal community to legalize abortion can be construed as an “essential evil” for a Christian community, but it will not be morally wrong from the intersubjective perspective, each taking the autonomy of the other as a basic presumption. In such cases, we may judge something as “essentially wrong or right” and it will be our private subjective conviction (or a conviction of our parochial community). But it turns out to be “morally wrong” when and only when, being a matter of taste or a subjective verity, it pretends to have an intersubjective meaning without an argumentatively sufficient, intersubjectively-accepted justification.

For Habermas, the differentiation of limits between the subjective and the intersubjective is a guarantee from communicative pathologies, that is, from manipulations and intrusions into a private sphere of an individual or a community. In a historical perspective, as previously stated, all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes were (and some of

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13. According to Weber’s definition of social action as an action oriented towards the Other.

14. He speaks about it, for example, in Habermas, 1984: 43–74, 2008: 24–76. This differentiation can sometimes be found by Habermas as a conceptual separation between propositional verity, subjective authenticity, and juridical validity. Propositional verity is the common knowledge of the “objective world” or facts; subjective authenticity refers to the purely subjective inner world; juridical validity refers to intersubjectively shared and acknowledged norms.
them still are) based on this assumption of non-differentiation. In extreme cases, this non-differentiation conditions violence, aggression, and destructive transgression; on a discursive level, it can, by default, legitimize ignorance, non-understanding, or discursive domination.

To continue, we can define a relationship in which the limits between the subjectively veritable and the intersubjectively justified/valid are recognized, clearly differentiated, and not violated as “moral.” In this case, it is taken for granted that a person may judge others’ values and tastes as “essentially wrong,” but may not interfere into a private life with their own ethical values and judgments, or redefine others’ positions. We can logically conclude that if a conflictual situation between them arises, they ideally should base their strategies of conflict resolution on this initial differentiation before they go into a deeper essential controversy.

Issuing from this initial differentiation, morality and ethics should be also differentiated and constituted in two different plans, according to Habermas. Morality is a set of common regulative principles of social interaction. Ethics is a private domain of values and orientations of an individual or a community within a larger community (society, state, or cosmopolitan community). Morality is a set of normative rules that coordinates intersubjective interaction. Moral principles articulate what can or should be accepted as an intersubjective norm. Ethics expresses a parochial idea of what good is, or what it should be, depending on cultural traditions, and the epistemological contexts of a particular individual or a community. What is ethically good for one person (community) can be not at all good for another person (community). Yet, morality is the “neutral” regulative force that coordinates interaction between all these different persons and communities with their different ethical values, preferences, and claims. We need morality, writes Habermas (1994: 47), “that rests only on the normative content of universal conditions of coexistence in a society (founded on mutual respect for persons)”.

Habermas deduces this logic of differentiation between morally right/wrong, on the one hand, and ethical good/evil, on the other, from the pluralistic nature of modern society. A great number of communities heteronomous to each other (national, ethnical, confessional, political, etc.) have to share a common space, common resources, and coexist with each other. At the same time, he suggests this differentiation to be employed as an instrument of the analysis and correction of social pathologies. Communities and other participants of political and cultural life enter into conflict contradictions with each other, and encounter a lack of a common universal language. Therefore, as Habermas writes, “in modern societies, moral norms must detach themselves from the concrete contents of the plurality of attitudes toward life that now manifest themselves” (ibid.).

In such a way, (by philosophical means), a “secondary” community is modeled in modern Europe which, from one side, does not have national limits, but, which, from the other side, generates a clear logic of intersubjective limits, an ethos of limits, and a

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15. As he precises, moral position does not express any axiological orientations; it can only make clear to what extent claims of a particular point of view may be accepted as intersubjectively legitimate. Morality does not coincide with the notion of social good in this sense; it is purely formal, logical, and deontological.
limitary conscience. The paradox exists in the fact that participants of this community perceive themselves as limited by others and (co)limited with others, while at the same time being at the same time an agent of limitless communication. This very combination of simultaneously open- and restrictive-limits seems paradoxical in the sense of being open-to-others, and restrictive with regard to others. This new European identity of the limitary subject implies that the subject discerns and acknowledges limits of other subjects; they (the subject in question) are, in a sense, produced by these limits. The subject in question is limited by their own ethical orientation and values. They are (co)limited by the same subjects, but are, at the same time, included in a community of limitless communication with (co)limitary others. In such a way, an ideal community of nations, cultures, confessions, political parties, and individuals is to be construed and constructed.

This structural logic of limits is essential for limiting egocentric worldviews, that is, worldviews concentrated on the individuals’ or local parochial ego, and incapable of taking the perspectives of others into account. The fact that others are there constrains us in our limits, and reminds us of the limits between us and others. Ideal communication, (in an Habermasian sense), always implicitly implies these significant limits. But limits do not only divide us, they also, as we have seen, weave social tissue by interconnecting us. As soon as we acknowledge others as others, we enter into a relationship with their otherness. We find ourselves ready to restructure our relationship with others, and to conscientiously draw new information from the way limits are structured in our life worlds. From this point of view, limits are the very core of our human community; they make us (distinguishable) humans among other humans.

To master the principles of this hierarchical system of limits would be essential for the morphologically-complex and heteronomous Russian society, and its social, political, national, ethnical, and confessional inhomogeneity. Within a long period of Soviet history, Russia had the tendency of a centralized, ideologically-authoritarian model of social interaction. Norms were hierarchically imposed on all spheres of life without presuming any alternatives. When the limits to the exterior world were opened, Russia began to experience this tension of intersubjective (international and intercultural) limits. For Russia as a political subject, it is, thus, very important to see and to acknowledge itself limited by others, and (co)limited (together) with others. Russia’s attitude towards international norms, and the interpretation of international norms depends on a great extent of this perception of itself as a (co)limited subject.

The same can be said about the internal politics within the country. For example, in taking commonly significant decisions or elaborating commonly valid laws, Russian society could orient itself not only on the axiology of traditional values and stable or even dogmatic authorities, but take the heteronomous ethical orientations of different communities into account. The Government could encourage analytical groups to investigate

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16. In his interview “Conversation about God and the World,” he uses the notion of the “decentred idea of normativity” that implies that we can only accept something as a norm when we take the perspective of all concerned into account, that is, when we see ourselves as limited by others. See Habermas, 2006b, or, 2002: 147–167.
empirical cases when ethical values of certain social groups are presented as “commonly accepted” and “intersubjectively shared” to the detriment of other groups’ values and orientations, when certain social groups extrapolate their axiology to the whole of Russian society while others do not have effective instruments to stand up for their limits, and, by that, do not have instruments to realize to what extent a heterogeneously complex Russian society is based on mutually exclusive principles.

Public articulation of this difference between the “subjective” and the “intersubjective,” the “ethical” and the “moral,” the “veritable” and the “legitimate,” or to put it more simply, between me and Other, could contribute to a more productive mutual clarification of heteronomous positions, values, and interests, and as a consequence, to a better resolution of social and political conflicts, to the mitigation of social tension, and to the creation of non-exclusive social relationships. It could give us an opportunity to listen to heretofore mute and unnoticeable different voices. As Jean-Luc Nancy formulates it (2001: 12–13), “We should go out from the monotheism of thought, as . . . we do not conceive this world in terms of Unity anymore.”

References

Логика интерсубъективных границ в сообществе Ю. Хабермаса (или Почему мы не должны быть единым целым)

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В статье рассматривается модель транснационального космополитического морально-правового сообщества безграничной коммуникации Ю. Хабермаса. Эта модель появляется как попытка философскими средствами выработать гарантии от авторитарных монополий на власть, следствиями которых в ХХ веке оказались диктаторские режимы и национальные сообщества (протототалитарного типа). Проводится реконструкция этой модели наднационального сообщества и анализируется, каким образом в этом сообществе мыслится морально ориентированное интерсубъективное взаимодействие. Показывается, что значимой исследовательской и этической проблемой для Хабермаса является различение границ между «внутренним» (субъективным) и «внешним» (интерсубъективным) миром. Согласно этому различению, субъективная истина или частная ценостная позиция индивида/сообщества может определяться ценостными установками, предпочтениями и вкусами индивида/сообщества; тогда как притязание на истинность (claim), претендующее на то, чтобы быть интерсубъективной нормой, должно быть оправдано и принято всеми, кого эта норма так или иначе касается. Неразличение границ между тем, что считаю истинным лично я, и тем, что должны признавать за норму другие (или национальные сообщества, индивидуальные ценностные установки, предпочтения индивида/сообщества), лежит в основании многих социальных, (гео)политических, этнических, конфессиональных и прочих конфликтов и коммуникативных деформаций. До сих пор критики Хабермаса не уделяли этому аспекту должного внимания. Между тем, именно такое различение между субъективно истинным и интерсубъективно валидным делает сообщество Хабермаса антитоталитарным и выявляет глубокое этическое значение интерсубъективных границ.

Ключевые слова: Ю. Хабермас, Дж. С. Милль, моральное сообщество, интерсубъективность, внешний мир, внутренний мир, интерсубъективные границы
Living in-between: The Uses of Marginality in Sociological Theory*

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It may seem that the concept of marginality has already been thoroughly studied and sometimes even considered as a useless and obsolete theoretical notion. However, in this article I develop the notion in a novel way with regard to recent theoretical debates on the social implications of shifting borderlines in the contemporary world. The notion of “marginal man” introduced by Robert Park is central for my approach since it embodies the “spatial—social” interaction. I construct and use the nexus of space, time and movement to account for the analytical capacities of this concept. The article covers mainly the spatial aspects of marginality and its connotations. I outline two main approaches to the ideal type of the “marginal man” in the paper: 1) the spatial-functional approach (traced back to Simmel’s notion of Stranger), which focuses on the essential functions of Stranger for a group border, and 2) “formal”—making approach to multiple borders (and particularly shifting ones) that shape “marginal’s” identification as placed in-between borders and challenge the orderliness of bordered space. The central task of the marginality research is not to classify different “strangers” and “marginals”, or to describe their conditions, self-identities, and psychological controversies, but to depict social processes responsible for “marginalization”, exclusion, and enabling liminal positions. In this article I argue that the analytical vista of the “marginality” concept can be extended beyond the individual/personal framework and include social institutions (in the example of citizenship).

Keywords: space, border, frontier, marginality, marginal man, stranger, movement

There are some concepts in sociological theory that once appeared in the analysis of social phenomena and specific circumstances, and then became irrelevant to current theoretical discourse with changed circumstances. But under certain social changes, these concepts are popular again, and relevant for theory-oriented research. An example of this is the concept of marginality, re-emerging in the wake of American emigration in order to explore a new social type, that of the marginal man, and has undergone many reverberations and inversions of meaning. Given its original sociological connotations, the concept of the marginal man is useful, and even indispensable, for the analysis of post-Soviet and current social realities.

The initial difficulty for the research emerged with the social change which used to be called “post-soviet” or “post-imperial.” The development of a new social reality produced new social spaces (new states, new borderlines, new “social closures” and new ag-
gregations; in a word—the “post-Soviet space”, entering into the different kind of social analyses), as well as another social time (new regularities, revision of historical narratives, new points of countdown, etc.). These processes inevitably generated (or made evident) a particular social type known as the “marginal man.”

The popular preconceptions of “marginals” could be attributed to approximately twenty-five million people in the post-soviet space as they found themselves outside their “historical motherland” within a fortnight. This manifold varies from overt hostility and scorn (when “marginal” means “declassified person”, “lumpen”, “criminal”, “rootless”, “vagrant”, etc.), to the neutral, formal, or even sympathetic attitude (“migrants”, “non-citizens”, “double citizens”, “refugees”, “compatriots abroad”, etc.). The post-soviet marginals could be viewed as exemplifying the universal modern social type of “marginal”, determined and formed by the global processes of the framework of experience unification while creating new forms of fragmentation and dispersal. In other words, the definition of the social type of “marginal” was actualized via the modern processes of difference, exclusion and marginalization. 1

Thus, the conceptual premise of the main research objective formulation consists of the suggestion that “marginal” is a universal social type. Methodologically, this inferred presupposition that “marginality” provides a new “ideal type” for modern social reality analysis, and is made along space/time dimensions.

The main objective of the research on marginality is to develop a conceptual framework of reference for the sociological analysis of marginality as a specific post-imperial social type, process, and social relationship. With regard to this objective, two special tasks could be formulated — to establish contingency of this term with the basic sociological concepts that are generally used to understand the idea of marginality, and to work out a theoretical operationalization of the “marginality” in the context of processes of the destabilized society such as desocialisation and re-socialisation, social/cultural/political exclusion, hybridization, and diffusion.

As stated, the central question of the marginality research is not to classify different “strangers” and “marginals”, or to describe their condition and self-identities, and psychological controversies, but to depict social processes responsible for “marginalization”, exclusion, and liminal positions. The identification of such processes generating “marginal” type provides an opportunity to find out a sociological account of the marginal condition as opposed to psychological one. Identifying the principal differences between sociological and psychological approaches to the concept of marginality is one of the significant points of the research on marginality. The central argument of these differences is as follows: the psychological approach, as presented in numerous works on “marginals”, “vagabonds”, “exiles”, “pilgrims”, “strangers”, etc., focuses on the description of the marginal’s feelings, sentiments, consciousness, self-consciousness, memories, and perceptions, while the sociological approach is interested in the marginal’s functions in relation to the group, or his/her specific practices developed while being in between the cut-

1. Discussion on these processes see in Giddens, 1991: 5–6.
lines of different social institutions, or in the forms of the marginal’s activity reciprocally producing the processes of institutional marginalization. The further elaboration of the sociological approach to the definition of “marginality” demands a revision, first of all, of the “classical” social theory resources in regard of the new marginalities. The concepts of “the stranger”, “the other” and “the marginal man” represented this pull of resources.

The main sources of concepts and ideas relative and useful for the analysis of marginality were the texts of classical sociology. These classical texts could be selected and singled out according to the main categories constituting the concept of marginality: space, time, and movement/mobilities (as well as related categories of norm, and ambivalence). These tentative dimensions of marginality are specified and transformed into the conceptual framework of marginality through the works of G. Simmel on “Stranger” (1989, 1992), and through his sociology of space. The dimension of space was concretized by Simmelian terms of “the unity of closeness and remoteness”, “host/stranger relationship”, and the “stranger’s freedom and objectivity.” It will be sufficient here to note the research and debate on the Simmelian Stranger and Otherness which resulted, according to Donald Levine, in the classification of different “Stranger” status-types: Guest, Sojourner, Newcomer, Intruder, Inner Enemy, Marginal Man (Levine, 1977). The main criterion for this classification is the Simmelian notion of Stranger as the “co-presence of closeness and remoteness”; all the types/statuses of Stranger classification come from the underlying relationship of Host-Stranger and its emotional character (the degree of compulsive friendliness or hostility); the process of such a relationship is associated with assimilation and its core variable of Estrangement. Any classification is vulnerable to criticism, including this one, if one pursues a classification to fit specific post-imperial conditions. The questions arising from the classification concerns not only the “characteristic properties of each of these types of stranger relationship” (Levine, 1977: 23), or factors determining person’s entrance into one or another of these type relations, or person’s moving from one type to another; our major interest is the very process by which persons find themselves to become marginals (strangers) in the group, and why this process of marginalization becomes independent of the person’s will to stay or leave the group.

Another classical peace of text having the direct influence on the marginality issue is one of A. Schutz on “Stranger” and “Homecomer” (1945). Here time dimension acquired the shape through the concepts of regularity, continuity, routinization, recurrence, simultaneity and others. Significant for the marginality research objectives are also works of G. H. Mead on The Philosophy of the Present (1932); of E. Durkheim on anomie and “moral community” (1906) (for the norm dimension and the modes of “normalization”), but primarily — of R. Park on “marginal man”, migration, human ecology and the cycle of “competition/conflict/accommodation and assimilation” (for the movement and ambivalence dimensions).

The most evident definition of the “marginal man” by R. Park comes from the term of the “margin”/“border”, and, thus, makes the issue of marginality to be, first of all, the

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subject of the sociology of space. Although the Park’s version of Sociology of Space (Human Ecology) makes its reference to the Simmelian Sociology of Space (particularly to the notion of the Stranger — Der Fremde), it is significantly modified in its epistemological issues. The modification comes, first of all, from the different account of the “border”/“margin” — it is no more defined in the predominately cognitivistic manner, like: “The boundary is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that forms itself spatially” (Simmel, 1997: 143), as the objectification of the human attitude towards the “piece of space”, making the sense of group identification. Thus, the account of the Stranger and his relationship to the boundary of the group is essentially functional — the Stranger, by crossing the borders of the group deliberately — unlike group members — makes the group to get aware of what it is not like, he is a pure function of the group identification process. Park comes to his notion of the “marginal man” not only through the reflections on the ideal type of the Stranger and the social-functional meaning of the border, but, first of all, as the theoretical outcome of his empirical studies of the migration process in America. In this theoretical framework the group and the marginal exchange their functions — multiple group boundaries become the source for the marginal’s identity, they are embodied in the marginal’s personality, crossing the boundary is not just getting close or remote to the group, but to overcome the physical space, to make the interaction with the space. This was a different from Simmelian Sociology of Space, treating space not only as becoming a social fact via human action and experience, but forming and producing social facts. Space and its physical features impact the social institutions and human behavior. The Space is not just the container of the Social, enabling to exercise the human capacity to differentiation, streamline and meaningful ordering, but the primordial state of the Social, its starting point of motion.  

Thus, we can talk about another principal distinction between the two main approaches to the analysis of the marginality in sociological theory. One of the approaches could be called “functional”: it could be said to regard and define a marginal from the group’s point of view. It focuses on the marginal’s relation to the group (community, society) and takes “identity” identification with the group) and “participation” (or even loosely comprehensible notion of the norm of participation in group activities) concepts as a frame of reference for this relation. “Identity” and “participation” facilitate the general classification of the functional definitions of “marginality”: in the utter case of the definition of marginality “identity-making” could be regarded as participation; this approach to the study of marginality is sooner “actionist” one and corresponds to the subject matter for the study of marginality. It can be complemented by and compared to the study of marginals’ functions or uses in social and cultural relationship and to the study of the form of marginality under the processes of desocialization and resocialization. Considering the actionist interpretation of marginality (where the core operational concept is participa-

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3. As Frederic Turner (certainly known to R.Park) wrote in his notorious work on *The Significance of the Frontier in the American History*: “… the frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control” (Turner, 1921: 42).
tion) one cannot but notice that marginality is usually defined as *a lack of participation* in social institutions (in economics, in political decision making, in symbolic resources’ distribution, etc.), as a deprivation and exclusion from the social structures (Germani, 1980). Such point of view provides functionally “negative” aspect of marginality definition. But if the deviation from the participation norm to the opposite extreme—*surplus* of participation—is suggested, then marginal is located *between* the different kinds of social borders that shape social relationships and cement social order. This is that positive aspect of marginality definition which has been already stressed by R. Park and which describe the position of the marginal as in-between the worlds, cultures, social orders, not identifying completely with either. This position of *in-betweenness* facilitates the move towards the “formal” sociological approach to marginality which will be introduced below.

But first, some remarks on the functional definition. Both aspects of the definition—positive and negative—entail functional meaning: a marginal has a universal social distance enabling him to perform as an observer and providing him with the criterion for observation (the norms of social/cultural/political orders “beyond the border” may serve as such a criterion). It gives an opportunity for the instrumental interpretation of the stranger; Richard Rorty quite frankly suggests this pragmatist “inevitable and unobjectionable ethnocentrism” for the Western culture (Rorty, 1992).

Thus one of the main marginal’s functions is to contribute to the process of social self-reflection and society’s self identification giving a chance to indicate what society is not alike.

Another functional advantage of marginality consists in that it makes possible to explain social change not necessarily as a result of the systemic crisis, but as a permanent condition of the “complicated strategic situation”, of the “interaction among the unequal and mobile social relations” (Foucault, 1984). It helps to escape the necessity to admit the condition of the permanent systemic crisis. Here the change infers no necessarily a conflict, but rather a paradox: the resolution of such a situation requires also paradoxical strategy that does not exclude completely the alternatives for the specific chosen solution, but makes possible to preserve and reproduce them. The condition of marginality (and the presence of marginals), therefore, not only generates an ambiguity/abeyance/contradiction of the social positions (what makes the problem of social control particularly acute), but also provides with the set of alternatives for the resolution of complex situation.

In other words, the point is that the marginality is an intrinsic feature of the evolutionary development, when there is not any linear, deterministic relation between the certain event (war, revolution, etc.) and the social mutation; the change takes a range of hardly detachable and inaccessible for direct observation stages. Marginals and strangers constitute the material cumulating and transmitting these shades of cultural and social change.

The negative—dysfunctional—aspect of marginality, particularly salient on the institutional level of the social order, clears up during the institutional, systemic crises, when marginals become a result of such a crisis, institutionally surplus material, costs
for the social change. They actualize the necessity of social control and set the problem of creating new institutional positions for the institutionally ambivalent, abeyant groups (Mizruchi, 1983).

As a distinct from the “functional” approach there could be outlined another also sociological way of “marginality” account based not on the marginal’s relation to the group (and thus centered on the marginal’s functions and uses for the group), but rather on its relation to many groups (two at least), on its state of in-betweenness and cultural conflict. This approach strives to formalize the condition of marginality in the space/time/movement dimensions and to depict marginal’s position and modes of activity not in functional relation to one group (or subsequently, to one and then to another), but regarding his activity, per se, as located in the definite point of the multi-group environment and effected by the surrounding boundaries and forms. This approach will be referred to as “formal” one. It also, as it was mentioned above, starts from the classical sociology of space and time and, first of all from the Park’s concept of “the marginal man” as well as of his vision of the sociology of space (“human ecology”) and of the social ontology in general (the cycle of orders “competition—conflict—accommodation—assimilation”).

The correlation of the concepts “frontier”, “institutional border”, “social conflict as a form of social border”, “spatial dimension of marginality” is a special point of reference. By the definition marginals and the very process of marginalization presuppose the notion of boundary, edge, limit. Marginals’ static uncertainty acquires also dynamics when the established institutional border lines and clear-cuts start to shift and to transform under the social change and become “frontiers”; thus, marginals perform as the main agents of these frontier lines. As to the study of the form of marginality process, it depends on the interpretation of the very notion of “margin” as clear-cut, division, edge, limit, frame, periphery, or frontier.

Time dimension of the marginality is revealed through the concepts of “Homecomer”, the presence/absence dialectics in marginal position, routinization of the Marginal, regularity of participation, continuity and simultaneity in the group’s “cultural pattern” production and reproduction. “The beginning” of the group was paid a special attention since the revision and rewriting the history or biography of the group is the most effective means of marginalization. In this case the marginal is portrayed as Latecomer, those, “who was not here at the very beginning.”

The category of movement as part of the frame of reference for the formal marginality analysis is the less elaborated part of the studies on marginality. Specific forms of mobilities of the marginals (such as oscillations, fluctuations) are of interest here. The further logic of the research on developing marginalities demand to analyze marginal units fixed in space/time dimensions in their change perspective, that is in movement. This will indispensible become the next focus of marginality investigations.

So, the question point was how at all persons are moved to marginal positions, or how they are made to be marginals, or what compels them to perform as marginals.

Keeping in mind these theoretical framework questions Marginality is to be presented through the terms of its Space dimension which covered the following topics: Distinction,
Distance, Ordering, Border, Frontier, Marginal as a frontiersman, Environment, Center/periphery, Global marginal. The subsequent part of the Marginality study is evidently centered on the Time dimension of marginality and the topics here are: The Presence/Absence dialectics in marginal position, Routinization of the Marginal, Regularity, continuity and simultaneity in the group’s “cultural pattern” production and reproduction, “The beginning” of the group and marginal as Latecomer, Eternal Marginal. Another part of the study deals with the functional meaning of Marginality and puts forward questions on: Participation/exclusion, Marginal as an observer, Ambivalence, abeyance and contingency, Marginal as a radical and as a conservative, Astration/Asymilation and the problem of Control, The logic of transformation “The Other—The Stranger—The Enemy.”

Among the new questions, which infer from this analysis, the crucial one concerns the reflexivity of the marginal man: is the marginal man always aware of his marginality? Whether the very state of marginality develops on the individual (personal) level, as “the conflict of cultures”, or it might also proceed on the super-individual (institutional, societal) level independent of the individual intentions and involving individuals (and collectivities as well) into the process of marginalization? If these levels are interconnected, then what are the mechanisms, or patterns, of this alliance?

This issue could be illustrated by the marginal case of the post-soviet/Russian citizenship, which is one of the recent uses of the marginality theory for the analysis of the social institution. The main point is that the post-soviet citizenship is marginalized between the formal (written in the Constitution law on citizenship) norms defining “a citizen” and the actual practices of performing as a citizen. Specific citizen’s rights and duties (first of all the right to vote in the elections) can be enjoyed and performed by those who are not formally citizens. Such a situation stems from the old soviet practice to equate “citizens” and “permanent residents” of the country. Permanent residents (after 1992)—by the new post-soviet formal rules—are not automatically entitled to Russian citizenship (they have to pass the procedure of naturalization for that), but in practice they could vote since the electorate are still formed by the permanent residents, not by the “formal” citizens. The peculiarity of the situation is amplified by the fact that neither “a lay voter”, nor an official election functionary always realizes the difference between citizenship and permanent residency and can be aware of the constant resident non-citizen’s marginal position. Perhaps, the number of such “marginal voters” is insignificant for the elections final results (no one ever measured it), but the very their existence is a remarkable feature of the post-soviet political and civic culture (Bankovskaya, 2006). This case can be very useful for the further analysis of the relationship between “social/political” and “spatial” dimensions in the process of marginalization.

Turning to the conditions of the post-soviet marginalization it is worth to mention peculiarities of this process concerning the relation between “borders” and “marginal.” Usually marginals, strangers, newcomers, etc. are seen as trying to transcend the border, to erase it, to make it transparent and flexible; they try to combine the attributes of two (or more) form-units (Herrick, 1977; Tirykian, 1973).
The post-imperial case here deals with the process of marginalization which take place in the conditions of emerging borders, multiplying boundaries (spatial, institutional, symbolic); the initial unit falls apart, the diffuse, social and cultural space become an environment, marginalia, for the newly formed concentrated clots of social and cultural reality.

Marginal here faces a choice: to join this new form of social organization, to accept a new form of relationship and to identify oneself with it, by the word—to enter inside the bounded entity. The alternative offers to stay beyond the new boundaries, in the former diffuse environment. Sometimes staying in between means to survive on the frontier line, where two new entities are still interacting, conflicting, dividing spatial resources, and still forming the borderlines between them.

So, the marginal in such a position tries rather to escape, to avoid the contact with borders and clear-cut lines, then to combine or erase them. He seems to be in a conflict with the borders and perceives their reality and relativity particularly clear and acute. This type does not seem to be more emancipated and exempt from the control of the custom and tradition (Park, 1967); he rather meets a necessity to confront the growing and multiplying control modes around him; marginal is smashed by the need to defend himself against the attempts to swallow his independent ambiguity and to absorb it into the definitely formed unit. If Simmelian Stranger presupposed both “from every given point in space, and thus the conceptional opposite to fixation at such a point” (Simmel, 1950: 402), then in our case we should sooner speak about the liberation of given point space from the stranger and as opposite—fixation, or keeping him close.

The phase of spatial alteration of the social/cultural forms—expansion or contraction—creates problems (and perspectives) emerging along with the necessity to deal with the new (predominately spatial in its nature) interpretation of post soviet political and social context as an “empire”; the very presence of the “post-soviet space” in the political discourse and practice indicates on the reality of the social entity without the actual borders (since the borders of the Soviet state do not exist), still the meaning of this entity and its contents are real and functional. Thus, marginals could be also portrayed as the essentially “imperial” agents, as agents of the “post-soviet” meaning.

The most complicated theoretical setback becomes the concept of the “social norm” (“anomic”), specifically—“norm of social participation” (and non-participation). It acquires particular meaning when “the new democratic order” is dealt as a result of spatial transformation. Here the problem of marginality bridges the realms of political and social/cultural, since it actualizes a perspective of perversion a Stranger into an Enemy. The process of marginalization, thus being a ferment of the political transformation and re-identification, performs also as a counterbalance to the unification and “massification” of modern democracies.

Thus, the logic of the “marginality” investigation and the methodology of its framework construction consisted in conceptual operationalization of the basic categories of “space”, “time” and “movement” to the grid of concepts appropriate for the adequate ac-
count both of the ideal type of the “marginality” as a special social relation and of particular modes in which it is embodied.

One more principal question concerned the identity of the marginal. It inferred, at least two points. What way the identity of the “marginal” could be defined if not from the point of view of the group? Regarded functionally, from the group positions, marginal is a part of the group’s environment, milieu, which is unified, formless and perceived functionally. Reciprocally, from the point of view of the marginal (as to his identity) any definite group is a part of his environment. The variety of distinct, clearly formed up communities, of their borders and the multitude of different kinds of oppositions and distinctions in general constitute the universal “environment” for the marginal. For the marginal the universal features of the group have the prior meaning; those features which make all the groups more abstract and “imagined”, and equally probable to occur in the constellation of his identity. The occurrence of individual in the social circles’ crossing is not always a result of individual’s own efforts, not always is it even realized by the individual. The identity of the marginal, based on the constellation of the different groups’ borders, is distinct from the identity of any other contemporary, also based on the interference and crossing of various social circles, by the fact that marginal, first, uses the resources of the “environment” for self-identification, thus initiating this constellation, or in any rate, realizing its significance for his own identity; and, second, marginal does not fully identify himself with this constellation, always keeping in mind the possibility to change it.

Marginal represents, figuratively speaking, that who formulates his life narrative not by the expressions of the kind “It happened so”, but of the kind “I did it so.”

Such a reflexivity in relation to self-identity means the more free choice among the equally probable alternatives and the more varied styles of life. The main modern cultural contradiction as to the marginal/stranger could be expressed via the contradiction between the growing abstractness (and inner differentiation) of the collectivity and the diminishing individual opportunities to use this variety of constellations and crossings for self-identification: the choice is too large, but choice criteria are too scarce and they are too abstract. The shadow side of the marginal’s freedom and the dramatics of his condition reveals in what Giddens refers to as “existential isolation”: this is not as much the isolation of the individuals from each other but rather the separation of individuals from the “moral resources” rendered by the particular group and comprising the criteria for the individual’s choice (Giddens, 1991: 9). The core question on the marginal’s freedom in the modern cultural environment could be as well formulated as follows: whether marginal’s freedom from the group norms means the exemption of the morals from the localism, particular forms and the realization of the universal human values, or it means the “existential isolation” followed by the loss of the person’s meaning?

4. The role of the marginal in his relationship with the group could be compared with the role of money in transactions: as money is an embodiment of a pure form in modern economic—and not merely economic—exchange, which expels the individuality and concreteness of the situation; the marginal is a form of identity, which expels any particular features of the communities which the marginal is phenomenally bound to.
Thus, the reflexive constellation of the different collectivities’ borders into the identity of the marginal comprises his authenticity, uniqueness and contingency. This infers not only marginal’s predisposition to the “erasing of the borders”, to their relativization, but also to the special kind of conservatism in relation to the cut-lines. The ambiguity and the state of in-betweenness of the marginal is set by the fact that he, being exempt from the bound to the collectivity which participated in his identity, still remains dependent on their clear-cuts and distinctions, on their mutual oppositions: if their form and concreteness is lost or erased completely, then the marginal’s identity definition via the constellation of these forms will also lose its sense, the unique combination of various definite oppositions will be messed. Being aware of the fact that his authenticity depends on the compilation of definite forms marginal contributes to their preserving and cultivation to the extent, to what marginal strives to preserve and cultivate his own authenticity. Definite forms and oppositions are not unified or eliminated in the process of marginalization, but the opportunities to combine them keep in growing; accordingly, multiply also the types of marginals.

References


Между границ: понятие маргинальности в социологической теории

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Понятие «маргинальность» может показаться хорошо изученным. Иногда его даже не считают полезным теоретическим инструментом. Однако в данной статье предпринята попытка заново приступить к исследованию данного понятия в связи с социальными последствиями изменения границ в современном мире. Центральным здесь оказывается введенное Робертом Парком понятие «маргинальный человек». «Маргинальный человек» воплощает в себе взаимодействие пространственного и социального. Выявление аналитического потенциала этого понятия может происходить в измерениях пространства, времени и движения. В статье рассматриваются по преимуществу пространственные аспекты маргинальности: очерчены два основных подхода к идеальному типу маргинального человека. Пространственно-функциональный подход, восходящий к «Чужаку» Зиммеля, фокусируется на определении функций Чужака для границы группы. «Формальный» подход исходит из множественности границ (в особенности из того, что границы меняются и смешиваются). С этой точки зрения маргинал есть тот, кто находится между границами и бросает вызов упорядоченности разделяемых им и пространства. В статье утверждается, что аналитическая перспектива понятия «маргинальность» может быть расширена. Маргинальным может быть не только человек, но и институты. Главным вопросом исследования маргинальности является не классификация чужаков и маргиналов и не описание условий их жизни, идентичности и психологических сложностей, но описание социальных процессов, вызывающих маргинализацию, исключение, появление лиминальных позиций. В качестве исследовательского кейса в статье использован институт гражданства.

Ключевые слова: пространство, время, граница, фронттир, маргинальность, маргинал, чужак, движение
Territoriality, State, and Nationality in the Making of Borders of Finland: The Evolving Concept of Border in the Peace Treaties between Russia and Sweden, 1323–1809

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This paper examines conceptual change in negotiating borders in the European North. By analyzing the definitions of the status given to Finland in peace treaties between Russia and Sweden, the paper strives to enlighten how through the centuries Russia was involved in negotiating key concepts of European political language, state, territoriality and nationality. With the theoretical discussions in conceptual history as starting point, the paper illustrates how a concept of state, separated from the person of the ruler, emerges in mediaeval and early modern peace treaties, and how the estates of the ruler gradually gain status as political units. With special focus on how notions of a linear state border were attached to the territory of Finland, the paper discusses broader processes of the development of ideas of territorial state and linear state borders. The paper asks how and at which political junctures new understandings of sovereignty appear in the treaties between Russia and Sweden and how international recognition of territorial integrity and the rights of citizens were introduced as part of the relations between the two countries. The broader aim of the paper is to contribute to a comparative discussion on how state-making and bordering processes in the European North were linked to political modernization, and how and to what degree the redefinition of borders and territories were connected to new kinds of conceptualizations of state, sovereignty and nationality characteristic to modern politics.

Keywords: territoriality, state, sovereignty, nationality, border, Finland, Russia, Sweden

In Finnish historical textbooks, the peace treaties between Russia and Sweden are often presented as milestones in the formation of the borders of Finland. As many historians have pointed out, this pattern is in sharp contrast to the way Finland is referred to in the texts of the agreements. For example, Matti Klinge has emphasized the fact that in the text of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, concluded between Sweden and Russia in September, 1809, it is not Finland but six Swedish provinces on the eastern side of the Gulf of Bothnia that are named and ceded to Russia; it is only later that they came to constitute an administratively separate, territorially-clearly-defined Grand Duchy of Finland in the frame of the Russian Empire (Klinge, 1975; Jussila, 1999).

In my paper, I will study what kind of references to Finland as a political space or a separate geographical unit can be found in the texts of the peace treaties in detail. My analysis is based on a critical rereading of the peace treaties between Russia and Sweden,

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from the so-called Treaty of Nöteborg (1323) to the Treaty of Fredrikshamn (1809). I approach the question from the perspective of conceptual history. My starting point is that in order to interpret the status given to Finland in different treaties, it is necessary to simultaneously analyze broader changes in the understanding of basic political concepts, such as state, territoriality, sovereignty, and nationality.

I will examine how a concept of state, separated from the person of the ruler, emerges in mediæval and early modern peace treaties, and how the estates of the ruler gradually gain status as political units. Additionally, I will explore the development of the ideas of territorial state and linear state borders, especially how notions of the territory of Finland were attached to the negotiations and definition of linear state borders. I am interested in how and at which political junctures new understandings of sovereignty are adopted as part of international relations. How do the ideas of international recognition of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the rights of the citizen and groups appear in the treaties between Russia and Sweden? Finally, what kind of legacy do the treaties leave for conceptualizing Finland in terms of political space within the Russian empire?

The broader aim of the paper is to contribute to a comparative discussion on how state-making and bordering processes in the European North were linked to political modernization, and how and to what degree were the redefinition of borders and territories connected to new kinds of conceptualizations of state, nationality, and sovereignty characteristic to modern politics?¹

**Finland as a Sovereign Territorial Nation State?**

Historical textbooks often depict the formation of the borders of Finland with maps that present a state-like unit with clearly demarcated borders that seem to have existed since the Middle Ages. The fact that such a sovereign Finnish state has only existed since World War One is mentioned in most cases, but at the same time, references to periods of “Swedish” or “Russian rule” accentuate that a Finland as an age-old political entity or an original ethnic community has always existed, even if temporarily pressed under the yoke of a foreign power.

In this sense, the maps tend to project the modern idea of a *sovereign, territorial nation state* back in history. This hidden message of boundary lines of textbook maps is in stark contrast with what is known in light of the current historiography of state and nation formation in the European North. In terms of conceptual history, all the parts of this equation need to be put under careful conceptual analysis. What kind of conceptualizations of statehood, territoriality, nationality, and sovereignty do we actually find in medieval and early modern peace treaties, and what notion of a Finland was connected to them?

As the British historian Quentin Skinner has shown, it is highly questionable whether it is possible to identify a *concept of the state* that would be clearly separate from the per-

¹. In this context the goal is to bring new perspectives to the important discussions concerning the Swedish conglomerate state (e.g. Gustafsson, 1998) and the Russian empire (e.g. Kappeler, 2001; Miller, 2008).
The Boundaries of Finland in Transition
(Fennia, 2002, 180: 1–2)
sona of the ruler and his personal estates and possessions in Medieval times (Skinner, 1989). Secondly, from the recent research on early Nordic state-formation, we know that it is only at the time of the formation of a modern centralized state apparatus in the late Middle Ages and Early modern period that a new understanding of territoriality in terms of strict border lines is born (Katajala, 2006).

The third problem of the textbook maps is the historical projection of the modern nation and nation state back in history. While we can certainly identify a push in early modern Europe towards centralized territorial states, the idea of a Finland as separate political space under Swedish rule was not part of the self-understanding of the contemporaries. For example, as Osmo Jussila and Matti Klinge have shown, the idea of Finland as a state and as a nation was first solidified in the minds of the leading Finnish elite during the 19th century (Jussila, 1968; Klinge, 1975). In the sense of a modern nation or political community, the formation of a Finland first began during the latter part of the 19th century when civic organizations and newspapers activated broader elements of the population within a shared political and social arena (Stenius, 1986; Liikanen, 1995; Pulkkinen, 2001).

Perhaps the most difficult problem of the maps is connected to the concept of sovereignty. Following the criticism against the “Myth of the Treaty of Westphalia,” the notion of the “Westphalian age” characterized by fixed territorial notion of sovereignty and the integrity of borders can be seen as severely biased (Osiander, 2009). Instead of a fixed “Westphalian notion of sovereignty,” modern political language is obviously characterized by competing conceptualizations of borders that represent political innovation intimately associated with the revolutionary political movements of the modern period. In the course of these struggles, the concept of sovereignty became an elementary part of the new political discourse that challenged existing notions of the legitimation of power and introduced revolutionary claims for reframing and recasting political landscapes (Kalmo, Skinner, 2010; Ball, Farr, Hanson, 1989).

This politicization cannot, however, be understood simply in terms of the emerging hegemony of ethnic-national claim for self-government. Rather, as a form of political innovation for reframing political arenas, the notion of popular sovereignty reflects the contested nature and internal contradictions of the democratic principles (Rosanvallon, 2009). Evidently, there is a deep antagonism between principles of “dynastic sovereignty” (personified by the ruler and the idea of the integrity of his estates) and “popular sovereignty” (“we, the people” as the ultimate source of power and the principal nominator for sovereign territory). In this sense, sovereignty belongs obviously to the so-called “movement concepts” that, with the breakthrough of modern politics, became “temporalised” as “tools for steering historical movement” (Koselleck, 1979).

Following Reinhardt Koselleck’s Sattelzeit notion, it is easy to question the idea of a fixed concept of territorial sovereignty typical of the “Westphalian” period. The time of the break-through of modern politics can, on the contrary, be understood in terms of a gradual shift from dynastic power structures to more-or-less democratic forms of government which thoroughly changed the significance of the concept of sovereignty. In the context of popular political mobilization, new ideas of popular sovereignty turned
borders into frames of emerging political arenas, and into markers of sovereign polities where “we, the people” had the final say. In this manner, the concept of sovereignty became intimately associated with political innovation that challenged existing notions of the legitimation of power and introduced claims for the rights of the citizen, especially in the case of the so-called young nation-states. At what time and at what political juncture were these ideas connected to the notion of a Finland as a separate political space?

**State and Ruler in the Treaty of Nöteborg 1323**

When reading the text of the treaty of Nöteborg of 1323, it is obvious that we are not analyzing an agreement between two modern states. It is explicitly indicated that the agreement is not between two states but two rulers; Yuriy Danilovich, Prince of Moscow (1303–1325), Grand Prince of Vladimir (1317–1322), elected Prince of Novgorod (1322/1322), and the then-7-year-old Magnus IV of Sweden (1316–1374), represented by envoys that included Hanseatic merchants from Gotland (Rydberg, 1877).

The position of both rulers was vague, and in this sense, we can talk about contested or unstable sovereignty; both had an obvious need of legitimization as sovereign rulers. The question may be asked whether one of the functions of the Nöteborg agreement was indeed mutual recognition that would strengthen the position of the rulers in regard to loyalty of their vassals and solidify their control of the counties and castles mentioned in the treaty. In this sense, sovereignty did not simply mean gained authority for the use of power, but can also be understood as recognition of the claims for authority.

Especially interesting is the position of Yuriy in regard to the emerging state structures of the republic of Novgorod. Yuriy’s position as the ruler of Moscow was, to a high degree, dependent on the support of the Khan of the Golden Horde. At the time of the treaty, Yuriy’s role as a ruler of Novgorod was probably more dependent on the authorization of the council of the city state, as is indicated in the text with the reference to “tota communitate Nogardie.” In both the cases of the child ruler Magnus and the elected prince Yuriy, the dynastic sovereignty was vague, and in need of mutual recognition in terms of royal reciprocity, equality, and trust offered by the treaty.

It well may be said that this symbolic recognition was the more important part of the treaty than the territorial definition of the border. The geographical references to the border are more precise only for the Southern part concerning areas of interest involving the castles the two parties had built for controlling trade and carrying taxes. Furthermore, in explicit terms, the treaty of the princes is not an agreement between Novgorod and Sweden over state territory, but about rule over regional units, that is, the counties named in the treaty. In this sense, the concept of state is obviously not separated from the person that is the ruler. The Treaty does not define the border of the state territory of Sweden or Novgorod, or that of Finland. Indeed, Finland is not even mentioned in the text of the treaty (Gallén, Lind, 1991; Liikanen, 2011).
From Teusina (1595) to Stolbova (1617): Recognizing Autocratic Rule or Territorial States?

The next Peace Treaty highlighted in the Finnish historiography was signed in Teusina, 1595. It is obvious that at the time a clear change had occurred in terms of understanding statehood. Already in the description of the parties, states are mentioned in addition to their rulers. The agreement was signed by plenipotentiary envoys on behalf of the Great Lord King Sigismund and the Swedish realm (rike), and Fjodor Ivanovits, autocrat of all Russia. As in the case of Nöteborg, the positions of the rulers were extremely vague, and they were in need of support and recognition. Sigismund, King of Sweden from 1592, was fighting over the crown with his uncle until Sigismund was deposed in 1599. Fjodor was holding the Russian crown from 1584–1598, but with Boris Godunov as the de facto ruler. In regards to sovereignty, it can indeed be asked whether we can talk about de facto sovereign rulers. In broader terms, it almost seems as an illusion to think of some kind of original absolute sovereignty of the ruler which is later fragmented (cf. Kalmo, Skinner, 2010). On the bases of the first treaties concerning the European North, it is more plausible to conclude that this kind of fixed sovereignty concept may have never existed.

In terms of understanding borders and territoriality, the Teusina Treaty does not indicate clear changes to modes of thinking of earlier times. Finland is now explicitly mentioned as a geographical entity, but not as a political unit with defined borders. In fact, in terms of demarcation of borders, this also concerns Sweden and Russia. The border is again defined in terms of ceded counties, not as an agreement of state boundary. This seems to verify the conclusion of recent research that territorial control of space was in fact less important to the partners than control over water routes and trade (Korpela, 2008; Katajala, 2006).

When it comes to state and territoriality, we can recognize a more clear change in modes of thinking with the Treaty of Stolbova (1617). The Swedish and Russian states are now both explicitly mentioned as partners of the treaty (Sveriges Chrono and Ryske Rijket). There seems to be also a more elaborated understanding of territorial control attached to the concept of state. Ceded areas are still defined in terms of county borders, but these are obviously understood to form more undeviating state borders at the same time. The concept of border is used in this new way e.g. in connection to the ceding of Kexholm county to Sweden, as well as when ceding back numerous occupied castles and their surrounding territories to Russia.

Finland is referred to in the document as a politically recognized unit but only in the title of the King of Sweden which includes the Grand Duke of Finland. At the time, Finland did not form a separate administrative unit, and in other parts of the Treaty it was not referred to in political-administrative terms. In the text, Finland is mentioned

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2. Interestingly, Finnish historical writing has largely bypassed the Treaty of Plussa (1583) that ended the Livonian War (1558–1583) and concerned mainly Ingrian areas on the shores of the Gulf of Finland. Obviously, the Treaty focusing on the areas from Ivangorod to Kexholm has suited ill for the tradition of discussing the birth of the “borders of Finland.”
several times as a geographic concept in matters of trade, and there is a reference to the towns of Finland; however, the territory of Finland is not an issue agreed in the treaty in explicit terms.

In broader terms, the treaty has been seen as a turning point from the traditional pursuits of controlling trade and water routes towards the control of territory. Stolbova meant a great victory for Sweden, but at the same time, it marked an end of the pursuit for control over Russian trade. It is said that when Gustav II Adolf gave an account to the estates of the Diet about the victorious peace with Russia, he only briefly referred to the plans concerning trade politics that had for centuries been in the centre of the animosity between the parties, and instead concentrated on strategic border issues (Attman, 1948).

This might be understood as part of the forming of the concept of a new kind of sovereignty connected to strengthening the central government and autocratic administration. However, still even at this point, we should perhaps only talk about seemingly strong autocratic rulers; the titles of Gustav II Adolf and Fjodor Ivanovits cover the first page of the treaty, but their positions were far from stable and in need of both internal and external recognition. Gustav was 23 year old, and he had been in power for six years after the dynastic struggles between his father, Charles, and Sigismund of Poland and other competing internal candidates for the Crown. Michael Romanov was 20 year old, and it was his first recognition as the rightful tsar of Russia in the agreement that put an end to Swedish claims to the Crown of Russia. This recognition finally ended the “Time of Troubles” with no recognized Tsar between 1610 and 1613. In this sense, the sovereignty concept of the treaty was perhaps not only connected to strengthening the notion of territorial state, but also an instrument of legitimizing dynastic rule and autocratic administration.

**Nystad (1721)—a Treaty over Political Space?**

In terms of shifting understandings of the concept of state, the treaty of Nystad seems to be a product of conflicting tendencies. It was an agreement between powerful rulers with strong absolutist ambitions, and at the same time, a treaty between states in a new broader sense that concerned not only administrative institutions, but also their citizens. In the document, the parties gave mutual guarantees to one another in the name of the “powers, countries, subjects and inhabitants” (Fredsfördrag, 1843).

This also now concerned the Grand Duchy of Finland, which was explicitly mentioned as a political territorial unit. In the Treaty, the Tsar granted that he and his heirs or successors would forever abstain from claims on the Grand Duchy which was restored to Sweden after the Russian occupation during the war. A significant restriction was, however, attached to this recognition of Finland as a political unit by adding that this applied to the “now restored Grand Duchy under what form or name it happened to have.” What was new and exceptional in the treaty was that the definition of state border was not based on boundaries of the old counties, but was consciously drawn across them.

It can be interpreted that the new definition of Finland as a separate political space was, in the first place, connected to the return of the occupied areas. It had perhaps been
easier for Sweden to negotiate the restitution of the occupied areas as one territorial unit, and to get guarantees over the future territorial integrity of the area. In this sense, the treaty also introduced and recognized the notion of territorial integration in explicit terms. With clear references to the rights of the citizens of the ceded areas, it represents, at the same time, a more general shift in European political thinking in regards to understanding political spaces.

**Treaty of Fredrikshamn 1809: Finland in a European Frame**

Concerning the idea of a Finland as a recognized political space, the text of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn seems to represent a partial return to earlier bordering practices. The definition of the border is mainly done in a manner similar to the medieval fashion of ceding counties. Neither Finland nor the Grand Duchy are mentioned in this connection, and the area to be ceded is defined in the form of a list of names of counties that were to be ceded. In this sense, we can recognize a return to earlier bordering practices which are in contrast with the general line of conceptualizing state and sovereignty in the treaty.

In many parts of the agreement, a broad concept of state is used, and the parties of the treaty are defined in a broad sense. The Treaty is between “us, our states and subjects.” The rights of the subjects are, however, not part of the agreement as broadly outlined as in the Treaty of Nystad. In this sense, a clearly more limited scope of civic rights was subjected to negotiation between the two states.

The formulations concerning political space and the rights of the citizen within a given political space might be connected to the unequal positions of the partners. Alexander I was negotiating with Napoleon over the future of the whole of Europe. The Swedish army was defeated, and Swedish territory was occupied far beyond the Finnish-speaking areas on the eastern side of the Gulf of Bothnia. This imbalance was manifested in the treaty, notably in the title of Alexander I, which was half a page long and already included the title of Grand Duke of Finland (StorFurste til Smolensko, Lithauen, Wolhynien, Podolien och Finland). The fact that the emperor had already taken the title of the Grand Duke of Finland before the agreement of January 1809 can be seen as a symbolic gesture to mark that key matters of the treaty were considered not to need negotiation with or the consent of Sweden.

This might partly explain the much discussed problem why the matters concerning the future of Finland are not settled in the treaty along the lines of the promises that Alexander I had made to Finnish estates in Borgå during the war. In Borgå, at least according to a later Finnish interpretation, Alexander had guaranteed the status of Finland as a nation and conferred a constitution to it. Regardless of the accuracy of these interpretations, it seems that Alexander held these as matters to be organized in a broader European frame, and not in negotiation with Sweden.

Indeed, the agreement can be in a high degree read as a European peace treaty. The interests of Napoleon and the allies of Russia were an explicitly expressed priority signaling a new, broader kind of geopolitical context for understanding sovereignty. Système
Continental, the forcing of Sweden to join the blockade against Britain, was an indisputable key issue. In fact, the dictates in the treaty that concerned European-level politics were recorded in the articles II and III, and thus preceded matters of ceding areas and defining borders that took place in articles IV and V. In this manner, it was made clear that the decisions of Tilsit between Alexander and Napoleon concerning the political map and the future of Europe were not negotiated, but dictated to Sweden (Klinge, 2010). In this sense, the peace treaty should maybe not be read in terms of a return to earlier notions of state, territoriality, and nationhood. Perhaps the visions Alexander presented in Borgå concerning the status and the constitution of Finland were parts of bigger plans of constructing a new European state system along the lines that Alexander and Napoleon had designed in Tilsit, a system that the parties were never able to agree on in practice in the end.

**Conclusions: From Mutual Recognition of Rulers Towards Fragmented European Sovereignty Concepts**

Although the notion of a Grand Duchy of Finland disappears from the last treaty between Sweden and Russia, it is obvious that looking at the concept of state in a longer time frame, we can recognize a trend towards a more-strictly territorially defined frame of government, which in the end, included even the idea of guaranteed rights of the inhabitants. At the time of Napoleonic wars and the Vienna congress, these ideas became an elementary part of a new constitutional thinking which is known to also have affected Alexander I.

In the first treaties analyzed in this study, states exists in a sense of a power sphere of the ruler that were defined in terms of regions. In the last treaties, there is a clear idea of state borders between countries with centralized administrations. In terms of changing significance of territoriality, there is a line of development from competing strategies of controlling trade and tribute-gathering towards territorially strictly-defined centrally governed political space, the integrity of which is given international recognition.

Lastly, in terms of nationality, we may conclude that nationality or ethnicity were not regarded as bases for negotiating borders for all of the analyzed period. However, it is obvious that from the 18th century on, we can identify conceptual changes that turned the Grand Duchy of Finland from a titular symbol of the might of the ruler towards an institutional frame of politics. Finland was referred to as a territorial political unit, and the rights of its citizen were discussed and designed according to the dominant political ideas within the European state system. Hopefully, this line of development can contribute to broader discussion concerning the transition of dynastic states towards modern centralized (nation) states, and polities based on the idea of popular sovereignty. In any case, it points to the obvious need for comparative research on conceptual shifts in negotiation and conflict over the borders and territorial structures of the conglomerate states in the European North.
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Территориальность, государство и гражданственность в создании границ Финляндии: возникновение концепта границы в мирных соглашениях между Россией и Швецией в 1323–1809 гг.

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В статье автор исследует концептуальные изменения в переговорных процессах о границах в Северной Европе. Анализируя, как определяется статус Финляндии в мирных договорах между Россией и Швецией, автор показывает, как сквозь века Россия участвовала в обсуждении ключевых понятий европейского политического языка, государственности, территориальности и гражданственности. Начиная с теоретических дискуссий в истории понятий, автор прослеживает, как понятие государства, отделенное от личности правителя, возникает в мирных соглашениях средневековья и раннего Нового времени и как владения правителя получили статус политических образований. Через рассмотрение того, как понятие линейной государственной границы было связано с территорией Финляндии, в статье обсуждаются более обширные процессы развития идеи о территориальном государстве и линейных государственных границах. В статье ставится вопрос о том, как и через какие политические образования возникают новые представления о суверенитете в мирных соглашениях между Россией и Швецией и как в отношения между двумя странами были введены международное признание территориальной неприкосновенности и гражданские права. Цель статьи состоит в развитии сравнительной дискуссии о том, как возникновение государства и процесс установления границ в Северной Европе были связаны с политической модернизацией и как и в какой степени переопределение границ и территорий были связаны с новыми концептуализациями государства, суверенитета и гражданственности типичные для современной политики.

Ключевые слова: территориальность, государство, суверенитет, гражданственность, граница, Финляндия, Россия, Швеция
Bordering Wastelands

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In this anthropological study, I examine how a particular state and regional border is crossed in the context of a joint socio-ecological project concerning recycling waste in Karelia. During a two-year, multilevel project, cooperation developed between the Petrozavodsk municipality and its northern partners under the auspices of the Nordic Council of Ministers. This cooperation was advanced particularly through the eastward translation of values, including early education and sustainable behavior, which were consistent within broader international border relations across the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. The process of the taking over of these imported Nordic values and knowledge, and adapting them to the everyday and professional life of the local participants of the project went hand in hand with the perpetuation of cultural cross-border stereotypes. The idea of marking home from foreign became equally applicable to the space within a much smaller entity, such as a condominium, a round-table in a discussion room, or a city flowerbed, particularly when the construction of the border intersected with the construction of the other. Invisible barriers, as well as physical objects, can demarcate the divide between individuals of the same nationality and cultural background who need to claim, protect, and reconstruct a personal connection to a piece of land.

Keywords: postsocialism, recycling, sustainability, Nordic values, translation and adaptation of values, construction of the other, Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Karelia

Introduction

State and regional borders are regularly crossed for multiple reasons and purposes including the flow of both people and trade, and involve political security, entrepreneurship, and law, which represent the major concerns in border studies. At the same time, border research focused on migrating ideas, identities, values, attitudes, and priorities; power imbalances receives far less attention. As M. Wilson and H. Donnan put it, “Anthropologists approach these borderlines more as countless points of interaction, because the borderline is there, or in spite of it” (Donnan, Wilson, 2010: 8). It can be argued that less tangible instances of cross-cultural communication that parallel specific activities in cross-border cooperative projects and initiatives are quite influential factors affecting the projects’ outcomes. This view is shared at the highest political level within the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which is manifested in the conscious and deliberate attempts to create a common regional identity and sense of community among its inhabitants.¹

¹ From the very start of the political Barents project, Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg tried to present a broadly imagined rationale for constructing the new region. As such, he justified his initiative as a restoration of historical relations between Northern Norwegians and Northwestern Russians (Thor-
The Barents Region houses the international project *WASTE*: Waste Awareness. Sorting, Treatment, Education (2011–2013), located in Petrozavodsk, Karelia, and is the case study addressed in this article.  

One characteristic feature of the BEAR is that it is a region and an organization at the same time. Its functioning as an organization is not problematic when it involves cooperation on the highest level of the Barents Council, along with a number of projects realized by different regional structures. Still, there are a number of factors that hinder cross-border cooperation. One of them is the common border between Russia and its northern neighbors. The border is not only a demarcation line separating Russia from the countries of the Northern Council of Ministers, and the line dividing Russia and the European Union, but also a frontier between Russia and NATO. This context has had a significant effect on the original, and to some extent current, rationale for the Barents Council that continues to be an instrument of normalizing relations between former and current rivalries in the economic and military sphere. At the same time, the Barents region is evolving and constantly changing (Hettne, 2002), providing an important platform not only for socially meaningful projects, but also for regional security and peace building. This is why it would be unwise to undermine the peacekeeping capacity of the Barents Region.

The project *WASTE* lasted for two years, from 2011 until 2013; the year before the project began, I was in Petrozavodsk where I had the opportunity to observe *WASTE* in its pilot stage, as well as to familiarize myself with the pool of other international social and cultural projects underway, and to talk with participants. The data underpinning my analysis was collected through structured, unstructured, and spontaneous interviews with local people in Petrozavodsk who were involved in the project. These people included officials engaged in social work or in the local government, as well as with people not directly involved who had opinions about the project and were willing to share them with me. In total, I spoke with eighty-two people and conducted about two hundred interviews with them. I should admit that my results are most representative of the Karelian capital, Petrozavodsk, and does not necessarily extend to the whole republic, which is clearly divided into the center and the periphery. However, these locally bounded conclusions lead to potentially interesting generalizations addressed below.

Vald Stoltenberg, Foreword in: Stokke, Tunander, 1994; Stoltenberg, 1997). He perceived it as necessary to come up with some sort of “glue” that would secure the newly drawn regional lines and would bridge the territories that are so different in terms of societal norms, culture, politics, religion, and language. Mr. Stoltenberg appealed to the Pomor trade era that was chosen to be a symbolic consolidating factor. The Pomor era was a period of relatively peaceful and mutually beneficial trade between the Norwegian, Russian and a few Finnish settlements along the shore of the Barents Sea (Nielsen, 1994: 91). However, it is doubtful that there was a real need for this intensive construction of a common identity stimulated by the political objective to make the regional cooperation happen (Bærenholdt, 2007).

2. The international environmental project *WASTE*: Waste Awareness: Sorting, Treatment, Education (2011–2013) is a follow-up of a pilot project for the introduction of waste sorting methods in Petrozavodsk (2009), realized by the City Administration of Petrozavodsk under the auspices of the Nordic Council of Ministers.
In my position of a researcher, I embodied the dichotomy between *insider* and *outsider*. My identity was mixed, depending on several key personae I interacted with, and which I indexed depending on the context. For example, for the migration office in Karelia I was a representative of a Canadian university with proper documents and reference letters needed to ground my prolonged stay in Karelia. The use of my native language of Russian allowed me to be embraced as “almost local,” while my position of a volunteer in the project set the ground for open communication with other participants.

The larger outcome of the WASTE socio-ecological project, as well as similar socially-meaningful projects and programs, has been the “softening” of international borders, and setting a foundation for cooperation in more politically sensitive areas including the use of natural resources, or common security, for example. One of the meeting points of social, cultural, ecological, or network projects that is deemed “politically neutral” is the collaboration based on a set of mutually acceptable common values that forms a binding agent.

So what are those common priorities shared by the Nordic countries that are reflected in policy documents, in the foci of cooperative programs and projects, and in the rate of funding? Are they in accordance with the local Karelian realities, and do they have a chance to get rooted in this territory? The primary sources delineating the policies of the northern countries under the Nordic Cooperation, as well larger European partnership, converge in naming green development, education, civic society participation, and entrepreneurship as the most important items of the agenda. Thus, the position stated at the home web page of the Norden (cooperation between the northern European countries) refers directly to commonly shared values as the core and the starting point of partnership.

For Karelia, the topic of environmental protection became acute with a number of accumulated problems including improper waste-water treatment, the dire condition of the Petrozavodsk landfill and a great number of spontaneous (and unauthorized) landfills in the countryside, air and water pollution, etc. At the same time, the public’s readiness to take part in resolution of ecological issues grew proportionately to the awareness of them.

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As Dmitry Rybakov, the head of the Association of the Green of Karelia noted, “Our co-citizens start to realize their own responsibility for the environment which reveals in the fact that now it is much easier to mobilize them for eco-campaigns in the city than, say, five years ago.”

**Behind the Line on the Map**

However, the BEAR is not the only successful framework for international projects in Karelia. Every year, numerous programs and projects are developed and realized through the cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, region-to-region initiatives, projects between Petrozavodsk and its sister towns, projects of the cross-border cooperation program Russia—EU “Karelia,” projects of “contagious cooperation,” etc. Similarly, Karelia lies within the scope of the European Union policies of Strategic Partnership with its external eastern neighbors, a policy that is named among the key priorities by the European Commission (2000). Other platforms include the cross-border cooperation (CBC), and the developing European neighbourhood policy (ENP).

Gerald Blake (2010) developed a set of criteria to determine the condition of an international border as being under stress or without stress. Application of these criteria to the Karelain-Finnish border reveals that it can be characterized as a relatively soft border. There are no active territorial disputes, and the intensity of flow of people and goods in both directions is comparable. The local governments and municipalities are engaged in active cooperation with partners across the border (the majority of it meaning cooperation being with Finland) in regards to social and cultural projects, as well as infrastructural maintenance. Particular attention is given to environmental concerns. This is a “safe,” non-political area, unanimously acknowledged as an important focus in the light of the deteriorating environment in Karelia. Its northwestern neighbors are quite concerned about this, and have no illusions as to the inability of a human-drawn borderline to contain the boundaries of pollution. The partnership in this sphere also involves combating water, air, and ground pollution, as well as cooperating in rescues, and a forest-sector task force. In short, cross-border interactions in Karelia can serve as illustration to the idea voiced by Esklinen et al. (1999) about the changing scale of cooperation, with the focus on power shifting from central governments to regional and local bodies.

It is important to situate my study of a socio-ecological joint project designed to benefit a local Karelian community within the larger scale of inter-regional relations and the specifics of the Barents region as a product of new regionalism (Keating, 1998; Hettne, Inotai, 1994; Hettne, 2003) and the product of a new post-Cold War era. As such, it de-

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4. Interview, June 2014.
5. The author is grateful for the reports about international cooperative projects in Petrozavodsk for the period 2010-2013 to the Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of Karelia and personally to senior specialist A.M. Zvetkov.
lineates the borders that separate Russia and the Nordic countries, i.e., it highlights the distinctiveness of political, economic, cultural, and social systems of each.

Currently, during a period of mutual economic sanctions adopted by Russia and Europe on the basis of Russia’s government’s external policy in regards to Ukraine, the political relations between Russia and Finland remain consistently warm with no changes in the border-crossing policies. In Hastings’ and Donnan’s terms, “the international relations litmus test” has been passed (2010: 6). Although the one-year ban on import of certain food items introduced by the Russian government hit some Finnish producers quite seriously (and probably, it was most felt by the well-known dairy company Valio), the most recent news indicates that compromises are a solution. Thus, production of Valio milk and cream will begin in a plant near St. Petersburg at the partner factory Galaktika.7 As theorized by E. Haas in 1958, true international convergence is more likely to happen as a result of societal actors cooperating through cross-border projects and networks in “soft” spheres where cooperation does not provoke extensive control and paternalism on the part of the central government. This statement is developed further on, but at this point, it can be argued that the successes of cross-border bottom-up networks and projects like WASTE work to soften the Russian-European border.

**Nordic Countries as a Point of Reference for Karelia**

The focus on environment and youth in the context of sustainability has been implemented through different frameworks and programs, including Youth at Risk, 2008-2015, under the Kolarctic cross-border cooperation. Strong commitments to its Russian partner were underlined by the establishment of an interregional center for methodological support in Petrozavodsk in 2012 as a major coordination office for the whole of northwest Russia.8 Among other the most relevant initiatives involving recycling are first, the Nordic strategy for collection, sorting, reuse, and recycling of textiles, and second, the Nordic Waste Group that “works toward sustainable processing of waste products in the Nordic countries and Europe,” both of which platforms function through the Nordic Council of Ministers.

In spite of some criticism, Nordic countries from year to year continue to top the international rankings that assess not only custom components of well-being such as health, employment and income, safety and security, environment, education, and entrepreneurship and opportunity, but also measure even more subtle psychological and social parameters such as general life satisfaction. According to OECD’s Better Life Index, Nordic countries are in the top of the list, with Norway occupying second place only to Switzerland. Finland ranked seventh. Both indices are well above the OECD average.


results.\textsuperscript{9} Such highly successful performance cannot but attract Karelia whose joint international projects aim to benefit from the positive experience of the Nordic countries, as well as their technologies and innovations in the public sphere. The Nordics have invaluable experience and a pool of technologies to spread to their eastern neighbor with different ranges of applicability from almost-inimitable (literally) eco-cities with their sustainable brand of local entrepreneurship, to small programs implementing recycling strategies, and early ecological education that are easier to replicate.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Finding Mutual Ground Around \textit{WASTE}}

However, the objective need for change in the case of the catastrophic state of the Petrozavodsk landfill that was indirectly targeted by the project \textit{WASTE} does not in itself guarantee a consolidated action on the part of the local authorities and society. The question that seems relevant to me in this concern is the double correlation between a) the Nordic green values and their reflection in the \textit{WASTE}'s goals and agenda, and b) the Nordic green values as they are represented in the project's stated goals and their practical realization in the course of the project. Some of the tangible immediate outcomes of the cooperation within the \textit{WASTE} project were realized along several major directions, including the “cross-cultural translation and adaptation of values” on the level of society and individuals, changes in adult and children's behavior, measurable everyday practices towards more sustainability, and setting the base for continuing improvements in the ecological sphere in the city including cooperation between locals without foreign impetus.\textsuperscript{11} Recognition of the positive outcomes of the project resulted in the approval of a follow-up initiative (2013–2015) by the Nordic Council of Ministers that focuses on the small-scale entrepreneurship in the field of waste management in the republic of Karelia.

Finding common ground on the basis of mutually shared values is vital for cross-border cooperation between societies that differ in their political base, cultural patterns, religions, and language. The project \textit{WASTE} brought together four distinct nations; Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Russia, with a number of represented European partners in accordance with the strict demands of the financing party, the Nordic Council of Ministers. The most visible barrier was the difficulty of cross-cultural communication during common seminars and training, due to the complexity of having to negotiate four different native languages. This problem was solved by inviting a high-quality interpreter in English and Russian, whose skills and expertise were repeatedly reconfirmed during each meeting. A further facilitating factor was that representatives from the four nations were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{9} Better Life index, OECD. Available at: http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/ (accessed 16.04.2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{10} As an example, an article on the Swedish eco-municipality of Overtornea (Belser, 2004). But in fact, the examples are becoming more numerous throughout the whole northern Europe with the rest of EU slowly catching up.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} A most recent example is a round table discussion about the future of separate waste collection in the Petrozavodsk urban district that took place on October 10, 2014. It was organized by the Department of Environmental protection and ecology outreach of the city administration. Available at: http://www.petrozavodskmo.ru/petrozavodsk/index/news/more.htm?id=10766268@cmsArticle (accessed 11.10.2014).
\end{itemize}
together only occasionally at larger events, while the bulk of common practical activities was organized by a Petrozavodsk city administration in partnership with SYKLI, the Environmental School of Finland, Helsinki. Besides the generally good cultural understanding between the Karelians and the Finns, the coordinator on the Finnish side was a native Russian speaker and a former Petrozavodian citizen.

Importing or Exporting Values

It would be a demanding, ambitious, and virtually impossible task for a researcher to try to determine whether any conscious attempts from the side of a sponsoring agency were made in order to import (or export) its particular values and beliefs. Thus, my primary sources used to locate unconsciously promoted messages and suggestions include written documentation produced in the course the project, both official as well as informal oral communication that occurred between the participants at gatherings and events12, and structured interviews with participants, local officials, and ordinary people not directly involved. It should be noted that none of the public relations (PR) materials targeted at the general public, including brochures for educators and handouts for the associations of homeowners, included any specific references to “Nordic values” or “priorities.” The need for recycling, along with its moral imposition and its potential economic gain, was postulated as a purely local concern and citizens’ mutual responsibility.

A new perspective opens up if we introduce the category of degrees of disclosure of information when a particular type of message is selectively revealed to particular groups of people who are involved in the project in one or another capacity. The key points were highlighted quite differently in some project descriptions aimed at the Nordic Council of Ministers in PR materials, and in interviews with media. For example, in one of the official descriptions of the project that was not immediately available to the general public, it was stated that one of the goals was to introduce Nordic environmental technologies and environmentally-adapted solutions for the Russian market. Alternatively, the goal of educating citizens of the chosen settlements in applying methods of waste sorting and raising public awareness of the importance of eco-friendly behavior was widely distributed through all possible media to anyone interested in the project. Achievement of the earlier goal most likely meant profit for the Nordic partners and is in line with the follow-up project on the entrepreneurship in the field of waste collecting, sorting, and recycling in Karelia. At the same time, different means were developed and introduced for the realization of the latter goal that would involve interaction with the local society at the larger scale that was initially outlined. Interestingly, the cooperation with kindergartens added after the project was underway was not in the original plan at all. Ultimately, it proved to be one of the most productive directions taken by the project.

12. I personally attended all gatherings and events except for the final stage, which I observed remotely.
Petrozavodsk as a Gateway to the West

In general, Petrozavodsk is fertile ground for inclusion in the broadly defined “western values.” In many respects, the Nordic countries are the point of reference for neighboring Karelia due to a number of factors, including a long history of a shared border with Finland, which presently also means a common border with the European Union that is regularly and, for the most part, quite easily crossed. The European presence is obviously felt in Petrozavodsk with its monuments belonging to the contemporary art on the quay (gifts of sister towns), selection of restaurants, and available cuisines. The European influence is heard in the Nordic languages spoken on the streets, in the repertoire of the local cinemas, found in museums and art centers, and in the wide selection of goods from detergents to adult and children’s clothing. Because of the long and cold winters, many local parents consider it a badge of honor to dress up their child in overalls or in either new or second-hand two-part costumes from well-respected Finnish brands including Reima, Kerri, Luhta, and Lassie.

On the one hand, at the very beginning of the pilot project, Petrozavodsk society was susceptible to what was considered, at that time, to be trendy green initiatives, and on the other hand, such empathy did not mean automatic commitment to changing one’s way of life and adopting new patterns of behavior, which is a lengthy and quite complicated process. In my volunteer classes for children ages four to six in local kindergartens, as well as in my colleague’s presentations for school children, we gave statistical and visual information about the dire and even dangerous condition of the landfill that was accepting solid wastes from Petrozavodsk and adjacent areas. The pictures of the site and graphic representations of the daily amounts of waste produced along with the comparable weight of tracks and even train cars always evoked emotional response on the part of the children and teachers. This sense of involvement helped keep the interest high through to the end of the educational activities for the day, but was insufficient to start a stable movement towards changing practices.

Selecting Imported Values

Solidarity with “western values” can be manifested in different ways, which are not always straightforward. Just a few days ago, I read in the city administration newsletter about the free market day (free exchange of goods and services) to be held on the upcoming weekend. This event is coordinated through a public group on the platform of the social network VKontakte. The group names its physical location in Petrozavodsk, where it gathered 591 members on October 10, 2014. Its slogan reminded me that anti-capitalist and downshift philosophy also have a Western origin. The slogan read: “No Money, No Trade. Capitalism must die.”

The aspiration to open ground for the introduction and application of Nordic environmental technologies in waste treatment and recycling in the market of northwestern Russia can be traced historically. Since the times of the Iron Curtain, Russia was perceived
by its Nordic neighbors, particularly by Norway, as a potential security threat (Stokke & Tunander, 1994). With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s northern neighbors learned about the dire situation involved with the utilization of nuclear and other types of waste, mainly in Murmansk Oblast, which shares a border with Norway. The hazardous emissions spreading westward from the Russian territory by air and water became a concern that called for action (Dellenbrant and Olsson, 1994). Thus, in addition to improving environmental conditions in Karelia, the project also sought to open up a receptive market for Nordic technologies, facilities, and equipment through the transmitted knowledge base, the understanding of ecological imperatives, and the promotion of green values as they are understood in Northern Europe. Opening up new sales areas is potentially beneficial for both parties. However, to date, there are few players in the recycling business in Karelia, which was addressed by the director of the local company Ecolint in the following way; “this [collection of sorted waste with further utilization or transportation] is not a very profitable business . . . From time to time, new entrepreneurs try to enter this niche but mostly fail. It is a hard work for money that is never secured.” Perhaps, these are some of the reasons for the focus of the follow-up project on entrepreneurship in the sphere of waste management.

There are a number of challenges that hinder this process, and legal issues are among them. Under the project WASTE, there was an attempt to change the local legislation in relation to practices of waste management; this attempt failed. I hesitate to make flat assertions, but one possible reason for the failure could have been the conflict of interests between local and foreign businesses. For Russian players, such legislative lobbying could have resulted in the loss of established positions, whereas the northern partners could have seen the more favorable laws as the background for the spread of influence. At the same time, the spokes in the wheels of the new legislature could have been put there by federal officials, which would be in line with the Michael Mann 2007 opinion of still-powerful states. However, the true reasons for the waste treatment laws being left unchanged remain in the shadows. In other respects, federal intrusion or state bureaucracy was not felt during the project. Neither my own observations, nor the opinions voiced during interviews with project participants, suggest any problems on this level.

From my participant observation and analysis of the accompanying documents, I singled out several values emphasized in the course of the project’s development that were not always directly stated. These values or priorities are; early ecological education, development of sustainable behavior of adults and children, freedom of choice as a democratic value, motivation boosters, and volunteering. I discuss some of them in greater detail below. Education and public participation are named among the key factors of sustainable development in a number of EU policy documents. The means of achieving sus-

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13. In one report about the WASTE project (2011), it was stated that implementation of the project will help to attract Nordic companies which produce environmental technologies to the Russian market, and will contribute to the improvement of environmental conditions in the Baltic and Barents Sea areas.
14. Interview taken on 18.06.2014
16. See, for example, 2009 Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (Presidency report).
tainable development in this case remained the same as developed European countries, including the establishment of the grounds for ecological modernization, transition to energy-effective and resource-saving production models, new technologies and forms of management, and the spread of ecological socialization and education. In this sense, the project WASTE was directed to sustainability.

**Early Ecological Education**

During my talks with educators from schools and kindergartens, no one voiced the opinion that, for children, acquaintance with environmental topics was useless. In fact, ecological education is a part of new methodological policies of the federal ministry of education; it is notable that ecological education is now obligatory for junior educational institutes. At the same time, doubts regarding the value of participation in the project were conditioned by other priorities and current activities of particular kindergartens. It is true that except for the classes given by volunteers, neither schools nor kindergartens would have included games and activities devoted to waste sorting. Ecological lessons in preschool are broadly associated with cute animals and vulnerable greenery that call for help on the child’s part, as well as a set of rules or limitations that s/he must follow while outside in order not to harm wildlife. In light of this approach, the topic of waste is easily dismissed as outside the sphere of early education ecological training to the point of being discreditable.

Three kindergarten teachers whom I talked to in connection to the project made comments along these lines, stating that

> ... why would we want our children to dig into litter containers? Parents won’t appreciate this ... no matter how well you wash it, it’s dirty! I think it’s an upright violation of hygiene norms [in response to my comment that all used plastic bottles and cans distributed to children for play and activities are rigorously washed]; many children in our kindergarten come from better-off families ... I don’t think that the parents will understand why we can’t play with new toys and have to make handicraft from used material.

None of these women, nor the establishments they represented, decided to participate in the project. The private comments that I got seem to be directly related to the topic of garbage and purity in Anthropology, and primarily, to its pioneer, Mary Douglas (2005). As it was revealed later on, similar considerations played a significant part in the decision of some educational institutions that already had begun participation to withdraw.

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from the project. In this process, I became a witness of the construction of a double boundary. First, these negative attitudes set a partition around what should not be allowed in their kindergarten space, and what became labeled as impure and even troublesome. This boundary separated the children who would not have a chance to learn about some aspects of their surrounding reality from those who would have because they found themselves included in a different social paradigm. Also, this boundary separates us, educators who stand for “what is appropriate for kids” from them, the strange inhabitants of other kindergartens who do not share these obvious maxims. Or, the other way around, it is a dividing line between us, the open-minded pedagogues of a new generation\textsuperscript{17}, and them, our ecologically indifferent colleagues who do not have the courage to open their eyes to the truth of real environmental problems around us. I have to admit that I did not conduct separate research to explore this hypothesis further, which is based on five informal talks with kindergarten teachers and their head-mistresses. Nevertheless, these voiced attitudes open up an important perspective on the internal factors that have a possibility to hinder or support the waste recycling initiatives in the region.

**Head-Administrators and Subordinates: Guarding Personal Borders**

Investment in innovations is another value that can be certainly called one of the Nordic priorities and that finds its realization in the project WASTE. It should be noted that participation in this project by teachers from schools and kindergartens means taking over responsibilities for extra-curriculum activities. Performance of these obligations, as a rule, is shared in the following way; the head of the kindergarten is responsible administratively, and a particular educator, or educators, bear the bulk of work on their own shoulders with an average extra pay of 500–700 rubles per month.\textsuperscript{18} I encountered a few successful exceptions to this, when a head administrator, one who took children’s education in recycling wastes to heart, shouldered the major responsibility for the kindergarten’s participation, and coordinated all activities personally. However, this situation may become motivationally discouraging for counselors and assistants as much as the burden of sole responsibility.

The division of power and roles between the head administrators and their subordinates definitely plays out in their relations and organization of work. Thus, the choice of a teacher to go on a study trip was not always straightforward and was left to the discretion of the head administrator. Often, several teachers were working on the implementation of the project’s activities in a particular kindergarten, and the choice of only one person to go on a trip abroad (as required by the sponsor) occasionally produced tensions inside the group, especially if the input of each participant was relatively equal.

\textsuperscript{17} Interestingly, I found that the age category is not meaningful in this context. Elderly teachers could exhibit as much openness to innovations and flexibility as the lack of these from the side of recent graduates of pedagogical institutions.

\textsuperscript{18} 500 rubles is roughly $13. The information is received from the interviews with heads and educators in participating kindergartens. The principle of confidentiality applies to their shared opinions and specific figures.
The majority of head administrators was hesitant to occupy the spot, and had the teachers go on the trip. Among responses elicited to the question of the principles surrounding the choice-making, the head administrators consistently mentioned such reasons as the teachers’ comparatively lower salaries; the teachers’ young(er) ages and the need to “see the world” that was in opposition to giving credit to the more experienced teacher; the “justice factor,” that is, the one who works, goes on a trip, etc., saying “She’s [a teacher] fresh from college and it will be good to motivate her with a trip,” or “this is our most experienced teacher and she must be rewarded for her work,” or “in our team, she’s the most active participant, so it would be fair to send her.” I should note here, that in the case of the “encouragement motif,” the study trip appears to have lost its attributive adjective of “study,” and focused on a sense of fun and relaxing occasion, the “trip” part of “study trip.” In an interview conducted in 2010, a newly-minted politician in the Petrozavodsk local government who came from the youth policy field, made a point of his party’s campaign directed toward advancing opportunities for regular employees instead of head administrators, who had often and extensively misused their office. This can be one of the reasons for the kindergarten administrative heads’ cautious words and deeds, and the overwhelming choice of a teacher rather than a head administrator to take the study trip.

The evidence supporting the existing practice of involving high ranking participants as opposed to lower ranking ones without formal affiliation can be found in examining the list of participants of the international projects in Karelia that involve study trips. One example is a project named “Development of Youth Entrepreneurship Through the Partnership Network of North-west Russia and the Nordic countries” (2011), financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Out of the eight participants who went on the study trip, there was not a single young entrepreneur. Instead, the pool of participants consisted of two local government officials, three representatives of high educational establishments of Petrozavodsk, one high-ranking representative of the municipal youth occupation development center, the project’s administrator, and a media coverage person.

My research shows that the best politics in choosing participants would be to use a weighted analysis in each particular case, that is, it would be most politic to use an individual approach. Thus, coming back to the project WASTE, only one kindergarten administrative head went on the mentioned study trip feeling the full right to do so. This individual was involved in a partnership with a couple of Finnish kindergartens long before the project commenced, and had vast experience in organizing ecological and other thematic activities for her own children. She had established collaborations with other local kindergartens, eagerly implementing new knowledge and approaches taken up from her Finnish friends. One of the bravest innovations of this kindergarten under the leadership of its head administrator was the practice of having sleep-over nights, unique for Petrozavodsk. This was an organized event for children over five years of age attending the kindergarten. Several times a year, they had an opportunity to stay for the night at their kindergarten to celebrate a kind of independence (under the care of their teachers), and have a tea-party followed by an hour of story-telling before going to sleep in the beds they usually occupied at nap time. This particular kindergarten’s head ad-
ministrator represents an excellent example for the need of an individual approach in the analysis of power relations, and the degree of openness of opportunities for employees. This individual took the participation in the waste recycling project to heart, and numerous examples of her creative approach and untiring activity was felt in every corner of the kindergarten entrusted to her care.

Expectations and Perceived Outcomes: Poorer vs. Wealthier Schools

One final aspect that attracted my attention while doing my fieldwork was the difference in conceptual positions of the kindergartens that actually plunged into the work in the project. These positions can be broadly defined as a “thumbs-up optimism of the poor,” and a “skepticism of the rich.” Specifically, these positions refer to the personal estimations of the kindergartens’ representatives regarding the possible outcomes from participation in the project. Roughly, the two opposing positions in their extreme forms, as elaborated in the interviews, can be described as follows. The first one represents the extremely optimistic view of the effects that participation in the project will bring in the spirit of “keep my eyes on the prize.” In this, much of the success devolved onto the good will of children and parents who were supposed, in the minds of interviewees, to unanimously support the idea of the turning to separating wastes not only in the kindergarten, but also at home, and to be ready to use all trash material for crafts and help the kindergarten win prizes, including money for implementation of particular recycling projects, as well as merit certificates important for the institution’s prestige. Such a view was voiced almost exclusively by those who, in my estimation, were in the most poorly equipped kindergartens. The opposite view, in the spirit of “the way is full of pitfalls but we will try,” refers to the kindergartens that were extremely active, participating in a number of municipal and international projects, and which regarded the WASTE project as one of many initiatives in which they were already involved. For them, it was very important to make sure beforehand that the benefits of participating were greater than the expenses; the final decision wascoldly made on the basis of such an analysis.

Constructing the Other

“Borders have and will continue to serve as barriers of exclusion and protection, marking home from the foreign. In this sense they still provide the function of separation and defense that is expected of them” (Donnan, Wilson, 2010: 11). Although the authors wrote this about nation state borders, the idea of marking home from foreign is equally applicable to the space within a much smaller entity, such as a condominium, a round-table in a discussion room, or a flowerbed, if the construction of the border intersects with the construction of the other. Below, I discuss three examples of different types of such constructions; how members of an association of homeowners can become insiders or outsiders in their own apartment house depending on their recycling behavior; the way in which cross-cultural stereotypes are perpetuated at international meetings in the city
administration and get reflected later on by the media; and the way in which municipal ecological campaigns frame “us vs. them” on the smallest piece of land one could imagine.

The Passion of Trash Containers

One of the adult target groups in the project WASTE were the leaders and residents of condominiums in particular districts in Petrozavodsk where recycling stations were already installed or were planned to be installed. In my talks with this category of project participants, we touched upon a number of aspects of sorting household wastes and the obstacles that were faced along the way. An unexpected and recurrent topic that emerged in many of the interviews with residents of different apartment blocks was the boundary erected between residents of the same condominium. The categories of us versus them were introduced depending on the degree and quality of residents’ participation in the waste sorting in the yards of their apartment blocks:

We took pains to become members of the project and have the bins installed . . . I, personally, put up notices for residents with instructions how to use them [the bins], tell them about our common gatherings . . . You think they come? You think they make an effort not to confuse a glass bin with a plastic one? Well, many of them do, but those who don’t . . . They’re renting here and don’t care at all . . . Some of apartment owners also are having a hard time understanding what it is all about. 19

Another leader was outraged by the mess around the recycling station in his yard:

Look, look here! It’s all messed up! I got a notice from Avtospetstrans [the municipal company that was responsible for recycling stations at that time] that in our bins the wastes are mixed! People use improper containers. I think, even children could have learned by now . . . I can name all my neighbors who do it right and those who mess with it. 20

As much as a commitment to separate waste collection was initially a solidifying factor among the residents of one building block, it simultaneously drew a line between those who conformed and those who did not care. In response to my question about the means of locating all the “delinquent neighbors,” one leader, D.V., clarified that he spent a couple of hours in the mornings and in the evenings watching the recycling station from his apartment window. During the day, several “responsible old ladies” were taking over. Several months following the installation of recycling stations, the neighbor relationship within the two apartment blocks that I studied became considerably strained.

19. A. S., a head of one of condominiums participating in the project.
20. D. V., a head of a participating condominium.
Polluting Russians and Baffled Europeans: Constructing Us vs. Them

The issue of separate waste management is not only discussed at round-tables and seminars that are specifically devoted to this topic. The recent seminar in honor of Mr. Egon Bahr became a platform for cooperative cross-cultural problem-solving in the spheres of ecology and youth politics in Karelia, when young Russian and German politicians and community workers came together. In this case, it was the copy-writers from the city’s administration web-site who participated in another instance of the construction of us versus them. According to the report of the seminar, its foreign participants were very surprised to find out about the infamous numerous unauthorized landfills in Petrozavodsk. “It was unclear for Europeans how one can consciously litter and make dirty one’s own city.”21 In this story, the Europeans are represented as not even understanding the facts of littering that indeed, perhaps, is more common in Russia than in Germany. It also bears a suggestion that nothing like this could happen on European grounds where such behavior is viewed as unnatural. This prejudice of exemplary them versus uncivilized us reconfirms the applicability of A. Yurchak’s (2006) research on the meaning of the idealized West for Soviet citizens to the current post-soviet reality. This perspective opens up another important research frame about the social boundaries in the context of preserving or defending one’s home space, which is supposed to be kept clean, as opposed to the alien space across the border where it is not shameful to litter. The question is, then, where does this alien space start and where does the border lie? And what other borderlines are coincident with the exemplary/uncivilized us versus them; the nation state border, the regional or city limits, or one’s threshold at the entrance doorway?

Invisible Planters at a Flowerbed

Drawing a borderline between “insiders” and “strangers” can be discovered even within the tiniest pieces of land involved in municipal ecological campaigns. An exciting event devoted to the planting of decorative flowers in different parts of Petrozavodsk by interested citizens was scheduled for June 16, 2014. I set off on my little “field trip” with an intention to catch two birds with one hand. First, I presumed that this would be a good occasion to learn more about the local residents’ perceptions of domestic space, and second, I wished to make my two preschool children to literally dig into a socially meaningful activity that would have an immediate and beautiful result.

The three flowerbeds that we visited were located next to apartment blocks on the outer side of the buildings facing the street. Each flowerbed was taken care of by a different group of people. As it turned out later, they were residents of the immediately neighboring buildings, accompanied by representatives of a community-based organization or a sponsor of planting stock. When our gardening team arrived at the first site, the

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planting was already underway, and the flowerbed was quite obviously divided into two sections. The sections were not divided into equal portions; rather, they were divided roughly in two-thirds and one-third by the two well-defined groups, with the larger piece of land being occupied by the residents who came to “decorate their space around their own house.”22 The smaller piece was put at the mercy of another group, either representing workers of an organization that was sponsoring this particular flowerbed (such as Karel’skaya Dacha), or a societal organization (such as Mama) that, besides planting, was rigorously documenting each step of their involvement to produce a video about it as a future post on its VKontakte web-page.

The two distinct groups did not mingle in any of the three planting sites that we visited: our sincere offer of help was not welcomed at any of these sites. I had the impression that my children and I were seen as undesired intruders in a kind of a closed ritual of an almost sacred group; our own inventory (toy shovels and buckets) seemed to have induced irritation rather than admiration. Pushing my fieldwork further, I insisted on the children’s participation with a beaming smile, and took great pains to get them involved in at least some kind of small activity, like watering the planted flowers. It should be noted that the problem was not, as might be expected, that I had been labeled as a non-Petrozavodian citizen; rather, the exclusion had to do with the defense of the conquered territory on the part of the participating organizations, or the unwillingness to “let children spoil what I’ll look at for years passing by,” on the side of the local neighbors.23

The NGO side was more welcoming after they discovered a potential benefit from our participation: they were filming the children to include them in their video report about the campaign. The division between the two groups, to the point of not speaking to each other unless the other side had violated the borderline inside the flowerbed, sometimes demarcated with a string, was striking. Every group knew how to plant flowers, but only the residents’ groups, largely consisting of elderly women and school children, knew exactly “how to plant flowers at their flowerbed.”24 The municipal website advertised this event five days in advance and welcomed all interested citizens to participate.25 In his research of insiders and outsiders within one territorial entity, A.V. Shipilov goes in depth into the reasons for the creation of oppositions between us and them, the reasons why the assertion of one’s own means the negation of the other’s, etc. Citing Ortega y Gasset’s book Man and People (1957), the author agrees that “The other can be both a friend and a foe, and that is why any society and any community means also dissociation, the friends and foes living together” (Shipilov, 2008: 10).

22. Quote by V. L., an elderly female resident of the neighboring apartment block who was planting flowers opposite her kitchen window.
23. As stated by S. G., an elderly female resident of a neighboring house.
24. A. D., an elderly woman planting flowers at the intersection between Lenin Avenue and Engels Street.
25. “Anybody who wants to can participate in this campaign. The townsfolk can call the ecology department at city administration in advance at 71-35-72 or 71-35-66 on Monday or come straight to a selected planting site.” News published 11.06.2014 on the Petrozavodsk city administration web-site. Available at: http://www.petrozavodsk-mo.ru/petrozavodsk/index/news.htm?f=61&fid=2&blk=10528684 (accessed 11.06.2014).
Conclusions: Bordering Wastelands

It is striking how the frames of the border and the borderline stretch and shrink depending on one’s perspective or viewpoint. The borderlines expand and contract along many different scales, from the construction of the other along the borderland of the national states and cooperative regions to less visible borderlands that exist within a neighborhood. Such borderlands may be represented by strings cutting across flowerbeds that physically demarcate the divide between individuals of the same nationality and cultural background who need to claim, protect, and reconstruct a personal connection to a piece of land.

Common Nordic values, including green development, education, entrepreneurship, and civic society participation, are evident in international cooperative projects, in the roundtables and seminars held in the Petrozavodsk city administration, and in the course of the local municipal green campaigns with the narrower focus on youth, the local environment, and recycling. Petrozavodsk’s relative openness to the western winds and orientation towards its (still) idealized Nordic neighbors allow for a particular susceptibility to the flow of innovations, especially in terms of ideas and technology. These innovations have been extended through the mediating activities of international partners, particularly through the Nordic Council of Ministers, an active promotional and funding body in northwest Russia. After having been imported to the Karelian grounds, some of unconsciously promoted messages and suggestions that accompanied the ideas of sustainability in the Nordic way have become progressively rooted in the local reality, and adapted into the everyday and professional life of citizens. The process of transferring ideas seems to be inseparable from the transfer of practice and technical solutions as well as the learning process. Practical results of the WASTE project, among others, include the systemic changes in the practice of waste treatment on the island of Kizhi.

Another particular outcome of the international cooperative projects in Karelia is that their effects are felt not only in the borderland areas, but also diffused from the Petrozavodsk “hot spot” further on the Russian side of the border to other participants of these projects located further from the border. For example, in the case of the project in question, the territories that benefited from participation were Pskov region and the city of Apatity. The physical crossing of the border by the participants in both eastern and western directions produced particularly fruitful results during the project. Bringing in foreign experts and building upon the reverence felt by locals for western technologies helped dispel possible “legitimacy concerns” regarding the meaning and importance of ecological education and the activism that had been consistently supported by a very limited part of the population.

The historically long and fruitful international partnership in Karelia is realized on numerous platforms. One of these platforms is the Barents Region cooperation arena, whose major objective was declared to be the promotion of “sustainable development in all aspects: economic, environmental and social, and strengthening of comprehensive security in the Region.” In this sense, the project WASTE, Waste Awareness: Sorting,
Treatment, Education, is an exemplary representative of the realization of this objective in practice.

This case study of this project shows how the broadly defined official values of influential neighbors penetrate and find their niche within the set of values held by local Karelian citizens, mixing with purely local ways to establish and maintain one’s domestic or alien space, negotiating between the rights and duties of leaders and employees, defining and judging what is appropriate, and what has to be expelled from one’s orbit because of perceptions of impurity, or that of being “dirty.” Finding common ground on the basis of mutually shared values proves to be vital not only for cross-border cooperation between societies, but even more so, within one’s particular society. The Nordic policy of cross-border partnership with Russia, as in this example of a waste management project, demonstrates how the ideological adherence to environmental commitments goes hand-in-hand with practical benefits, such as opening up a receptive market and sales area for Nordic technologies, facilities and equipment.

As I am writing these lines, these mechanisms keep rolling on, increasingly reminiscent of a growing snowball. The Petrozavodsk municipal website recently put out information on the recent round-table discussion devoted to the future of separate waste management in the city that took place on October 10, 2014, that involved almost exclusively local participants, experts, and society actors, with the exception of a couple of Russian non-Karelian guests. This was a platform for commencing dialogue between the local government officials and NGOs including educators, public activists, and business owners. It is evident now, almost a year after the closing conference of the WASTE project, that it has become an important milestone for further initiatives, and a successful test of the public’s readiness to take over. As was noted by Rashid Alimov, a representative of Greenpeace Russia, if 10–15% of the city population is ready for separate waste collection, the introduction of this technology on the city level becomes relevant. It is fascinating to track these areas of continuing permeability and impermeability of ideas and innovations in the borderlands, to document the direction of the exchanges, and how the cross-border exchanges are adapted in their new contexts.

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Сортировка ценностей на Карельском пограничье

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В данном антропологическом исследовании я рассматриваю процесс пересечения российско-скандинавской государственной и региональной границ в контексте совместного
социоэкологического проекта по внедрению раздельного сбора отходов в Карелии. В течение этого двухлетнего многоуровневого проекта сотрудничество между Петрозаводским мунципалитетом и его северными партнерами под эгидой Совета министров Северных Стран развивалось, в частности, посредством трансляции и адаптации ценностей, включая раннее обучение и социально-ответственное поведение, что соответствовало специфике приграничных отношений в Баренцевом Евро-Арктическом регионе. Процесс адаптирования Северных ценностей и знаний к повседневной и профессиональной жизни участников проекта шел рука об руку с распространением культурных трансграничных стереотипов. Идея отделения своего от чужого с таким же успехом находит применение и в рамках гораздо меньшей территориальной единицы, такой как кондоминиум или городская клумба, но при условии, что конструирование границ совпадает с осмыслением другого. Невидимые барьера, так же как и физические объекты, иногда разделяют людей, принадлежащих к одной и той же национальности и обладающих общим культурным опытом, но они могут ощущать потребность утвердить и защитить свою личную связь с определенным участком земли.

Ключевые слова: постсоциализм, переработка отходов, устойчивое развитие, северные ценности, трансляция и адаптация ценностей, конструирование другого, Баренцев Евро-Арктический регион, Карелия
Engaging Autobiography: Mobility Trauma and International Relations

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This article outlines the possibilities of autobiographical stories to criticize status quo iterations of International Relations (IR). The article draws on the personal experiences of the author's deportation order issued by the United Kingdom's Home Office and its associated Border Agency (UKBA) to challenge the accepted assumptions of a cosmopolitan worldview as it relates to orderly international institutional design. It highlights the possibilities of trauma when border management and personal mobility collide. It suggests that mobility trauma ensues when the expectations of human mobility, outlined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infringe the state's role as security provider. It begins in part one with a challenge to the traditional role and understanding of international borders that sustain order within the international. It examines the unacknowledged role that human vulnerability plays within IR and institutional design while frankly engaging with human vulnerability and trauma in the second section. This section details the experiences of the author when her mobility rights were curtailed and the ensuing identity crisis prompted by such events. The final section investigates the ideas of critical cosmopolitan scholarship demanding that such discourses acknowledge and work through the possibility of failed agency when the demands of state security supersede individual mobility rights. It turns to the possibility of traumatic iterations of IR in order to probe such possibilities. The article suggests, in its conclusion, the possibility of storytelling and psychoanalysis to endorse unorthodox agency, and the possibility of a dynamic international institutional design, that challenges the status quo iterations of IR.

Keywords: autobiography, international relations, borders, cosmopolitanism, narrative psychoanalysis

I was ordered to be deported from the United Kingdom, and the process unfolded over nine months in 2013. The experience left me feeling helpless, without a voice, unable to access “the political.” I could not be an effective agent. As an academic writing within the discipline of International Relations (IR), this experience remains confusing.1 It drove me to reflect upon the cosmopolitan worldview I had long championed at a professional and personal level. Cosmopolitanism, very briefly, understands that a common moral humanity, predicated on an assumed shared vulnerability, exists. It contests the primacy of the state, champions the individual moral subject, and eschews violence and conflict. It gestures towards a vulnerable interpretation of being political in common (Lu, 2009; O’Neill, 2000; Erskine, 2000; Kaldor, 2013; Buchanen, Nye, 2004; Held, 1995; Archibugi,
1993; Held, Archibugi, 1995). Reflecting on this most basic iteration of the cosmopolitan aspiration, in light of being ordered deported, revealed a series of paradoxes that I could not meaningfully process. Cosmopolitanism ought to attend to the harm that emerges when border management and human mobility intersect; however, cosmopolitan practices and structures are complicit in a process of silencing at this very intersection. This, I suggest, is problematic because such silencing furthers, rather than engages with, instances of harm.

This article disrupts the story of assumed human mobility. It demands that if cosmopolitanism really does eschew violence and conflict, and promotes a universal vulnerable subject, it must attend to the harm that such paradoxes reveal. I suggest that the underlying universal assumption of the cosmopolitan worldview renders this task impossible. The idea of the rights-bearing subject, the assumed linearity of trauma and its experiences, and the complicit acceptance of state borders within its institutional design, forecloses the possibility of listening and reflection. The experience of trauma, I suggest, is non-linear and challenges the spatial and temporal assumptions guiding international institutional design. In order to meaningfully engage with this experience, we must have the space to listen and reflect. Acting in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient. Trauma is not experienced and negotiated by the empowered universal ethicist. Working through traumatic experiences can only happen on the timetable of the traumatized person. In order to attend to the idiosyncrasies of mobility trauma in suitably appropriate ways, IR must be flexible, dynamic, and open-ended.

This paper is skeptical of a cosmopolitan worldview, and challenges the universality of its assumptions. It turns to the idea of voice, facilitated by an autobiographical methodology, to investiage the harm that ensues in light of universal assumptions of being human. Part One of this article interrogates the institutional design of IR querying the role that borders play in managing order, and the complicit role of cosmopolitan order therein. Part Two reveals my own experience of human mobility when, in April 2013, I was ordered to be deported from the United Kingdom. It reveals a personal and professional identity crisis that began when I realized that I was not welcome in the UK despite my assumed value as a good democratic citizen. This ordeal highlights the precarious existence of the foreigner within the state. Their transplantation within the political is only successful if it is aligned with democratic institutional iterations of the public good. The ability to render this precariousness to an audience, academic or otherwise, is all but impossible if access to the political is denied. Part Three develops this theme further. It probes the notion of abject cosmopolitanism demanding that critical cosmopolitanism go further and grapple with the possibility of failed agency. The conclusion imagines what can be done in the face of such a failure, and describes the possibilities of narrative and psychoanalytical methods applied to the failed expectations of personal mobility in a global age.

The expectations of mobility articulated in a universal rights discourse and associated with a cosmopolitan world view cannot protect the vulnerable individual from the lived

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human mobility in a global era. Article 13 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* affirms that all individuals have the right to travel freely. It is a right that is exercised in a variety of ways on a daily basis. A cursory glance at the statistics provided by Heathrow Airport (2014) in the United Kingdom (UK) confirms this. In 2013, 72.3 million people travelled its corridors, the busiest year on record. On any given day, an average of 191,200 people pass through its terminals; on the 30th of June, 238,949 people did during the busiest day of 2013. This is, I acknowledge, a privileged type of travel. But it is indicative of the ability of a global population to actively engage as mobile people as described in Article 13. This right is curtailed when, for any number of reasons, an individual is denied entry into a state.

Article 13 similarly articulates a right to return home. When this right is taken away from an individual or forced unwillingly on another, their expectations of mobility are curtailed. To “be removed,” or to be subjected to forced migration, occurs for many reasons. The United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) distinguishes between three categories of removal: deportation, administrative removals, and voluntary departures. It then further distinguishes and defines these terms noting that deportation “applies to people (and the children of such people) whose removal from the country is deemed ‘conducive to the public good’ by the Secretary of State, or when recommended by a court in conjunction with conviction of a criminal offence punishable by a prison term” (2014). While these terms and their definitions may provide legal clarity to the process of deportation, they do not attend to the particularities of this experience. They do not tell us what events led to the deportation order being issued, nor do they highlight the experiences of the deportee. Instead, the statistics relating to deportation paint a stark picture of a particular political act without giving any insight to its influence or impact on the everyday experiences of being human.

The Migration Observatory at Oxford University reports that of the 320,000 UK émigrés in 2013, 50,741 of those individuals were forcibly removed from the UK. This is a 14.5% rise in the number of deportations since 2012, and an overall doubling of deportation since 2004. The rise in deportations indicates that the UK government increasingly believes that properly-conceived deportation is an appropriate tool to manage human mobility. Peter Nyers (2003) argues that deportation is not only a policy tool, but also a performative act. To deport a person is an explicit demonstration of the state’s sovereign, legitimate power. It recognizes the state as the primary security provider, re-affirms an international order that emphasizes internal order over external anarchy, and the ability of the state to mediate such boundaries.

I do not accept that cosmopolitan assumptions cannot challenge *realpolitik* lessons of the realist world view, but I acknowledge the pedagogy supporting a *realpolitik* victory. I am deeply troubled to learn that the cosmopolitan worldview that freely and openly articulates the inherent vulnerability of the global population simultaneously silences those who are enacting their mobility rights. This is especially problematic if the mobile person is a forced migrant seeking out the most basic rights of subsistence and security. A fleeting glimpse at statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
reveals that millions of people flee war, violent conflict, and persecution every year. In 2013 alone, 51.2 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide. This, they write, “was the highest on record since comprehensive statistics on global forced displacement have been collected” (UNHCR, 2014). These, and the aforementioned, statistics reveal that people are increasingly mobile. They leave one community and seek out another. Regardless of the reasons prompting mobility, the enacting of mobility rights is a clear and growing trend.

As a first step towards a dynamic iteration of IR that meaningfully engages with this trend, I turn to the idea of “the voice.” I contend that “the voice” is a necessary addition to the normative and ethical iterations of IR because, as Roxanne Doty writes, it foregrounds issues of inclusion and exclusion, identity and difference, and institutional design. I draw on the emerging trend of an autobiographical methodology within IR and use it in this paper to highlight “the voice.” It is one way of imagining alternative encounters with mobility expectations. I turn to the reflexive potential of autobiographical encounters, aware of the emerging community of scholars who champion both autobiography and autoethnography within the discipline (Bleiker, Brigg, 2010; Lowenheim, 2010; Doty, 2010; Neumann, 2010; Dauphinee, 2010). I am guided particularly by the writings of Naeem Inyatullah (2010). I suggest, as he does, that autobiography provides “a substantive look at life/lives in process” and reveals “the mundane and the dramatic, the empirical and the theoretical, the structures and the processes that constitute and change humans” (Inyatullah, 2010: 7). Autobiography as methodology enhances the idea of mobility trauma. It offers insight into how scholars of IR might better contribute to the understanding of the identified paradoxes of cosmopolitan mobility.

The inclusion of autobiographical methodologies in IR scholarship is radical. It situates the personal and the emotional at the epicenter of an unfolding narrative. Feminist discourses have long advocated a role for “the personal” within the political, and the possibilities of reflexivity within research design (see for example, Ruddick, 1989; Cohn, 1987; and more recently, Ackerly, True, 2008). Feminist encounters with the personal challenge rational explanations and universal structures, providing a greater nuance to research design. Ackerly and True (2008) argue that there is a need to reflect upon the appropriateness of research design when unexpected stories and conclusions surface. The conclusions of Ackerly and True provide alternative imaginings of being political that suggest individuality and idiosyncrasy ought to feature when unorthodox experiences of being political emerge. I suggest, drawing the arguments of Ackerly and True, that autobiography enhances the personal experiences of mobility and security. It creates a space for the voice at the intersection of border management and human mobility.

Borders and Order

Where the personal expectations of mobility collide with the state’s management of mobility, we tend to find a border. Borders are defined in many ways. They have a geographical component that notes the physical limitations and boundaries of the state (Rumford,
Borders are also central to discussions of world order and institutional design (Rengger, 2001; Suganami, 1989; Waltz, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2001; Ikenberry, 2009; Buzan, 2004; Dunne, 1998). They permeate discussions of forced migration, engage with the labelling of stateless persons, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees (Innes, 2014), and influence the discourse of international citizenship (Benhabib, 2004). Borders are also critically examined. For example, Vaughn-Williams and Parker (2009) contest status quo descriptions of borders challenging the underlying assumptions of boundaries, borders, and their reification in IR.

Judith Butler (1990) offers an alternative discussion of borders, or boundaries, in her work Gender Trouble. She highlights the role that borders play in establishing control and social regulation over a subject. While her work is directly related to the self as subject, I suggest her discussion of borders offers much to inform the discipline of IR. For example, she notes the inherent desire for stability associated with the performativity of a border. She also discusses the absolute inability to achieve such stability.

The boundary between the inner and outer is confounded by those excremental passages in which the inner effectively becomes outer, and this excreting function becomes, as it were, the model by which other forms of identity-differentiation are accomplished. In effect, this is the mode by which Others become shit. For inner and outer worlds to remain utterly distinct, the entire surface of the body would have to achieve an impossible impermeability. This sealing of its surfaces would constitute the seamless boundary of the subject; but this enclosure would invariably be exploded by precisely that excremental filth that it fears. (Butler, 1990: 182)

Butler provides a compelling argument against the possibility of ever achieving impermeability; however, the desire for impermeability, or stability, can be seen within the assumptions of institutional design and IR discourses of order.

As Rengger’s (2001) publication on world order and political theory suggests, managed accounts of order invoke borders to distinguish the ideas of inner and outer discussed by Butler. He demonstrates how a particular reading of international sovereignty defines the international. The absence of an overarching legitimate governing authority renders the international anarchic. Borders are the boundaries that both manage and reify anarchy. Borders are, in effect, a cordon sanitaire. This cordon is understood in geographical and spatial representations of the state. What is inside the border is safe, and what is outside that border is a potential threat. Borders, as Margrit Shildrik (2000) argues, are assumed to render “us” safe from the threats of “them.” She is critical of this interpretation of boundaries because she, like Butler, is aware of their permeable nature. She provides compelling evidence that the sense of security afforded by such an imaging of borders in fact prompts situations of exile and silencing. Those labelled “other,” who do not conform to the status quo, are set outside the political. I suggest that such assumptions permeate traditional accounts of world order. Individuals who should be protected by Article 13 for whatever reason must provide ample evidence of their suitability for
entry. They must challenge the aura of reasonable suspicion of the foreigner if they want to be admitted into the political.

As Mark B. Salter (2006) has argued in drawing on the ideas of Agamben and Foucault, those who navigate borders are rather abruptly silenced. Salter vividly re-creates that moment when a passenger disembarks from an airplane and then travels the corridors of the airport to finally arrive at a border site. From the point of disembarking until reaching a border, the traveler exists in a state of suspended existence. He or she lacks state representation and protection. This state of suspension lasts throughout the border experience. A traveler is viewed with suspicion; why does he/she wish to gain access? What instability follows if the mobile person gains entry to the political? These are the problems that a border agent tries to deny by holding hostage, on behalf of the government, the rights of mobility of the traveler. A traveler lacks a voice. In essence, anyone who navigates a state border lacks an element of agency throughout this process. Salter’s traveler recalls the privileged statistics of Heathrow Airport, where 72.3 million people decide of their own free will to take up the right to travel. For the most part, these individuals pass through border control with ease, provided they have a passport. Their silencing, in effect, ends when they prove their suitability to the public good. This silencing is temporary.

Temporary or otherwise, when the voice of a mobile person is removed, the concept of a border and its management is beyond contestation. The cordon sanitaire remains unharmed and in place because a voice is required to contest the status quo. This silencing achieves two things. It maintains the precarious assumption of impermeability while reifying the harmful labels of “us” and “them.” The realities of “inside” and “outside” are starkly revealed. It is here that the expectations of mobility in a globalized world and the management of human mobility are heightened and highlighted. The traveler is an active agent. He/she is actualizing the expectations of mobility as articulated in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It re-affirms the right to move and reside within “the borders of each state,” and also the right to leave and return to one’s country of origin. But with each border crossing, the realities of border management are experienced. The traveler is subject to what Salter identities as the “confessional experience.” Not only must they produce the required documentation, the traveler must also disclose any information demanded by the border agent. Here a voice is allowed to speak. The voice is not an idiosyncratic expression of agency, but is rendered complicit in the elusive quest for controlled permeability.

There is also evidence that suggests an-altogether more harmful silencing that is happening to the forced migrant. Liisa Malkki’s (1995, 1996) ethnographic fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi reveals how silencing is complicit in the experience of mobility. Malkki’s silencing was not facilitated in the absence of the rule of law as noted by Salter (2006). The silencing she witnessed emerged within the structures of international humanitarian aid. While in Rwanda, she noticed a trend whereby the particular stories and life experiences of the exiled were expunged. The voices of displaced persons were silenced. The particularities of violent conflict, of the loss of one’s homeland, and of the
idiosyncrasies of war could not overcome the impersonal rendering of the human rights subject, the international humanitarian regime, and the over-arching liberal interpretations of international order. To have a story, or to be a person with wounds (physical and/or ontological), was not part of the overarching narrative of being an exile. She labels this experience as “corporeal anonymity.” Maalki’s fieldwork reveals that the structures that articulate a universal right to mobility and shape the expectations of mobility also silence those who need access to the political. She notes how this silencing begins, how it is upheld, and what the experience of such silencing can be like for an exile. The experience of corporeal anonymity poses very real problems for the cosmopolitan discourse. In its most general sense, cosmopolitanism defends the vulnerable and imagines a world united in moral solidarity. What Malkki’s work reveals, however, is that its framework is unable to attend to the needs of the vulnerable migrant.

In her publication, *The Rights of Others* (2004), Seyla Benhabib, a noted cosmopolitan writer, deals directly with this problem. She contests the relationship of borders, political membership, and migration. She begins her discussion with an account of political membership. It is “the principles and practices for incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities” (Benhabib, 2004: 1). Mobility, she writes, is encapsulated in the discourse of citizenship; however, she wonders if citizenship is fit for purpose. She, like myself, queries how philosophical and empirical discussions might begin to mediate the relationship of state sovereignty and mobility rights. She wonders where rights within this relationship might feature, if at all. Benhabib qualifies how and why someone might find themselves excluded from a given political community. She addresses the struggles associated with such negotiations, which she calls democratic iterations. They are, she writes, “those complex processes of public argument, deliberations and exchanges through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, positioned and repositioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society” (Benhabib, 2004: 179).

Benhabib approaches this discussion in a discursive fashion. Her framework reminds her readers that the role of the philosopher, in this case, is to separate the political from the moral and the social. The philosopher must look at the relationship of the universal and the particular as a series of mediations and negotiations. By making such distinction, we are able to move the discussion of citizenship from a vicious debate to a virtuous discussion. She then goes on to say (Benhabib, 2007: 451), in a rebuttal to Aleinikoff (2007), that she is “less interested in justifying the finality of closure but more in the circulation of normative issues and questions throughout the public spheres and civil societies of democracies, and beyond their borders, such as to enable the democratic conversation to continue despite decisional closure.” Benhabib’s work assumes an ongoing conversation. This ongoing discussion is facilitated by empowered agents. This, I suggest, is a limitation. It does not imagine a space where the disenfranchised might contribute meaningfully to the iterative process or how they might contribute at all in the absence of a voice and access to the political.
The philosopher is the primary agent in Benhabib’s iterative process. This agent not only has a voice but it also has access to the political. I wonder if this voice is best suited to the task at hand. The cosmopolitan philosopher championed by Benhabib enjoys a position of privilege. Kimberly Hutchings (2013) comments on this privilege when she questions the reflexive abilities of the universal ethicist. In a publication centered on the possibilities of vulnerability in IR, Hutchings asks the reader to wonder at the type of harm that might ensue if the universal ethicist is unable to empathize with the suffering other. A double harm could emerge whereby the original suffering remains unaddressed, and, in fact, further enhanced simply because the cosmopolitan scholar, situated within a universal framework of assumed order and morality, is unable to realistically engage with the suffering other. The universal ethicist is unable to be actively reflexive. This is because the structures of the cosmopolitan worldview do not entertain the possibility of listening. These structures inherently assume a universal human experience. Harm and trauma, I suggest, are idiosyncratic and defy universal experience. How then can the universal philosopher or cosmopolitan agent attend to such suffering? In short, they most likely cannot.

At the same time, within a democratic iteration, there is no point when the exiled other can meaningfully engage as an agent. Such iterations assume access to the political, and the silencing of the exiled other prohibits such engagement. If we recall the original claims of Butler (1990) and Shildrick (2000), such individuals are situated outside the political because they are deemed a threat. Malkki (1996) provides an explanation for the type of threat they pose. She problematizes the humanitarian regime which assumes that one is only moral or can acquire moral knowledge if they live within a state. Without a state, in the absence of a family, or a motherland, the migrant is unable to understand the expectations of good citizenship. They are, in effect, a threat to the stability and order of “the political” of their new country. The literature that is part and parcel of the cosmopolitan discourse and which should support those outside the political, suggests that to willingly choose to leave one’s home community and build a life elsewhere is pathological. This assumption is a direct challenge to the right of return articulated in Article 13. The pathological label delegitimizes the lived experience of the forced migrant. Their stories challenge the assumed impermeability of borders and the universality of being human.

Forced migrants are positioned beyond the democratic responsibilities of the modern state and simultaneously denied access to the political. They are, in this institutional design, powerless. I suggest that the idiosyncratic experiences of mobility could inform Benhabib’s concepts in ways unavailable to the cosmopolitan philosopher. Such information could provide compelling information on the need to re-visit citizenship, and the way that borders manage mobility in a global age. In their current condition, borders do not facilitate the stability and protection of the global population as articulated within cosmopolitan discourses. In fact, the literature suggests an increased number of migrants being turned away, and therefore, an increase of suffering. The current desire for secure, or impermeable, borders is structurally reprehensible, and certainly traumatic personally.
Working through the Threat of Deportation

My story is one of unenforced deportation. At times, it aligns with the ideas of forced migration, at times it does not. Likewise, at times, it evokes, as Edward Said has written, an exiled subjectivity (2001). What I acknowledge explicitly is this: it is not the only story to emerge when mobility rights, and the expectations they sustain, collide with border management in a global world. It may be representational of a larger experience, but at the same time, it might not. This article does not seek to fill an entire gap that exists in understanding the plight of the forced migrant. To do so would run counter to the challenges put forward throughout this article. Rather, in telling my story, I illustrate the power of “the voice” when it is able to be heard. There is a need to engage at a personal level in IR. Albeit biased, actual experiences, both personal and emotional have much to offer to the discourses of IR in general, and cosmopolitanism in particular. This is the importance of “the voice.” It affords a space for anyone’s story if they want to tell it. It facilitates a space where others can listen. It imagines a space outside “the political” where agency, unorthodox as it may be, can establish itself.

I was ordered deported from the United Kingdom in 2013. On 18 April, 2013, I was waiting for the return of my Canadian passport from the UKBA. What I thought would be a delivery returning my passport turned out to be a registered letter informing me that my work permit application had been rejected. I had seven days to appeal the decision, or 28 days to leave the country. I am a Canadian citizen, but a resident of the UK. I have lived in the UK for 12 years. I arrived in 2002 as a graduate student on the required student visa. When this expired after my PhD in IR was completed, I applied for a Fresh Talent Scotland Visa for one year. That led to a Highly Skilled Migrant Workers Visa in 2008 when I applied for and received a lectureship in Politics and International Relations at Aston University in Birmingham, UK. This visa expired on 18 February, 2013. I sent my renewal application to the UKBA on February 1, with little fear of refusal. Not only am I a good democratic citizen with ties to the community, I was also married to a British citizen and had two children, ages 8 months and almost 3, who are British by birth. My own arrogance allowed me to believe that deportation was something that happened to someone else, not me. I was a highly skilled migrant. I am the type of person that governments wanted to have in the country, or so I thought. I was wrong in my assumption.

Perhaps, you are wondering, why I did not seek British Citizenship, or perhaps, why not apply for a spousal visa? I qualify for both. The answers are not that simple, however, but are framed in a variety of discourses. At a very practical and financial level, my husband and I believed our family would be more secure if I applied for a work permit. I am the primary income earner in the family. It is my permanent job that allows us to hold a mortgage, have access to solid and reputable financial investments, and provide for our children in a responsible fashion. In essence, a spousal visa and family visa require the marriage unit to remain intact. Should it dissolve, the foreign party is required to leave the country. In other words, the possibilities of a relationship breakdown and dissolution render me a flight risk in the eyes of financial institutions. In choosing to remain as an
independent worker, we thought that our children would be better protected, and our independence, autonomy, and financial well-being would remain secure. Yet again, we were wrong.

I recognize that my experience of deportation unfolded in relative comfort. I was allowed to stay with my family throughout the entire process. Our daily lives continued in a routine fashion. I went back to work when my maternity leave ended. The boys kept going to their nursery, and my husband continued working at his job. We were, in all accounts, materially provided for. Not only did we have food, shelter, and a variety of goods providing varying levels of comfort, we also had support during the appeal process itself. Institutionally, the University helped fund the appeal. We had a solicitor prepare our appeal arguments, and a barrister who argued them at the immigration tribunal. I did not face language and learning barriers like others in my own situation, a point poignantly rendered to me as I sat waiting to write the “Life in the United Kingdom” test, a necessary part of becoming a permanent resident and citizen. Moreover, we had childcare provisions on the day of the appeal itself. This was something we took for granted, and only realized our privileges while sitting in the waiting room watching other families arrive with up to five children in tow.

I might, rather flippantly suggest, that our experience is/was very much a #firstworld-problem!

What I now understand is this; the numbing sensation I felt when reading the deportation order was the beginning of a traumatic experience. I faced an identity crisis. I could not put into words what we were experiencing as a family. I was terrified that I would be separated from my husband and children. But my terror went beyond that. How could I provide for them if I didn’t have a job? I am the primary (but not sole) income earner in the family. Our mortgage depends on my salary. What would we do if we lost our house? How could I keep the children safe? Where would we get the money to buy our weekly groceries? These might seem like trivial problems, but these were some of the questions that plagued us as a family from April to December as we awaited the outcome of the immigration appeal. These were the practical elements of my trauma. When we found out that I could stay in the UK they dissolved in an instant.

On the other hand, aspects of this traumatic event remain with me. When I discovered I was under the threat of deportation, I felt a deep rejection. I felt that I was not good enough. I did not align with the public good as interpreted by the Home Office. The rejection wasn’t simply political. It was also exceptionally personal. Having abandoned one way of negotiating the world only to build it anew on cosmopolitan principles, I began to wonder if, yet again, I got it wrong. For the first time, I felt that the cosmopolitan principles I embraced reading Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) *The Fragility of Goodness* might not fulfill the promises I thought they had. Nussbaum’s work offers an account of being human that can attend to both the contingent nature of life in common while articulating an account of moral agency and the common good. Nussbaum outlines the role that luck plays in everyday life and, at times, the tragic nature of being human. She recounts not only that goodness is something that must be cultivated and developed, but also that hu-
man beings, through no fault of their own, will experience harm and suffering. The role that she assigns to emotions in softening the brutality of the social and political world is telling. Not only does it reveal the centrality of vulnerability in our daily lives and how fragile life is, but that even in the face of the uncontrollable and the contingent, people as agents can try and rise above it.

Nussbaum’s world is both beautiful and brutal. I understood, in the idea of the moral cosmopolitan agent, a way of engaging the world that articulated responsibility coupled with moral agency and practical reason. It did not suggest a relational account of obligations and duties. The motivation to act in a morally appropriate fashion, guided by kindness and not opportunity, is a way of being part of a community. One is accountable to the community through one’s own shared values and ideals that measure one’s actions and reactions. In such communities, one can make mistakes, provided one learns from them. If one can acknowledge hurt, or bad luck, and work with those harmed, aware of the underlying kindly motivations, one can learn as a community how best to move forward. Perhaps I am personally unlucky. I chose to trust the wrong people to help me with the visa renewal process. Equally, perhaps I had assumed (wrongly it transpired) that the UKBa might demonstrate elements of common sense when they noticed the mistakes in the application by my sponsoring institution.

There is a reflexive element to my previously constructed worldview. When harm is experienced, or unintended consequences malign the common good, agents revisit the decisions they made and wonder if, in the future, alternative modes of agency would have been more appropriate. I struggle to find evidence of such reflexivity within cosmopolitan principles. The universality underpinning cosmopolitan iterations of IR do not soften the unwelcome experience of deportation. The agent within that worldview could not help me navigate that experience. I could not realistically communicate what I was going through, but perhaps even more problematically, the recipient agent did not know what questions to ask that could help them to more clearly understand the situation. In fact, I wonder if a philosophical cosmopolitan agent would think to ask a question full-stop. There was, and remains, an absence of reflection or reflexive capabilities within the cosmopolitan agent. I believe it is this absence of reflection that maintains the anxiety and unease I continue to feel when I now work through what it is to endorse a cosmopolitan approach to global politics. I struggle to understand how I can use this framework to shed light on the nature of borders, especially in the absence of responsible agency and reflexivity. I worry that it cannot attend to the harm that follows when mundane matters of law result in the (potential) separation of friends, families, and communities.

I do feel shame for imagining that I might be above the politics of mobility, that others, but not me, had cause to worry. This flies in the face of the cosmopolitan worldview I previously endorsed. If we are all morally worthy, then we should all be equally vulnerable to humanity’s creations. Certain portions of the global population should not be more precariously placed than others. Perhaps even worse, my previous publication (Beattie, 2008, 2013) actually deals with vulnerability in IR. The same year I was ordered deported, I suggested (2013) that we needed greater nuance and application of the concept to enrich
our understanding of the suffering other within the global world. That I could argue this point, all the while adopting the universal moral assumptions of the natural law tradition, now makes me cringe. I cringe because I could not realize, from my position of privilege, the universalizing ontology of the tradition marginalizing the personal stories of being human. I regret such claims, and now, rather oddly, find myself grateful for having the experience of being ordered deported. It shattered my privileged worldview and made me aware of the greater harms that universal assumptions can provoke. However, I make this statement many months after the practical elements of my trauma have come to a close.

I have lost a sense of security and purpose in the wider world. This is equally scary and painful. I genuinely do not know if that sense of security and ease within the world will ever return. But I am not sure that I would have it back given the opportunity. I’m not sure I can mourn the loss of my previously held cosmopolitan sensibilities. I believe my anxiety and fear facilitate the ability to listen and wonder in the first instance instead of rushing in to act. I do not believe I have a greater understanding of the forced migrant, or the insecurities their own story reveals. But the pathology of being unwelcome prompts a newfound empathy and a desire to understand the plight of others. The inherent value of trauma is that it remains with me always. It situates me in the present and demands that I engage in the moment. It forces me to acknowledge the little details. What is significant to my construction of IR is that it differs from what it once did. I am attuned to the personal. I have a desire to now listen to the stories of others and understand what renders them simultaneously terrified and courageous in the face of the unknown and unpredictable.

**Beyond Abjection**

In “Abject cosmopolitanism: the politics of protection in the anti-deportation movement” (2003), Nyers wonders if in eschewing conflict and war and attending to a wider vulnerability open to the possibilities of friendship and hospitality, cosmopolitanism fails to acknowledge, in an appropriate manner, those who sit outside the political. He wonders if and when such individuals challenge the legitimacy of the state, or disrupt the political, what impact that challenge has on the state and the wellbeing of the abject. Abjects, he notes, are “increasingly classed as the objects of securitised fears and anxieties, possessing either an unsavory agency (i.e., they are identity-frauds, queue jumpers, or people who undermine consent in the polity) or a dangerous agency (i.e., they are criminals, terrorists, or agents of insecurity)” (Nyers, 2003: 1070). He engages with these labels wondering if it is possible to incorporate the subjects of de-connection and often-violent detachment within the state into a broadly construed discussion of cosmopolitanism.

He turns to the works of Paul Ranciere (2004), and Bonnie Honig (2009), to engage with what he describes as “the abject.” The “abject cosmopolitan(s)” that Nyers identifies are the refugees and immigration groups challenging their own specified exclusions, and the associated political practices and/or problems that can emerge:
The abject is someone who is cast-out, discarded and rejected. In contrast to the vaunted status of cosmopolitanism, the abject are held in low regard as outcasts. While the cosmopolitan is at home everywhere, the abject have been jettisoned, forced out into a life of displacement. When considered together, therefore, the “abject” and the “cosmopolitan” appear as stark contrast, relating to one another only in highly oppositional terms; high/low, hope/despair, beautiful/ugly, belonging/exclusion, everywhere/nowhere. (Nyers, 2003: 1073)

In essence, the abject stand as the opposition to the good democratic citizen. This being said, the abject are agents. Drawing on the writings of Nikolas Rose (1999), Nyers reminds the reader that to be abject, or to be subject to abjection, is an act of force. Furthermore, he, like Judith Butler (1993: 3), suggests that such positionings are, in actual fact, a means of repositioning the struggle to “re-articulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility.” In actual fact, in his discussions of abject agency, we can actually begin to see the very important role that lived experience and personal appeals can and do play in attending to both the harm and trauma of mobility.

While governments around the world are moving to a system of tighter border controls, there is also a series of coordinated protest movements against such policies and practices. As Nandita Sharma (2003) describes them, “no border movements” coalesce around a series of shared goals. They are committed to the free movement of people and the end to displacement on a global scale. They likewise support indigenous land claims and the right to self-determination. Nyers (2003: 1084) builds on these ideas in his examination of the work that the Non-Status Refugees Action Committee (CASS) has done to limit the deportation of its migrant community:

These meetings usually include forcing officials to read the individuals case files and hear the testimonies of the refugee claimants. This is the key advantage of delegation visits: they allow for face-to-face encounters with state officials invested with enormous powers of discretion. As one member of CASS complained, “We are treated as file numbers, not as human beings.” Once the compelling individual stories behind these numbers are shared, it is not unusual for immigration staff to be moved to tears.

In their work, we can identify tactics that disrupt administration, the routines, and the “normality of deportations.” They support delegation visits. These tactics give a voice to those traditionally rendered “abject” or voiceless. Nyers’s account of agency is compelling. He is able to allocate powers of the agent to those traditionally rendered voiceless, and to those who are cast as suspicious and threatening. His work is a serious improvement on the cosmopolitanism advanced by Benhabib (2004, 2007). He attends to the need for empowerment, the problematics of global institutional design, and an inherently natural mobile ontology. Yet, I suggest he has not gone far enough. While he envisions a role for agency, he does not attend to the possibility of failure. The potential for trauma that ensues in the face of a deportation order, never mind its actual implementation, remains real and unaddressed.
When I refer to trauma or traumatic experience, I am drawing on a wide range of scholars, some located within IR, and others who sit outside the formal disciplinary boundaries. As Jenny Edkins (2002: 245) writes, trauma, or traumatic events, “involves an exposure to an event so shocking that our everyday expectations of how the world works are severely disrupted.” Traumatic events involve a sense of betrayal, a loss of trust, and a shattering of one’s world view. Trauma, as Crossely (2000) writes, unmakes our world. Perhaps most problematic for the mimetic practices of IR and borders therein is that the events of trauma do not conform to standard unfoldings of history, time, and space. Traumatic events are, as Edkins (2002) writes, non-linear. While one can distinguish the life before and after the traumatic event, a point nicely outlined by Gemignani (2001) in his work on trauma and migration, at the point of trauma itself, the agent is rendered silent. This is most likely the case because in the face of trauma individuals speak to a numbing sensation, an inability to express the unfolding experience(s) in words or acts.

The experience of trauma forces individuals to come face-to-face with the vulnerability that frames philosophical cosmopolitanism. I suggest that such encounters with vulnerability are curtailed if, and when, they challenge the potential for impermeable borders. As my own experience revealed, being a good democratic citizen, assuming that I was a key player in the wider global community, could not and did not provide me with the tools to navigate this particular vulnerability. To be rendered silent, when trauma occurs, is an understood phenomenon. Rather interestingly, in my own shock and silence, I found solace in the aforementioned luck discussed by Nussbaum (2001) in as much as bad things can happen through no fault of one’s own. It is how we move forward that is telling. I could re-assert some power in my daily activities, acknowledging the lack of power I experienced because of the failed work permit application while simultaneously taking comfort in the fact that how I reacted to this determination was an indication of the person I believed I was, a global cosmopolitan citizen.

At the moment of trauma, this helped. As I began to work through this experience in the upcoming months, however, it was increasingly unhelpful because I could not find a place therein for my own therapeutic rendering of my shattered worldview. Trauma is both unpredictable and idiosyncratic, and because of this, it does not align with universal technical constructions of aid. Such agents are imbued with an obligation and responsibility to help others. But the timetable that outlines when and how help is secured is very much at the behest of the empowered agent, and not the individual experiencing trauma. This is the experience of corporeal anonymity discussed by Malkki (1996). Simply stated, the cosmopolitan would help at the moment of the traumatic experience. In that silence, the experience of numbing, when little information is available on the nature of harm being experienced, the agent would act regardless of whether or not it was the most appropriate moment.

The idiosyncratic nature of trauma, its inability to be rendered controllable and set within a timetable, poses problems for IR, in general, and cosmopolitanism, in particular. As Kate Schick (2009: 147–148) argues in her thinking through of trauma and the ideas of Adorno, the therapeutic needs of the traumatized individual do not align with the
universal, technical knowledge of a liberal ethical approach to addressing past harm and avoiding it in the future:

The concrete other, passed over in the pursuit of universal guidelines for living, is often the individual experiencing the negative aspects of progress and is precisely the one who suffers in silence. Although a desire to emancipate humankind from suffering provides the motivation for mainstream international ethics, this suffering is too quickly passed over in the attempt to delineate universal norms, and the influence of present emotion or past traumas on present capability for political interaction is all but ignored.

The moment when the traumatized agent is able to acknowledge and work through the harm experienced is unpredictable and unexpected. Personally, it was not until the ordeal was finished that I was able to begin to work through the events and the impact they had on our lives. Only in the secure knowledge that I was staying in the UK could I meaningfully address the underlying fear and insecurity that had navigated my life, and the lives of my family, throughout most of 2013. The security that I required in order to analyze the experience and its underlying identity crisis that ensued did not materialize at the moment of trauma, but rather 13 months later. Furthermore, the nature of support that I needed, as well as the length of time I needed to work through all of these events, remains highly personal. Not only are the stories of forced migration idiosyncratic, but so are the ways in which the agents works through the events and seek to rebuild their lives, although with a heightened sense of their vulnerability in a global world. This type of therapeutic process requires those offering aid to be highly attuned to the specificity of the experience. In other words the process of working through, or therapy, is not easily universalized.

In rendering the cosmopolitan agent abject, and reminding us that not all experiences are the same and that one must be mindful of creating a universal, identifiable other, Nyers (2003) has gone further than most in offering a voice to those who experience the negative aspects of forced migration. His identification of storytelling within the CASS strategy is telling in that regard. It empowers the abject at that moment in time, facilitating a space within which the story can emerge. This is but one moment in the experience of forced migration. It does not encapsulate the entirety of the deportation ordeal. Nyers draws on the experiences of non-status Algerian persons in Canada. His 2002 telling of their story does not reflect the original need to flee, the insecurity of the mobile experience, nor the uncertainty once arriving in Canada. While it does hint at the ongoing ordeal within the state, it does not speak to the impact this experience has had on the personal aspects of being human. More is needed to attend to the holistic experience of forced migration and the impact it has on the relational and social components of being human. In order to make this claim with sufficient force and impact, the Conclusion gestures to the need for a narrative framework within which autobiography and story-telling take on a meaningful role in the repositioning of the agent within a vulnerable global world.
Conclusion

In the works of David Carr (1986), the relationship between time and narrative experience is thoughtfully presented, and the possibilities of a narrative approach are revealed. He argues, drawing on the ideas of Husserl, that life experiences can mirror the structure of narrative or story-telling. He argues that life is not a series of monochromatic events unrelated to each other, but rather like music notes in a symphony; they only gain relevance and understanding when situated alongside the note played before and after. Carr argues that in our actions, we can identify plot development, structure, and narrative. These framings of our stories can be experienced actively and passively. He writes that “The narrative grasp of the storyteller is not a leap beyond time but a way of being in time. It is no more alien to time than the curving bands are alien to the river or the potter’s hands to the clay” (Carr, 1986: 89). What emerges then is an altogether alternative experiencing of life events that are given meaning not only by past histories, but by present reflection as well. If we return to the opening claims of this article and reflect meaningfully on the ideas put forward by Inyatullah (2011), we can further reinforce the claim that authentic voice, rendered personal and vulnerable, can play both effective and affective roles in revealing the structures and process of the political.

Drawing on Carr (1986), Crossely (2000) argues on behalf of a narrative approach to engage with the specificities of traumatic experiences. In her opinion, telling stories, or telling one’s own story, allows for the agent to begin to make sense of the newfound traumatic world, and slowly begin the task of aligning their temporal and spatial experience with the practices of the political:

> Literary stories such as fiction and autobiography do not in any sense “impose” a structure and order on human action and life. Instead, they tend to reinforce and make more explicit the symbolisation that is already at work within a culture at the level of practical human action. The function of narratives such as autobiographies, then, is simply to reveal structures or meanings that previously remained implicit or unrecognised, and thus to transform life and elevate it to another level. (Crossely, 2000: 537)

It is to begin again the task of engaging within the political. It is within these relationships and experiences that the human story, the vocalizing of shared histories can, and does, emerge. As she writes, “we have a sense of who we are through a sense of where we stand in relation to “the good” (Crossely, 2000: 533). The possibility of narration facilitates a return of one’s ontological security. One is able to construct anew the relationship that the self has within the community, but in particular, to access the underlying account of the good around which both political and social relationships coalesce.

Crossley indicates the therapeutic potential of narrative and psychoanalysis. She displays many affinities to the critiques noted by Schick (2009), and Edkins (2002), in the attendant problems of suffering in a liberal worldview. She writes that narrative “appreciates the linguistic and discursive structuring of “self” and “experience” but also maintains
a sense of the essentially personal, coherent and real nature of individual subjectivity” (Crossely, 2000: 530). She is referring to the elusive “concrete other” noted by Schick, while reiterating the challenge of Edkins (2002) that therapy does not exist to reinsert one’s self in the previously held worldview. Therapy deconstructs the status quo stories informing the personal, the awareness of our shared vulnerabilities, and the ongoing insecurity that is revealed when such stories are found wanting. We do not engage in such practices to re-insert ourselves in a world that has let us down. Instead, there is a concerted effort to work through the event and to shore up strength in the hopes of negotiating the world as it is, in its fully unpredictable and hopeful way. In essence, it is to tell, and re-tell the traumatic experience, to shore up personal strength, and work through the space in between.

The traumatized agent is beginning the task of rebuilding relationships, of situating themselves in time, as suggested by Carr (1986). They are re-asserting their agency on their own terms, defining what tools they need to assimilate such experiences. They are, as Crossely (2000) writes, seeking out relationships. I suggest further that these agents are rebuilding their communities. I am influenced in this suggestion by the writings of Elizabeth Dauphinee (2010). She argues on behalf of ontological communities instead of epistemic communities. Such ontological communities, she writes, “involve a certain alchemy and a commitment to understanding our worlds as spaces of opportunity for creation and fruitful debate that seek not to destroy the ideas and risks we might be willing to take, but instead foster them” (Dauphinee, 2010: 817). How might a mobile agent begin such a task?

As Gemangini (2011) has revealed in his work with refugees and undocumented migrants, the past is part and parcel of the phenomenological experience of the migrant story. One cannot disavow this experience, but rather engage with it to work through and re-align new and emerging ideas of the self and other within the community. Telling one’s story, and the creation of the space for autobiography, can sustain such practices. In the aftermath of being ordered deported, I lost my way and my story, along with my identity, was critically examined. I do not suggest that I have found the path that I want to follow, but in seeking to understand my experience, I found the experience of trauma meaningful and useful. I take to heart what Ellis (2004) writes when she notes that scholars, prompted by “a knock,” can reflect and write about such instances. These “knocks,” I suggest, bear a similarity to the communal or personal traumatic experiences discussed throughout this article.

I tried to find reasons for why I was ordered to be deported, but none were forthcoming. I found solace in the writings of Edkins (2002). Her investigation of 9/11 reminds readers that security, war, and conflict may be the dominant security story in IR. She labels this approach “securitization” and identifies it as the chief response of government and policy makers to the events of 9/11. Her argument, however, is this: even though securitization remains the dominant approach, or story, of IR, it is not the only story. Societies can choose, if they wish, to be political in other ways. She reminds the reader that societies choose what stories to tell and which stories define them. She endorses an account of
politicization, not securitization. This story begins with reflection, it prompts learning, and suggests negotiation as a means of engaging with others within (and beyond) the political. Politicization challenges the universality of security and heavy-handed action. In being aware of this point, I suggest that the stories of permeable and impermeable boundaries are told with reference to the idea of securitization highlighted and criticized by Edkins. They highlight the problems created when mobility is managed in such a way that it violates the expectations agents have of a right to be mobile.

As I present my position within a variety of communities, and seek to re-establish relationships as discussed by Crossely (2000), I am aware of the need for permeable boundaries, and the precarious misbelief of impermeability in an age when people actively take up the right to be mobile. I am likewise aware of the need for my voice to help interrogate and reflect upon the suffering that impermeability fosters. It is for this reason that I emphasize both lived experience and voice throughout this paper. It imagines alternative forms of agency that might influence the political from outside its boundaries, but also invites others to engage. I do so fully aware of Edkin’s (2002) iteration of politicization contra securitization, and the possibility of a dynamic, open-ended vision of the international fostered by the lived experience of others.

**Bibliography**


Привлекая автобиографию: травма мобильности и международные отношения

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Автор предлагает использовать автобиографическую методологию для анализа травматического опыта депортации. В статье делается предположение, что травма мобильности возникает, когда принципы свободного перемещения людей, зафиксированные в Статье 13 Всеобщей декларации прав человека, вступают в противоречие с ролью государства в обеспечении безопасности. Для описания этого опыта автор анализирует автобиографический опыт депортации. В частности, пересматриваются космополитические представления и показывается, как они поддерживают миф о непроницаемых границах государств, и одновременно замалчиваются взгляды тех, кто подвергает этот миф сомнению. В заключение автор описывает роль повествования и психоанализа в поддержке критической повестки и возможность существования гибкого международного институционального устройства, которое бы пересматривало статус кво в практиках международных отношений.

Ключевые слова: автобиография, международные отношения, границы, космополитизм, нарративный психоанализ
We’re fond of the aphorism “Everyone is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own facts.” We think good data make good facts, and we’re just idealistic enough to believe that a common foundation of facts can help societies identify problems and discover solutions. (p. vii)

If you bring social scientists and journalists into the same sandbox and give them the right tools, values, and missions, you can create a new kind of institution—a “fact tank”—that helps people understand the world around them. (p. 200)

Whether you like it or not, or agree or strongly oppose such an assertion, we all live, or believe to be living in a world constructed from sociological data, mainly from the results of surveys. The beginning of the present era of national representative surveys is primarily associated with the name of George Horace Gallup, an American pioneer of survey sampling techniques, and the inventor of the Gallup poll. There is a quite well-known fact that in the 1936 presidential elections in the United States, the Literary Digest magazine conducted a poll based on over two million written questionnaires returned by mail which predicted that Alf Landon would be the winner. George Gallup carried out a survey on a random representative sample of a few thousand Americans, and predicted that Franklin Roosevelt would defeat Alf Landon in the U.S. Presidential election. He also predicted that the forecasts of the Literary Digest would be wrong because the results of the magazine’s poll were based on a sample of people who were registered as telephone or car owners, and did not represent all of the voting groups of American society at that time.

Certainly, Gallup was not the only creator of the small representative sample and face-to-face interviews methodology. In fact, “the adequate understanding of George Gallup’s
achievements indispensably requires a detailed study of the heritage of other pollsters who explored the political and consumer attitudes of Americans from 1930 to 1950” as well, such as Archibald Crossley, Hadley Cantril, Elmo Roper, Robert and Helen Lynd, Alfred Charles Kinsey, etc. They created the methodology and the industry of public opinion polls, and “fundamentally changed the concept of the U.S. public about social science in general and its methods too, and, most importantly, transformed the views of people about themselves. Prior to these studies, society was dominated by the perception that social scientists studied exclusively social problems, whereas afterwards people saw themselves for the first time.”

However, the names of Gallup, Crossley, and Roper not only stand for the symbolic designation of the beginning of the era of an absolute faith in the predictive power of representative surveys and sampling techniques, but also for the synonym of the deepest collapse of the sociological dream of acquisition of the methodology guaranteeing the way to obtain the true knowledge once and for all. In 1948, when the American society trusted in the technology of sample-based public opinion polls, and the forecasts of Gallup, Crossley and Roper, propagated by the press and radio broadcasts, were attracting enormous attention, this scientific trio had their moment of greatest ignominy, called “the 1948 great fiasco,” when they predicted that Republican Thomas Dewey would defeat Democrat Harry Truman. Of course, during the first years of electoral polling, there was a continual criticism of errors in the forecasts about regional and local elections outcomes, sampling arrangements, and wordings of separate questions, but such a resounding failure was completely unexpected.

The trio did not accept that there were any fundamental shortcomings in the measuring instrument they invented, or that such a failure denied the importance and the necessity of studying public opinion. Gallup was sure that the problem was not in the eventually-inappropriate sampling procedure, but in the early discontinuation of polling three weeks before Election Day. This was due to the mistaken belief that nothing much changes in the last few weeks of the political campaign. The subsequent methodological studies of the public opinion polls pioneers aimed at overcoming critical remarks that can be disaggregated into three groups: “addressed, first, towards the wording of the questions and the selection of the words, second, towards the size of the used samples and their structure, and, third, towards the existence of the very possibility to reveal public opinion.” These studies helped the new surveys’ methodology pass successfully the toughest tests of the subsequent decades. This success allowed public opinion polls to gradually become an integral part of the political system and everyday social life, not only in the United States, but also in other countries, including Russia.

The reader may quite rightly ask why he has to wade through such a long preface to the review of the book that seems to be quite simple and, indeed, is easy to read, which does not diminish its undeniable merits. The answer is evident: today, at least in Russia,

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2. Ibid.: 148
none other than the sociologists themselves turned out to be the most stringent and tough critics of public opinion surveys. This situation is deeply depressing for two reasons. First, both theoretically- and empirically-oriented sociologists critically assess the state of the public opinion polls industry. The “theorists” question the sociological affiliation of the polls in wondering why everybody thinks that asking 1,200–1,500 respondents in different places across the country specific questions at a specific time should automatically make one a sociologist even if adequate, reliable and useful data is provided for political and marketing purposes. The “methodologists” argue about the structure and status of the sociological knowledge, focus on the reliability of the data, and criticize quantitative research practices for being “artifactual” and “a sly game of numbers.” The “empiricists” doubt the objectivity, reliability, and scientific independence of the public opinion polls, and refer to the recurring failures of the electoral forecasts, to the strange and exotic (because of its enormous price and unrealistic terms) government tenders seeking information through sociological studies, and to the fact that today any public authority, businessman, or individual possessing enough financial resources is able to make a sample, to construct a questionnaire, to conduct a survey, and to present the entire palette of “necessary” data distributions, that is, happens to be a “sociologist.” Secondly, the politicians unexpectedly became the main advocates of public opinion surveys, which allows them to impudently manipulate the data to convince the population of the correctness of the decisions proposed, or already implemented. For example, take the infamous “Crimean survey” and the media buzz around Vladimir Putin’s mentioning it as the proof of the unprecedented public support of the Russian Federation’s political decision to make the Crimea a part of Russia.

Sociologists accept the challenges mentioned, but, unfortunately, generally prefer to confront methodological, technical and reputational attacks by attempts to solve two basic problems of public opinion polls. These problems are (1) measurement errors “caused” by the “tools” of the survey (questionnaire design, structure and content, interviewers and supervisors work, too formal perception of communicational features, etc.), and (2) representational biases due to the discrepancies between the projected and the actual sampling. As a result, we are drawing in an endless sea of data collected over decades of empirical research, gathered in thousands of archival documents and databases, reflecting all possible aspects of public opinion. However, we are still not interested in the interpretation of the information treasure that the generations of Russian sociologists have obtained, or turn to it for illustrative rather than analytical purposes. It does not really matter how we describe the situation, whether as an epistemological paradox of the exponential growth of the social data and the proportional reduction of its explanatory potential, or as an information explosion causing the situation where sociologists lag behind

the sociology. The crux of the problem does not change: we ignore both the explanatory and predictive capabilities of the survey data, because we are too focused on achieving the “right” data, rather than analyzing and interpreting the existing set.

Therefore, the book *The Next America* by Paul Taylor completely falls outside of the general (at least Russian) critical sociological trend. It does not contain a single mention of the survey problems related to the sampling procedures, questionnaire design, or other issues of obtaining valid sociological data through public opinion polls. The book focuses exclusively on the predictive capabilities and limits of forecasts based on the representative national surveys conducted mainly by the Pew Research Center. The author emphasizes that such predictive capabilities depends not only on the data itself. It also depends on its right contextualization with the results of other research projects, and expert opinions provided by politicians, journalists, and scientists representing different disciplinary fields. To put it more precisely, there are two key themes in the book: first, the current state of the American society “measured” by public opinion polls, and examined primarily through the generational prism, and second, the future of the American society as predicted by national surveys. The data on both topics is contextualized by a wide variety of non-sociological and non-surveys-gathered information. Furthermore, an interested Russian reader can discover a third tacitly-assumed theme in the text, being the collapse of his favorite stereotypes about American society (provided that he had such).

Let us begin with the first thematic line of the book. It should be noted that the two thematic lines are identified by the reviewer and closely intertwined in the author’s narrative. Actually, the book consists of twelve chapters typical for such editions: on generations, generational gaps, financial problems, digital competence disparities between

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6. Pew Research Center opened a decade ago, and Paul Taylor has served as its executive vice president overseeing the Social & Demographic Trends project, the Hispanic Trends project, and various center-wide research initiatives. Before that, he was a newspaper reporter for twenty-five years, the last fourteen at the Washington Post, where he covered three U.S. presidential campaigns. The Pew Research Center staff consists of public opinion survey researchers, political scientists, demographers, economists, sociologists, and ex-reporters.

7. There are following generations in the contemporary American society: the Greatest Generation refers to those born before 1928; the Silent Generation, those born from 1928 to 1945 (the Silents are the oldest, most financially secure and most unsettled by the ongoing social changes, conservative and conformist, uneasy with the pace of demographic, cultural, and technological change); the Baby Boom Generation, those born from 1946 to 1964 (the Boomers will be crashing through the gates of old age in record numbers for the next two decades, not nearly as well financially fortified for the journey as they had hoped, giving reasons why they are gloomy about their lives, worried about retirement, and wondering why they are not young any more); Generation X, those born from 1965 to 1980 (the Xers are navigating middle age with mounting economic anxieties about their old age, are savvy, entrepreneurial loners, distrustful of social institutions); the Millennial Generation, those adults born after 1980, the youngest members of the generation still being in their teens (the Millennials are twenty-somethings and a lot of them landed back in their childhood homes in record numbers pushed out by the hostile economy; they are empowered by digital technology, coddled by parents, respectful of elders, slow to reach adulthood, conflict-averse, and at ease with racial, ethnic, and sexual diversity); there is still no chronological point for their successor generation. Boomers (76 millions) and Millennials (80 millions) are the biggest of the four living generations, each significantly larger than the generation that came before (Silents and Xers, respectively).
different age groups, the aging problems, etc. The preface lays the beginning for the first thematic line of the book when the author states that the America of his childhood “with its expanding middle class, secure jobs, intact nuclear families, devout believers, distinct gender roles, polite politics, consensus-building media” is nothing like the country his year-old granddaughter will inherit. He writes that nowadays, “political, social, and religious institutions are weaker, middle class smaller, cultural norms looser, public debate coarser, technologies faster, immigrant-woven tapestry richer, racial, ethnic, religious, and gender identities more ambiguous, the society more polarized and more tolerant” (p. vii).

Hereinafter, referring (a) to the great number of tabulated and charted data gathered by different researchers; (b) to the opinions of scholars, academics, and journalists, whose names appear throughout the book in citations, quotes, and footnotes; (c) to the interview of Natalie Marks (a pseudonym), the young woman whose digital coming-of-age story gave some chapters a narrative arc; (d) to the well-known facts (for example, that longer life spans and improving living standards beget lower birthrates); and (e) to the quite unexpected conclusions (for example, that Japan has become the global leader in the development and manufacture of caretaker robots since, and that by 2050, there will not be nearly enough young caregivers for the aged in the country), the author consistently examines in what way each of the basic elements of the contemporary American society has already transformed, and in what direction some important changes are still unfolding.

The first main idea of the book is that there changes no one pays attention to (though should) until he (or society as a whole) takes a hard look around at itself and notices that things are different. The most striking example of rare and revealing “aha” moments are demographic transformations, because they are “dramas in slow motion, unfold incrementally, almost imperceptibly, tick by tock, without trumpets of press conferences” (p. 1). Such an “aha” moment occurred in America on November 6, 2012, the night of President Barack Obama’s reelection victory. His victory revealed the meaning of the demography for the politics, and convinced politicians that the United States turned to be a country with a permanently high-turnout of blacks, Latinos⁸, and young people. If it were otherwise (a country of a high turnout of whites, men, and older people), Mitt Romney would have won by millions of votes. Thus, if any political party wishes to be competitive in future presidential elections, it needs to become more appealing to the nation’s newly most racially and ethnically diverse electorate. The second main idea of the book is that we need a generational frame to illuminate the demographic, economic, social, cultural, and technological changes in the remaking of not only national politics, but also of families, livelihoods, relationships, and identities, that is, the everyday life of Americans. These shifts have left no realm of American society untouched.

What are the key reasons that made American society more unequal, more diverse, more mixed-race, more digitally-linked, more tolerant, less-married, less fertile, less re-

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⁸ The terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are used in the book interchangeably, because Hispanics can be of any race.
ligious, less mobile, and less confident, its political and social institutions and the public itself more polarized and partisan, and its economy producing more low- and high-wage jobs with fewer opportunities in between? As a result, the middle class is shrinking, median household income has flattened, the wealth gaps between the rich and the poor, the young and the old, the whites and the blacks have widened to the levels never before seen in modern times. Let us start with the gender “dimension” of the ongoing changes. It is not limited to the fact that “the sex-without attachment rules apply equally to young men and women and leave both genders emotionally shortchanged” (p. 20). Women have become more economically independent, and gender roles are converging both at work and at home, which contributes to the further decline of marriage. The fastest-growing household type in America contains just one person (nearly 3 in 10 households today contain just one person, double the share in 1960). An American teenager has less chance of being raised by both biological parents than anywhere else in the world. Women have become the sole or primary breadwinners in 4 in 10 households with children (a half century ago, it was 1 in 40); a majority of these “breadwinner moms” are unmarried, and 37% of wives earn more than their husbands. According to a Pew Research poll in 2011, 66% of young women (59% of young men) were sure that being successful in a high-paying career or profession was a very important life priority. In the same year, the share of the male labor force declined to 53% (it was 62% in 1970), and that of women increased to 47% (from 38% in 1970). This reversal of traditional gender expectations has become possible also because the public overwhelmingly supports the trend toward more women in the workforce, and more egalitarian marriages, where both spouses are trying to balance work and family. Nonetheless, many traditional gender norms still endure, at least declaratively. For example, in 2013, about half of respondents believed that children were better off if the mother stayed at home, with just 8% saying the same if the father stayed at home.

According to Pew Research data, existing economic and financial hardships (“the wretched economy”) bring families together. The second fastest-growing household type in America are multigenerational households, in which two or more adult generations live together, often because that is the only way to make ends meet. Forty per cent of all Millennial men ages 18 to 31, and 32% of young women of that age, were living in their parents’ homes in 2012. This is the highest share in modern history that symbolizes either post-adolescence or pre-adulthood (delayed adulthood) (p. 19). This fact, by the way, contradicts the Russian stereotype that American society is made of only nuclear families consisting of parents and minor children. Even when multiple generations do not live in the same home, they look after one another in other ways. Adults provide various forms of caregiving to elderly parents, well-to-do seniors provide financial assistance to

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9. The book is so full of data that it is not possible to summarize all the trends thoroughly described in it.
10. For more details see, for example, Klinenberg E. (2013) Going Solo: The Extraordinary Rise and Surprising Appeal of Living Alone, London: Penguin Books. However, such “post-familialism” or “new singleism” is a global phenomenon, having taken root not just in the U.S., but in Canada and the wealthy countries of Europe and East Asia due to the urbanization, secularism, women’s economic empowerment, and higher standards of living.
adult children buying homes or to grandchildren going to college, grandparents contribute their time in caring for their grandchildren, and the biggest intergenerational family transfer is inheritance.

Secondly, a perceived Russian stereotype is that the basis of the American society is a strong and huge middle class. However, the American middle class has suffered its worst economic run since the Great Depression. It has decreased in size, has fallen backward in income and wealth, and has shed some of its characteristic faith in the future. Approximately 85% of Americans believe it has become tougher to live a middle-class lifestyle than it was a decade ago. Nevertheless, most middle-class Americans believe that they have a better standard of living than their parents at the same age, that their children will do even better than they did. This demonstrates the trademark optimism of the American middle class, albeit not as well-founded as it used to be. The third Russian stereotype is that the U.S. is a land of great and equal opportunities, “but today a child born into poverty in Canada and most Western European countries has a statistically better chance of making it to the top these days than does a poor kid in the U.S.” (p. 9).

Today, “young adults are taking longer to grow up; the middle-aged longer to grow old; and the elderly longer to depart this vale of tears” (p. 4). Taylor writes that “The Millennials’ (twenty-somethings’) two seemingly incompatible characteristics—their slow walk to adulthood and their unshaken confidence in the future (they are America’s most stubborn optimists and humankind’s first generation of digital natives believing that the whole world wants to see your funny cat photos)—are their most distinctive traits” (p. 20). Pessimists believe that the reason for the slow walk to adulthood is the unemployment crisis, which is partly true, because as Millennials are entering the workforce, Boomers are entering retirement. However, hard times and bad choices lead to the juxtaposition that some of the jobs Boomers are not leaving are the same jobs Millennials are not getting. Boomers seem to have experienced less happiness on average than have other generations over the entire life spans. There are two reasons for this; first, the very size of their cohort has led to a lifetime of stressful intragenerational competition for a limited share of top spots in schools, colleges, and careers, and secondly, they are having trouble getting their minds around the idea that they are not young anymore. As a result, Millennials are the most “dependent” generation for “their futures will be enhanced or encumbered by choices their elders are making now” (p. 28).

The author asserts the existence of an unusually large generation gap in American society today. He admits that generation gaps are hardly a novelty, and refers to the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, that in America, “each generation is a new people” (p. 30), but today demographically, politically, economically, socially, and technologically, generations are more different from each other than at any time in living memory. They have a different racial and ethnic makeup (nearly half of all chil-

11. Taylor is very careful within the generational analysis frame: he acknowledges that there are as many different personality types within a generation as across generations, but generational generalizations do have some value, because people bear the marks of their distinctive coming-of-age experiences providing them unique generational identities.
The U.S. public opinion, in the aggregate, has changed dramatically in two ways. On the one hand, biases against minorities and gays are diminishing, especially among younger generations. For example, a half of adults support same-sex marriage, with a considerable generation gap with about 70% of young Americans and 30% of older citizens supporting its legalization. On the other hand, there is a growing tendency of people to sort themselves into political parties based on their ideological differences. Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats have always had different opinions, but the problem is that these days they also seem to have different facts. Perception gaps have increased, because politicians spend too much time “in today’s version of Plato’s cave, trading their “facts” back and forth in a media-saturated echo chamber of think-alike colleagues, readers, tweeters, and viewers” (p. 15).

Taylor also writes that “Immigration is the engine that makes and remakes America . . . and today the engine is roaring again to reengineer the compact between the generations. . . . Immigrants are strivers. They have energy, ingenuity, a tolerance for risk, an appetite for hard work, and a faith in the future. Few if any countries have been more enriched by immigrants. And not many countries are better at weaving them into the social, political, and economic fabric of their new home. . . . Even so, Americans don’t typically welcome newcomers with arms fully extended, especially not when they arrive in large numbers” (p. 69). Today’s America is home to a record 42 million immigrants and 37 million US-born children of immigrants. Today’s immigrants (9 of 10 are not Europeans) look very different from the previous waves of settlers and immigrants who created America. However, it is difficult to find more fervent devotees of the traditional American values (we are not talking about being more law-abiding than other Americans, because immigrants know any brush with the law could result in deportation). Hispanics and Asians, on the one hand, embrace values common to immigrant groups (hardworking, family-oriented, entrepreneurial, and freedom loving) that could easily make them natural Republicans but did not. They favor an active government, and tend to be social

12. The terms “first generation,” “foreign born” and “immigrant” are used in the book interchangeably.
liberals. Moreover, “the deeper Hispanics and Asian Americans and their adult children have sunk their roots into America, the more Democratic they have become” (p. 84). The immigrants are also the face of the country to the world, since “their life stories embody the values the nation holds most dear: pluralism, dynamism, tolerance, entrepreneurship, achievement, optimism” (p. 87).

Nevertheless, the problem is that older generations are predominantly white, and younger generations increasingly nonwhite, which results in “different political philosophies, social views, and policy preferences” (p. 5). The young are big government liberals, the least religiously-connected in modern American history, comfortable with the new lifestyles, family forms, and technologies that disorient most of the old. The young start their working and taxpaying lives in the worst economy since the Great Depression. The old are small-government conservatives, the most devout believers in the industrialized world. They are finishing their retirement years costing trillions of dollars to the governmental Social Security and Medicare systems that their children and grandchildren will spend their lives paying off.

The modern immigration wave has not only boosted the American economy, but has given the country a racial makeover, made it multicolored, and changed old racial labels that are having trouble keeping up with the new marriage trends. In more than a quarter of all recent Hispanic and Asian marriages, 1 in 6 black, and 1 in 11 white newlyweds are married to someone of a different race or ethnicity; “not too long ago these marriages were illegal and taboo, now they barely raise an eyebrow” (p. 7). Thus, race is becoming more subtle and shaded, and forces society to find a modern vocabulary for accurate racial identification markers, since the existing labels, categories, and classification schemes have not kept up with the ongoing wedding, birth, and identification choices. For example, responses to the question of what Barack Obama is racially depends on the wording, the context, and whom you ask; most blacks call him black, while most whites say he is of mixed race.

The author concludes that the American twentieth-century metaphor of the “melting pot” has turned into the metaphor of a “mosaic” in a more racially and ethnically diverse nation to reflect the differences in the assimilation processes. Today, “every piece contributes to a whole, but not by losing its distinctiveness” (p. 74). However, America has not become “a postracial society,” although “there are fewer out-and-out bigots and the new racial landscape is increasingly bursting with nuance, shadings, subtleties, possibilities, ironies” (p. 96). There are still significant gaps between blacks and whites in household income and wealth, high school completion, life expectancy, and unemployment rate. Black men are six times as likely as white men to be incarcerated. Most of the racial gaps between blacks and whites in key personal finance indicators widened during the 2007–2009 recession and have since remained at these elevated levels. However, reality is one thing, perception another; “most blacks joined with most whites in saying that the two racial groups have grown more alike in the past decade, both in their standards of living and their core values” (p. 105).
Race is not the only changing demographic characteristic. Another is religion. It is not just that the American public is becoming less white and less Protestant. American society is also becoming less attached to religious denomination in general. Nowadays, 1 in 5 American adults and a third under the age of 30 is religiously unaffiliated; three quarters of the so-called “nones” believe in God, but have no religious affiliation. Approximately three-quarters of now-unaffiliated adults were raised with an affiliation (74%). The author, referring to the Pew Research surveys, lays to rest some common misperceptions about the “nones,” and shows that (1) disaffiliation has taken place across different demographic groups, regardless of sex, education, income, or place of residence, although the recent change has been concentrated in one racial group, that is of white Americans; (2) the unaffiliated are not uniformly secular, since most of them believe in God; (3) nor are the “nones” uniformly hostile toward organized religion, although they are much more likely than the public overall to say that churches and other religious organizations are too concerned with money, power, rules, and politics. Nevertheless, despite the disaffiliation trends, the U.S. remains a highly religious country and is still the most religiously observant nation among the world’s great powers. However, American youngsters lead the society in being more pluralistic and less connected to traditional religious institutions.

The second thematic line of the book is inspired by the belief of the author expressed in the preface that “Change is the constant. No matter what we’re like today, we’re going to be different tomorrow” (p. vii). The author does not criticize or endorse the changes, because “some are for the better, some for the worse, and some people no doubt will differ over which is which, but most are mutually reinforcing” (p. 4). He rather seeks to predict the results of the ongoing changes, for while it is interesting and inevitable to live in a constantly changing world, we feel depressed and confused if we do not understand the general direction and possible consequences of changes for ourselves, and society as a whole. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nonwhites will become the majority of the population in 2043. The share of whites has declined from 85% in 1960 to 64% in 2010, and projected to become 43% in 2060. However, their place will not be taken by blacks or Chinese, as most Russians would think, referring to Hollywood blockbusters or common national stereotypes about America. The share of blacks and Asians\(^\text{13}\) is projected to change slightly (from 12% in 2010 to 13% in 2060 for blacks, and from 5% to 8% for Asians), while the share of Hispanics will increase from 16% to 31%. By 2050, an estimated 162 million Americans (37% of the population) will be “immigrant stock” (immigrants themselves or their US-born children). This would be the highest percentage in the U.S. history. We witness that men and women “navigate a brave new world of gender convergence,” which supports the decline of traditional marriage, but it is not clear yet how well the institution of marriage will survive, and in precisely what forms; “No one knows what the future holds, but it’s clear that the ever-changing digital landscape is likely to keep generation gaps quite wide for the foreseeable future and may even change the very nature of what it means to be human and to grow old” (p. 156).

\(^{13}\) Asians also include Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders.
The author believes that his work should not be taken as “a gloom-and-doom book,” though it portrays the American society as tugged at by centrifugal forces, and its two basic institutions, the government and the family, shaken to their cores. In addition, the book describes the preconditions for “a generation war,” “the unsparing arithmetic of a graying population is about to force political leaders to rewrite the social contract between young and old. This will lead to tax increases, benefit cuts, or both. Taking stuff away from people is never popular in a democracy, but it’s particularly fraught on this issue at this time, because old and young in America are so different—racially, ethnically, politically” (p. 45). Nevertheless, the author believes the book provides too many “findings that give voice to the optimism, pragmatism, and resilience of the American public, even in the teeth of dysfunctional politics, rising inequality, frayed families, and anemic labor markets” (p. 15). There is much evidence to be optimistic. The generations are interdependent in their family lives; the young are every bit as supportive as the old and have a great respect for their elders, and “seem much more disposed toward cooperation than conflict, perhaps because of the nurturing parental norms that guided their upbringing” (p. 46). Thus, “America isn’t breaking apart at the seams. The American dream isn’t dying. . . . The nation faces huge challenges, no doubt. So do the rest of the world’s aging superpowers. If you had to pick a nation with the right staff to ride out of the coming demographic storm, you’d be crazy not to choose America” (p. 15). As a result, one must admit that this is a very optimistic (but not blinkered optimism), life-affirming, and convincing statement, thoroughly well-founded in the book by the survey data and thoughtful generalizations (even though just small parts of both are presented in the review, and in a quite incomplete way).

The book is remarkably concise and surprisingly informative, with the preface possesses both features. For this reason, the general conclusion of the book is already given, with the following text aiming to confirm it. In exploring the many ways America is transforming, the author raises the question of the generational responsibility within the ongoing, unprecedented changes that produce longer life spans and the difficulties of getting old, lower birth rates, and the difficulties of finding the road map to adulthood, because “the generations relate to one another not only as citizens, voters and interest groups, but as parents, children, and caregivers in an era when the family itself is one of the institutions most buffeted by change” (p. vii–viii). The new demographics of aging means that the future American society will not be able to pay those costs and thus unable to fulfill the promises made to the older generations without bankrupting the young and starving the future. This situation may set off a generation war, although this is not a foregone conclusion, for “the drama doesn’t have to end in tragedy if the generations bring to the public square the same genius for interdependence they bring to their family lives” (p. 5).

The author confesses, that as a political reporter years ago, he used to have a weakness for trying to forecast election outcomes, but now does not presume to know how the story he tells will end. He ventures to describe only the current state of affairs and a future which anyone can figure out if demographics and public opinion polls data are carefully
studied. The author wants to be just “a tour guide who explains how the nation got from the middle of the last century to the present and to provide some insights about what this breathtaking journey tells us about changes yet to come” (p. viii). I must admit the author is an excellent guide and succeeded amazingly well with the task he has set himself to. What a pity that, so far, none of the Russian sociologists have dared to play the same role. However, let us hope that is still ahead.

Пределы прогностических возможностей общенацональных опросов общественного мнения, или Возможное будущее Америки

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